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Dittmer, UNPO/The Hague, Netherlands, November 2013.
complexities of political life within the contours of specific states. In light of this, and
against all empirical evidence, diplomatic studies tend to reproduce the fiction of the
existence of a perfect and timeless political community – the state – as the foundational
assumption that gives sense to the whole diplomatic system. The interplay between
domestic complexity and diplomacy is occasionally examined but only to the extent that
‘balkanization’, ethnic cleansing, and ultimately war (e.g. Campbell 1998). Otherwise,
inclination is even more salient amongst those studies focused on the problems
surrounding diplomatic recognition of so-called ‘de facto’ states (Kingston and Spears
2004, Caspersen 2012). After all, visibility given to these cases is not the result of some
intrinsic qualities of the affected territories. Quite the opposite, they only receive
diplomatic attention to the extent that they serve as the ultimate pretext for the
1
Bearing these reflections in mind, this chapter aims to explore the possible implications
of domestic pluralism and territorial politics – understood as the challenges posed by the
state – for a better understanding of the past, present and possible futures of diplomacy.
that we presently observe all over the world, in the hands of subnational governments,
indigenous nations and other domestic constituencies, can be largely understood as the
from being anachronic, tellingly shows some important functional adjustments and
symbolic struggles to which the global diplomatic system has to respond in order to
secure its own sustainability. The argument will be deployed in four stages. First, to
justify the specificity of my approach, some brief conceptual clarifications on the notion
political and territorial pluralism within the political community was crucial in the
formative process of diplomacy and remains crucial today, some recent contributions
‘diplomatic culture’ will be examined in view of these arguments with the purpose of
of diplomacy and the changing forms of domestic political order. Finally, as a way of
2
An elusive concept
Despite various attempts to clarify its content (e.g. Duchacek 1990, Lecours 2002;
Paquin 2004, Kuznetsov 2014), ‘paradiplomacy’ remains an elusive concept. Its validity
has been frequently contested, and in spite of its wide diffusion in recent decades it
remains ‘unstable and undecided’, thus constituting not a ‘core’ but a ‘sore’ political
concept in the sense advanced by Terence Ball (1999). In other words, it is a concept
more salient for the cognitive dissonances and occasional contestation it produces
amongst scholars and practitioners than for its intrinsic value. In 1961 diplomatic
historian Rohan Butler defined ‘paradiplomacy’ as the exercise of ‘personal and parallel
government’ (1961: 13). Although excluding any form of governmental agency, this
media technologies, is also present in Der Derian’s occasional use of the word (1987:
202-203). In contrast with these precedents, Duchacek and Soldatos (1990) and others
later (cfr. Aldecoa and Keating 1999, Paquin 2004, Kuznetsov 2014), apply the notion
‘paradiplomacy’ nonetheless fail to address what constitutes surely its most salient
feature, namely, its ambivalence. In other words, the way in which both in practice and
3
affirm that by ‘collapsing conventional notions of the official and proper conduits of
statecraft, these cases disrupt diplomatic performances of the state’, but also that rather
‘than calling for a dismantling of the state’ this appropriation paradoxically reinforces it.
worlds’, they are nevertheless folded in on, brushing up alongside and drawing
‘diplomacy’ that must be considered in its totality (McConnell, Moreau and Dittmer
2012: 812).
a tension between those that consider the centralization of diplomacy as optimal –either
in theoretical or practical terms (e.g. Barston 2006, Kleiner 2010, Berridge 2011)-, and
those who conversely question it (Riordan 2006, Pigman 2010, Bjola and Kornprobst
2012) This would explain the ultimate rationale behind its acceptance (e.g. Aldecoa and
Keating 1999, Paquin 2004, Kuznetsov 2014), as well as the motivation either for its
Hocking (1993), both of which tend to emphasize the consensual and inclusive
However, as Constantinou and Der Derian (2010: 12) have pointed out, in the end
simply an ‘inter-state affair’. For that reason it is worth examining the conditions under
which so-called ‘paradiplomacy’ and ‘diplomacy’ may converge, not only in practice,
as they already do, but also discursively. Such an endeavour requires a greater attention
4
to the mutual co-determination in history between changing forms of diplomacy and the
both diplomacy and paradiplomacy tend to cultivate. After all, careful consideration of
political pluralism in diplomatic history reveals that those multiple intrusions in the
diplomatic realm that we label today as ‘paradiplomatic’ are anything but new.
(Para)diplomatic history
This section shows that the contention that official embassies are not always
representative of the political community they are expected or intended to represent, and
enduring features of diplomacy from its foundational moments in antiquity to its current
Duran (2013) reminds us that the first available written text in the history of western
more with paradiplomacy – parapresbeia in its original Greek form – than with
diplomacy itself. The text concentrates on the mutual accusations of Demosthenes and
Aeschines about how they respectively performed/betrayed their role as members of the
leads T.C. Brennan to similar conclusions with regard to the practice of Roman
5
framework was provided by Greek-speaking polities, the Roman Senate, or
Roman officials in the field…. no factor increased the general volatility of ancient
diplomacy and contributed to its high failure rate as much as the prevalence of
represent the same political community – is certainly absent from the conventional
diplomacy’ (2009: 186) in the Byzantine era helps us to understand some recurrent
argued, for instance, that those old controversies find echo today in current disputes
over the legitimacy of successive ‘embassies’ and ‘counter-embassies’ that finally drove
Ukraine to the critical situation experienced in 2014. In that case Ukraine’s official
constituencies, rapidly losing domestic and international credibility, and were finally
replaced by other representatives, both at the state level and at the level of its diverse
constituencies. This not only has implications for the interventionist moves of different
foreign powers such as the Russian Federation, USA or the EU. It is also expressive of
the unstable and agonistic nature of the political community that these successive and
addition, the hidden link between two fields, namely those of democratic and
However, tracing back the continuity between old and new forms of paradiplomacy also
requires a more detailed account of the evolving contours of the relationship between
domestic pluralism and diplomatic order. In what follows I briefly examine how that
6
relationship evolved from early to classical modernity, in a context in which a new
centralization of power was taking form. The influential work of Mattingly (1973) was
crucial in shaping the idea that the humanistic value of diplomacy as a way of mediating
later displaced by its strategic role as a new bureaucratic and formalized institution,
the advent of modern diplomacy was not only crucial for the shaping of the modern
state system, but also for the territorialisation of politics within states themselves. This
administrative and military dispositifs and organized ignorance for the purposes of what
Foucault called governmentalité (2004). Although not without some merit (see
amongst historians, since the process of territorialisation referred above was neither
The classical interpretation of diplomacy as one of the major engines of the state-
not as fast, not so much top-down process and by far not as effective as
diplomacy tailored to measure the rise of the nation-state (e.g. Anderson 1993), the new
stream in diplomatic history emphasizes continuity more than rupture in the passing
7
2013). As for the relationship between domestic political order and the diplomatic
system, some new voices go even further in advocating for ‘dissolving artificial division
between exterior and interior politics’, and shifting from ‘viewing the foreign policy of
a nation as demarcated from the domestic policy’, towards a more ‘holistic view of the
In this vein, Christian Windler, one of the most active voices in this field, places a new
contacts were characterized not by the principle of equality amongst states but by a
hierarchical order in which both Princes and the representatives of diverse allegiances –
which facilitated a mutual process of symbolic and pragmatic learning, and crystallized
254).
developed by John H. Elliot (1992) convincingly describes the Ottoman and Spanish
Empires and other European monarchies as a cluster of political units all formally
territories created both opportunities for coexistence and risks of rupture. This
composite solution, with its combination of vertical and horizontal arrangements, and
the prevailing mode of political organization from the fifteenth to the nineteenth
8
such as that represented by the Union between Scotland and England in 1707, remain
The ‘composite monarchies’ model also contributed to the demolition of the myth of
Westphalia as the cornerstone of the modern notion of state sovereignty (Osiander 1994,
Teschke 2003). The Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, which closed the era of the
wars of religion in Europe, did not create in 1648 a new state system based on the
rather a system in which the universal ambitions of some monarchies were conciliated
literally hundreds of small political units. For instance, constituent units of the German
Empire even won their autonomy in the conduction of diplomatic relations. Treaty-
making power – under the inter se et cum exteris fodera principle – was indeed granted
to them, as far as it were not oriented against the Emperor’s interest (Ochoa-Brun 2012:
Early modern foreign relations were not only dominated by sovereign rulers
(usually referred to as Kings) and their ambassadors, but also and in fact
17th and 18th century diplomacy saw diplomats from all sorts of princes: electors,
cities. Among these actors, sovereigns and their ambassadors were the (Western-
European) exception, not the rule. Early modern diplomacy was a field of practice
very different from the state-centred, international system of the 19th and 20th
century (2013:2)
9
The diplomatic implications of the composite form of the Ottoman Empire have been
also recently re-examined through a similar prism (Kárman 2013). Diplomacy with
foreign independent powers such as France or England was for centuries compatible
with the diplomatic interventions of the tributary constituencies of the Ottoman Empire,
and Wallachia, who carefully cultivated either with ad hoc envoys or with permanent
residents their own diplomatic contacts with the suzerain Sultanate. These diplomatic
contacts decline at the end of the Seventeenth century but they show the ‘subtly refined
Similar developments were also common for centuries in the Chinese tributary system
and survive the Opium War in 1839. The growing power and influence of Western
powers during the nineteenth century forced the Chinese empire to adopt radical
transformations in its diplomatic culture, but for half a century the dynasty tried to
establish direct diplomatic contacts with non-tributary foreign powers explain the
important role that provincial governors and other local official played initially during
Although the Qing dynasty tried to adapt itself to the new imperatives:
10
Imperial Commissioners that had been especially appointed by the emperor, at the
That complex (para)diplomatic network disappeared in 1912 when the late Qing
dynasty fell and China became a republic, and remained absent from 1949 to 1978
during the early stages of People’s Republic of China, but since then, in the context of
new era international activism for the Chinese provinces ( Cheung and Tang 2001)
The connection between domestic political order and diplomacy acquired however a
new profile in the age of modern revolutions. The American and French revolutions,
Vienna in 1815, significantly, albeit not immediately, reduced that early modern
(1987) asserts that diplomacy only acquired its modern meaning at a critical juncture in
world history when the prevailing proto-diplomatic system was under serious attack. As
when it confronts the first major threat to its fledgling existence, the French Revolution’
(1987:107). In other words, it was only under the radical challenge of modern
revolution that old diplomacy realized its ultimate rationale, being forced to define both
its institutional recognizability and its formal content. In support of this vision it can be
argued that it was only after the revision and regulation of existing diplomatic practices
and institutions during the Congress of Vienna, in the light of the decisive impact of
both the American and French Revolutions throughout the world, that modern and
secularized diplomacy was born in 1815 (see Belissa and Ferragu 2007). Furthermore,
some authors contend that the Treaty of Versailles represented a similar counter-
11
Whilst initial revolutionary attempts to transform diplomacy did not bring the radical
changes they announced, they did at least allow for reformulating the connection
between domestic political order and diplomatic systems in some unexpected ways
(Armstrong 1993). Stinchcombe (1994), for instance, argues that Haiti's diplomatic
isolation in the Americas after its revolution and independence in 1804 was due to its
politics in the United States. Moreover, in spite of Haitian support for the independence
movements of many Latin American countries, the republic of former slaves was
excluded from the hemisphere's first regional meeting of independent nations held in
Panama in 1826, and was not recognized by the U.S. until 1862, after the start of the
Civil War. Not in vain, during the Civil War the eleven Southern states intensively
sought international support and diplomatic recognition for their cause from European
conversely facilitating the Union’s efforts to prevent European states from recognizing
the Confederacy as a legitimate nation and from getting involved in the Civil War
(Brauer 1977). These historical precedents remained highly relevant a century later.
Renee Romano offers a telling illustration of this in the course of her historical research
on the connection between the racial discrimination experienced in the early years of the
Cold War by African diplomats accredited in Washington D.C. and New York, and the
advancement of the cause of racial equality in the United States, which would later
they would have no diplomatic immunity from antiblack racism, so did the State
Department find that its focus on foreign policy could not be used as an excuse for
12
However, the American Revolution had, of course, many other important implications
that remain observable today. One in particular deserves special attention in the context
of the present work. As the first modern constitution the U.S. settled an influential
standard for the distribution of powers in federal states in the domain of foreign affairs.
In common with many other federal systems, it soon became clear that the position that
acquired prevalence reserved that power for the federal government (cfr. Beaulieu 1892,
Donot 1912). In 1931, for instance, after a careful examination of federal systems
existing across the world at that time, Harold W. Stoke reduced the available options in
intercourse to members of the union, and those which deny all such intercourse.
The federations of the latter type are much more numerous than those of the
However the formalization of the most restrictive version represented by the U.S.
Glenn S. McRoberts elegantly summarizes the final outcome in words that laity may
easily understand:
government to perform those functions which the states alone were incompetent
to perform. While defining those functions was the source of much debate, there
was general agreement that one such function was the conduct of foreign affairs.
Unfortunately, this sentiment did not find its way into the specific language of the
13
In view of this, and as happens across the world, constitutional discussions on the role
of U.S. states in foreign affairs tend to adopt, in the voices of the custodians of
precluded from usurping or unduly interfering with the federal government’s power to
conduct foreign affairs’ (McRoberts 1989: 643). The so-called Massachusetts’ Burma
Law case is very illustrative however of the scope and limits of these restrictive views.
In 1996 the legislature of Massachusetts enacted a law prohibiting state entities from
buying goods and services from companies doing business with Myanmar as a form of
boycott to that country because of severe human rights violations committed by its
government. The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) filed suit against it arguing
that this law infringed upon the federal government's foreign affairs and foreign
commerce powers, and that it was already pre-empted by a federal act establishing
sanctions against that country. In 2000, the Supreme Court of the U.S. nullified the law,
reasoning that the Massachusetts’ Burma Law undermined U.S. Congress’ delegation of
effective discretion to the President to control and limit economic sanctions against
Burma solely to U.S. persons and new investment, as well as its mandate to the
strategy towards Burma’ (Crosby vs. NFTC 2000: III.3). Notwithstanding the formal
value of that court ruling for setting the limits for U.S. states’ interventions in the
international realm (Stumberg and Porterfield 2001), the fact remains that since then
they have been even more active in that field than ever before (see Schaefer 2011,
Macmillan 2012).
Looking back to the past again, the complex and enduring interplay between domestic
pluralism and diplomatic order that this section aims to examine acquired an even more
intricate profile in the context of the rise and decline of the Spanish American Empire.
14
Although frequently ignored in favour of the prevailing place of war and coercive
conquest in the colonization process, diplomatic dealings also permeated early colonial
indigenous peoples against the conquerors. The Spanish defeat in the important Battle
of Curalaba of 1598 in Chile convinced the Spanish Crown of the need to combine
coercion with dialogue that became known as ‘peaceful conquest’. Although diplomatic
dealings with indigenous peoples never displaced blood and fire as the main form of
active role of the indigenous in the shaping of a hybrid colonial order. Historical
research demonstrates that important cultural, legal and political dimensions were
frequently negotiated, securing for the indigenous peoples some forms of autonomy and
way of managing the contentious relationship between indigenous nations and the
Spaniards, were two centuries later crucial in securing indigenous support for Spanish
efforts to hinder the advancement of English ambitions in the subcontinent. But they
also facilitated colonial emancipation and the consolidation of the new sovereign
republics in the nineteenth century. General San Martin, the leader of both the
Argentine and Chilean independence movements, was able, for instance, to gain support
from indigenous nations against the Spanish army in the Revolutionary wars (see
diplomacy’. From 1810 and 1816, between the deposition of the Spanish viceroyalty
15
authorities and the full independence of the new American republics, the revolutionaries
and Panama–rejected the idea of a ‘single and indivisible’ republic and instead created a
dozen sovereign and independent entities. At the same time, conscious of the dangers
foreign invasions and impede the arising of a new tyrant (cfr. Gutierrez-Ardila 2009:4).
Although not fully diplomatic in ambition the resulting horizontal negotiations amongst
inspired by the notion of ius gentium (law of peoples). This was the same notion that in
Europe was at that very precise moment on the way to be replaced by a new one – ius
inter gentes – tailored to measure the needs of European rising nation–states through the
modern grammars of international law now understood as law amongst states (Lechner
The main objective of this provincial or constitutive diplomacy was to remedy the
dissolution of their wider unity and to re-establish the social ties that had been
Similar developments were underway at the same time in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata – the territories that now belong to Argentina, Chile and Paraguay – in the context
Cordoba, Mendoza, Salta and Tucuman – remained obedient to Buenos Aires, others
such as Santa Fe, Corrientes and Entre Rios, along with other constituencies that now
belong to Chile or Paraguay, reclaimed sovereignty and the right to create their own
intensity, such attempts to assert territorial identity and contacts across borders, and to
16
secure autonomy in front of a new centralism, were also registered in Concepcion and
The history of modern Brazil after the demise of monarchy also allows for a
paradiplomatic reading of the formative processes of both its federal system and its
evolving forms of domestic political order and state participation in the wider
diplomatic realm. Recent research (Bessa and Sombra 2012) on the early stages of the
Brazilian republic – Republica Velha from 1890 to 1930 – reveal that under the close
monitoring of the central government Brazilian constituent units were extremely active
in international capital markets, being crucial in shaping the integration of the new
Brazil into the nascent global economy. That era of paradiplomatic activism,
particularly salient in the fields of foreign trade and external borrowing, came to an end
with the 1930 Revolution, which opened a new era of centralization that culminated
with the Estado Novo dictatorship, which lasts from 1937 to 1945 (Bessa and Sombra
2012). Democratization processes at the end of the century facilitated the recovery of
those old paradiplomatic practices, helping to forge one of the most distinctive elements
demand for secession or separatism, these paradiplomatic initiatives reveal quite the
opposite. They highlight the importance of the assertion of political subjectivity and
agency in the paradiplomatic field as a precondition for shaping a subsequent fair and
wider state, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia or Mexico. This is not to say
that the new Latin American republics were immune to secessionist movements, as
17
Yucatan’s repeated attempts to secede from Mexico reveal (e.g. Williams 1929), but its
Similar developments, albeit with their own distinctive tones, were also registered in the
British Commonwealth. Diplomatic historian Lorna Lloyd (2001) aptly summarizes her
important research on how many British dominions were able to despatch and receive
diplomatic missions long before they became fully independent and sovereign states:
statehood – was absent when, towards the end of the nineteenth century,
and their envoys were given a non-diplomatic title. This remained true even after
the self-governing dominions began to appear on the international scene and then,
in 1931, were allowed to opt for sovereignty. This was because Britain was
anxious to play down what had happened, and the dominions were not
This singular system, which only disappeared in the 1970s in view of its complicated
Relations, operated even within the dominions themselves, since both Australian and
Canadian constituencies were able to maintain their own separate provincial delegates
for a long time after both territories became federalized (Lloyd 2007: 14).
These and other similar precedents may help us to understand what Michael Collins has
recently called the ‘Federal Moment’ in the post-1945 decolonisation age (2013):
18
namely that historical and genuinely transnational moment in which both old colonial
rulers, such as Great Britain, France or the Netherlands, and local national elites,
colonial ties and networks of interests. Although the special case of South Africa
illustrates the ambivalences and perils of such an idea, a wider sample of federal
experiments in the past century offer a compelling demonstration of the external and
hosting states – or empires – has been a durable and widespread feature of diplomacy
across history. More importantly, those old constituent diplomacies were not only a
common practice in the past: they were crucial in the shaping a modern system of
sovereign states adapted to their own domestic complexity and pluralism. The long
process of centralization that followed the functional and normative imperatives that
one. Formalization of diplomacy as state privilege was never complete and the old
plurality of voices and practices that we find in history reappeared, once and again
(Para)diplomatic culture?
the diplomatic realm (e.g. Barston 2009, Berridge 2011) constitutes an interesting case
19
of scholarly resistance to some of the most compelling and repeated criticisms that
international relations scholarship has received in decades (cfr. Walker 1993, Murphy
1998). That resistance is even more disconcerting in view of the many innovations that
– more or less reluctantly – diplomatic services all over the world are increasingly
adopting to cope with the implications of social and political pluralism for diplomatic
generally far more inclined than scholars to accept the necessity of a new diplomatic
culture (e.g. Riordan 2006, Heine 2006, Bolewski 2007, Roberts 2009). They see such a
new diplomatic culture as not only valid to operate –in both pragmatic and symbolic
modes – in diplomatic contacts amongst states and other international bodies, but one
able to trespass – both within and across states – the territorial assumptions through
which chanceries from all over the world have, in the last two centuries, formulated
their mutual diplomatic relationships. The need for greater attention to diplomatic
diplomatic culture, has also been emphasized by authors who are correspondingly
experienced practitioners (e.g. Neumann 2002, Heine 2006, Roberts 2009). German
diplomat and scholar Wilfried Bolewski, for instance, aptly describes what he calls the
tend to conflate the formal dimensions of diplomacy with its actual and changing
morphologies. Alan James’ restrictive reflections illustrate very well how that
conflation operates:
20
The existence of a State is a logical pre-condition for the establishment of
diplomatic relations. And by ‘State’ is meant the type of territorial entity which in
which is not a formal part of any wider constitutional arrangement. Thus Australia
other such States. But the constituent Australian State of New South Wales is not
establish the sort of relations which are termed diplomatic. It may establish offices
abroad, as it has done, for example, in London. And it may be that, as there, the
host State will as a matter of courtesy accord the office limited privileges and
immunities. But such offices will not have the status of diplomatic missions, and
will therefore not benefit from the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Other authoritative and inquisitive authors as Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otter solemnly
declare in one of their works a sharp separation between the internal and external
as a more fragile counterpart, operating within a system based upon states, to the
Against all empirical evidence, such scholars therefore reproduce the fiction of the
existence of a perfect, stable and timeless political community – the state – as the
21
foundational assumption that gives sense to the whole diplomatic system. Hedley Bull’s
are dealing with. He defined it as ‘the common stock of ideas and values possessed by
the official representatives of states’ (Bull 1977: 171-2). In so doing he avoids any
in terms of its contentious relations with the complexities of the domestic political
sphere, such as those related to class, gender, nation or race (e.g. Shaffer 1998).
offers the tools for such an approach. In his genealogy of diplomacy he convincingly
examines how ‘diplomatic culture was formed and transformed, and how its power of
normalization in a Leviathan-less world has been reproduced’ (Der Derian 1987: 4).
Later in the same work he defines diplomatic culture as ‘the mediation of estrangement
by symbolic power and social constrains’ (ibid: 42). He thus does not place the
inception of modern diplomacy under the logic of power politics nor subordinate it to
the rise of the nation-state (cf. Anderson 1993), but in the gradual realization of the
limitations confronted by even the most powerful state in front of alienated powers that
escaped its control either by persuasion or force. But despite his fruitful heuristics, Der
Derian seems to keep modern political community encapsulated within the contours of
specific states, since he later presents the ‘recognition of the difference between
208). He suggests that only the latter would be the proper subject of ‘horizontal’
diplomatic mediation whilst the former should be better approached through the idea of
‘antidiplomacy’, as the proper dominion for the ‘vertical’ mediation of the universal
22
alienation of humankind (ibid). In so doing, Der Derian seems to renounce too soon the
possible virtues of extending diplomatic culture to that middle ground constituted by the
management of domestic pluralism both within and across states. For it happens that
through the recourse to a new ‘permanent’ revolution. Rather, mediating the internal
estrangement that is at the core of virtually all states – as a result of the increasing
demands for recognition of plurality in social life – requires the adoption of a new
diplomatic culture within states themselves. More than estrangement among states,
within states (Feldman 2005). This estrangement takes form both horizontally among
different constituent units within a single or various states, and vertically in terms of the
relationship of these constituent units with the central authority, adopting diverse
profiles in different historical stages. In sum, in all their variety, these forms of
secessionist one, exposing the central government’s pretension to truly and completely
Mainstream diplomatic studies tend to consider the political communities that diplomats
represent as more or less complex, but also necessarily as ones confined within the
boundaries of the state of which those diplomats are official representatives (e.g.
Barston 2009, Kleiner 2010). To that extent it can be argued that any possible ‘necessity
23
uprising – falls largely outside of their scope (Anderson 2012). It is in line with the
perhaps the best means for cultivating virtues necessary to revitalize a contentious
(2012: 81)
within and across states through the exclusive means and ends of diplomacy amongst
states, paradiplomatic culture may serve, and historically has actually served, to mediate
some of them through its distinctive practices, institutions and discourses (see
Mamadouh and Van der Wusten 2016). For, paraphrasing Sharp’s thoughts on
identities’ (Sharp 1999: 33). The most salient difference would be, however, that in the
Sharp identifies as the core of diplomatic culture, takes place not only amongst states
but also within and across them. Hopefully this new understanding of diplomacy as
intrinsically linked to the changing forms of domestic political order will allow us to
consider the competing legitimacies and the complex institutional mediations which
24
diplomatic culture has implications not only for the practicalities of global policy-
making, but also for our understanding of the contemporary conditions in which the
may be able to democratize the global political sphere. Although rarely spectacular
either in form of content, paradiplomacy, in sum, can be read – in spite of its many
agency drives the inevitable but extremely complex move towards a new – albeit surely
still imperfect – democratic polis and transnational citizenry (see Honig 1993, Connolly
2005, Schaap 2006). If diplomatic services across the world are unable to deal with the
challenge of pluralism within the contours of the specific political community they
respectively and officially represent, how they will be able to manage the challenge of
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This chapter draws in part on, and expands on, some arguments previously advanced in Cornago, Noe (2013) Plural Diplomacies:
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