POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO),

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000

Principle: While police power may be validly delegated to the President by law, do not
authorize the President, or any other administrative body, to take over the internal management
of a cooperative.

FACTS:

On May 18, 1989, Conrad L. Leviste filed with the Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte,
a complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine
Smelter Corporation (PSC).

For failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court declared PSC in default and allowed
plaintiff Leviste to present evidence ex-parte.

A copy of the writ of possession was served on petitioner as owner of the power lines standing
on certain portions of the subject property. Later, on August 12, 1992, Vines Realty filed an
amended motion for an order of demolition and removal of improvements on the subject land.
Among the improvements for removal were the power lines and electric posts belonging to
petitioner.

Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a
party to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that it had
subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property.

The sheriff, at the request of Vines Realty demolished the remaining electric posts resulting in
the cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and barangays.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land
sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage.
RULLING:
Yes.
To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such
power by other corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric
transmission and distribution lines or systems."
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme
Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use.37
The Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDT38 thus held that:
"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title
to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power
may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right-of-way."
Public utilities’ power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the
expropriator.
Consequently, we rule that a court’s writ of demolition can not prevail over the easement of a
right-of-way which falls within the power of eminent domain.
LAGCAO V JUDGE LABRA
G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004

PRINCIPLE: Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain; they can
exercise the power only when expressly authorized by the Legislature.

FACTS:
The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to
initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of lot (1029) of petitioners Diosdado,
Doroteo and Ursula Lagcao.
In 1964, Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of which is the lot 1029.
1965,petitioners purchased said lot on installment but in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted to the
Province of Cebu. The latter tried to annul sale which resulted to the filing of the case of the
petitioners.
RTC and CA ruled in their favor and as such a deed of sale was executed and a TCT was issued
in their favor. When they tried to take possession of the land, they found out that it was occupied
by squatters. Thus, they instituted ejectment proceedings which was later on granted by the
MTCC and affirmed by RTC.
However, Mayor Garcia wrote letters requesting the deferment of the demolition since the city
was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters; this was granted. During the suspension
the Sanguiang Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution and 2 ordinances (all about the lot 1029).
Ord. No. 1843likewise appropriated the amount of 6, 881, 600 for the payment of subject land;
this was approved bythe Mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain is valid in the case at bar.

RULLING:
NO, it is NOT VALID. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public character.

Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out
for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or
selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site
of a socialized housing project.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It
must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature.
These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6)
must not be unreasonable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V PLDT
G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969

PRINCIPLE: All private property capable of ownership may be expropriated, except money
and choses in action. Even services may be subject to eminent domain.

FACTS:
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing
its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable
government officers to call private parties. One of the rules of PLDT is the prohibition on the
Bureau’s public use of the service furnished for the private use of said Bureau. The Bureau has
extended its services to the general public since its inception (also using the lines of PLDT).
PLDT contends that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch
Exchange is inter-connected with the PLDT’s facilities and after giving an ultimatum, PLDT
disconnected the trunk lines rented by the Bureau, effectively isolating the Philippines from the
rest of the world (except United States).

Petitioner thus filed for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PLDT may be forced to execute a contract with petitioner

HELD:
The parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
While the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may,
in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to
permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT subject to just
compensation. The use of PLDT’s lines and services are subjected to a burden to the respondent
for the public use and benefit, thus, they constitute properties over which the power of eminent
domain may be exercised.
CITY OF MANILA V CHINESE COMMUNITY

G.R NO. 14355 OCTOBER 31, 1919

Principle: Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate
of legislature acting under a general grant of authority.

Facts:
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery
for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that
such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said
lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes
were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create
irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves
and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip
of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the
expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held:
The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of
the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the
courts have the right to inquire to.
Ayala de Roxas vs City of Manila

G.R. No. L-3144 November 19, 1907

Principle: May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of
the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended.

Facts:

Petitioner applied to the defendant city engineer for a license to construct a terrace over “the
strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal
of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her”; but the defendant
refused to grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace, because, as the plaintiff
has been informed, the sole reason wherefore the license was denied is because “the said
defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and without any construction whatever
thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a portion of the ground belonging to her, in
order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the plaintiff will only be able to use the
said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in general, thus losing the
enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said strip of the property which the plaintiff and
the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during more than seventy
years. Additionally, it was agreed between both parties that the strip above referred to had not
been expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had
the latter offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof.

Issue: Whether the non-issuance of a license to the petitioners is tantamount to a taking that
requires just compensation

Held:

Yes.

What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy,
use, and freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when
they applied for a license to construct a terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it
with the intention of establishing a public easement provided for in an ordinance of their own
which they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the Law of Waters and of the Civil Code in
force.

In the decision entered by the court on the 5th of May, 1906, regarding the demurrer, the
following was set forth:

The easement of a zone for public use, authorized by article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866, is
developed in articles 160 and 161, inclusive, of said law; the general interest on behalf of which
the easement is supported is determined, for navigation, by articles 160 and 161; for flotation, by
article 162; for salvage, by article 163; and for fishing, by article 164; in all of them the owner of
the riverside property supports the easement “upon being previously indemnified for loss and
damage.” (Folio 41.)

Said zone for public use, the same as a towpath, is solely available for the purposes of
navigation, flotation, fishing, and salvage, being closed to any other use which be attempted;
therefore, it is erroneous to pretend that the right of the owner of the property bordering upon the
stream can be reduced to the level of the public right; on the contrary he should only be called
upon to bear those burdens which are in the general interest, but not without prior, or
subsequently indemnity. (Folio 43.)

If as affirmed in statement No. 4, and accepted by the defendants, the Sibacon Creek is a canal
— let us grant that it is navigable, because it has been held by competent authority — and that
under the name of a public wharf, which is the largest in area, it is desired to establish a towpath,
which is the smallest, it must be remembered that the law does not grant it along navigable
canals (art. 157), and, at all events, the establishment thereof must be preceded by the
corresponding indemnity. (Arts. 154 and 157.)

Under section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be enacted in the
Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; and the due process of law in order to deprive a person of his property is, according to the
Code of Civil Procedure, reserved to the judicial authority. The refusal to grant a license or the
enactment of an ordinance whereby a person may be deprived of property or rights, or an
attempt thereat is made, without previously indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor can it
be, due process of law.

Considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is
not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the
exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it
may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be
previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy
employed in such cases, as it is the only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be
resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city
by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is invested. The question involved here is
not the actual establishment of an easement which might be objected to by an action in court, but
a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it
is not simply a measure in connection with building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress,
without due process of law, real rights which are attached to the right of ownership.

The imposition of an easement over a 3-meter strip of the plaintiff’s property could not legally be
done without payment to it of just compensation.

The Court commanded the defendant to issue said license.

People v Fajardo

G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

Principle: Property owner was entitled to payment of just compensation for the impair view of
the plaza from the highway was likewise considered taking.

Facts:
Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that
prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it
redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station
near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction
under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a
typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing
view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the
ordinance’s constitutionality.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No, petition granted.

Ratio:
The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an
arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and
which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The
ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power,
and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may
eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do
this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall
have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging
a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two
pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected
under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either
established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings
to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear
that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243
(c)
Republic vs Castellvi

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

Principle: Requisites for valid taking: the expropriator must enter a private property; entry must
be for more than a momentary period; entry must be under warrant or color of authority; property
must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Facts:

Petitioner, as a lessee, occupied the property of Castellvi in 1947 on a year to year basis (from
July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year.) Before the expiration of the contract of
lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the
AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11, 1956,
Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had
decided not to continue leasing the property. Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of
Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the
premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00
that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse,
the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to
the President.

Petitioner Republic stated that the “taking ” of Castellvi’s property should be deemed as of the
year 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement.

Respondent argued that the two essential elements in the “taking” of property under the power of
eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a
permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was
ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic
entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s contention that the taking occurred in 1947 (and not in 1959, is
correct

Held:

No. The following must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of eminent domain:

1) The expropriator must enter a private property.

2) The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected.
5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

The “taking” of Catellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have
taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. The Court finds merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the
“taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and
occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in
devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its
beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property
in 1947.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the
property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs.
Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it
is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority
of the court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959
when the complaint for eminent domain was filed