EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (ART. 2) G.R. No.
80718 (Resolution), January 29, 1988
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985
FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
ISSUE: WON presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated to be valid and enforceable
HELD: Yes, publication is necessary. Article 2 of the Civil Code states that
“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.” The
clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
DE ROY VS. CA
FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of
private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of
gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by CA in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received
by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of
the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September
30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September
24, 1987 but this was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend
that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the
Court of Appeals was promulgated.
ISSUE: WON the ruling in the Habaluyas case stating that the 15-day
period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended, is applicable to the case at bar
HELD: Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (GRs.) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY
G.R. No. 6791, March 29, 1954
FACTS: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the CFI, finding him
guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section
34 of RA No. 265, and penalizing him. The charge was that the appellant
who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S. dollars, U. S.
checks and U. S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell
the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following
the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The
appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in
the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant,
and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is
contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both require
said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or
notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this
contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 do not require
the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the
implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: WON the circulars and regulations in question should be published
in order to have force and effect
HELD: Circulars and regulations, especially like Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation, should be
published before becoming effective. Before the public may be bound by
its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must be published and the people officially and specifically informed of
said contents and its penalties
NPC v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL
GR NO. 176006, 26 March 2010
FACTS: RTC declared unconstitutional items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No.
99-75 which provides that only partnerships or corporations that directly
use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either
purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the
disposal of ACSR wires for being violative of substantial due process
because, while it created rights in favor of third parties, the circular had
not been published. NPC contended that it not be published since it was
not of general application.
ISSUE/S: Should the NPC Circular be published?
HELD: No. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely
an internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement
an existing law but was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to
his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap
ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the
responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-
qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for the
deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of
the award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All
these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the
bidding and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights
of the public in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding
process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely,
indirectly and incidentally.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
GR NO. 180643, 25 March 2008
FACTS: Respondent Committees argue that the Senate does not have to
publish its Rules because it was already published in 1995 and in 2006.
They further claim that the Senate, as a continuing body, is not required
to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.
ISSUE/S: Should the Senate rules on procedure be published?
HELD: The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring
that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules
of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the
rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in
subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative
inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily
adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all
orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are
null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses
should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the
publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
proceedings are considered valid and effective.
PIMENTEL v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
GR NO. 187714, 8 March 2011
FACTS: Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was elected Senate President. The
Ethics Committee was reorganized and thereafter, the Senate adopted
the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges which was
published in the Official Gazette on March 23, 2009. Senator Pimentel
raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUE/S: Is the publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole required for their effectivity?
HELD: The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules
of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect
only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need
not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication
before the rules can take effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole
affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the
Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members.
Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to
the Senate. However, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published
before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their
publication. The majority of the members of the Senate approved the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication
requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the
majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement
just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been
published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules
can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate
must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are
affected.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO ONE (ART. 3)
GARCIA VS. RECIO
G.R. NO. 138322
FACTS: On March 1, 1987, Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen,
as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian
government. Petitioner, a Filipina, and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Starting October
22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[ in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only
in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had
revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated
to marry petitioner.
RULING: In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party
in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy.
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his
legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no
basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS (ART. 4)
VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR. NO. 164815
FACTS: On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly
issued warrant of arrest to Sr.Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping
for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in
Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily
searched. A firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist.
The subject firearm was later verified that it was not issued to Valeroso
but to one Raul Palencia Salvatierra. The defense, on the other hand,
contended that Valeroso was arrested and searched in thecboarding
house of his children in New Era Quezon City. He was aroused from
his slumber when four heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the
room. The pointed their guns on him and pulled him outvof the room as
the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room.
Moments later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has
found a gun inside. Adrian Yuson, an occupant to the adjacent room
testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. also testified stating that the
firearm with live ammunition was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of
a Memorandum Receipt. The petitioner was found guilty as charged by
the RTC. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same with
modification. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in imposing the penalty prescribed
under R.A. 8294, the law which amended P.D. 1866, which took effect
only during the pendency of the case.
RULING: Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended. It provides that The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time
petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No.
8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, the pendency of the case
with the trial court. As a general rule, penal laws should not have
retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post
facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this
is not as a right of the offender, but founded on the very principles on
which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty
are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294,
the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the
imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum
period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, prision correccional maximum is the prescribed penalty and will form
the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term
shall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum
term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term,
is in consonance with the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Court of
Appeals[ and Barredo v. Vinarao. As to the subject firearm and its five (5)
live ammunition, their proper disposition should be made under Article
45 of the Revised Penal Codewhich provides, among others, that the
proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government.
PNB VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 104528
FACTS: Private respondents, represented by spouses Antonio and Susana
Astudillo, were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina
Village, Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed
over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of
the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage,
private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers
and constructed their houses on the lots in question. Subsequently, the
subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.
Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later
consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs
(OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB -
without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc. - may
collect from private respondents only the "remaining amortizations, in
accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously
entered into with" Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private
respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought
from said subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision. On March 10, 1992, the
Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the
HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President erred in applying P.D.
957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject
mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975.
RULING: pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." However, it is
obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those
real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its
enactment, and such intent must be given effect if the laudable purpose
of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved.
While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its
entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable
intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming
subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the
gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious
that the law - as an instrument of social justice - must favors the weak.
Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with which
it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed
to have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking and ascertained
(whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the
actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered
as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been
built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents
obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer
to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order
to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very
essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over
helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957
termed "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers." The intent
of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation,
circumstances and condition it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
ABS – CBN BROADCASTING CORP. VS. CTA and CIR
G.R. No. L-52306, October 12, 1981
FACTS: Petitioner ABS-CBN was engaged in the business of telecasting
local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not
engaged in trade or business within the Philippines for which petitioner
paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film
rentals. On April 12, 1961, in implementation of sec. 24(b) of the NIRC, as
amended by RA 2343, the CIR issued Gen.Circ.No. V-334. Petitioner
dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR the amount of 30% of one-
half of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in
trade or business within the Philippines. The last year that petitioner
withheld taxes pursuant to the foregoing Circular was in 1968. RA No.
5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from
30 % to 35 % and revising the tax basis from "such amount" referring to
rents, etc. to "gross income,". On February 8, 1971, the CIR issued RMC
No. 4-71, revoking GCNo. V-334, and holding that the latter was
"erroneous for lack of legal basis”. On the basis of this new Circular,
respondent CIR issued against petitioner a letter of assessment and
demand dated April 15, 1971, but allegedly released by it and received by
petitioner on April 12, 1971, requiring them to pay deficiency withholding
income tax on the remitted film rentals for the years 1965 through 1968
and film royalty as of the end of 1968 in the total amount of P525,897.06.
Petitioner requested for a reconsideration and withdrawal of the
assessment.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can apply General Circular No. 4-71
retroactively and issue a deficiency assessment against petitioner in the
amount of P 525, 987. 06 as deficiency withholding income tax for the
year 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968.
HELD: No. In point is Sec. 338-A (now Sec. 327) of the Tax Code. As
inserted by Republic Act No. 6110 on August 9, 1969, it provides: Sec.
338-A. Non-retroactivity of rulings. — Any revocation, modification, or
reversal of and of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance
with the preceding section or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given retroactive
application if the relocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to
the taxpayers, except in the following cases: (a) where the taxpayer
deliberately mis-states or omits material facts from his return or any
document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue: (b) where
the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are
materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c)
where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
It is clear from the foregoing that rulings or circulars promulgated by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive application where
to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. The prejudice to
petitioner of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular No. 4-
71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after
1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General
Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay
deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968
for a period of time commencing in 1965. Petitioner was no longer in a
position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had
already remitted all film rentals and no longer had any control over them
when the new Circular was issued. And in so far as the enumerated
exceptions are concerned, admittedly, petitioner does not fall under any
of them.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS (ART. 6)

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA JUEGO
G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001.
FACTS: A widow filed a complaint for damages against the employer of
her deceased spouse. Her husband, working as a construction worker for
the appellant, fell from the 14th floor of a tower which caused his death.
The employer asserts that the widow’s previous availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund prevented her from claiming further
benefits from the employer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the widow is precluded from recovering damages
under the Civil Code after having previously availed of the death benefits
of her husband under the Labor Code.
HELD: YES. An injured worker has a right of selection between availing of
the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing
under the Civil Code for higher damages, but he cannot pursue both at
the same time. When a party makes an election, it becomes final and
results in a waiver of election. But, if there is a lack of knowledge of fact,
the waiver is not applicable. There was no proof that the widow knew
how exactly her husband died nor the remedies available before claiming
damages under the Labor Code. Therefore, it was held that the employer
should pay the widow, provided that whatever she already received from
the Insurance Fund be deducted from the court’s award of damages.
EMETERIO CUI VS. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961.
FACTS: Emeterio Cui (plaintiff), finished his law studies in Arellano
University (defendant) up to and including the first semester of the fourth
year. He left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos
University. He was awarded scholarship grants during the time he was in
Arellano University. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the
transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. The defendant
refused to issue transcripts until after he had paid back the total amount
of scholarship grants, which is P1,033.87. Plaintiff paid to defendant the
said sum under protest. Before plaintiff was awarded scholarship grants,
he was made to sign a contract with the defendant university wherein he
waived his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to
the defendant the equivalent of his scholarship cash.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of the contract between the plaintiff
Emeterio Cui and the defendant Arellano University, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the
latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, valid or not?
HELD: The stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence,
null and void. In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a
court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be
done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent
with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the
security of individual rights. Scholarships are awarded in recognition of
merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige.
Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good
morals or those generally accepted principles of morality which have
received some kind of social and practical confirmation. In educational
institutions, scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant
students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help
gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
PNB V. NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS
G.R. NO. 139479, December 27, 2002
Facts: Petitioner PNB granted respondents 4 million pesos of credit line to
finance a movie project. The loan was secured by mortgages on
respondents‘ real and personal properties. Respondents defaulted in
their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties. The auction sale was re-scheduled several times without need
of republication of the notice of sale. Subsequently, the respondents filed
an action for annulment of the foreclosure sale claiming that such was
void because, among others, there was lack of publication of the notice of
foreclosure sale. The trail court ordered the annulment and set aside the
foreclosure proceedings. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not publication of foreclosure sale can be validly
waived by agreement of the parties.
Held: Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages on real property is specific with regard to the posting and
publication requirements of the notice of sale, to wit:
"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less
than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than
four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for
at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city."
The SC ruled that petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to
waive the posting and publication nrequirements of Act No. 3135. While
it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is
not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not
so much to notify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the
nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place,
and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a
sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting
and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor‘s benefit, but for
the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless
stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any
waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act
No. 3135.
PEOPLE v. SERZO
G.R. 118435, June 20, 1997
FACTS: Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower
court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal after the latter rescued
minors being held by the former. Pre-trial was waived and the case
proceeded to trial on the merits. The accused alleged that he was denied
the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without
counsel, so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he
moved that the arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his
own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without
one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel
de officio. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-
examined for the accused.
ISSUE: Did respondent waive his right to counsel?
HELD: Yes. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio
who assisted him in all stages of the proceedings.The option to hire ones
counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle
with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and
the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the
imbalance in the adversarial system where an accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition
of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal
which has the power to take his life or liberty.
The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is
rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must
balance the private against the state's and offended party's equally
important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is
waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently
made
GONGON V. COURT OF APPEALS
32 SCRA 412
FACTS: Matias Gongon bought a lot and paid for a term of 15 years at a
nominal monthly rental of P6.00. The sublessee constructed his
residential house on the property and since then has been living there,
together with his family.
Meanwhile, the Tambobong Estate was purchased by the Government
from the Roman Catholic Church on December 31, 1947 Matias Gongon
filed an application with the defunct Rural Progress Administration for the
purchase of Lot 18-B, Block 23, claiming preferential right as bona fide
occupant. The application was opposed by Amada Aquino, who also filed
her own application, alleging that as bona fide tenant or lessee she had
the preferential right to purchase the lot. After investigation, the Director
of Lands — the Bureau of Lands having then taken over the functions of
the Rural Progress Administration — rendered a decision on May 31,
1965 approving Gongon‘s application, he being the actual occupant. On
appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this official
set aside the order of the Director of Lands and gave due course to
Amada Aquino‘s application.
Matias Gongon moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
the Land Tenure Administration, which had meanwhile taken over the
functions, powers and duties of the Landed Estate Division of the Bureau
of Lands upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 1400. Matias Gongon
then appealed to the Office of the President, which thereafter affirmed
the decision of the Land Tenure Administration. Accordingly, on February
24, 1961 the Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot
18-B in favor of Amada Aquino, as a result of which she obtained, on
March 10, 19761, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84738 in her name.
On April 24, 1961 Matias Gongon filed the instant case in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to annul the decisions of the Land Tenure
Administration and of not in question to him; to cancel its registration in
the name of Amada Aquino and to have it registered in his name instead.
The complaint likewise contained a prayer for attorney‘s fees and costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver is void.
RULING: Yes. Petitioner‘s waiver of his preferential right over the lot
being contrary to the avowed policy laid down in Commonwealth Act No.
539, such waiver is null and void.
The intendment of Commonwealth Act No. 539, governing the acquisition
and disposition of landed estates is to award lots to those who may apply,
the first choice to the bona fide "tenants," the second to the "occupants,"
and the last, to "private individuals," if the parties affected thereby stand
on equal footing or under equal circumstances. Where the parties cannot
be said to be in equal footing — respondent spouses have their house on
another lot they already own which is bigger than that where petitioner
constructed his house — justice and equity command that petitioner be
given the preferential right to purchase the lot in question to carry out
the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless
REPEAL OF LAWS (ART. 7)

Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy
259 SCRA 129
Facts: It was alleged that Judge Domagtoy solemnized marriage of
Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on specific acts committed by
respondent MCTC Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross
misconduct, ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the marriages solemnized by the respondent judge
are valid under Art. 7 par.1 of the Family Code.
Ruling: No. Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, provides:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death
or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect."
Under Article 8, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2)
in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense
that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is
the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is
a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony
and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding
of the basic principles of civil law.
Beso vs. Dagunan
323 SCRA 566
Facts: In the Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the Beso
charged JudgeDagunan with solemnizing marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering
the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Respondent judge averred that (1) on Aug. 28, 1997, he is indisposed and
unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita, Samar. In the afternoon
of that date, without prior appointment, Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent judge in J.P.R.
Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar urgently requesting the celebration of
their marriage; (2) complainant Beso, the bride, is an accredited OFW,
who, respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention
under the present government policy.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is administratively liable.
Ruling: Yes. Article 7 of the Family Code provides,
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
“
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death
or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect."
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held
outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance
with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her
fiancé Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was
there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers
or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that
respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the
marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas
worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official
attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further
avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good
faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so
that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married."
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but
must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without
resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Certainly, judges, by the very
delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties.
Mecano vs COA
G.R. No. 103928
Facts: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized due to his
cholecystitis and on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming
reimbursement from the COA as he was entitled thereto under Sec. 699
of the Revised Administrative Code. Several endorsement was done to his
claim until the Chairman of COA denied his claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-
enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. Mecano anchored his
petition on the basis of Secretary Drilon’s opinion on the matter stating
that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or
abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the
particular Section 699 of the latter".
Issuue: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the Revisedf Administrative Code.
Ruling: No. In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to
supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny
of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section
27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which
reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing
clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended
repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new
and old laws. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied
repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of
later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to
abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on
the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to
abrogate the old one.
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later
act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not
cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code.
There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in
the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law,
the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits
under Section 699, and still others.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS FORM PART OF THE LAWS OF THE LAND (ART.8)
PEOPLE VS. LICERA
G.R. No. L-39990, 2 July 1975
FACTS: In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of
Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of
firearms. In 1968, he was convicted of the offense charged. He claims that
as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang (1959), was exempt from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the lower court
erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa (1967) which held
that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no
exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors
from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
ISSUE/S: Should the Macarandang ruling, the prevailing Ruling at the time
of the appointment, operate despite being abrogated by a new ruling
removing the exemption?
RULING: Yes. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the
law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
The rule enunciated in Macarandang to the effect that the appointment
of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the
category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent to a member of the municipal
police" whom Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts
from the requirements relating to firearms licenses, had been revoked by
the rule in Mapa which held that said section provides no exemption for
persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the
firearm license requirement.
Where a new Ruling abrogates an old rule, the new Ruling should operate
respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old
rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof.
PEOPLE v. JABINAL
G.R. No. L-30061, 27 February 1974
FACTS: Sometime in 1964, Jose Jabinal was charged with Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. However, although he had no
license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander. He contends that he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in
People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero. The accused was found
GUILTY as charged and only considered as mitigating circumstances the
appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent on
the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs.
Mapa.
ISSUE/S: Should the Ruling enunciated in the case of People v. Mapa be
applied in the case against Jabinal even if the said Ruling was pronounced
after the commission of the crime and after the filing of the criminal
action against him?
HELD: No. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system.”The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of
the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant
was found by possession of the firearm in question and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in
the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and
a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society.
DUTY OF JUDGES (ART. 9)
CHUAYAN v. BERNAS
G.R. No. 10010, 1 August 1916
FACTS: On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the
cockpit of the municipality of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks
belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively. Each of said
persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had
declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the
said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be declared the winner. The
justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw. From this
judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the
province. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal. The ground for the dismissal
pronounced by the lower court in the judgment appealed from was that
the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar
with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof;
that he does not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally,
that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights of the plaintiff
and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.
ISSUE/S: Does lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case
justifies a judge's dismissal of a case submitted to him for decision?
HELD: No. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding
the law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that
the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is
the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not
knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that
can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by
dismissing them without deciding the issues.
The Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the
general principles of law.
PEOPLE VS VENERACION
249 SCRA 251
FACTS: A 7 year old girl was killed and raped by the respondents. After
the trial and presentation of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision
finding respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide and was sentenced with the penalty of reclusion
perpertua. Disagreeing with the penalty imposed, the city prosecutor of
manila filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of
death be imposed. Respondent judge denied the Motion.
ISSUE: Is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty
of reclusion perpetua or death?
HELD: No, clearly under the law, Sec. 11, of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty
imposable for the crime of rape with homicide is not reclusion perpetua
but death. We are aware of the trial judge’s misgivings in imposing the
death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this court
sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize
that a court of law is no place for protracted debate on the morality or
propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence
of death as a penalty in specific and well defined instances. The
discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose death penalty is an
ancient one, but it is a matter upon which the judges have no control.

CALTEX VS PALOMAR
18 SCRA 247
FACTS: Caltex launched a contest in which participants are to estimate
the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period. There was no consideration or fee in
joining nor the need to purchase Caltex products be necessary. Entry
forms are available upon request at each caltex station where a sealed
can is provided for deposit of accomplished entry stubs. Foreseeing the
extensive use of mail, representations were made by Caltex with postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. The
postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request arguing that it
violated provisions of the Postal Law on anti-lottery under the Revised
Administrative Code. Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before
the regular courts thru a petition of declaratory relief, that their contest is
not a lottery as the element of consideration is missing. Participants are
not required to pay anything. Palomar assailed the petition, stating that it
is not proper and that he is merely applying the law and there is no legal
issue at all. Therefore, there is no need for the courts to call for the
construction on the statute in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is proper?
HELD: Yes, petition is proper. Construction of law is in order if what is in
issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in a
certain law. The appellant, Palomar, underrates the force and binding
effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it will not
have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is
calculated to subserve. At the very least the appellant will be bound. But
more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system. In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the
statute itself.
PEOPLE v. LICERA
G.R. No. L-39990
FACTS: This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the
judgment the court of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. Licera invokes as his
legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his
appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor
Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as secret agent, he was a
"peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang, 1 was
exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to
possess firearms. But at the time of the decision, said case has been
repealed by the case of Mapa.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the case of Macarandang should be applied
despite it repeal by the case of Mapa requiring license to carry firearms
HELD: At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at
the time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle
without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and,
hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang
precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old
rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not
adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied
thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in
the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for,
in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability
of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

DOUBTFUL STATUTES (ART. 10)
PEOPLE v. PURISIMA G.R. No. L-42050-66
FACTS: The petition is a consolidation of 26 cases involving one basic
question of law. Information were filed charging the respective accused
with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9. In dismissing or quashing the Information, the trial courts
concurred that the element of carrying outside of the accused's residence
of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion
of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder was lacking.
ISSUE/S: Whether the information are sufficient in form and substance
HELD: In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure - a
presidential decree in these cases - the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Statutes are to be construed in
the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied.
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended
scope and purpose. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that
there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were
never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which
the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences. It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by
the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or
an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression,
arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so
on. Thus since the two elements of such crime are first, the carrying
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not
used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that
the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or
in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder. In other words, a simple act of
carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a
criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it.
IN RE: ESTATE OF PADILLA 74 PHIL 377
FACTS: During the marriage of Padilla and Paterno, the former gave
capital to their conjugal partnership while the latter brought in
properties. Later, Padilla died testate and gave his whole estate to his
mother. Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, commenced the instant
proceedings by filing a petition wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her
paraphernal property be segregated from the inventoried estate and
delivered to her together with the corresponding reimbursements and
indemnities; that she be given one-half of the conjugal partnership
property.
ISSUE/S: Whether the properties are conjugal
HELD: Art. 1404 (2) of the Spanish Code provides that the improvements
made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements
from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or
wife, belong to the conjugal partnership. Buildings constructed, at the
expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one
of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land
shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
In the instant case, the husband constructed buildings on the wife’s lots.
Isabel alleged that the CFI erred in since from the time of the construction
of the buildings, the conjugal partnership became the owner of the whole
property, that any increase in value should accrue to the conjugal
partnership and any depreciation should be suffered by the same. Based
on the above provision, the ownership of the land is retained by the wife
until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Mere construction of a building from common
funds does not automatically convey the ownership of the wife’s land to
the conjugal partnership. Construction and improvements are simply an
exercise of the usufruct pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the
wife’s land. Subsequently, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay
any rent during the occupation of the wife’s land. Before the payment of
the value of land is made from the common funds, all the increase or
decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss and she can only
demand payment after the conjugal partnership is liquidated.
Furthermore, the wife should not be allowed to demand payment of the
lot during the marriage and before liquidation because this would disturb
the husband’s management of the conjugal partnership.
Whether the value of the paraphernal buildings which were demolished
to construct new ones using conjugal funds, are reimbursable to the wife.
Concepcion maintains that is doubtful if the demolished buildings were of
any value. However, the SC maintained that however small the value of
the buildings at the time of the demolition should be, considering the
principle of justice equity, reimbursed to the wife. Suffice it to mention
the ancient maxim of the Roman law, "Jure nature aequum est,
meminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem" which
was restated by the Partidas in these terms: "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." When the statutes are
silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental principles which the
courts invoke in order to arrive at a solution that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience. There is also the issue of money borrowed
by the husband for horse race, pastime and for payment of personal debt
of the husband. Applying Art. 1386 of the Spanish Code which reads, the
personal obligations of the husband cannot be enforced against the fruits
of the paraphernal property, unless it is proven that they redounded to
the benefit of the family, said amount cannot be applied to the conjugal
partnership and should be paid by the husband.
MARTINEZ v. VAN BUSKIRK G.R. No. L-5691
FACTS: Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real,
district of Ermita, city of Manila. When a delivery wagon belonging to the
defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the
defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the
street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was
proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's
carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was
coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand
side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery
wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the
defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said
plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff
by making a serious cut upon her head. Defendant presented evidence to
the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the
time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a
safe and reliable cochero.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the cochero is negligent.
HELD: It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which
caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit,
during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were
left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that
time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice;
that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the
manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all
cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was
being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question,
which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
CUSTOMS (ART. 11 -12)
YAO KEE vs. SY-GONZALES
167 SCRA 736
FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving
behind properties here in the Philippines. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et
al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that
they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition
was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of
the deceased whom he married in China. The trial court rendered
decision in favor of Yao Kee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao
Kee as not proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Both parties
moved for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in
accordance with Philippine laws.
HELD: No. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be
alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage,
the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, for failure
to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE THE
USE OF THE FIRM NAME OZAETA, ROMULO, ETC.
92 SCRA 1
FACTS: The surviving parters of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a petition
praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the name of their firm,
the names of their partner who passed away. One of the petitioners’
arguments stated that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name in so far as
Greater Manila Area is concerned. No custom exists which recognizes
that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members
of the firm. They also stated that the continued use of a deceased
partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the
legal profession of most countries in the world

ISSUE: Whether or not the law firm “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes” is allowed tosustain the name of their deceased partner, Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, in the name of theirfirm
HELD:NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American BarAssociation stated the following:“The continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom,
is not unethical but care should be takenthat no imposition or deception
is practiced through this use.” No local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner’sname in the firm names
of law partnerships. Firm names, under Philippine custom,identify the
more active or senior partners in a firm. Firm names in the
Philippineschange and evolve when partners die, leave or a new one is
added. It is questionable toadd the new name of a partner and sustain
the name of the deceased one since they havenever been, technically,
partners in the first place. When it comes to the arguments of the
petitioners stating that U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the
deceased partner’sname, this is so because in the U.S., it is a sanctioned
custom as stated in the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society (33 N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not applyin the Philippines. The
petition filed herein is denied and petitioner is advised to drop thename
“OZAETA” from the firm name.
COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF TIME (ART. 13)
GARCIA VS. RECIO
GR No. 13822; October 2, 2001
FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen. On 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. Two years after
becoming an Australian citizen, Recio married Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan
City. In 1995, they lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage. In 1998, Grace Garcia filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy and claimed that she learned
Recio’s marriage to Samson in 1997. While the suit was pending in
Philippine courts, Recio was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Australia because the marriage had irrevocably broken down.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not an Australian divorce decree is a public
document and requires no other proof of its authenticity and due
execution contrary to petitioner’s contention that it is a question of fact.
HELD: Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports
to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested]
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules
on evidence must be demonstrated. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved
in the negative.
CIR vs. Primetown
G.R. NO. 162155
FACTS: On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent
Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of
income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue
district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), he explained that the increase in
the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for
projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to
slowdown. As a consequence, while business was good during the first
quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to P71,879,228
that year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 13 of the Civil Code should be applied in
computing the legal periods or sec. 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987
HELD: Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a
year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing
Corporation v. Tecson, we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days
regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.
However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be
twelve calendar months; month of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall
be computed according to the number of days the
specific month contains; day, to a day of twenty-four
hours and; night from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis
supplied)
A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard
to the number of days it may contain. It is the period of time running
from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including,
the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the
last day of that month. To illustrate, one calendar month from December
31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar
month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008.
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law
is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions
of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous
one). Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of
1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate
the laws to be abolished. Thus, the provision above only
 impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have
been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is
whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of
the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to
365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar
months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code
of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the
time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998) consisted
of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was
filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent
filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary
period.
CIVIL LAWS (ART. 15-17)
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO,
FACTS: Deceased Joseph G. Brimo is a Turkish citizen. Andre Brimo
opposed the scheme of partition of Joseph’s estate. Said properties are
located in the Philippine and wished that the distribution of the estate are
in accordance with Philippine Laws. Oppositor claimed that the will is not
in accordance with with Turkish laws. The errors were laid down : 1.)
Approval of said scheme patition, 2.) denial of his participation in the
inheritance 3.) denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the partition 4.) The approval of the purchase made by Pietro
Lanza of the deceased’s business and the deed of transfer of said business
and 5.) the declaration that the Turkish Laws are impertinent to this
cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of
partition and the delivery of the deceased’s business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish Laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Turkish Laws or Philippine Laws shall be applied on
the estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen who have resided for in the
Philippines for a reasonable time.
HELD: But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws,
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish
laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
According to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law
of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law
which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is
null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said
clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that
the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the
herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other
respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO
G.R. NO. 139 SCRA 139
FACTS: Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen, and private respondent Richard
Upton, an American Citizen were married in Hong Kong. They established
their residence in the Phliippines and begot 2 children. The parties
obtained a divorce in the United States and such petitioner was re-
married in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.
Richard Upton filed suit in the RTC in Pasay City and alleged that
petitioner’s business were the conjugal property of the parties and asked
for an accounting of such business and he (Richard) be declared to
manage the conjugal property.
Alice filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court and respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner and no community property.
The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether
the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after
their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd.,
to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations. As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty,
Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons,
to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be
adjudicated by the court.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he
is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.
PILAPIL vs. IBAY SOMERA
174 SCRA 653, 30 June 1989
FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and
Erich Geiling were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated
a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983.
Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before RTC of Manila on January 23,
1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local
Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery
alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner “had an affair
with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city fiscal approved
a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to
defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon.
Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before
such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings.
On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and
also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be
arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper.
RULING: The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case
was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued
in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in prosecutions
for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse. The fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is admitted. Private
respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Barreto vs. Gonzales
58 Phil 238; G.R. No. L-37048 March 7, 1933
FACTS: Plaintiff and defendant are Filipino citizens residing in Manila
married on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and wife until the
spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time have not
lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born.
Negotiations between the parties continued for several months,
whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support
and that of her children. Shortly after this agreement the husband left the
Philippines betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that
jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which was
decreed on November 28, 1927. Defendant moved to California and
returned to the Philippines in August 1928, where he has since remained.
On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through
the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen and has three children
as a result of that marriage. Defendant reduced the amount he had
agreed to pay monthly for the support of his 1st wife and four minor
children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
alimony. Plaintiff brought an action in the CFI of Manila requesting that
the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of
divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decree of divorce obtained by a Filipino citizen
abroad is recognized under the Philippines Laws.
HELD: NO. The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their
separation until the case was submitted to this court, in which they all
prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates
a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding
divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and
under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial
domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the
residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose
of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if
matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this
court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce
has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon
lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not
overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands.
It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such
laws are too strict or too liberal.
GOVERNMENT vs. FRANK
13 Phil 238; G. R. No. 2935. March 23, 1909
FACTS: On April 17 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, in
the United States, Defendant Frank through a representative of the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for a
period of two years with the plaintiff, by which defendant was to receive
a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the
said plaintiff and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the
expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and
one-half salary during said period of travel. Said contract contained a
provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of Frank, he
should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the
Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period.
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-
salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a
further compliance with the terms of the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from
Frank the sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been
paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila,
and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws
No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his
special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80
and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and
also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was
therefore not responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the
Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars.
ISSUES: 1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the
contract entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
HELD: 1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative
department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended
said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have
the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of
1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which
the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not
been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been
amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still
constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the
Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor
and therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The record
discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of
Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority
to contract. Frank claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws
of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained
the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending
that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the
time and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant
had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than
that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a
contract are determined b the law of the place where the contract is
made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy,
such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of
limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
CONSTANZA YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO vs. GABRIEL FUSTER
G.R. No. 7487. December 29, 1913.
FACTS: (JOHNSON, J p:) 1875 Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yañez were
married in Malaga, Spain. In 1892, Fuster came to the Philippine, settled,
and acquired real and personal property. Yanez followed and lived with
him until 1899 where they both “resolved to separate and live apart, both
consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband
authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the
said lady pleases.” In the same document, the husband undertook to
send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support. In 1909
Yanez returned and commenced divorce proceedings against her
husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him. She
asked for divorce, separation of properties and the conjugal property be
liquidated. In deciding the case, the CFI Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the
plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17,
directed that the communal property be divided between the parties,
with costs against the defendant, Both parties appealed from this
judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the property,
was proceeded with to the court, who then rendered final judgment,
from which, also, both parties appealed.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI has jurisdiction to try an action for divorce between
two Catholic Spaniards.
HELD: Yes. The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a
divorce is not comprised within the personal status of the husband and
wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights
which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law,
and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the
private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation.
"The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are
considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally
submitted to the territorial principle . . . All persons that have to demand
justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing
by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunals of the
state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to
enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose
himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which, although he
won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of the
court's lack of means to enforce them.
The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within
the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the person of the Spanish
subject wherever he may go. In the present action for divorce the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the
persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were
residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN VS. BOHANAN
G.R. No. L-12105. January 30, 1960
Facts: (LABRADOR, J) C.O. Bohanan died and left a last will of testament
where he left half of his residuary estate to his grandson, and the other
half to his brother and sister. He also gave small amounts of legacies to
his children and to other people. His wife, Magdalena was excluded in the
will. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate a last will. The testator was a citizen of Nevada, USA
and divorced his wife Magdalena in Reno. Magdalena and her children,
question the validity of the will, claiming that they have been deprived of
their legitimes.
Issue: Whether or not the testamentary disposition based on the national
law of the decedent is valid.
Held: Yes, the testamentary disposition is valid. Article 10 of the old Civil
Code provides that the validity of the testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question. Incase at bar, the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada.
Since the laws of said state allow the testator
to dispose of all his property according to his will, his testamentary
dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be their
legitimes under Philippine law should be respected
BELLIS VS. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967
Facts: (BENGZON, J.P., J) Amos Bellis was born in Texas and was a citizen
of the State of Texas and of the United States. By his first wife, Mary
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second
wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children;
and in addition, he had three illegitimate children. He executed a will in
the Philippines which divided his estate in the following manner: (a)
$240,000 to his first wife, Mary Mallen; (b) 120,000 divided equally
among the three illegitimate children ₱ and (c) the residual estate divided
equally among his seven legitimate children. Two of the illegitimate
children questioned this. According to them they are being deprived of
their legitimes based on Philippine law
Issue:
1. W/N the petitioners are entitled to their legitimes as per
Philippine law
2. W/N the situation calls for the application of the renvoi doctrine.

Held: 1. No, the decedent is a citizen of Texas, USA. The Philippine law
would not apply.
2. No, the Renvoi doctrine is not applicable in this case. Art. 16 of the Civil
Code states that "intestate and testamentary successions...shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration". Under Texas law, there are no forced heirs or legitimes so
the illegitimate children are not entitled to the decedent's estate. The
renvoi doctrine arises where the decedent is a national of one country
and domiciled in another. The decedent is a citizen of Texas and
domiciled therein. It would only arise if Texas has a conflict rule providing
that the law of the country where the properties are situated will govern,
where the said properties involved are found in the Philippines whose law
provides that the national law of the testator should govern no conflict
arises.
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600
be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to
his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen,
insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of
the deceased Edward in an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that
he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship
by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in
the Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the
California law?
HELD: The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The application
of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term “national law” is used therein. As explained in the
various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16
of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question
to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is
not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the
state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of
the parent recognizing them.
As the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by
the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
California, not by the internal law of California. supervening events warrant it.
Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognized
in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, such as custody must still
be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res
ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ
judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties opposed
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so. In the
present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
FACTS: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. The trial
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981
of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and
interests of the children
Alexandra Kristine. Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Makati RTC. Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree
GARCIA-RECIO vs RECIO
of divorce from Germany. The decree provides that the parental custody
366 SCRA 4372, 2 October 2002
of the children should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed a motion to
dismiss the nullity case as a divorce decree had already been
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
promulgated, which was granted by respondent Judge Salonga.
Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as
Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the case should proceed for the
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, their marriage was
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
dissolved by a divorce decree, issued by an Australian Family Court. On
distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga
January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia in Cabanatuan
partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the
City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior
issues of support and custody of their children.
judicial dissolution of their marriage. Their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured
ISSUES: Whether or not the granting the motion to dismiss the nullity
in Australia.
case valid ; it is valid to assume jurisdiction to tackle child custody and
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
support.
ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she only learned of
Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson in November 1997.
HELD: A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not
yet attained finality. The court can modify or alter a judgment even after
ISSUE: Whether the divorce decree submitted by Rederick Recio is
the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable. Where certain facts and
absolve him of bigamy.
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when
HELD: The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the
divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since
the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, it does not prove
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. The decree, being a
foreign document was inadmissible to court because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be
used.
A document may be proven as an official record of a foreign country by
either:
1. an official publication;
2. attested by the officer having legal custody of the document;
3. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
4. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper Philippine
diplomatic or consular officer stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and
5. authenticated by the seal of his office.
PEOPLE VS. LOL-LO & SARAW
43 PHIL. 19; G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922.
FACTS: Two boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In one of the boats
was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat 11 men, women,
and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first
asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women.
All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two
of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women,
and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw
later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. All of the elements of the crime
of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility. Pirates are in law hostes humani
generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is
against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state,
"for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
crime of piracy are still in force.
HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead. Penal code dealing with the
crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense
against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent
means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should
be imposed. At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in
the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken
of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into
consideration in fixing the penalty
 EUGENIO vs. VELEZ
185 SCRA 45
FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. She
cohabited with the petitioner against her will and always had the
intention of escaping. She died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence on Aug. 28, 1988.
Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases) filed a petition
for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but
petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the
ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings.
The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor
for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?
HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was
correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an unmarried
man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.”
Petitioner’s claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as contemplated
under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize
common law marriages where “a man and a woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions”.
In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not
in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal
impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana
PILAPIL vs. IBAY SOMERA
174 SCRA 653, 30 June 1989
FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and
Erich Geiling were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated
a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983. Pilapil,
petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before RTC of Manila on January 23, 1983
where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local
Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner “had
an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city
fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both
criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge
denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both
accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct
contempt and fined.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper.
RULING: The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case
was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued
in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in prosecutions
for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse. The fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is admitted. Private
respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They
established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They
were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time
with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8,
1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon
Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as
the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where
petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.
Republic VS Iyoy
GR 152577
Facts: The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the reversal of the
decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy
null and void based on Article 36. On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and
Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely
went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to
sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an
American and had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several
occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children in
which she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation. March
25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that
Fely’s acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were
manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his
testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract,
and the invitation where Fely used her new husband’s last name as
evidences. Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a
drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was already an
American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the
evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity?
Held: The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish
psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.” Finally, Article 36 “is not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume.”
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on
May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis
City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain
Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the
Family Code.
HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the
court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law
ROEHR v. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
FACTS: Wolfang O. Roehr, a German citizen married Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina in 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They begot two children. In 1996, Carmen filed
an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage. A motion to dismiss
was denied and the subsequent motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
but was
denied and the case was remanded to the RTC. Meanwhile, Wolfang
obtained a decree of divorce in Germany and granted parental custody
over their children to him. In view of said decree, petitioner filed a
Second Motion to Dismiss in 1999 on the ground that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of
divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of
petitioner and private respondent. An order granting the Motion to
Dismiss was issued because of the dissolution of the marriage. A motion
was filed by the respondent asking that the case be set for hearing for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of their properties. It was opposed on the ground that there
was nothing to be done anymore as the marital tie of the spouses had
already been severed by the divorce decree and that the decree has
already been recognized by the court in its order. The lower Court issued
an order partially setting aside the former order for the purpose of
tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support
and custody of their children. This order was questioned on the basis of
the contention that the divorce decree obtained in Germany had already
severed the marital relations of the parties, hence, nothing can be done
anymore.
ISSUE/S: Is a foreign divorce decree recognized in our jurisdiction and
does it affect the obligations on care and support of the children?
HELD: NO. In Garcia v. Recio, Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., and Llorente v.
Court of Appeals, it has been consistently held that a divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to
the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera where the Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his
country. It was held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our the Rules of Court.
(ART 19-21)
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA
G.R. No. 137916, December 8, 2004
FACTS: The Spouses Jacinto Gotangco and Charity Bantug were the
owners of seven parcels of land located in Palayan City. On August 22,
1980, the Spouses Gotangco secured a loan for their poultry project in
Palayan City from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). They
then executed a real estate mortgage over the parcels of land. On July 17,
1982, the Spouses Gotangco, as vendors, executed in favor of Elpidio O.
Cucio a contract to sell over the seven parcels of land mortgaged to DBP
for P50,000.00, payable in two installments. The parties agreed that the
said amount shall be paid directly to DBP and applied to the mortgage
indebtedness of the Spouses Gotangco and that, upon full payment of the
purchase price, the Spouses shall execute a deed of sale over the said
their account with the DBP. parcels of land in favor of Cucio. The contract
to sell was known to DBP. On February 20, 1989, the DBP wrote the
Spouses Gotangco demanding payment of the balance of their loan in the
amount of P408,026.96 within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
However, the Spouses failed to respond or pay Cucio then filed a
complaint against the Spouses Gotangco and the DBP with the RTC of
Palayan City for injunction and damages. Cucio alleged, inter alia, that
despite his payment
of the full purchase price of the seven (7) parcels of land and his demands
for the turnover of the owner’s duplicates of the said title to the Spouses
Gotangco, the DBP refused to do so. He further alleged that the DBP even
demanded the payment of the interest on the loan account of the
Spouses Gotangco. Furthermore, the Spouses Gotangco refused to
execute a deed of absolute sale of the said parcels of land in his favor.
While the case was
pending, the DBP informed the Spouses Gotangco in a Letter dated
February 20, 199020 that it was going to have the mortgage foreclosed
for their failure to settle their account. On June 8, 1990, the Spouses
Gotangco wrote the DBP requesting for an updated statement of their
account and the application of their payments, inclusive of the proceeds
of their insurance claims. On the same date, the DBP filed an application
for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed in its favor by the
Spouses Gotangco. The Spouses Gotangco forthwith filed a petition
before the trial court for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
public auction, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
in favor of the DBP would render the decision of the court on the merits
moot and academic. During the trial, Jacinto Gotangco testified that he
suffered mental anguish and serious anxieties because of the threatened
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in favor of DBP. The
Trial Court ordered DBP to pay the Gotangcos the sum of P250,000.00 as
moral damages. On appeal by the DBP, the CA affirmed the decision, but
reduced the award of moral damages to P50,000.00.
ISSUE/S: Is there a factual or legal basis for the grant of moral damages
in favor of
the Gotangcos as against DBP?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there is no sufficient basis for the
award of moral damages in favor of the respondents spouses based on
Article 19 of the New Civil Code as a result of petitioner’s application for
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. For one thing, Charity Bantug
Gotangco did not testify. There is no factual basis for the award of moral
damages
in her favor. Abuse of right under Article 19 of the New Civil Code, on
which the RTC anchored its award for damages and attorney’s fees,
provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith. The elements of abuse of rights
are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of said provision. Good faith is
presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.
Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the
acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
UYPITCHING v. QUIAMCO
G.R. No. 146322, 6 December 2006
FACTS: In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan
Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil
aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They
surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of
its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate
of registration but the three accused never came to see him again.
Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside
respondent's business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it
was visible and accessible to the public. It turned out that, in October
1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by
petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation
managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its
payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. been
"taken by respondent's men." "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." When
Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the
obligation and continued the payments. In September 1982, however,
Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner
corporation's collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had
allegedly Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching,
accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover
the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola,
talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt.
Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and
forth inside the establishment uttering On learning that respondent was
not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for
respondent in his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the
establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find
respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and,
on petitioner Uypitching's instruction and over the clerk's objection, took
the motorcycle.
ISSUE/S: Did the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warrant the
award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs
in favor of respondent?
HELD: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere.
To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These
supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in
society. YES. Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for
petitioner corporation's exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to
recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right
to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
foreclosure. True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged
property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon.
There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of
possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must
bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step
to the sale, or to obtain judicial Petitioner corporation failed to bring the
proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the
motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the
motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course
of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even
mouthed a slanderous statement. No doubt, petitioner corporation,
acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the
lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of
respondent. Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public morals,
and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. The basic
principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
provides: Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. Article 19, also known as the
"principle of
abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly
or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to
liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal
right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when
it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will
attach.
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married. However, Velez left her without
any reason. Eventually, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from
again. Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. Judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff for damages. The RTC issued an order denying defendant's
aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to the SC.
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant
asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that
"there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach
of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not
an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so.
Issue: WON the breach of promise to marry is actionable.
Held: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not
contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM vs. ROBERTO REYES
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005
Facts: Respondent Roberto Reyes, while he was having coffee at the
lobby of Hotel Nikko he was spotted by his friend of several years, who
then approached him. She invited him to join her in a party at the hotels
penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager. After a
couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at
the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he
was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for
Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at
the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party. Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing
distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation. A Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out
of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by
the policeman. Respondent claimed for damages. Ruby Lim, for her part,
admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the
ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. One of her functions
included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General
Manager. At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter
ordering a drink. She inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms.
Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. Ms.
Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he
was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to
inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim
and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes for
damages.
Issue: Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes,
to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant
Held: Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the
party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for
damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither
can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from
that of its employee. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to
set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards
are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain
herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Article 21, on the other hand, states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it
is done with intent to injure.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave
was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this
regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration
that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first
verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a
cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration
of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two years old, single, Filipino
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected
in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen and
is an exchange student taking a medical course; the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of
the school semester and that, the petitioner forced her to live with him.
She was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing
of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment,
she sustained injuries. Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement
and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Plaintiff's father, also claimed
that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou,
he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the
reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many
relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. The RTC ruled for the
respondent. Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at
bar.
Held: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not
an actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or
quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and
to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
PE vs. ALFONSO PE
5 SCRA 200
FACTS: The defendant was regarded as a family member so he was
allowed to visit the plaintiffs’ house and to ask Lolita to teach him to pray
the rosary. Defendant, a married man, had a clandestine love affair with
Lolita, the 24 year old unmarried woman. When the family learnt about
their secret affair, defendant was forbidden to visit their house and to see
Lolita. However, their affair still continued. On April 1957, Lolita
disappeared from her brother’s house in Quezon City. A note written by
the defendant was seen on the aparador of Lolita. The family filed an
action for damages in pursuant with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the injury caused to the family of Lolita by the
defendant is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
HELD: The court held that there can be no other conclusion that can be
drawn from this chain of events that the defendant succeeded in winning
the heart of Lolita through clever strategies. Knowing that he is a married
man, the wrong that he had done to her and to the family is
immeasurable. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita’s family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code
Quisumbing vs. MERALCO
GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002
FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the
owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City.
Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by
Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot
inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as
standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the
plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had
been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who
conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors
advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further
verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered,
defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the
couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of
the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of
P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be
disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate
reconnection.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent
manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s
rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them
accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.
HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to
pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is
ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including
attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of
individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due
process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are
imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the
effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any
action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people.
“Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately
disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but
only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to
by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board”. During the inspection, no government official
or ERB representative was present.
Petitioner’s claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply
proof and was premised only upon Lorna’s testimony. These are
compensation for an injury that will put the injure position where it was
before it was injured.
Globe Mackay Cable vs.CA
176 SCRA 778
FACTS: Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by
petitioner Globe Mackay in dual capacity as purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972,
the respondent discovered fraudulent anomalies and transactions in the
said corporation for which it lost several hundred thousands of pesos. The
private respondent reported to his superiors including Henry, the
petitioner. However, he was confronted by Hendry stating that Tobias
was the number one suspect. He was ordered to take a one week forced
leave. When he returned to work, Hendry called him ‘crook’ and
‘swindler’, and left a scornful remark to the Filipinos. The petitioners also
charged six criminal cases against the respondent—five cases of estafa
and one for violating Article 290 of the RPC (Discovering Secrets through
Seizure of Correspondence). The petitioner also sent a poison letter to
RETELCO causing the respondent to be unemployed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the
respondent.
HELD: Petitioners invoked the right of damnun absque injuria or the
damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of legal right or
amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. However, this is not applicable
in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might
have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in
which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which
petitioners must be held liable. The court awarded Tobias the following:
Php 80, 000 as actual damages, Php 200, 000 as moral damages, Php 20,
0000 as exemplary damages; Php 30, 000 as attorney’s fees; and, costs.
Petition was denied and the decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
University of the East v. Jader
GR NO. 132344
FACTS: Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to
take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his
last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark
when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal
examination. In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list
of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in
the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies,
the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture
ceremonies and graduated. On April to September 1998, he took a leave
of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far
Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a
deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examinations. The RTC granted actual damages and the CA added moral
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.
RULING: No. Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages
cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered
shock, trauma, and pain. Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader
negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible
enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his
academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his
failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he
has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of
the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of
Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral
damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with
modification.
AZNAR V. CITIBANK
GR NO. 164273
FACTS: Petitioner is a holder of a credit card and claims that when he
presented his credit card in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore
and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And when he tried to use the
same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to
purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that
his card was blacklisted by the respondent bank. To prove that
respondent blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a computer
print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the
signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in
question was “DECL OVERLIMIT” or declared over the limit.
ISSUE: WON Citibank is liable for damage to Aznar?
HELD: NO. Citibank cannot be said to have breached any duty since the
card was not declined in all the stores Aznar used it. It is settled that in
order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
HEIRS OF NALA v. CABANSAG
FACTS: Artemio bought a 50-square meter property from spouses
Eugenio and Felisa, part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name
of the Gomez spouses.. In October, 1991, he received a demand letter
from Atty. Alexander demanding payment for rentals from 1987 to 1991
until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Purisima;
failing which, civil and criminal charges will be brought against him. This
demand letter was followed by another demand letter. According to
Artemio, the demand letter caused him damages prompting him to file a
complaint for damages against Purisima and Atty. Alexander. In their
defense, Atty. Alexander alleged that he merely acted in behalf of his
client Purisima, who contested the ownership of the lot by Artemio.
Purisima alleged that the lot was pat of an 800-sq. meter property owned
by her late husband, Eulogio, which was divided into two parts. The 400-
square meter lot was conveyed to the spouses Gomez by virtue of a
fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be held in trust by
the Gomezes in behalf of their (Eulogio and Purisima) children. Artemio is
only renting the property which he occupies. She only learned of the deed
of sale by the Gomez spouses to Artemio when the latter filed the case
for damages against her and Atty. Alexander.
ISSUE: Whether or not Artemio and Atty. Alexander and Purisima liable
for damages, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
HELD: In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights
principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal
right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala
and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending
the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for
Nala’s actions since she believed that the property was owned by her
husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the
same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the
property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for
damages against Nala that she learned of such sale.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado
to send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps
to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by
respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury.
Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne
solely by him.
Carpio vs. Valmonte, Gr no. 151866, 28 March 2008
FACTS: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator,
and on the Big day she went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her
family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons
were already there including the bride, the bride’s parents and relatives,
the make-up artist and his assistant, the official photographers, and the
fashion designer. Among those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an
aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. After
reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items
needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors
and finished all the necessary errands for the wedding. When she went
back to the suite, she was accused by Soledad Carpio that she was the
one who took the lost jewelry of the latter. The hotel security
searched the bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the
room and Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and
trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. A few days after the
incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal
letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’
relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of
petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the
letter. Valmonte then filed a suit for damages against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valmonte is entitled to damages
RULING: Yes. Petitioners imputations against respondent was
made with malice and in bad faith. In the sphere of our law on human
relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully
or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief
for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are
not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct.
First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as
abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find the existence of
an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent or prejudicing or injuring another. When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
accountable. One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which
would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby
offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts
with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent
was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody
knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper
bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but out rightly
accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went
out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the
guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had
the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually
stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is
impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a
manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and
resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently,
she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article
21 for which she should be held accountable.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ART 22)
Villalva vs RCBC Savings Bank
FACTS: Petitioner spouses issued forty-eight checks
totaling P547,392.00 to cover installment payments due on promissory
notes executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue (TQA) for the purchase
of a 93 Toyota Corolla. The promissory notes were secured by a Chattel
Mortgage executed by the petitioner spouses on the vehicle in favor of
TQA. Under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, petitioner spouses were to
insure the vehicle against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire, and
endorse and deliver the policies to the mortgagor. The promissory notes
and chattel mortgage were assigned to Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC). They were later assigned by RCBC to RCBC Savings
Bank. In time, all forty-eight (48) checks issued by the petitioner spouses
were encashed by respondent RCBC Savings Bank. The evidence shows
that the petitioner spouses faithfully complied with the obligation to
insure the mortgaged vehicle from 1993 until 1996. Petitioner spouses
procured the necessary insurance but did not deliver the same to the
respondent and as a consequence, respondent had the mortgaged
vehicle insured for a period of one year and paid a P14,523.36 insurance
premium. The insurance policy obtained by respondent was later
cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by petitioner spouses over
the mortgaged vehicle, and respondent bank was
reimbursed P10,939.86 by Malayan Insurance Company. The premium
paid by respondent bank exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by
Malayan Insurance Company by P3,583.50. Respondent sent a letter of
demand to the petitioners for P12,361.02 allegedly representing unpaid
obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage. In lieu thereof,
respondent demanded that petitioner spouses surrender the mortgaged
vehicle within five days from notice.]The petitioner spouses ignored the
demand letter. Respondent, in order to get the 93 Toyota Corolla, filed a
complaint for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with
the Metropolitan TrialCourt of Pasay City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners failed to comply with their
obligation to insure the subject vehicle under the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage
RULING: We hold that petitioners did not default in the
performance of their obligation. As a rule, demand is required before a
party may be considered in default.However, demand by a creditor is not
necessary in order that delay may exist: (1) when the obligation or the
law expressly so declares; (2) when from the nature and the
circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the
time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered
was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or (3)
when demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it
beyond his power to perform. None of the exceptions are present in this
case.
RESPECT FOR OTHER’S PRIVACY (ART. 26)
Tenchavez vs Escano, 15 SCRA 355
FACTS: Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age, exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer
and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan
Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register. Without
informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she
was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two
years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States.
She filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." A decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open
court by the said tribunal. Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo
Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has
begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May
1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño,
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff
and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran;
while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is
valid and binding upon the courts of the Philippines
RULING: It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage
between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the
Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time
the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still
a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the
time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that
term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast
to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of
divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV,
Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes
that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a
foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens could be a
patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view
of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code.
St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA
133 SCRA 179
FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the
faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage
for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty
Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an
ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This
was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house
featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the
company asked permission and the intended house to be published.
After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis
demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or
apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto,
the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s
counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18,
1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but
nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a
complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of
rectification was published.
ISSUE: WON St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.
RULING: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely
circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology
and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier
rectification . St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under
articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned
advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to
Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps”.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (ART. 36)
Ching v. CA
423 SCRA 356
FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Makati RTC with Estafa, in
relation to the Trust Receipts Law.ۥ Thereafter, Petitioner filed before
the Manila RTC for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages.
Petitioner then filed a petition before the Makati RTC for the suspension
of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil
action.
ISSUE: WON there is a prejudicial question
RULING: No. The two essential requisites of a prejudicial question are: (1)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the case
at bar, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for the declaration
of nullity of documents and for damages, does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming
arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates
that the transaction entered into between the parties was not a trust
receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be
established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other
evidence.
Te v. Choa,
G.R. No. 126446
FACTS: In 1988, Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil rites. Although
they did not live together, they would usually see each other. In 1989,
Liliana gave birth to their daughter. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting
her. In 1990, Arthur contracted another marriage while still married to
Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy case against Te and administrative
case for the revocation of his and his mistress’ engineering license. Te
filed a petition for nullity of marriage. RTC rendered a decision on the
bigamy case even the petition for annulment was pending.
ISSUE: WON the annulment should be resolved first before the criminal
case be decided upon.
RULING: No. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because
all that is required for bigamy to prosper is that the 1st marriage be
subsisting at the time the 2ndmarriage is contracted
Mercado v. Tan
337 SCRA 122
FACTS: Vincent G. Mercado, while still being married to Thelma Oliva,
contracted another marriage with Ma. Consuelo Tan.
Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and one month after the latter filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The RTC
decision declared the marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
RULING: Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: "Article 40. The
absolute nullity of a previous, marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage
void."
A declaration of nullity of marriage is now necessary before one can
contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, one may be charged
with and convicted of bigamy. Such declaration is also necessary even if
the earlier marriage is characterized by statute ”void."
MORIGO V. PEOPLE
GR. NO. 145226
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They
lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and
various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married
in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed
petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992,
Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a
suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his
marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he
contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free
from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that
there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence,
he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Spouses Yu v. PCIB
 GR NO. 147902
FACTS: Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title,
interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan
City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International
Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a
loan. As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties
due thereon, respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of
respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry
of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After two months before
the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte
petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners
complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and
to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC.
Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing
that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue
to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of
which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of
a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
HELD: Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding
since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately
and take their own direction independently of each other.
Donato vs. Luna
GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988
FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was
filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based
on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the
petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978.
Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering
into the marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous
knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage
was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior
to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years
proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for
which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant
to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until
November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato
already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the
ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question
since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was
proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by
means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the PERSONS (ART 37-51)
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Quimiguing vs. Icao
G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970

FACTS:

This is an appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First

Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding),
dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
denying amendment of the same pleading.

Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex with Quimiguing, a

student, several times by force and intimidation and without her consent.
As a result, she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by
Icao, and had to stop studying. Quimiguing claims support at P120.00
monthly, damages and attorney’s fees. Icao moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action since complainant did not allege that
the child had indeed been born; trial judge sustained defendant’s motion.
Plaintiff amended the complaint but trial court sustained the dismissal
and ruled that no amendment to complaint is allowable. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is covered by Article 40 of the New Civil

Code which will entitle the child to claim support through the mother.

HELD:

Yes. Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result

of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. The Supreme
Court says that since, as provided in Article 40 of the New Civil Code (the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it,
provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in following
article), petitioner Quimiguing’s child, since time of conception, and as
having fulfilled the requirement of having been born later, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee.
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was
carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the
terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a
cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered
Geluz vs. CA
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they
were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent,
she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage,
she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC
and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a
two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband
did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo,
private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and
last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay
P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn
child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones who
caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called
presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur
later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed
legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue
on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that
lacked juridical personality.
 It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a
conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present
case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages.
However, such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.
DE JESUS VS SYQUIA
[G.R. No. L-39110]
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco de Jesus, 20 years old, and Cesar Syquia, 23 met
in a barber shop where de Jesus worked as cashier. They had a
relationship and Antonia got pregnant with a baby boy. During her
pregnancy, Syquia often visited her. He even wrote a letter to a reverend
father saying that he wanted his name to be given to the child. When he
went to Japan and China, he was writing letters to Antonia reminding her
to keep herself in good condition so that their junior would be strong.
When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house in
Manila where they lived as a family for a year. She became pregnant
again but Syquia left her to marry another woman. During the christening
of the child which Syquia arranged, he decided to give the child the name
of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
ISSUE:
WON the note to the padre in connection with the other letters
written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves
acknowledgement of paternity.
HELD:
YES. The letter written by Syquia to reverend father serves as
admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the
admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is
that the writing shall be indubitable.
The acknowledgment shown is thus sufficient. It is a universal
rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a
bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person.
The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights.
It is contented however that the words used in the writings are not legally
sufficient to indemnify the child. This contention is not well founded.
The words contained in the note are not capable of two constructions.
The baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael
Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which
the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. It seems that the only
legal question is whether the acknowledgement must be made in a single
document or may be made in more than one document.
LIMJUCO VS ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
[G.R. No. L-770]
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special
or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive
capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan
and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of
DUMLAO v. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC.
San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. Petioner
Facts: Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. T-662
argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the
rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria,
estate of Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards
Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay
granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the law.
solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal
ISSUE: rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in
case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision
WON the Estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Upon defendants' failure
personality. to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become
final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered
HELD: the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the
land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. It
YES. The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial
turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960
personality because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could
when the action was filed. Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all
be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the
surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will,
settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the
sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for the annulment of the judgment
exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of
against Oria and the execution against his land, the ground for annulment
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those
being lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria.
surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience
before the Public Service Commission.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the person of Oria
prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its
final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Ruling: No. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of against him is a patent nullity. As far as Oria was concerned, the lower
the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of
so adjudged and decreed”. jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been,
validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His
juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
MOY YA LIM YAO et. al v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
Facts: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in
connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines
to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come
into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month. After
repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner
of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and
immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought an action for injunction which the Court of First Instance in
Manila denied.
Issues: (1) Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino
citizen upon her marriage to Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo, a
Filipino citizen. (2) Whether there is need of judicial naturalization
proceeding before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered a
Filipino.
Ruling: (1) Yes. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
(2) No. In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law,
the time when citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the
time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in
issue in any proceeding, would be required to prove, for instance, that his
father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his claim
to citizenship. His citizenship status commences from the time of birth,
although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent
time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized
becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino
husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven
fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo filed for candidacy for governorship. This was
contested by Raul Lee who filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that
Frivaldo be disqualified because he was not a Filipino citizen. Second
Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution granting petition. The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until
after the elections. His candidacy continued and he was voted. Three days
after, the COMELEC affirmed the previous Resolution. The Board of
Canvassers completed the canvass of the election and determined that
Frivaldo garnered the largest number of votes, followed by Lee. Lee filed
another petition praying for his proclamation as Governor and his petition
was granted. Frivaldo filed a new petition. He alleged that he already took
his oath of allegiance on June 30, 1995 and that there was no more legal
impediment his proclamation as governor. On December 19, 1995, the
COMELEC First Division annulled the proclamation of Lee and proclaimed
Frivaldo as rightful governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which
COMELEC denied. Lee filed a petition questioning the Frivaldo’s
proclamation when his (Frivaldo) “judicially declared disqualification is a
continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected
to and to hold the Office of Governor.”
Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo satisfied the citizenship requirement
by section 39 of the Local Government Code(LGC) thereby making
him eligible for the disputed seat (governor)?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Holding that first, the
citizenship requirement of the LGC is unlike the same's residency
requirement which requires a certain time of residence to be
qualified, in this case the citizenship requirement is needed to be
present at the time of proclamation. Second, it is uncontested that
under P.D. 725 Frivaldo regained his citizenship with no less than
the Solicitor general, such citizenship was regained starting from the
time that Frivaldo applied for such which is September 1994. To
hold that Frivaldo only regained his citizenship on June 30 1995, the
time when it was granted, would be an injustice for the part of
Frivaldo because starting at the time that he applied for citizenship
he immediately became a stateless person and that according to the
civil code, curative statutes must be given retroactive effect, P.D.
725 is a curative statute. The Supreme Court also relied on his
other acts and the voice of the people by further holding that "...it
would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause." "
...the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality." "Concededly, he sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this
stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to
this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of
Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an
oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate
of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents
248 SCRA 300 / G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Facts:
On 8 March 1995, petitioner Imelda filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
where she claimed that she was a domiciliary there for ‘seven months’.
Later, she submitted an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy that
she was a domiciliary of Leyte ‘since childhood’. The respondent filed a
petition to nullify her candidacy, and to disqualify her as the winner in the
elections since she did not meet the requirement as having domiciliary in
the First District of Leyte for at least a year as she have had stayed in
Ilocos Norte, San Juan, and later on in Malacañang.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election
purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the
time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
Ruling:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise
of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs.
Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the
fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence,
in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent
to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes
his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an
individual to have different residences in various places. However, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons,
he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence.
"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile. For political purposes the concepts
of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws.
MARRIAGE
NIÑAL VS. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.
FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones in 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners. In 1985, Teodulfa died. One
year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of
the Family Code. The RTC Judge dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage is valid.
HELD: (1) No. The second marriage is void ab initio because it cannot be
said that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months has elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five year cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife".
GARCIA VS. RECIO
G.R. No. 138922, October 2, 2002.
FACTS: In 1987, Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson,
an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. In 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. In 1992,
Respondent, Recio, became an Australian citizen. In 1994, petitioner, a
Filipina, and respondent got married. In their application for marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” In 1995, the
petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent
contends that petitioner knows of his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution. About five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure
a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. The Trial Court declared
the first marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not Recio has the capacity of remarry.
HELD: No. A divorce decree obtained by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article
21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal
capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license.The Supreme Court held that it cannot grant petitioner's prayer to
declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there
being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
REPUBLIC VS. OBRECIDO
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on
May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis
City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain
Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the
Family Code.
HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the
court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine
law.
LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
FACTS:
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy and a naturalized American citizen. Lorenzo married
petitioner Paula Llorente. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home.
When Lorenzo returned to the Philippines to visit his wife, he discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo
refused to forgive Paula and live with her. Lorenzo returned to the United
States and filed for divorce which was granted and became final in 1952.
Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. From 1958 to
1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife and
produced three children. Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In
the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three
children. Lorenzo filed with the RTC a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. The trial court
admitted the will to probate. Before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce obtained by Lorenzo Llorente was
valid.
HELD:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the
same case, the Court ruled thataliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that
once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to
the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.
VOID MARRIAGES
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Lao and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were
married at the Manila Cathedral. Contrary to Gina’s expectations that the
newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with
each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on the side thereof,
then turned his back and went to sleep. They slept together in the same
room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the
annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina
alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm when erect).
ISSUE:
Does the refusal of private respondent to have sexual intercourse
with petitioner a ground of psychological incapacity?
RULING:
YES. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the
FC is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy
the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngco
 G.R. No. 168896, October 27, 2004
FACTS:
After 24 years of married life together, Manuel filed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity of his wife Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their
marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude
towards him; that she incessantly complained about almost everything
and anyone connected with him and anything not of her liking like the
physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with
other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the
prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial
Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around
the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less
about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose
before marriage.
ISSUE:
Is Juanita psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
NO. We have here a case of a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds
his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight rein on his wallet
“irritants” and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for
his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these
inadequacies of petitioner Juanita do not amount to psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. Whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case depends crucially on the
facts of the case
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO
FACTS:
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel were
married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on
11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their
own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named
Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life
together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that
all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely
volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about
almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly
parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the
physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with
other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the
prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial
Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around
the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less
about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose
before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation
from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is
permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it
will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity
of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent
and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or
respondent Manuel.
RULING:
No. Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag is apropos. There, we held
that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the
facts of the case.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown
that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his
ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent
Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a
marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem.
REPUBLIC vs. CA and MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985
in Manila. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
spends more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money and depended on his parents for financial aid and assistance.
When he lost his job Roridel became the family’s breadwiiner. Frequent
quarrels followed, which eventually resulted to their separation.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel
consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social
worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.
The trial court declared the marriage void. The CA, in affirming this
decision, ruled that "that the marriage between the parties broke up
because of their opposing and conflicting personalities.".
 The petitioner, Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be
construed as psychological incapacity.
HELD: The Supreme Court puts merit on the petition.
As the Court ruled in Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals in 1995,
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity . . . and to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.” The Court also stressed that
this psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated and must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Accordingly, in the present case, there is no clear showing that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more
of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. It was held that mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. There had been no showing of the
gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts. 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Arts. 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of

Art. 36 of the Family Code were laid down by the Court for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to

the plaintiff.

BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS

 G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they
had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material
support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court, in declaring the marriage null and void, found
Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children.
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had
not been established by the totality of the evidence presented.
Accordingly, there was no personal medical or psychological examination
conducted upon the appellant. The trail court’s conclusion was only based
on the testimony of the plaintiff. Hence, no sufficient evidence was
gathered that would show that he was indeed suffering from an
incapacity which was psychological or mental (not physical) to the extent
that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming and that
the incapacity was grave, had preceded the marriage and was incurable.
ISSUES:
1) Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the
respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
2) Whether the marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity. However, the totality of the evidence she
presented is not enough to show such incapacity. Psychological
incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. Hence, the Court did
not declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
The guidelines set forth by the Court in Santos vs CA (1995) and
Republic vs CA & Molina (1997) do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition.
Although the Court was convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to his family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. His behavior became apparent only
when he lost his job and failed to get a good one for a period of six years.
The Court further stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not
to be confused with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In this case, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, v. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA
 G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005
FACTS: Noel Buenaventura filed a petition to declare the marriage void on
the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
Buenaventura. The trial court ruled that (1) marriage entered into
between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
Buenaventura null and void ab initio; and (2) ordered the plaintiff to pay
defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of
this decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00. The award or moral
damages was based on the finding that Noel deceived the Isabel into
marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he
was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he
married her that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his
career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to
relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son,
Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work
such that in times cause Isabel to suffer mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the
parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
ISSUE/S:
(1) whether or not the facts surrounding the nullify of marriage constitute
a ground for the recovery of damages. (2)How will the properties be
divided/partitioned.
Ruling.
(1) No award for damages. The Court of Appeals and the trial court
considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or
inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as
grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize
acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the
control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages
on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage,
but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by
a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in
this case. For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that
one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must
assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis
for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private
respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a
willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral
damages was without basis in law and in fact.
(2) Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43
of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not
apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were
found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been
acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by
the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties
appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common
by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be
sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains.
MELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI BOBIS
GR No. 138509, July 31, 2000
FACTS: On 1985, Isagani contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, Isagani contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on Imelda's complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against Isagani. Sometime thereafter,
Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license constituting a prejudicial question to the bigamy case.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the fact that the first marriage was celebrated
without license validated the second marriage, hence a defense in bigamy
case.
HELD: No. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time
of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration
of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear
implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused,
to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the
first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because
there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which
are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the
first marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first
having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,
can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per
current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the
second marriage will also be void.[19] The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner.[20] Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of
the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated
above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to
defeat the criminal action against him.
Lucio Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, Feb. 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Berrete were married on August 30, 1990 in
Bohol. Sometime in 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada and
left Lucio behind. On August 19,1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a
petition for divorce against Lucio which was granted on January 17, 1992
and took effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, Lucio married
Maria Lumbago. Lucio then filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. Lucio was, however, charged with bigamy.
The trial court discounted his claim that his first marriage to Lucia was
null and void ab initio. It further held that want of a valid ceremony is not
a defense in a charge of bigamy. Froilan filed an appeal with the CA.
While the same was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision on the civil case declaring the marriage between
Lucio and Lucia void ab initio. The appellate court, however, affirmed the
judgment of conviction ratiocinating that what the RPC seeks to punish is
the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage has
been dissolved. It held that the fact the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case. San Beda College of Law
CIVIL LAW REVIEW – FAMILY CODE 21 4S 2014-2015 Both the trial court
and CA ruled that the divorce obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court
could not be accorded validity as it was contrary to public policy.
ISSUE:
Is Morigo guilty of bigamy?
RULING: NO.
First, in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of
bigamy thus: a. the offender has been legally married; b. the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead; c. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and d. the subsequent
marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
Second, the mere private act of singing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage. The trial court found that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The
first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Berrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak
of.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from
Mercado v. Tan where it was held that a judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage
was actually solemnized not just one, but twice: first before a judge
where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months
later before a priest in religious rites. In the instant case, however, no
marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer.
OFELIA GOMEZ v. LIPANA
G.R. No. L-23214, 30 June 1970
Facts:
The defendant-appelant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages:
the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra
Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the seocond marriage, the first
was still subsisting, whcih fact,however, Lipana concealed from the
second wife. On December 17, 1943, the spouse of the second marriage
acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubai, Quezon city, for the price
of P3,000.00. The Torrens Title for the property was issued in the name of
“Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez”. Isidra Gomez died intestate
and childless, survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. Ofelia
Gomez, judicial administrator of her estate, commenced the present suit,
praying for the
forfeiture of the husband’s share in the Cubao property in favor of the sid
estate. Reliance was placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil code, the
Spanish text of which provides:
La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al
ser declarado nulo. El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la
nulidad, no tendra parte en los bienes gananciales.
The society of joint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or
on having been declared void, The conjuge that for his bad faith will
havebeen a cause of the nullity, will not have part in the community
properties.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and
that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the
aforecited provision and declared his interest in the disputed property
forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the
aforecited provision and declared his interest in the disputed property
forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
ISSUES:
1. Can the validity of a marriage be attacked collaterally?
2. Is Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code applicable in this case?
Ruling:
1. YES. There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to
Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married
Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the
conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party
invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the
defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever
having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the
second marriage less than seven years after the first, and he has not
shown that his first wife was then generally considered dead or was
believed by him to be so.
2. YES. The conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial
declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after the
dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the
Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.
Even though the said provision was no longer in force, it is still presumed
with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the
marriage nor the conjugal partnership never existed, and hence such
spouse has no right to share in the conjugal properties; but this legal
effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is
still in force, and in any event is
of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice
of the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal
partnershipformed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the
husband during its
existence. The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the
other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
G.R. NO. 133778, March 14, 2000
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie,
petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter
died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating
that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing
the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977.
After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for
lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration
of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death?
RULING: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted
an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because
from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito
and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is
still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the
parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
VILLANUEVA vs. CA
G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa,
Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a
petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence
and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that
he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that
private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. Lilia
prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for
almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her
after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.
ISSUE: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent.
RULING: No. It was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less
than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step
to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction
evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed
by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would
bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the
criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him. The
Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his
person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he
was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a
bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the
proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. Also, appellant cannot
claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se,
not a ground to annul a marriage.
Leouel Santos vs CA
GR 112019 06/04/1995
FACTS: Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's
parents into the young spouses family affairs, the couple would start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents. Julia finally left for the U.S.A. to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. He desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to
get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint
for "Voiding of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code"
ISSUE: whether or not there is psychological incapacity
RULING: Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the
very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated
to enter into married life. Petitioner is NOT correct. Psychological
incapacity refers to causes of psychological nature being unable to
assume the essential marital obligations. There is NONE in the instant
case. Article 36 is confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. If ever the marriage is to be
declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the
person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact
deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage.
Republic vs CA, Molina
GR 108763 02/13/1997
FACTS: Rodriel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo. She alleged that Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with her in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that when Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila,
since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; and that
finally the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged.
ISSUE: whether or not there is psychological incapacity
RULING: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability. There is no clear showing to us
that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
Lucia Hernandez vs. CA and Mario C. Hernandez, G.R. No. 126010,
December 8, 1999
Facts: On January 1, 1981, petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and
private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married. They had three
children namely, Mae, Lyra and Marian. Petitioner filed before the RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City, on July 10, 1992, a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that, her husband failed
to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in
drinking sprees from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing
of the suit. She also claimed that, after they were married, her husband
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child,
while having affairs with different women. And he (her husband)
endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible
disease (STD). Petitioner prayed that she must be given support for their
three children from private respondent; that she be awarded the custody
of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel
of land in Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep used
by private respondent when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.
The trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was
collusion between the parties. Said prosecutor found no evidence of
collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial. The trial court
dismissed said petition for annulment of marriage. The Court of Appeals
held that no evidence was presented to show that private respondent
was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of petitioner Lucita Hernandez and
private respondent Mario Hernandez should be annulled on the ground
of private respondent’s psychological incapacity.
Ruling: The Court ruled in negative. Art. 36 of the Family Code states that
“A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” As pointed out
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests
upon petitioner.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the
fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering
from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities .It was not satisfactorily proved that private respondent
was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical.
Dedel vs. CA, 421 SCRA 461
Facts: On September 28, 1966, petitioner David B. Dedel and respondent
Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel (Sharon Dedel for brevity) got married before the
City Court of Pasay. On May 20, 1967, the civil marriage was ratified in a
church wedding. They had four children, namely: Beverly Jane, Stephanie
Janice, Kenneth David and Ingrid. Nonetheless, the conjugal partnership,
acquired neither property nor debt. Petitioner averred that during the
marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife
and mother, had extra-marital affairs with several men, and one of them
was a Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim (Ibrahim for brevity).
Sharon was once confirmed for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not
stop her illicit relationship with the Ibrahim, whom she married and with
whom she had two children. However, when Ibrahim left the country,
Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by
Ibrahim. On December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join
Ibrahim with their children. Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions. Petitioner filed on April 1, 1997, a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity before the RTC Makati City, Branch 149. Petitioner presented
Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of Sharon and declared that she was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder. Such disorder amounted to psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. After trial, judgment was
rendered by court in affirmative. The Court of Appeals recalled and set
aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding that private respondent Sharon Dedel is psychologically
incapacitated.
Ruling: The Court ruled in negative. In this case, respondent’s sexual
infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to the
extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It
appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity. The Court found no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of
the appellate court. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this
case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem. While the Court sympathized with petitioner’s
marital predicament, its first and foremost duty is to apply the law no
matter how harsh it may be.
JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004
FACTS:
Adriana alleged that she and Jose were married; out of said
marriage, they begot one son; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage when he
frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible
activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; she
was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties;
said agreement was approved by the RTC of Makati City; they had long
been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of
their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana
prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void
but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child. The trial
court then set the case for hearing. Adriana testified that her marriage
with Jose was because Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a
living and instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars;
that she was also the one spending for their child. No evidence was
presented regarding the amount of support needed by John Paul or the
capacity of Jose to give support. Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-
Open on the ground that she was able to secure additional new evidence
which were significant, material and indispensable. The trial court
granted the motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the
reception of additional evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence
the Marriage Contract between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another
Marriage Contract between Jose and one Evan Lock showing that Jose
had been married twice before he married Adriana. The Trial Court
declared their marriage void and ordered Lam to pay child support of
20,000 a month. This was contested by Lam stating that a common fund
was agreed upon wherein they would both contribute 250,000 each for
the support of their child. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void
for being bigamous in nature?
(2) Whether or not the 20,000 pesos monthly support is justified?
HELD :
(1) Yes. Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between Adriana and Jose for being bigamous is concerned, the decision
rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having been
issued beyond its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not
assail the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion
for reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. Jose is estopped
from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana.
(2) No. It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of
support on the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove
the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family
Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.
In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana
regarding her claim for support of the child is her testimony. Such
testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the
amount that the parents are reasonably able to give.
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
[G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006]
FACTS:
Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the RTC seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara
under the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a
decision upon the finding that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant
evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking. The appeal filed
with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution for failure
of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period. After the decision attained finality, petitioner filed
another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC, this
time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to
the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her
part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss, praying for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping. RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence this petition, the
petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the
same the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause
of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of
action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they
were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were
different. Petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second
petition. Petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on
forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of
action. On the other hand, respondent, in her comment, counters that
while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves
the same issue raised that is the validity of petitioner and respondent’s
marriage, and prays for the same remedy and the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the
rule on forum shopping and that petitioner violated the rule on
multiplicity of suits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to
the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family
Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being
impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code?
HELD :
No. The concept of res judicata prohibits this. Res judicata is a bar
due to prior judgment. Petitioner forgets that he is simply invoking
different grounds for the same cause of action. In both petitions,
petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to respondent. The same relief is sought which is the nullification of
marriage for a different ground. Furthermore, the instant case is
premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid
celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage
license. However, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had
been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is
now bound by this admission. This admission prevents him from taking a
different stand in the present case where he claims otherwise. The court
does not favor those who present their claims in pieces on different
action.
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO
FACTS:
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel were
married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on
11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their
own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named
Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life
together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that
all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely
volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about
almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly
parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the
physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with
other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the
prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial
Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around
the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less
about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose
before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation
from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is
permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it
will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity
of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent
and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or
respondent Manuel.
RULING:
No. Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag is apropos. There, we held
that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the
facts of the case.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown
that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his
ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent
Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a
marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem.
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR. vs. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they got
married, both in civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting their
first child. Since petitioner was still a medical student, while respondent
was a student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioner’s parents, on whom
they were financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four
children.
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didn’t
have time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him even
before marriage when he could not give her the things she wanted. He
added that she was not supportive of his career. Even marriage
counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she
refused to have sex with him and even told him to look for other women.
He filed the petition for nullification of their marriage when he found out
their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by a man whom
respondent hired to follow him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity
RULING:
No. The marriage subsists.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals, we
categorically said that psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. These include the obligations
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the intention of the law is to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In the present case, the spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s
refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not
constitute psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and
respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage,
which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations,9 it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness10 existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of
the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He
asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage
was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As manifestations of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things.
Both petitioner and respondent presented the testimonies of doctors to
support their own claims.
Issue: Whether or not Antonio can invoke Article 36 of the Family Code to
declare their marriage null and void.
Ruling: We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.
She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient
to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It
is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent's psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
Petitioner's witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent's
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her
mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent's
inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would
similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to
reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article
68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted
by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by
the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail
totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the
assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its
attention. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which
held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the
incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established
by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact
that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability
as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently
convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to
the degree that annulment was warranted.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
Facts: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.||
Issue: 1) Whether or not the requirements in Molina and Santos do not
apply here because the present case involves a “mixed marriage,” the
husband being a Japanese national. 2) Whether or not respondent
successfully proved Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Ruling: 1) We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence,
the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to
any person regardless of nationality.||| (Republic v. Quintero-Hamano,
G.R. No. 149498, [May 20, 2004])
2) Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care
for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his
marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he
never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to
see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind
of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule,
there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an
instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned
his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage.
As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that
he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
LANDICHO V. RELOVA, 22 SCRA 731
G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968
FACTS: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge,
with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that
petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which
marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes
Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe
Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and
void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation
allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous
character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a
third- party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira
Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said
third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by
means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear
and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati,
Rizal.
ISSUE: Is the civil case filed a prejudicial question? themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
HELD: Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal
liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in
issue. "The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages
entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial DONATO v. LUNA, 160 SCRA 441
questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988
suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of
marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
FACTS: A case for bigamy was filed by Paz Abayan against petitioner
the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage
Leonilo Donato .Before the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28,
must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and
1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner on the
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
ground that Paz married Donato since she had no previous knowledge
bigamy.
that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping. Donato
defensed that his second marriage with Paz was void since it was
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage
intimidation and undue influence were employed by the latter to obtain
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was
his consent to the marriage.
the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on
the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that
ISSUE/S: Is the civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the
petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint
juvenile and domestic relations court a prejudicial question to the
against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
criminal case for bigamy?
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation.
Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by HELD: NO. Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial
petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered
case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was
proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by
means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order
of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
sustained.
Wegel vs Sempio-Dy
143 SCRA 499
ISSUE: WON it is necessary for plaintiff to prove that her first marriage
was vitiated with force .
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that it was not necessary for Lilia to
prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be
void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she
is still validly married to her first husband. Her marriage to Karl is void.
There is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for
then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he
can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void
under the law.

FACTS: Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his with
etitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia, while admitting the existence of
said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and
void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly
forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue
agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage
(assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said
Domingo vs CA
prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of
the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to
226 scra 572
present evidence: (1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both her and the first husband; and (2) that the first FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a
husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
someone else. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married
evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage
first marriage had already been agreed upon.
when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she
came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she
discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The
latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the
declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the
other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not
for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUES: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be
filed for purposes of remarriage.
RULING: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for
purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection
of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her
partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said
person is freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s
prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be
separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them
Beltran vs. People
GR. No.137567; June 20, 2000
FACTS:
In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. They’ve
had 4 children since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an
action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felix’s PI.
Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a
certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran.
In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and
Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts
hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not
be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied
Beltran’s petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal.
Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of
concubinage.
RULING:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the
case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter
pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only
that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.”
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the
criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void,
suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Mercado vs. Tan
GR No. 137110; August 1, 2000
FACTS:
In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But
in June 1991, Mercado married a second time. He married a certain
Consuelo Tan.
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.
In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with
Oliva be declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code
(psychological incapacity).
In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy
against Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio.
Mercado now sought the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him.
He contended that since his first marriage was declared void ab initio,
there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his “second” marriage
with Tan was actually his first marriage.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
RULING:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: "Article 40. The
absolute nullity of a previous, , marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage
void."
A declaration of nullity of marriage is now necessary before one
can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, one may be
charged with and convicted of bigamy. Such declaration is also necessary
even if the earlier marriage is characterized by statute "void."
In the case at bar, Mercado was already married to Tan but did
not file a declaration of nullity of marriage with Oliva until Tan filed
bigamy case. The crime had already been consummated by then. To file a
petition to have his first marriage void after Tan charged him with bigamy
is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
REPUBLIC VS NOLASCO G.R. No. 94053 MARCH 17, 1993
FACTS: Respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court
a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The Republic of the
Philippines opposed the petition based on the argument that Nolasco did
not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse that the spouse
has already been dead and second, Nolasco’s attempt to have his
marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a ―cunning attempt‖ to
circumvent the law on marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement of well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead has been satisfied?
RULING: No, in the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet
Monica Parker’s whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When
arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica’s departure,
instead of seeking the help of local authorities or the British Embassy, he
secured another seaman’s contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. Neither can the Court
give credence to respondents bare assertions that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts considering that respondent did not
identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that
since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good
evidence. But this kind of evidence by its nature cannot be rebutted. In
any case admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. As noted before
there has been serious doubts to respondent’s credibility. Moreover,
even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that
the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintance
ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO, G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio died intestate survived by his wife, Marietta
Calisterio. The deceased was the second husband of herein respondent
Marietta Calisterio who had been married to James William Bounds. The
latter disappeared without a trace on February 11, 1947 while Marietta
married Teodorico eleven (11) year after on May 9, 1958 without
Marietta securing a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
Herein petitioner, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional
Trial Court a petition claiming to be the surviving heir of Teodorico as well
as praying that the latter’s marriage with Marietta to be declared null and
void. Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the sister. The Court of Appeals
reversed such decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a second marriage contracted during the time
when the Civil Code was the controlling law should be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
death?
RULING: Yes. The court held that the second marriage in this case is valid.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta
was solemnized on May 8, 1958. The law in force at that time was the
Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on August 3, 1988.
Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance
only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Verily, the
applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the
New Civil Code (See Civil Code.) A judicial declaration of absence of the
absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed
valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that
the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of
the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there
is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in
relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first
husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for
more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in
1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage,
having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus
be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds.
MANUEL VS. PEOPLE
476 SCRA 461
FACTS: On July 28, 1975, Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaa before
Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati. Manuel went to Baguio City to visit the
private complainant, Tina B. Gandalera, whom he met in January 1996.
Eventually, despite Gandalera’s resistance, Manuel succeeded in having
his way with her. Manuel proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring her that he was single. They were married on April 22, 1996. It
appeared in their marriage contract that Manuel was single. The couple
was happy during the first three years of their married life. However, in
January 2001, Manuel left and stopped giving financial support. In August
2001, Gandalera made inquiries from the National Statistics Office where
she learned that Manuel had been previously married. Manuel testified
that he informed Gandalera of his previous marriage to Gaa, but she still
agreed to marry him. He declared he was single in his marriage contract
with Gandalera because he believed in good faith that his first marriage
was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Gandalera. Further, he
claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Gaa was charged with
estafa in 1975. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her
again. He insisted that he married Gandalera, believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Gaa for
more than 20 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the period of absence of Gaa can be a basis of
honest belief on the part of Manuel that his first spouse is already dead.
RULING: No, a spouse cannot assume that his/her first spouse is already
dead without procuring a declaration of presumptive death from the
court. Article 41 of the Family Code reads:
“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.”
Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage,
he/she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the
effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
Manuel failed to discharge his burden to prove that when he married
Gandalera, he was of the well-grounded belief that Gaa was already dead,
as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years. He must have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife. This would constitute proof that he
acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he
married Gandalera and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of
bigamy.
MORIGO VS. PEOPLE
422 SCRA 376

FACTS: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Bohol from 1974-1978. After
school year 1977-1978, Morigo and Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Morigo received a card from Barrete. After an exchange of
letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Barrete returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication. When Barrete came back to the
Philippines in 1990, she proposed to petition Morigo to join her in
Canada. They married each other on August 30, 1990. Few days after,
Barrete reported back to work, leaving Morigo behind. On August 19,
1991, Barrete filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court and took effect
on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The
complaint sought the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with
Barrete, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, Morigo was charged with Bigamy. He moved for
suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Barrete posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When
arraigned in the bigamy case, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued. The trial court, in convicting the petitioner, discounted
petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Barrete was null and
void ab initio. It ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again. On October 23, 1997, the trial
court declared the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since
no marriage ceremony actually took place.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy in view of the
prior declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
RULING: Lucio Morigo is not criminally liable for Bigamy. For the accused
to be held liable for the said crime, the law requires that he/she must
have been legally married. In the instant case, Lucio Morigo was never
married to Lucia Barrete. No marriage ceremony at all was performed by
a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Morigo and Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
TENEBRO VS. CA (G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004)
FACTS: Petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together
continuously and without interruption until twhen Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between
him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
Petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required
Tenebro, was indeed her husband. license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-
lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
Petitioner waw convicted for bigamy. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration
ISSUE: Whether or not void subsequent marriage may still declare the of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
petitioner not liable for bigamy. concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal
RULING: Yes. effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that
petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during liability for bigamy
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was
celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first
marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our
mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy
is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage
are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract
between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the
permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this case,
all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age,
 SUSAN NICDAO CARINO VS. SUSAN YEE-CARINO
(G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001)
FACTS: SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. The first was
on June 20, 1969 with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he
begot two (2) children, while the second, was on November 10, 1992,
with respondent Susan Yee Cariño, during the subsistence of the first
marriage, with whom he had no issue. When SPO4 Santiago Carino died
in 1988 petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance from various government agencies. Petitioner was
able to collect from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig
a total of P146,000, while respondent collected from GSIS and SSS the
total amount of P21,000. On December 14, 1993, respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87 an action for
collection against the respondent to recover half the amount collected by
petitioner. Respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage with petitioner and presented evidence that the same
was contracted without the necessary marriage license. RTC Quezon City
ruled in favor of respondent. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the first marriage is valid?
2. Whether or not the nullity of the previous marriage validates
the second marriage?
RULING: 1. NO. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the
marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. It is beyond
cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. However, Nicdao is
entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage
is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each
other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to
the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is
governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they
earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally
contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by
each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.
2. NO. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to
the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due
to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money, etc. owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and
salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art.
148 of FC).

OFELIA P. TY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES
G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS: In 1977, respondent married Anna Villanueva. Said marriage was
declared void for lack of marriage license in 1980. Before such
declaration, respondent wed petitioner in 1979. In 1991, respondent filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner stating
that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage
to Anna Maria had not been issued.
ISSUE/S: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required
before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly.
HELD: No. Since the first marriage of private respondent is void for lack of
license and consent, there is no need for judicial declaration of its nullity
before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code
has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the
present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the
children is patent.
FACTS: Sarao and Guevarra got married in 1932. In the afternoon,
plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge with defendant but he was asked
to wait for the evening. That night, he proceeded but though he found
the orifice of the defendant sufficiently large for his organ, she
complained of pains in her private parts. He also noticed that something
was oozing therefrom with an offensive smell. Upon the advice of a
physician, defendant submitted to a operation as she had a tumor which
infected her uterus and ovaries. With the consent of plaintiff, her uterus
and ovaries were removed thereby making her incapable to procreate but
not to copulate. Plaintiff now comes before the courts to have his
marriage annulled on the ground in impotency.
ISSUE/S: May the marriage be annulled on the ground of incompetency?
HELD: No. US law generally held that the meaning of impotency is not the
ability to procreate but the inability to copulate. It is thus a defect of
copulation and not of reproduction. Barrenness will not invalidate the
marriage. In this case, defendant is not impotent. The operation made
her sterile but by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse. It was
due to plaintiff’s own voluntary desistance, memory of first unpleasant
experience that made him give up the idea of again having carnal
knowledge with her even after she had already been rid of her disease.
Buccat v. Buccat
72 Phil 19
FACTS:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938,
became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26 of the same
year. On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9
months pregnant, gave birth to a son. As a result of this event, Godoredo
left the Luida and never returned to married life with her. The following
year, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that
when he agreed to marry Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
ISSUE:
WON Luida’s concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for the
annulment of marriage (fraud)
RULING:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a
sacred institution in which the State is interested. In this case, the court
did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy
constituting a ground for annulment; it was unlikely that Godofredo, a
first year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy when they
got married. The allegation that it is not rare to find persons with
developed abdomens, seems to us childish to deserve our consideration,
all the more that the plaintiff is a first-year student of law. SC affirmed
the lower court’s decision.
Aquino v. Delizo
109 Phil 21
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed
petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent
Conchita Delizo. The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September
6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other
things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of
her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on
December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter the fact that she was
pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer,
defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Was there fraud (concealment of pregnancy) which renders the marriage
voidable?
RULING:
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par.
(4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil.,
19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action
for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim
that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to
be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage.
That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the
defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant
at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared
to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was
"naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical
authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation annulment of marriages by default. He further contends that when he
on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as
height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more to the reason for his non-appearance as provided for in Arts 48 and 60 of
general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122.) If, as claimed the FC.
by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected
to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time ISSUE: Whether or not the non-intervention of the prosecuting attorney
of their marriage, more so because she must have attempted to conceal is fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court
the true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the
HELD: The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of
woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
Arts 48 and 60 of the FC. For one, petitioner was not declared in default
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33 % at five
by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer and
months and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc.
actively participated in the proceedings by filing several pleadings and
Pregnancy, p. 10.).
cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent . It is clear then that
that every stage of litigation was characterized by no-holds barred
contest and not by collusion. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to
TUASON vs. CA
determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care
GR No. 116607, April 10, 1996
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusions that
FACTS: Private respondent Maria Victoria Tuason filed with the RTC a
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the
petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to
petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
petitioner Emilio Tuason on the ground of psychological incapacity. After
parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-
private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the
intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between
reception of petitioner’s evidence but the latter failed to appear at the
the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
scheduled hearings. On oral motion of private respondent, the court
trial court.
declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and
deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
presented. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage null
and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
the defendant. CA affirmed the order of the trial court. Petitioner cites
the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage CORPUS vs. ORCHOTORENA
and legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the AM No RTJ-04-1861, July 30, 2004
state because the law looks with disfavour upon haphazard declaration of
FACTS: Mr. Macias, incumbent presiding judge of RTC Zamboanga Del
Norte, filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Mrs. Macias. The case was raffled to respondent’s court. Upon
learning of the publication of summons, Mrs. Macias within the 30-day
period, filed a motion to dismiss. However, instead of first acting upon
the motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits on April
19, 2001, or one day before the scheduled hearing for the motion to
dismiss. On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the motion to
dismiss and re-set the hearing on the merits. After the scheduled hearings
the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case
submitted for decision. While Mrs. Macias opposed the hearing on the
merits, respondent proceeded with the hearing without resolving the
other motions and manifestations. For this reason, Mrs. Macias filed the
instant complaint before the OCA alleging deprivation of her right to due
process. Respondent judge, however, argues that Mrs. Macias was given
the opportunity to be heard and points out that the records of the case
would show that the proceedings were done in good faith and based on
law and jurisprudence.
it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. Thus, the report of the
Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to
go in the case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural issue. While the
records show that the public prosecutor had filed a certification with the
respondent judge’s court, stating, that he appeared in behalf of the
Solicitor General during ex-parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence, and
that he had no objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage, such certification does not suffice to comply with the
mandatory requirement that the court should order the investigating
prosecutor too determine whether a collusion exists between the parties.
Such directive must be made by the court before trial could proceed, not
after the trial on the merits of the case had already been had. Notably,
said certification was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the
termination of the case. Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that
the respondent judge violated Mrs. Macias right to due process when he
completely ignored the pertinent rules.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent judge violated Mrs. Macia’s right to

due process

HELD: This case is a classic example of railroading or procedural short cut.

Even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the
period had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct
a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default
proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage. Under
Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, if the defending party
in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties
exists, if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to
 127. Cervantes vs Fajardo
Facts:
This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the
person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and
wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister
and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and
Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when
she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption
of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina
Carreon. Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein
petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00,
otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede
to the demand. While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina
Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence in
Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her
mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house in
Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but
Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child
for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had
executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners
that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid
the amount of P150,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not the natural parents or adoptive parents have
custody over Angelie Cervantes?
Held:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother
shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply
where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 5 In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from
this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with
the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open
cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an
upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had
previously given birth to another child by another married man with
whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and
vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a
sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral
outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who
are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and
socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better
than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is
not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man,
can most likely give her.
 128. Republic vs Iyoy
Facts:
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each
other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, in the same year
she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985,
Crasus learned that Fely married an American and had a child. Fely went
back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the
marriage of one of her children in which she used her husband’s last
name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging
that Fely’s acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were
manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his
testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract,
and the invitation where Fely used her new husband’s last name as
evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard,
womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was already an American
citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue: (1) Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity?
(2) Whether or not Art. 26 Par. 2 Applies
Held:
1.The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish
psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.”
Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”
2. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact
date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before
the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had
been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce,
Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus.
 129. Espiritu vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met
in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital.
Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began
to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986,
their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief
vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon
their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and
given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to
separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went
back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines,
but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was
sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with
his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided
to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children,
thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the father or mother would be qualified to take
care and custody of the child?
Held:
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not
a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the
age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age,
the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is
given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child,
and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. We laid down
the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and
moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents"; and
where custody of the minor was given to a non-relative as against the
mother, then the country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained
its basis in this manner: . . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent
to the custody of her child. Courts must not lose sight of the basic
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount", and that
for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered
separated from the mother (do.).
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons." If a child is
over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by
that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit
and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it
deems fit under the circumstances.
130. MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children
REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO. Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
Topic Support Pendente Lite
Facts: On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in
behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration
of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente
lite with the RTC Makati5
which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also
owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in
different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of
Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad. It
having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial
means to support his granddaughters' education, he, in lieu of petitioner
and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.

Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the
latter’s father, Francisco, for general support and for the payment of the
required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted
efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with
respondent Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally
known to be financially well-off

Issue: Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for

her granddaughter’s educational support.

Ruling: here being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and
respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children's
college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to
furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under
Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents. It bears stressing that
respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and
manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged
in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the majority
stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping
 131. ANAYA V. PALAROAN G.R. No. L-27930; November 26, 1970 marriage. While a woman may detest such nondisclosure of premarital
lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to
Facts: the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her
consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that
institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the
1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the
same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court
of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was
rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of
Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the
counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando
had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-
divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part
of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently
doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced . . . frank disclosure
of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from
going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted
`FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of
Article 85 of the Civil Code" (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for
the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his

premarital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage?

Ruling: No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with

another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would
constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a
 132. JUANARIA FRANCISCO vs. LOPE TAYAO G.R. No. L-26435
Facts: Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant,
contracted marriage in the City of Manila in 1912. They separated in
1917. The husband then removed to Zamboanga. There he was later
prosecuted for having committed adultery with a married woman named
Bernardina Medrano, wife of Ambrosio Torres, at whose instance the
criminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that proceeding,
Lope Tayao, together with his coaccused Bernardina Medrano, was
sentenced by the late Judge Ponciano Reyes to suffer three years, six
months, and twenty-one days imprisonment prision correccional, and to
pay the costs.
the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal
action"—that is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final
sentence in a criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband. Act No. 2716, amendatory of
article 437 of the Penal Code, adds nothing to the Divorce Law except as
it clarifies the meaning of concubinage. The undeniable fact remains that
the defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of
adultery and not the crime of concubinage. The criminal case was
instituted on the complaint of the injured husband. It was not instituted
by the injured wife which is essential for the proper initiation of a
prosecution for concubinage.

On these facts, the action of Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, against

Lope Tayao, the defendant, to have the bonds of matrimony between
them dissolved was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and
was there denied by Judge of First Instance Revilla. The trial judge based
his decision principally on the point that the plaintiff was not an innocent
spouse within the meaning of sections 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law. This
finding, as well as the dismissal of the complaint, is challenged by the
plaintiff on appeal.

Issue:Whether or not a wife can secure a divorce from the husband when
the latter has been convicted of adultery and not concubinage

Ruling: No. The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, is emphatically
clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce can
only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the
part of the husband . . . ." Note well the adverb "only" and the
conjunctive "or." The same thought is again emphasized in section 3 of
the Divorce Law which provides that "The divorce may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. . . . " Later on
comes section 8 providing that "A divorce shall not be granted without
 133. FROILAN GANDIONCO VS HON SEMEN PENAFRANDA
GR NO 79284
NOVEMBER 27, 1987
FACTS:
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the
petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th
Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by
respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on
the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of
damages. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the
Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner
for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional
remedy of supportpendente lite,pending a decision in the action for legal
separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal
separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December
1986, ordered The payment of supportpendente lite. On the other hand,
petitioner contends that hat the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente
lite, should be suspended in view of the ciminal case for concubinage filed
against him the private respondent. Lastly, he also contends that his
conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action
for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for
legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
RULING:
1. In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is
one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal
consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification
from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged."
2. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a civil action for legal separation and the

incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente
lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage.

2. Whether or not conviction for concubinage should be first

secured before action for legl separation will prosper.
 134. ONG VS ONG Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal,
G.R. No. 153206 especially when they are borne out by the records or are based on
October 23, 2006 substantial evidence.In this case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by
the CA and are adequately supported by the records.

FACTS: Lastly, the Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the
assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment
Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 They have three children: of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals
Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of
majority. Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55
par. (1) of the Family Code4before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
William, on the other hand, contends that Lucita only filed such
complaintbe able to acquire properties in the conjugal partnership of
gains.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of appelas committed an error of law in

disregarding clear evidence repudiating private respondent's claim of
repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct on the part of
petitioner

RULING:

It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a

petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds
more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of
the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the
facts as determined by the lower courts.
 135. REPUBIC VS IYOY
G.R. No. 152577
September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. They had five children. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was
hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. Fely left the conjugal home and
decided to reside in America where she celebrated another marriage with
an American citizen after securing divorce papers in the Philippines.
Twelve years later, Crasus filed an actoin for the annulemnt of Marriage
by reason of psychological incapacity of his wife. He also contends that
because of the previous divorce decree secured Fely, it is just justifiable
to annul their marriage in the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Fely is psychologically incapacitated to perform
marital obligations in the marriage
2. Whether or not the Art 26 paragaraph 2 of the Family code is
applicable in the case
RULING:
1. As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases,
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that
hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her
hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent
Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may indeed be
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the
root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is
serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time
of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
2. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was
not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC
that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she
left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely wa still
a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then
and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
 136. Gines vs. Bugayong, 100 Phil 616 137.
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong , was married to defendant Leonila Ginez.
Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters.
Leonila left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by
letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan, from
which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study college there.
Benjamin began receiving letters from plaintiff's sister-in-law and some
from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his
wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the
night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin
Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he
received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of
answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her.
further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their
house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other
meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between
them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the
husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We
agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above
narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as
alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the
offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of
Article 100 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether there was condonation on the part of the innocent

spouse which deprives him to file a legal separation case.

Held:

A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband,

especially those portions quoted above, clearly shows that there was a
condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank
infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife.
Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to
adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected
between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to
come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented
to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together
they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the
 137. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177 138. the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
— actio personalis moritur cum persona. As to the petition of respondent-
Facts: appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to
Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on 21
continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result
lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her
of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and
husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired
determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by
properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband
the heirs of the appellant. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not
cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the
been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would
Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his
first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when
share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio alleged affirmative and
she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment
special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money
became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had
and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab
died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that
initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior
the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any
and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any
customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
Issue: marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised
When an action for legal separation is converted by the Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the
death of a party abate the proceedings?

Held:

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than

the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil
Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only
the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation,
stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that
 138. Cervantes vs. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79965, January 27, 1989
Facts:
It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to
respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina
Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida
Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and
custody of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit
of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also
executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. The adoptive
parents, herein petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a
letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners
refused to accede to the demand.
physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and
giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein
respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an
illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents
over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse
of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority
over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting
parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

Issue:

Who has a better right over the custody of the child?

Held:

It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally

married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his
relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will
not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and
develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent
Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another
married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who
eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C.
Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father,
could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the
other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally,
 139. Espiritu vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding
first met sometime in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the
National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a
local hospital. They both went abroad to work and there maintained a
common law relationship. They finally got married while they were on a
brief vacation in the Philippines. They had two (2) children, Rosalind and
Reginald. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided
to separate. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his
sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita claims that
she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a
criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid being arrested.
Meanwhile, she decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody
over the children.
a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to
show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family
Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of
attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend. Their
choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the
record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the
two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no
longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the
presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two
years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are
compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to
the mother.

Issue: Should the custody of the children be given to Teresita?

Ruling: NO. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child,
courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is
over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by
that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit
and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it
deems fit under the circumstances. Both Rosalind and Reginald are over 7
years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong,
ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be
better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and
 140 Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916 separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so
Facts: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling
respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as
Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it
petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded
her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept
on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting
injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled
in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her
husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue
of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent.
Goitia filed motion for review.

Issue: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her
outside the conjugal home.

Ruling: The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the
husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on
the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural
and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is
of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him
to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is
not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in
the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign.
This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace
and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands
upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
141. Arroyo vs. Vasquez G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921 which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is,
without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
Facts: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to
for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the return. Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both
intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores
initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without
live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had been sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return.
compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and
thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, a
liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of
the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations within. Thus, the judge gave
judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home
was with sufficient justification.

Ruling: Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is

not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled,
an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process
of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof;
and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the
policy of the practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable
to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile,
 142. VALDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS (LAGON) alleged conjugal property was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail
266 SCRA 324 when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the property is
FACTS: Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina de Leon Valdez owned a parcel of registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to
land in Sultan Kudarat. Carlos died intestate and was survived by Josefina when the property was acquired by the same spouse, this is an indication
and their children. A year after, Josefina caused the partition of the land that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse (Josefina).
into 8 divisions, selling one portion to Jose Lagon. Subsequently, 2 more
divisions were sold to Lagon with a condition. However, the condition was
not incorporated in the deed and there was a miscalculation in the
amount of the purchase price – resulting in the non-payment of the
balance. The condition was not met by Lagon. Meanwhile, the TCTs of the
8 parcels of land were still named under “Josefina Valdez, married to
Carlos Valdez, Sr.” Subsequently, Josefina and her children executed a
deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Carlos Valdez, Sr.
wherein all the children waived their rights over the estate in favor of
Josefina. A number of years have passed, Lagon still hasn’t complied with
the condition and the payment of the balance. It was only when an
interested purchaser in the parcel of land acquired by Lagon, did he
demand from Josefina the TCTs. Josefina refused due to the non-
compliance of the condition. She even bargained to lower the remaining
balance to be paid by Lagon, but Lagon refused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is the exclusive property of

Josefina de Leon Valdez.

RULING: YES. the title covering the property was issued on August 1967,
during the marriage of Sps. Carlos Valdez, Sr. and petitioner Josefina,
under the name “Josefina Valdez, married to Carlos Valdez, Sr.” The
issuance of the title in the name solely of one spouse is not determinative
of the conjugal nature of the property, since there was no showing that
the property was purchased during the marriage. The presumption under
the law is that the property acquired during the marriage is conjugal.
However, this does not apply when there is no showing as to when the
 143. AGAPAY vs. PALANG for being done between persons guilty of concubinage at the time of the
276 SCRA 341 donation.

FACTS: Miguel Palang married Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left for

Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child, Herminia, was
born on May 1950. Miguel attempted to obtain a divorce decree in
Hawaii. When he went back for good on 1972, he refused to live with
Carlina. Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with Erlinda Agapay
(19 y/o). Two months prior, they “jointly” purchased an agricultural land,
and a house and lot. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation involving their conjugal property to Herminia. Miguel
and Erlinda produced a son. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage,
two years later, Miguel died.

ISSUE: Whether or not the agricultural land and house and lot purchased
by Miguel and Erlinda should be awarded to Carlina.

RULING: Yes. The sale of the agricultural land was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage being void, the properties
acquired by them through actual joint contribution shall be owned by
both in proportion to their contributions. If actual contribution is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares. There having been no proof of contribution by Erlinda, the
agricultural land should revert to the conjugal property of Miguel and
Carlina. (Erlinda was onyl 19 y/o at the time of the subsequent marriage.
She had no sufficient source of income to contribute for the properties
jointly purchased.)

The house and lot should also revert to the conjugal property of Miguel
and Carlina. There was testimonial evidence which shows that Miguel
provided for the money for the sale, and directing Erlinda’s name alone to
be placed as the buyer, thereby forming a donation. Such donation is void
 144. Harding vs. Comercial Union Assurance, 38 Phul 464
Facts: In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for a car insurance for a
Studebaker she received as a gift from her husband. She was assisted by
Smith, Bell and Co which as the duly authorized representative, an
insurance agent of Commercial Union in the Philippines. The car’s value
was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic, Mr. Server of
the Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding to Smith, Bell and
Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta
Garage which is also an agent of Smith, Bell and Co.
Even assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a
defense, the burden would be upon it to show that the gift in question
does not fall within the exception therein established. We cannot say, as
a matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his wife is
not a moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend upon the
circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is disclosed by the
record.

In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebraker. Mrs. Harding filed an

insurance claim but Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the
representations and averments made as to the cost of the car were false;
and that said statement is a warranty. Commercial Union alse stated that
the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift from her
husband is void citing article 1334 of the Civil Code which provides that
“All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void. Moderate
gifts which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of the
family are not included in this rule.”

Issue: Whether or not the gift made by Mr. Harding to his wife is valid.

Held: Yes. The Court ruled that Commercial Union is not the proper party
to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding to his wife. They
bore absolutely no relation to the parties to the transfer at the time it
occurred and had no rights or interests inchoate, present, remote, or
otherwise, in the property in question at the time the transfer occurred.
Although certain transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband
are prohibited in the article referred to, such prohibition can be taken
advantage of only by persons who bear such a relation to the parties
making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes
with their rights or interests. Unless such a relationship appears the
transfer cannot be attacked.
 145. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez since petitioner was equally guilty as her second husband in effecting the
Facts: invalid conveyance, she is not entitled to relief under the law.
Petitioner was the registered owner of two fishponds in Bulacan, which
she sold to her daughter by first marriage, who then sold the same back
to petitioner and her second husband (the father of herein respondents).
Upon the second husband’s death, the fishponds were deemed included
in the conjugal property and partitioned among his heirs: herein
petitioner and respondents. Later, petitioner leased the respondents’ half
of the fishponds for a 5-year period. When the respondents demanded
unpaid rentals, petitioner responded by filing suit, attacking the validity of
the transfer of the fishponds to the conjugal partnership and, ultimately,
to the respondents – essentially arguing that she was actually still the
owner of the fishponds. CFI Bulacan upheld validity of the transfer.

Issue:
Whether or not transfer of property to the conjugal partnership may be
invalidated for circumvention of law against donation between spouses

Held:
Transfer of property to the conjugal partnership cannot be invalidated.

The facts of the case show a clear intention on the part of Spouses
Rodriguez to effect a donation between spouses – which is prohibited by
the applicable law at that time (Art. 1334 (1), Old Civil Code). Jurists
explain that the conveyance is invalid because the contract is tainted by
illegal causa. Thus, ordinarily, such a donation would have been
invalidated.

However, the law on contracts (Arts. 1305, 1306, Old Civil Code) also
applies the principle of in pari delicto non oritur action. So in this case,
 146. Arcaba v. Vda. De Batocael donation made by [Comille] in favor of [petitioner] is void under Art. 87 of
the Family Code.”
Facts:

Francisco Comille was the registered owner of a house and lot in

Zamboanga del Norte. After his retirement, he engaged the services of
petitioner and two others as helpers and house caretakers. Although
petitioner alleged otherwise, there were many indications that she was
also Comille’s lover, e.g., (a) slept in same bedroom with Comille for many
years in her employment, (b) documents (business permit, death
certificate) signed by petitioner using the surname Comille, (c) did not
receive a regular cash wage, (d) designated as ‘common-law wife’ of
Comille in an answer in another RTC case. A few months before he died,
Comille donated to petitioner a 1/3-portion of the lot plus the house
itself, ostensibly as a reward for many years of faithful service. After his
death, Comille’s heirs attacked the donation as a void one under Art. 87
of the Family Code. RTC Dipolog declared the donation invalid; CA denied
reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 87 of the Family Code invalidates donations

between common law spouses

Held:

Art. 87 invalidates donations between common law spouses.

The facts clearly show that petitioner was Comille’s common law wife,
i.e., they were cohabiting, publicly assuming the marital relation, “and
dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the
public as such... Respondents having proven by a preponderance of
evidence that [petitioner] and [Comille] lived together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the

147. BA Finance Corporation v. CA
Facts:
A & L Industries was established during the marriage of Augusto and Lily
Yulo; however, it was managed by and registered as a single
proprietorship in the name of Lily Yulo. Around May 1975, Augusto
abandoned his wife, children, and the family home. Two months later,
Augusto obtained a loan of Php 591,000 from petitioner, presenting (a) a
promissory note executed by him in his own name and as representative
of A & L Industries, (b) a special power of attorney apparently executed
by Lily, authorizing him to obtain that loan. Augusto failed to pay when
the debt became due and demandable, so petitioner filed an action to
collect and was able to obtain a writ of attachment over the properties of
A & L Industries. Lily Yulo raised the defenses that (a) she and Augusto
had already separated, and Augusto had already abandoned his family, by
the time he obtained the loan, (b) she was the sole proprietor and never
authorized Augusto to obtain the loan, (c) she never received any part of
the proceeds of the loan. CFI Manila dismissed the complaint against Lily
and A & L Industries; CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not conjugal property can be made liable for an obligation
contracted by a spouse for his own benefit
Held:
Conjugal property cannot be made liable for an obligation contracted by a
spouse for his own benefit.
“There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the
marriage of Augusto and Lily Yulo and therefore the same is presumed
conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the
spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature ... However, for the said
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must
have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Art. 161
of the Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner
is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by ... Lily
Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit
because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned
his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear
that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to
procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries
liable now for the said loan would be unjust and contrary to the express
provision of the Civil Code.”
“It is true that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property
pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163 of the new Civil Code. However, as
such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are
chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the
legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest
belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family.” (Luzon Surety
Co., Inc. v. De Gracia)
 148. G.R. No. 79734 December 8, 1988
MARMONT RESORT HOTEL ENTERPRISES vs. GUIANG
FACTS: In May 1975, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed
between Maris Trading and Marmont Resort (Marmont), a corporation
engaged in the hotel and resort business with office and establishment at
Olongapo City. Under the agreement, Maris Trading undertook to drill for
water and to provide all equipment necessary to install and complete a
water supply facility to service Marmont, for P40,000. Maris Trading
drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a parcel of land,
then occupied by respondent spouses Federico and Aurora Guiang. Five
months later, a second Memorandum of Agreement ceding the spouses’
property in favor of Maris trading was executed with Federico Guiang
signing as witness. After some time, the water supply of the Marmont
Resort Hotel became inadequate to meet the hotel's water requirements.
Marmont secured the services of another contractor, which suggested
that in addition to the existing water pump, a submersible pump be
installed to increase the pressure and improve the flow of water to the
hotel. Juan Montelibano, Jr., manager of Marmont, sought permission
from the Guiang spouses to inspect the water pump which had been
installed on the portion of the land previously occupied by the spouses
and to make the necessary additional installations thereon. No
permission, was granted. In May 1980, Marmont filed a Complaint against
the Guiang spouses for damages resulting from their refusal to allow
representatives of petitioner and the second contractor firm entry into
the water facility site. Guiang spouses denied having had any previous
knowledge of the first Memorandum of Agreement and asserted that the
second Memorandum of Agreement was invalid for not having been
executed in accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON there is a valid memorandum considering that the property
involved is a conjugal property alienated by the wife without the consent
of her husband.
HELD: YES.
Article 165 and 172 state the general principle under our civil law, that
the wife may not validly bind the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the husband, who is legally the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. In this particular case, however, the second Memorandum of
Agreement, although ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with
Maris Trading, was also signed by her husband Federico, as one of the
witnesses thereto. This circumstance indicates not only that Federico was
present during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in
fact, given his consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora.
Otherwise, he should not have appended his signature to the document
as witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the second
Memorandum of Agreement as their effective consent thereto is
sufficiently manifested in the document itself.
That the land in dispute was, at the time of execution of the second
Memorandum of Agreement, public land, is of no consequence here.
Pending approval of Federico's Miscellaneous Sales Application over said
land, respondent spouses enjoyed possessory and other rights over the
same which could validly be assigned or transferred in favor of third
persons. In this case, respondent spouses chose to transfer such rights
(over the portion upon which the water pump was installed) to Maris
Trading, as evidenced by the fourth paragraph of the second
Memorandum of Agreement, quoted earlier. Furthermore, assuming
(though only for the sake of argument) that the alienation to Maris
Trading was legally objectionable, respondent spouses are not the proper
parties to raise the issue of invalidity, they and Maris Trading being in pari
delicto. Only the government may raise that issue.
 149. G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. CA
FACTS: Donata Montemayor is the second wife of Clodualdo Vitug with
whom he had 8 children. Clodualdo Vitug died intestate in May 1929 so
his estate was settled and distributed wherein Donata was the
Administratrix. In November 1952, Donata, through her son, Salvador
Vitug, mortgaged to PNB several parcels of land in Pampanga to
guarantee the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro
Bacani in the amount of P40,900 registered in the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga. In December 1963. Donata also mortgaged in favor of PNB 2
other properties in Pampanga to guarantee the payment of the loan
account of her son Salvador in the amount of P35,200 which was also
registered. The properties were all in the name of Donata at the time
they were mortgaged and were free from all liens and encumbrances.
Salvador failed to pay so the bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties
which were sold at public auction where PNB was the highest bidder.
Salvador and Pedro failed to settle their accounts with PNB so the latter
foreclosed the properties which were sold at public auction and likewise
PNB was the buyer thereof. In August 1968 the properties were all in the
name of PNB. PNB sold 2 of the properties to Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion
V. de Guzman, Prudencia V. Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V.
Gutierrez. In May 1958, Donata executed a contract of lease in favor of
her children Pragmacio and Maximo. By virtue of a general power of
attorney executed by Donata in September 1966 in favor of Pragmacio,
the latter executed a contract of lease in September 1967 of the said lot
in favor of Maximo. In March 1970 Pragmacio and Maximo filed an action
for partition and reconveyance with damages against Marcelo Mendiola,
special administrator of the intestate estate of Donata who died earlier,
all the transferee of the properties from PNB and PNB. The subject of the
action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the conjugal property
of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they
claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the
PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They
invoked the case decided by this which is an action for partition and
liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were
found to be conjugal in nature.
ISSUE: WON the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the
spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code
apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of
the widow?
HELD: NO.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that, “All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the
husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the
properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already
a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said
spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot
prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved. The PNB had a reason to rely on what
appears on the certificates of title of the properties mortgaged. For all
legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the
mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not
aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor.
 150. G.R. No. L-19565 January 30, 1968
DE LA CRUZ vs. DE LA CRUZ
FACTS: Estrella and the Severino were married in Bacolod in February
1938. During the marriage they acquired 7 parcels of land of the Bacolod,
and 3 parcels of the Silay. They are also engaged in business ventures
with fixed assets from which they obtained a net profit of P75,655.78 oer
year. The profit of the Philippine Texboard Factory, the principal business
of the spouses, was P90,454.48 for 1957. As of the end of 1959, the total
assets of the various enterprises of the conjugal partnership were valued
at P1,021,407.68, not including those of the Top Service Inc. This
corporation was the Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, the Golden
Acres Subdivision and the Green Valley Subdivision in Las Piñas, and a lot
and building located at Manila purchased by the amount borrowed from
the Manufacturer's Bank. The spouses are indebted to the PNB and the
DBP for loans and to secure which they mortgaged the Philippine
Texboard Factory, and several properties in Bacolod and Silay. Estrella
filed a complaint in July 1958, alleging that her husband, the Severino,
had abandoned her and was mismanaging their conjugal partnership
properties, and praying for separation of property, monthly support of
P2,500, and payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs. The court
allowed the amount prayed for as alimony pendente lite, which however,
was reduced to P2,000. Thereafter the court ordered the separation and
division of the conjugal assets.
ISSUES: WON the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff
constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the
conjugal partnership properties?
HELD: NO
The defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife.
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when she
has been abandoned by the husband for at least one year are the same as
those granted to her by article 167 in case of abuse of the powers of
administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies,
under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere
separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement
but also amount to financial and moral desertion. The concept of
abandonment in article 178 may be established in relation to the
alternative remedies granted to the wife when she has been abandoned
by the husband, namely, receivership, administration by her, or
separation of property, all of which are designed to protect the conjugal
assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's
continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a
ready and steady source of support. Physical separation alone is not the
full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his
voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his
wife.
In the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did not intend to leave
his wife and children permanently. The record conclusively shows that he
continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the
conjugal home. There is good reason to believe, that she and the children
received more than this amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife
and children continued to draw from his office more than P500 monthly.
And then there is at all no showing that the plaintiff and the children
were living in want. The plaintiff even admitted that she frequently
played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money; to spare.
 150. G.R. No. L-19565 January 30, 1968
DE LA CRUZ vs. DE LA CRUZ
FACTS: Estrella and the Severino were married in Bacolod in February
1938. During the marriage they acquired 7 parcels of land of the Bacolod,
and 3 parcels of the Silay. They are also engaged in business ventures
with fixed assets from which they obtained a net profit of P75,655.78 oer
year. The profit of the Philippine Texboard Factory, the principal business
of the spouses, was P90,454.48 for 1957. As of the end of 1959, the total
assets of the various enterprises of the conjugal partnership were valued
at P1,021,407.68, not including those of the Top Service Inc. This
corporation was the Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, the Golden
Acres Subdivision and the Green Valley Subdivision in Las Piñas, and a lot
and building located at Manila purchased by the amount borrowed from
the Manufacturer's Bank. The spouses are indebted to the PNB and the
DBP for loans and to secure which they mortgaged the Philippine
Texboard Factory, and several properties in Bacolod and Silay. Estrella
filed a complaint in July 1958, alleging that her husband, the Severino,
had abandoned her and was mismanaging their conjugal partnership
properties, and praying for separation of property, monthly support of
P2,500, and payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs. The court
allowed the amount prayed for as alimony pendente lite, which however,
was reduced to P2,000. Thereafter the court ordered the separation and
division of the conjugal assets.
ISSUE: WON the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff
of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the
matrimonial assets?
HELD: NO.
The defendant is not guilty of abuse of his powers of administration of
the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets.
Anent the allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the conjugal
partnership property, the record presents a different picture. There is
absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the conjugal
assets.
The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of
the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the
wife of the progress of the family businesses constitutes abuse of
administration. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband
perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he
commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of
mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and
utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. If
there is only physical separation between the spouses, engendered by
the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to
manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and
efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support
to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to
grant the wife's petition for separation of property. The remedies granted
to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as
condonation of the husband's act but are designed to protect the
conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want.
Therefore, a denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of
the husband's act but merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a
cause of action.
 151. Metrobank, et al. v. Tan been acquired by a spouse while he was still single, and registered only
after the marriage. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
G.R. No. 163712, November 30, 2006
different acts. The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that
properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal
cannot apply in the instant case. Before such presumption can apply, it
FACTS: must first be established that the property was in fact acquired during the
The husband contracted an obligation secured by a mortgage over the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
property under the names “Jose Tan married to Eliza Go Tan”, since the condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
husband failed to pay, there was foreclosure of the mortgage which was conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor presented in the case
objected to by the wife on the ground that the property was mortgaged at bar.
without her consent, hence, it is void contending that a conjugal property
cannot be mortgaged without the consent of the spouse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the real estate mortgage agreements executed by the
husband shall be valid even without the consent of the wife.
Held:
Yes, the lack of consent to the mortgage covering the title in question
would not render the encumbrance void under the second paragraph of
Article 124 of the Family Code. For proof is wanting that the property
covered by the title is conjugal – that it was acquired during respondents’
marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption that it is
conjugal property. (Article 116, F.C.). The statement in the title that the
property is “registered in accordance with the provisions of Section 103
of the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B. TAN, of legal
age, married to Eliza Go Tan does not prove or indicate that the property
is conjugal. In Ruiz v. CA, G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003, 401 SCRA 410, it
was ruled that the phrase “married to “ is merely descriptive of the civil
status of a person and should not be construed to mean that the spouse
is also a registered owner. Furthermore, registration of the
property is not proof that such property was acquired during the
marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have
 152. Rodriguez v. De La Cruz lost her property and that the same has become the property of her
husband. No such claim was made in the court below on behalf of the
G.R. No. L-3629, September 28, 1907
defendants. Their claim was that the said Hilarion de la Cruz had acquired
said property during the existence of his marriage with his first wife,
Andrea de Leon.
FACTS:
The deceased, Hilarion De la Cruz, continued to administer the property
of his first wife even during the subsistence of his second marriage with
the petitioner but the court granted action for partition filed by the heirs
of Hilarion. The petitioner filed an action to recover parcels of land
contending that she inherited from her father and administer said land
since 1882.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administration of the property of the wife during
marriage shall vest ownership to the husband.
HELD:

There is no provision in the Civil Code which prohibits a husband from

administering the property of his wife, as her representative, and
certainly it cannot be concluded that the property which he administers
for his wife is his for the mere reason that he has administered the same
for a long time.

Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the
ownership of her property which she brings to the marriage relation. It is
true that article 1384 prescribes that she shall have the management of
the property, unless she was delivered the same to her husband by
means of a public document, providing that he may administer said
property; but it cannot be claimed; from the mere fact that she has
permitted her husband to administer her property without having his
authority to do so evidenced by a public document, that she has thereby
 153. Pelayo v. CA
G. R. No. 141323, June 8, 2005

FACTS:
David Pelayo sold two parcels of agricultural land to respondent Melki
Perez on January 1988 and the sale was evidenced by Deed of Absolute
Sale and Mrs. Pelayo signed only the third space in the space provided for
the witness, when Perez instituted an action for specific performance,
defendant Pelayo said that the deed was without consent of Mrs. Perez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Pelayo consented to the sale of their conjugal
property.
HELD:
Yes, the consent need not be expressed. It can be implied. In the present
case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Mrs. Pelayo
signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the
execution of said document point to the fact that Mrs. Pelayo was fully
aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.
 154. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO;
G.R. No. 153802; March 11, 2005
FACTS: During the marriage of spouses Miguela Dailo and Marcelino
Dailo, Jr, they purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City. The
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings
and Loan Bank and executed a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the
subject property without the knowledge and consent of respondent.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage, respondent
instituted a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate
of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against
petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in
question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited; . . . .”
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming
as such. Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the
late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a
doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or Not the Mortgage is valid.

2. Whether or Not the Conjugal Partnership is liable for the payment of

the loan obtained by the husband.

RULING: 1. Mortgage is void. In this case, without the knowledge and

consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By
express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition
or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

2. NO. conjugal shall not be liable. Under Article 121 of the Family Code,
“[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
 155. SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR TIERRA CORP,
WILFRIDO MARTINEZ, MIGUEL LACSON, and RICARDO LOPA;
G.R. No. 143382; November 29, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, applied for a P12,000,000
credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company.
It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual
respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa
who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation
for the payment of the loan.
Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it
suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed
a complaint against respondent corp and individual respondents. RTC
issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of
respondent corporation and respondent Martinez including the conjugal
house and lot of the spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an
indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a
third party
RULING: No. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
In acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly
intended for a third party.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the
direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or profession, the transaction falls within the term “obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the
husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is
a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person
or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the
transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and
not for the surety or his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement
between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the
benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement)
under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit.
Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge
that burden.
 156. VILLANUEVA V. COURT OF APPEALS;
G.R. No. 143286; April 14, 2004
FACTS: Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been
married on October 7, 1926. During their marriage, they acquired real
properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu.
In 1945, Nicolas cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva. Pacita, has
no occupation and no properties of her own from which she could derive
income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his
illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the income of
his properties.
Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her
husband Nicolas Retuya and Pacita Villanueva et. al., Eusebia sought the
reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties claiming that
such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the
marriage between Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal.
2. Whether or not the presumption of co-ownership between Nicolas and
and Pacita should be upheld.
RULING: 1. YES, they are conjugal. All property acquired by the spouses
during the marriage, regardless in whose name the property is registered,
is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not
rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or
the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116
of the Family Code expressly provides that the presumption remains even
if the property is registered in the name of one or both of the spouses.
if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is
that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that
they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that
the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita
started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita
and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves
admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of
acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, hence the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is
that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
3. Petitioners reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code is
misplaced. A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must
be proof of actual joint contribution by both the live-in partners
before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to
their contribution. The presumption of equality of contribution
arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate
contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint
contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof of actual
contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners
failed to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita in the
acquisition of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed to prove
that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or that she
actually contributed her own money to acquire it.
 157. VILLANUEVA VS IAC
Facts: Spouses Bunsa were the original owners of Lot 13. It was inherited
by their children, Modesto and Frederico Aranas. The southern portion,
Lot 13C was given to Modesto. Modesto was married to Victoria who
predeceased him. They had no children, but Modesto was survived by 2
illegitimate children, Dorothea and Teodoro. They mortgaged the
property and upon failure to pay the loan, Lot 13C was transferred to
Bernas. Petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint stating that they are co-
owners by virtue of a will made by Victoria who bequeathed to them
“interests, rights and properties real and personal … as her net share
from conjugal property with her husband Modesto.”
Issue: Whether Lot 13C be considered as conjugal partnership property of
spouses Modesto and Victoria
Ruling: NO. Lot 13C is an exclusive property of Modesto which he
inherited from his parents. Art 148 provides that to be considered as the
exclusive property of each spouse, it should brought to the marriage as
his own or that which each acquires during the marriage by lucrative title.
158. TAN VS. CA
Facts: During the marriage of Esteria Teves Tan and Alfonso Tan, they
purchased a 906 sqm. Lot. The funds used in the construction of the
house were drawn from a loan she and her husband secured, but it was
Alfonso and his mother who drew the loan. Spouses Tan are now legally
separated. The TC ruled that Esteria should be given 1/3 portion of the lot
which is the conjugal property of the spoiuses.The CA reversed the Trial
Court’s decision and ruled that although the subject property was
acquired during the spouses’ marriage, it was inherited by the Tan
siblings from their mother; thus, should be considered as exclusive
property of Alfonso.
Issue: Whether the 906 sqm lot is conjugal property of spouses Esteria
and Alfonso Tan.
Ruling: No. It is the exclusive property of Alfonso, which he inherited
from his mother. Art. 148 provides that those acquired during the
marriage by lucrative title shall be considered as exclusive property of
each spouse.
 159. GENATO VS DE LORENZO

Facts: The late Simona Genato made an indorsement at the back of share
certificate no. 7 and 18 that she assigns and transfers to Florentino
Genato and Francisco Genato the rights to the shares. Philippine Trust
Company, judicial administrator of the intestate estate filed a complaint
to recover the 530 shares of stock to be included in the inventory and to
be distributed among the surviving heirs.

Issue: Whether the donation is valid.

Ruling: No. The court found that there was no valid consideration for the
sale nor was there a valid donation due to lack of proper acceptance and
non- compliance with the formalities. One of the two donees was not
present at the delivery and there is no showing that Francisco authorized
Florentino to accept for him. The delivery by the donor and acceptance of
the done must be simultaneous and the acceptance of a person other
than a true done must be authorized by proper power of attorney set
forth in a public document.Thus, the shares are deemed never to have
ceased to be the property of their mother, Simona.
 160. BPI V. POSADAS
GR NO. 34583, OCTOBER 22, 1931
FACTS: The present complaint seeks to recover from the
defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the
amount of P1,209 paid by the plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of
administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, as
inheritance tax upon the sum of P20,150, which is the amount of an
insurance policy on the deceased's life, wherein his own estate was
named the beneficiary. Inasmuch as one of the questions raised in
the appeal is whether an insurance policy on said Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze's life was, by reason of its ownership, subject to the
inheritance tax, it would be well to decide first whether the amount
thereof is paraphernal or community property. According to the
foregoing agreed statement of facts, the estate of Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for
$10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada on
January 14, 1913. During the following five years the insured paid the
premiums at the Manila branch of the company, and in 1918 the
policy was transferred to the London branch.
ISSUE: Whether or not the P1,209 paid under protest is part
of the community property?
RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the Decision and ruled:
(1) That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal
partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to
the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2) that if the
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal
funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part
and conjugal in part; and (3) that the proceeds of a life-insurance
policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered
to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets
of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the
inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to
the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was
domiciled in these Islands or outside.
The estate of a deceased person cannot be placed on the
same footing as an individual heir. The proceeds of a life-insurance
policy payable to the estate of the insured passed to the executor or
administrator of such estate, and forms part of its; whereas the
proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to an heir of the insured as
beneficiary belongs exclusively to said heir and does not form part of
the deceased's estate subject to administration.
Just as an individual beneficiary of a life-insurance policy
taken out by a married person becomes the exclusive owner of the
proceeds upon the death of the insured even if the premiums were
paid by the conjugal partnership, so, it is argued, where the
beneficiary named is the estate of the deceased whose life is insured,
the proceeds of the policy become a part of said estate upon the
death of the insured even if the premium have been paid with
conjugal funds.
As all the premiums on the life-insurance policy taken out by
the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, were paid out of the conjugal funds,
with the exception of the first, the proceeds of the policy, excluding
the proportional part corresponding to the first premium, constitute
community property, notwithstanding the fact that the policy was
made payable to the deceased's estate, so that one-half of said
proceeds belongs to the estate, and the other half to the deceased's
widow, the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze.
 161. JOCSON V. COURT OF APPEALS RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents stating
that they are not conjugal properties but exclusive properties of Emilio
GR NO. L-55322, FEBRUARY 16, 1989
Jocson.
FACTS: Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the husband of Agustina, Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972. As adverted to above, the
It is thus clear before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption
present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents
under Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties
executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents
were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what
Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his
apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third
claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the
(1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these
name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that
documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the
the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture.
properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and
Acquisition oftitle and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents. Petitioner explained
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
that there could be no real sale between a father and daughter who are
already existing.
living under the same roof, especially so when the father has no need of
money as the properties supposedly sold were all income-producing. In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient
Further, petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 proof to show that the disputed properties were acquired during his
and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and parents' converture, we would have ruled that properties, though
Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. The registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in
lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner and It further declared the view of the presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof,
properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal the condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
and ordered that the properties subject matter of all the documents be
registered in the name of herein petitioners and private respondents. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties included in the documents are
conjugal properties of the Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete.
 162. MARAMBA V. LOZANO, ET AL
GR NO. L-21533, JUNE 29, 1967p
FACTS: The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant Nieves
de Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for the collection of a sum of
money. After trial, the court a quo on June 23, 1959 rendered its decision
sentencing the defendants herein, Nieves de Lozano and Pascual Lozano,
to pay unto the herein plaintiff, Hermogenes Maramba. Defendant Nieves
de Lozano made a partial satisfaction of the judgment in the amount of
P2,000.00, and requested for an adjournment of the sale to October 26,
1960. On October 17, 1960, she filed an amended motion, dated October
14, alleging that on November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case,
defendant Pascual Lozano died and that the property levied upon was her
paraphernal property, and praying that her liability be fixed at one-half
(1/2) of the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending the
resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from
carrying out the auction sale scheduled on October 26, 1960. On that
date the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves
de Lozano which had been levied upon was sold to the judgment creditor,
as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the balance of the
judgment debt.
Appellant next points out that even if the land levied upon were originally
paraphernal, it became conjugal property by virtue of the construction of
a house thereon at the expense of the common fund, pursuant to Article
158, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. However, it has been held by this
Court that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the
exclusive property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it
conjugal. It is true that in the meantime the conjugal partnership may use
both the land and the building, but it does so not as owner but in the
exercise of the right of usufruct. The ownership of the land remains the
same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment can only be
demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. The record does not
show that there has already been a liquidation of the conjugal
partnership between the late Pascual Lozano and Nieves de Lozano.
Consequently, the property levied upon, being the separate property of
defendant Nieves deLozano, cannot be made to answer for the liability of
the other defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entire judgment debt can be satisfied from the
proceeds of the property sold at public auction in view of the
presumption that it is conjugal in character although in the name of only
one of the spouses.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The presumption
under Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the
marriage. But in the instant case there is no showing as to when the
property in question was acquired, and hence the fact that the title is in
the wife's name alone is determinative. Furthermore, appellant himself
admits in his that the property in question is paraphernal.
163 the presumption established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that property
G.R. No. 73733 December 16, 1986 acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there
EPIFANIA MAGALLON vs. HON. ROSALINA L. MONTEJO being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except that
which arises by implication from the aforestated entry in the certificate of
FACTS: Private respondents instituted a case against Martin Lacerna to title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim on
compel partition of a land in Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, claiming to be the the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin Lacerna's
common children of Martin Lacerna and deceased Eustaquia Pichan, marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private respondents.
asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her
conjugal property. On the basis of the findings of the court, the private
respondents were declared entitled to one-half of the land claimed by
them. It appears, however, that at the time the case was brought, and
while it was being heard in the Trial Court, no certificate of title to the
land had yet been issued to Martin Lacerna until the case was pending on
appeal. Appearing on the face of the certificate, it is issued in the name of
" ... MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino, of legal age, married to Epifania Magallon
... ," the latter being the present petitioner. The appellate court affirmed
the decision of the trial court and became final and executory. A writ of
execution was issued for the partition of the land, which was served to
both Martin Lacerna and Epifania Magallon. The latter filed with the Trial
Court a "Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging that the
land subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and Martin
Lacerna thus excluded from enforcement of the writ.

ISSUE: Whether the property is the conjugal property of Lacerna and

Magallon.

RULING: No. From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the
petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of
title to the land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named
therein, Martin Lacerna. The phrase "married to Epifania Magallon
written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the registered
owner, and does not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal"
property of Lacerna and petitioner herein. Neither can petitioner invoke
164
G.R. No. L-48137 October 4, 1943
IN RE TESTATE ESTATE OF NARCISO A. PADILLA
FACTS: This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of
the late Narciso A. Padilla. At the celebration of the marriage, the
husband contributed a small capital to the conjugal partnership, and the
wife brought to the marriage considerable property in real estate, jewelry
and cash. Practically all of the conjugal partnership property came from
the fruits of the paraphernal property. The husband, who left no children,
executed a will giving his whole estate to his mother, Isabel Bibby Vda. de
Padilla. In a petition initiated by the widow, The Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered judgment declaring certain pieces of real estate and
jewelry as well as certain sums of money to be paraphernal, and ordering
the same to be delivered to the widow. From the foregoing, the testator's
mother appeals, claiming certain properties as conjugal. Included in the
properties in controversy is a debt made by the husband from the wife.
which is lawfully held in usufruct by the conjugal partnership during the
marriage.
(2) No. Article 1385 of the Spanish Code ordains that the fruits of the
paraphernal property form part of the conjugal partnership and are
subject to the payment of the charges against the marriage. It is likewise
true that under article 1408, par. 1, all debts and obligations contracted
by the husband during the marriage are chargeable against the conjugal
partnership, but article 1386 is an exception to the rule, and exempts the
fruits of the paraphernal property from the payment of the personal
obligations of the husband, unless there is proof that they redounded to
the benefit of the family. It is self-evident that the amounts in question
did not benefit the family. Hence, they cannot be charged against the
fruits of the paraphernal property. They should be paid from the
husband's funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal owing

to the improvements made which came from conjugal funds; whether or
not the debt be chargeable to the fruits of the paraphernal property.

RULING: (1) No. The mere construction of a building from common funds
does not automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the
conjugal partnership. Such a mode of using the land, namely, by erecting
a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of usufruct pertaining
to the conjugal partnership over the wife's land. The ownership of the
land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a
result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Therefore, before
payment of the value of the land is made from the common funds, all the
increase or decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss. And when
may she demand payment? Not until the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership because up to that time, it is neither necessary nor
appropriate to transfer to the partnership the dominion over the land,
165
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, et. al. vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: Sps. Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda have been living
separately since the early years of their marriage. In 1971, Romarico
purchased a parcel of land in Angeles City from his father with money
borrowed from an officemate. In 1972, while in Hong Kong, Katrina
entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned
to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the
pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan
demanded payment of their value. In an action for the collection of sum
of money against Romarico and Katrina, the reply with counterclaim filed
was only in behalf of the latter. The court promulgated in favour of the
Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four
lots in Angeles City, all in the name of “Romarico Henson married to
Katrina Henson”. The properties were sold at public auction. A monthe
before the redemption, Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the
decision including the writ and levy of execution, alleging that he was
“not given his day in court” and that he has nothing to do with the
business transactions of Katrina.
acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership even though Romarico and Katrina had been
living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties
are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico
acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan.
If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal
assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount
importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a
property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is
the source of the money utilized in the purchase. The conjugal nature of
the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid
for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to
be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE: Whether or not the debt of the wife without the knowledge of the
husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property.

RULING: No. Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when
Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when that
business transaction eventually resulted in the filing of the civil case,
Romarico acted, or, as charged by petitioners, failed to act, in the belief
that he was not involved in the personal dealings of his estranged wife.
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, having been
166. ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, VICTOR DE
GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO
DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 160347; November 29, 2006
FACTS: Spouses Carandang and the decedent Quirino de Guzman were
stockholders and corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System
(MBS). The Carandangs have equities at 54 % while Quirino has 46%.
When the capital stock of MBS was increased on November 26,
1983, the Carandangs subscribed P345,000 from it, P293,250 from the
said amount was loaned by Quirino to the Carandangs. In the subsequent
increase in MBS’ capital stock on March 3, 1989, the Carandangs
subscribed again to the increase in the amount of P93,750. But, P43,125
out of the mentioned amount was again loaned by Quirino.
When Quirino sent a demand letter to the Carandangs for the
payment of the loan, the Carandangs refused to pay. They contend that a
pre-incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang
and Quirino, whereby Quirino promised to pay for the stock subscriptions
of the Arcadio without cost, in consideration for Arcadio’s technical
expertise, his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and
upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no
indebtedness on the part of the Carandangs.
SPOUSES CARANDANG: Three of the four checks used to pay their stock
subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the
decedent’s wife. Thus, Milagros should be considered as an indispensable
party in the complaint. Being such, the failure to join Milagros as a party
in the case should cause the dismissal of the action by reason of a
jurisprudence stating that: “(i)f a suit is not brought in the name of or
against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure
to state a cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly
an indispensable party, was not included as a party-plaintiff.
HELD: Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute
any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
govern their property relations.
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. Credits are personal properties, acquired during the
time the loan or other credit transaction was executed. Therefore, credits
loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal
property.
Assuming that the four checks are credits, they are assumed to be
conjugal properties of Quirino and Milagros. There being no evidence to
the contrary, such presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman,
being a co-owner of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party
in interest.
“In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real
parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of
the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of
the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.”
 167. LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-39587
March 24, 1934
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in
Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first time in the area and he was entirely
unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge of
the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in
question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was
impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters
from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of
the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said
truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded
his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus
occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles.
Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him,
which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. The 3 victims were
injured and were hospitalized.
ISSUE:
1. WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities
for damages properfor injuries sustained by wife and child for loss of
domestic service of wife to husband
HELD:
Taking into consideration the fact that the wife — in the language of the
court, which saw her at the trial — “young and beautiful and the big scar,
which she has on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received
by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the fracture of her
left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult
for her to walk”, and taking into further consideration her social standing,
neither is the sum adjudicated to her for patrimonial and moral damages,
excessive.
As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive,
taking into consideration the fact that the lacerations received by her
have left deep scars that permanently disfigure her face and that the
fractures of both her legs permanently render it difficult for her to walk
freely, continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her
balance in addition to the fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great
extent affect her matrimonial future.
c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of
what is called Anglo-Saxon common law “consortium” of his wife, that is,
“her services, society and conjugal companionship”, as a result of
personal injuries which she had received from the accident now under
consideration.
Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the
husband’s rights is to count on his wife’s assistance. This assistance
comprises the management of the home and the performance of
household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be
more useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil
rights and are aspiring to become man’s equal in all the activities of life,
marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies
with the duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon
her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from
deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. In the case
under consideration, apart from the services of his wife as translator and
secretary, the value of which has not been proven, Lilius has not
presented any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and
their nature, rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may
serve as a basis in estimating their value.
Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife’s domestic assistance and
conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which
neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is necessary for the
party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the
person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and
that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been
prevented from so doing
 168. GO vs YAMANE
G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006
FACTS:
A Lot in Baguio City is registered in the name of Muriel Yamane, wife of
Leonardo Yamane. Atty. De Guzman whohandled a case for wife and her
sisters levied the said property to satisfy the lien for attorney’s fees. The
RTC of Baguio City held that the subject parcel of land was the
paraphernal property of Muriel Yamane and not theconjugal property of
the spouses. Leonardo Yamane, husband filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. Thecase was brought to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. The
appellate court contends that, “property acquired duringmarriage is
presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are
shown to have been used for thepurpose.” Husband’s name appeared on
the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and the Deed of Absolute Sale. Both
documents indicate that Muriel was married to Leonardo Yamane.
ISSUE:
Whether the nature of the property is conjugal or paraphernal
27, 1967, or specifically during the marriage. We then follow the rule that
proof of the acquisition of the subject property during a marriage suffices
to render the statutory presumption operative. It is clear enough that the
presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership. The
contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters
appears to have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter.
Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her
two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for
them. Accordingly, whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel in the
litigation for her and her sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her
exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against the
contested conjugal property. This piece of land may not be used to pay
for her indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown to be
one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. The power of the
court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. In this case, therefore, the
property -- being conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied upon. Petition is
DENIED

HELD:
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is
presumed to be conjugal in nature, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. (Article 160) The nature of a
property, whether conjugal or paraphernal, is determined by law and not
by the will of one of the spouses. The mere registration of a property in
the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. Conjugal
property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by
one spouse, unless some advantage of benefit is shown to have accrued
to the conjugal partnership. The CA committed no error in declaring that
the parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel
and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay on February
 169. Jovellanos vs. CA

Facts: On September 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife Insurance

Company entered into a contract denominated as a lease and conditional
sale agreement over the subject property. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos
was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had 3 children, the
petitioners herein. Leonor died on January 1959. On May 1967, Daniel
married private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos with whom he begot
two children, her herein co-respondents. On January 1975, with the lease
amounts having been paid. Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a
deed of absolute sale. On September 1985, Daniel Jovellanos died.

Issue: Whether or not the subject property belongs to the conjugal

partnership of the second marriage

Held: Yes. In a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon

delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price.
Therefore, since the full ownership was vested upon execution of the
deed of absolute sale in 1975 during the second marriage, the subject
property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said
second wife applying Article 118 of the Family Code which provides:

"Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds
of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the
buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to
the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the
marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership."
 170. Castillo vs. Pasco
Facts: In October 1931 Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married
Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived two previous husbands.
Petitioners were descendants of Marcelo Castillo, Sr. by his previous
marriage. On December 1932, spouses Gonzales executed a deed of sale
conveying said property to the spouses Castillo and Pasco payable in
three installments. The initial payment of P1,000 for the fishpond was
made up of P600, that one of the vendors owed to Pasco, and P400 in
cash. The second installment of P2,000 appears to have been paid with
the proceeds of the loan from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, to whom the fishpond
was mortgaged by both spouses. The last payment of P3,000 was derived
from a loan secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in the
name of Macaria Pasco. On April 1933, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal
property
Held: Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was the applicable law in
1932, the property acquired for onerous consideration during the
marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the
source of the funds employed for its acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said
Code provided:
"ART. 1396. The following is separate property of either spouse:
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife as or to the
husband."
On the other hand, Article 1401 prescribed that:
"ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:
1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the
partnership or for one of the spouses only."
Where the initial payment for property acquired during coverture under
the old Civil Code was made partly out of indebtedness of third persons
due to the wife alone, in the absence of proof that the husband
authorized her to use conjugal funds, such payment was considered made
out of private funds of the wife. Money obtained during coverture by
loans to the husband or to both spouses, even if guaranteed by mortgage
on the paraphernal property of the wife, was considered, under the old
law, conjugal property repayable at maturity with conjugal partnership
funds.
Therefore, since the fishpond was acquired during the effectivity of the
old Civil Code partly with paraphernal funds of the wife and partly with
conjugal funds, the fishpond belongs to both patrimonies in common, in
proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price. An
undivided 1/6 should be deemed paraphernal, and the remaining five-
sixths held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses
Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco.
 171. Ayala Investment and Development Corp. vs. CA

Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from

Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on making himself
jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC. PBM
failed to pay the loan. AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM
and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. The court rendered judgment
ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. A
writ of execution pending appeal was issued which caused the issuance
and service upon spouses Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties.

Issue: Whether or not a surety agreement or an accommodation contract

entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is considered "for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership

Held: No. Article 121 of the Family Code provides that 'The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated Administrator-Spouse for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains.' The burden of proof that the
debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains,
lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, the
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to
the conjugal partnership. AIDC failed to prove that the debt was
contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
 172. Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two
loans from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-
President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for
the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI default in the payment of all its
loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial
court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching
requiring the sheriff to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to
answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of
Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment alleging
inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were
acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal
funds. Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition
of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking
the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 121 and that
such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the
name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching.
According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted
in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.
ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to
answer for the loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is
liable for the said account of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal
partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s
act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the
private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was
between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of
the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the
petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a
contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited.
The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.

HELD: No. The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing

guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for the
payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise
of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership

property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce
evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his
exclusive money.
 173. Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Miguela C. Dailo, as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the
G.R. No. 153802; March 11, 2005 loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family,
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8,
without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the
situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The Deed of Absolute
payment of the principal obligation.
Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. Without the knowledge
and consent of the respondent, a certain Gesmundo, in pursuant to SPA,
obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank and
executed a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property as a
security therefor. The said property was foreclosed upon maturity. The
respondent claimed that she had no knowledge of the said mortgage and
that the subject property was conjugal in nature. In the meantime,
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by the late marcelino dailo, jr. The same having redounded to
the benefit of the family.

HELD: NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: . . .

(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the

consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited; . . . .”

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that

should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for
the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming
 174. Lacson vs Diaz general rule, it is incumbent upon the one who invokes this provision or
the creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are obtaining.
G.R. No. L-19346; May 31, 1965

FACTS: On August 7, 1961, the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental

sent to the manager of TalisaySilay Milling Company, wherein defendant
Diaz was employed, a notice to garnish onethird of his monthly salary and
of any other personal properties belonging to said defendant, to cover
the total amount of P132,718.30.

Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution and to
lift the notice of garnishment (of his salary), on the ground that the same
are not enforceable against his present family. It was claimed that since
the money-judgment arose out of a contract entered into by him during
his first marriage, said judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries
which form part of the conjugal properties of the second marriage.
Plaintiffs opposed this motion, for the reason that re-marriage is not a
cause for extinction of obligations. As his aforesaid motion, after hearing,
was denied by the court for lack of merit, the defendant instituted the
present appeal.

ISSUE: WON the obligations contacted by one spouse before marriage

chargeable against conjugal assets

HELD: As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband or wife before

the marriage, as well as fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such
obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the New Civil Code have
already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or
the same is insufficient.

Considering that the enforceability of the personal obligation of the

husband or wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception to the
 175. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FROILAN LAGRIMAS
G.R. No. L-25355 August 28, 1969
Facts:
An information was filed against Froilan Lagrimas, for the murder of
Pelagio Cagro committed on February 15, 1960 in Pambujan, Samar. After
trial, the lower court found the accused guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the appellants as such heirs in the sum of P6,000.00 plus the
additional sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of damages, attorney's fees
and burial expenses. The lower court upon motion of appellants issued a
writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity. A levy was had on eleven
parcels of land in the province declared for tax purposes in the name of
the accused. The sale thereof at public auction was scheduled on January
5, 1965 but on December 29, 1964 the wife of the accused, Mercedes
Aguirre de Lagrimas, filed a motion to quash the writ of attachment as
well as the writ of execution with the allegation that the property levied
upon belonged to the conjugal partnership and, therefore, could not be
held liable for the pecuniary indemnity the husband was required to pay.
The then judge of the lower court granted such motion declaring null and
void the order of attachment and the writ of execution, in accordance
with Article 161 of the new Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership is free from the criminal liability
incurred by one of the spouses prior to the stage of liquidation.
Ruling:
Yes, it shall be charged to the conjugal partnership. The law speaks of
"partnership assets." It contemplates that the responsibilities to which
enumerated in Article 161, chargeable against such assets, must be
complied with first. It is thus obvious that the termination of the conjugal
partnership is not contemplated as a prerequisite.
If the appealed order were to be upheld, he would be in effect exempt
therefrom, the heirs of the offended party being made to suffer still
further. In doing justice to the heirs of the murdered victim, no injustice
is committed against the family of the offender. It is made a condition
under this article of the Civil Code that the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 161, covering primarily the maintenance of the family and the
education of the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one
of them as well as other obligations of a preferential character, are first
satisfied. It is thus apparent that the legal scheme cannot be susceptible
to the charge that for a transgression of the law by either husband or
wife, the rest of the family may be made to bear burdens of an extremely
onerous character.
Lacson v. Diaz: "Considering that the enforceability of the personal
obligations of the husband or wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the
exception to the general rule, it is incumbent upon the one who invokes
this provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its
applicability are obtaining."
 176. JOSE UY and Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA Whether or not the wife of an incapacitated husband could manage the
vs. COURT OF APPEALS conjugal property and may assume powers of administration of the
G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000 conjugal property including selling a parcel of land.

Ruling:
Facts:
The subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-
The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without
having suffered a stroke which left him comatose and bereft of any motor motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.9 In
or mental faculties. The wife of the deceased, Gilda signified to the court such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under
her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
properties and also alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and
hospitalization expenses are piling up. For this, she urgently needed to The petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was
improvements. Said incapacity of Ernesto Sr. was affirmed by the RTC of essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of
Iloilo City, and Gilda was authorized to assume sole powers of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with
administration of their conjugal properties pursuant to Article 124 of the the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the
Family Code. Teodoro Jardeleza, the son, filed a motion for Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in
reconsideration of the judgment and questioned the property sale of Lot the Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due process,
No. 4291, stating that the market value of the property would be around particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits.
12 to 15 million pesos, but had been sold to Gilda’s daughter, Glenda Uy
for only 8 million pesos. He also pointed out that the building thereon
which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to his father’s industry,
labor and service, and further argues that the conjugal partnership had
other liquid assets to pay off all financial obligations in the form of cash
and stocks which can off-set against the cost of medical and hospital
bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said
hospital which allows him to pay on instalment basis and that his two
attending physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for
their professional services.

Issue:
 177. THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties
of the respondents from the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa,
respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and
Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The
agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with
assurance from him that he would secure his wife’s consent. Petitioner
was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses
were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property
without the wife's written consent.
Ruling:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: “In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence,
for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and
wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her
written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties,
which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its
validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate
consent.
 178. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND LUZVIMINDA GUIANG VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND GUILDA CORPUZ
G.R. NO. 125172, JUNE 26, 1998.
FACTS:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale
null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in
the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while
she was in Manila seeking employment (with the consent of her
husband), her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their
residence and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato,
respondent gathered her children and went back to the subject property.
Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable
settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of
the bargain, respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her husband
and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain
deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent
and her husband, null and void.
ISSUE:
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Respondent’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal
property was totally inexistent or absent. The nullity of the contract of
sale is premised on the absence of private respondent’s consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last
element being indubitably absent in the case at bar. A void contract
cannot be ratified.
Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a
continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties,
following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent
events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing
against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured
an “amicable settlement” and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion
for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a
continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a
continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent
would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the
Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article
124.

Whether or not contract without the consent of wife is void.

HELD:

Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
 179. VALDEZ VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. NO. 122749, JULY 31, 1996.
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and
begotten 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The
trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and
void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same
code. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision
regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in
“unions without marriage”. She asserted that the Family Code contained
no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in
"unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children
filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home'
and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply."
ISSUE:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition
of property in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case
may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under
this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare
the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the
"family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as
in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned
in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil
Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of
the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
 180. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO VS. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
G.R. NO. 132529, FEBRUARY 2, 2001.
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without
marriage license. They had two children. He then married Susan Yee on
November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost 10 year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with
the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of
P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired
by Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted
that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage
between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became
aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to
the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by
Nicdao.
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under
the Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police
officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only
entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual
joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death
benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being
the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage license.
Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not
contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation
of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed
death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by
intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for
the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he
or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage
void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the
second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
 181. BUENAVENTURA VS CA
454 SCRA 261
Facts: A petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed
by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura,
herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with
leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended
answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
Issue: 1.) WON moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees may be
awarded on account of psychological incapacity (non-performance
of marital obligations
2.)WON co-ownership is applicable to the valid marriage
Ruling: 1.) The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of
the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered
these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It
is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an
innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts
as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the
mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it
was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of
his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. For the same
reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a
consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the
petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private
respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the
petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in
law and in fact. Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it
follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil
Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
2.) Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43
of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not
apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.||
 182. GONZALES VS GONZALES
478 SCRA 327
Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with
prayer for support pendente lite. The complaint alleges that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage.
He beats her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her,
and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time they
lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza
business and worked hard for its development. She prays for the
declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains. The RTC ruled that the marriage contracted
by the parties is null and void ab initio.
Issue: WON the properties of the parties should be divided equally
between them
Ruling: Their property relation shall be governed by the provisions of
Article 147 of the Family Code which enumerates the two instances when
the property relations between spouses shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to
marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live
together under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-
ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in
equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the
cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts,
work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further
provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of
the pizza business, petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a
plain housewife and that she helped him in managing the business. In his
handwritten letter to her dated September 6, 1989, he admitted that
"You've helped me for what we are now and I won't let it be destroyed."
It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered
respondent to be his partner in his pizza business and to take over its
operations. Respondent started managing the business in 1976. Her job
was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2) manage
the personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection and supervision of
outlets. She reported for work everyday, even on Saturdays and Sundays,
without receiving any salary or allowance.
 183. AGAPAY VS. PALANG
GR No. 116668
Facts: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with private respondent
Carlina. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii.
Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12,
1950. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had
attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in
1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a
house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. The then sixty-three-year-old Miguel
contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay.
Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural. A house and lot was purchased with Erlinda as the sole
vendee. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon
Carlina's complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina Palang and her
daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages seeking to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Issue: WON the subject properties should be awarded to Erlinda Agapay
Ruling: Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and
no presumption of equal shares. In the case at bar, the riceland should
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and
private respondent Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary
public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the
falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel
Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was
properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly
void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than
those in legal union.
 184. MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY vs TEODORO (1967)
FACTS: Petitioner was able to obtain a Writ of Execution against several
personal properties allegedly of Jose Cominas, the husband of herein
respondent. The CA issued a permanent injunction against the CFI’s
sheriff, holding that the marriage of Jose Cominas and respondent is void
ab initio and they are not legally capacitated to marry each other as
divorce is not recognized here, therefore there can be no co-ownership to
speak of. Such personal properties being fruits of respondent’s
paraphernal investments which have accrued before her marriage with
Jose Cominas, thereby her own exclusive properties thus cannot be levied
upon to satisfy a judgement against Jose Cominas.
ISSUE: W/N the CA’s decision is erroneous.
HELD: The CA is correct. Jose Cominas’ divorce abroad cannot be
recognized here therefore his first marriage is deemed subsisting; his
marriage with herein respondent void ab initio. Thus, there can be no co-
ownership by Jose Cominas and respondent herein to speak of. Such
levied properties proved as actually belonging to respondent alone,
cannot be the subject of execution. (Case obsolete based on Old Civil
Code)
185. JUANIZA vs JOSE (1979)
FACTS: A jeepney registered under and operated by Eugenio Jose caught
a collision accident with a train of PNR, resulting to the death of 7
passengers. Eugenio was married to one Socorro, but has been cohabiting
with his common-law wife, Rosalia, for 16 years already at the time of the
incident. The trial court rendered judgement holding Eugenio and Rosalia
solidarily liable for damages due to the death of the passengers.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred.
HELD: The trial court is not correct. Common-law marriages not being
recognized here, the jeepney therefore belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Eugenio and his lawful wife, Socorro. Rosalia cannot be
held solidarily liable as such awarded damages may only be satisfied
against the exclusive property of Eugenio, and in case of absence or
insufficiency, by the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement upon
liquidation.
186. BELCODERO vs CA 187.Francisco vs. Master Iron Works & Construction Corp.
Facts:
Josefina married Eduardo and bought two house and lot when she was
only 24 years old. Eduardo made an affidavit waiving all claims he had
FACTS: Alayo was married to Juliana with whom he begot 3 children.
over said property. On 1990, a complaint against Eduardo was filed by
Later, he cohabited with one Josefa, with whom he had a daughter,
MIWCC and it prospered, thus the properties were levied upon. This was
Josephine. Alayo then acquired a parcel of land and was able to register
opposed by Josefina alleging that they were her paraphernal property.
the same under Josefa. When Alayo died, Josefa and Josephine executed
Subsequently Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage on the
an extrajudicial partition of the subject land and sale of Josefa’s interest
ground that Eduardo was already married to a certain Carmelita.
therein to Josephine, thereby vesting full ownership to the latter. Juliana
and her children filed an action for reconveyance, which was granted and
Issue:
adjudged in their favor.
Whether or not the subject property paraphernal property

Ruling:
ISSUE: W/N the order of reconveyance is proper No. The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her
personal funds. Article 144 of the NCC applies only to a relationship
between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each
other, It does not apply to a cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to
HELD: The reconveyance is proper as the subject land is presumed as
concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
belonging to the conjugal partnership, unless proved as exclusively
there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between
belonging to one spouse. The presumption is not rebutted as Alayo
the man and his lawful wife.
merely authorized the registration of the land under Josefa’s name, and
that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. As regards
succession, a common-law wife has no legal standing thereby she does
not have the right to inherit.
 188. Atienza vs. De Castro
Facts:
Atienza (Married) hired the services of Yolanda as accountant. They
eventually lived together, had lots of sex, and had two kids. However,
they left each other. Later on he learned that Yolanda had a new partner
and that she allowed the said partner to live in their house so he filed a
complaint for partition alleging that the house were acquired with HIS
money but was transferred in Yolanda’s name without his consent. The
CA ruled in favor of Yolanda since Lupo failed to overcome the burden of
proving his allegation that the subject property was purchased by Yolanda
thru his exclusive funds.
Issue:
Whether or not pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code he is deemed a
co-owner
Ruling:
No. Their property regime is governed by Art.148 of the FC, which applies
to bigamous relationships. Under this regime, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, proof of actual contribution is required.
189. Joaquino vs. Reyes
Facts:
Lourdes, the widow of Rodolfo Reyes, filed a Complaint for reconveyance
alleging that before his death Rodolfo had illicit relations with Milagros
who purchased properties despite the fact that she had no income, thus
the respondent prays that those properties be declared the conjugal
property of the spouses Reyes and that Milagros be ordered to reconvey
the property in her favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the registration of the title in the name of the paramour
is conclusive
Ruling:
Though registered in the paramour's name, property acquired with the
salaries and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal partnership
with the legal spouse. The registration of the property in petitioner's
name was clearly designed to deprive Rodolfo's legal spouse and
compulsory heirs of ownership. By operation of law, petitioner is deemed
to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely on the
registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known
exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title.
 190. GUILLERMA TUMLOS v. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez deserves scant
G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000 consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it can be
FACTS: Spouses Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against the applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights.
Tumlos, alleging that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and that through tolerance
they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment building since 1989,
without any payment of any rent. When the demand for payment went
unheeded, they prayed that the Tumlos be ordered to vacate the
property in question and to pay the stated unpaid rents. Guillerma filed
an answer to the complaint, claiming that she is also the co-owner and
co-vendee of the apartment in question together with Mario Fernandez
since they had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the
property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they
lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for
about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting
rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as
to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE/S: Is Guillerma a co-owner of the subject property?

HELD: NO. Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and
the RTC, we cannot accept petitioner’s submission that she is a co-owner
of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. As
correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil
Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code. It does not apply to a
cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife.
Hence, petitioners argument -- that the Family Code is inapplicable
because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred
before its effectivity. In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence
that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject
property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her
 common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to
191. JOHN ABING v. JULIET WAEYAN have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal
G.R. No. 146294; July 31, 2006 shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in
FACTS: In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-owner of the structure in
wife without the benefit of marriage and together bought a 2-storey question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected
residential house. In December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked therefrom.
thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint
account. The original structure underwent renovation and housed a sari-
sari store. When their relationship turned sour in 1995, they decided to
partition their property and executed a Memorandum of Agreement.
Under the unsigned MOA, John shall leave the couple’s dwelling and in
turn, Juliet shall pay him his share in their properties. Juliet partially paid
John of his shares in their properties but failed to make good the balance.
On account thereof, John demanded of her to vacate the annex structure
housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an
ejectment suit against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet alleging
that the money used to build the annex structure was from his exclusive
funds. Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their
common funds and that the subject structure annexed thereto was
merely an attachment or an extension of their original residential house,
hence the same pertained to the two of them in common.

ISSUE/S: Is the subject property exclusively owned by petitioner?

HELD: NO. Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own
funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the
construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such
naked claim. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration covering
the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and again that tax
declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of
ownership. The law is clear. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, in the
absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by
 192. PEDRO GAYON v. SILVESTRE GAYON and plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does
GENOVEVA DE GAYON not bar the same.
G.R. No. L-28394; November 26, 1970

FACTS: Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against the spouses Silvestre and
Genoveva alleging that the spouses executed a deed where they sold to
one Pedro Gelera a parcel of unregistered land in Guimbal, Iloilo. Gelera,
in turn, sold the same to Pedro Gayon, who prays that a judicial decree
for the consolidation of the title be issued in his favor. Genoveva, in her
answer, denied the execution of any document in favor of petitioner and
that Silvestre died long before the institution of the complaint. The lower
court issued an order dismissing the complaint considering the fact that
Silvestre Gayon is now dead and his wife Genoveva de Gayon has nothing
to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint and due to the fact
that plaintiff “did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the
case” before filing his complaint.

ISSUE/S: Is Compromise, Under Article 222 Of The Civil Code, Required?

HELD: NO. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from Article 222,
as to the requirement of earnest efforts towards a compromise, applies
to suits “filed or maintained between members of the same family.” This
phrase, “members of the same family,” should, however, be construed in
the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which: Family relations
shall include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent
and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among
brothers and sisters. Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, whereas her
children are his nephews and/or nieces. In asmuch as none of them is
included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should
be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and
Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it
follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and
 193. O’LACO VS. CO CHO CHIT
GR No. 58010. March 31, 1993
FACTS:
Emila is the half sister of O Lay Kia who is, as is her husband Co Cho Chit, a
Chinese national and cannot own property in the Philippines. O lay kia
bought a piece of land and had it named under her sister, Emilia. Emilia
on the other hand sold the property to the Church without the knowledge
of her sister. When O Lay Kia found out, they immediately filed a case for
breach of contract.
ISSUE: Whether or nor there was a trust relationship between the sisters.
RULING:
Yes. ”… trust relations between parties may either be express or implied.
Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts
of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an
intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being
express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of
intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law
as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both
coming into being by operation of law.
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest
and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties.
They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved
in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal
title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of
another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and
prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one
who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal
right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to
hold.”
In this case, the court cited five instances that prove a trust relationship.
First, sps O Lay Kia were in possession of all the pertinent documents of
the sale from the beginning until the end of the transaction. Second,
there is a previous case of similar facts involving O lay kia and her brother
on a different parcel of land decided in her favor. Third, the
circumstances leading to Emilia acquiring a title to the land was dubius.
Fourth, until the sale to the church, Emilia actually recognized the trust
(by promising to take care of the transfer to the actual owners as soon as
she is able.) A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites
concur: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust; and, (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and convincing. And finally, fifth, Emilia actually
had no source of income to show how it was possible for her to purchase
the land.
 194. MANACOP VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in
1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore
not exempt form attachment.

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a

residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner
The petition was dismissed by SC.
failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment
signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein
(FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum
of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former.
Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter
insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied
by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from
attachment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted from

attachment.

RULING:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by

operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision
does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have
 195. MONDEQUILLO VS. BREVA
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential
land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With
regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public
land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant
who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the
present case became a family home by operation of law under Article
153.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family
home.
RULING:
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home
from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the
provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar
as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and
153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was
the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family
Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be
made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
Petition was dismissed.
 196. Gomez vs. Sta. Ines

FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against Marietta Sta. Ines to compel

the latter to deliver the owners copy of TCT over the rice land entrusted
by the petitioners’ mother to Sta. Ines and demanding the latter to make
an accounting of the produce of the said land. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners and ordered the return of the TCT and to pay for damages.
When the judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued, by virtue of which, land registered in the name of Marietta Sta.
Ines was levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the damages awarded.
Thereafter, a petition for annulment of the sale on the ground that the
same was a family home was filed by the husband and children of
Marietta. In their petition, they aver that the property is exempt from
execution under the Rules on Civil Procedure as said property is the
judgment debtors’ duly constituted family home under the Family Code.
According to respondents, the house and lot was constituted jointly by
Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied
the same as a family residence in 1972.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may validly seek the annulment of

the sale and execution of the writ on the ground that the same is a family
home.

RULING: No. Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall
be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among
other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.
In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not constituted
as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time
Marietta incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed
constituted as such only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03
August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the
family home.
 197. Patricio vs. Dario III family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal
age.
FACTS: When Marcelino Dario IV died, he was survived by his wife Perla
Patricio (petitioner) and their children Marcelino III (respondent) and
Marcelino Marc. Among the properties he left include a residential house.
The children extra judicially settled the estate and a new TCT was issued
in the names of petitioner, respondent, and Marcelino Marc. As
respondent refused to partition the property, an action for partition was
filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc. The trial court ordered the
partition of the property and ordered its sale by public auction. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition and
held that the family home should continue despite the death of one of
the spouses. It further held that the respondent’s minor son, a grandson
of spouses Dario and Patricio was a minor beneficiary of the family home.

ISSUE: Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the
co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor
beneficiary still resides in the said home

RULING: Yes. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is

entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Xxx

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his

grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family
home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated
under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being
dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he
is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own
 198. Versola vs. CA ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their
property is exempt from execution.

FACTS: Respondent Dr. Victoria Ong Oh granted a loan to a certain

Dolores Ledesma who issued as security a check and executed a deed of RULING: No. The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale
mortgage over a house and lot, subject property herein. Ledesma then under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the
sold the house to petitioners, Spouses Versola. To make do with the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
payment for Ledesma, the spouses obtained a loan from Asiatrust Bank. by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It
Thereafter, a scheme was agreed upon to settle the obligation of is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that
Ledesma to Ong Oh. Respondent Ong Oh would grant additional loan to such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up
Ledesma which would be credited as payment of petitioners for the and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from
property. Ledesma would then execute a deed of sale in favor of Spouses later claiming the exception.
Versola. Ong Oh would then deliver the TCT to Asiatrust. Once the
spouses has obtained a title in their names, they will execute a real estate
mortgage in favor of Asiatrust who would then grant a loan to them.
However, when Asiatrust tried to register the mortgage, it discovered
that a notice of levy on execution has been annotated on the title of the
property. It thereafter refused to grant the loan to petitioner spouses.
Respondent, meanwhile, presented the check of Ledesma but the same
was dishonored. Respondent Ong oh then filed a complaint for sum of
money against Ledesma, petitioners and Asiatrust. RTC rendered a
decision against the spouses. CA dismissed their appeal. No appeal having
been filed, the decision became final. RTC granted a writ of execution and
the sheriff set the sale of the property. Petitioner filed an
objection/exception to the sheriff’s sale. However, the property was still
sold. The spouses failed to redeem the property during the redemption
period. Two years thereafter, petitioner spouses opposed the motion of
respondent for the issuance of confirmation of judicial sale on the ground
that the property is the family home of the petitioners and therefore
exempt from execution.
 199. Taneo vs. CA, G.R. No. 10532, March 9, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent Gilig won in a civil case against petitioner
Taneo for the judgment amount of 5,000 was rendered in 1966. The
following properties of Taneo were levied: parcel of land and family home
located in Igpit, Opol, Misaims Oriental. They were sold in a public auction
to Gilig as highest bidder. Tan filed for action to declare the deed of
conveyance as void and for quieting of title with the RTC. The RTC
dismissed the same and the CA affirmed the decision. Taneo now seeks
reversal of the CA’s judgment with the contention that the house which
their father constituted as family home since 1964 is exempt fro
execution. In a last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners invoke
the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
HELD: A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. The
family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it
is situated, which confers upon the family a right to enjoy such
properties, provided it remain with the person constituting it and his
heirs.
The family home may be constituted judicially (through petition and
approval from the court) or extrajudicially (through recording in an
instrument with the Registry of Deeds that the it is a family home).
the old civil code applies. Under the Old Civil Code, the general rule is that
the family home is exempt from execution. However, there are instances
wherein the family home is not exempt from execution under Art. 243,
which reads:
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment, except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the
Registry of Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
record of the declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-
men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building
In the case at bar, the money judgment was rendered in 1964. The family
home was erected in 1964 but the instrument was registered only 1966.
Thus, the family home is not exempt from execution because it falls
under the 2nd instances wherein a family home is not exempt from
execution

Under the Old Civil Code, the operative act which created the family
home extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of
the declaration.
However, under the Family Code, registration was no longer necessary
under Article 153.
In the case at bar, the the petitioner’s family erected the house as their
family home in 1964 and registered the required instrument in 1966, so

LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND ADOPTION
200. SSS vs. Aguas, 483 SCRA 383
FACTS: Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died. Pablo’s
surviving spouse, Rosanna Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death
benefits on indicating in her claim that Pablo was survived by his minor
child, Jeylnn. Her claim for monthly pension was settled. SSS received a
sworn statement from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister,
contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna
abandoned the family abode approximately more than 6 years before,
and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for
support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with
Rosanna. The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary
beneficiary. CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS
death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo
HELD: Jennelyn only . Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth
certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to
authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was
born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo
were married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the
latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn
was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no
showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime.
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her
birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his
specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by
the father is a competent evidence of paternity.
For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2
qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is
dependent upon the member for support.
A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be
said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any
showing to the contrary. If it is proved that the were still living together at
the time of his death, it is presumed that she was dependent on the
husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing
for herself.
Only Jennelyn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was established
that she is his legitimate child. Records show that Janet was merely
"adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it.
Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as
a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at
the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if
they were already living separately. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be extended
to other siblings.
 201. Benitez-Badua vs. CA, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994 Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared that the was
the petitioner’s father.
FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of
various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his
husband died in 1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a complaint for
the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the
nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-
Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood,
though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to
prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted
documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name
were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand,
the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to
physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological
child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to

establish her legitimacy.

HELD: No. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as
the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal
rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification
of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife

executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole
heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and
ascendants”. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the

202. Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-49542, September 12, 1980
FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband
being Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that
due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30,
1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth
to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang. The records also
disclose that respondent; filed a complaint for recognition and support
against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Davao. Defendant
Macadangdang filed his answer on June 30, 1972, opposing plaintiff's
claim and praying for its dismissal
ISSUE: Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the
legitimate child of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw
HELD: YES
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be
immaterial to the resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What
should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the aforenamed
child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish
physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse.
Since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same
province, the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access
to each other. The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty
180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300
days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her
husband. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof
that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the
first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted
by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or
proved, the husband must be taken be the father of the child. The law
expressly refers to physical impossibility. The separation between the
spouses must be such as to make sexual access impossible. This may take
place when they reside in different countries or provinces, and they have
never been together during the period of conception. It must be stressed
that Article 256 of the Civil Code provides that the child is presumed
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law is not willing that
the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of either
parent, nor merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse
occurred. The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born
in wedlock belongs only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the
mother and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time,
and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit brought for the purpose.
 203. Babiera v. Catotal
G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
FACTS: Respondent Presencia Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Lanao del Norte a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. Respondent asserted
that she was the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Carinosa. Flora Guinto, the natural mother of herein
petitioner and the housemaid of the late spouses, caused the registration
of the facts of birth of her child, without the consent of the spouses, by
simulating that the petitioner was the child of said spouses, then 65 years
old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera
appear as the mother by forging her signature. Teofosta filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that 'the petition states no cause of action, it
being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff
has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of
the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has the legal capacity to impugn
the legitimacy/to file a petition for cancellation of entry of birth of
petitioner Teofista
HELD: YES
Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present
action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in
interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of
respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for
partition which the latter filed against the former. The case concerned
the properties inherited by respondent from her parents. Moreover,
Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A
close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in
which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer
herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at
all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to
Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood
relation to impugn in the first place. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this
reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband
or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth
Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive
period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily,
the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it
was allegedly void ab initio. Also at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to
have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so
in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical
care normally available only in a hospital.
 204. Tison v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997
FACTS: Petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and
nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is
the sister of petitioners' father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant,
and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by
right of representation. The records reveal that upon the
death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin,
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto
himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute, as a
consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued
in the name of Martin Guerrero. Then, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to
herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name. Martin
Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, may
attack the legitimacy of the petitioners
HELD: NO
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded
on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule
that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The issue
whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller
cannot be properly controverted in the present action for re-
conveyance. This is aside from the further consideration that private
respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in
favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted. The burden of proof
rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption
in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. The
presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to
shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. And in
order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates
must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. Where
there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and
unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may
stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. This is based
on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact
presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal
presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved.
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing
evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to
evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact.
Where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship
to another person. it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the
admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration
is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main
evidence unnecessary
 205. Maria Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
205 SCRA 337
Facts: During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3)
marriages. His first wife died on November 8, 1904 with whom he begot
four children. With his second wife he begot one daughter. With his third
wife he begot three children. Lupo died without will and left properties
which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupo's descendants by
his first and second manages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a Lot no. 163 in Muntinlupa.
It became a subject of voluntary registration proceedings and later an
OCT was issued to the said heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners
caused the subdivision of the said lot for which separate transfer
certificates of title were issued to the respective parties. Lupo's children
by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco filed with the lower court an
amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with 3 other lots
were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the
adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they were deprived of their
respective shares in the lots. Children of the third marriage pray for
partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the
deed of extrajudicial partition. Petitioners herein contend that Lupo and
Felipa were not validly married and that private respondents were not
legitimate children of their said parents, thus they were not entitled to a
share in the questioned lots.
Issue: Whether or Not Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were validly
married thus making private respondents legitimate children of Lupo
Mariategui thereby divesting them of their inheritance
Ruling: Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been
lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when
(his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and
(his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife,
and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage
certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered
to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have
taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of
legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record proves
the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no
evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced
before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents,
Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the
documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the
status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother
Jacinto.
Private respondents averred that in spite of their demands,
petitioners failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful
shares in the estate of their father. This allegation, though denied by the
petitioners was never successfully refuted by them. In spite of petitioners'
undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who
are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private
respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui.
 206. Irene Reyes vs. Court of Appeals birth, will, statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does
not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. She
135 SCRA 439 nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and the
action for this must be brought within the proper prescriptive period.
Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint praying that the defendant
Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the
Irene Reyes be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in
recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
favor of private respondents over parcels of land. They alleged in the
the presumed parents, except when the father or mother dies during the
complaint that the defendants thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit,
minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years from
misrepresentation and other falsifications succeeded in registering in the
the age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a
offices of the Register of Deeds subjected lands wherein defendant Reyes
document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
alleged that she was the sole child of the deceased Francisco Delgado and
either or both parents recognize the child, the action shall be brought
entitled to inherit the parcels of lands. Private respondents stated that
within four years from the finding of the document." Since Irene was
Reyes is not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, who died
already of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had
without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva Ramero and
not presented any discovered document wherein her presumed father
Justino Reyes; that private respondents, sisters and brother of the
recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already barred.
deceased Francisco Delgado are the heirs entitled to inherit from the
decedent. Dissent: Reyes’ filiation was proven in the Lower Court. The rule requiring
voluntary or compulsory recognition for the so-called spurious children or
Reyes alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter of the defendant
bastards is not mandatory. Article 289 of the Civil Code does not make
Romero and Delgado; her mother Ramero had separated from her lawful
such recognition mandatory. Irene's filiation as Francisco Delgado's child
husband Reyes and that she was born during the cohabitation of Delgado
was duly proven within the meaning of article 887. She is the nearest
and Ramero as common-law husband and wife, and since her birth, lived
compulsory and legal heir of Francisco. She excludes the brother, two
with her parents, who reared and treated her as their child, maintaining
sisters and niece of Francisco (Art. 988, Civil Code).
her and sending her through college. She had presented evidence of
filiation, yet the Court held that she is a spurious child of the decedent,
thus, cannot merit from the estate of Delgado as she was not recognized
voluntarily or by court action.

Issue: WON voluntary recognition or court action is needed for an

illegitimate child to be considered as an heir.

Ruling: The Court held that Irene may have proved is that she had been in
continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is not
natural. But such fact alone without a valid recognition in a record of
 207. Jison vs. CA, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS: In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA
alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO
impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny
of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6
August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by
his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO
gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a
Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and
eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to
expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her
illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such. At
trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven witnesses
ISSUE: Whether or not Monina was in continuous possession of her
claimed status of an illegitimate child
HELD: Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as
MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children. For the success of an action to
establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which
MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned
in the first paragraph, a high standard of proof is required. Specifically, to
prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in
society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. By continuous is
meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular
length of time.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by
MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that
occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO,
coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly
established the following facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time
when her mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts
and conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate,
thus:
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school
uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus,
defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a]
monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother,
acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija
or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellants monthly
allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz &
Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her
long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant
to use his surname in her scholastic and other records
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested
throughout the years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in
an uninterrupted manner.
 208. Mendoza vs. CA, 201 SCRA 675
FACTS: The private respondent, Teopista Toring Tufiacao, claimed she
was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied
her claim. Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age,
but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim. Vicente, who
professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring,
declared that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named
Ondoy, who later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a
lot to Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half-sister. It was
also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot. This
witness stressed that when Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never
once visited her alleged father.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teopista has sufficiently established her
relationship as illegitimate child.
HELD: To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues. The possession of such status means that
the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through
others, spontaneously and without concealment though without
publicity. There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care. The plaintiff lived with her
mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of
Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, that this could have been because
defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to
take his illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate
wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente
Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with
the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We
also note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this
is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the
regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently
established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were
"off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s
testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath she said that her
mother solely spent for her education and in another that Casimiro
helped in supporting her. But although Teopista has failed to show that
she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that
status by another method. An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed filiation "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is
her father," according to the Family Code. The trial court conceded that
"the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio
Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the
defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130,
Section 39, of the Rules of Court, regarding acts and declarations about
pedigree. Precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are
certain safeguards against its abuse. The following requisites have to be
complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be
admitted in evidence: a.) The declarant is dead or unable to testify, b.)
The pedigree must be in issue, c.) The declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in issue, d.) The declaration must be made
before the controversy arose, e.) The relationship between the declarant
and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence
other than such declaration. All the above requisites are present in the
case at bar.
 209. Marcelo vs. lee GR No. 118387 Oct. 7, 2001 therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh
Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latters children.
There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between
FACTS: This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners
same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private
respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife,
Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly
children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan, but whose
entries in the records of birth was falsified by their father (Lee Tek Sheng)
to appear that petitioners mother was Keh Shiok Cheng. Thus, private
respondents filed petitions to cancel and/or correct the false and
erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by
deleting and/or canceling therein the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as their
mother, and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is
allegedly the petitioners true birth mother.

ISSUES: Whether or not resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
is proper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and
filiation of petitioners.

RULING: Yes. It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as

the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by
private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners
records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth
records. Contrary to petitioners contention that the petitions before the
lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer
 210. Liyao vs Liyao GR No 138961 Mar 7 2002
FACTS: Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for
compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the late
William Liyao against herein respondents, the legitimate wife and
children of the deceased. Corazon is legally married but living separately
from her husband allegedly for more than ten years at the time of the
institution of this civil case. She cohabited with the late William until his
death. Petitioner alleged that he “was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao,” having been
“recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime and presented witnesses and evidence to prove his allegations.
On the other hand, respondents painted a different picture of the story.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner. CA reversed the ruling of
RTC, favoured the presumption of legitimacy of the child and gave weight
to the testimonies of the witnesses of the respondents that Corazon and
her husband were seen together during the period she cohabited with
the deceased.
1. No. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress (Art 167,FC).
2. No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present
petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband,
or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of
a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does
not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged
paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption. (Art 170-171, FC)

ISSUES:

1. WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel recognition

by respondents can prosper.

2. WON petitioner’s action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

RULING:
 211. [G.R. No. 157037. May 20, 2004.]
ECETA vs. ECETA
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J :
Facts: Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta.
During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The
couple acquired several properties. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind
Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died.
During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate
daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his
mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. Maria Theresa
filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for "Partition
and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of
her father's death, she became Rosalina's co-heir and co-owner of the
Cubao property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is
paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. The
court rendered judgment in favour of Theresa. Rosalina appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling.
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa's
birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this
act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over
Maria Theresa, thus: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1)
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

Issue: Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the
certificate of live birth (Exhibit A) is competent evidence to prove the
alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her
alleged father Vicente Eceta.

Whether the admission made by petitioner that respondent is her

granddaughter is enough to prove respondent's filiation with Vicente
Eceta, the only son of petitioner.

Held: The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria

Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed
and admitted, as duly noted in the trial court's pre-trial order, that Maria
Theresa is Rosalina's granddaughter. Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa
successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
 212. [G.R. No. 135817. November 30, 2006.]
RODRIGUEZ vs. LIM
CALLEJO, SR., J :
FACTS: Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the court a quo a complaint for
cancellation of certificate of title and injunction against the
spouses Rodriguez. In his complaint, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. alleged that his
mother, Dominga Goyma, was the owner of two parcels of land (subject
lots). The subject lots were registered in the name of Dominga Goyma.
Dominga Goyma died and was survived by her only son, Pablo
Goyma Lim, Jr., a spurious son acknowledged and recognized by her. The
complaint also alleged that during her lifetime, Dominga Goyma
exclusively possessed the subject lots and upon her death, Pablo
Goyma Lim, Jr. succeeded to all her rights of ownership and possession.
However, the spouses Rodriguez, despite their knowledge that Pablo
Goyma Lim, Jr., was now the owner and possessor of the subject lots,
allegedly unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear that they had
purchased the subject lots from persons who were not the owners
thereof. The spouses Rodriguez allegedly tried to enter and occupy the
subject lots by force and intimidation. The court rendered judgment in
favour of LIM, the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSOR-IN-
INTEREST, PABLO GO IMA LIM, WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES AND ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID PABLO
GO IMA LIM WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY HER [SIC] PARENTS AS AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND THE ALLEGED DOCUMENTS PROVING
HIS VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT DO NOT SUFFICE TO PROVE
HIS FILIATION TO HIS PARENTS.
HELD: The Court has laid down the manner of establishing the filiation of
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as follows: The filiation of
illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in, any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is required. In fact,
any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval.
Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to
prove that he was the illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga
Goyma.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
 213. Verceles vs. Posada itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
FACTS: This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision and the
Resolution of the CA which affirmed the Judgment of the RTC and held
petitioner liable to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada since her
birth. Petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity and filiation of Verna (2) Yes. Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for
Aiza Posada has not been duly established or proved in the proceedings; establishing filiation.
that the award for damages and attorneys fees has no basis; and that the
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a collateral action.
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
Posada as father and that it was respondent Clarissa who placed his name
alleged parent.
on the birth certificate as father without his consent. He further contends
the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of paternity
but mere expressions of concern and advice.
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which
ISSUES: establish Verna Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the FC. In addition,
the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters,
(1) Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for
pictures and testimonies, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that
damages with support pendente lite; (2) Whether or not the filiation of
Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven

RULING:

(1) Yes. A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although
its caption states Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite, Clarissa’s
averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his
amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her
child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish
a case for recognition of paternity. Due recognition of an illegitimate child
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
 214. Angeles vs. Maglaya
FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of
Manila, leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among other
valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole
legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an
administrator. Petitioner Belen claims, as Francisco’s second wife and
surviving spouse, that she should be made administratix of Francisco’s
estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter of
Francisco, for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate
daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him.
Further, she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the
legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented
the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any
acceptable document to prove such union. She also said that she and
Francisco adopted a child. Respondent in turn alleged that per
certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938
records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where
the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were
destroyed. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Pieces of evidence were
presented on her behalf.
ISSUE: WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Mercado.
RULING: NO
CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child
is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (Art.
146, FC). However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art. 164 may be
availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor.
Respondent failed to present evidence of Francisco’s marriage to
Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom
legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed
by the attending physician making it only proof of the fact of the birth of
a child.
The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot
be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or
midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. None of the
evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or
recognition. Further, RTC Caloocan, in the case respondent filed to nullify
the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their child, said that respondent is
NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from
claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva
Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to
Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially
determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has
thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or
litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a
subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter. Finally, it should
be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the
estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of
kin of the deceased.
 215. IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
FACTS: Honorato Catindig (petitioner) filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that
Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia,"
and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
The RTC granted the adoption but denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
ISSUE: W/N an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father,
may use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name
RULING: YES
Law is Silent as to the Use of Middle Name
The members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted
the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of
the child's mother as his middle name. They approved the suggestion that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall
bear the surname of the adopters." Again, it is silent whether he can use
a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.
The Underlying Intent of Adoption is in Favor of the Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not
merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations,
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the
adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998," secures these rights and privileges for the
adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
 216. LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS: Diwata Landingin (petitioner), a citizen of the US, of Filipino
parentage and a resident of Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are the natural
children of Manuel (petitioner's brother) and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
that when Manuel died, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother, Maria Ramos; Amelia went to Italy, re-married there and
now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws;
the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her
children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away, petitioner desires
to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-
year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married,
gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in
her own home in Guam, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with
the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the
minors. Petitioner's brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors
while in petitioner's custody. The RTC granted the adoption. The OSG
appealed. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the
written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos
RULING: NO
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for
the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child
without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and refusal to perform
the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds
presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and
neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement
of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time
of adoption.
PETITION IS DENIED
 217. CASIMIRO MENDOZA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 86302 to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own
September 24, 1991 defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of
modern medicine and technology
FACTS: Teopista Toring Tuñacao claimed that she was the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter has denied her claim. The
lower courts have denied Teopista’s claim for her failure to show that she
was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child of Casimiro because she never lived with and received support from
Casimiro. The lower courts also ruled that the declarations of Casimiro’s
relatives, that she is the daughter of Casimiro, are not sufficient to prove
her filiation.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Section 39 of Rule 130 (Acts or declaration

about pedigree) may be used in proving filiation.

HELD: YES. All the requisites in applying Section 39 of Rule 130 are
present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about
the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida
Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of the
testimony of Casimiro’s cousin. The declarations referred to the filiation
of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues
involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations
were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the
controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship
between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence
other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the
estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of
his heirs. The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could
have done this by deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the
trial of the case. In view of the circumstances of this case, Teopista has
proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is
entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the
policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice
 218.VICTORIA C. TAYAG v. CA G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008
FACTS: Felicidad Tayag (respondent), illegitimate child of the decedent,
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the
estate of Ismael Tayag. Victoria Tayag, who claims to be the legitimate
wife of the deceased, opposed the petition. She averred, among others,
that it is necessary to allege that Felicidad was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There being no such
allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot
be brought after the death of the putative father.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may be allowed to prove her illegitimacy.
HELD: YES. Felicidad must be allowed to adduce proof of her illegitimacy
to be able to know whether she falls under the first paragraph of Article
172 or the second paragraph thereof. There is a need to determine if her
petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been
foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a
material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the
decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate
filiation.
219. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. In his petition, he prayed that Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mother’s maiden name, and her surname be
changed to Catindig. The court granted the petition, changing the child’s
name to Stephanie Nathy Catindig pursuant to Art 189 of the Family
Code, instituted her as Honorato’s legitimate child and heir. Honorato
filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that the child be
allowed to use her mother’s maiden name as her middle name. The OSG
agreed with Honorato in order for her relationship with her mother be
maintained and preserved to prevent any confusion and hardship in the
future, and under Art 189, remain an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural
father, use the surname of her mother as her middle name
HELD:
Yes, there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, in this case, Stephanie, from using as middle name her
mother’s surname. RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) states that
an illegitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of
any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and
mother. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
 220. DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, Petitioner, vs REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006]

FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition
for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the
former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. Diwata alleged in her petition that
when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there
and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer
communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were
being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their
written consent for their adoption. However, Diwata failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the

written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.

HELD:
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents
is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of
the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the
legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that
the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she
should thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
221. MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who
REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO v. CA G.R. have disowned them.
No. 125041 June 30, 2006

FACTS: At the time of the institution of this Petition, the twins were
about to enter college in the US where Mangonon, together with her
daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. The
expensive tuition in the US has constrained Belen to seek the aid of the
Court to compel the father and the grandfather of the twins to give them
financial support for their education in the US. The Delgados claim that
they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their
obligation to support the twins. Their choice for that matter was to send
the twins back to the Philippines and let them study in any of the local
universities. Francisco (grandfather) further claims that he should not be
compelled to give support since the same is the primary responsibility of
the parents.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Francisco may be compelled to support his

grandchildren despite the presence of the parents of the twins and
whether or not the Delgados may choose the manner of giving support.

HELD: YES. The SC ordered Francisco, who was proven to be well-off, to

support his grandchildren on the basis of Article 199, considering that
their parents were not capable of supporting their children. The SC
ordered Francisco the payment of support in arrears since the twins may
have already finished their schooling by the time this decision was
rendered. The amount of support to be paid was computed from the time
they entered college until they had finished their respective studies. NO.
With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by
the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been
affected. It would be difficult for Rica and Rina to accept the fact that
those persons they consider and claim as family denied having any
familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and
 222. CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO
CASTILLO, respondent. A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003
FACTS: Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children
when he had an affair with Carmelita Zaguirre. Zaguirre then got
pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter. The latter, who was
already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and
promising for her support which did not materialize after the birth
of the child and now he is facing disbarment.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Castillo is guillty of gross immoral
conduct. (Support)
HELD: YES. Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a
woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a
child whom he previously recognized and promised to support.
Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality
required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his
notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by
Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is
highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession,
tantamount to self-stultification.
223. AURELIA DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA vs. RAFAEL VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. L-29959 December 3, 1929
Facts: Aurelia instituted an action against her husband, Rafael, for the
purpose of obtaining separate maintenance and custody of the two
younger minor children, Guillermo and Sergio Villanueva. The grounds on
which separate maintenance is sought infidelity and cruelty. Proof
showed that during the period of about ten years prior to the institution
of the action, the defendant was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with
four different women, and even after the action was begun, he is shown
to have had illicit relations with still another. In the end, the events led to
a final separation.
Issue: Whether the wife can seek separate maintenance against the
husband
Ruling: Yes. Repeated acts of conjugal infidelity on the part of the
husband are proved, and he appears to be a recurrent, if not an incurable
offender against the sanctity of the marriage tie. This give the wife an
undeniable right to relief. The law is not so unreasonable as to require a
wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable
propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him
unbearable. As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia vs. Campos Rueda
(35 Phil., 252, 262), a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve
himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a
husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife
from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her
departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and
repudiate his duties thereunder.
 224. MARIA QUINTANA vs. GELASIO LERMA
G.R. No. L-7426 February 5, 1913
Facts: Maria filed an action against her husband, Gelasio for support
which is based upon a written contract of separation whereby each
renounced certain rights as against the other and divided the conjugal
property between them. Gelasio undertaking in consideration of the
premises to pay Maria within the first three days of each month the sum
of P20 for her support and maintenance. Gelasio set up as a special
defense that the wife had forfeited her right to support by committing
adultery. This allegation was stricken out by the court on motion, upon
the ground that commission of adultery is not recognized as a ground
upon which the obligation to support ceases. The court refused to
recognize such defense or to permit any evidence to be introduced in
support thereof.

Issues: (1) Whether the written agreement made by the parties is void.
(2) Whether adultery may be permitted as a special defense against
action for support

Ruling: (1) Yes. Article 1432 of the Civil Code provides: "In default of
express declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the
property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only take place by virtue
of a judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50."
Under this article the agreement in suit is void. The wife, however, has a
right of action against her husband for support under the provisions of
the Civil Code and, although the contract in question is void, her right of
action does not for that reason fail.
(2) Yes. We are of the opinion that the special defense of adultery set up
by the defendant in his answer both to the original and the amended
complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained will
defeat the action.
 225. Lorenzo Mendoza vs Georgina Parungao et.al for support. However, Paruñgao is entitled to payment in advance of her
share to the conjugal property, if such exists. CFI’s order of monthly
41 Phil 471 August 7, 1926 payment is to be considered an advance of conjugal property share but
no writ of execution can be issued thereon because of excess of
Facts: On August 7, 1925, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
jurisdiction and its interlocutory character.
rendered judgment in civil case No. 3745 of said court in which the herein
respondent Gorgonia Paruñgao was plaintiff and the herein petitioner
Lorenzo Mendoza defendant, declaring the marriage between the two
null on account of the return of the first husband of the petitioner, who
had been though dead after an absence of more than seven years,
howeer, the first husband subsequently died.

While the first judgment was on appeal, Paruñgao filed for

alimony and settlement of her conjugal property with Mendoza on
September 1925.

Subsequently, the court directed Mendoza to give Paruñgao

monthly support. However, the writs of execution were not complied
with.

Issue: Whether or not Paruñgao, when she filed for liquidation of

conjugal property and alimony, is entitled to support during pendency of
the action.

Held: No. The right to support between spouses arises from law (art. 143
of the Civil Code) and is based upon their obligation to mutually help each
other created by the matrimonial bond. After the complaint for
annulment of marriage has been filed by the wife and admitted she is
entitled to support during the pendency of the suit (arts. 67 and 68, par.
4, Civil Code), but once the nullity is decreed, the right ceases, because
the mutual obligation created by the marriage is extinguished. The
marriage of the respondent with the petitioner having been annulled on
August 7, 1925, by virtue of the rule enunciated, she was no longer
entitled to support on September 14, 1925, when she filed her complaint
 226. Luis Francisco vs Francisco Zandueta such son. His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that
nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law
61 Phil 752 August 9, 1935 or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who
claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by
Facts: It appears that the respondent, Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, aged
legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises
two years, through his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Rosario
a presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there
Gomez, instituted an action for support against the herein petitioner in
is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, case No. 47238. In that
must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final
case it is alleged that the therein plaintiff is the acknowledged son of Luis
judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status,
Francisco and as such is entitled to support. The petitioner, as defendant
from which the right to support is derived, being in issue, it is apparent
in that case, answered by a general denial of each and every material
that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative
allegation contained in the complaint and as a special defense alleged
declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.
that he never acknowledged and could not have acknowledged that he
never acknowledged and could not have acknowledged the plaintiff as his
son; that he was not present at the baptism of the plaintiff and that he
was married at the time it is alleged that the plaintiff was born. Hence, he
is not entitled to support.

Issue: Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without

first establishing his status as petitioner’s son

Held: No. Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound
to support each other: (1) Husband and wife, (2) legitimate ascendants
and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the
legitimate descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children
not having the legal status of natural children and (5) brothers and sisters.
In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis
of the action for support, the civil status of marriage or that of
relationship.

Paraphrasing the language used in the decision in the Yangco case it may
be said that in the present case the action for support is brought by a
minor, through his guardian ad litem, who alleges that he is the son of the
petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as
 227. QUIMIGUING vs ICAO
FACTS: Parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations. Defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in
having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation, and without her consent. As a result she became pregnant,
despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages
and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of
action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born;
and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's
motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a
result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but
the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment
was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and
damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint
HELD: A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child
is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet
unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same
Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary
heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator
Article 854, Civil Code)
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man
forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear
violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation
for the damage caused.
 228. ADVINCULA vs ADVINCULA
FACTS: Sometime in 1956, Manuela Advincula filed Civil Case No. 3553,
CFI of Iloilo, against Manuel Advincula, for acknowledge merit and
support. On motion of both parties, said case was dismissed. On January
16, 1961, Manuela Advincula filed the complaint under consideration
against the same Manuela Advincula, also acknowledgment and support,
Civil Case No. 5659, same court. Instead of filing his answer, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 3553 barred the filing of the second complaint. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that as the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 3553, was without reservation, the same was with prejudice.
waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the
subject of compromise (Art. 2035). This being true it is indisputable that
the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact
that the previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed.
And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an
adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein
plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment
is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has
the right to bring the action for support, for it is only then that her cause
of action accrues. The right to ask support is demandable from the date in
which plaintiff was in need of the same.

It appears that the former dismissal was predicated up a compromise.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the former was with prejudice. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does civil status of persons and future
support, cannot be subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil
Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not
HELD: In both Civil Cases Nos. 3553 and 5659, the action of the plaintiff bar the filing of another action, asking the same relief against the same
was for acknowledgment and support. Judgment for support does not defendant.
become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that needy party is
entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in
accordance with his increase or decreased needs, and with the means of
the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.

The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional
because the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the
means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the
right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to
a third person; neither can it be compensated with what the recipient
owes the obligor (Art. 301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be
 229. Jocson vs. Empire Insurance Co., 103 Phil 580 where it appears that the minors had means of their own.” Therefore, the
disbursements made by Agustin, which were even sanctioned by the
lower court, are not illegal. Claim for support should also be done in a
separate action, not in guardianship proceedings. Judgment affirmed;
Facts:
without costs since (case) is a pauper’s appeal.
Agustin Jocson was appointed guardian of the persons and
properties of his minor children Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and Jesus,
had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co. for surety and managed his
children’s properties that included war damage payments, which formed
part of their inheritance from their mother. After his death, Perla, who
had already reached age of majority and thereafter appointed guardian of
her still minor brothers Enrique and Jesus, filed a petition for the
reopening of Agustin’s accounts, claiming that illegal disbursements were
made from the guardianship funds for education and clothing. Upon
reaching age of majority, Enrique and Jesus adopted the petition and
moved for declaration of illegality of disbursements—which Empire
Insurance Co. and Agustin’s administratrix appealed from—on the ground
that these should have come instead from the support, which they were
entitled to receive from their father.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners-appellants’ contention their father’s

disbursements from their guardianship funds are illegal are valid?

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes

education and clothing) must be demanded and established before it
becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners’ mere
relationship with their father. “The need for support, as already stated,
cannot be presumed and especially must this be true in the present case
 230. Baltazar vs. Serfino, 14 SCRA 820 residence and his tailoring shop was profiting well.
2. No. The Supreme Court ruled that obligation to give
support shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to receive it needs it for maintenance.
Facts:
However, it shall not be paid from the date it is
Olympia, a widow, bore the son of Sergio, a married man, on extrajudicially demanded.
December 19, 1943. She contends that the amount granted by the court
should have been P50, payable from the time of Armenio’s birth except
for the period of May 1957 to April 1959 when the child was living with
his father and that the defendant-appellee should pay P1000 on account
of attorney’s fees.

Issue:

1. Whether the amount of support should be increased?

2. Whether the defendant should pay a monthly support
dating from his son’s birth?

Ruling:

1. Yes. According to Art. 196 of the Civil Code, the amount

of support should be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the needs of the recipient. The
lower court found that defendant-appellee, who was
supporting his wife and legitimate children, was earning
amply from his rice mill, ten-hectare land and palay
produce, which places his average annual income at
P1,085. Additionally, the court took notice of the facts
that he does not need to pay rent for his family’s
 231. DE MARCAIDA VS REDFERN 41 PHIL. 271
G.R. No. L-26062;December 31, 1926
TOPIC: SUPPORT

FACTS: The plaintiffs are Jose V. Ramirez and his wife, Eloisa de Marcaida.
The defendant is J. R. Redfern. Jose V. Ramirez and J. R. Redfern are
brothers-in-law. Mrs. Redfern and her children were left to live in England
from 1910 to 1922 while the defendant went back to the Philippines. He
constantly provided them with financial support although from February
to October of 1922, he could only provide them with $8 per month. On
1920 Mrs. Redfern obtained from her sister, herein plaintiff, the sum of
$600, $185, (which she had not made use of until 1922) and $875 after
she had returned to the Philippines, for support and maintenance. All
these were obtained by Mrs. Redfern without the defendant’s
knowledge.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE TO PAY FOR THE

ADVANCES MADE BY THE PLAINTIFFS TO HIS WIFE.

RULING: NO. The case falls squarely within the provisions of the first
paragraph of article 1894 of the Civil Code. This article provides: "When
without the knowledge of the person who is bound to give support to a
dependent, a stranger supplies it, the latter shall be entitled to recover
the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it out of charity,
and without the expectation of recovering it." For one to recover under
the provisions of article 1894 of the Civil Code, it must be alleged and
proved, first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one bound
to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was
supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. The
negative qualification is when the support is given without the
expectation of recovering it.
 232. SANTOS VS CA 242 SCRA 407 protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995 latter's needs.
It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for
FACTS: Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of the latter’s the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as
parents ever since the child was born. The grandparents were the ones well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart
who provided support for the child, since Leouel cannot afford to do so. and senses.
Julia then left for the States to work but Leouel does not know where. As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex
The grandparents claim that Julia has been sending financial support to of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
her son. On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child from his welfare of the minor.
grandparents. The grandparents then filed for custody of the boy, which
the trial court granted. Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents
have failed to show the he is unfit to be the father and that the substitute
parental authority granted to the boy’s grandparents was inappropriate.
The respondents claim that they are financially well-off to take care of the
son, while Leouel is not. They can provide the child with an air-
conditioned room since he is asthmatic. Also, Julia has entrusted the boy
to them. Leouel’s use of trickery to abduct the child also is a sign of his
unfitness. They likewise claim that they are in the best position to take
care of the child, and this should be the primary consideration of the
court.

ISSUE: WON LEOUEL SHOULD BE AWARDED PROPER CUSTODY

HELD: Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be an unfit parent. The
fact hat he kidnapped his son from the latter’s maternal grandparents
does not render him unfit. Also, disqualifying him as custodian because of
the nature of his work (soldier) would mean depriving all soldiers of their
child’s company. Only in cases of death, absence or unsuitability of
parents may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparents.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is
the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and
 233. SAGALA-ESLAO VS CA [Parental Authority]
FACTS: When Maria Paz's husband Reynaldo Eslao died, she entrusted
custody of her youngest child Angelica to her grieving mother-in-law. She
then returned to her mother's house with Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz
got married to a Japanese-American and live with him in the US. After
this she returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and
bring them to the US. She then informed Teresita about her desire to take
custody of Angelica her new husband's willingness to adopt her children.
Teresita refused, and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica when
she was 10 days old. Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the
return of the custody of Angelica to her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody
of the child
RULING: No. The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is
one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law
and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created
by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the
parental relationship. Thus, when Maria entrusted the custody of
Angelica to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary
custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of
parental authority. The law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution.
234. VANCIL VS BELMES [Parental Authority]
FACTS: The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent,
the children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural
mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for removal of
Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural
mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject
minors. Trial court rejected Belmes'petition. Since Valerie had reached
the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court
resolves to determine who between the mother and grandmother of
minor Vincent should be his guardian.
ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is considered the guardian of Vincent
having continuous parental authority over the latter
RULING: Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the
preferential right to be his guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons
of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Vancil,
as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority
only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that
Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental authority
over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that
Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot qualify as a
substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like
her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian.
 235. Espiritu vs. CA, 242 SCRA 362
FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding
first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City. In 1977, Teresita left for Los
Angeles to work as a nurse, and subsequently acquired immigrant status.
In 1984, Reynaldo was sent to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer, and
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship
of husband and wife. Two years later, their daughter Rosalind was born.
In 1987, while on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and
Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their
second child, Reginald, was born. The couple separated in 1990. Teresita
then left Reynaldo and their children and returned to the U.S. In 1992,
Teresita returned to gain custody over her children. The trial court
granted custody to the father. It considered the fact that the clear choice
of both children was the father, and considered the testimony of the child
therapist attending to them. According to the therapist, Rosalind was
suffering from anxiety and all her responses about her mother were
negative. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an incident where
she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their
house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother
even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because
of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family
to go back to the United States to live with her mother.
mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not
conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons." If a child is over
seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that
choice. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the
paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is
given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child,
and award the custody on the basis of that consideration; taking into
account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents.
Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be
ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child.
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent
who was given custody suffers a future character change and becomes
unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted. To
be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the
child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be
the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of age
and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.

ISSUE: Whether the presumption of law (that children under 7 years of

age be under the custody of the mother) is controlling in this case

RULING: The Court awarded custody to the father, the choice of both
children. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the
 236. Medina vs. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502
FACTS: Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph
Casero in the clinic owned and operated by respondent Dr. Venancia
Makabili. The child was to be her third child, whom she had with a
married man, Feliciano Casero. The mother left the child with Dra.
Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her
own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del
Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent him to school.
From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and
never paid for his expenses.
The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano
Casero with her two other children apparently with the tolerance, if not
the acquiescence, of Casero's lawful wife who resides elsewhere.
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of
her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all
questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Art. 363, Civil Code,) and that for
compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated
from the mother. This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of
legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus
vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the
offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different
institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The
obligational aspect is now supreme.

ISSUE: Whether, in the determination of the custody of a minor, the

biological parent should be preferred over a foster parent

RULING: The right of parents to the company and custody of their

children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to
provide the children with adequate support, education, moral,
intellectual and civic training and development (Art. 356, Civil Code). As
remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss
in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love
and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest
years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what
advantage the child could derive from being coerced to abandon
respondent's care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and
witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter's
legitimate wife.
237. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS whose father is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook
OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are
G.R. NO. 7995. January 27, 1989. legally married appear to be morally, socially and financially capable.
Besides, the minor had been legally adopted by petitioners with full
FACTS knowledge and consent of respondents.

Minor Angelie was born to respondents common-law husband Accordingly, the Court granted the custody and care of the minor
and wife Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon. Respondents offered the to petitioners to whom they properly belong.
child for adoption to petitioners spouses Cervantes whom are Gina
Carreon’s sister and brother-in-law. The appropriate petition for adoption
was filed and granted in favor of the petitioners. Thereafter, while
petitioners were out at work, respondent Gina brought the child to her
house. Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but respondent
refused. She sent a word that she will return the child to petitioners if she
were paid the amount of P150,000.00. The petitioners filed the present
petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the person of minor Angelie
Anne Cervantes.

ISSUE

Whether or not the custody and care of the minor Angelie should
be granted to her adopters and not to her natural parents

RULING

In all controversies regarding the custody, care, education and

property of children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. The provision that
no mother shall be separated from a child under (now seven [7] years of
age) will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. The common-law relationship of the minor’s natural parents
will not accord the latter the desirable atmosphere where she can grow
into an upright person. Also, respondent Gina had previously given birth
to another child of different father. For a minor to grow up with a sister
 238. DAISIE DAVID VS. COURT OF APPEALS child to him. Accordingly, the Court ordered private respondent to deliver
250 SCRA 82 the minor Christopher J. to the custody of his mother.

FACTS

Petitioner David had an intimate relationship with her former

employer, private respondent Ramon Villar, a married man, which
resulted to the birth of a son named Christopher J. Villar asked Daisie to
allow Christopher J., then six (6) years of age, to go with his family for a
vacation. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

ISSUE

Whether or not the mother of a an illegitimate minor, who may

not be enjoying a life of affluence, as opposed to the offer of luxurious life
by the father if the minor should live with him, is entitled to the custody
of her minor child

RULING

The Court held that it is enough that the mother is earning a

decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.
A child less than seven (7) years of age cannot be taken from the
mother’s custody. Even now that the child is over seven (7) years of age,
the mother’s custody over him will have to be upheld because the child
categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213
of the Family Code, “courts must respect the choice of the child over
seven (7) years of age, unless the chosen parent is unfit” and here it has
not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of
her child. If private respondent (the father) loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of the custody of the
 239. HORACIO LUNA and LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON ROQUE A. TAMAYO, as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR Branch CXXXI1 Makati,
Metro Manila, MARIA LOURDES SANTOS, and SIXTO SALUMBIDES,
respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the
petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-
Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her correspondent Sixto
Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known
as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.
It appears that two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley
Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a
childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her
with love and affection and brought her up as their very own. The couple
doted upon Shirley who called them "Mama" and "Papa". She calls her
natural parents "Mommy" and "Daddy." A few months before
September, 1980, her "Mama" and "Papa" decided to take Shirley to
America. Respondents refused to give written consent to the child’s
application for a U.S. Visa. Petitioners left with Shirley private
respondents, upon the latter's request. When the petitioners returned on
October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents had transferred
Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also
refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the said respondents allow
Shirley to visit the petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the
private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and deliver her to
their care and custody. The Court of First Instance declared the
petitioners entitled to the child's custody and forthwith granted the writ
prayed for, which the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not procedural rules, more particularly the duty of lower
courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody
cases, should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the
child?
Held:
Yes. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or
run away from home if she should be taken away from the herein
petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents, made during
the hearings on the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution
and reiterated in her letters to the members of the Court and during the
hearing of the case before this Court, is a circumstance that would make
the execution of the judgment rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the
care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare
is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override
procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their
children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at
stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent
choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning
and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an
atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual
development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to
a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care and
understanding, guidance and counseling. and moral and material security.
 240. G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005 Ruling:

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner, Yes. Article 213 of the Family Code provides that: “In case of separation of
vs. the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant
Trial Court Parañaque City, Branch 260; and JOYCELYN D. PABLO- considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
GUALBERTO, respondents. unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
Facts: to order otherwise." This Court has held that when the parents are
separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the
custody of their child. The general rule that children under seven years of
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City a petition for declaration of nullity
age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison d’etre in the
of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer
basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving care. Based on
for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello,
jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that
whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and
Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her
his school when she decided to abandon Crisanto sometime in early
purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of
February 2002. Judge Helen B. Ricafort, on a judgment rended April 3,
their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper
2002, awarded custody pendent elite of the child to Crisanto, on account
moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no
of testimony that Jocelyn is engaged in a lesbian relationship and that she
evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual
does not care for the child as she often goes out of the house. The Judge
proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development
allegedly issued the assailed Order reversing her Order of April 3, 2002
suffered as a result. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
and this time awarding custody of the child to Jocelyn. On the one hand,
wrench the child from the mother’s custody.
the mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the Family Code, her
minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father
argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling
reasons," he must be awarded custody of the child.

Issue:

Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded the

custody of the child to the father, violated Art. 213 of the Family Code,
which mandates that ‘no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.’?
 241. CHARLTON TAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ABEDNEGO O. ADRE, which can be properly ventilated in a full-blown hearing scheduled by the
respondent. court for that purpose.

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1898 / January 31, 2005
Facts:
Tan was the respondent in a habeas corpus case filed by his wife Rosana
Reyes-Tan. After giving due course to the petition, Judge Adre issued the
writ and ordered Tan to bring before the court the body of their
daughter, Charlene Tan. On the date of hearing, the court provisionally
turned over the custody of the child to the mother.
Tan filed a verified complaint alleging that Adre acted with grave abuse of
authority when the latter hurriedly turned over the custody of their
daughter to his wife immediately after their lawyers entered their
appearances. He argues that the judge should have considered Rosana's
fitness as a mother as she is not qualified for she is working in Japan and
is now involved with another man.
The acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not subject
to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or bad faith. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action even though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to
liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts, no
matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint
against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review
and correction, because an administrative complaint is not an appropriate
remedy where judicial recourse is still available.

Issue:

W/N Judge Adre committed grave abuse of discretion in turning over the
custody of Charlene to Rosana

Held:

No, the law grants the mother the custody of a child under seven years of
age. Charlene was only four years old. Note also, that the questioned
order was only provisional, meaning temporary, preliminary or tentative.
The provisional custody granted to the mother of the child does not
preclude complainant from proving the compelling reasons cited by him
242. JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P.
MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 156343 / October 18, 2004
Facts:
Joey Briones filed a petition for habeas corpus to obtain the custody of his
minor child, Michael Kevin Pineda, against Maricel P. Miguel and
Francisca P. Miguel. The petition was later amended to include Loreta P.
Miguel, Michael's mother, as one of the respondents. Briones alleges that
Michael is his illegitimate son with Loreta who is now married to a
Japanese national and presently resides in Japan. He also alleges that he
caused Michael to be brought here in the Philippines so that he could
take care of him and send him to school.
In 2001, Briones alleges that Maricel and Francisca came to their
house in Caloocan and requested if they could bring Michael to SM for
recreation. However, they never brought Michael back.
Briones alleges that he went to Maricel in Tuguegarao City several
times but was informed that Michael is now with his mother at Batal
Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, he was told that Michael was
in Tuguegarao City. He asked the assistance of the Police and the DSWD
but to no avail, compelling him to file the abovementioned petition for
habeas corpus.
Loreta denies that it was Maricel and Francisca who took Michael
and alleges that it was her who took Michael, to which Briones agreed
and consented. She also alleges that Briones was deported from Japan
after having been found to have committed an infraction under Japanese
laws.
The CA awarded Michael's custody to Loreta, applying Art. 213 of
the Family Code. The CA acknowledged that while Briones indeed loved
his son, they found no reason why Michael should be separated from his
mother. Briones argues that while Loreta has a preferential right over
their mother child, custody should be awarded to him whenever the
latter leaves for Japan.
Issue:
W/N Briones, as the natural father, may be denied by the custody and
parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away
Held:
No. Firstly, Michael is already with his mother in Japan and is studying
there which renders the case moot. Secondly, Art. 176 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.
In David v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the recognition of an
illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to
give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to
the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows
that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over
the minor.
Also, Art. 213 of the Family Code provides that no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to
exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else.
 243. St. Mary’s Academy vs William Carpitanos The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries
FACTS: caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
Herein petitioner St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for
damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court
the school year 1995-1996. They visited schools from where there were
for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein
prospective enrollees. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign along with
petitioner.
the other high school students and rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
Vivencio Villanueva. They went to Larayan Elementary School. The said
jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same
school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which
resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

RULING:

SC reversed the decision and did not hold St. Mary liable but instead held
Vivencio Villanueva--the owner of the mitsubishi jeep liable.

There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.
 244. Republic vs CA, GR NO. 97906, May 21, 1992

FACTS:
Maximo Wong petitioned for the change of his name to Maximo Alcala,
Jr. whichwas his name prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong. Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo
Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y.Alcala. Siblings Maximo Alcala, Jr. (2 ½ years
old) and Margaret Alcala (9 years old)were adopted by Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong (naturalized Filipinocitizens) with the consent of
their parents. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while
Concepcion TyWong was a high school teacher. They decided to adopt
the children as theyremained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The
couple showered theiradopted children with parental love and reared
them as their own children. Maximo Wong (22 years old) then married
and a junior Engineering student atNotre Dame University, Cotabato City,
filed a petition to change his name toMaximo Alcala, Jr.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Maximo Wong may legally change his name to Maximo
Alcala, Jr.

HELD:
Maximo Wong may legally change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. Change
of name is a privilege, given the proper or reasonable cause or compelling
reason. SC was guided by the jurisprudential dictum that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of
identification, and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced and the
consequences that will likely follow;
It is a privilege which may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or
reasonable cause or compelling reason therefore.
 245. VALERIO KALAW VS. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ
GR NO. 166357 January 14, 2015
FACTS: Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses (a psychologist and a priest/canon law expert) who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts
heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment
of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife,
constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD. However, the
Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that
there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
Hence, the MR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of
psychological incapacity
HELD:YES.
Molina guidelines(Republic vs. CA) were not abandoned, expert opinions
were just given much respect in this case. The Court held that the
guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid,
such that their application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read
and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency
in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of
nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity
that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence,
every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence
must be considered. The totality of the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of
facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and
be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on
the causation.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to
such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment,
least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of
the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently
and competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We
uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because
they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should
not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of
the petitioner’s factual premises.
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental
duties
The marriage was declared null and void ab initio due to they
psychological incapacity of BOTH parties under Art. 36. FC.
 246. GLENN VINAS VS. MARY GRACE PAREL-VINAS
GR NO. 208790 January 21, 2015
FACTS: In 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, got
married in civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas. The couple lived together
under one roof. In March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the
time the instant petition was filed (2009), Mary Grace had not returned
yet. Glenn sought submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by
Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag assessed Mary
Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and
his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in
college. Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. (*lived separately
for 4 years)
ISSUE: Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
HELD: No.
The lack of personal examination of assessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr.
Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not
sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s
condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing,
strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores. Further, she
is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with another man. She
has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time
the latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is
conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace.
While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the
latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be
rooted in some psychological illness.
Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years
into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In
fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful
when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their
problems only came in later.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will"
on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to
a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated
by said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the
original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for
more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established
fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an
impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their home in 2006 indicates
either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply
with her obligation to live with her husband.
 247. Robert F. Mallilin vs. Luz G. Jamesolamin
GR No. 192718
Facts:
Robert and Luz were married. They begot three (3) children. Robert filed
a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC. Robert
alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from psychological and mental incapacity. Such incapacity
became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited
clear manifestation of immaturity and inability to cope with the heavy
obligations of a parent. Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim stating
that it was Robert who was psychologically incapacitated. Robert
disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married
an American. While the case was pending before the trial court, Robert
filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of
First Instance which declared their marriage void ab initio. RTC had
rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The OSG interposed an appeal arguing that
Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Luz, arguing that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual
infidelity of Luz. The OSG contended, such ground should not result in the
nullification of the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a
ground for legal separation.
No. Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. The Court
is of the considered view that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the
psychological incapacity. As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds
for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Additionally, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to
prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court stated that
interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the totality of evidence adduced proves that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting its annulment under Art. 36 of the Family Code

Held:
 248. Philippine National Bank vs. Jose Garcia and Children
GR No. 182839
Facts:
The spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia obtained a loan facility from
the petitioner, Philippine National Bank initially for P150,000.00. The loan
was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their property. Jose Sr. (the
dad) agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subject
property as additional collateral security for the latter’s increased loan.
On maturity of the loan, the spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan. The
respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of
Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, as they acquired the subject property
during their marriage; that upon Ligaya’s death, Jose Sr., together with his
children by law, became owners pro indiviso of the subject property and
that the petitioner bank was at fault for not including Jose Sr. as payee to
the check representing the loan despite its knowledge that Jose Sr. was a
signatory to the real estate mortgage. the Spouses Garcia alleged that
Jose Sr. was indebted to them in the amount of P133,800.00. To settle
this indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the subject property as
additional security for their (the Garcias’) loan to the petitioner bank. The
petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage was made
in good faith and for value and that the real estate mortgage over the
properties was duly registered and inscribed on their titles and was thus
binding on the whole world.
partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." Because of the
petitioner bank’s failure to rebut the allegation that the subject property
was acquired during the former’s marriage to Ligaya, the legal
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to this
property. Upon the death of Ligaya, the conjugal partnership was
converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving
spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.
Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property after
the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the
right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed
property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property
without his children’s consent. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void
insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children because they
did not give their consent to the transaction.

Issue:

Whether or not the property is conjugal

Held:

Yes. Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, their property relations were governed by the conjugal
 249. GR.No.200169 Jan 28, 2015 AGUILAR v SIASAT, treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
FACTS: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died, approval. It must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March
intestate. Included in their estate are two parcels of land. In June 1996, 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-
petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil case Aguilar and before their respective deaths has sufficiently proved that he
for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly
Siasat. He alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof
the Aguilar spouses; that he discovered that the subject titles were of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of
missing, so he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed a the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of
Petition for the issuance of second owner’s copy of Certificate of Title, legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
which respondent opposed; and during the hearing of the said Petition, instrument and signed by the parent concerned." Petitioner has shown
respondent presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records
subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed that respondent be ordered to covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City
surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles in her were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other
possession. Respondent however, claimed that petitioner is not the son documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1– to
and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as
was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a
and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the
same being an express recognition in a public instrument.
ISSUE: W/N SSS E-1 acknowledged and notarized before a notary public,
executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the petitioner as his son is a
sufficient proof to establish filiation.
HELD: The Court grants the Petition. The filiation of illegitimate children,
like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be
proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is
 250. GR.No.193225 February 9, 2015 BBB vs. AAA
FACTS: BBB and started to date in 1996. AAA was then a medical student
and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy
named CCC. During the relationship with BBB, AAA bore two more
children namely, DDD and EEE. BBB and AAA married in civil rights and
thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including CCC’s, was
amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said
marriage. The relationship, was far from ideal and has had its share of
happy moments and heated arguments. BBB alleges that AAA’s irrational
jealousy has caused their frequent arguments and because of their
repeated fights, he was forced to leave the family . Soon after BBB left,
AAA herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children
with her, which made it difficult for BBB to see their kids regularly. This
has also caused the family expense to double, making it even more
difficult for BBB to fulfill his financial obligations. AAA, on the other hand,
alleges that their heated arguments were often due to BBB’s incessant
womanizing. Extremely hurt, AAA decided to leave the conjugal home
with the children and lived temporarily at a friend’s house. Citing the
foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed an
application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a
request to make the same permanent. Finding good ground in AAA’s
application, RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter, made
permanent.CA affirmed.
ISSUES: W/N THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED?
HELD: The deletion from the PPO of the directive of the RTC and the CA
relative to the award of support is not warranted. While CCC is not BBB’s
biological son, he was legitimated under the latter’s name. Like DDD and
EEE, CCC is entitled to receive support from BBB.
BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody,
which allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to
support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. This Court is not
persuaded.Article 177 of the Family Code provides that "[o]nly children
conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other may be legitimated." Article 178 states that
"[l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between
parents."
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s
biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC
legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly then,
the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but
falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code
pertinently provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
The principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from
making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should
not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own
misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation
process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the
Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a
legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s support.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from
raising before the proper court the issue of CCC’s status and filiation.
However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this
Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that "the civil status [of a
child] cannot be attacked collaterally." The child’s legitimacy "cannot be
contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for
a different purpose." The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application
for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological
son is a collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.
 251. ROSALDES VS. PEOPLE Rosaldes, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school. Such
GR 173988 October 8, 2014 circumstances prove child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned
the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael as a human being.
FACTS: Michael Ryan was a Grade 1 student in a public elementary
school. In a hurry to enter his classroom, he accidentally bumped the
knee of his teacher, Ms. Felina Rosaldes who was then sleeping in a
bamboo sofa. Rosaldes pushed him in the floor. Michael Ryan fell, hit a
desk, and lost consciousness. Nevertheless, Rosaldes picked him up by
the ear and repeatedly slammed him on the floor. Michael went home
crying. Rosaldes got criminally charged for child abuse. Rosaldes justifies
her acts by saying that she is a school teacher and that she only acted to
discipline her student, Michael Ryan.

ISSUE/S: Rosaldes’ manner of exercising of parental authority over

student, Michael Ryan justified?

RULING: Although not every instance of laying of hands on a child

constitutes child abuse, under Art. 233 of the FC, the person exercising
substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school
administrator, teacher, or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child.

Her infliction of physical maltreatment is clearly prohibited under said

provision which expressly bans corporal punishment by a school
administrator, teacher, or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).

Although Rosaldes as a school teacher could duly discipline her students,

what she did to Michael was unnecessary, excessive and violent. She
went overboard in disciplining a helpless and weak 7-year old boy. In
addition to the physical pain suffered by Michael, he suffered from
emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school out of fear of
 252. OCAMPO VS. OCAMPO
GR 198908 February 9, 2015
FACTS: Virginia Ocampo and Deogracio Ocampo got married. Virginia
filed a Petition for Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Degracio’s
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the FC. RTC declared their
marriage void ab initio. RTC directed them to submit a project of partition
of their properties. Virginia and Degracio failed to agree on the partition,
so hearing ensued and the court declared 50-50 sharing. Virginia assailed
the 50-50 sharing and argued that Deogracio should be no longer entitled
to his share in the conjugal property being the guilty spouse in bad faith
and suffering from psychological perversity.
Requisites for Article 147 to apply, the man and the woman:
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
(3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void,
as in the instant case.
The term "capacitated" in Art. 147 which goes into the “good faith” or
“bad faith” of the parties pertains to the legal capacity to contract
marriage. In this case, no impediment to marry has been shown to have
existed on the part of Deogracio. As such, he was not in bad faith to the
effect that his share in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children.

ISSUE/S: Deogracio not entitled to his share in the conjugal property by The former spouses agree they acquired the subject properties during the
reason of bad faith and suffering psychological perversity? subsistence of their “marriage”. Thus, they are presumed co-owned
Should the partition be based on conjugal partnership of gains or co- under Art. 147. This presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that
ownership? the titles and tax declarations are in the name of Virginia only.
Accordingly, the partition of their properties shall be on the basis of co-
RULING: In a void marriage, as in those under Art. 36, the property ownership and not conjugal partnership of gains.
relations of the parties is governed either by Art. 147 or Art. 148. Art. 147
if the parties are legally capacitated and there is no legal impediment, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Under Art. 147, their
properties shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they cohabited are
presumed obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and are
owned by them equally. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of any property is deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition if
he/she took care of the family and of the household.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children.
 253. Cabanting vs BPI
(GR 201927 February 17, 2016)
Facts:
Cabanting bought from Diamond Motors / BPI a car on installment basis
for which a promissory note with chattel mortgage was executed. One of
the stipulations was that any failure to pay an amount on schedule will
make the entire outstanding sum to become due and payable without
prior notice and demand. When the two Cabanting failed to pay some
monthly amortizations, BPI sued them for replevin and
damages. Decision was rendered ordering them to pay the car’s unpaid
value with damages. The respondents appealed the decision claiming
that there has been no proof of prior demand and that the stipulation on
its waiver must be deemed invalid for being a contract of adhesion.
Issue 1: Whether or not a stipulation waiving the necessity of notice and
demand is valid
Yes. A contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts. Such
are not invalid per se and are not entirely prohibited because the one
who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. If the
other party adheres, he gives his consent.
The court may strike down such contracts as void when the weaker party
is deprived of the opportunity to bargain at an equal footing. Here, there
is no proof that petitioners were disadvantaged, uneducated or utterly
inexperienced in dealing with financial institutions; thus, there is no
reason for the court to step in and protect the interest of the supposed
weaker party.
Held 3:
No. Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court
that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the
property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.

Issue 2: Whether or not a contract of adhesion such as in this case is valid

Issue 3: Whether or not a prior demand is required in actions for replevin

Held 1:

Yes. Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides that one incurs in delay or is
in default from the time the obligor demands the fulfilment of the
obligation from the obligee. However, Article 1169 (1) also expressly
provides that demand is not necessary under certain circumstances, and
one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly waive demand.

Held 2:
 254. Smart vs. Solidum
(GR 204646 April 15 2015)
Facts:
Solidum was dismissed for dishonesty-related offenses. The Labor Arbiter
ruled that he was illegally dismissed and thereby entitled to
reinstatement and full back wages. Solidum received the copy of LA’s
decision on July 13, 2006. Smart appealed before the NLRC. While appeal
was pending, the LA issued writs of execution covering the period of July
21, 2006 to January 22, 2009 for the collection of Solidum’s the accrued
salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses.
In January 26, 2009, the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision. Solidum filed a
motion for reconsideration.
While waiting for the NLRC resolution, on May 4, 2009, Solidum filed
before the LA an ex parte motion for a writ of execution to be issued
ordering the sheriff to collect from Smart his salaries, etc. which accrued
from January 21, 2009 to April 20, 2009. The LA, however, denied the
issuance of writ of execution on the ground that the NLRC has reversed its
decision, so that Solidum is no longer entitled to his claim of
reinstatement when the NLRC decision was rendered.
Held:
Yes. Since the NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and executory
on 10 August 2009, Solidum is entitled toP2,881,335.86, representing his
accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses for the
period 21 January to 20 July 2009.
In Bago v. NLRC, the Court held that employees are entitled to their
accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses until the
NLRC’s reversal of the labor arbiter’s order of reinstatement becomes
final and executory, as shown on the entry of judgment. The Court held
that:
Finally, on Arlyn’s claim that respondents "unilaterally withheld her
payroll reinstatement" after the NLRC reversed on September 27, 2004
the Labor Arbiter’s decision, Article 223, paragraph 6 of the Labor Code
provides that the decision of the NLRC on appeals from decisions of the
Labor Arbiter "shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties."

In May 29, 2009, the NLRC denied Solidum’s motion for reconsideration.
Copy of the decision was mailed to Solidum on July 11, 2009. In its entry
of judgment, it was confirmed that the NLRC May 29, 2009 resolution has
become final and executory on August 10, 2009.

Issue :

Whether or not Solidum is entitled to the award for accrued salaries and
benefits
 255. SSS vs. AZOTE
G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015

Facts:

Edgardo Azote submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their
children as beneficiaries. When he died, Edna tried to claim the death
benefits as the wife of a deceased member but it was denied. It appears
from the SSS records that Edgardo had another set of SSS Form E-4 where
his former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as
beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo was previously married to
another woman. She then filed for a petition before the SSS and notice
was sent to Rosemarie but she made no answer. The SSS dismissed
Edna’s petition because the previous designation of Rosemarie and her
child as beneficiaries was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was still
presumed to be legal wife as Edna could not be prove that Edgardo’s
previous marriage was annulled.

Issue: Whether Edna is entitled to SSS benefits as the second wife of a

deceased member.

Ruling:
No. Only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s SSS benefits. Here, there is concrete proof that
Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as
evidenced by their marriage contract.
Since the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when
the Family Code was already in force, Edna, pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code, must establish that there was no impediment or that the
impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her
marriage to Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that
she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify
under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.
 256. SM LAND, INC., vs. BCDA
G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015
Facts:
Pursuant to the Bases Conversion and Development Act, the BCDA
opened for disposition and development its Bonifacio South Property. SM
Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the
development of the lot through a public-private joint venture agreement.
There is cause which is their interest in the sale or acquisition of the
property and their undertaking to perform their respective obligations.
Lastly, there is object, which is the Certificate od Successful Negotiations,
upon which certain rights and obligations spring forth, including the
commencement of activities for the solicitation for comparative
proposals.

Thereafter, the BCDA created a Joint Venture Selection Committee which

recommended the acceptance of the unsolicited proposal, which
recommendation was favorably acted upon by the BCDA. Despite its
acceptance, however, the BCDA clarified that its act should not be
construed to bind the agency to enter into a joint venture agreement
with the petitioner but only constitutes an authorization granted to the
JV-SC to conduct detailed negotiations with petitioner SMLI and iron out
the terms and conditions of the agreement.

However, instead of subjecting the proposal to competitive challenge,

BCDA unilaterally cancelled the contract with SMLI.

Issue: Whether BCDA and SMLI has a contract that bestow upon the
latter the right to demand that its unsolicited proposal be subjected to a
competitive challenge.

Ruling:

Yes. There is a perfected contract between BCDA and SMLI, a source of

rights and reciprocal obligations on the part of both parties.
There is consent, as manifested by the meeting of the offer (unsolicited
proposal by SMLI) and acceptance (BCDA accepted the terms of the final
unsolicited proposal).
 257. ABELLA, et.al v. HEIRS OF SAN JUAN
G.R 182629; FEBRUARY 24, 2016
FACTS:
On January 28, 1981, Dr. Manuel Abella (Dr. Abella) and Francisca entered
into an Agreement3 whereby the Balatas property will be exchanged with
a 6,000-square meter agricultural lot situated at San Rafael, Cararayan,
Naga City (Cararayan property). The parties agreed that in addition to the
Cararayan property, Francisca shall receive from Dr. Abella the amount of
P5,250.00 as disturbance compensation and a 120-square meter home lot
situated at Balatas, Naga City. Dr. Abella complied with all the stipulations
in the Agreement. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) thru
Salvador Pejo, CESO II, Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Regional
Director and later DAR Regional Director Pablo S. Sayson also approved
the Agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether the agreement is void for violating P.D 27
HELD:
Yes, The Court ruled that the Agreement was void, for being violative of
PD 27 which provides that title to the land acquired pursuant to the
Decree of Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be
transferable, except by hereditary succession or to the Government, in
accordance with its provisions, the Code of Agrarian Reform and other
existing laws and regulations.
258. CASTILLO v. DE LEON-CASTILLO
G.R NO. 189607; APRIL 18, 2016
FACTS:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married
Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married
herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). Renato filed before the RTC
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,4 praying that his
marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others
that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured
any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
ISSUE:
Whether the second of marriage of Lea to Renato is valid
HELD:
Yes. The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this
case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the
Civil Code. The Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary
to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil
Code as in the case of Lea’s first marriage to Bautista for lack of marriage
license.