Malaysia is a multiethnic, multicultural, multi-religious, and multilingual society.

“Solidarity,
harmony and unity” is a significant agenda for the stability of the country (Hai Liaw and Ridzuan 2015,
137), and there is no other powerful force in Malaysian society than communalism: division of the
country into ethnic minorities (Neher 1991, 103), 61.4 percent Bumiputeras (50.4 percent Malay and 11
percent other indigenous groups), 23.7 percent Chinese, 7.1 percent Indians, and the remaining 7.8
percent divided into smaller ethnic groups (Christie and Noor 2016, 2). The origin of this ethnic division
in Malaysian society can be traced back to Britain’s imposition of a divide and rule policy that lasted until
independence in 1957, but the impact can be seen until today. From 1860 to 1940, many immigrants,
mostly impoverished workers from South China came to Malaysia to work the tin mines and perform
labor that indigenous Malays had rejected (Neher 1991, 103). Subsequently, it became necessary for the
British authority to assign certain ethnic group to different economic sectors. For example, the indigenous
Malays peasantry lived in rural areas where they engaged in their traditional methods of agriculture and
fishing, with little social mobility. On the other hand, the immigrant population which mostly consists of
the Chinese and the Indian were involved with the British large-scale commercial production in more
urban areas (Christie and Noor 2016, 2). Ethic division and conflict continue to be the focal concerns in
Malaysia due to the legacy of colonialism.

This labor distribution had resulted to the disparity of income between ethnic groups. The
Malays, in spite of comprising the bulk of the population remained impoverished together with the
Indians immigrants. On the other hand, the Chinese, given their economic disposition were able to
improve their economic stature by constantly seeking business opportunities to further strengthen their
wealth (Hai Liaw and Ridzuan 2015, 138). This separateness in terms of economic function was
reinforced even as the Chinese expanded their economic roles by becoming money lenders, middlemen,
contractors, and manufacturer. Among other things, the dissatisfaction particularly on the part of the
Malays resulted in stereotyping. Malays view the Chinese as violent, materialistic, dishonest in terms of
business dealings, “ritually unclean, and politically suspect,” (Neher 1991, 104) while the Malay
themselves as scrupulous in their economic dealings with others and are more concerned with the quality
of human relationships than with material benefits and profits. The Chinese, on the other hand, view
themselves as hardworking, visionary, economical, and faithful to their families whereas the typical
Malay is indolent and superstitious and without motivation for hard work or personal advancement
(Neher 1991, 103-104).
 In order to mitigate these profound ethnic differences, the British colonizers arranged the Bargain
when they relinquished colonial authority over Malaya in 1957. The Bargain included constitutional
advantages given to the Malays; support for a Malay as a head of state (Yang diPertuan Agong), chosen
from the nine Malay Sultans; Malay as the country’s official language; and Islam as the official religion.
Also, the formulated bargain provided special constitutional rights to Malays in terms of land
procurement, educational support, and civil service employment (Neher 1991, 104). To meet the terms of
the Bargain, the political parties in Malaysia which were formed along ethnic lines with three leading
parties: United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) formed an Alliance Coalition and came up with an informal agreement
with the understanding that non-Malays will be granted with citizenship and unfettered economic
activities in exchange for conceding political hegemony to Malays who controlled UMNO (Christie and
Noor 2016, 2). As long as that formula was accepted by all ethnic groups, the Malaysian political system
was stable.

Nevertheless, the extent of this ethnic strife between the Malays and the non-Malays became even
more apparent as it greatly affected the political system of Malaysia when the agreed formula was
challenged in the national election of May 1969 when many Chinese voted for other Chinese opposition
parties such as the Democratic Action Party and Gerakan Party, rather than the Alliance coalition
(Christie and Noor 2016, 3). Malays perceived the loss of seats as a threat because according to “the
bargain” their political dominance was supposed to counterbalance their disadvantaged economic position
vis-à-vis Chinese. In the wake of Malay losses in the 1969 elections, riots ensued in various parts of the
country, causing the deaths of at least 196 persons and precipitating declaration of a state of emergency
that lasted almost two years (Neher 1991, 105). The Malaysian government viewed this political
disturbance as a threat to the ethnic Bargain which had been the formulated to ensure civic stability. To
guarantee that Malays retained their monopoly of political power, a state of emergency was decreed,
parliament was provisionally disbanded, civil liberties were abridged, and total authority was granted to a
National Operations Council (NOC). The NOC was tasked to work on restoring civic stability in order to
eventually return to parliamentary democracy (Neher 1991, 105).

In addition to the creation of the NOC, believing that economic tensions were mainly responsible
for the communal riots, Tun Razak the new prime minister tried to resolve this by proposing the New
Economic Policy (NEP) to promote national unity which consists of two policies for development (Neher
1991, 105). The first is to reduce and eradicate poverty by raising the income levels and also increase the
employment opportunities to all Malaysians regardless of ethnic affiliations. The second is to restructure
the Malaysian society for better economic balance, and to reduce and eliminate the race identification
base on economic function (Hai Liaw and Ridzuan 2015, 138). However, in essence, this meant that
Malay participation in the economic sphere was to be increased by granting special privileges in terms of
business ownership, tax breaks, investment incentives, and employment quotas (Christie and Noor 2016,
4-5). Subsequently, the government formulated the (1) National Education Policy in 1961, National
Language Policy of the same year, and the National Cultural Policy in 1971 in order to enhance national
identity, promote national integrations, unity and maintain ethnic harmony(Hai Liaw and Ridzuan 2015,
138-140).

Ethnic Conflict in Malaysia can be explained through the Primordial theory because the stark
differences amongst ethnic groups all derived from the same basic premise: ethnic hatreds and fears of the
“other” are so entrenched that efforts to control violence are not likely to work (Harvey 2000, 41).
Violence escalates as group affinities and securities are challenged, which inevitably manifested in the
1969 riot in Malaysia. As elaborated by Johnson (1997, 6) the primordial theory works on the notion that
strong ethnic affiliation comes from the phenotypic matching of an organism’s physical and behavioral
characteristics (e.g., dialect, customs, diet) and in the case of Malaysia there are virtually apparent
physical differences among people of different ethnic origins, primarily because intermarriage in the
region is highly discouraged. Historically, intermarriage has had grave consequences on the ethnic fabric
of Malaysian society, because religion still remains a severe barrier to the intermarriage and assimilation
amongst different ethnic groups (Edmonds 1986, 1). This blatant delineation became even more apparent
with the creation of each ethnic group’s own educational systems. This resulted to the separation of
students based on their native language, and hindered interaction among students from different ethnic
groups. It is also noteworthy that national universities use Malay language as the medium of instruction
which imply prejudice towards non-Malay students (Hai Liaw and Ridzuan 2015, 137-138).