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Subject: A Proposal to Apply Norton Long’s Theory of “Power and Administration” to Solve
Issues Seen in the Centralia Mine Disaster Case Study
Introduction
In “Power and Administration,” Norton Long writes that the most important place where
individuals receive power is through a structure of interests, which is “an important determinant
of the scope of possible action” which competes with “formal hierarchy” as a source of power
and authority (Stillman, p. 100). Long also argues that in the American system of politics,
“subordinates cannot depend on the formal chain of command to deliver enough political power
to permit them to do their jobs” (p. 100). This line of thinking can be directly applied to John
Bartlow Martin’s case study, “The Blast in Centralia No. 5: A Mine Disaster No One Stopped,”
by addressing two key issues:
Administrative Rationality
Long writes that administrative rationality “demands that objectives be determined and sights set
in conformity with a realistic appraisal of power position and potential,” and the current
American political system prevents a sufficient separation between politics and administration
(p. 100). In the Centralia Mine Disaster case study, state mine inspector Driscoll O. Scanlan is
unable to confront this administrative rationality because he is incapable of operating within the
political frame. Scanlan is determined to enforce the mining laws ‘to the letter of the law,” but
during the weeks and years that lead up to the disaster, his stubborn resistance to political
realities prevents his reports and recommendations from being taken seriously (p. 32). As a mine
inspector, Scanlan has the legal power and authority to close any mine that is in violation of the
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law, but he refuses to act because his decision can result in his firing and replacement with an
inspector who is weak-kneed and politically corrupt. By applying Long’s theory on
administrative rationality, Scanlan can carefully navigate the political sphere he personally
rejects to force superiors to heed warnings and recommendations associated with rock dustings,
sprinkler systems, and other failing safety measures.
Chain of Command
In the case study, the chain of command is one of the biggest hindrances to the administrative
process, from the miners represented by Local Union 52 to the Governor of Illinois. At any given
moment, critical information that can prevent the mine disaster is sitting on someone’s desk, and
officials then shift responsibility to parties outside of their own department. Subordinates work
within the chain of command to have their recommendations and observations heard by parties
who can acknowledge the violations and fix the problems. This process has flaws, though. For
example:
• Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug creates the Coal Mines Administration (CMA), and
Federal Inspector Perz is sent to investigate the Centralia site on November 4th.
• Inspector Perz creates a preliminary report on November 7th listing “13 major violations
of the safety code,” and his final report identifies “57 violations of the safety code, 21 of
them major and 36 minor” (p. 39). The final report is sent to the same seven places that
received the initial report.
• On November 14th the CMA receives the preliminary report and requests that the mining
company correct one of the 13 major violations listed in the initial report.
• Months go by, and virtually nothing is accomplished with regards to the other 12
violations in the initial report and 57 violations in the final report.
• When the CMA asks the company for specific evidence that progress has been made
towards correcting violations, the mine blows up before additional correspondence is sent
from the company.
Just as Scanlan has the authority to shut down the Centralia mine, Inspector Perz has the
authority to use “imminent danger” as legal reasoning to force the site to shut down (especially
since the chain of command is hindering effective communication and progress). Not only that,
the newly-created CMA allows for a safety committee of miners to be established that can also
use “an immediate danger” to close the mine; however, “several months elapsed before Local 52
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so much as appointed a safety committee, and even after the disaster the only surviving member
of the committee didn’t know what his powers were” (p. 40).
Long’s theory of power and administration states that many subordinates “must supplement the
resources available through the hierarchy with those they can muster on their own, or accept the
consequences in frustration—a course itself not without danger” (p. 100). Long, Scanlan, and the
Centralia miners must not accept these consequences as they work within—and against—their
respective chains of command. After all, the “dangers” in this case study are simple: fatalities,
legal ramifications, and sizable monetary expenses in the wake of an impending explosion. An
inability to recognize the extent of one’s powers—as seen in the safety committee’s inaction—
proves to be fatal mistake. If the safety committee activates this power, they bypass the myriad
of problems associated with the chain of command by forcing a mine closure at a time when
their recommendations are falling on deaf ears.
Conclusion
Norton Long’s thoughts on power and administration can be useful in the Centralia case study
because they specifically address two fundamental issues at the heart of the disaster:
administrative rationality and chain of command. The individuals who have the power to stop the
disaster, like Scanlan, Perz, and the miners themselves, are unable to reach the full attention of
their superiors and they waste valuable time attempting to navigate complicated and ineffective
bureaucratic channels. For a longer proposal and analysis, further research can be conducted with
regards to Long’s theory on structures of interests; specifically, that a structure of interests
creates power struggles associated with organizational identification and conflicting point-of-
view.
Resources
Stillman, R. J. (2010). Public administration: Concepts and cases (9th ed.). Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company.