(4) People vs.
Ortiza
GR No. 200302
 Ortiza was charged with the crime of Murder. Appellant
died prior to Final Judgment of the case.
RULING:
In the case of People vs. Bayotas, the court has held that:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action
The legal representative of the estate of the deceased
[appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil
aspect of this case," the current Rules, pursuant to our
pronouncement in Bayotas, require the private offended party,
or his heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to
pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant.
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that
there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal
case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil
case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the
present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil
case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack
of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-
delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s
death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the
amounts awarded by the CA.
(5) Llamanzares vs. Comelec
GR No. 221697, 8 March 2016
 Issue on Residence
(6) Salibo vs. Warden of Quezon City Jail
GR No. 197597, 8 April 2015
 Salibo was suspected to be Butukan S. Malang, an
accused in the Maguindanao Massacre and was
apprehended and subsequently detained.
RULING:
I. In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for
Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial
court "acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits" of petitioner Salibo's
Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial
court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court
of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of trial courts, respondent Warden
correctly filed the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
II. Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. The nature of the restraint
of liberty need not be related to any offense so as
to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of
habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-
conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged
violation of the liberty of abode.
III. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any
warrant charging him of an offense. He was not
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a
court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and,
therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a
warrant. It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo
presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is
not the accused Butukan S. Malang. He was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an
offense.
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion
to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo
filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged
could not have been cured by mere amendment of
the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Changing the name of the accused appearing in
the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from
"Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo"
will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in
this case.
(7) Mison vs. Gallegos
GR No. 210759, 23 June 2015
 Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-
Request to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison,
Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the
immediate arrest and deportatio n of Ku to Korea for
being an undesirable alien.
ISSUE: Whether or not Writ of Amparo was properly granted in
the case at bar. (No)
Ruling:
“Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:- The petition for a
writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.”
The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As
to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in
Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting
"enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in
Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851, to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political
organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
 information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the
subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, Ku’s circumstance
does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or
involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents
of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to
acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give
information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that
the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the
law for a prolonged time.
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the
privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku
and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged
threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and
unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental
function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details
concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced
disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his
whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the
issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
(8) Callo vs. Comm. Morente
GR No. 230324
 Parker was charged for deportation for being an
undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien. It
was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a fugitive from
justice in the United States of America with an
outstanding arrest warrant. Parker was detained and
then filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Issue: The only issue in this case is whether or not the right
to life, liberty, and security of Parker is threatened by the
respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and
subsequently the award of the interim reliefs.
Ruling:
I. Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary
disappearance, or any threats thereof, that would
warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. For the
issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a
person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient
to allege and prove that a person has
disappeared. It has to be shown by the required
quantum of proof that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government or a political
organization, and that there is a refusal to
acknowledge the same or to give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons. In
this case, Parker has not disappeared. Her
detention has been sufficiently justified by the
Bureau of Immigration, given that there is an SDO
and a pending criminal case against her.
II. Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker
and Danielle Nopuente are two different persons.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or
by any qualified person or entity in the following
order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely:
the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved
party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of
those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization,
association or institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate family or relative of the
aggrieved party.
Thus, while "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority
on who can file the petition should be strictly followed. In this
case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no
immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or
collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity. Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no
legal standing to file this petition.
(9) Balao vs. Balao
GR No. 186050, 21 June 2016
 James Balao founding member of the Cordillera
Peoples Alliance, a coalition of nongovernment
organizations working for the cause of indigenous
peoples in the Cordillera Region was abducted by 5
unidentified armed men. After efforts to find him proved
futile, James's siblings, filed a petition for the issuance
of a writ of amparo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should adopt the
recommendations of the RTC. (NO)
RULING:
Under Section 20 of the Amparo rule, the court is mandated to
archive, and not dismiss, the case should it determine that it
could not proceed for a valid cause. Jurisprudence states that
archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to
temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate
action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright
dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but
held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action
thereon can be taken.60 To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions
the archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by a valid
cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats
on their lives or to similar analogous causes that would prevent
the court from effectively hearing and conducting
the amparo proceedings which, however, do not obtain in these
cases.
Here, while it may appear that the investigation conducted by
the AFP reached an impasse, it must be pointed out that there
was still an active lead worth pursuing by the PNP. Thus, the
investigation had not reached a dead end - which would have
warranted the case's archiving - because the testimony of
Gonzales set forth an immediate action on the part of the PNP
which could possibly solve, or uncover new leads, in the ongoing
investigation of James's abduction. Therefore, the RTC's
recommendation that these cases should be archived is clearly
premature, and hence, must be rejected.
(10) Mamba vs. Bueno
GR No. 191416
 The canteen owned by Emelita N. Mamba (Emelita) in
Tuao, Cagayan was robbed. Emelita is the mother of
Mayor Mamba. Several members of the Task Force
went to the. house of the respondent, then still a
 minor, to invite him for questioning on his supposed
involvement in the robbery.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition for review on certiorari before the Court
was filed within the reglementary period;
2. Whether the CA erred in granting the petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparo.
RULING:
1. Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final
judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The appeal may raise question of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from
the date of notice of the adverse judgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as
in habeas corpus cases.
There is nothing in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which proscribes the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the final judgment or
order that grants or denies a writ of amparo. Section 11 of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC only prohibits the following pleadings and
motions:
Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following
pleadings and motions are prohibited:
a. Motion to dismiss;
b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit,
position paper and other pleadings;
c. Dilatory motion for postponement;
d. Motion for a bill of particulars;
e. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
f. Third-party complaint;
g. Reply;
h. Motion to declare respondent in default;
i. Intervention;
j. Memorandum;
k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim
relief orders; and
l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order.
What is prohibited under Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC are
motions for reconsideration directed against interlocutory orders
or interim relief orders, not those assailing the final judgment or
order. The pleadings and motions enumerated in Section 11 of
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC would unnecessarily cause delays in the
proceedings; they are, thus, proscribed since they would run
counter to the summary nature of the rule on the writ
of amparo. A motion seeking a reconsideration of a final
judgment or order in such case, obviously, no longer affects the
proceedings.
2. In an amparo action, the parties must establish their
respective claims by substantial evidence.
What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by
substantial evidence that he was apprehended by the members
of the Task Force, illegally detained, and tortured. It was further
established that Maritess would not have seen his son if not for
the timely intercession of P/Supt. Buenaobra of the PNP
Cagayan Regional Office. The members of the Task Force
apprehended and detained the respondent to make him admit
to his complicity in the heist the night before sans the benefit of
legal and judicial processes.
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's
favor notwithstanding that he has already been released from
detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate
the punishment of those behind the illegal detention through
subsequent investigation and action. Clearly, there is substantial
evidence in this case that would warrant the conclusion that the
respondent's right to security, as a guarantee of protection by
the government, was violated. Accordingly, the CA correctly
issued the writ of amparo in favor of the respondent.
(11) Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College
GR No. 202666, 29 September 2014
 Julia and Juliene, both minors, were graduating high
school students at St. Theresa's College, Cebu City.
While changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along
with several others, took digital pictures of themselves
clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were
then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
Ruling:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents.
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also
be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well
as information uploaded by the user.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy.
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook
would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It
is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN
users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those
to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question,
or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad,
are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to
them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their
protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question.
(12) Silverio vs. Republic
GR No. 174669, 22 Oct 2007
Ruling:
RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) now governs the change of first
name It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise
lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was
his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s
primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with
the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally
done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was
also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate
is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true
and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
(13) Republic vs. Cagandahan
(14) Grande vs. Antonio
GR No. 206248, 18 Feb 2014
 Grande and Antonio lived as husband and wife,
although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons
were born. The children were not expressly recognized
by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the
children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship,
however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for
US with her two children. This prompted Antonio to file
a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction / Change of Surname of Minors
and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before RTC appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.
RULING:
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want
to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(respondent) or the mother (petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free
from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must
be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can order
the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
(15) Republic vs. Olaybar
GR No. 189538, 10 Feb 2014
 Respondent requested from NSO a Certificate of No
Marriage as one of the requirements for her marriage
with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof,
she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, at the Office
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not
know the alleged husband; she did not appear before
the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She,
thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife
portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband,
as parties to the case.
ISSUE: WON the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in Rule 108?
YES.
RULING:
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108,
respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well
as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents.
It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set
forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor
General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn
authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage
was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the
marriage certificate was a forgery.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent;
the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties
had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
(16) Fujiki vs. Marinay
GR No. 196049, 26 June 2013
 Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3)
for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation
to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the NSO.
RULING:
I. A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects
the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove
as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
II. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof
of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108.
Rule 108, Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.
RULING:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry through an
appropriate adversary proceeding.
The Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential
oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and
another given to other persons who are not named in the petition
but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. 34 Consequently, the petition for a substantial
correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who
have or claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.
In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to
implead both the Local Civil Registrar and his half-
siblings. 42 Although he claims that his half-siblings have
acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural rules
nonetheless mandate compliance with the requirements in the
interest of fair play and due process and to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.
In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of
an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and
controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings therein
null and void.

III. Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere

expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or

cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of
a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a

marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law.

Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes

conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status,
right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.

(17) In the Matter of the Petition for Correction of Entry

(Change of the Family name in the birth certificate of Felipe
C. Almojuela as appearing in the records of the National
Statistics Office) Vs. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 211724; August 24, 2016
> Petitioner has been using the surname “Almojuela.” However,
when he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the
NSO he was surprised to discover that he was registered as
“Felipe Condeno,” instead of “Felipe Almojuela.” Thus, he filed
a Petition for Correction of Entry5 in his NSO birth certificate
before the RTC.