In re: Atty.

Bucana
A.M. No. 1637 July 6, 1976

FACTS: Spouses Gonalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon entered into an agreement
whereby in case anyone of them will remarry, both parties offer no objection and waive
all civil and criminal actions against them. This agreement was notarized by Notary
Public Rufilo D. Bucana. This prompted Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar to send a letter
before the SC to subject Atty. Bucana to disciplinary action knowing that the subject of
the agreement is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose.
Upon order of the SC, Atty. Bucana submitted his explanation saying that indeed the
spouses went to his office and asked that the document be notarized. He, however,
vehemently refused to notarize it. He then placed the document on his desk. A week
later, he found that the document was lost in his table and the same was already
notarized as per his file copies in the office. He asked his Secretary to look for the
spouses but they could no longer be found. He added that he inadvertently notarized
the same in view of the numerous documents on his table and at that time he was
emotionally disturbed as his father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. His
contentions were corroborated by two witnesses.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Bucana should be held liable.

RULING: Yes. It is unquestionable that the agreement is indeed contrary to law, morals
and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and
of society without which there could be neither civilization nor progress. The contract, in
substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife to
take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another
man, without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to
commit bigamy. This is not only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a crime.
A notary public, by virtue of the nature of his office, is required to exercise his duties
with due care and with due regard to the provisions of existing law.
 Silverio vs Republic

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels
trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok,
Thailand. The procedure was successful – he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter,
in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and
his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila
RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his
American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on
equity; that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and
should not be in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition
(even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury
or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate
may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in
existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was
passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of
Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that
the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is
based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law,
a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-
assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition
for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And
not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a
male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a
male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes
sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.”
 REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Facts:

The respondent’s petition was granted by the RTC on January 12, 2005. The following
facts were presented by the respondent to the RTC:

(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the Certificate of
Live birth.

(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of CAH,
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics.

(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the latter issued a medical certificate. Such
document testified respondent’s claim.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling had been filed.

Issue:

The issue raised in this petition is:

(1) Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the
ground of her medical condition knows as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”,
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

(1) No. The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent. The court considered the unique circumstance in this case
where nature had taken its course.

“As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change
of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of
respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name
to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.”
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy
143 SCRA 449

FACTS:

Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain
Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of
latter’s former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she
contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was
married to another woman before their marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

HELD:

It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force
because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is
still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void.
Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then
such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry.
Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.
 TY vs. CA
G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000

Respondent Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March

1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 1977. However, on
August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared
their marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding
was also declared void for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was
issued nullifying his marriage to Villanueva, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner,
thru civil rites on April 4, 1979 in Pasay. Three years after, on April 4, 1982, they also
had a church wedding in Makati.
On January 1991, Edgardo filed a case with the RTC of Pasig, praying that his
marriage to Ofelia Ty be declared null and void because they allegedly had no marriage
license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner,
he was still married to Anna Maria. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria
was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on
April 4, 1979.
Ofelia, in defending her marriage to private respondent, submitted their Marriage
License which was issued in Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did not question this document
when it was submitted in evidence. However, the fact that the civil marriage of Edgardo
and Ofelia took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage
as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that petitioner and
respondent had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.
The Pasig RTC ruled in favor of Edgardo Reyes and declared his marriage to Ofelia
Ty null and void ab initio. Both parties appealed to the CA, which subsequently affirmed
the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
(to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly
contracted.

ISSUE:
1) Is a decree of nullity of the first marriage required before a subsequent marriage can
be entered into validly?
2) May the Family Code be given retroactive effect to the instant case?
3) What is the effect of re-using for a church wedding the marriage license that was
1st used in a civil wedding 3 years ago?
4) Is petitioner entitled to moral damages as indemnity for her husband’s filing of a
baseless complaint?

HELD:
1) and 2) NO.
The SC held different rulings regarding the matter however, the confusion under the
Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. The rulings in Gomez,
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.
Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of

Appeals (1993), the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family
Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52,
54, 86, 99, 147, 148).

However, Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) applied the old rule because of the peculiar
circumstances of the case. The first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality
for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void
since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the
issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held
that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendozaand Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he
could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that
impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.

3) Coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremonywherein petitioner married
private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Obviously, the
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the
CA erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical
marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative
defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court
from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the
State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality.

In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and
formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the
first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the
civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding
of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to
ratify but also to fortify the first.

4) No damages should be awarded in the present case. Petitioner wants her marriage
to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as
legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a
baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her
parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband
pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such
incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. There are other
remedies (legal separation, or prosecution for adultery or concubinage).
Joselano Guevarra v. Atty Jose Emmanuel Eala, AC No.7136, August 1, 2007
Facts:

Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair with the respondent. After
leaving the conjugal home, petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was living
together in a residential house few blocks away from the church they were married. Few
months thereafter, Irene gave birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of the respondent
as the father in the certificate of live birth.

Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Irene and a criminal complaint for
adultery against respondent and Irene.

Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP-CBD on the ground of
gross immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was
dismissed by the IBP Board of Governors due to lack of merit.

Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross
immoral conduct?

Ruling:

Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the
surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married
lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was
carried out discreetly.

Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests

deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal)

Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly
immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving
of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay v. Atty.
Tucay)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice
law.

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law."
 BESO VS. DAGUMAN

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000

Complainant: Zenaida S. Beso

Respondent: Judge Juan Daguman, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan, Pagsanjan,

Samar

Ponente: J. Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In the
Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy
and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar with
the following facts:

(a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainant’s fiancée, Bernardito A.
Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondent’s
residence in Calbayog City, Samar;

(b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant;

(c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire
regarding her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was not
registered;

(d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all
the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent.

The respondent averred with the following rationale:

(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the
complainant and Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the
complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy;

(b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not
too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;

(c) Respondent’s failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because
Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11,
1998 found the respondent Judge “…committed non-feasance in office” and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).

Issues:

The issues raised in this complaint are:

(1) Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction; and

(2) Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and
not registering the complainant’s marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.

Held:

(1) Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the
Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, “Any incumbent member of
the judiciary with the court’s jurisdiction”. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the
Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a
marriage outside of his jurisdiction:

(1.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(1.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(1.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

In this case, non of the three instances is present.

(2) Yes. The judge committed negligence. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code,
such duty to register the marriage is the respondent’s duty. The same article
provides,“It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage… to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen (15) days after the
marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the
solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license, and in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned
in Article 8.”.
 ARAES vs OCCIANO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.

Facts:

On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes and
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of Orobia was
not recognized, because the marriage was a null. She also cannot claim the pension of
her husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts
and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.

In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan
Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February
2000. He was assured that all the documents were complete, thus he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to the
request of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before starting
the ceremony he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, thus he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the
physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their
failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same
day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the
latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered
to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge
vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite
the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
confessing that she filed the complaint out of rage, and she realizes her own
shortcomings. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same.
From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on
5 January
2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed
it. Also, the Civil
Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur has no records of
the marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so
the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. The LCR informed the judge
that they cannot issue the same due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.

Issue:

Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and
without the requisite marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to
their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. An appellate court Justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating officialto administrative liability.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted
for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance
of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent
judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by

petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of
the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action
WHEREFORE,Judge Salvador M. Occiano, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealtwith
more severely.