FrogMaintenanceManualver15 2

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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER DATE: 20.10.06

GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL
Page 1 of 1
PARTIAL REVISION NOTICE
Note: This Notice should be attached in front of the index in the respective manual
General Technical Manual Revision 18.2
Client Technical Manual Revision 15.2
Date 20.09.06
Pages revised 3.52 Lifejacket recommendations

New section
3.53 Night time operations
New section
4.1 Inspection and maintenance procedures
Added note on replacement of slings
4.3 Six monthly inspection
“Visual Inspection” terminology changed to be consistent
4.4 Annual inspection and repairs
Updated recommendations for replacement of slings and standard
replacement parts. Updated definitions of the ‘degrees of usage’
6.02 EC Type examination certificate

New section
Reason for revision 3.52 and 3.53 are additional guidance notes.
4.1, 4.3, and 4.4 are a rationalisation of the maintenance
procedures.
6.02 Requested for sales purposes to client complete certification

set
Safety impact 4.4 A reduced period between replacement of Lifting components
(for low usage units) is not considered to increase risk because (i)
the cyclical loading on the Frog unit is low and (ii) the components
are visually inspected annually for signs of damage.
Operational impact None
Commercial impact None
Building/ QA/QC None

impact
Compiled by: Andrew Grimes Authorised by: Sandy Watson
Reflex Marine Ltd.

Website: www.reflexmarine.com • Email: info@reflexmarine.com
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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER DATE: 20.07.05

Page 1 of 1
PARTIAL REVISION NOTICE
Note: This Notice should be attached in front of the index in the respective manual
General Technical Manual Revision 18.1
Client Technical Manual Revision 15.1
Date 05.10.05
Pages revised 2.5 Parts List revised to 13.1

Addition of the following auxiliary items;
1. F-01-150 Frog Trolley
2. F-01-250 ATEX Strobe Light
3. F-01-251 Strobe Mounting Clip
Material Change to the following item
4. F-01-221 M12 x 130 Hex head bolt
Reason for revision 1. Trolley missing from previous revision.

2. & 3. Strobe and mounting clip are new auxiliary items.
4. M12 x 130 bolt material spec incorrect in previous issue.
Safety impact None
Operational impact None
Commercial impact None
Building/ QA/QC Revise QA Plan to 18.1

impact
Compiled by: Authorised by:

Reflex Marine Ltd.
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Copyrighted as an unpublished work
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
! COPYRIGHT 2002 by Reflex Marine Limited
This work contains the CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY INFORMATION of

Reflex Marine Limited. Neither this document nor any information disclosed herein
shall be reproduced in any form, used, or disclosed to others for any purpose
including manufacturing without the prior express written permission of Reflex
Marine Limited.
Produced in the United Kingdom

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COPY NO:
FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER
REVISION: 15
DATE: 20.07.05
CLIENT TECHNICAL MANUAL INDEX Page 1 of 2
* - Section Updated
SECTION DESCRIPTION REV
1.00 Document Revision & Control 3*
2.00 Technical Specification

2.10 General description 2
2.20 Specification summary 5*
2.30 Product identification 3*
2.35 Product Labelling 6*
2.36 Stretcher Fitting Diagram 1
2.37 Seating Diagram 2
2.38 Safety Stickers 1
2.50 Parts list & material specification 13*
2.61 Load Test Procedure 2
2.65 Variations - Subzero unit specification 5*
2.80 Certification/ documentation requirements 4
2.90 Shipping and Storage 3
- FS-GA1 Frog Plan and Section Diagram A
- F-ASY-DF Deck fastening Diagram 0
3.00 Operating Procedures

3.10 Background 1
3.20 Operating Envelope 5*
3.30 Pre-Transfer Planning 0
3.40 Transfer Log 2
3.50 Operating Instructions 6*
3.51 Stretcher Fitting Procedures 1
- FS-GA4 Buoyancy Assembly 0
3.60 Crane Operator Guidance 5*
3.70 Tag Lines 0
3.80 Luggage Storage 0
3.81 Fitting Weather proof cover 0
4.00 Inspection & Maintenance Procedures

4.10 General introduction 0
4.20 Inspection prior to use 2
4.30 Six monthly inspection 5*
4.40 Annual inspection 9*
- F-ASY-12 Annual replacement parts (keel nut fine thread type) C*
- F-ASY-12-M40 Annual replacement parts (keel nut fine, low temp) B*
- F-ASY-15 Annual replacement parts (keel nut course thread type) B*
- F-ASY-18 Annual replacement parts (keel bolt type) A*
- ASY-18-M40 Annual replacement parts (keel bolt, low temp type) A*
Reflex Marine Ltd.

Website: www.reflexmarine.com• Email: info@reflexmarine.com
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COPY NO:
FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER
REVISION: 15
DATE: 20.07.05
CLIENT TECHNICAL MANUAL INDEX Page 2 of 2
* - Section Updated
SECTION DESCRIPTION REV
4.50 Inspection after repairs 0

4.60 Inspection Diagrams 2*
- FS-GA2 Main Support Tube Assembly A*
- FS-GA3-0 Seating Harness Assembly (Earlier design) 0
- FS-GA3-A Seating Harness Assembly (Later design) A*
- FS-GA4 Buoyancy Assembly 0
- F-ASY-11 Sling Antifouling Assembly (type 1) A
- F-ASY-17 Sling Antifouling Assembly (type 2) A*
5.00 Client Specific Modifications
6.00 Design Verification

6.01 Declaration of Conformity 2*
6.05 Manufacturers Risk Assessment 2
6.10 Legislative and Industry Standards 0
6.20 Independent Design Review 0
6.22 MIRA Review 0
6.25 Independent Risk Analysis 0
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER REVISION: 3
GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL DATE: 17.03.05
SUBJECT: 1.0 - DOCUMENT REVISION AND CONTROL Page 1 of 2
1. Aim
To ensure that all changes to any of the documents contained in this manual are
carried out and distributed in a controlled and authorised manner.
2. Control
Any proposed change in documentation must be submitted to the Technical

Director in writing for his authorisation. This not only refers to changes in
drawings, but also to all documents contained in this manual.
A record must be maintained of all documentation changes.
A list of all revisions and amendments shall be included in each controlled copy of
this General Technical Manual.
A record will be kept of the Frog client list in order that each client can be sent
revisions to the Client Technical Manual.
The owner will return a document transmittal for controlled manual and updates to
Reflex Marine.
The control, revision and distribution of this and the Client Technical Manual will
be the responsibility of the Technical Director.
3. EC type examination certificate
Reflex Marine will ensure that the equipment and operating instructions remains
in conformity with the EC Machinery directive.
As per the Machinery directive, Reflex Marine will submit a copy of the technical
file to EC type examination body for review when changes are made to the
technical file. The EC type examination body may then issue an updated
examination certificate where deemed necessary.
4. Partial Revision
To simplify control of minor changes to the manual a partial revision procedure

has been added.
Where previously one minor change would constitute a full revision complete
with hard copy issue of manual index, revision list; partial revision may be
controlled by electronic distribution of updated sections.
Compiled by: Carol Richards Authorised by:
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 1.0 - DOCUMENT REVISION AND CONTROL Page 2 of 2
The partial revision will be issued with a covering note, containing revision
number, which will be inserted into the manual index by the owner. The owner
will attach updated sections to associated section in manual.
Full revision are indicated by updating the manual to a whole integer i.e. revision
10, partial revision refers to decimal revisions i.e. revision 10.1.
5. Web Site
The Client Technical Manual will be made available in Portable Document

Format on a web site www.reflexmarine.com/ctm
The Manual will be available as an entire document, as a revision to the previous

release, or in Norwegian translation.
The web site will not be linked from the main Reflex Marine web site, and will
only be found by persons who are informed of its existence.
Compiled by: Carol Richards Authorised by:
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.1 - GENERAL DESCRIPTION Page 1 of 1
There is currently one Model of the Frog in Production: -
! Model FS-01 (3 man seated convertible to 1 man seated plus 1 stretcher)
The FROG comprises two main assemblies. Firstly, the stainless steel outer
framework containing foam filled polyethylene buoyancy panels and, secondly, a
spring-dampened seating assembly mounted on a central column.
The outer framework protects passengers from impacts and contains the buoyant
blocks that ensure the FROG floats and is self-righting in water. At its base is a keel
weight that assists in rapid self- righting.
The outer shell lands on three tripod feet, which provide shock absorption and ensure
that the FROG is stable on uneven surfaces or when landing on a heaving vessel. The
outer shell has three large open accesses that allow rapid unimpeded exit.
During transit passengers are secured in full bucket seats, with full harnesses to
protect them against whiplash and falling. The seats are mounted on a sprung carriage
to provide protection against heavy landings. The sling assembly is designed to
prevent rotation.
All materials have been selected specifically to minimise corrosion in the marine
environment.
CE Marking
This manual makes reference to CE marking of the FROG, however not all Frogs are
supplied with CE marking. The FROG units with the CE declaration of conformity
are identified with a CE marking plate. For non-CE marked units please disregard all
references to CE marking in this manual.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.2 - SPECIFICATION SUMMARY Page 1 of 2
1. Specification Summary - FS-01 (stretcher version)
Pay Load:
- 3 x 90kg persons seated plus 20 kg luggage per person.
- or: 1 person seated plus 1 in a stretcher.
- or: 330 kg of freight (evenly distributed).
Dimensions:
- Nominal Width 1 2.50m
- Nominal Width 2 2.20m
- Nominal Height 2.90m
Tare Weight:
- 485 kg
Verification:
- EC type examination by DNV Norway
- Design reviewed by independent certifying authority Bureau Veritas.
- Manufactured to ISO 9002.
Materials:
- Outer framework - All 316 and A4 Stainless Steel
- Buoyancy - Polyurethane Foam filled Polyethylene Tanks
Impact Behaviour:
- The Seats are suspended on a damping spring designed to protect passengers
from impacts up to 4m/s. This has been verified in full impact testing.
- The capsule is also highly resistant to lateral impact designed to withstand
2m/s impact. Also verified in full scale impact testing.
Other Features:
- Full height bucket seats
- Quick release seat harness buckle
- Four-point harness protects against whiplash
- Grab Handles
- Stretcher protective frame and support base.
- Secondary Back-up slinging
- Angle of Stability – 35 degrees (1-3 passengers)
Options:
- Low Temperature unit, certified to -40 degrees C.
- Weather proof storage cover
- Luggage stowage box and nets
- Tool Kit
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.2 - SPECIFICATION SUMMARY Page 2 of 2
Options continued:
- Skid Trolley for moving Frog without crane
- Locator strobe light to assist crane driver (Note: Strobe is not certified for use
in hazardous areas)
- Service contract for Annual Inspections and Repairs
- Onshore and Offshore Training available
National Technical Standards:

- UK, BS449: Part2:1969: The use of Structural Steel in Building
- UK, BS2830:1994: Suspended Chairs and Cradles for the use in the
Construction
Industry European Standards:

- EC Machinery Directive
- EN 1050, EN292 Parts 1 & 2
- Load Test – ILO152/ LOLER
National Regulations:
- UK, PUWER/ LOLER
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.3 - PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION Page 1 of 2
1. Product ID Numbers
There is currently three versions, the model numbers are as follows :-
! FS-01 Standard 3 man version with the facility to carry a stretcher

! FS-01-M40 Certified for use down to –40 degrees Celsius.
! FS-AU Specification modified to meet Australian Standard
The model number for each FROG will be stamped on a plate, which is attached to
each FROG.
2. Part Numbers
In the drawing / part numbering system, each drawing or part is assigned a three part
number as shown below :-
A B C
Part no. F 01 001
Part “A" Refers to the product type or name and consists of 1 letter.
! an ‘F’ prefix are for frog unit
Part “B" Refers to the “mark” of each particular product type.
" “01” refers to FS-01 –standard model

" “AU” refers to Australian Specification parts
Part “C" Refers to the ‘actual part’ and provides a unique part number.
3. Frog Serial Numbering
Every FROG built will be assigned a build serial number. These serial numbers will
be allocated sequentially in the order in which they are built.
For Model FS the serial numbers will start from FS 001, and continue FS 002, FS 003
etc.
The serial number for each FROG will be stamped on a plate, which is attached to
each FROG.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

Website:www.reflexmarine.com • Email: info@reflexmarine.com
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SUBJECT: 2.3 - PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION Page 2 of 2
4. Component Serial Numbers
Where material grades and material traceability is deemed to be safety critical these
components will require unique component numbers - where appropriate these will be
allocated by Reflex Marine and Stamped or etched as required.
Components that require unique identification are referenced in the Parts list section
in this manual.
The serial system will be compiled as follows :-
Frog unit number

Serial no = Part number Mill certificate number
(where applicable)
For M16 bolts, where etching is impractical, batches of bolts will be colour coded and
a note added to the mill certificate to identify the colour coded bolts with a particular
mill certificate.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

Website:www.reflexmarine.com • Email: info@reflexmarine.com
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SUBJECT: 2.35 - PRODUCT LABELLING/ NOTICES Page 1 of 4
1. Essential requirement as per EU machinery directive
Frog should be indelibly marked with the following information. (See drawing
number F-01-110 for template).
i. CE Mark.
ii. Description of Equipment.
iii. Model.
iv. Serial Number.
v. Manufacturers Address.
vi. Year of construction.
vii. Mass of usual configuration/ Mass without Payload (Tare weight).
viii. Safe Working Load (SWL).
ix. Maximum Gross Mass (MGM).
x. Maximum number of Passengers
fig1. CE Marking Plate for Frog.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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2. Decal - Vinyl stickers located on outside of buoyancy units (see fig 2.)
Note: MDPE Buoyancy requires preparation of surface for good contact adhesion.
Gently heat the contact area until the surface is oxidised and appears shiny.
i. 3 off per Frog. Circular Frog logo. – 250 dia.

ii. 3 off per Frog Rectangle Reflex Marine Logo. 250x125.
iii. 2 off per Frog. Rectangle Reflex Marine URL - "www.reflexmarine.com".
250x100.
iv. 1off per Frog. Rectangle Reflex Marine tel. no- "+44 (0)1224 209200".
250x100.
v. Buoyancy columns numbered "A,B,C" Arial bold 150mm height, black
(See F-ASY-01) - Stretcher seat column marked "A" and "B"&"C" clockwise.
vi. 9 off per Frog. Retroflective Tape. (2x 110mm lengths on lower and 1 x 220
mm on upper buoyancy)
3. Decal - Vinyl stickers located inside of LOWER buoyancy units (see fig 2.)
Gently heat the contact area until the surface is oxidised and appears shiny
i. Buoyancy columns numbered "A,B,C" Arial bold 150mm height, black

(See F-ASY-01) - Stretcher seat column marked "A" and "B"&"C" clockwise.
ii. 2 off per Frog - Notice "FIX LOWER BUOYANCY UNIT B & C TO
OUTSIDE OF FRAME FOR STRETCHER TRANSFERS. (FITTINGS
PLACED FROM OUTSIDE)"
iii. 6 off per Frog - “NO HAND HOLD” sticker at Upper/ Lower buoyancy
interface. One at each end of lower buoyancy block.
4. Operating Instructions - located inside of UPPER buoyancy units (see fig 2.)
Gently heat the contact area until the surface is oxidised and appears shiny
i. Operating Instructions, see section 3.5 (2 pages)

ii. Seat change-out plan, see section 2.37 (1 page)
iii. Stretcher change-out section, see section 2.36 (1 page)
iv. 2 off per Frog. SWL Rating "THIS UNIT IS SUITABLE FOR 3 MAN
SEATED OR 1 MAN SEATED PLUS 1 STRETCHER PASSENGER
TRANSFERS ONLY. 20KG LUGGAGE PER PERSON. SWL =330KG"
v. 3 off per Frog. Safety Notice “KEEP FEET INSIDE FROG”
Positioned as follows:
See table overleaf
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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Column A Column B Column C

Operating Instructions 1 (2 pages) - -
Seat Change out Plan - - 1
Stretcher Fitting Guide - 1 -
SWL Rating - 1 1
‘Keep Feet Inside Fog’ 1 1 1
fig2. Pillar Markings for Frog
RETROFLECTIVE TAPE
OPERATING
INSTRUCTIONS
CE PLATE
LOAD TEST PLATE
FROG LOGO ‘KEEP FEET INSIDE

FROG’
‘NO HAND HOLD’
‘NO HAND HOLD’
RETROFLECTIVE
TAPE
‘BUOYANCY
REFLEX LOGO & BLOCKS B & C…’
WEB/ TEL NO.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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5. Marking on lower buoyancy fittings. (GRP TYPE ONLY)
i. With permanent marker, write "TOP B" and "BOTTOM B" on respective
lower buoyancy fittings for columns B and C.
6. Notices placed on seat back
i. 3 x sticker "ENSURE THAT BELTS ARE PROPERLY ADJUSTED AND

TIGHTENED BEFORE LIFT-OFF"
or
3 x sticker “LOOSEN BELT, TIGHTEN WAIST STRAPS FIRST, THEN
SHOULDER STRAPS”
7. Norwegian Operating Instructions
Part No. F-01-107. One Set consists of the following:
Adhesive Operating Instructions Pages 1 of 2 & 2 of 2 (Ref: 3.5)

Adhesive Seating Arrangement Diagrams (Ref: 2.37)
Adhesive Stretcher Fitting Diagram (Ref: 2.36)
Procedure for Fitting:
To convert a Standard Frog, remove the current “Seating Arrangement” and

“Stretcher Fitting” Diagrams from the centre of the A3 Panels on the inside of the
Upper Buoyancy Modules. Replace one A3 Panel with the “Norwegian Operating
Instructions” (Page 1 of 2 and Page 2 of 2). Also replace the other A3 Panel with the
new “Seating Arrangement” and “Stretcher Fitting” Diagrams.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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FROG - STRETCHER FITTING DIAGRAM
2.36 STRETCHER FRAME DIA REV1

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FROG SEATING ARRANGEMENT DIAGRAMS
3 SEATED
A
C B
1 SEATED +
STRETCHER
A
C B
2.37 SEATING DIAG REV 2

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FROG IS SUITABLE FOR 3 MAN SEATED OR 1

MAN SEATED PLUS 1 STRETCHER TRANSFERS
ONLY. 20KG LUGGAGE PER PERSON ONLY.
SWL =330KG
FROG IS SUITABLE FOR 3 MAN SEATED OR 1

MAN SEATED PLUS 1 STRETCHER TRANSFERS
ONLY. 20KG LUGGAGE PER PERSON ONLY.
SWL =330KG
ENSURE BELTS ARE PROPERLY ADJUSTED

AND TIGHTENED BEFORE LIFT-OFF


2.38 SAFETY STICKERS REV1 Page 1 of 2

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FIX LOWER BUOYANCY UNIT B & C TO OUTSIDE

OF FRAME FOR STRETCHER TRANSFERS
FIX LOWER BUOYANCY UNIT B & C TO OUTSIDE

OF FRAME FOR STRETCHER TRANSFERS
NO HAND HOLD NO HAND HOLD
KEEP FEET KEEP FEET

INSIDE FROG INSIDE FROG
KEEP FEET
INSIDE FROG
2.38 SAFETY STICKERS REV1 Page 2 of 2
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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER REVISION: 13.1

SECTION: 2.5 PARTS LIST & MATERIAL SPECIFICATION 05.10.05
1. Definition according to criticality
All items in the parts list is divided into two groups, critical and non-critical
components. The critical components are defined as follows:
Components in which if failure were to occur, then there would be a high risk to the
safety of the passengers in the FROG. The critical components are all connected to
the Main Support Tube, which is the prime structural component in the design. All
components defined as critical are identified in the parts list.
2. Fastener Specifications
Because of corrosion considerations, all fasteners on the FROG must be supplied in

stainless steel suitable for marine use. All nuts and bolts must be Grade A4 or A2. All
nuts should be fitted with NYLOC inserts where applicable.
3. Certification
Certification Supplied is identified with the following letters:
MC - 3.1B Material Certificate

CC - Certificate of Conformance
LTC - Load test Certificate
NDE - Non-Destructive Examination report
4. I.D. Numbers
Parts given I.D. numbers will be marked in accordance with section 2.3.
Complied by: Authorised by: Page 1 of 1

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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER REVISION; 13.1

SECTION: 2.5 PARTS LIST & MATERIAL SPECIFICATION
UPDATED INFORMATION IN BOLD

AUX - AUXILLIARY ITEM. NOT SUPPLIED AS STANDARD
PART NO. QTY DESCRIPTION CRITICAL CERTS MATERIAL I.D. NO. (See LOCATION/ ASSEMBLY
2.3)
F-01-010 1 SLIDING SLEEVE / SPRING HOUSING Y NDE AISI 316 S/STEEL N SEAT
F-01-011 1 KEEL PLATE NUT (FINE THD) Y MC A4 S/ STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-011-M40 1 KEEL PLATE NUT (FINE THD) LOW TEMP Y MC A4 S/ STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-012 1 KEEL PLATE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-013 3 FLOOR RETAINER TOP PLATE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N FLOOR
F-01-014 2 CIRCULAR SEAT SUPPORT PLATE Y NDE AISI 316 S/STEEL N SEAT
F-01-015 1 MAIN SUPPORT TUBE Y MC AISI 316 S/STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-015-M40 1 MAIN SUPPORT TUBE Y MC AISI 316 S/STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-016 1 LIFTING EYE PLUG Y MC AISI 316 S/STEEL Y LIFTING POINT
F-01-016-M40 1 LIFTING EYE PLUG Y MC AISI 316 S/STEEL Y LIFTING POINT
F-01-017 1 STOP COLLAR N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-018 1 CAP PLATE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N FRAME
F-01-019 3 FOOT N - REFER TO DRAWING N FOOT
F-01-020 3 CORNER PLATE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N FRAME
F-01-021. 1 SEAT BASE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N SEAT
F-01-022 1 STRETCHER FRAME N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N STRETCHER
F-01-023 3 3 POINT HARNESS Y CC ------------------------------------- N SEAT
F-01-024 1 2 LEG SLING (30FT) Y LTC, MC ------------------------------------- Y SLING
F-01-024-M40 1 2 LEG DYNEX ROPE SLING (30FT) Y LTC, MC ------------------------------------- Y SLING
F-01-025 1 BACK-UP EYE PLATE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-026 1 BACK-UP EYE BOLT N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-027 1 MAIN SEAT SPRING N - REFER TO DRAWING N SEAT
F-01-028 3 SEAT N - --------------------------------------- N SEAT
F-01-029 1 SEAT FIXING COLLAR Y - AISI 316 S/STEEL N SEAT
F-01-030 3 WASHERS PLATES (OUTSIDE & INSIDE) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N FLOOR
F-01-031 3 RUBBER WASHERS (FOOT) N - GRADE RUBBER N FOOT
F-01-032 1 RUBBER WASHER FOR STOP COLLAR N - COMMERCIAL GRADE N COLUMN
RUBBER
F-01-033 1 KEEL PLATE NUT ROLL PIN (10 X 80 LONG) N - STAINLESS STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-034 2 STRETCHER FRAME STRAPS N - N STRETCHER
F-01-035 3 FLOOR GRATING SECTION N - GALVANISED STEEL N FLOOR
F-01-036 2 ANTI_ROTATION FITTING N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-037 1 ANTI-ROTATION ROLL PIN (12 X 60 LONG) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-038 3 M6 X 10 GRUB SCREW FOR SEAT FIXING COLLAR N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N SEAT
F-01-040 3 LOWER BUOYANCY UNITS N - --------------------------------------- N BUOYANCY
F-01-041 6 FIXING (LOWER BUOYANCY) (GRP ONLY) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-042 12 TUBES (LOWER UNIT) (GRP ONLY) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-043 3 UPPER BUOYANCY UNITS N - --------------------------------------- N BUOYANCY
F-01-044 3 GRAB HANDLES N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-045 6 TUBES (UPPER BUOYANCY) (GRP ONLY) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-046 6 FIXING (UPPER BUOYANCY) (GRP ONLY) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-047 18 BUOYANCY TUBE CAP (GRP ONLY) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-048 6 MDPE BUOYANCY SPACERS N - NYLON N BUOYANCY
F-01-049 18 MDPE BUOYANCY FITTING M12 x 60mm BUTTON HEAD SCREW N - A2 S/ STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-050 30 M10, 55 LONG HEX SCREW (PERIPHERAL BRACE + CAP PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
F-01-051 30 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUT (PERIPHERAL BRACE + CAP PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
F-01-052 18 M10 PLAIN WASHER (CAP PLATE + SEAT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
F-01-053 6 M16, 90 LONG HEX BOLT (CENTRAL BRACE TO KEEL PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
Page 1 of 4
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2.3)
F-01-054 6 M16 X 80 SOCKET HEAD CAP SCREW (CENTRAL BRACE TO FOOT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
F-01-055 12 M16 NYLOCK HEX NUT (CENTRAL BRACE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME

F-01-056 3 M10, 80 LONG BUTTON HEAD SCREW (FLOOR RETAINER PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FLOOR
F-01-057 3 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUT (FLOOR RETAINER PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FLOOR
F-01-058 3 M20, 200 LONG HEX BOLT (FOOT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FOOT
F-01-059 3 M20 WASHER (FOOT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FOOT
F-01-060 3 M20 NYLOCK HEX NUT (FOOT) N - A4 S/ STEEL N FOOT
F-01-061 1 M10, 75 LONG HEX BOLT (STOP COLLAR) N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-062 2 M10 WASHER (STOP COLLAR) N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-063 1 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUT (STOP COLLAR) N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-064 3 M16, 80 LONG HEX BOLT (CIRCULAR SUPPORT PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-065 3 M16 NYLOCK HEX NUT (CIRCULAR SUPPORT PLATE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-066 3 M10, 80 LONG BUTTON HEAD SCREW (CIRCULAR SUPPORT PLATE N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
HARNESS ANCHOR POINTS)
F-01-067 3 M10, NYLOCK HEX NUT (CIRCULAR SUPPORT PLATE HARNESS N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
ANCHOR POINTS)
F-01-068 3 M10 BUTTON HEAD SCREW, 35 LONG (SEAT FIXING COLLAR / N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
HARNESS ANCHOR)
F-01-069 3 M10 SLIM HEX NUT (SEAT COLLAR/ HARNESS ANCHOR) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-070 6 M10, 60 LONG BUTTON HEAD SCREW (SEAT FITTING) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-071 6 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUT (SEAT FITTING) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-072 1 M10, 80 LONG BUTTON HEAD SCREW (STRETCHER FRAME) N - A4 S/ STEEL N STRETCHER
F-01-073 1 M10 WINGNUT (STRETCHER FRAME) N - A4 S/ STEEL N STRETCHER
F-01-074 12 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUTS (LOWER BUOYANCY) (GRP ONLY) N - A4 S/ STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-075 OBSOLETE
F-01-076 OBSOLETE
F-01-077 8 M10 NYLOCK HEX NUTS (SEAT GRATE SUPPORTS) N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-080 2 M48 HEX NUT (FINE THD) (LOCK/SUPPORT NUT) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-081 2 M16 BOLT 70 LONG c/w Cross Hole (LIFTING EYE PLUG) Y CC A4 - GRADE 80 (MIN YIELD Y LIFTING POINT
600N/mm2)
F-01-082 4 M16 WASHER (LIFTING EYE PLUG) N - A4 S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-083 2 M16 NUT (LIFTING EYE PLUG) Y - A4 S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-084 2 TAMPER PROOF SEAL (LIFTING EYE PLUG) N - STAINLESS STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-085 1 M24 WASHER (BACK-UP EYE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-086 1 M24 NUT (BACK-UP LIFT EYE) N - A4 S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-087 1 TAMPER PROOF SEAL (BACK-UP EYE) N - STAINLESS STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-088 24 M12 SPRING WASHER N - A4 S/ STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-100 1 GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL N - - N NOT SUPPLIED
F-01-101 1 CLIENT TECHNICAL MANUAL N - - N INFORMATION
F-01-102 1 TRAINING VIDEO N - - N INFORMATION
F-01-105 1 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS N - - N BUOYANCY
F-01-106 1 STICKERS N - - N BUOYANCY
F-01-107 AUX OPERATING INSTRUCTION (NORWEGIAN) N - --------------------------------------- N BUOYANCY
F-01-110 1 CE MARKING PLATE N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N FRAME
F-01-111 1 KEEL PLATE NUT (COARSE THD) Y MC A4 S/ STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-111-M40 1 KEEL PLATE NUT (COARSE THD) LOW TEMP Y MC A4 S/ STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-112 1 2 LEG SLING - 10FT LONG (INC SHACKLES) Y LTC, MC ------------------------------------- Y SLING
Page 2 of 4
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2.3)
F-01-113 1 2 LEG SLING - 20FT LONG (INC SHACKLES) Y LTC, MC ------------------------------------- Y SLING
F-01-114 2 M48 HEX NUT (COARSE THD) (LOCK/SUPPORT NUT) N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-115 1 MAIN SUPPORT TUBE (COARSE THD) Y MC AISI 316 S/STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-115-M40 1 MAIN SUPPORT TUBE (COARSE THD) Y MC AISI 316 S/STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-119 3 FOOT WASHER N - NYLON N FOOT
F-01-120 AUX FERNO BASKET STRETCHER N - - N AUXILLIARY
F-01-122 AUX JOTRON AQ4 STROBE N - - N AUXILLIARY
F-01-124 1 HIGH VISIBILITY SLING COVER (30FT) N - - N SLING
F-01-125 AUX HIGH VISIBILITY SLING COVER (10FT) N - - N SLING
F-01-126 AUX HIGH VISIBILITY SLING COVER (20FT) N - - N SLING
F-01-130 6 BUNGEE NET (OXFORD NETS P/N - OF 128) N - - N LUGGAGE NET
F-01-131 12 LUGGAGE NET TAB N - - N LUGGAGE NET
F-01-132 15 M10 BUTTON HEAD SCREW X 20 N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N LUGGAGE NET & SEAT
F-01-133 12 M10 PLAIN WASHER N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N LUGGAGE NET
F-01-134 3 CENTRAL BRACE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N FRAME
F-01-135 3 PERIPHERAL BRACE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N FRAME
F-01-136 2 M10 X 60 HEX SCREW c/w Cross Hole N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-137 3 3 OD X 30 SPLIT PIN N - S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-138 3 10mm SEAT HARNESS SPACER N - A4 S/ STEEL N SEAT
F-01-139 1 3 OD X 50 SPLIT PIN N - S/ STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-140 6 M12 X 70 HEX SCREW N - A4 S/ STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-141 6 M12 X 75 HEX SCREW N - A4 S/ STEEL N BUOYANCY
F-01-142 4 M3 X 10 SCREW N - A4 S/ STEEL N FRAME
F-01-143 1 M12 NYLOCK HEX NUT N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-150 AUX FROG TROLLEY N - - N AUXILLIARY
F-01-151 AUX FROG WEATHER COVER N - - N AUXILLIARY
F-01-155 AUX LUGGAGE BOX N - - N AUXILLIARY
F-01-156 AUX 25 O.D. x 14 I.D. x 35mm SPACER N - NYLON/ RUBBER N AUXILLIARY
F-01-157 AUX M12 HEX BOLT X 75 N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N AUXILLIARY
F-01-158 21 M12 WASHER N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N BUOYANCY & AUX & COLUMN
F-01-159 AUX M12 SPRING WASHER N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N AUXILLIARY

F-01-160 4 STRETCHER FRAME BUNGS - 50 X 50 N - --------------------------------------- N STRETCHER
F-01-161 8 STRETCHER FRAME BUNGS - 25 X 25 N - --------------------------------------- N STRETCHER
F-01-165 6 GRAB HANDLE BUNGS - 50 X 25 N - --------------------------------------- N BUOYANCY
F-01-200 1 ANTI-FOULING BRACKET N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N LIFTING POINT
F-01-201 17 H/DUTY CABLE TIE N - - N LIFTING POINT
F-01-210 1 UPPER CENTRALISER N - NYLON 6 N COLUMN
F-01-211 1 LOWER CENTRALISER N - NYLON 6 N COLUMN
F-01-212 1 SLIDING SLEEVE WELDMENT Y NDE AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-213 2 BEARING RUNNER N - NYLON 6 N COLUMN
F-01-214 1 KEEL PLATE BOSS - EXTENDED M48 Y MC A4 S/ STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-214-M40 1 KEEL PLATE BOSS - EXTENDED M48 Y MC A4 S/ STEEL Y COLUMN
F-01-215 1 M10 X 95 HEX HEAD BOLT N - A4 S/ STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-216 1 ORIENTATION PLATE FOR KEEL PLATE BOSS N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-217 3 M10 X 50 BUTTON HEAD SCREW (SEAT FITTING) N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N SEAT
F-01-218 1 M10 X 50 HEX HEAD SCREW c/w cross hole N - A4 STAINLESS STEEL N COLUMN
F-01-219 3 M10 WASHER X 32 OD (SEAT FITTING) N - A2 STAINLESS STEEL N SEAT
F-01-220 1 SHACKLE BUSHING N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N LIFTING POINT
Page 3 of 4
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2.3)
F-01-221 1 M12 X 130 HEX HEAD BOLT N - 17-4PH S/STEEL (Min yield N COLUMN/ SLEEVE
1000 Mpa)
F-01-250 2 AUX ATEX STROBE LIGHT N - - - AUXILLIARY
F-01-251 1 AUX STAINLESS STEEL CLIP FOR ATEX STROBE LIGHT N - - - AUXILLIARY
F-ASY-05 6 PILLAR STRUTS N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N FRAME
F-ASY-05 3 BRACING PLATE N - AISI 316 S/STEEL N FRAME
F-ASY-12 AUX ANNUAL REPLACEMENT PARTS KIT (FINE THD) Y MC,MC,CC AISI 316, A4 & S/STEEL SEE DWG LIFTING POINT & COLUMN
F-ASY-12-M40 AUX ANNUAL REPLACEMENT PARTS KIT (FINE THD) Y MC,MC,CC AISI 316, A4 & S/STEEL SEE DWG LIFTING POINT & COLUMN
F-ASY-13 3 LUGGAGE NET ASSEMBLY N - - N LUGGAGE NET
F-ASY-14 AUX LUGGAGE BOX ASSEMBLY N - - N AUXILLIARY
F-ASY-15 AUX ANNUAL REPLACEMENT PARTS KIT (COURSE THREAD) Y MC,MC,CC AISI 316, A4 & S/STEEL SEE DWG LIFTING POINT & COLUMN
F-ASY-18 AUX ANNUAL REPLACE'T PARTS KIT (KEEL BOSS WITH M10 Y CC,MC,CC AISI 316, A4 & S/STEEL SEE DWG LIFTING POINT & COLUMN
ALIGNMENT BOLT)
F-ASY-18-M40 AUX ANNUAL REPLACE'T PARTS KIT (KEEL BOSS WITH M10 Y CC,MC,CC AISI 316, A4 & S/STEEL SEE DWG LIFTING POINT & COLUMN
ALIGNMENT BOLT)
F-ASY-19 AUX STRETCHER FRAME TOOL-KIT N - - N AUXILLIARY
Reflex Marine Ltd.

Page 4 of 4
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SUBJECT: 2.61 LOAD TEST PROCEDURE NO. FP02 Page 1 of 1
NOTE: The Load Test is to be carried out by an independent test house with
nationally recognised accreditation in accordance with ILO 152.
Test Load
The TARE WEIGHT of the FROG = 485 kg *
The maximum PAYLOAD of the FROG = 330 kg
(3 x (90kg person + 20 kg luggage))
Therefore the MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT = 815 kg *
The PROOF LOAD applied = 2 x the MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT
= 2 x 815 kg = 1630 kg
Therefore the test weight to be applied = 1630 kg - 485 kg = 1145 kg *
The distribution of the test weight should be as follows:
540 kg on the seats and spread equally between them.
- 605 kg placed on the floor and distributed evenly.
Test
Both the main lifting eye path and the back-up lifting eye path must be tested.
This must be clearly indicated on test certificate. Also reference ILO 152 on
certificate.
The Unit should be lifted and held Static for minimum of 3 minutes.
Test plate
A test plate will be issued and attached by the test house, which should show:
- Tare weight (kg)

- Pay load / SWL (kg)
- Maximum gross load (kg)
- The load test date
- Test Load (kg)
- The serial number of the FROG.- FSXXX (where XXX is unit I.D. No.)
- The Model number of the FROG – FS01
* NOTE. The TARE WEIGHT of the FROG is approximately 485 kg but may vary
slightly from model to model. The above weights are therefore given only as an
illustration, and each Frog must be weighed prior to load test.
After the load test has been carried out, a visual inspection of the FROG must be
carried out to ensure that no damage to the frame or any of the critical components
has taken place. In particular, the Lifting Eye Plug and bolts should be visually
inspected for any signs of over stress, particularly in the area round the boltholes. This
inspection must be carried out by a Competent Person.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.65 - DESIGN SPECIFICATION FOR -40C FROG Page 1 of 2
Introduction
At sub-zero temperatures, most types of steel become more brittle and are therefore
more likely to fail under impact or cyclical load conditions.
However, stainless steels are far less affected by low temperatures than mild or carbon
steels and it is for this reason that stainless steel is used in cryogenic applications.
Most of the steel used in the Frog is 316L stainless steel, apart from the seat and floor
gratings. However we still require certification to prove that the 316L stainless steel
used in the Frog has acceptable ductility levels at – 40 C.
Components That Are Affected
In order that the Frog can be rated for use down to –40C , all of the Critical
Components need to have material certification which states that the 316L material is
safe for use at –40C. The critical components are those specified in the Critical Parts
List in section 2.5 of this manual.
This includes the Lifting Set which needs to be replaced by one using DYNEX rope
construction. (See specification below)
Material Specification And Testing
All of the Critical Components on the standard Frog are manufactured from 316L
stainless steel. (except for the lifting set). Although it is known that 316L stainless
steel has good impact properties at –40 C, the mill provides material certification at
room temperature only, i.e. 20 C. It would be prohibitively expensive to have Charpy
tests carried out by the mill at –40 C; therefore separate Charpy tests need to be
carried out at –40 C on samples of the actual batches of material used in the
manufacture of the Critical Components.
It is not necessary, or indeed practical to carry out Charpy tests on all of the
components on the Critical Parts list. e.g. nuts, washers and other small items which
are too small to machine Charpy test pieces from. For this reason Charpy tests need
only be carried out on the following items:
Main Support Tube. Part no. F-01-015-M40

Lifting Eye Plug. Part no. F-01-016-M40
M16 Bolt Part no. F-01-081
Keel Plate Nut Part no. F-01-011-M40 or
Keel Plate Boss Part no. F-01-214-M40
The above Charpy tests must be carried out by an accredited metallurgical test house,
and the results must be endorsed by the test house as being acceptable. As a
guideline, the Charpy values obtained at – 40 C should not be more than 5% less than
the values obtained at +20 C.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.65 - DESIGN SPECIFICATION FOR -40C FROG Page 2 of 2
Lifting Set Specification
For – 40 C operation, wire ropes are not acceptable and polyethylene ropes have to be
used instead. The specification for the lifting set is generally as set out in the General
Technical Manual, except that the wire ropes are replaced by DYNEX 75 ropes which
are made from Dyneema SK75 fibres. The detailed specification to be as follows:
Part Number F-01-024-M40
Two leg Dynex rope sling.
One leg @ 360 ins. x 16mm Dynex rope terminated with hard eyes
One leg @ 368 ins. x 16mm Dynex rope terminated with hard eyes both C/W wear
sleeves
Min Breaking Load: 27.4 Tonnes
Fitted to a HA22ML master link with a 3.25 tonne nut & bolt Polar type bow shackle
on each leg. (Pin to be less than 20mm dia.)
Earth wire to be attached between Master link and Main Lifting shackle.
Load test to be in accordance with BS1290 to SWL 2000 kg. Each leg to be tested
individually to 4000 kg.
Test certificate serial no. to be stamped on the master link and each lower ferrule with
suffix (-1 & -2)
The certification provided will be the same as that for the standard wire rope sling set
with the addition of the a Certificate of conformance for the master link and shackles
stating that they are safe for operation at – 40 C.
Certification
The Client certification package will be the same as for the standard Frog, with the
addition of the low temperature C of C for the seat harness.
The Reflex Marine certification package will have the additional Charpy test
certificate for the tests as detailed above.
Marking
The unit shall be marked as per section 2.3 of the technical. i.e. units shall be marked
with Model Number FS01-M40
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.8 - CERTIFICATION & DOCUMENTATION Page 1 of 1
REQUIREMENTS
Each new build of the FROG will require to have a complete set of certification and
documentation as specified below.
All Frog users will be supplied with copies of the following certification and
documentation.
1. Certification Pack (includes the following)

" EC Declaration of Conformity*
" Manufacturers Certificate of Conformance
" Manufacturers BS EN ISO 9002 Certificate
" Frog Load Test Certificate
" Sling set Load Test Certificate
" Back-up Eyebolt Certificate of Conformance
" Lifting Plug Material Certificate
" M16 Lifting Plug Bolts Certificate of Conformance
" Seat Harness Certificate of Conformance
" 3rd Party Inspection Checklist
" 3rd Party Inspection Release Note
" 3rd Party Inspection BS EN ISO 9001 Certificate
2. Client Technical Manual*
* - For CE marked Frogs the EC Declaration of Conformity and the Client Technical
Manual will be translated into language of the country (EC Member state) in which
the machinery is to be used.
Reflex Marine will retain copies of the above certification and additional certification
as specified below. If required, the applicable certification below can be made
available for review by Clients.
" Material certification for all Critical and Non-critical components
" Inspection and Repair History
" Weld Procedures/ Welder qualifications
" NDT approval (PCN)/ NDT Reports (where applicable)
" Manufacturing Signed Checklist and Route Cards
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.9 SHIPPING AND STORAGE Page 1 of 2
Shipping – Inspection
It is recommended that before and after shipping the Frog be inspected to check for
damage sustained in transit.
Shipping – Preparation
The Frog should be shipped in seated mode.
Prior to shipping the seat harnesses should be secured by tightening the seat harnesses
and tying the buckle together. This will prevent set harness flapping and damaging seat.
It is recommended that the Frog is covered for shipping either with a Frog weather-proof
cover or other heavy duty tarpaulin material.
Shipping – Containerisation
The Frog will not fit in a standard or High-cube container. If Frog is transported on Flat
rack it must be secured. Recommended securing points are peripheral floor brace/ floor
grating, back-up lifting eyebolt. To protect it from excess loading, the main lifting eye
should not be used as a securing point
Shipping – Crating
Reflex Marine currently use the following types of pallet and crating for the Frog. All
types are suitable for Forklift handling. Contact Reflex marine for more details.
Type Length Width Height Mass

Unpacked 2.5 m 2.2 m 2.9 m c. 485 kg
Pallet/Skid – Frog Unit Upright 2.5 m 2.2 m 3.0 m c. 550 kg
Pallet/ Skid – Frog Unit on Side 3.1 m 2.6 m 2.6 m c. 600 kg
Full Crating – Frog Unit Upright 2.8 m 2.4 m 3.2 m c.1050 kg
Full Crating – Frog Unit on Side 3.1 m 2.8 m 2.5 m c 1040 kg
Full Crating – Frog Unit with Cover & Trolley c 1150 kg
Slatted Crating – Frog Unit Upright 2.8 m 2.4 m 3.2 m c. 900 kg
Handling – Forklift
Handling of the Frog with Forklift truck may damage the underside of the Frog (Landing
feet or Main column), therefore it is not recommended unless the unit is secured to pallet
specifically for forks.
Handling – Crane
When lifting the Frog with short chain or strop, the temporary shackle should be fixed to
the Back-up eyebolt. Care must be taken not to damage the Frog lifting set.
Storage
The Frog has been designed to cope with the harsh conditions on an offshore installation
or vessel, however it is important to protect the unit as much as possible from any
Compiled by:
Authorised by:
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 2.9 SHIPPING AND STORAGE Page 2 of 2
hazardous elements. It is recommended that the frog is covered with the Frog weather-
proof cover whilst not in use. The cover will work for both configurations.
For Deck Fastening Reflex recommend using the peripheral braces around the floor
grating. An example showing a deck fastening configuration is attached – F-ASY-DF.
The Frog overall dimensions are as follows (see GA1, attached) : -
In 3 seat mode In stretcher plus 1 seat mode

HEIGHT : 2.9 m HEIGHT : 2.9 m
WIDTH 1 : 2.2 m WIDTH 1 : 2.4 m
WIDTH 2 : 2.5 m WIDTH 2 : 3.2
TARE WT : 485 kg TARE WT : 485 kg
Compiled by:
Authorised by:
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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BACK TO INDEX
BACK TO INDEX
GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL DATE: 07-07-01
SUBJECT: 3.10 - OPERATING PROCEDURES - BACKGROUND Page 1 of 1
The FROG Personnel Transfer Capsule (PTC) is a new design of personnel transfer
device designed to provide increased protection when carrying out personnel transfers
between vessels / installations by crane.
It performs a similar function to traditional rope personnel transfer baskets, but

includes special provisions for carrying out emergency medical transfers and can
accommodate a stretcher in a protected environment.
Crane personnel transfers are carried out for a wide variety of reasons including
routine, urgent operational and emergency (medical) reasons.
The Frog PTC is intended for use as a transfer capsule. Personnel should only use the
equipment following proper briefing in its operation. Personnel should at all times be
seated and properly strapped in using the harnesses supplied. The Frog is not intended
for use as a work-basket.
The Frog should also only be used with properly designed and maintained lifting
equipment. It should be noted that some national regulations require cranes to be
specifically certified for man-riding operations.
Note: It should be noted that the regulations governing personnel transfer operations
vary greatly from country to country and it is imperative that operators of the
equipment establish the relevant requirements for the area of operation.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.20 - OPERATING ENVELOPE Page 1 of 4
Introduction
The Frog has been designed to ensure passengers safety even when operating in the
most demanding conditions.
There are a large number of factors that affect the safe conduct of all marine personnel
transfer; crew skill and experience, met-ocean conditions, landing area, vessel station
keeping response, visibility, line-of-sight, and so on. A combination of many factors
will determine the risk involved in a transfer.
It is important that all environmental and operational factors are taken into account in
the pre-transfer risk assessment. Assessing the impact of these factors on operational
risk is best done by competent persons experienced in use of the equipment and the
local conditions.
Vertical impacts2
Passengers are protected during heavy landings and take-offs from a vessel deck of up
to 4.0 m/s by the properties of the feet and spring-mounted seat. This protects
passengers up to currently recommended operating limits.
Lateral impacts2
Passengers are also protected from lateral impacts by the framework and seat harness.
Lateral impacts are only likely to arise due to sway caused by offlead when lifting.
The passengers will be protected up to and beyond the 2m/s maximum expected
impact speed (based on a 6 degree 30m line offlead). The central column may deform
on lateral impact and therefore it is important that the equipment is inspected after any
impact.
Stability2
The unit has a low centre of gravity and a tripod base, providing stability on uneven
surfaces or on a pitching / rolling vessel. The polyurethane coated landing feet are
also a non-skid design keeping grip on deck surfaces. The static angle of stability has
been tested to 35 degrees, for a load of 1-3 passengers.
Control of hoist line2
The Frog is designed to stay firmly on the deck of the vessel whilst passengers are
transferring in and out of the Frog. The crane operator has the responsibility to maintain
slack in the line upon landing to allow for the vessel movement. The recommended
limits in this section are based on the use of the standard Frog sling length of 30ft/ 9m.
For the use of shorter slings an additional risk assessment combined with dry runs
should be performed to establish safe operation routines and weather conditions. (See
section 3.6 crane operator guidance).
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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Track record2
The Frog has been used in heavy weather conditions and has been reported to be
stable and perform well in high winds (when used in conjunction with non-rotating
wire rope forerunner and swivel).
Operating parameters > Sea state
The Frog has an inbuilt damping system which prevents passengers from experiencing shock
loads up to a relative landing and take-off velocities up to 4m/s.
The maximum recommended sea state, or significant wave height, for the operation of the Frog
is determined by the maximum relative velocity between the Frog (or hook) and the landing
deck.
The calculation for relative velocity used here is based on the European offshore crane
standard, EN 13852-1:2004. Whereby the maximum anticipated relative velocity between a
load and a vessel deck, is given by the following;
Relative velocity A Hook velocityC D E (Vessel deck velocity 2 D Boom tip velocity 2)
* Equal to 1.67m/s (100 m /min, 330ft/min) for lifts below 5 tonnes. Higher crane hook speeds
may be available, and it follows that the higher the available crane speed the higher the
possibility of a heavy landing or take off. However, with a qualified crane operator, it is
considered unlikely that the Frog will be landed at full hook speed on a deck rising at full
speed, or vice versa.
If there are concerns about heavy landings operators may wish to consider the following
methods to reduce risk of heavy landings and take-off; Dry runs without passengers, Landing in
centre of deck where less vessel movement, Transfer of less passengers to increase damping,
hook speed indicator.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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Table 1: Recommended sea states for Frog
Sig. wave Max. wave Fixed Semi-sub FPSO Vessel

height. height. platform to to to to
(m / ft) (m / ft) Vessel Vessel Vessel Vessel
\ 1.0m / 3_ \ 1.9m / 6’ " " " "
\ 1.5m / 5_ \ 2.8m / 9’ " " " "C
\ 2.0m / 7_ \ 3.7m / 12’ " " " X
\ 2.5m / 8_ \ 4.6m / 15’ " " "C X
\ 3.0m / 10_ \ 5.6m / 18’ " " "C X
\ 3.5m / 11_ \ 6.5m / 21’ " "C X X
\ 4.0m / 13_ \ 7.5m / 24’ "C "C X X
\ 4.5m / 15_ \ 8.4m / 28’ "C X X X
\ 5.0m / 16_ \ 9.3m / 30’ "C X X X
\ 5.5m / 18_ \ 10.2m / 33’ X X X X
KEY
Low risk of high landing or take-off velocity, and exceeding Frog personnel
"
damping.
Increasing risk of high landing or take-off velocity. Consideration of hook
speed and consideration of all other factors is recommended to ensure
"C
controlled landing and take-off. Dry run to gauge risk (without personnel) also
recommended.
High risk of high landing or take-off velocity. Not suitable for routine
X
operations unless a specific hazard analysis can demonstrate otherwise.
In all cases, adequate planning and risk assessment must be performed.
Operating parameters > Additional factors
Note 1: We emphasise that users should not rely on these recommendations alone. Persons
best placed to judge the risk of specific transfers are the onsite persons that have
experience of the local conditions and equipment to be used. All factors should be
evaluated together in their pre-transfer risk assessment.
Note 2: We recommend that crews conduct dry runs without passengers when there are
concerns about conditions to help assess risk of transfer.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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Table 2: Other operating parameters
Parameter Recommendation
40 knots (equivalent to 20 m/s). Frog is very stable in high
Wind Speed wind. Limiting factor is usually crane operability or control of
Load.
Crane operator should have clear view of the pick up and set
Visibility
down areas
Vessel motion/ Frog Pitch 10 o, Roll 10 o. (Frog stable up to 35 o For load of 1-3
Stability Passengers. In static test)
Able to maintain position within a 5m (15ft) radius If high risk
Vessel station-keeping of vessel losing position recommend disconnect Frog for
passenger embarkation
Landing area Clear of obstructions, protrusions, trip and fall hazards
Ice and spills must be cleaned from landing area prior to
Landing area – ice/ spills
Transfer
Recommended 6m x 6m clear space (20ft x 20ft) Based on +/-
1m landing accuracy + 1m entry and exit path for personnel.
Landing area on vessel
Smaller deck spaces require individual risk assessment with
consideration of reduced weather limits.
Landing area on Recommended 4m x 4m clear space (13ft x 13ft). Based on
installation +1m entry and exit path all round the Frog.
Crane operator Briefing video within 1 month. Local authority requirements
experience for personnel transfer must be adhered to.
Deck crew experience Briefing video within 1 month.
Passenger training Briefing video within 1 month.
Radio communication must be established between the crane
Communications
operator and the vessel deck crew and master.
Crane must be of certified for use for lifting personnel and
Crane construction
properly maintained.
FS01 units: +50C to -20C
Temperature
FS01-M40 units: +50C to -40C
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.30 TRANSFER PLANNING Page 1 of 1
The key to safe operations is familiarisation of all involved crew in the careful
planning of the operation. Apart from the limitations given in section 3.2, it is
recommended that safe operating conditions be defined by onsite supervision, which
should take account of local anomalies. The following measures are also
recommended as a means of ensuring safe transfer operations:
! Carry out regular transfer drills. (Weekly recommended)
! Carry out a Pre-transfer hazard analysis and plan each operation using a ‘Transfer
Log’ (see Section 3.4).
! Ensure that passengers and crews are fully briefed prior to an operation.
! Ensure also that the vessel crews are fully briefed on the planned operation. Pre-
transfer planning call and video briefings of the crew should be considered.
! Ensure the host vessel is briefed prior to the transfer (highlight potential hazards).
! If in an emergency a transfer must be carried out in poor conditions – carry out

trial runs without passengers.
! Ensure that all transfer operations are properly supervised.
Safe transfers require careful planning and supervision

Reflex Marine Ltd.
BACK TO INDEX

SUBJECT: 3.40 - TRANSFER LOG Page 1 of 2
As for most potentially hazardous operations carried out in the offshore environment,
the safety of personnel can be greatly improved by careful and systematic pre-job
planning. Preparation should include: -
Identification and assessment of the principal hazards

Inspection of the equipment
Proper briefing of personnel
Clear allocation of responsibility for the safe conduct of the operation
Reflex recommends that operators properly log all marine transfers.
A sample Transfer Log is attached overleaf (1 page)
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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3.40 REV2 / 29.04.02 /

MARINE PERSONNEL TRANSFER LOG
Date: From (vessel name):
Transfer time: To (vessel name):
Personnel Crane (port / starboard etc):

Carrier type:
Transfer classification ROUTINE / EMERGENCY (delete as appropriate)
Reason for transfer:
Wind speed Wind direction Sea state Visibility
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING TRANSFER (vessel position / deck space etc)
PASSENGER DETAILS
Passengers are requested to sign below if they consent to undertaking a basket transfer detailed above.
Important note to passenger – Certain national regulations place constraints on the use of personnel
transfers. Please ensure you are aware of any local regulations prior to proceeding.
Name Title Signed consent Time / date
PERSON IN CHARGE
Hazards identified :
Have operating instructions in the capsule been read and understood YES / NO
Has the condition of the transfer capsule and associated equipment been checked YES / NO
Have passengers been fully briefed on the operation YES / NO
Action to be taken to minimise hazards :
Name Position Signature Time / date
CLOSE OUT STATEMENT
The transfer was carried out without incident YES / NO
No unforeseen hazards were identified during the operation YES / NO
(Delete as appropriate). If either answer is NO give details / recommendations:
Name Position Signature Time / date

BACK TO INDEX
SUBJECT: 3.5 - OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS Page 1 of 1
Operating Guidelines are attached overleaf (2 pages)

Reflex Marine Ltd.
BACK TO INDEX
FROG OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

.
PRE-TRANSFER
1. Supervisor - Conduct pre-transfer hazard analysis (see manual sections 3.3 and 3.2)
2. Supervisor - Conduct inspection of equipment prior to use (see next page)
3. Supervisor - Brief all persons
i. Crane operator iii. Passengers
ii. Deck crew iv. Vessel - Master, Deck crew
4. Passengers - Wear recommended P.P.E. (Personal Protective Equipment), P.F.D.
(Personal Floatation Device), and survival suit where applicable.
Note: Send P.F.D. to vessel prior to transfer to avoid rush
LIFT-OFF
1. Deck Crew - Hook-up masterlink.*

2. Deck Crew - Signal to passengers to enter capsule when safe to do so.
3. Passengers - Ensure Luggage is secure in designated area. (Manual Section 3.8).
4. Passengers - Strap-in, do not rush – loosen belt, tighten lower straps, then upper straps.
5. Passengers - Signal to deck crew when seat belt secure by holding hand up/ thumbs up.
6. Deck Crew - Ensure passengers are strapped in.
7. Deck Crew - Ensure taglines (where applicable) and sling are not snagged.
8. Deck Crew - Stand clear and signal lift to crane operator.
LANDING
1. Crane Op. - All raising and lowering must be over water.

2. Crane Op. - Guide Capsule into clear landing area.
3. Deck Crew - Keep safe position if handling unit - do not stand between Frog and Rail.
4. Deck Crew - If taglines are used beware of specific risks. (manual Section 3.7).
5. Crane Op. - Crane operator to release slack when Frog has landed (manual Section 3.6).
6. Crane Op. - Crane operator to put Sling down-weather.
7. Deck Crew - Ensure sling slack is not hazard for exiting passengers.*
8. Deck Crew - When Frog securely on deck. Signal “All clear” to Passengers.
9. Passengers - Remain seated until given “All clear” by Deck-crew.
10. Passengers - Collect luggage.
11. Passengers - Move away from capsule towards safe area.
* Note - If risk of vessel losing position or crane line snatch (e.g. vessel to vessel transfers) it is
recommended to disconnect the Frog for passenger exit and entry
OPERATING LIMITS
Refer to section 3.2 of Client Technical Manual for recommendations.
REV6/20.07.05/AIG Page 1 of 2
BACK TO INDEX
FROG OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

INSPECTION PRIOR TO USE
1. Check LOAD TEST PLATE and all

CERTIFICATION are in order.
2. Check all Frog FITTINGS,

FRAMEWORK and BUOYANCY
are in good order.
3. Check SLINGS are correctly

attached and in good order. Check
the SPLIT PINS are fitted to
shackles. Slings should be in the
HIGH VISIBILITY COVER.
4. Check LIFT EYE PLUG is fully

engaged (the machined shoulder
should rest on the top of the
threaded main lifting column).
5. Check M16 BOLTS are secure and

split pins and tamper-proof seals in
position.
6. Check BACK-UP LIFTING

EYEBOLT, nut and tamper-proof
seal are fitted correctly and in
good order.
7. Check SEAT HARNESSES operate

properly and attachment points are
secure.
8. Check M48 KEEL PLATE NUT

and ROLL PIN are in position (or
alternative arrangement M48 KEEL
PLATE NUT and M10 ALIGNMENT
BOLT. Not shown here. Refer to
GA2 in manual if in doubt).
REV6/20.07.05/AIG Page 2 of 2
BACK TO INDEX

SUBJECT: 3.51 STRETCHER FITTING PROCEDURE Page 1 of 2
CONVERTING FROG TO STRETCHER MODE
Before you Begin.

" It is recommended that the procedure be conducted by two or three persons. This is to
ease handling of Lower buoyancy blocks approx. 20kg.
" Procedure should not be conducted over grated flooring to prevent risk of fittings
falling through floor.
" Procedure should be conducted with a clear area around Frog. This is required for
fitting the Lower buoyancy to the outside of the Frog. It is also required to set down
seat and stretcher frame
Recommended Tools.
1 – 6mm Hex Key (for M10) (Seat, Stretcher Frame)
2 – 8mm Hex Key (for M12) (Buoyancy)
3 – 17mm Wrench (for M10) (Seat)
4 – 19mm Wrench (for M12) (Luggage Box)
5 – Box/ Bag for Loose Fittings
6 – FROG Diagrams
Procedure: Converting to Stretcher Mode.

Refer to 2.36 Stretcher Fitting Diagram and 2.37 Seat Arrangement Diagram and GA.4
Buoyancy Fitting (overleaf)
1. In order to reduce time, Luggage Nets do not have to be removed.

Remove Luggage box (4 x M12 Hex Bolt) from Lower buoyancy.
2. Remove bolts (4 x M12 Dome Cap) and spacers from Lower buoyancy blocks B and
C.
Note: The latest Frogs do not have Spacers P/N F-01-048 between the Lower
Buoyancy Modules and the Frame.
3. Fix Lower buoyancy units B and C to outside of unit. Tighten to hand tight with Hex
Key. Note: Over-tightening of these bolts can lead to damaged buoyancy. See GA.4
Buoyancy Fitting (overleaf) (See also 2.37 Seat Arrangement Diagram.)
4. Remove Lower fixing bolts (2 x M10 Dome Cap) from Seat facing door B-C.
5. Loosen Upper fixing bolt (1 x M10 Dome Cap) and remove nut from seat facing door
B-C. The Seat can be removed once the bolt head is passed through the key-slot.
6. Seat harness can now be fastened behind Column to clear area for Stretcher frame.
7. Insert Stretcher frame onto Seat base. Align tab with hole on Circular plate and fix
with M10 Dome Cap Bolt and Wing nut. See 2.36 Stretcher Fitting Diagram.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.51 STRETCHER FITTING PROCEDURE Page 2 of 2
Procedure: Positioning the stretcher.

1. Complete ‘Converting to Stretcher Mode’ procedure.
2. Ensure stretcher casualty is securely strapped into stretcher.
3. Observe safe manual handling practice when lifting stretcher.
4. Using Three persons to lift the stretcher (2 either side at shoulders, 1 at feet) move
stretcher head first through door B-C (door opening with stretcher frame).
5. Place head-end of Stretcher onto Stretcher frame and slide Stretcher into position as
per 2.37 Seat Arrangement Diagram.
6. An Intravenous drip may be placed on the hook* on the central column. * - (Where
fitted).
7. Secure the Stretcher into position with two Straps provided. See 2.36 Stretcher Fitting
Diagram.
a. Begin by feeding the fork end of the Strap through eyelets on the stretcher
frame then through closest handles of the stretcher and continue around through
to second Stretcher Handle.
b. Fasten Underneath.
c. Ensure Stretcher is secure.
8. Only one additional passenger should accompany the casualty.
Procedure: Converting to 3 Seat Mode.

Refer to 2.36 Stretcher Fitting Diagram and 2.37 Seat Arrangement Diagram and GA.4
Buoyancy Fitting (overleaf)
Refitting the Seats is the reverse of the Conversion. Please note the following:
Tighten Fittings for Lower buoyancy unit and Seat to low torque hand tight only. Over-
tightening of these bolts can lead to damage of Buoyancy inserts or Seat.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.52 PPE/ LIFE JACKET RECOMMENDATIONS Page 1 of 3
It is the operator’s responsibility to provide personnel being transferred in the Frog with the
appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). This may include personal flotation devices
(PFD), immersion suits, suitable clothing such as gloves and hard hats and footwear. All
PFDs should be equipped with suitable means of illumination during night transfers.
Appropriate man overboard rescue and recovery arrangements should be in place and on
standby during transfers (e.g. standby vessel equipped with a fast rescue craft ready to
launch).
Factors affecting selection of PFD for the Frog
For selection of the PFD type most suitable for Frog operations the following factors are
considered;
In the event of immersion of the Frog the operator should have contingency to
immediately rescue the passengers from the water. (Without fast rescue contingency
personnel transfer should not take place.)
In the event of immersion of the Frog, the Frog will provide sufficient buoyancy,
keeping the Frog in an upright position and keeping passengers upper body out of the
water, providing passengers with a clear breathing channel.
If, while the Frog is immersed, the passengers decide to exit from the Frog to either
evade hazards (such as waves or rising water level) or as part of their recovery effort,
their PFD should not impede their exit either through it’s bulk, compatibility with the
seat harness, or excess buoyancy force.
Therefore the required features for the PFDs for use with the Frog are;
(i) To provide sufficient buoyancy for passenger awaiting recovery in water.
(ii) Design suitable for passenger to exit Frog while immersed.
(iii) Compatibility/ ease of use with seat harness during transfers. Entry to the Frog/
Donning harness and buckling up, and exiting the Frog/ un-buckling and exiting.
(iv) Design that will not automatically inflate while passenger is strapped into seat
harness.
Types of PFDs and level of flotation
Different PFDs provide different performance depending on their application. These can be
divided up as follows:
PFDs with buoyancy up to 100N are for use in inshore waters, or where persons may
have to wait a short period for rescue. PFDs with buoyancy of 150N-275N are
designed for offshore/ open water use, or where persons may have to wait prolonged
period for rescue.
PFDs which provide face up in-water support to the user regardless of physical
condition are termed offshore lifejackets. PFDs that require the user to perform
swimming or postural movements to keep their face out of the water are described as
buoyancy aids.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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In rough offshore water, with personnel wearing heavy clothing, any PFD with 50N or less
may be ineffective. For use with the Frog, rescue and recovery means should be on standby
during the transfer, therefore there should be no requirement for the rescuees to be afloat in
the water for any length of time. Additionally a larger PFD may impede the passenger exit of
the Frog as part of the rescue effort.
It is the operator’s duty to decide what PFD is most suitable for their operation.
Recommended PFDs
Reflex Marine have evaluated the 5 most common types of PFDs used in the offshore and
marine sector and has the following comments about their suitability for use with the Frog.
Inherently buoyant work vest buoyancy aid (100N)
Recommended: PFD suited for use with Frog. Flat buoyancy panels are
unobtrusive and allow passengers easy entry and exit from Seat harness.
PVC coated type is also recommended for durability of PFD. RML
recommend that any PFD of this type is tested with seat harness in Frog
for compatibility.
Manual inflatable lifejacket (150N)
Recommended (with safety note): PFD suited for use

with Frog however inflation toggles may interfere with
seat harness creating risk that PFD may inflate when
person is strapped in. Personnel should be informed
that PFD should not be inflated when person is
strapped in the Frog.
Non-recommended PFDs over page…
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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Non-recommended PFDs
Inherently buoyant ‘yoke’ type lifejacket (100-150N)
Not recommended: This type of PFD is bulky and may prove

restrictive when donning seat harness. PFD generally has a poor fit with
seat harness, particularly over shoulders. Seat harness buckle release
mechanism may become positioned underneath PFD out of line-of-sight
of passenger, making exit more difficult.
Offshore work vest buoyancy aid (50N)
Not recommended. This PFD may be ineffective for passengers with

heavy clothing.
Automatic inflatable lifejacket (Contact with water)
Not recommended. Risk that PFD may inflate when

person is strapped in and Frog is immersed which may
impede passengers exit for rescue.
Additional considerations.
1. Reflex Marine recommended that a number of PFDs, specifically designated for use
with the Frog, are marked as ‘FROG USE ONLY’ and are kept in a safe, clean storage
area near the transfer muster area.
It is recommended that the Platform and Vessel retain at least six PFDs each,
specifically for transfer purposes. This number will allow a second group of three
passengers to don PFDs and be prepared to embark, whilst the first group is being
transferred. The PFDs from the first transfer group can then be sent back with the
Frog for the third group, and so on.
2. Deck crew should ensure that when passengers are exiting the Frog, the passengers
move clear of the landing area to the designated safe area before removing PFDs.
3. Passengers using the PFDs for the first time should be given assistance by the deck
crew. PFDs should be tried by all crew as part of any practical training given.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.53 – NIGHT TIME OPERATIONS Page 1 of 1
Personnel transfers in an offshore environment should be subject to strict controls and clearly
defined operating instructions.
With the following additional controls in place it may be allowable for personnel transfers
using the Frog Personnel Transfer Capsule to be used during the hours of darkness:
The risk assessment for the task shall be comprehensively reviewed prior to
commencing operations. The lifting plan and risk assessment shall be approved in
writing by the Offshore Installation Manager or appointed deputy.
The operator should have contingency to immediately rescue the passengers from the
water e.g. Fast Rescue Craft. Without fast rescue contingency personnel transfer
should not take place.
The crane boom is fitted with adequate floodlights to illuminate the crane hook and
Frog unit. The crane operator must maintain a clear line of view with the Frog unit at
all times.
The takeoff and landing areas are illuminated to a level of at least 20 lux or greater.
The Frog unit is fitted with a strobe light to allow clear locating by all parties
The hoisting, transit and landing paths of the Frog unit are predefined in the lifting
plan and are adhered to.
Radio contact is maintained throughout the entire lifting operation between the crane
operator and the take-off and landing site.
An unmanned trial run which covers as a minimum the take-off, transit and landing
paths of the Frog should be conducted prior to commencing personnel transfers. The
crane operator should confirm readiness to proceed on completion of the trial run.
A non-visual based method of communicating with the lifted personnel should be in

place, e.g. radio or loudhailer… in the event of an emergency.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.60 – CRANE OPERATOR GUIDANCE Page 1 of 2
When landing the Frog on the deck of a heaving vessel crane operator should always
release and maintain line slack to prevent any snatching. This means the Frog will
be secure on the deck and will provide occupants plenty of time to enter and exit the
Frog. (This landing procedure is different than the rope basket procedure, which relies
on the crane operator to keep the soft rope basket upright during entry and exit).
For the standard 30ft / 9m sling provided with the Frog, it is generally recommended
that approx. 10 ft / 3m of slack is paid out once the unit has landed on the vessel,
however, the required amount may vary according to sea state and vessel motion
response. The crane operator should pay out sufficient slack to avoid snatching,
although, should avoid paying out more than is necessary as the section of sling
hanging could constitute a hazard to crews alighting or entering the capsule.
It is also recommended that the crane operator slew the boom ‘down weather’ from the
capsule. This will provide more time to crane operator / crews to react in the event of
a failure of the vessel’s station keeping.
(6.8m)
(9m)
(6m)
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.60 – CRANE OPERATOR GUIDANCE Page 2 of 2
IMPORTANT NOTE ON USE OF SHORTER SLINGS:
Reflex Marine recommend the use of a 30ft / 9m sling however for operations where
the 30ft sling is not suitable then a 20ft / 6m or 10ft / 3m sling can be supplied.
It should be noted that using shorter slings increases the risk of snatching - Using the
20ft / 6m sling, 10ft / 3m of slack will provide a 17.3ft /5.3m allowable offset before
the sling becomes taught from the crane hook weight – this does not however account
for vessel heave. And for a 10ft / 3m sling, 8ft / 2.4m of slack will provide 9.8ft / 2.7m
(allowable offset).
Using a shorter sling set also increases risks associated with the hook block being in
close proximity to the passengers alighting.
Note: The operating limits in section 3.2 are defined for Frog with sling length of 30ft/
9m. For transfers using shorter sling additional risk assessment combined with dry
runs should be performed to establish safe operation routines and weather conditions.
Compiled by:
Authorised by:
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.7 TAG LINES Page 1 of 1
Tag Lines (Hand Line) are not supplied with the Frog. However if users wish to use tag
lines for handling the Frog the following should be considered: -
Tag lines should be attached to the floor grating and 30x30 brace at the edge of the
doorway. (See below)
Reflex Marine suggest one or two 3m lines are practicable for handling the Frog,
however length of line used is at the discretion of the deck crew.
Be aware of Specific risks arising from use of tag lines: -
" Deck crew using taglines will be standing closer to frog during landing, which
increases the risk of impact or caught in between.
" Ensure taglines are not tied or caught on any adjacent equipment of structures
" Ensure taglines are clear of knotting and deck crew have suitable hand and eye
protection
Tagline Fixing Point Tagline Fixing Point
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.8 LUGGAGE STORAGE Page 1 of 1
The Frog is supplied with 3 luggage storage nets that are located in the corners of the
Frog against the lower buoyancy blocks. This forms a pocket in which luggage can be
stored. (see photo)
All luggage items should be stored in the corners so that they do not constitute a tripping
hazard for passengers exiting the Frog.
Passengers are allowed 20kg each for hand luggage.
The nets are constructed of elastic shock-chord (or bungee) and will stretch to contain
items in an area roughly 600mm x 500mm. Items of luggage that are too large for the nets
should be secured to the floor grating.
The floor grating is spaced 25mm x 50mm therefore small items should be bagged to
prevent items falling through floor.
To prevent any ‘doubling up’ of luggage, as a rule, passengers should place luggage to
their right when entering the Frog.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 3.81 FITTING THE WEATHERPROOF COVER Page 1 of 1
RML recommend that this procedure is carried out by two persons, with use of a Stepladder
to reach upper parts.
1. Wrap cover around Frog 4. Lace doorway/ Fasten doorway

(Note – wind hazard)
2. Adjust fold out sections for stretcher 5. Fasten at floor/ base.

mode as required.
3. Lace/ Fasten cover from top 6. Secure around the floor/ base with ties
(Note - access steps required) provided.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 4.1 - INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE Page 1 of 1
PROCEDURES - GENERAL INTRODUCTION
It is imperative for the safe operation of the FROG that each unit be periodically
inspected and tested in accordance with procedures and schedules set out below.
It is essential that inspections be carried out by a Competent Person who should have
the appropriate practical and theoretical knowledge and experience of the equipment.
This will enable them to detect defects and weaknesses and to assess their importance
in relation to the safety and continued use of the equipment. It is essential that the
Competent Person is sufficiently independent and impartial to allow objective
decisions to be made.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 4.1 - INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE Page 1 of 1
PROCEDURES - GENERAL INTRODUCTION
It is imperative for the safe operation of the FROG that each unit be periodically inspected
and tested in accordance with procedures and schedules set out in this section of the technical
manual.
Competent persons
It is essential that inspections be carried out by a competent person who should have the
appropriate practical and theoretical knowledge and experience of the equipment. This will
enable them to detect defects and weaknesses and to assess their importance in relation to the
safety and continued use of the equipment. It is essential that the competent person is
sufficiently independent and impartial to allow objective decisions to be made.
Inspection and replacement of slings
The lifting slings of the FROG are considered to be the most exposed item and the most
susceptible to damage and corrosion. Additionally, visual inspection of the non-rotational
wire rope is problematic due to the varying direction of wire lay through the rope.
Therefore we recommend that: -
The slings are inspected prior to every use.

The slings should also be inspected every six months by a competent person.
The slings are replaced at least every 24 months.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 4.2 - INSPECTION PRIOR TO USE Page 1 of 1
See Section 3.5 - Operating Instructions.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 4.3 - SIX MONTHLY INSPECTION Page 1 of 2
Diagrams
Refer to following diagrams in section 4.6 of this manual:
General Assembly 2 (GA2) – Central Lifting Assembly
General Assembly 3(GA3) – Seat Harness Assembly
General Assembly 4 (GA4) – Buoyancy Assembly
Procedure
All inspection should be carried out by a competent person.

1. Visually inspect the Lifting Eye Plug in situ for signs of wear, cracks, deformation or
other damage.
2. Visually inspect the two M16 Lifting Eye bolts, nuts and seal wire that attach the
Lifting Eye Plug to the Main Support Tube for wear or damage.
3. Visually inspect the Back up Eyebolt for wear or damage and check that the seal wire is
intact.
4. Visually inspect the sliding sleeve and the M12 alignment bolt and nylon bushings.
(Anti-rotation roll pin on older units).
5. At the lower end of Main support tube, visually inspect the Keel plate M48 Nut and
check that the M10 alignment bolt is secure (Keel plate nut roll pin on older units).
Check the orientation plate is secure. (Anti-rotation blocks on older units)
6. Visually inspect the seat base that all bolts and other fasteners are fully secure.
7. Visually inspect the frame and buoyancy compartments for damage.
8. Visually inspect the feet to ensure that they are in good condition and that they are
properly secured to the capsule.
Note:- Measure height of Foot and replace if under 150 mm in height. Small (20 mm)
cuts are acceptable; however the Foot should be replaced when the internal Foam
becomes visible.
9. Visually inspect the Seat harness attachment points and the harness webbing for signs
of wear, fraying or damage.
10. Check all Seat harness buckles to ensure each is functioning correctly. (Inspector to sit
in each seat and check fastening and unfastening of each harness).
11. Check the date of the last load test to ensure compliance with requirements.
12. Visually inspect the lifting sling set.
(Note: Low Temperature Dynex Fibre Slings are fitted with Earth Wire)
13. Complete an inspection report on the above which should be signed and dated by a
Competent Person. (an example is attached overleaf)
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 4.3 - SIX MONTHLY INSPECTION Page 2 of 2
Six Month Inspection Checklist
Unit No. Inspection Date
Inspected by
Position/ Company
Signature
Check Description Pass/ Comment/ Corrective Action

No. Fail
1. Lifteye plug
2. Lifteye plug M16 Bolts
3. Backup Eyebolt
Sliding Sleeve and
4.
alignment bolt or roll pin.
Keel plate M48nut and
5.
Orientation plate or
blocks
6. Frame and Seat base
7. Buoyancy
8. Landing Feet
9. Seat Harnesses
10. Seat Harnesses (sit-in)
11. Load Test Plate
12. Lifting Set
13. Documentation/ Report
NOTES:
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 4.4 - ANNUAL INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE Page 1 of 4
Diagrams
Refer to following diagrams in section 4.6 of this manual:
General Assembly 2 (GA2) Central Lifting Assembly

General Assembly 3(GA3) Seat Harness Assembly
General Assembly 4 (GA4) Buoyancy Assembly
Assembly Drawing 11 (F-ASY-11) Sling Anti-Fouling Assembly
Assembly Drawing 17 (F-ASY-17) Sling Anti-Fouling Assembly
Procedure
Complete all of the items detailed below followed by the inspection items on the six-monthly
inspection. All inspection should be carried out by a competent person.
1. Remove and visually inspect the Lifting Eye Plug for damage. Replace according to
the amount of usage of the Frog (*see below) or on recommendation from the
Competent Person/ inspector.
2. Remove and visually inspect the two M16 Lifting eye securing bolts for damage.
Visually inspect the two M16 holes in the Main support tube for damage.
Replace appropriate parts according to the amount of usage of the Frog (*see Table 1
below) or on recommendation from the Competent Person/ inspector. Bolt torque to
210N/m.
3. Visually inspect the Back-up Eyebolt, nut and split pin in situ.
Replace on recommendation from the Competent Person/ inspector. (*see ‘Other
replacement parts’ below)
4. Remove the Keel Plate Nut and visually check that the threads at the bottom of the
Main Support Tube are in good condition.
Replace appropriate parts according to the amount of usage of the Frog (*see Table 1
below) or on recommendation from the Competent Person/ inspector.
5. Remove and visually inspect the lifting sling.

Replace the sling set on recommendation from the Competent Person/ inspector or
every 24 Months irrespective of condition.
6. Carry out a full load test as prescribed in the Load Test Procedure (Sect 2.61).
7. Complete an inspection report on the above, which should be signed and dated by a
Competent person. (an example is attached overleaf)
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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* Frog Usage and Maintenance
Replacement of Frog parts is controlled on a risk based approach, whereby the higher the
usage of the Frog the more frequently parts should be replaced. Usage is defined in the table
below.
Table 1
Average transfer Recommended frequency of change Usage definition

frequency (per year) out of parts
<100 transfers Every 3 years Low Usage
100-500 transfers Every 2 years Normal Usage
> 500 transfer Annually High Usage
Notes:
Annual Inspections are still carried out per procedure for Normal and Low usage,
however provided the Annual Replacement Parts show no signs of damage or strain,
then they do not need to be changed out annually.
Records of non change-out should be recorded in the “Comment / Corrective Action”

column of the Annual Inspection Checklist. The table above indicates the
recommended frequency of change out of parts.
Sling must be replaced a minimum of every 24 months irrespective of usage
Operators opting for a lower frequency parts change out routine shall need to monitor
usage on a periodic basis to ensure that the low usage limits indicated in the table
above are not exceeded. Any doubt over the amount of transfers conducted then the
maintenance strategy should revert back to High Usage. This should also be
considered if there is any suspicion of impacts or overloads.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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Replacement Parts Kits
When ordering Replacement Parts Kits, it is important to ensure the correct kit is ordered for
the Frog in question. Prior to ordering the kit, establish the Frog Serial Number which is
stamped on the Load Test Data Plate. The Number is typically FS-xxx or FS-xxx-M40 where
xxx represents a three digit number starting at 001. The Part Numbers for the (5) Annual
Replacement Parts Kits are as follows and copies of the Tabulated Drawing are included after
this procedure.
Part Number Description

F-ASY-12 Standard Frog with M48 (Fine)Keel Plate Nut and Roll pin
F-ASY-12-M40 Low Temp Frog with M48 (Fine)Keel Plate Nut and Roll pin
F-ASY-15 Standard Frog with M48 (Coarse) Keel Plate Nut and Roll pin
F-ASY-18 Standard Frog with M48 Keel Boss and M10 Alignment Bolt
F-ASY-18-M40 Low Temp Frog with M48 Keel Boss and M10 Alignment Bolt
Other replacement parts
Part Part No. for Part No. for Replacement Frequency

Standard Frog Low-temp Frog
(FS01) (FS01-M40)
30ft Sling Set F-01-024 F-01-024-M40 Replace every 24 months or at
the request of Competent
person.
Back Up Eyebolt, F-01-026 , -085, F-01-026 , -085, Replace at the request of
Nut, Pin, and Seal -086, and-087 -086, and-087 Competent person
Foot Fender F-01-019 F-01-019 Replace at the request of
Competent person. See 6
month inspection procedure
point 8.
The maximum period prior to changing out the critical lifting components listed in the Annual
Inspection procedure shall be 3 years.
It should be noted that this recommendation applies to change out of components parts only
and does not replace or alter the inspection intervals as proscribed by the relevant legislation
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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ANNUAL INSPECTION CHECKLIST
Unit No. Frog Usage

(Transfers per year)
Inspection Date Prior Load Test Date
Inspected by/
Position
Signature
Check Description Pass/ Comment/ Corrective Action

No. Fail
Annual Inspection
1. Replace Lifting Eye Plug
2. Replace M16 Bolts
3. Backup Eyebolt
4. Replace Keel Plate Nut
5. Replace Sling
6. Load Test
7. Report/ Documentation
Six Monthly Inspection
1. Lifteye plug
2. Lifteye plug M16 Bolts
3. Backup Eyebolt
Sliding sleeve and
4.
Keel plate M48nut and
5. alignment bolt or roll pin.
Orientation plate or blocks
6. Frame and Seat base
7. Buoyancy
8. Landing Feet
9. Seat Harnesses
10. Seat Harnesses (sit-in)
11. Load Test Plate
12. Lifting Set
13. Report/ Documentation
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 4.5 - INSPECTION AFTER REPAIRS OR Page 1 of 1
MODIFICATIONS
The normal six monthly inspection as detailed in this manual.
Where the FROG has sustained substantial damage, a detailed Examination of the unit
should be carried out and details of all damage should be recorded in a “ Damage
Report”. Details of the cause of the damage should also be recorded, if known. If
damage to the frame has occurred, welds should be examined for cracks using dye
penetrant.
Details of all repairs or modifications carried out should be recorded and copies of
damage and repair/modifications reports should be sent to the party controlling the
use of the FROG and also to Reflex Marine Limited.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 4.6 - INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE DIAGRAMS Page 1 of 1
Attached:
General Assembly 2 (FS-GA2) – Central Lifting Assembly

General Assembly 3(FS-GA3) Rev 0 – Seat Harness Assembly, Earlier type.
General Assembly 3(FS-GA3)Rev A – Seat Harness Assembly, Later type.
General Assembly 4 (FS-GA4) – Buoyancy Assembly
Assembly Drawing 11 (F-ASY-11) Sling Anti-Fouling Assembly OR

Assembly Drawing 17 (F-ASY-17) – Improved Sling Anti-Fouling Assembly
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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EC DECLARATION OF CONFORMITY FOR MACHINERY

Equipment
Frog Personnel Transfer Capsule

Model No. FS01 and FS01-M40
Serial No.
Manufacturer
Reflex Marine Limited

Meridian House
Heron Way, Newham
Truro, TR1 2XN, UK
Provisions
This declaration states that the above mentioned equipment complies to the European
Council Directive 98/37/EC.
Notified Body
Det Norske Veritas Region Norge AS, ID No. 0434

Veritasveien 1
N-1322 HØVIK
NORWAY
Number of EC Type-Examination Certificate
DNV-2002-OSL-MD-0064
European Standards
European Standards EN 1050, EN292 Parts 1 & 2
National Technical Standards
BS 449 : Part 2 : 1969 : The use of Structural Steel in Building

BS 2830: 1994 : Suspended Chairs and Cradles for use in the Construction Industry
Signature (on behalf of the Manufacturer)
Philip Strong, Managing Director, Reflex Marine Ltd
GTM 6.01/Rev 2/20.07.05/AIG

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SUBJECT: 6.02 – EC TYPE EXAMINATION CERTIFICATE Page 1 of 1
EC Type examination certificate attached overleaf
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE

SECTION 6.05 RISK ASSESSMENT REVISION 2 - 10.06.02
EQUIPMENT FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE
COMPILED BY ANDREW GRIMES SIGNED:
PROJECT MANAGER
DATE 14-May-02
CHECKED BY ALEXANDER WATSON SIGNED:
OPERATIONS MANAGER
DATE
PLACE OF USE OFFSHORE OIL PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS TO AND FROM SUPPORT VESSELS
USER GROUPS OPERATORS – INSTALLATION SUPERVISOR, QUALIFIED CRANE OPERATOR, QUALIFIED BANKSMAN OR
PASSENGER – ALL CREW
MAINTENANCE – COMPETENT PERSON, EXPERIENCED LIFTING ENGINEER
PURPOSE OF USE PERSONNEL TRANSFERS FOR ROUTINE OPERATIONS
PERSONNEL TRANSFERS FOR EMERGENCY/ COMPASSIONATE REASONS
PRECAUTIONARY RIG EVACUATIONS
TRANSFER OF CASUALTIES (PROVISION FOR STRETCHER CASUALTY AND PARAMEDIC)
REFERENCES REFLEX MARINE FROG GENERAL TECHNICAL MANUAL
REFLEX MARINE FROG CLIENT TECHNICAL MANUAL
REFLEX MARINE FROG TRAINING VIDEO
SPARROWS DESIGN BOOK FOR FROG CAPSULE STRENGTH VERIFICATION
MIRA REPORT ON SPINAL INJURY RISK FOR FROG CAPSULE
EC MACHINERY DIRCTIVE 98/37/EC - ANNEX I ESSENTIAL HEALTH AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
BS EN 1050 SAFETY OF MACHINERY – PRINCIPLES OF RISK ASSESSMENT
BS EN 292 PARTS 1 & 2 SAFETY OF MACHINERY – BASIC CONCEPTS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGN
LIMITS OF MACHINERY
OPERATING CONDITIONS Please refer to section 3.2 of Technical Manual

LOAD SAFE WORKING LOAD = 330 KG (3 PERSONS PLUS 60KG LUGGAGE)
VERTICAL IMPACT 4 m/s = anticipated maximum impact due to crane velocity and vessel heave
HORIZONTAL IMPACT 2 m/s = anticipated maximum impact due to crane velocity
TEMPERATURE FS01: +50 C° TO -20 C° , FS01-M40: +50 C °TO -40 C°
DEFINITION OF ROLES (Technical File Reference)

SUPERVISOR OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSFER
PRE-TRANSFER HAZARD ANALYSIS (Section 3.3)
PLANNING TRANSFER (Section 3.3)
INSTRUCTION OF ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN TRANSFER (Section 3.3)
PRE-TRANSFER INSPECTION CONTROL (Section 3.5)
CRANE OPERATOR ASSIST IN PLANNING OF TRANSFER (Section 3.3)
ASSESS WIND, SEA AND WEATHER CONDITIONS (Section 3.2)
CONDUCTING TRANSFER (Section 3.5, Section 3.6)
COMMUNICATION WITH DECK CREW (Section 3.5)
COMMUNICATION WITH VESSEL MASTER (Section 3.5)
BANKSMAN/ DECK CREW HANDLING FROG DURING LIFT-OFF AND LANDING (Section 3.5, Section 3.7)
COMMUNICATION WITH CRANE OPERATOR (Section 3.5)
COMMUNICATION WITH VESSEL MASTER (Section 3.5)
COMMUNICATION WITH PASSENGERS (Section 3.5)
PASSENGER ENSURE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IS WORN (Section 3.5)
COMMUNICATION WITH DECK CREW (Section 3.5)
OBSERVATION AND AWARENESS TO HAZARDS (Section 3.5)
STORAGE OF LUGGAGE (Section 3.8)
MAINTENANCE PERIODIC INSPECTION OF UNIT (Section 4)
6.05 Risk Assessment Rev2, WORKSHEET 1 of 4 Page 1 of 1

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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION/ INITIAL RISK
RISK I.D. EN 1050 REF INITIAL RISK

OPERATOR (S) PERSONNEL EXPOSED (S) TASK HAZARD CAUSE/ FAILURE MODE SEVERITY PROBABILITY
NO. ANNEX A. LEVEL
MECHANICAL HAZARDS 1
Passenger/ Deck Crew Fingers getting trapped between
1 PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - CRUSHING 1.1 2 2 4
buoyancy blocks
2 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - ENTANGLEMENT 1.4 Personnel Entanglement With Sling 3 3 9
Passengers/ Deck Crew trapped between FROG and fixed

3 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - TRAPPING 1.5 3 2 6
object. Includes use of Tagline.
4 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Overload Mechanical Failure Leading To FROG Falling 5 1 5
5 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Corrosion Mechanical Failure Leading To FROG Falling 5 1 5
6 CRANE OPERATOR , DECK CREW DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - HANDLING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Crush Injury Deck Crew Handling Unit 4 2 8
7 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Side Impact – Injury Of Passenger 3 2 6
8 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Vertical Impact - Heavy Landing 2 3 6
9 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Water Impact - FROG Immersion Into Sea 2 1 2
10 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Crane Boom Failure 5 1 5
11 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Capsule Toppling Over Due To Vessel Movement 3 2 6
Stability - Capsule turning over due to horizontal speed at

12 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 3 2 6
touch down
13 CRANE OPERATOR , PASSENGER PASSENGER OPERATION TRANSFER MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Impact on passengers body parts outside frog 3 2 6
14 CRANE OPERATOR, DECK CREW PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL - IMPACT 1.6 Poor friction on deck surface i.e. ice leading to sliding 3 2 6
15 MECHANICAL - STABBING 1.7 N/A 0

16 MECHANICAL - ABRASION 1.8 N/A 0
17 MECHANICAL - PRESSURE EJECTION 1.9 N/A 0
18 ELECTRICAL HAZARDS 2 N/A 0
19 THERMAL HAZARDS 3 N/A 0
20 HAZARDS GENERATED BY NOISE 4 N/A 0
21 HAZARDS GENERATED BY VIBRATION 5 N/A 0
22 HAZARDS GENERATED BY RADIATION 6 N/A 0
HAZARDS GENERAYTED BY MATERIALS AND
23 7 N/A 0
SUBSTANCES
HAZARDS GENERATED BY NEGLECTING

24 8 0
ERGONOMIC PRINCIPLES IN MACHINERY DESIGN
ERGONOMIC - NO PERSONAL PROTECTIVE

25 8.3 Hazard from Falling objects/ Immersion in water 3 2 6
EQUIPMENT
26 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER ERGONOMIC - STRESS 8.5 Hazard from Vertigo Sufferers 1 2 2
27 COMBINATION OF HAZARDS 9 N/A 0
UNEXPECTED START-UP, ENEXPECTED OVER-
28 10 N/A 0
RUN/ OVER SPEED

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NO. ANNEX A. LEVEL
UNEXPECTED START-UP - FAILURE OF CONTROL

29 10.1 N/A 0
SYSTEM
30 UNEXPECTED START-UP - ENVIRONMENT 10.4 N/A 0
IMPOSSIBILITY OF STOPPING MACHINE IN THE
31 11 N/A 0
BEST POSSIBLE POSITION
VARIATIONS IN THE ROTATIONAL SPEED OF
32 12 N/A 0
TOOLS
33 FAILURE OF THE POWER SUPPLY 13 N/A 0
34 FAILURE OF THE CONTROL CIRCUIT 14 N/A 0
35 ERRORS OF FITTING 15 N/A 0
36 BREAK-UP DURING OPERATION 16 N/A 0
37 PASSENGER DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER FALLING OR EJECTED OBJECTS OR FLUIDS 17 Luggage items falling from carrier 3 2 6
LOSS OF STABILITY/ OVERTURNING OF

38 18 see 71 0
MACHINERY
39 0
40 PASSENGER PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING SLIP, TRIP, FALL (RELATED TO THE MACHINERY) 19 Passenger trip on entry and exit of Frog 2 2 4
41 RELATING TO THE TRAVELLING FUNCTION 20 N/A 0

42 LINKED TO THE WORK POSITION 21 0
43 FALL DURING ACCESS 21.1 see 40 0
MECHANICAL HAZARDS WORK POSITION - ROLL
44 21.4 0
OVER
45 INSUFFICIENT VISIBILITY AT WORK POSITION 21.5 0
Passengers suffering from dizziness, or otherwise getting hurt

46 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER INADEQUATE LIGHTING 21.6 1 2 2
due to capsule rotation.
47 NOISE AT WORK POSITION 21.8 N/A 0
48 DUE TO CONTROL SYSTEM 22 N/A 0
49 FROM HANDLING THE MACHINE 23 see 6 0
DUE TO POWER SOURCE AND TO THE
50 24 N/A 0
TRANSMISSION OF POWER
51 FROM/ TO THIRD PERSONS 25 N/A 0
INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DRIVER/
52 26 N/A 0
OPERATOR
53 ADDITIONAL HAZARDS DUE TO LIFTING 27 0
54 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - LANDING MECHANICAL HAZARDS - LACK OF STABILITY 27.1.1 Passenger exiting in dangerous direction 3 2 6
55 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER OPERATION - TRANSFER - INCIDENT MECHANICAL HAZARDS - OVERLOADING 27.1.2 passengers getting struck by wave 0
MECHANCAL HAZARDS - UNEXPECTED Maintenance checking lifing points requires ladder - Undue
56 INSPECTOR INSPECTOR PERIODIC INSPECTION 27.1.4 2 1 2
MOVEMENTS OF LOADS care taken
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - INADEQUATE HOLDING
57 27.1.5 N/A 0
DEVICES/ ACCESSORIES
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - INSUFFICIENT
58 27.4 see 4 0
MECHANICAL STRENGTH OF PARTS
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - INADEQUATE
59 SELECTION OF LIFTING ACCESSORIES AND 27.6 see 4 0
INTEGRATION WITH MACHINE
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - FROM ABNORMAL
60 CONDITIONS OF ASSEMBLY/ TEST/ USE / 27.8 See 72-75 0
MAINTENANCE

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NO. ANNEX A. LEVEL
61 ELECTRICAL HAZARD FROM LIGHTING 28 N/A 0
HAZARDS GENERATED FROM NEGLECTING

62 29 0
ERGONOMIC PRINCIPLES
ERGONOMIC HAZARD - INSUFFICIENT VISIBILITY

63 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER 29.1 Impact hazards due to unsighted Crane Operator 4 1 4
FOR DRIVING POSITION
MECHANICAL HAZARDS AND HAZARDOUS
64 30 see 1 - 17 0
EVENTS
65 RESTRICTED MOVEMENTS OF PERSON 31 N/A 0
For low temp unit dynex sling may lead to build up of static
66 ALL ALL OPERATION TRANSFER FIRE AND EXPLOSION 32 4 2 8
charge on Frog leading to spark at touchdown
67 EMMISION OF DUST, GASES ETC. 33 N/A 0
ADDITIONAL HAZARDS DUE TO LIFTING
68 34 0
PERSONS
MECHANICAL HAZARDS - INSUFFICIENT
69 MECHANICAL STRENGTH - WORKING 34.1 see 4 0
COEFFICIENTS
70 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER FALLING OF PERSON FROM PERSON CARRIER 35 Falling Passenger from Carrier 4 1 4
FALLING OR OVERTURNING OF PERSON Overturning of Frog Due to Vessel Movement/ Insufficient

71 CRANE OPERATOR PASSENGER, DECK CREW OPERATION - TRANSFER 36 3 2 6
CARRIER Lifting set slack
72 HUMAN ERROR/ HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 37 Insufficient Pre-transfer Risk Assessment 4 2 8
73 Insufficient Pre-transfer Inspection 4 2 8
74 Passenger Error, Seat Harness Incorrectly fitted 4 2 8
75 Passeneger Error,/ Deck Crew Error signalling 'All Clear' 4 1 4

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CONTROL MEASURES/ RESIDUAL RISK
RISK I.D.
CAUSE/ FAILURE MODE RISK REDUCTION METHOD SEVERITY PROBABILITY RESIDUAL RISK LEVEL PERSON RESPONSIBLE STATUS
NO.
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 - Operating Instructions
1 Passenger/ Deck Crew Fingers getting trapped between buoyancy blocks 2 1 2 SUPERVISOR, PASSENGER
Instruction - Notice - 2.35 Product Labelling
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 - Operating Instructions SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR, DECK
2 Personnel Entanglement With Sling 3 1 3
Instruction - Training Video CREW
Passengers/ Deck Crew trapped between FROG and fixed object. Includes Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR, DECK
3 3 1 3
the use of Taglines. Instruction - Manual - 3.7 - Tag Lines CREW
Instructions - Notice - 2.35 Product Labelling
4 Overload Mechanical Failure Leading To FROG Falling 5 1 5
Design - Manual - 6.3 - Engineering Design Calculations
5 Corrosion Mechanical Failure Leading To FROG Falling Design - Manual - 2.1 - General Description 5 1 5
SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR, DECK
6 Crush Injury Deck Crew Handling Unit Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction 4 1 4
CREW
7 Side Impact – Injury Of Passenger Design - Manual - 6.3 - Engineering Design Calculations 3 1 3
8 Vertical Impact - Heavy Landing Design - Manual - 6.3 - Engineering Design Calculations 2 1 2
9 Water Impact - FROG Immersion Into Sea Design - Manual - 6.7 - Wave Pool Test 2 1 2
10 Crane Boom Failure Instruction - Manual - 3.2 -Operating Envelope 5 1 5
Instruction - Manual - 3.2 -Operating Envelope
11 Capsule Toppling Over Due To Vessel Movement Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction 3 1 3 SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR
Instruction - Manual - 3.6 - Crane Operator Guidance
12 Stability - Capsule turning over due to horizontal speed at touch down Instruction - Manual - 3.2 -Operating Envelope 3 1 3
13 Impact on passengers body parts outside frog Instruction - Notice - 2.35 Product Labelling 3 1 3 PASSENGER
Instruction - Manual - 3.2 -Operating Envelope SUPERISOR, CRANE OPERATOR, DECK
14 Poor friction on deck surface i.e. ice leading to sliding 3 1 3
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction CREW
15 N/A 0
16 N/A 0
17 N/A 0
18 N/A 0
19 N/A 0
20 N/A 0
21 N/A 0
22 N/A 0
23 N/A 0
24 0
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instructions
25 Hazard from Falling objects/ Immersion in water 3 1 3
Instruction - Manual -3.8 Luggage Storage
26 Hazard from Vertigo Sufferers - 1 2 2
27 N/A 0
28 N/A 0
29 N/A 0
30 N/A 0
31 N/A 0
32 N/A 0
33 N/A 0

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RISK I.D.
NO.
34 N/A 0
35 N/A 0
36 N/A 0
37 Luggage items falling from carrier Instruction - Manual - 3.8 - Luggage Storage 3 1 3 PASSENGER
38 see 71 0
39 N/A 0
40 Passenger trip on entry and exit of Frog Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instructions 2 2 4 PASSENGER, DECK CREW
41 N/A 0
42 N/A 0
43 see 40 0
44 N/A 0
45 N/A 0
Passengers suffering from dizziness, or otherwise getting hurt due to Design - Manual - 2.1 - General Description
46 1 1 1
capsule rotation. Instruction - Manual - 3.2 - Operating Envelope
47 N/A 0
48 N/A 0
49 see 6 0
50 N/A 0
51 N/A 0
52 N/A 0
53 N/A 0
54 Passenger exiting in dangerous direction Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instructions 3 2 6 DECK CREW, PASSENGER
55 passengers getting struck by wave Design - Manual - 2.1 - General Description 2 1 2
56 Maintenance checking lifing points requires ladder - 2 1 2
57 N/A 0
58 see 4 0
59 see 4 0
60 See 72-75 0
61 N/A 0
62 N/A 0
63 Impact hazards due to unsighted Crane Operator 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, CRANE OPERATOR
Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction
64 see 1 - 17 0
65 N/A 0
For low temp unit. Dynex sling isolates FROG and may cause build up of
66 Design - Manual - 2.65 Subzero Unit Specification 4 1 4
static charge on Frog leading to spark at touchdown
67 N/A 0
68 N/A 0
69 see 4 0
Design - Manual - 2.1 - General Description
70 Falling Passenger from Carrier Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, PASSENGER
Instruction - Training Video

Instruction - Manual - 3.5 -Operating Instruction
71 Overturning of Frog Due to Vessel Movement/ Insufficient Lifting set slack 3 1 3 SUPERVISOR, CRANE OPERATOR
Instruction - Manual - 3.6 - Crane Operator Guidance
72 Insufficient Pre-transfer Risk Assessment Instruction - Manual - 3.3 - Pre-transfer Planning 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, CRANE OPERATOR

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RISK I.D.
NO.
Instruction - Manual - 3.3 - Pre-transfer Planning
73 Insufficient Pre-transfer Inspection Instruction - Manual - 3.5 - Operating Instructions 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, INSPECTOR
74 Passenger Error, Seat Harness Incorrectly fitted Instruction - Training Video 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, PASSENGER
75 Passeneger Error,/ Deck Crew Error signalling 'All Clear' Instruction - Manual - 3.5 - Operating Instructions 4 1 4 SUPERVISOR, DECK CREW, PASSENGER

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Severity
1 Negligible - Negligible injury, no absence from work Minor damage No significant impact on environment
2 Slight - Minor injury requiring first aid treatment Moderate damage Minor impact on the environment
3 Moderate - Injury leading to lost time accident Significant damage Moderate pollution
4 High - Single fatality or multiple serious injury Limited structural damage Severe but localised pollution
5 Very high - Multiple fatality Major structural damage Major pollution
Likelihood
1 Very unlikely A freak combination of factors would be required for an incident to occur
2 Unlikely A rare combination of factors would be required for an incident to occur
3 Possible Could happen when additional factors are present but otherwise unlikely to occur
4 Likely Not certain to happen, but an additional factor may result in an accident
5 Very likely Almost inevitable that an accident would result
Risk Rating (SxL)

1 TO 6 Low May be acceptable; however, review task to see if risk can be reduced further.
Task should only proceed with appropriate management authorisation after consultation with
7 TO 14 Medium specialist personnel and assessment team. Where possible, the task should be redefined to take
account of the hazards involved or the risk should be reduced further prior to commencement
Task must not proceed. It should be redefined or further control measures put in place to reduce the
15 TO 25 High risk. The controls should be re-assessed for adequacy prior to task commencement.

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SUBJECT: 6.1 LEGISLATIVE AND INDUSTRY STANDARDS Page 1 of 4
Review of lifting regulations (LOLER 98)

Application to marine personnel transfers
Introduction
New lifting regulations (LOLER 98) were introduced in the UK on 5th December 98.
These laws have specific impact on ‘marine transfer operations’, affecting:
i. The design of equipment used for lifting personnel transfers.

ii. How operations should be planned and conducted.
iii. How the equipment should be preserved and maintained.
The comments below pertain to the Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment
Regulations 1998 (LOLER 98), as well as the Approved Code of Practice and
Guidance issues by the HSE1. Bold italic sections are quoted from the regulations.
The section in standard italics are quoted either from the Approved Codes of Practice
(ACOP) or the HSE guidance notes.
Relevant extracts from regulations
LOLER 98 - Regulation 5
(1) Every employer shall ensure that lifting equipment for lifting persons –
a) Subject to paragraph b), is such as to prevent a person using it being crushed,

trapped or struck or falling from the carrier;
b) is such as to prevent so far as it is reasonably practical a person using it, while

carrying out activities from the carrier, being crushed, trapped or struck or
falling from the carrier;
Comments - This regulation probably has the greatest bearing on marine

personnel transfers. Paragraph a) is considered to be the relevant part; since
paragraph b) refers to ‘carrying out activities from the carrier’, which would
not apply to personnel transfers. The design of traditional personnel baskets
does not prevent a person from falling nor being struck against a structure.
Indeed accidents of this nature have occurred, resulting in fatalities.
In conclusion it appears that regulation 5 (1) a) effectively outlaws the use of

traditional rope baskets.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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Guidance 5 (1) Article 147
As part of the risk assessment carried out to satisfy your duties under the
Management Regulations, you should assess the risks arising from other work
equipment, structures or objects which the person being lifting may strike.
Fully enclosed carriers and falling objects protection on carriers can reduce
the risks in such circumstances. They should be used wherever there is a need
provided that it is reasonably practical to do so, taking into account the nature
of the work involved.
Comments - The use of traditional personnel basket transfers does not appear
to comply with this guideline.
PUWER 98 Regulation 4(1) - (2) (refer to Page 12 of reference below)
(1) Every employer shall ensure that work equipment is so constructed or adapted
as to be suitable for the purpose for which it is to be used or provided.
(2) In selecting work equipment, every employer shall have regard to the working
conditions and the risks to health and safety of persons which exist in the
premises or undertaking in which that work equipment is to be used and any
additional risks posed by the use of that work equipment.
Comment - It is doubtful whether the provision of rope baskets for personnel

transfers would comply with the above regulations.
ACOP 3 – Article 68
Where a person is required to be present on any part of the lifting equipment

e.g for operational, maintenance, or inspection purposes, the working place,
particularly if a platform, for that activity should be such as to minimise the
risks of accidents arising from slips, trips or falls.
Comment - The design of traditional personnel baskets does not prevent a

person from falling. The new generation of personnel transfer capsules does
not specifically provide edge protection, but personnel are strapped in with
harnesses which achieve the same purpose as edge protection. Articles 70 – 76
outline the requirements for edge protection to prevent falls and to protect
persons from falling objects.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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LOLER 98 - Regulation 8
(1) Every employer shall ensure that every lifting operation involving
lifting equipment is –
a) properly planned by a competent person;
b) appropriately supervised;
c) carried out in a safe manner
Comments
A large proportion of this regulation as well as the associated ACOPs and

guidance are highly relevant to marine personnel transfers. The key aspects
are :-
i. The requirement for a competent person to carry out risk assessments on

specific types of lifting operations (refer to Articles 210–212).
ii. The duty of the employer to provide suitably designed equipment for use in
the workplace (refer to Article 214). Provision of traditional personnel basket is
unlikely to meet this requirement.
iii. The requirement to properly plan lifting operations (refer to Article 217,
particularly parts e) and f), also Article 221).
iv. The requirement to provide appropriate information, instruction, training and

supervision for lifting operations (this is broadly covered in Section 8
Organisation of lifting operations, Articles 227 and 228 are of particular
relevance).
v. The requirement to take full account of the proximity of other hazards and
environment in which the operation are to take place, including variable factors
such as meteorological conditions (Article 253 and 265).
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
1. It is the responsibility of an employer to provide equipment to the work site that

complies with the new regulations. LOLER 98 Regulation 5 (1) a) states that
‘Every employer shall ensure that lifting equipment for lifting persons ...... is
such as to prevent a person using it being crushed, trapped or struck or falling
from the carrier’. The design of traditional personnel basket does not prevent a
person from falling nor being struck against a structure. Indeed accidents of this
nature have occurred, resulting in fatalities.
Employers providing traditional ‘rope’ personnel transfer baskets do not appear to

comply with this obligation. This view is reinforced by a number of other Articles,
in particular Article 214.
The newer style of personnel transfer capsule (i.e the Frog) now on the market
does appear to comply with Regulation 5.
2. There are a large number of variables involved in personnel transfers offshore,

which include :-
a) Position of the crane performing the lift

b) Position of the vessel to/from which the transfer will be performed
c) Wind and sea conditions
d) Available deck space for landing
e) Visibility (line of sight of crane operator and persons supervising lifts,
lighting etc)
Given this scenario it is considered that the most effective way to ensure safe
operations and to demonstrate compliance with the law is to formerly plan
each lift (or sequence of lifts). It is recommended that employers utilise a
‘transfer log’ similar to that attached, as an aid to planning and to provide a
record demonstrating the adequate planning of operations.
Reference 1. Safe use of lifting equipment, Health & Safety Commission, L113,
HSE Books, 1998
Pas / RM / 9Z Loler summary / 18.12.99
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 6.20 INDEPENDENT DESIGN REVIEW Page 1 of 1
Attached is a copy of the Bureau Veritas design review certificate, covering FA-01
and FS-01 type units.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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SUBJECT: 6.22 MIRA IMPACT ANAYSIS Page 1 of 2
Background
Crash impact experts from Motor Industry Research Association (MIRA) were
contracted to study the biomechanical effects of passengers associated with the impact
scenarios identified in the Risk Assessment. Their findings demonstrated a high level
of protection offered by the Frog (which would greatly exceed the protection offered
by a traditional rope transfer basket). Risks to passengers associated with impacts
within the maximum operating envelope for the unit were generally shown to be low.
The following MIRA reports are included in the GTM for reference. In summary the
finding were as follows:
Vertical Impact Assessment
A vertical impact assessment was carried out for lumbar spine injury and cervical
spine injury under the most extreme operating conditions defined for the Frog. Injury
criteria were derived from 'Biomechanical Data' sourced by MIRA. The main
assumptions relating to the work case scenario were as follows:
# Maximum relative impact velocity 4.0 m/s
# Single passenger (increased spring deceleration)
# Extreme weather limit - Significant wave height 2 m. (Platform to Vessel
transfer)
# Maximum crane hook velocity 2.2 m/s
# 5th percentile female passenger (group with highest injury risk)
# 1kg Headgear representing heaviest offshore Hardhat type.
The assumptions (in particular the Crane Hook Velocity) are all pessimistic, and the
risk of this extreme impact scenario is very low.
Conclusion
The assessment indicates that, given the parameters above, the risk of lumbar spine
injury is less than 0.2%.
Forces in the cervical spine caused by the same acceleration indicate that a seated
occupant may experience 30% of the Injury Assessment Reference Value (IARV) for
continuous loading (>27ms) and 8% IARV for brief loading (0ms). Therefore
passengers do not suffer a significant risk of neck injury.

Reflex Marine Ltd.
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SUBJECT: 6.22 MIRA IMPACT ANAYSIS Page 2 of 2
Lateral Impact Assessment

A lateral impact assessment was carried out for the most extreme operating conditions
defined for the Frog. Injury criteria were derived from 'Biomechanical Data' sourced
by MIRA. The main assumptions relating to the worst case scenario were as follows:
# Extreme weather limit - Significant wave height 2m.
# Passenger transfer from an 'unstable' support vessel.
# Crane line angle of 4 degrees (extreme pick up scenario)
# Impact occurring at maximum load velocity - striking an object at mid-
pendulum swing (4m away from the pick up point).
# 5th percentile female passenger (group with highest risk of injury)
# 95th percentile male head mass (group with the largest head mass)
# Head effectively clamped at the shoulders (no reduction in loads due to seat
belt / torso movement)
These assumptions are all pessimistic (the restrained shoulder in particular result in a
gross overestimate of injury potential). The risk of this type of extreme impact is
therefore assumed to be very low.
It should also be noted that the Frog seat design provides comprehensive protection
against the higher lateral impact risk (whiplash injury).
Conclusion
The assessment concluded that in the above circumstances risk level is below the
injury threshold - 40 % IARV for continuous load, 14% for brief (0ms) loading.
Therefore the seated occupant is unlikely to suffer neck injury as a result of these
conditions.

Reflex Marine Ltd.
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SUBJECT: 6.25 INDEPENDENT RISK ANALYSIS Page 1 of 1
Attached is a copy of the Det Norske Veritas operational risk assessment report.
Reflex Marine Ltd.

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____________________________ ____________________________
HELICOPTER / PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE

COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
______________________________________________________________________
Prepared for
Austal Ships and Reflex Marine
Revision 1
Det Norske Veritas

(DNV Project Number 93105011)
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July 2005
Austal Ships
Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
Client: Austal Ships Client Contract No:
Title of Report: Helicopter / Personnel Transfer Capsule Comparative Risk Assessment
Indexing Terms: Helicopter, Personnel Transfer Basket, Crew Boat
Summary: Comparative risk assessment of transfers to / from offshore installations

by helicopter and personnel transfer capsule (PTC).
Work Carried Out By: Martin Holley
DNV Project No. Prepared by: Approved by:
93105011 M. Holley S. Robertson
Document Revision Record
Rev No Issue Date Reason for Issue Prepared by Approved by

0 12 Jan 00 Preliminary issue for comment MGH SJR
1 9 Mar 00 Including client comments MGH SJR
Det Norske Veritas

Queensgate Centre
8 William Street
Fremantle WA 6160
Tel. +61 8 9239 7666
http://www.dnv.com/
Revision 1 \\jenny_dell\reflex marine central files\400 technical and design\410 technical manual file\418 gtm rev 18 - wip july
2005\gtm 18 unchanged original word and excel files unsigned\6.25 dnv comparative risk assessment.doc
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Det Norske Veritas RANZ
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2 Pages)

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 The Frog ............................................................................................................................ 1
2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION .................................................................................................. 3
3. HELICOPTER INCIDENT DATA............................................................................................ 6
4. PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE INCIDENT DATA..................................................... 8
4.1 Dropped Object Incident Data (Reference 5).................................................................... 9
5. REVIEW OF WORLD-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL DATA ................................................. 11
6. COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................................. 13
6.1 Personnel Transfer Capsule Risks................................................................................... 13
6.2 Helicopter Transfer Risks ............................................................................................... 14
6.3 Risk Comparison............................................................................................................. 15
7. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................... 16
8. REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 17
APPENDIX I QUALITATIVE RISK RANKING MATRIX (1 Page)

APPENDIX II CAUSES OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS (1 Page)
APPENDIX III PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE INFORMATION (3 Pages)
APPENDIX IV CREW BOAT INFORMATION (2 Pages)
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Austal Ships
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Austal Ships have developed a design for a High Speed Crew and Supply Vessel. One method of
transferring personnel from the vessel to an offshore installation is by personnel transfer capsule.
Reflex Marine of Aberdeen manufacture such a transfer capsule, commonly referred to as The Frog.
The Frog was designed to replace the traditional transfer basket and a number of units are already in
use around the world.
This report commissioned by Austal Ships and Reflex Marine details an independent comparative
risk assessment of transferring personnel to/from offshore installations using the transfer capsule
compared to traditional helicopter transfer. The scope of the study has been limited to the actual
transfer of personnel to/from the installation and does not include the transit phase to/from the
shore.
The Frog personnel transfer capsule is specifically designed for the transfer of personnel from
offshore support vessels to and from offshore installations. The Frog's design features address the
following hazards associated with such transfers:
x falling out of the capsule
x heavy landings
x landing and swinging impacts; and
x immersion.
The major residual accident event is the dropping of the capsule during the transfer so that it
impacts the vessel, installation or the sea at velocities greater than the design impact velocity of
4m/s. The risks associated with this low probability event have been assessed relative to the risks
associated with helicopter transfer.
A summary of the comparative risks is presented in the following table. The results are based on
transferring a total of 18 personnel.
Risk Indicators Personnel Helicopter

Capsule
North Sea and Rest of the
Australia World
Probability of an accident 3.0 x 10-5 2.4 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-6
Probability of an individual being 2.9 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-6
injured
Probability of an individual 0.2 x 10-6 0.2 x 10-6 0.6 x 10-6
becoming a fatality
Total potential loss of life 3.6 x 10-6 4.1 x 10-6 11.3 x 10-6
The probability of an accident per lift of a personnel transfer capsule is similar to that per helicopter
take-off and landing (of the order of 10-6 per operation). However, because to transfer a given
number of personnel (18 in this example) multiple lifts of the transfer capsule would be required,
the total probability of an accident is greater for transfer by personnel capsule than by helicopter.
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Austal Ships
On the same basis a helicopter accident is likely to involve more people (higher capacity) than an
accident involving a personnel transfer capsule. Consequently the risk to an individual per transfer
(injury or fatality risk) is similar, whether transferred by helicopter or personnel transfer capsule.
The statistics for helicopter accidents world-wide do show an approximate three-fold increase for
fatalities in the Rest of the World compared to the North Sea and Australia. The reasons for this are
not analysed but could include factors such as type and specification of helicopters used (e.g. single
or twin engine), provision of emergency response services, and maintenance. Consequently the
risks of transfer by personnel transfer capsule are less than the risks of helicopter transfer in the
Rest of the World.
The results for transfer by personnel capsule are subject to a relatively high degree of uncertainty.
This is primarily due to the lack of data with respect to transfer by personnel capsule. However,
given that the Frog has a number of design features to mitigate the identified hazards, and that when
lifting fellow workers following documented procedures the likelihood of an incident is likely to be
considerably lower than for normal crane operations, the risks associated with transfer by personnel
capsule may be overestimated. Therefore, although a firm conclusion as to which method is safer
cannot be drawn, it is considered likely that transfer by personnel capsule is safer than by
helicopter.
Other factors such as availability, ease of operation and cost are also likely to be key in the decision
making process.
The scope of this study was limited to the actual transfer of personnel to/from the installation and
does not include the transit phase to/from the shore. The results should be considered accordingly.
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Austal Ships
1. INTRODUCTION
Austal Ships have developed a design for a High Speed Crew and Supply Vessel (see
Appendix IV for details). One method of transferring personnel from the vessel to an
offshore installation is by personnel transfer capsule. Reflex Marine of Aberdeen
manufacture such a transfer capsule, commonly referred to as The Frog. The Frog was
designed to replace the traditional transfer basket and a number of units are already in use
around the world.
Austal Ships and Reflex Marine have commissioned DNV to undertake an independent
comparative risk assessment of transferring personnel to/from offshore installations using
the transfer capsule compared to traditional helicopter transfer. The scope of the study has
been limited to the actual transfer of personnel to/from the installation and does not include
the transit phase to/from the shore.
1.1 The Frog

The Frog is a transfer capsule designed to replace the traditional transfer basket. It provides
a method of transferring 3 personnel at a time to support vessels and back again. The
construction comprises two main assemblies - an outer framework, which provides
buoyancy and protection of personnel and a sprung seating assembly mounted on a central
column.
The outer framework protects passengers from impacts and contains buoyant blocks to
ensure that the Frog floats and is self-righting in water. The outer shell lands on three tripod
feet, which provide shock absorption and ensure that the Frog is stable on uneven surfaces
or when landing on a heaving vessel. The outer shell has three large open access ways.
During transit, passengers are secured in full bucket seats, with full harnesses to protect
them against whiplash and falling. The seats are mounted on a sprung carriageway to
provide protection against heavy landings.
Figure 1.1 shows a Frog being lowered onto a supply vessel. Further details of the transfer
capsule are provided in Appendix III.
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Austal Ships
FIGURE 1.1 : THE FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE
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Austal Ships
2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
A desk top hazard identification exercise has been undertaken to identify and qualitatively
review hazards associated with helicopter and personnel capsule transfer to/from the
installation.
The risk associated with each hazard has been qualitatively assessed using a 5x5 matrix as
presented in Appendix I. The risk categories are defined as follows:
x Low - The risk is broadly acceptable and no further risk treatment would be required
x Medium - The risk is tolerable if As Low As Reasonably Practicable
x High - The risk is unacceptable and further risk reduction measures are required
Hazard Typical Risk Control Measures Qualitative Risk

Assessment
Personnel Transfer Capsule
Heavy landing Designed so that both the Frog and passengers Freq - Probable
can safely withstand a vertical impact of 4m/s Conseq - Minor
Spring mounted dampened seating assembly
Risk - Low
Three tripod feet provide shock absorption
Certified and experienced crane operators
Heaving vessel Spring mounted dampened seating assembly Freq - Occasional
impacting capsule and three tripod feet provide shock absorption Conseq - Minor
during pick-up during pick-up
Risk - Low
Typically environmental operating limits for
transfer operations would include sea state
Dropped capsule Certified and experienced crane operators Freq - V. Remote
Onto installation Lifting equipment routinely inspected and Conseq - Major
Onto vessel certified Risk - Medium
Environmental operating limits for transfer
Into sea
operations
Crane operating procedures minimise height
of capsule above installation deck
Buoyancy distribution ensures that the
capsule will float and self right in the event of
immersion
Large access openings for easy escape
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July 2005 4
Austal Ships

Assessment
Swinging capsule Stainless steel outer framework designed to Freq - Remote
withstand 4m/s lateral impact
Conseq - Moderate
Risk - Low
Crane operating procedures
Environmental operating limits for transfer
operations
Falling out of Individual seats with four point harnesses Freq - V. Remote
capsule Conseq - Major
Risk - Medium
Crane/boom failure Due to relatively light load (Maximum gross Freq - V. Remote
weight 870kg) this scenario is only
Conseq - Critical
considered credible if the lift catches on the
vessel. Dedicated transfer area at stern of Risk - Medium
vessel reduces likelihood
Crew boat Light weight, responsive and highly Freq - Remote
impacting manoeuvrable crew boat with a waterjet Conseq - Minor
installation control system and catamaran configuration.
Risk - Low
Possible DP and bow thruster
Certified operator
Crew boat will only enter installation
exclusion zone after gaining permission from
the installation
Installation designed to withstand minor
impacts from crew boats/supply vessels
Deck crew struck Lightweight sling disconnect system Freq - Remote
by capsule, sling or Experienced and trained deck crew
Conseq - Moderate
crane cable via
weather or mal- Risk - Low
operation
Helicopter Transfer
Helicopter ditching Causes of helicopter accidents and typical risk Freq - V. Remote
control measures are well documented. It is Conseq - Moderate
not the intent of this study to identify or
Risk - Low
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July 2005 5
Austal Ships

Assessment
assess helicopter accidents in detail. However Freq - V. Remote
Helicopter crash
for completeness a list of causes of helicopter
into sea or into
accidents in the North Sea, 1970 to 1995 is Conseq - Critical
installation
included in Appendix II. Risk - Medium
Heavy landing As above Freq - Occasional
Conseq - Moderate
Risk - Medium
Rotor blade Freq - V. Remote
impacting person Conseq - Major
on helideck
Risk - Medium
Helicopter fire Freq - V. Remote
Conseq - Critical
Risk - Medium
Man overboard Freq - V. Remote
from helideck Conseq - Major
Risk - Medium
The identified Personnel Transfer Capsule hazards are all assessed as low or medium risk.
The hazards assessed as medium risk are:
x Dropped capsule - this and crane/boom failure are the most severe hazard scenarios and
have the potential to result in multiple fatalities. Dropped objects are well documented
as hazardous events in offshore operations and this scenario is assessed in more detail in
Section 6.
x Crane/boom failure - due to the relatively light load this event is only considered
credible if the lift catches on the vessel, however the Frog's tapered shape is designed to
deflect it away from any structure and prevent it from snagging while being hoisted. In
the event crane/boom failure were to occur the event could be catastrophic. As for
dropped capsule this scenario is assessed in more detail in Section 6.
x Falling out of the capsule - the capsule is fitted with four point harnesses to prevent
individuals falling out. Although it is conceivable that due to human error an individual
were to fall out of the capsule it is considered very remote and hence this event is not
considered further.
The helicopter accident scenarios are generally assessed as medium risk. This is in
accordance with historical evidence, which shows helicopter travel as one of the major risk
contributors to the total risk associated with offshore operations. A review of helicopter
incident data is presented in Section 3.
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July 2005 6
Austal Ships
3. HELICOPTER INCIDENT DATA

Helicopter accident and incident statistics have been reviewed from a number of sources
including:
x Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (Reference 1);
x UK Civil Aviation Authority (Reference 2); and
x Exploration and Production Forum (Reference 3).
The Table below summarises the key data.
TABLE 3.1 : SUMMARY OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT STATISTICS
Source Period Reportable Accident Fatal Accident

Frequency (1) Frequency
(per 100,000 hours) (per 100,000 hours)
UK CAA Offshore 1980-95 1.90 0.32
UK CAA Offshore 1989-98 1.10 0.19
Australian BASI 1986-95 5.77 0.53 (2)
Australian BASI 1989-98 3.95 0 (2)
E&P Forum Worldwide 1995-98 1.35 0.70
E&P Forum North Sea 1994-98 1.06 0.24
E&P Forum GoM 1994-98 1.10 0.57
Note 1. The definition of reportable accident varies between jurisdictions. This may
explain why the likelihood of an accident being fatal in Australia appears
significantly lower than the average.
Note 2. The current ten year rolling fatal accident frequency for Australian operations is 0,
however the effect of a single fatal accident on the accident frequency can be seen
by contrasting this value with that for 1986-95.
To compare the risks associated with helicopter transfer with those from transfer by
personnel capsule it is necessary to determine the helicopter risk due to take-off and landing
at an offshore installation. The UK CAA data 1989-98 has been selected as the basis for this
study for the following reasons:
x it is specific to offshore operations;
x it is based on a large and statistically significant dataset;
x additional statistics, such as accident rate per take-off and landing are available; and
x it reflects improvements in safety in the North Sea during the 1990s.
However the data reviewed shows that the fatal accident rate in the North Sea is
significantly less than the average world-wide. Consequently when comparing with other
regions around the world, such as the Gulf of Mexico, an adjustment for the higher
helicopter fatal accident frequencies needs to be made.
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Austal Ships
Analysis of the UK CAA statistics gives the following data:

TABLE 3.2 : UK CAA HELICOPTER ACCIDENT STATISTICS (1989-1998)
Reportable accident frequency during take-off and 1.6 per million flight stages (1)
landing
Probability of accident per transfer offshore (2) 2.4 per million transfers
Probability of a reportable accident being fatal 0.18
Probability of a fatal accident per transfer offshore (2) 0.43 per million transfers
Probability of death in a fatal accident during take-off or 0.46
landing
Probability of an individual being a fatality per transfer 0.2 per million transfers
offshore (2)
Note 1. A flight stage includes one take-off and one landing. This may be considered
equivalent to one transfer.
Note 2. A take-off or landing on an offshore platform inevitably involves more hazards than
one at an onshore heliport. A breakdown of take-off/landing accidents according to
location shows that a majority of take-off/landing accidents occur offshore. An
internal analysis by DNV indicates that the accident frequency offshore is
approximately 1.5 times the average, and onshore approximately 0.5 times the
average. This analysis was based on a limited dataset but appears reasonable and is
therefore used in this study.
In addition to the risks posed to helicopter occupants, accidents involving helicopters can
cause damage to the platform itself. Such damage could be caused by a helicopter crashing
during take-off or landing, or by an accident while the helicopter is on the helideck such as a
fire or being blown off by the wind. However the only known cases of damage to the
platform have been during take-off/landing. Most of the reported events involved little or
no damage to the platform.
The only fatalities from accidents on the ground or helideck have been ground crew struck
by rotor blades. In the UK North Sea there were 2 such fatalities between 1980 and 1995,
during which time there were 4,160,000 flight stages. Therefore the probability of a a
ground crew fatality per transfer is given by:
2 / 4,160,000 = 5 x 10-7 fatalities per transfer
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July 2005 8
Austal Ships
4. PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE INCIDENT DATA

United States, United Kingdom, Australian and E&P Forum worldwide accident statistics
have been reviewed to determine incident data for personnel transfer by basket, capsule or
similar device.
Personnel basket transfer is most commonly used in the United States. A recent report by
the US Minerals Management Service Crane Accident Workgroup (Reference 6) details a
number of incidents involving basket transfers offshore the United States. These are
summarised in Table 4.1 below.
TABLE 4.1:
PERSONNEL BASKET TRANSFER INCIDENTS FROM 1995 TO OCTOBER 1999
Brief Description Date Injuries and Fatalities Listed Causes

Worker departing personnel 1/2/96 Broken leg Equipment failure
basket injured when crane line
slipped
Worker injured while exiting 10/5/96 Broken leg Slip/trip/fall
personnel basket
Worker fell out of basket when 10/24/96 1 injury Slip/trip/fall
it caught on an air conditioning
unit
Employee pinned by personnel 10/26/97 1 minor injury Human error
basket
Boom fell while moving 2 7/16/99 2 injured, fractured Equipment failure
people in personnel basket ankle and leg
None of the incidents have resulted in fatalities, the most likely injury being a broken bone.
Through discussions with the Western Australia Department of Minerals and Energy it has
been ascertained that, to their knowledge, there has been one injury in WA waters involving
personnel basket transfer. This occurred in 1997, when during a basket transfer the vessel
rose due to the swell and the deck struck the basket knocking a person out of the basket and
onto the deck.
The E&P Forum publishes the Safety Performance of the Global E&P Industry. The 1998
report (Reference 4) details all fatal and significant incidents worldwide both onshore and
offshore during 1998. There are no recorded incidents associated with personnel transfer
operations by basket, capsule or similar device. One incident involving boat to boat transfer
is recorded; this occurred offshore Malaysia when a member of the vessel crew misjudged
the clearance between the 2 vessels and fell into the sea sustaining bruises on his arm and
forearm.
DNV also maintains its own database of fatalities in offshore activities on the UK
Continental Shelf. This is based on OIR/9A reports prior to 1992, together with data from
the Health and Safety Executive on diving fatalities, separate sources on helicopter fatalities
and press reports on fatalities since 1992. The latest update covers the period 1977-96. In
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Austal Ships
this period, of the 379 recorded fatalities none were associated with personnel transfer by
basket, capsule or similar device.
Although a number of incidents involving transfer by personnel basket have been reported,
no fatalities have been recorded in the data reviewed. No data on the number of lifts/
transfers has been sourced, hence an injury/fatality rate cannot be explicitly calculated.
However, a review of dropped object incident data can be used to determine an appropriate
estimate of injury/fatality rates per transfer operation.
4.1 Dropped Object Incident Data (Reference 5)

The personnel transfer capsule is generally lifted to and from the offshore installation by one
of the installation's main cranes. One of the more severe failure mechanisms is dropping of
the capsule during the transfer. The dropped capsule may fall either into the sea, onto the
boat or onto the installation.
The Department of Energy / HSE database for UK platforms during 1981-92, covering 1777
installation years including fixed installations, jack-ups and semi-submersibles, lists a total
of 1160 incidents involving cranes. Of these, 227 dropped and swinging load incidents were
considered serious, i.e. with the potential to cause hydrocarbon leaks if they hit live
equipment. These were broken down by crane type and impact location as given below:
TABLE 4.2 : CRANE INCIDENTS OFFSHORE UK 1981 TO 1992
Crane Type Impact on Fall into sea Impact on Total

installation vessel
Main crane 79 44 41 164
Derrick crane 17 10 0 27
Other fixed 12 1 0 13
device
Portable device 22 1 0 23
Total 130 56 41 227
The overall frequency of serious incidents is 0.13 per installation year, of which 0.092 per
installation year occurred from the main cranes. This is similar to a frequency of 0.1 drops
per crane year attributed to a UKOOA survey of 11 companies. The same source estimated
an average of 2000 lifts per crane year, and hence obtained a frequency of 5 x 10-5 per lift.
A confidential source of Norwegian data on crane operations offshore during 1974-85
indicates the following frequencies:
Dropped load - 1.4 x 10-5 per lift
Boom collapse - 1.8 x 10-5 per lift
Crane collapse - 3.2 x 10-6 per lift
The dropped load frequency might well be expected to vary with load size. An internal
DNV analysis of Department of Energy Dangerous Incident Reports for the UK sector
during 1985-88 indicates that the dropped load frequency for heavy loads could be more
than an order of magnitude higher than for light loads.
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Austal Ships
Given the relatively light weight of a personnel transfer capsule (870 kg), the dedicated
rigging, documented operating guidelines and the additional care likely to be shown when
lifting fellow workers, it is reasonable to assume that the likelihood of dropping a transfer
capsule is an order of magnitude less than the average for normal crane lifts. Therefore
based on the above incident data, the frequency of dropping the personnel transfer capsule is
taken to be 5 x 10-6 per transfer.
The probability of impacting the installation or vessel, or falling into the sea, based on the
incident data for main cranes is as follows:
Impact on installation - 48%
Impact on vessel - 25%
Fall into sea - 27%
This probably overestimates the likelihood of impacting on the installation as the incident
data includes transferring loads around an installation as well as loading/unloading supply
vessels. A more realistic split for vessel to installation transfers is considered to be:
Impact on installation - 33%
Impact on vessel - 33%
Fall into sea - 33%
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Austal Ships
5. REVIEW OF WORLD-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL DATA

Table 5.1 compares sea temperatures, wind speeds and currents for six regions around the
world.
Except for the North Sea the average sea temperatures are in excess of 25qC with the
minimum in excess of 20qC. The result of this is that, in the regions considered,
hypothermia of persons immersed in the sea is only an important factor in the North Sea. On
average, currents are similar across the different areas, however on a local / platform scale
there can be significant variations. Currents and tides are important factors when
considering the drift and dispersion of personnel who have entered the water and require
rescue.
The North Sea has the greatest percentage of severe weather (defined as Beaufort Force 8
and above) and the lowest percentage of calm weather (defined as Beaufort Force 3 and
below). In other regions severe weather is restricted to cyclones/hurricanes and offshore
India to the monsoon period. The result of this is that crane operating limits are only likely
to be an issue in the North Sea. In the other regions considered installation cranes are likely
to be available, except during seasonal severe storms.
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Austal Ships
TABLE 5.1 : COMPARISON OF ENVIRONMENTAL PARAMETERS
Environmental North Sea Gulf of Mexico Far East Middle East Australia India
Parameter
Average Sea 6 – 14 qC 20 – 31 qC 24 – 31 qC 20 – 31 qC 26 – 31 qC 24 – 28 qC
Temperatures (qC)
Current Speed Average : 0.3 Average : 1-2 Average : 0.4 Average : 0.1 Average : 0.5 Average : 0.3
(Knots) knots knots knots knots knots knots
Max : 1.2 knots Max : 3 knots Max : 2.8 knots Max : 1.2 knots Max : 1.4 knots Max : 1.7 knots
Probability of 0.26 0.43 0.86 0.62 0.49 0.34
Calm Wind
d Beaufort 3
Probability of 0.64 0.57 0.14 0.38 0.51 0.66
Moderate Wind
Beaufort 4 to 7
Probability of 0.11 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.0 < 0.01 < 0.01
Severe Wind (Up to 10% during
t Beaufort 8 the height of the
monsoon)
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Austal Ships
6. COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

This section compares the risks of transfer by personnel transfer capsule and helicopter. It is
assumed that 18 passengers (typical crew change helicopter compliment) are being
transferred to an offshore installation.
6.1 Personnel Transfer Capsule Risks

As discussed in Section 4 there is very little data available relating directly to personnel
transfer by basket, capsule or similar device. Consequently event tree analysis has been
used to estimate the risks associated with such transfers.
The primary source of fatality risk is dropping of the capsule when transferring personnel.
Figure 6.1 shows the event tree for such a scenario. The data used in the event tree are taken
from Section 4 and summarised in Table 6.1.
FIGURE 6.1 : DROPPED CAPSULE EVENT TREE
Likelihood of an Likelihood of an
Frequency of droped individual becoming a individual sustaining
transfer capsule Location of impact fatality an injury
1.67E-08
0.33 0.01 8.25E-07
Installsation 0.5
8.25E-07
1.67E-08
5.00E-06 0.33 0.01 8.25E-07
(per lift) Vessel 0.5
8.25E-07
1.67E-07
0.33 0.1 1.20E-06
Sea 0.8
3.00E-07
Probability of dropping the capsule per lift 5.00E-06

Probability of dropping the capsule per transfer of 18 persons (i.e. 6 lifts) 3.00E-05
Probability of an individual being a fatality per transfer 2.00E-07
Probability of an individual sustaining serious injury per transfer 2.85E-06
Potential loss of life per transfer of 18 persons (i.e. 6 lifts) 3.60E-06
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July 2005 14
Austal Ships
TABLE 6.1 : EVENT TREE DATA
Description Value Comment

Frequency of dropped 5 x 10-6 per lift As per Section 4
transfer capsule
Location of impact 1/3 onto the installation As per Section 4
1/3 onto vessel
1/3 into sea
Likelihood of an individual Impacting the installation - 0.01 The drop height will be greatest over the sea
becoming a fatality and hence the impact energy will be
Impacting the vessel - 0.01
greatest. The self-righting and buoyant
Impacting the sea - 0.1 capsule should prevent drowning, however
fatalities due to the impact are possible.
Likelihood of an individual Impacting the installation - 0.5 The likelihood of an individual suffering
sustaining an injury some form of injury is considered high. As
Impacting the vessel - 0.5
for fatalities above, dropping into the sea is
Impacting the sea - 0.8 considered the most severe due to the drop
height.
There have been numerous injuries to crane operators and deck crew during lifting
operations in the offshore industry. These are not included in the above analysis due to the
lack of explicit data. However, when comparing the risks with those of helicopter transfer
the risks to the crane operator and deck crew should also be considered.
6.2 Helicopter Transfer Risks

The following accident probabilities and individual risks for North Sea operations are taken
from Table 3.2.
Probability of an accident - 2.4 x 10-6 per transfer
Probability of an individual being injured - 2.4 x 10-6 per transfer
(due to the severe nature of helicopter accidents everybody is assumed to receive some form
of injury in an accident)
Probability of an individual becoming a fatality - 0.2 x 10-6 per transfer
Potential loss of life of passengers - 3.6 x 10-6 per transfer
Potential loss of life of ground crew - 0.5 x 10-6 per transfer
Total potential loss of life - 4.1 x 10-6 per transfer
Based on Table 3.1 it is considered appropriate to use the North Sea data as presented above
for both North Sea and Australian offshore operations. However when considering Gulf of
Mexico operations a multiplier of 3 (0.57/0.19) should be applied to the fatal accident rate.
Although specific data is not available for other regions around the world, based on the E&P
Forum world-wide data, a similar adjustment is considered appropriate.
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July 2005 15
Austal Ships
6.3 Risk Comparison

Table 6.2 compares the estimated risks for personnel capsule and helicopter transfer.
TABLE 6.2 : RISK COMPARISON
Risk Indicators Personnel Helicopter

(all per transfer of 18 individuals) Capsule
North Sea and Rest of the
Australia World
Probability of an accident 3.0 x 10-5 2.4 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-6
Probability of an individual being 2.9 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-6
injured
Probability of an individual 0.2 x 10-6 0.2 x 10-6 0.6 x 10-6
becoming a fatality
Total potential loss of life 3.6 x 10-6 4.1 x 10-6 11.3 x 10-6
The probability of an accident per lift of a personnel transfer capsule is similar to that per
helicopter take-off and landing (of the order of 10-6 per operation). However, because to
transfer a given number of personnel (18 in this example) multiple lifts of the transfer
capsule would be required, the total probability of an accident is greater for personnel
transfer capsule than helicopters.
On the same basis a helicopter accident is likely to involve more people (higher capacity)
than an accident involving a personnel transfer capsule. Consequently the risk to an
individual per transfer (injury or fatality risk) is similar, whether transferred by helicopter or
personnel transfer capsule.
The statistics for helicopter accidents world-wide do show an approximate three-fold
increase for fatalities in the Rest of the World compared to the North Sea and Australia. The
reasons for this are not analysed but could include factors such as type and specification of
helicopters used (e.g. single or twin engine), provision of emergency response services, and
maintenance. Consequently the risks of transfer by personnel transfer capsule are less than
the risks of helicopter transfer in the Rest of the World.
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July 2005 16
Austal Ships
7. CONCLUSIONS
The Frog personnel transfer capsule is specifically designed for the transfer of personnel
from offshore support vessels to and from offshore installations. The Frog's design features
address the following hazards associated with such transfers:
x falling out of the capsule
x heavy landings
x landing and swinging impacts; and
x immersion.
The major residual accident event is the dropping of the capsule during the transfer so that it
impacts the vessel, installation or the sea at velocities greater than the design impact velocity
of 4m/s. The risks associated with this low probability event have been assessed relative to
the risks associated with helicopter transfer.
In the North Sea and offshore Australia risks to individuals have been shown to be similar
whether transferred by helicopter or personnel capsule. However helicopter risks are on
average three times higher in the rest of the world and hence in these areas it may be safer to
transfer by personnel capsule.
The results for transfer by personnel capsule are subject to a relatively high degree of
uncertainty. This is primarily due to the lack of data with respect to transfer by personnel
capsule. However, given that the Frog has a number of design features to mitigate the
identified hazards, and that when lifting fellow workers following documented procedures
the likelihood of an incident is likely to be considerably lower than for normal crane
operations, the risks associated with transfer by personnel capsule may be overestimated.
Therefore, although a firm conclusion as to which method is safer cannot be drawn, it is
considered likely that transfer by personnel capsule is safer than by helicopter.
Other factors such as availability, ease of operation and cost are also likely to be key in the
decision making process.
The scope of this study was limited to the actual transfer of personnel to/from the
installation and does not include the transit phase to/from the shore. The results should be
considered accordingly.
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July 2005 17
Austal Ships
8. REFERENCES
1. Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, "Civil Aircraft Accidents, Activities and Rates"
Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services Website, December
1999.
2. UK CAA, "UK Offshore Helicopter Operations Statistical Report for 1998", Safety Data
Department, July 1999.
3. E&P Forum, "1998 E&P Forum World-Wide Oil Industry Helicopter operations and
Safety Review", May 1999.
4. E&P Forum, "Safety Performance of the Global E&P Industry 1998", Report No.
6.80/295 July 1999.
5. DNV ARF C1 Rev 1 - "Guide to QRA of Offshore Installations", Confidential internal
document, 1998.
6. US Minerals Management Service, "Report of the Crane Accident Workgroup", October
1998.
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Austal Ships
APPENDIX I
QUALITATIVE RISK RANKING MATRIX
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Austal Ships
I.1. QUALITATIVE RISK RANKING MATRIX
Likelihood/Frequency/Probability
Consequence Very Remote Remote Occasional Probable Frequent
Minor Low Low Low Low Medium
Moderate Low Low Medium Medium Medium
Serious Low Medium Medium Medium High
Major Medium Medium High High High
Critical Medium High High High High
Likelihood Categories for Risk Assessment Matrix
Likelihood Category Description

Very Remote Not expected to occur during facility lifetime.
Remote Expect to occur no more than once in a facility lifetime.
Occasional Expected to occur a few times during facility lifetime.
Probable Expected to occur several times during facility lifetime.
Frequent Expected to occur more than once per year.
Consequence Categories for Risk Assessment Matrix
Consequence Category Description

Minor Incident that requires first aid
Moderate Incident that requires medical treatment
Serious Life threatening incident resulting in severe injuries
Major Incident resulting in a fatality
Critical Incident that results in multiple fatalities
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Austal Ships
APPENDIX II
CAUSES OF HELICOPTER INCIDENTS
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Austal Ships
II.1. CAUSES OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS

A causal analysis of North Sea helicopter accidents is shown below. Due to either a lack of
information or sometimes a combination of causes the categorisation is rather judgmental.
Primary Cause Accidents In

North Sea, 1970-95
Main rotor 8
Tail rotor 4
Tail rotor 3
Engine 4
Gearbox/transmission 4
Tail boom 1
Stabiliser 1
Undercarriage 3
Float 1
Electrical system 1
Hydraulic system 1
Control system 1
Unknown mechanical causes 7
Total mechanical failures 39
Fire in engine 3
Fire in rotor brake 2
Fire in gearbox 1
Total fires 6
Flew into sea 4
Flew into ground/obstruction 3
Flew into platform 5
Heavy landing 5
Landed with landing gear up 1
Ran off helideck 1
Snagged in helideck net 2
Rotor hit tail boom 3
Object ingested into rotor/engine 3
Winch snagged/injured passenger 2
Rotor struck other aircraft/object 2
Rotor struck ground crew 3
Passenger tripped 1
Total operational errors 35
Lightning strike 2
Rotor blade icing 1
Snow ingested into engine 1
Aircraft blown over 1
Total environmental causes 5
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Austal Ships
APPENDIX III
PERSONNEL TRANSFER CAPSULE INFORMATION
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July 2005
Austal Ships
APPENDIX IV
CREW BOAT INFORMATION
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FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER DATE: 20.10.06

General Technical Manual Revision 18.2

Client Technical Manual Revision 15.2

Pages revised 3.52 Lifejacket recommendations

6.02 EC Type examination certificate

6.02 Requested for sales purposes to client complete certification

Operational impact None

Commercial impact None

Building/ QA/QC None

Compiled by: Andrew Grimes Authorised by: Sandy Watson

Reflex Marine Ltd.

FROG PERSONNEL TRANSFER CARRIER DATE: 20.07.05

General Technical Manual Revision 18.1

Client Technical Manual Revision 15.1

Pages revised 2.5 Parts List revised to 13.1

Reason for revision 1. Trolley missing from previous revision.

Safety impact None

Operational impact None

Commercial impact None

Building/ QA/QC Revise QA Plan to 18.1

Compiled by: Authorised by:

Copyrighted as an unpublished work

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

! COPYRIGHT 2002 by Reflex Marine Limited

This work contains the CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY INFORMATION of

Produced in the United Kingdom

SECTION DESCRIPTION REV

1.00 Document Revision & Control 3*

2.00 Technical Specification

3.00 Operating Procedures

4.00 Inspection & Maintenance Procedures

Compiled by: Authorised by:

Reflex Marine Ltd.

SECTION DESCRIPTION REV

4.50 Inspection after repairs 0

5.00 Client Specific Modifications

6.00 Design Verification

Compiled by: Authorised by:

Reflex Marine Ltd.

Any proposed change in documentation must be submitted to the Technical

A record must be maintained of all documentation changes.

3. EC type examination certificate

To simplify control of minor changes to the manual a partial revision procedure

Compiled by: Carol Richards Authorised by:

Reflex Marine Ltd.

The Client Technical Manual will be made available in Portable Document

The Manual will be available as an entire document, as a revision to the previous

Compiled by: Carol Richards Authorised by:

Reflex Marine Ltd.

! Model FS-01 (3 man seated convertible to 1 man seated plus 1 stretcher)

Compiled by: Authorised by:

Reflex Marine Ltd.

Compiled by: Authorised by:

Reflex Marine Ltd.

National Technical Standards:

Industry European Standards:

Compiled by: Authorised by:

Reflex Marine Ltd.

There is currently three versions, the model numbers are as follows :-

! FS-01 Standard 3 man version with the facility to carry a stretcher

! an ‘F’ prefix are for frog unit

Part “B" Refers to the “mark” of each particular product type.