SANTIAGO vs. CF SHARP CREW MNGT.

Facts:
 Petitioner Paul Santiago had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Mngt. (respondent) for about 5 years. He signed
a new contract of employment with the duration of 9 mos. and was assured of a monthly salary, overtime pay and
other benefits.
 Then, he was deployed on board to "MSV Seaspread" to leave the port of Manila for Canada. A week before his
departure, Capt. Fernandez sent a message to captain of MSV Seaspread which stated that Fernandez received a
phone call from petitioner’s wife who asked not to send him to MSV Seaspread anymore; and other anonymous
callers said that if he will be allowed to depart, he will only jump ship in Canada like what his brother (Christopher) did
before.
 With this, he was told that he would not be leaving anymore but was reassured that he might be considered for
deployment at some future date.
 Thus, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
 Petitioner maintains that respondent violated the Migrant Workers Act and the POEA Rules when it failed to deploy
him within 30 days without a valid reason –– that it prevented the consummation of the POEA-approved contract.
Nevertheless, the contract is deemed consummated, and therefore he should be awarded actual damages.
 Also, he submits that respondent had no valid and sufficient cause to abandon the employment contract, as it merely
relied upon alleged phone calls from his wife and other unnamed callers in arriving at the conclusion that he would
jump ship like his brother. He points out that his wife had executed an affidavit strongly denying having called
respondent, and that the other alleged callers did not even disclose their identities.
 On the other hand, respondent argues that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to award petitioner's monetary claims.
His employment with respondent did not commence because his deployment was withheld for a valid reason.

Issue:
1. Did the parties enter into an employment contract? Was an employer-employee created?
2. W/N respondent is liable for damages

Held:
1.THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT PARTIES ENTERED INTO AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BUT NO EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP WAS ESTABLISHED. When respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada ––
considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment
contract did not commence.
 However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case
coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and
the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee
relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of
hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of
the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a
cause of action against the erring party.

2.YES, THE ACT CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF CONTRACT GIVING RISE TO PETITIONER’S CAUSE OF ACTION. We take
exception to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed
by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules are silent as to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does
not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not
end with the suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker.
They do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has
failed to deploy him.
 Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules
that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims
arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that: Sec.
10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within 90 calendar days after the filing of the complaint,
the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
 Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas employment,
his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.

NB: Issues on attorney’s fees, and moral damages are excluded from this digest.
STO. TOMAS vs. SALAC
 Congress enacted RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes,
sets the Government's policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and
promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.

NB: This case is a consolidation of the cases; different facts, issues and rulings on each case.

G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710

In 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto.
Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of
the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be
deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated.
RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government agencies
should have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
Issue: W/N Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
Held:
The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to
Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.

G.R. 167590

In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of the following provisions of
RA 8042:
a) Section 6, which defines the term “illegal recruitment”. PASEI claims that the definition by the law is vague as it
fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b) Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties for simple violations against
RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing inspection are already punishable for at least 6 years and
1 day imprisonment and a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c) Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file the criminal case where
he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed. PASEI argues that this provision is void for being
contrary to the Rules of Court which provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place where the crime
or any of its essential elements were committed;
d) Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in violation of RA 8042
shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being
violative of due process.

RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void.
Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.
Issue:
W/N Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.

Held: No, they are valid provisions.

a) Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms,
persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without
the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the
wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc.
of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they
commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
b) Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said penalties. Besides, it is not the
duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.
c) Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself, provides that the rule on venue
when it comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided
an alternative venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d) Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable
with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as
sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99

 In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her parents received insurance
benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy
conducted in the Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma)
filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment and placement agency which handled
Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).
 The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen was negligent in
investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin (a violation of RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages. The Supreme
Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly
and solidarily liable with Becmen.
 Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene. They aver that Section 10
is invalid.

Issue: W/N Section is invalid.

Held: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not automatic. However, the SC
reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on
record which shows that they were personally involved in their company’s particular actions or omissions in Jasmin’s case.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs. REBESENCIO
Facts:
 Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia Arabian Airlines as Temporary Flight Attendants with the
accreditation and approval of the POEA. After undergoing seminars required by the POEA for deployment
overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia, and after working as Temporary Flight Attendants,
respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio, Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal,
Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong and Loraine Schneider-Cruz then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with
Saudia.
 Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates
in 2006. Respondents alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant.
 Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its “Unified
Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants” (Unified Contract). Under the Unified Contract, the
employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. It provides:
(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on board to provide various
services required in normal or emergency cases on both domestic/international flights beside her role
in maintaining continuous safety and security of passengers, and since she will not be able to maintain
the required medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air Hostess becomes
pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment contract as void
and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness.

Issue:
W/N there was an illegal dismissal of the respondents

Held:
Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed.
 So, informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia’s policy. As argued by
respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At
the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s policy
excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration but sex.
 We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render difficult the
performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to
view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of one’s employment.
It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of
functions. However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no
other recourse but the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.
 Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the termination of
employment of women who take maternity leaves;
 Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., “to make an intelligent decision”),
Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a
pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’ citation) in this case, respondents themselves have
made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In their Comment, respondents write: Under the Labor Laws of Saudi
Arabia and the Philippines [,] it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue of
pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict [sic] in that no employer can terminate the
employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of
Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment of a
female worker or give her a warning of the same while on maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)