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Jaykov Foukzon
jaykovfoukzon@list.ru
Israel Institute of Technology,Haifa,Israel
I.Introduction.
1.1.Main results.
Let us remind that accordingly to naive set theory, any definable collection is a set. Let
R be the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. If R qualifies as a member
of itself, it would contradict its own definition as a set containing all sets that are not
members of themselves. On the other hand, if such a set is not a member of itself, it
would qualify as a member of itself by the same definition. This contradiction is Russell’s
paradox. In 1908, two ways of avoiding the paradox were proposed, Russell’s type
theory and Zermelo set theory, the first constructed axiomatic set theory. Zermelo’s
axioms went well beyond Frege’s axioms of extensionality and unlimited set abstraction,
and evolved into the now-canonical Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory ZFC. "But how do we
know that ZFC is a consistent theory, free of contradictions? The short answer is that we
don’t; it is a matter of faith (or of skepticism)"— E.Nelson wrote in his paper [1].
However, it is deemed unlikely that even ZFC 2 which is significantly stronger than ZFC
harbors an unsuspected contradiction; it is widely believed that if ZFC and ZFC 2 were
inconsistent, that fact would have been uncovered by now. This much is certain —ZFC
and ZFC 2 is immune to the classic paradoxes of naive set theory: Russell’s paradox, the
Burali-Forti paradox, and Cantor’s paradox.
Remark 1.1.1.Note that in this paper we view (i) the first order set theory ZFC under
the canonical first order semantics (ii) the second order set theory ZFC 2 under the
Henkin semantics [2],[3],[4],[5],[6].
Remark 1.1.2.Second-order logic essantially differs from the usual first-order
predicate
calculus in that it has variables and quantifiers not only for individuals but also for
subsets
of the universe and variables for n-ary relations as well [2],[6].The deductive calculus
DED 2 of second order logic is based on rules and axioms which guarantee that the
quantifiers range at least over definable subsets [6]. As to the semantics, there
are two tipes of models: (i) Suppose U is an ordinary first-order structure and
S is a set of subsets of the domain A of U. The main idea is that the set-variables
range over S, i.e. U, S X X S S S U, S S .
We call U, S a Henkin model, if U, S satisfies the axioms of DED 2 and
truth in U, S is preserved by the rules of DED 2 . We call this semantics
of second-order logic the Henkin semantics and second-order logic with the
Henkin semantics the Henkin second-order logic. There is a special class of
Henkin models, namely those U, S where S is the set of all subsets of A.
We call these full models. We call this semantics of second-order logic the full
semantics and second-order logic with the full semantics the full second-order logic.
Remark 1.1.3.We emphasize that the following facts are the main features of
second-order logic:
1.The Completeness Theorem: A sentence is provable in DED 2 if and only if it holds
in
all Henkin models [2],[6].
2.The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem: A sentence with an infinite Henkin model has a
countable Henkin model.
3.The Compactness Theorem: A set of sentences, every finite subset of
which has a Henkin model, has itself a Henkin model.
4.The Incompleteness Theorem: Neither DED 2 nor any other effectively
given deductive calculus is complete for full models, that is, there are
always sentences which are true in all full models but which are unprovable.
5.Failure of the Compactness Theorem for full models.
6.Failure of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem for full models.
7.There is a finite second-order axiom system 2 such that the semiring
of natural numbers is the only full model (up to isomorphism) of 2 .
8. There is a finite second-order axiom system RCF 2 such that the field
of real numbers is the only (up to isomorphism) full model of RCF 2 .
Remark 1.1.4.For let second-order ZFC be, as usual, the theory that results obtained
from ZFC when the axiom schema of replacement is replaced by its second-order
universal closure,i.e.
X Func X u rr ss u s, r X , 1. 1. 1
where X is a second-order variable, and where Func X abbreviates " X is a functional
relation",see [7].
Designation 1.1.1. We will denote (i) by ZFC Hs
2 set theory ZFC 2 with the Henkin
Hs ZFC Hs
semantics, (ii) by ZFC 2 set theory ZFC Hs2 M st 2 and (iii) by ZFC st set theory
ZFC M ZFC Th
st , where M st is a standard model of the theory Th.
Axiom M ZFC . [8]. There is a set M ZFC and a binary relation M ZFC M ZFC which
ZFC
makes M a model for ZFC.
Remark 1.1.3.(i)We emphasize that it is well known that axiom M ZFC a single
statement
in ZFC see [8],Ch.II,section 7.We denote this statement throught all this paper by
symbol Con ZFC; M ZFC .The completness theorem says that M ZFC Con ZFC .
Hs
(ii) Obviously there exists a single statement in ZFC 2 such that
Hs
M ZFC 2 Con ZFC Hs
2 .
ZFC Hs
We denote this statement throught all this paper by symbol Con ZFC Hs 2 ;M
2 and
there
Hs
exists a single statement M Z 2 in Z Hs
2 . We denote this statement throught all this
paper by
Z Hs
symbol Con Z Hs 2 ;M
2 .
Axiom M st . [8].There is a set M ZFC
ZFC
st such that if R is
ZFC ZFC
x, y |x y x M st y M st
ZFC
then M st is a model for ZFC under the relation R.
Z Hs
Definition 1.1.1.[8].The model M ZFC
st and M st2 is called a standard model since the
relation used is merely the standard - relation.
Remark 1.1.4.[8].Note that axiom M ZFC doesn’t imply axiom M ZFC st .
Remark 1.1.6.Note that in order to deduce: (i) ~Con ZFC 2 from Con ZFC Hs
Hs
2 ,
and (ii) ~Con ZFC from Con ZFC , by using Gödel encoding, one needs something
more
ZFC Hs
than the consistency of ZFC Hs Hs
2 , e.g., that ZFC 2 has an omega-model M
2
or an
ZFC Hs
standard model M st 2 i.e., a model in which the integers are the standard integers.To
put it another way, why should we believe a statement just because there’s a
ZFC Hs Hs
2 -proof of it? It’s clear that if ZFC 2 is inconsistent, then we won’t believe
ZFC Hs
2 -proofs. What’s slightly more subtle is that the mere consistency of ZFC 2 isn’t quite
enough to get us to believe arithmetical theorems of ZFC Hs 2 ; we must also believe that
these arithmetical theorems are asserting something about the standard naturals. It is
"conceivable" that ZFC Hs 2 might be consistent but that the only nonstandard models
ZFC Hs
M Nst 2 it has are those in which the integers are nonstandard, in which case we might
not "believe" an arithmetical statement such as "ZFC Hs2 is inconsistent" even if there is a
Hs
ZFC 2 -proof of it.
Hs Hs
(i) We define now the equivalence relation X X X by
1 X 2 X X 1 X 2 X 2. 1. 1
Hs Hs Hs
(ii) A subset X of Xsuch that 1 X 2 X holds for all 1 X and 2 X in X ,
Hs Hs
and never for 1 X in X and 2 X outside X , is called an equivalence class of
Hs
X .
(iii) The collection of all possible equivalence classes of Hs Hs
X by ~ X , denoted X / X
Hs Hs
X / X X Hs | X X . 2. 1. 2
Hs Hs
(iv) For any X X let X X X | X X denote the
Hs
equivalence class to which X belongs. All elements of X equivalent to each other
are also elements of the same equivalence class.
Definition 2.1.2.[9].Let Th be any theory in the recursive language Th PA , where
PA
is a language of Peano arithmetic.We say that a number-theoretic relation R x 1 , . . . , x n
of
n arguments is expressible in Th if and only if there is a wff R x 1 , . . . , x n of Th with the
free
variables x 1 , . . . , x n such that,for any natural numbers k 1 , . . . , k n , the following hold:
(i) If R k 1 , . . . , k n is true, then Th R k1, . . . , kn .
(ii) If R k 1 , . . . , k n is false, then Th R k 1 , . . . , k n .
Designation 2.1.2.(i) Let g ZFC Hs 2
u be a Gödel number of given an expression u of
Hs ZFC Hs
the set theory ZFC 2 ZFC Hs2 M st 2 .
Hs
(ii) Let Fr Hs
2 y, v be the relation : y is the Gödel number of a wff of the set theoryZFC 2
that contains free occurrences of the variable X with Gödel number v [9].
Hs
(iii) Note that the relation Fr Hs Hs
2 y, v is expressible in ZFC 2 by a wff Fr 2 y, v
(iv) Note that for any y, v by definition of the relation Fr Hs
2 y, v follows that
Fr Hs
2 y, v ! X g ZFC Hs
2
X y g ZFC Hs
2
X , 2. 1. 3
Hs
where X is a unique wff of ZFC 2 which contains free occurrences of the variable X
with Gödel number v. We denote a unique wff X defined by using equivalence
(1.2.3)
by symbol y, X , i.e.
Hs
Fr 2 y, v ! y, X g ZFC Hs
2
y, X y g ZFC Hs
2
X , 2. 1. 4
Hs
(v) Let 2 y, v, 1 be a Gödel number of the following wff: !X X Y X , where
g ZFC Hs
2
X y, g ZFC Hs
2
X , g ZFC Hs
2
Y 1.
Hs
(vi) Let Pr ZFC Hs
2
z be a predicate asserting provability in ZFC 2 , which defined by
canonical
formula,see for example [9],[11].
Definition 2.1.3. Let HsX be the countable collection of the all 1-place open wff’s of
Hs
the set theoryZFC 2 that contains free occurrences of the variable X.
Definition 2.1.4. Let g ZFC Hs
2
X . Let Hs be a set of the all Gödel numbers of the
Hs
1-place open wff’s of the set theoryZFC 2 that contains free occurrences of the
variable X
with Gödel number v, i.e.
Hs
y | y, Fr Hs
2 y, v , 2. 1. 5
or in the following equivalent form:
yy y y Fr Hs
2 y, v . 2. 1. 6
Hs
Remark 2.1.1.Note that from the axiom of separation it follows directly that is a set
Hs
in the sense of the set theory ZFC 2 .
Definition 2.1.5.(i)We define now the equivalence relation
Hs Hs
2. 1. 7
Hs
in the sense of the set theory ZFC 2 by
y1 y2 X y1, X y2, X 2. 1. 8
Note that from the axiom of separation it follows directly that the equivalence relation
Hs
is a relation in the sense of the set theory ZFC 2 .
(ii) A subset Hs of Hs such that y 1 y 2 holds for all y 1 and y 1 in Hs ,and never for y 1
in
Hs
and y 2 outside Hs , is an equivalence class of Hs .
Hs Hs
(iii) For any y let y Hs z |y z denote the equivalence class to which y
Hs
belongs. All elements of equivalent to each other are also elements of the same
equivalence class.
(iv)The collection of all possible equivalence classes of Hs by ~ , denoted Hs /
Hs Hs
/ y Hs |y . 2. 1. 9
Hs
Remark 2.1.2. Note that from the axiom of separation it follows directly that / is
a
Hs
set in the sense of the set theory ZFC 2 .
Definition 2.1.6.Let Hs2 be the countable collection of the all sets definable by 1-place
Hs
open wff of the set theory ZFC 2 , i.e.
Hs Hs
Y Y 2 X X Hs X / X !X X Y X . 2. 1. 10
Definition 2.1.7.We rewrite now (2.1.10) in the following equivalent form
Hs Hs
Y Y 2 X X Hs X / X Y X , 2. 1. 11
Hs
where the countable collection X / X is defined by
Hs Hs
X X X / X X X / X !X X 2. 1. 12
Hs
Definition 2.1.8. Let 2 be the countable collection of the all sets such that
Hs Hs
XX 2 X 2 X X. 2. 1. 13
Hs Hs Hs
Remark 2.1.3. Note that 2 2 since 2 is a collection definable by 1-place open
wff
Hs Hs
Z, 2 XX 2 X Z X X.
From (2.1.13) one obtains
Hs Hs Hs Hs
2 2 2 2 . 2. 1. 14
But (2.1.14) gives a contradiction
Hs Hs Hs Hs
2 2 2 2 . 2. 1. 15
Hs
However contradiction (2.1.15) it is not a contradiction inside ZFC 2 for the reason that
Hs
the countable collection Hs
2 is not a set in the sense of the set theory ZFC 2 .
Hs
In order to obtain a contradiction inside ZFC 2 we introduce the following
definitions.
Hs
Definition 2.1.9.We define now the countable set / by
y y Hs
Hs
/ y Hs
Hs
/ Fr Hs
2 y, v !X y, X . 2. 1. 16
Remark 2.1.4. Note that from the axiom of separation it follows directly that / is a
Hs
set in the sense of the set theory ZFC 2 .
Definition 2.1.10.We define now the countable set 2 Hs by formula
Hs Hs
Y Y 2 y y / g ZFC Hs
2
X Y X . 2. 1. 17
Hs
Note that from the axiom schema of replacement (1.1.1) it follows directly that 2 is
a
Hs
set in the sense of the set theory ZFC 2 .
Hs
Definition 2.1.11.We define now the countable set 2 by formula
Hs Hs
XX 2 X 2 X X. 2. 1. 18
Note that from the axiom schema of separation it follows directly that 2 Hs is a set in
the
Hs
sense of the set theory ZFC 2 .
Remark 2.1.5.Note that 2 Hs 2
Hs
since 2 Hs is a definable by the following formula
Hs
Z XX 2 X Z X X. 2. 1. 19
Hs
Theorem 2.1.1.Set theory is inconsistent.
ZFC 2
Hs Hs Hs Hs
Proof. From (2.1.18) and Remark 2.1.5 we obtain 2 2 2 2 from
which immediately one obtains a contradiction
Hs Hs Hs Hs
2 2 2 2 . 2. 1. 20
belongs. All elements of st equivalent to each other are also elements of the same
equivalence class.
(iv)The collection of all possible equivalence classes of st by ~ , denoted st /
st st
/ y st |y . 2. 2. 7
st
Remark 2.2.2. Note that from the axiom of separation it follows directly that / is
a
set in the sense of the set theory ZFC st .
Definition 2.2.5.Let st be the countable collection of the all sets definable by 1-place
open wff of the set theory ZFC st , i.e.
st
Y Y st X X st X/ X !X X Y X . 2. 2. 8
Definition 2.2.6.We rewrite now (2.2.8) in the following equivalent form
st
Y Y st X X st X / X Y X , 2. 2. 9
st
where the countable collection X / X is defined by
st st
X X st X / X X st X/ X !X X 2. 2. 10
Definition 2.2.7. Let st be the countable collection of the all sets such that
XX st X st X X. 2. 2. 11
Remark 2.2.3. Note that st st since st is a collection definable by 1-place open
wff
Z, st XX st X Z X X.
From (2.2.11) and Remark 2.2.3 one obtains directly
st st st st . 2. 2. 12
But (2.2.12) immediately gives a contradiction
st st st st . 2. 2. 13
However contradiction (2.2.13) it is not a true contradiction inside ZFC st for the reason
that the countable collection st is not a set in the sense of the set theory ZFC st .
In order to obtain a true contradiction inside ZFC st we introduce the following
definitions.
Definition 2.2.8.We define now the countable set st / by formula
st st
y y st / y st / Fr st y, v !X y, X . 2. 2. 14
st
Remark 2.2.4. Note that from the axiom of separation it follows directly that / is
a
set in the sense of the set theory ZFC st .
Definition 2.2.9.We define now the countable set st by formula
st
Y Y st y y st / g ZFC st X Y X . 2. 2. 15
Note that from the axiom schema of replacement it follows directly that st is a set in
the
sense of the set theory ZFC st .
Definition 2.2.10.We define now the countable set st by formula
XX st X st X X. 2. 2. 16
Note that from the axiom schema of separation it follows directly that st is a set in the
sense of the set theory ZFC st .
Remark 2.2.5.Note that st st since st is a definable by the following formula
Z XX st X Z X X. 2. 2. 17
Theorem 2.2.1.[11].Set theory ZFC st is inconsistent.
Proof. From (2.2.17) and Remark 2.2.5 we obtain st st st st from which
immediately one obtains a contradiction
st st st st . 2. 2. 18
Remark 2.2.6.Theorem 2.2.1 originally was proved in papers [11]-[13] by using
another
essentially complicated approach.
2.3.Derivation of the inconsistent definable set in ZFC Nst .
Definition 2.3.1.Let PA be a first order theory which contain usual postulates of Peano
arithmetic [9] and recursive defining equations for every primitive recursive function as
desired.So for any (n 1)-place function f defined by primitive recursion over any
n-place
base function g and (n 2)-place iteration function h there would be the defining
equations:
(i) f 0, y 1 , . . . , y n g y 1 , . . . , y n , (ii) f x 1, y 1 , . . . , y n h x, f x, y 1 , . . . , y n , y 1 , . . . , y n .
ZFC
Designation 2.3.1.(i) Let M Nst be a nonstandard model of ZFC and let M PA st be a
standard
model of PA. We assume now that M PA st M ZFCNst and denote such nonstandard model
ZFC
of the set theory ZFC by M Nst PA . (ii) Let ZFC Nst be the theory
ZFC Nst ZFC M ZFC
Nst PA .
Z XX Nst X Z X X. 2. 3. 17
Theorem 2.3.1.Set theory ZFC Nst is inconsistent.
Proof. From (2.3.16) and Remark 2.3.5 we obtain Nst Nst Nst Nst from
which one obtains a contradiction
Nst Nst Nst Nst . 2. 3. 18
Hs
3. Avoiding the contradictions from set theory ZFC 2 and
set theory ZFC st using Quinean approach.
In order to avoid difficultnes mentioned above we use well known Quinean approach
[14].
4.Conclusion:
5.Acknowledgments
A reviewers provided important clarifications.
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