Ejera vs. Merto, G.R. No.

163109, January 22, 2014

Issue: Does the case of petitioner fall under the exceptions on exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Ruling: No. It is true that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule, but
recognizes exceptions, specifically: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrines may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controversial acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where strong public interest is
involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.

The exceptions did not cover the petitioner’s case. In her complaint, she assailed Office Order No. 008 on
three basic legal grounds, namely: (a) the re-assignment, being “whimsical and indiscriminate,” violated
the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions; (b) Merto had no power to investigate
her, considering that the Provincial Governor was the “proper disciplining authority;” and (c) whether the
letter of Merto requiring her to explain her refusal to follow Office Order No. 008 should be under oath.

Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014

Issue: In challenging the validity of an administrative issuance carried out pursuant to the agency’s rule-
making power, must administrative remedies be exhausted first?

Ruling: No. It bears emphasizing that the assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the rule-making or
quasi-legislative power of the DILG. This pertains to “the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute.” Not to be confused with
the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law. In challenging the validity of an administrative issuance
carried out pursuant to the agency’s rule-making power, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not stand as a bar in promptly resorting to the filing of a case in court. This was made clear
by the Court in Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) v. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC),
where it was ruled, thus:

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency,

a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where
the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and
not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
Banco de Oro vs Republic, G.R. No. 198756, January 13, 2015

Issue: Does direct resort to the court to challenge the 2011 BIR Rulings violate the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies?

Ruling:No. Jurisprudence allows certain exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative

remedies.Two of these exceptions are when the issue involves a purely legal question and when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of a judicial intervention. The two exceptions are present in this
case. The question involved is purely legal, namely: (a) the interpretation of the 20-lender rule in the
definition of the terms public and deposit substitutes under the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code;
and (b) whether the imposition of the 20% final withholding tax on the PEACe Bonds upon maturity
violates the constitutional provisions on non-impairment of contracts and due process.Judicial
intervention is likewise urgent with the impending maturity of the PEACe Bonds on October 18, 2011.

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies also finds no application when the exhaustion will
result in an exercise in futility.

In this case, an appeal to the Secretary of Finance from the questioned 2011 BIR Ruling would be a futile
exercise because it was upon the request of the Secretary of Finance that the 2011 BIR Ruling was issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It appears that the Secretary of Finance adopted the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue’s opinions as his own. This position was in fact confirmed in the letter159 dated
October 10, 2011 where he ordered the Bureau of Treasury to withhold the amount corresponding to the
20% final withholding tax on the interest or discounts allegedly due from the bondholders on the strength
of the 2011 BIR Ruling.

Exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:

[The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies] is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon
by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question,(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,(5) when there
is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.

Diocese of Bacolod vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

Issue: For failing to bring the matter to the Comelec en Banc or its division, did the petitioners violate the
principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Ruling: No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in
this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy
is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court
may come into the picture.” Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. In the context of this
case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.

Paje vs. Casino, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015

Issue: Can the acts of an agency (DENR) and validity of its issuance (ECC) be challenged via the writ of
kalikasan?

Ruling: In general, the proper procedure to question a defectin an ECC is to follow the appeal process
provided in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with the proper administrative appeal
process, recourse may be made to the courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. However, in exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to challenge
defects in the ECC provided that (1) the defects are causally linked or reasonably connected to an
environmental damage of the nature and magnitudecontemplated under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan,
and (2) the case does not violate, or falls under an exception to, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and/or primary jurisdiction.

As previously discussed, in the case at bar, only the allegation with respect to the lack of an EIA relative
to the first and second amendments to the subject ECC may be reasonably connected to such an
environmental damage. Further, given the extreme urgency of resolving the issue due to the looming
power crisis, this case may be considered as falling under an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, the aforesaid issue may be conceivably resolved in a writ of kalikasan case.

More importantly, we have expressly ruled that this case is an exceptional case due to the looming power
crisis, so that the rules of procedure may be suspended in order to address issues which, ordinarily, the
Court would not consider proper in a writ of kalikasan case. Hence, all issues, including those not proper
in a writ of kalikasan case, were resolved here in order to forestall another round of protracted litigation
relative to the implementation of the subject project.

Issue: Was there failure to exhaust administrative remedies?