Parens Patriae

The Government of Philippine Islands vs El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ahorras de Manila

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

Facts:
On June 3, 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippine Islands, which was then under the
Spanish Dominion, that devastated lot of civilians. Therefore n Oct. 6 of that year, a central relief board
was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the money voluntarily contributed by
donors. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the
various sufferers name in its resolution.
These were later distributed in accordance with the above mentioned allotments, the sum of
$30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365.403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of
the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the first month,
directed its treasurer to turn over Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of relief fund in its installment of
20,000 each. These amounts received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and
June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of Monte de Piedad.
The Attorney General in representation of the Philippine Islands, a file of claim for the $80000
together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names
published in the Official Gazette instituted on May, 3, 1912 by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial in the lower court, judgment was entered in honor
of the plaintiff currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and cost of cause. The
Monte de Piedad then contended that the present Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground
that the obligation of the former was wiped out when there was a change of sovereignty.
Respondent:

1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros, were so given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish
Government of these Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of
Spain should not approve the action taken by the former government.

2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars
($80,000) being at present the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.

3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish
Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a national subscription
opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3, 1863, in these Island.

4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on
January 30, 1912, is unconstitutional.

5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the
Insular Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand
dollars ($80,000) given to it by the late Spanish Government of these Islands.
6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government
in the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender
currency in circulation, with legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.

Issue:
Whether or not the government of the Philippine Islands has capacity to file a suit against
the Monte de Piedad for the recovery of the said amount.
Ruling:
Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine Government being the guardian of the
“rights of the people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the beneficiary and therefore has the
capacity to file a suit against the appellant. The Philippine Government is not merely a nominal party
that’s why it can bring and prosecute this action by exercising its sovereign powers. The Supreme Court
then held the right of the government to file the case.

Cabanas v Pilapil Digest

Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise
indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother
Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of
Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s
trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance
policy?

YES.

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever
any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the
judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the
minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as
parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would be
more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent
to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the
case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its
role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO

G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986

Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner vs. President Corazon
Aquino, et al, defendant
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made
the judgment and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,
Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by
General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that
“all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could
continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government
are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and
deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and
war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of
the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out
with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of
courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could
not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of
international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief
done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not
intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate
international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the
occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not
become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by
some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF
SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and
courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue
exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by
the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him
to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even
during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control
through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise
in insurrection against the parent state)

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

(1946)

Ruffy, a provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary, instead of surrendering to the

Japanese forces, disbanded his company, retreated to the mountains and led a guerilla unit. Lieut.
Col. Jurado, recognized by the United States Armed Forces, was sent to replace Ruffy but was
slain by the latter and his companions. The same people who killed the replacing officer claim
that they were not subject to military law at the time when the offense was committed. But the
rule suspending political laws only affects the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory and is
not intended to bind the enemies in arms. Thus, members of the armed forces continued to be
covered by the National Defense Act, the Articles of War, and other laws relating to the armed
forces even during the Japanese occupation. By the acceptance of the petitioners’ appointments
as officers in the Philippine Army they became amenable to the Articles of War.

Characteristics of a government of paramount force:

• The belligerent occupant generally respects municipal laws (Civil Code, Insurance Code, etc.), or those
that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, unless they are
incompatible with new order of things.
• Laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as the right to bear arms, the freedom of
the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied are considered suspended during the
military occupation.
• Judicial acts and proceedings which are not of a political complexion (defamation as opposed to treason)
remain valid even beyond the occupation.
Effects of Belligerent Occupation
As to political laws. No change of sovereignty during a belligerent occupation, the political laws of the
occupied territory are merely suspended, subject to revival under the jus postliminium upon the end of the
occupation.
Note that the rule suspending political laws affects only the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory
and is not intended to bind the enemies in arms. Also, the rule does not apply to the law on treason
although decidedly political in character. As to non-political laws. The non-political laws are deemed
continued unless changed by the belligerent occupant since they are intended to govern the relations of
individuals as among themselves and are not generally affected by changes in regimes of rulers.
80 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 26 (1995 ed). 81 Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856.

As for judicial decisions. As for judicial decisions the same are valid during the occupation and even
beyond except those of a political complexion, which are automatically annulled upon the restoration of
the legitimate authority.82 e. Effects of Change in Sovereignty As to political laws. Where there is a
change in sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are not merely suspended but abrogated
unless they are retained or re-enacted by positive act of the new sovereign. As to non-political laws. Non-
political laws, continue in operation.

Effect of Belligerent Occupation

No change in sovereignty. However, political laws, except those of treason, are suspended; municipal
laws remain in force unless changed by the belligerent occupant. principle of jus postliminium – At the
end of the occupation, political laws are automatically revived. (Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil.
285)
Effect of Change of Sovereignty –
 The political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign,
are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Municipals laws remain in force. (Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77)

LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then
suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is NOT transferred to the occupier.
There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government DOES
NOT affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the
same government and same sovereign people

-------
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance
of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE

GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION.

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE

REVISED PENAL CODE.

HELD:
No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the
unending
allegiance owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a person
who owes permanent allegiance to a state is called a national.) of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated (repealed) or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby
to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government.

(Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in then
people and all government authority emanates from them.")

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the
control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily
to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military
occupation.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign
people.
(Art. 114. Treason. — Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the
Government of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them
or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to
exceed P20,000 pesos.)

DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines
were suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the
international law adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the
nation. The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole
authority of the invading power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict
with those of displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand
and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security
of his forces, for the maintenance of the law and order, and for the proper administration
of the country.

Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack
of an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as
Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of
certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a
portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn
Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the
President and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the
stockholder of the corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a
Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but
from Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the
lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8,
1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property
was no longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply
to the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have
been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New
Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance from
the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.

Peralta v. Director of Prisons

(1945)

Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, was prosecuted for the crime of
robbery as defined by the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. He
was found guilty and sentenced to serve time by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7 promulgated by the President of the Republic.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court’s existence was void
ab initio because it was created as a political instrumentality under the command of the
Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions of said ordinance violate his constitutional
rights; that the penalties provided for are much more severe than the RPC. SolGen is of the
opinion that the petition should be granted because the Ordinance mentioned in creating said
court is “tinged with political complexion”, that the procedure does not afford a fair trial
and violates constitutional right of accused persons under a legitimate Constitution.
The court is of the opinion that:

As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power
which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in International Law that
"The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its
source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely from
the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted
either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of
the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district."
(Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.)

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the

belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a
court is of a political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty
of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be
of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied.
There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.

The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the
competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the
crime of which said petitioner was convicted.

It appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No.
65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and
ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life
imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal
Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as
new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and
necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of
the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations.

The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the
Commonwealth Government; that is, whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive
sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time.

We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon, supra, that all judgment of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese
regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or
right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted
the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be
valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas
MacArthur.

Alcantara v. Director of Prisons

Petitioner was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms. The CA modified the
sentence from arresto mayor to prision correccional. Petitioner questions the validity of the CA
on the sole ground that the court was a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation. In Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, the
court ruled that the RP and the PEC were governments de facto and that judicial acts were good
and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
The CA that existing during Japanese occupation was the CA after the restoration. And even if
the CA was a new court, its judgments would still remain good and valid provided that they
do not have a political complexion.

A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new
act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against
the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new offenses
committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the
control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts
penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or
favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent
occupant. As examples, the crimes against national security, such as treason, espionage, etc., and
against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the Commonwealth or
United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the
belligerent occupant.

Ponente: Justice Feria

Aniceto Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons
(G.R. No. L-6, 29 November 1945, 75 Phil 494)
Doctrine – A punitive or penal sentence becomes that of a political complexion when it
penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws or acts already penalized by the
latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and
penalized as new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.
Type of Action/Appeal: Petition for writ of habeas corpus by Alcantara on the ground that he
was unduly deprived of liberty due to rendition of the judgment against him for felony of
illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries by CFI Ilocos Sur, which was
affirmed with modification by Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon.
Facts – Aniceto Alcantara was convicted in the CFI Ilocos Sur in Criminal Case 23 for the
felony of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon his appeal, the
Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon in Baguio City modified his sentence to an
indeterminate sentence ranging from 4 mos. and 21 days of arresto mayor to 3 years, 9 mos. and
3 days of prision correctional.
Issues – W/N the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon had jurisdiction over the case of
Alcantara, on the ground that it was a validly-created court (Court of Appeals of Northern
Luzon was created during the Japanese occupation) and that it has authority to hold
sessions in Baguio City, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 3?
Verdict – Petition for writ of habeas corpus by Alcantara was DENIED.
Held – The Court held that the sentence served by Alcantara (illegal discharge of firearms with
less serious physical injuries) is an criminal act that has no political complexion.
A punitive or penal sentence becomes that of a political complexion when it penalizes
either a new act not defined in the municipal laws or acts already penalized by the latter as
a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as
new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.
It cited the case of Co Kim Cham vs Valdez, where the Japanese Republic (of the Philippines)
and the Phil. Executive Commission were governments de facto and the judicial acts of the
courts thereof were good and valid and remained as such even after the Commonwealth
Government was restored, except those crimes with political complexion (political crimes)
Also, there was no substantial change in the jurisdiction and structure of the Court of Appeals
when the Japanese-initiated Republic abolished the pre-World War II Court of Appeals, and
reorganized it into several courts

Vilas v. City of Manila, 42 Phil 953

Facts:
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas
is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of
money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its
sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and it contention
now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

Issue:
Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the
City of Manila to its creditor

Held:
No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the
municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is
in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property
and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court
held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present
sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the
predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.
To quote:
'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that
whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one
nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended
for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new
government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government
to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are
designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances,
and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new
government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative
power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in
support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the [220 U.S. 345, 358] press,
or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of
obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other
subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same
matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of
property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health
and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of
government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered
or repealed.'

The above language was quoted with approval in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 298 , 45 S.
L. ed. 1088, 1110, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770.

PREVIOUSLY -> The charter contains no reference to the obligations or contracts of the
old city.
If we understand the argument against the liability here asserted, it proceeds mainly upon the
theory that inasmuch as the predecessor of the present city, the ayuntamiento of Manila, was a
corporate entity created by the Spanish government, when the sovereignty of Spain in the
islands was terminated by the treaty of cession, if not by the capitulation of August 13, 1898,
the municipality ipso facto disappeared for all purposes. This conclusion is reached upon the
supposed analogy to the doctrine of principal and agent, the death of the principal ending the
agency. So complete is the supposed death and annihilation of a municipal entity by extinction
of sovereignty of the creating state that it was said in one of the opinions below that all of the
public property of Manila passed to the United States, 'for a consideration, which was paid,' and
that the United States was therefore justified in creating an absolutely new municipality, and
endowing it with all of the assets of the defunct city, free from any obligation to the creditors of
that city. And so the matter was dismissed in the Trigas Case by the court of first instance, by
the suggestion that 'the plaintiff may have a claim against the Crown of Spain, which has
received from the United States payment for that done by the plaintiff.' [220 U.S. 345, 356] We
are unable to agree with the argument. It loses sight of the dual character of municipal
corporations. They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private
or business character. In the one character a municipal corporation is a governmental
subdivision, and for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state.
In the other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character it stands
for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public
purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred.