1.

Alice a fourth year law student of the University of the Philippines,

got herself pregnant out of wedlock. The father John a first year law
student of Ateneo Law school was engaged to be married to a lady
professor of UE College of Law. When the lady professor discovered
the pregnancy of Alice, She filed an administrative disciplinary case
against Alice for immortality with the University of the Philippines
College of law dean angry, Alice filed also a disciplinary case agaist
John with Ateneo Administation.

****All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom.

This was applied in the case of Garcia vs. Lambino G.R. No. L-40779, that involvement in
questionable conducts is a matter of school policy and regulation that obviously can in no
way be said to be arbitrary and thus are matters of technical and academic judgment that
the courts will not ordinarily interfere with.
Charges and complaints in courts implies a given right, legally demandable, and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. The question is whether or not the Dean’s
rights are violated with regards to the acts committed by Alice and John which is
clearly absent. Therefore, a charge of gross immorality against the three for civil damages
will not prosper, however their non-admission or expulsion in the mentioned college for
gross immorality or gross misconduct may prosper.

Prof. Concepcion argues (and I agree with him) that since an illegitimate child is under the
sole parental authority of the mother under Article 176 of the Family Code, then the consent
of the biological father is not necessary. Prof. Concepcion states that the problem is with the
wording of the law. He says that instead of “biological parent/s” the law should have used
“legal parent/s” instead.

What can women with illegitimate children do in this kind of situation? They can petition
Congress to amend RA 8552 so that the written consent of the father should not be required.
Or they can file a petition for declaratory relief before a competent court asking that the term
“biological parent/s” be interpreted to mean “legal parent/s”.

2. Several San Beda College of Law students boycotted classes to join a

rally outside the school campus to protest the tuition fee increase
charged by the school. The dean required them to immediately return
to their classes, otherwise administrative disciplinary case were to
be filed against them. The student did not comply , Hence, the dean
 charged them with gross misconduct and imposed on all those who
participated the penalty of suspension for 1month. The students
appealed the decision to the rector-president.

A boycott is a form of consumer activism involving the act of voluntarily abstaining from using,
buying, or dealing with a person, organization, or country as an expression of protest, usually
for political reasons.

Gross misconduct" is where you can be dismissed straight away because it is serious enough
and possibly criminal e.g. stealing or sexual harassment.

CHAPTER 3
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born

outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural. (119a)

Art. 270. Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent marriage

between the parents. (120a)

Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the
parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be
considered legitimated by subsequent marriage.

If a natural child is recognized or judicially declared as natural,

such recognition or declaration shall extend to his or her brothers
or sisters of the full blood: Provided, That the consent of the latter
shall be implied if they do not impugn the recognition within four
years from the time of such recognition, or in case they are minors,
within four years following the attainment of majority. (121a)

Art. 272. Children who are legitimated by subsequent marriage

shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (122)

Art. 273. Legitimation shall take effect from the time of the child's
birth. (123a)

Art. 274. The legitimation of children who died before the

celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. (124)
Art. 275. Legitimation may be impugned by those who are
prejudiced in their rights, when it takes place in favor of those who
do not have the legal condition of natural children or when the
requisites laid down in this Chapter are not complied with. (128a)

The Student Rights and Responsibilities Handbook sets forth the procedural standards for
disciplinary proceedings in relation to student rights in the classroom and for student conduct for
individuals and for groups. "The Institute shall initiate disciplinary action for conduct including that
which could be a threat to the personal safety of members of the academic community, conduct that
endangers property, and or conduct that is disruptive to the educational and administrative
processes of the Institute."

A violation of the Grounds for Disciplinary Action may be construed to include: (a) active violation;
(b) attempt to violate; and (c) solicitation of or aiding another in the commission of a violation.
Disciplinary action may be instituted in any case in which an individual or group of students is found
in violation of any of the following GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION.

• 1. Conduct which could be construed to be a violation of any federal, state, or local law.
• 2. Conduct which disrupts or interferes with the personal or group rights of other members of
the Institute community or with any activities of the Institute including, but not limited to,
access to facilities and performance of normal duties.
• 3.Conduct which violates personal, group, or Institute rights to be secure against unlawful
intrusion or seizure including, but not limited to: (a) theft or possession of stolen property; (b)
possession or use of unauthorized Institute keys or access devices; (c) unauthorized entry;
and (d) refusal to leave or to release any property when ordered to do so by any person
having jurisdiction over it.
• 4. Damage to property including, but not limited to vandalism.
• 5. Academic dishonesty, as defined in this document.
• 6. Fraud, including, but not limited to, forgery, misuse, and/or alteration of Institute records,
documents, or identification.
• 7. Use, possession, or distribution of controlled substances (illegal drugs, as defined by state
and federal law) and precursors of controlled substances or drug paraphernalia, except as
expressly permitted by state and federal law and Institute regulations.
• 8. Being in any place for the purpose of unlawful use, possession, or distribution of a
controlled substance.
• 9. Disorderly, lewd, harassing, or indecent conduct.
• 10. Assault and/or sexual assault.
• 11. Hazing as defined in this document or by New York State statute.
• 12. Willful failure or refusal to testify as a witness after having been directed to appear at an
Institute disciplinary proceeding, unless the testimony would tend to implicate said student in
a violation of Institute regulations; or knowingly providing false testimony or evidence at an
Institute disciplinary proceeding. An Institute disciplinary proceeding includes, but is not
limited to, formal or informal action by the offices of the Dean of Students or the Dean of the
Graduate School, hearings before the Judicial Board or Review Board, and procedures
adopted by the Trustees in connection with the Rules for Maintenance of Public Order.
• 13. Conduct which endangers the safety of the Institute community, including, but not limited
to, tampering with safety or fire-warning devices; setting a fire on Institute property; use of
cooking equipment in unauthorized areas of the residence halls; reckless operation of a
motor vehicle.
 • 14. Use, possession or storage of dangerous weapons, chemicals, explosive devices or
materials including, but not limited to, firearms, air guns, prohibited knives (such as switch
knives, swords, daggers, gravity knives, throwing stars, and knives with blades more than
three inches long), ammunition, slingshots, metallic knuckles, bows and arrows, firecrackers,
and bombs.
• 15. Failure to comply with an Institute official in the performance of his or her duties,
including but not limited to, failure to provide valid identification or knowingly furnishing false
information.
• 16. Failure to honor financial obligations to the Institute or to any element thereof.
• 17.. Conduct which violates Institute or student government regulations established for any
specific area or department by those having jurisdiction over it including, but not limited to:
Parking, Public Safety, Residence Life, Financial Aid, Health Services, the Folsom Library,
Computing and Information Services, and the Rensselaer Union.

Case1

Our landmark ruling in Estrada v. Escritor24 emphasizes that in determining whether the acts
complained of constitute "disgraceful and immoral behavior" under the Civil Service Laws, the
distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other
should be kept in mind.25 The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed—albeit
not exclusively—in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is important
because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.26 Thus, government
action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must
have a secular purpose.27

Thus, any judicial pronouncement that an activity constitutes "disgraceful and immoral" behavior
under the contemplation of the Civil Service law must satisfy the test that such conduct is regulated
on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. Such judicial declarations cannot be mere
effectuations of personal bias, notably those colored by particular religious mores. Nor would the
demand be satisfied by the haphazard invocation of "cultural" values, without a convincing
demonstration that these cultural biases have since been recognized and given accord within the
realm of public policy. The Constitution and the statutes of the land would serve as especially
authoritative sources of recognition, since they are irrefutable as to what the public policy is. At the
same time, the constitutional protections afforded under the Bill of Rights should be observed, to the
extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.

If the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct. The situation may not be desirable, and may cause complications
in the life of both mother and child, but it does not give cause for administrative sanction. There is no
law penalizing such an unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her sexual
conduct, or for that matter, proscribing the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried
persons. Neither does the sexual behavior among single persons contravene any fundamental state
policy as contained in the Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems
irrespective of dogmatic origins.

On the other hand, if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other
than the mother, then there could be cause for administrative sanction against either the father or
mother. In this case, the "disgraceful and immoral conduct" consists of having extra-marital relations
with a married person. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law,
the sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized28 and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a
special contract of permanent union.29Accordingly, the Court has had little qualms with penalizing
judicial employees for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity.

Thus, respondent's possible sanction arises not from her having had a child out of wedlock,
but from her sexual relations with a married man. That respondent and Neslie Leaño
engaged in extra-marital trysts is uncontroverted, admitted by respondent herself in her
verified complaint for parental recognition and support filed on 19 May 1998. Moreover, the
illicit liaison occurred during her employment with the judiciary. These circumstances were
considered by the OCA in arriving at its recommendation.

JOSE MONTAÑA, JULIANA M. MONTAÑA and MARTINA MONTAÑA, petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO M. RUADO, respondent.

It has been remarked that affairs of the heart may at the start be characterized by sweetness and
light only to turn sour at the end. It is not unlikely either that there will be moments of warmth
resulting in a love-child, not exactly unwanted, but apt to cause complications. So it did turn out
exactly in this administrative case, the male participant, respondent Edmundo M. Ruado, being a
member of the bar and, at the time of the complaint, an assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon. His
conduct in courting complainant Martina Montaña, 1 leading her to believe in the sincerity of his
intentions, both of them being single at the time, and to submit to his importunities to have sexual
relations resulting in her pregnancy and subsequent delivery, but thereafter marrying another
woman, was stigmatized as lacking in that "degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of, and must be possessed by, members of the bar. 2 Respondent was required to answer.
He did so: He denied the fact that he and complainant, Martina Montaña, were sweethearts and
further disclaimed any promise being given by him to marry her. Such being the circumstances, he
was rather insistent that he did not violate any trust or confidence and that he was not guilty of any
deceitful inducements. There was no denial, however, of the sexual intimacies that marked the
relationship as well as of complainant thereafter, as a consequence thereof, becoming pregnant.

It was at that stage that the administrative case was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The matter was investigated and the report of this
investigation was duly forthcoming. According to the findings: "Complainant Martina Montaña's
declarations in the investigation tend to show that she and respondent were sweethearts. This
started when they met at the Governor's office in Romblon. Complainant then was employed as filing
clerk while respondent [was the] public defender. Because they were often seen together, people
who knew them began to talk about them, as lovers. The frequency of their association continued
unabated until respondent revealed to complainant that his parents were against her for she had
created a bad impression on respondent's father. Complainant resented this. She left Romblon and
sought employment in Manila, eventually landing a job in the Bureau of Public Highways.
Respondent, however, stayed in Romblon and continued discharging his duties as Assistant
Provincial Fiscal, a position he was appointed to later. This episode momentarily broke the
relationship between the two." 3 Then come this portion: "Respondent, however, came to Manila on
several occasions during which he visited complainant. Eventually, the two made up. During these
visits, complainant was led to believe by respondent that he would marry her and the only drawback
was his financial instability and his moral obligation to support the education of his brothers and
sisters. Thus, whenever the subject of marriage was introduced in their conversations, respondent
simply begged deferment." 4 Further: "It was on these visits that respondent and complainant had
intimate affairs. There was an instance when respondent fetched complainant in her office.
Thereafter, the two proceeded to Long Beach Hotel in Pasay City. It was alleged by complainant that
she did not know at first that they were to proceed to the hotel. Complainant not knowing the place
where their taxi stopped reminded respondent that they were supposed to eat but respondent
confided to her that the place also served food at the same time leading her inside and since she felt
she would create a scene if she desisted, she went along with respondent and in one of the rooms
they had sexual intercourse. Other similar incidents followed. Such was what happened in March,
1960 when respondent attended the convention of the government prosecutors league in Manila and
having fetched complainant in her office the two proceeded first to a movie house at Rizal Avenue.
They wound up later at the Long Beach Hotel and once more indulged in sexual intercourse." 5 So:
"As a consequence, complainant became pregnant. Alarmed by her condition she immediately wrote
a letter to respondent and urged him to come to Manila. Respondent, in reply explained that he was
quite busy with his work. When respondent finally came he accompanied complainant to a doctor
who confirmed her pregnancy." 6 The deterioration of the relationship was set forth thus:
"Respondent seldom came to Manila after he learned of complainant's pregnancy. Obviously in
despair, complainant threatened to bring the matter to court and respondent's reaction was of
belligerence. The matter eventually reached the attention of the Department of Justice and
administrative investigations were conducted to determine respondent's fitness to hold on to his job
as Assistant Provincial Fiscal. Shortly thereafter, the instant case was filed seeking the disbarment
of herein respondent." 7

The Solicitor General, in his report, was duly mindful of circumstances that place the conduct of
respondent Ruado in not too harsh a light. As he pointed out, he did take note that marriage must
have entered "into the plans of complainant and respondent, 8 He could not believe, however, that
the various occasions in which the parties engaged in sexual relations were prompted solely by the
expectancy on her part that ere long the marital knot would be tied. They were both mature, no
longer in the first flush of youth, impelled to act thus because of the strong physical attraction that
each had for the other and of the force of a deeply-rooted desire too difficult to resist. Accordingly, it
is his view that there is relevance to this excerpt from an opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcion
in Soberano v. Villanueva: 9 "Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, especially
in the light of the circumstances attending this case, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member
of the Bar." 10 The injury thus inflicted to the good name and reputation of complainant, as noted in a
recent resolution, arose "from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as 'so powerful
an appetite,' an imperative of life closely associated with the 'recklessness and the caprice of desire.'
" 11

Not that he is entitled to exculpation. The Solicitor General explained why: "In view, however, of
respondent's position as Assistant Provincial Fiscal we must insist that he ought to have conducted
himself in an exemplary character. His indulging in pre-marital acts with complainant, even though
made possible by mutual desire, has placed him outside of the category of exemplary individuals in
the community. By committing such acts, respondent was dismissed or more accurately considered
resigned from his position as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon, Romblon, by the President of
the Philippines who modified the recommendation of the Department of Justice in the administrative
case against respondent that he be merely fined (Adm. Order No. 57). The dismissal of respondent
took effect upon receipt of the decision of the President on April 9, 1963. Hence, respondent has
ceased discharging his duties as Assistant Provincial Fiscal. In the light of the dismissal, it would
seem harsh under the special circumstances of the case to impose upon respondent the extreme
penalty of disbarment as prayed for by the complainant. In a case (Administrative Case No. 248,
February 26, 1962, Viojan vs. Duran), this Court considered the suspension of a Justice of the
Peace from his post as sufficient penalty for the immorality committed by him and hence dismissed
the disbarment proceedings. Herein respondent was not only suspended but dismissed or
considered resigned from his public office and to follow said dismissal with the penalty of disbarment
would be unreasonably stiff." 12
Accordingly, it was the recommendation that while the petition for disbarment of respondent Ruado
should be denied, he, nevertheless, should be reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same offense would be dealt with more severely by this Court. It must likewise be impressed on
him that he should comply with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon him as the father of
the child born out of wedlock, the result of his relationship with complainant Martina Montaña. This
Court is inclined to accept the above recommendation with the only modification that it should be a
severe reprimand.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo M. Ruado is severely reprimanded. Let a copy of this

resolution be entered on his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Jose Montaña, joined in the petition for
disbarment.

2 Petition, paragraph (8).

3 Report and Recommendation, page 15.

4 Ibid.

5 Report and Recommendation, page 16.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Report and Recommendation, page 18.

9 Administrative Case No. 215, December 29, 1962; 6 SCRA, 819.

10 Ibid, 895.

11 Cf. Barba v. Pedro, Administrative Case No. 545-SBC, December 26,

1974.

12 Report and Recommendation, 19-20.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,

vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer
Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct
because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the
birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.

Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was
then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law
student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused
to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.

Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their
relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam
and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual
congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have
sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she
had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind
because he loved her very much.

Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that
he and Magdalena were secretly married.

In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law
studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams
professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).

When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to
her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they
were not really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred
until after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to
applying for a marriage license.

Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for
the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he
passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on
September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the
baptism of his child.

Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days
after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena.
Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her
lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.

In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take
place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when
she returned to Davao.

Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a
confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada
police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).

Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the
child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached
that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral
defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.

The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's
cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his
disbarment.

An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court.

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of
good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community" (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of
intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the
ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral
code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path
of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite
sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a
woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral
conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.

This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that
"the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of
dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair
sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the
saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general."
(People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).

Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases:

(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez,
under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license
and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another
woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her
menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez
vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui,
100 Phil. 1102).

(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before
Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she
later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).

(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women
who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a
bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).

(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty
and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her
the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on
her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are
indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).

(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was
prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was
alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to
give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno
refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19
SCRA 439).

(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making
a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked
a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in
my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of
matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will
always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).

(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with
Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old
niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the
case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual
relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in
frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to
their trysts in hotels.

On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to
render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy
between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with
impudicity.

According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with
the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.

This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507,
February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975,
63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997,
September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).

Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment
against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman) Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos and de Castro, JJ., are on leave.

Fernandez and Guerrero JJ., were designated to sit in the Second Division.

elipe C. Wong, duly admitted in 1962 to the Bar, is sought to be disbarred for grave immorality by
Emerenciana V. Reyes, who filed her sworn complaint on October 26, 1962 (pp. 1-4, rec.).

In his answer filed on December 17, 1962, respondent completely denied the charge, claiming that
he and petitioner were merely friends (pp. 5-7, rec.)..

On January 21, 1963, petitioner filed her reply to the answer of respondent, attaching thereto xerox
copies of two letters written by respondent to her dated October 20, 1960 and December 14, 1960
(pp. 30-34, rec.) for comparison with the penmanship of the respondent in his answer sheets to the
Bar questions in 1961 to disprove respondent's claim that he never wrote letters to petitioner. The
aforesaid reply was forwarded to the Solicitor General, to whom the case was referred on December
28, 1962 for investigation, report and recommendation (pp. 10, 15, rec.).

After the submission of petitioner's evidence, respondent filed a motion to dismiss dated July 31,
1963, contending that in the light of the ruling of this Court in Soberano vs. Villanueva (Dec. 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 891-896), the evidence presented by the petitioner does not make out a case against
him (pp. 67-70, 85-90, rec.). Respondent likewise filed on August 1, 1963 a motion for the
cancellation of all scheduled hearings of the case until after the Court has resolved the said motion
to dismiss (p. 85, rec.).
Petitioner in turn filed an opposition dated August 17, 1963 to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the
Soberano ruling does not apply to her situation, because, unlike the complainant in said case
petitioner never doubted her marriage with respondent; and that respondent in fact wrote her
numerous letters and sent her telegrams, all addressing her either as "E.R. Wong" or "Emerenciana
R. Wong" (pp. 91-95, rec.)..

To this opposition, respondent filed a reply dated August 28, 1963, substantially reiterating the same
arguments contained in his motion to dismiss (pp. 96-100, rec.).

On June 9, 1972, then Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin, now CFI Judge, issued an order
resetting the case for hearing on June 20, 1972 (p. 58, rec.). The June 20, 1972 hearing was
however postponed, and it was only on September 6, 1972 that the hearing of the case was
continued but was again reset to October 18, 1972, upon motion of respondent so as to give him
time to file a motion with this Court in connection with his 1963 motion to dismiss (pp. 61, 66-74, 82,
rec.).

On September 13, 1972, respondent thus filed with this Court a motion reiterating his still unresolved
1963 motion to dismiss the case, adding that the Solicitor General had already reset the case for
hearing; that subsequent to the filing of the present administrative case, petitioner herein filed with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action against herein respondent,
entitled "Emerenciana V. Reyes, plaintiff, versus Felipe C. Wong, defendant," Civil Case No. E-
00454, For Recognition of Natural Children and Support; and that in the compromise agreement
dated October 28, 1966 submitted in said case, respondent acknowledged that he is the father of the
two daughters of petitioner and that he agreed to support these children, while petitioner in turn
agreed to withdraw this administrative case against respondent, which compromise agreement was
approved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on November 14, 1966 (pp. 105-108, rec.;
p. 4, Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, p. 118, rec.).

On September 18, 1972, petitioner filed another pleading reiterating her opposition to the motion to
dismiss of respondent (p. 109, rec.) .

The aforesaid pleadings were referred to the Solicitor General (p. 110, rec.) .

Before the Solicitor General could resolve the motion to dismiss, petitioner Emerenciana V. Reyes
filed on November 21, 1972 an affidavit of desistance, requesting permission to withdraw the
administrative complaint against respondent. Her affidavit, which was subscribed and sworn to
before City Fiscal Manuel R. Maza of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, stated that it would be for the
good of her children that the administrative case against respondent be dismissed and terminated
(p. 114, rec.; pp. 4-5, Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General; p. 118, rec.).

Since withdrawal by a complainant in an administrative case does not ipso facto exonerate a
respondent (Co vs. Candoy, 21 SCRA 438, 442 [1967]; Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586; Bolivar vs.
Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, 628 [1966]) -especially so in this instant case where the withdrawal of the
complainant came after she had rested her case - the Solicitor General did not act upon petitioner's
motion to withdraw; but instead proceeded to take up respondent's motion to dismiss.

With petitioner's desistance at this stage of the proceeding, and considering respondent's motion to
dismiss, the question left for resolution is whether in the light of the evidence presented by petitioner,
there is a prima faciecase against respondent to warrant requiring respondent to present his
evidence.
In his report and recommendation, the Solicitor General recommended that the present
administrative case be dismissed in the light of the Soberano case (p. 118, rec.).

We sustain the said recommendation of the Solicitor General, on the force of the Soberano ruling
and on the fact that the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to disclose a case against
respondent warranting disciplinary action.

As contained in the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General (pp. 1-3, 118, rec.), the
evidence adduced by petitioner reveals that:

Petitioner is a holder of the degree of Bachelor of Laws, graduating from the

MLQ University in 1960 (pp. 21-22, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); in 1958 petitioner
and respondent were classmates at the same university (p. 2, t.s.n., May 28,
1963); respondent began courting petitioner and finally won her love (p. 6,
t.s.n., May 28, 1963); sometime in the first week of February, 1960, petitioner
was requested to fill up and sign an application for marriage license (p. 4,
t.s.n., May 28, 1963); later on, upon the request of respondent, petitioner also
filled up and signed a marriage contract (pp. 4-5, t.s.n., May 28, 1963; pp. 38-
39, t.s.n., May 31, 1963); thereafter, petitioner was shown by respondent the
marriage contract, dated February 15, 1960, now allegedly signed by
witnesses and the Honorable Arsenio Dizon as the solemnizing minister (pp.
4-5, t.s.n., May 28, 1963; p. 46, t.s.n., May 31, 1963); believing that petitioner
was married to respondent, she went with him in hotels and had carnal
knowledge with him (pp. 5-6, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); they lived together in an
apartment at 1236 Isaac Peral, Manila, but moved out after some 4 months
when respondent went to Zamboanga City to work at the Bank of P.I. (pp. 6-
7, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); while respondent was in Zamboanga City, petitioner
gave birth to her first child on November 28, 1960 (p. 7, t.s.n., May 28, 1963);
in July 1961, respondent was in Manila reviewing for the Bar Examinations
which was to be held in August of that year (pp. 11-12, t.s.n., May 28, 1963);
petitioner who was then in Munoz, Nueva Ecija, was called by respondent to
Manila (p. 11, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); petitioner stayed at her sister's house in
Pandacan where respondent used to visit her (pp. 11-13, t.s.n., May 28,
1963); after respondent took the Bar examinations, he left for Mindoro to help
candidate Cesar Climaco in his senatorial campaign (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., May
28, 1963); on May 25, 1962, petitioner gave birth to her second child (p. 14,
t.s.n., May 28, 1963); petitioner thereafter received news from her cousin in
Zamboanga City that respondent had married someone else (p. 20, t.s.n.,
May 28, 1963); petitioner found out from the Local Civil Registrars of Manila
and Bacoor, Cavite, that their alleged marriage was not registered (pp. 18-20.
t.s.n., May 28, 1963).

Quite clearly petitioner's evidence disclosed that petitioner voluntarily yielded to the carnal desire of
respondent, with whom thereafter she freely lived as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage — an illegitimate cohabitation that stemmed from love and mutual desire. In fact, in his
letters to Petitioner (Exhibits A, C, G, H, I, J, K, M, O, Q, R, T, U, V, W and AA), respondent
manifested much concern for the health and well-being of petitioner and their Baby Sheila (p. 8,
Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General; p. 118, rec.). And in the compromise
agreement embodied in the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in C.C. No. E-
00454, respondent acknowledged that he is the father of the two natural children, Sheila Reyes
Wong and Florinda (Thelma) Reyes Wong, and agreed to support them (p. 8, Report and
Recommendation of the Solicitor General; p. 118, rec.). It was indeed a relationship that was devoid
of deceit on the part of the respondent and a happy one until his sudden turnabout and marriage to
another woman that compelled him to abandon petitioner and their children.

Petitioner's claim that she consented to live with respondent as husband and wife because she was
made to believe by respondent that she was legally married to him — as she was made to sign by
respondent an application for a marriage license and afterwards a marriage contract which later was
shown to her complete with the alleged signatures of supposed witnesses and of a solemnizing
officer allegedly in the person of no less than a member of the Supreme Court — is belied by the
contents of her letter dated December 18, 1961 (Exhibit 2-H) to respondent, from which letter We
can readily infer that she had knowledge of the legal infirmities of the said marriage contract. Said
letter reads:

Another thing that worry me so much is about our relationship at present. My

family is in good faith about the legality of our marriage. If they'll discover the
truth I don't know if what shall happen to both of us. I'm sure that they'll take
some drastic action against you and I don't want this thing to happen.

As I observed you even doubt the paternity of our children. I swear before
God and before all that this children are yours. But if you don't like to
recognize them as yours, nobody else can force you.

In this situation of ours now, nobody can be blamed for it except the two of
us.

How can you expect me not to worry when in spite of our present situation
we'll have another child?

Have we not gone to the extent of committing this mistake, both of us will be
happy. But now, its too late for us to repent.

In spite of everything we can still remedy our situation if you'll only grant my
request. All I want you to do is to come here or on before January in order to
settle down everything smoothly." (Pp. 6-7, Report and Recommendation of
the Solicitor-General; p. 118, rec.).

The above-quoted portions of petitioner's letter to respondent show that petitioner was aware all the
time of the nature of her relationship with respondent, foreclosing all doubts that the petitioner
knowingly and freely lived with respondent without the benefit of marriage (Soberano vs. Villanueva,
6 SCRA 893-894).

Furthermore, complainant was then in the fourth year in the School of Law, MLQ University. In the
first year of the law course, she already knew the requisites and formalities of a valid marriage,
which she took up again in Civil Law review in her senior year. Complainant could not have been so
naive as to be easily deceived to believe that she was legally married to respondent, knowing fully
well that no marriage ceremony was performed publicly, in the presence of witnesses and
solemnizing minister, before whom the parties to the marriage are to declare that they take each
other as husband and wife (Articles 55 & 57, New Civil Code). Petitioner should have realized that
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court would not have consented to taking part in the execution
of a simulated or fictitious marriage contract. This circumstance alone should have put her on her
guard and should have provoked her into further inquiry before submitting herself to the sexual
passions of respondent, if she valued her honor and virtue as she now pretends.
Undoubtedly, the cohabitation of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack of a valid marriage.
But to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must not merely be immoral; it must be "grossly
immoral" — "it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" (Section 27, Rule 138. New Rules of Court; Soberano vs.
Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893, 895; Mortel vs. Aspiras, December 28, 1956, 100 Phil. 587, 591-593;
Royong vs. Oblena, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 869-870; Bolivar vs. Simbol, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA
623, 630; and Quingwa vs. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-440, 444-445). And the same
must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to
compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power (Co vs. Candoy, October 23, 1967, 21
SCRA 439, 442). Likewise, the dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof
must be clearly demonstrated (Co vs. Candoy, supra). The evidence adduced by petitioner lacks the
quantity and quality required by the foregoing criteria.

All told, because of petitioner's active and voluntary participation in her illicit relationship with
respondent, the latter's acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible. For as We have
declared in Soberano:

Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, ... is neither so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar. ."
(p. 895)

It should be added that the decision of the Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
embodied the compromise agreement between the parties herein under which respondent expressly
acknowledged their two children and committed himself to support them.

WHEREFORE, THIS DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST RESPONDENT FELIPE C. WONG

IS HEREBY DISMISSED.

Castro, Teehankee, Esguerra and Munoz Palma, concur.

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