[G.R. No. L-5731. June 22, 1954.]
]
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., as Attorney General of the United
States, petitioner-appellee, vs. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY OF CANADA,respondent-appellant
FACTS:
Subject of this petition is the endowment policy which insured
Aihara and Gayapan and upon its maturity the proceeds were
payable to said insured. Brownell instituted this case to compel
Sun Life to comply with the demand to pay representing the half
of the proceeds of endowment policy and payable to one
Naogiro Aihara, a Japanese national. Such claim is based on
Section 5(b)(2) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United
States. Which claim was approved and granted by the lower
court ordering SLACOC to pay here inpetitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such Act is still binding despite the complete
independence of the Philippines from American government?
DECISION:
Yes. The extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is
clearly implied from the acts of the President of the Philippines
and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment
of R.A. Nos. 7, 8 and 477.
[G.R. No. L-26379. December 27, 1969.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent
FACTS:
William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help
provide technical assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April
1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83.
Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car
provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member
of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as
shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base.
As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be
at 17,912.34 and that his income tax would be 2,797.00. Reagan
paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund
because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale
took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal
contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also
cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of
his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE:
Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to
Philippine income tax?
DECISION:
No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority
may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the
other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that
lends support to Reagan’s assertion. The Base has not become
foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights
therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been
preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of comity,
courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is
employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source
but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence
taxable
Townsend vs Jemisson
13 Led. 194
Facts:
Jemison brought suit in the district court of US for the Middle
District of Alabama against Townsend, who is in Alabama.
Townsend was liable by note, to the Commercial Bank of
Columbus, Mississippi, for one John B. Jones, as his security for
about the sum of nine thousand eight hundred and six 50/100
dollars, besides interest thereon; and was also indebted to the
Mississippi Union Bank, at its branch in Macon, in the county of
Noxubee, about the sum of three thousand dollars, on a note of
four thousand dollars, executed by the said defendant and
others, payable at Jackson, at the banking house of the said
Mississippi Union Bank at Jackson, and in consideration that the
said plaintiff would take up the said last-mentioned note to the
Mississippi Union Bank, and would also take up the note of the
said Jones in the Commercial Bank of Columbus, Mississippi, on
which the said Townsend was liable as security as aforesaid,
except an amount equal to the amount of said Townsend's
liability to the said Mississippi Union Bank, and release the said
Townsend from the balance of his said liability to the said
Commercial Bank, he, the said defendant, then and there agreed
with the said plaintiff, to pay on his said liability, in the said
Commercial Bank of Columbus, Mississippi, the same amount
which the said plaintiff might take up for him, the said Townsend,
in the said Mississippi Union Bank
Issue:
In the validity of contract what rule governs?
Held:
All suits must be brought within the period prescribed by the
local law of the country where the suit was brought-lex fori;
otherwise it would be barred unless the plaintiff can bring
himself within one of the exemptions of the statues, if pleaded.
Where all remedies are barred or discharged by lex loci
contracrus, and have operated upon the case, then the bar may
be pleaded in a foreign tribunal, to repel any suit brought to
enforce the debt.
Positive, or the Roman usucaptio, is the acquisition of property,
real or personal, immovable or movable, by the continued
possession of the acquirer for such a time as is described by the
law to be sufficient.
Negative prescription is the loss or forfeiture of a right, by the
proprietor's neglecting to exercise or prosecute it during the
whole period which the law hath declared to be sufficient to infer
the loss of it. It includes the former, and applies also to all those
demands which are the subject of personal actions
The obligations of the contract upon the parties to it, except in
well- known cases, are to be expounded by the lex loci
contractus. Suits brought to enforce contracts, either in the State
where they were made, or in the courts of other States, are
subject to the remedies of the forum in which the suit is,
including that of statutes of limitation.
The obligation of every law is confined to the state in which it is
established, that it can only attach upon those who are its
subjects, and upon others who are within the territorial
jurisdiction of the State; that debtors can only be sued in the
courts having jurisdiction of where they are; that courts must
judge in respect to remedies from their own laws, except when
conventionally, or from the decision of courts, a comity has been
established between States to enforce in the courts of each
particular law or principle.
[G.R. No. L-41518. June 30, 1976.]
GUERRERO'S TRANSPORT SERVICES,
INC., petitioner, vs. BLAYLOCK TRANSPORTATION SERVICES
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-KILUSAN (BTEA-KILUSAN), LABOR
ARBITER FRANCISCO M. DE LOS REYES and JOSE
CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a
public bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to operate
and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval base.
This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of
Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion
Blayblock, the then incumbent concessionaire doing business
under the name of Blayblock Transport Services Blayblock.
Blayblock’s 395 employees are members of the union BTEA-
KILUSAN (the Union).
When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ
the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed a complaint w/
the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to employ its members,
pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement. The case
was dismissed by the NLRC upon Guerrero’s MTD on
jurisdictional grounds, there being no employer-employee
relationship between the parties. Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor
remanded the case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution
ordering Guererro to “absorb all complainants who filed their
applications on or before the deadline” set by Guerrero, except
those who may have derogatory records w/ the US Naval
Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.
Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of
the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC Resolution, & that any non-
compliance was attributable to the individual complainants who
failed to submit themselves for processing & examination. The
Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The
Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order
wasn’t appealed so it was declared final &executory
Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement
wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the
determination of members of the Union who shall be reinstated
by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final. The agreement is
deemed to have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by Guerrero, and
of Labor ordered the absorption of 175 members of the Union that such determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of
subject to 2 conditions. Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter
Francisco de los Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175
ISSUE: members into Guerrero's Transport Services, subject to the
following conditions:
Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport
be reinstated by Guerrero? Service at the time its concession expired; and
that they should pass final screening and approval by the
DECISION: appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned.

YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure
the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/ military from the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval Base at Subic,
requirements, "to provide security for employment, and, in the Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the names of the
event certain services are contracted out, the US Armed Forces members of the Union.
shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority
consideration to affected employees for employment. Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is
more than a mere contract and has the force and effect of any
A treaty has 2 aspects — as an international agreement between other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and
states, and as municipal law for the people of each state to their privies. For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the
observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid provision of parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is enforceable
the treaty enters into and forms part of the contract between by execution upon approval by the court.
Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In view of said
stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore, bound
to give "priority" to the employment of the qualified employees
of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in
recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered into the
aforementioned Compromise Agreement.

Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit

to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who of the members
[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.]
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
FACTS:
Morada, a Filipina flight stewardess for SAUDIA, was a attempted
raped by Saudia Arabian national crewmembers in Indonesia.
She returned to Manila and while there, she was convinced by
SAUDIA manager to go to Jeddah and sign some papers,
purporting to be release forms in favor of her fellow
crewmembers. It turned out that the documents were court
summons and orders, trying and finding her guilty of adultery
and other violations of Islamic tradition. Upon her release and
return to Manila, she filed a case for damages based on Art. 19
and 21 of the Civil Code.
DECISION:
There is a conflicts problem as there is a foreign element involved
-- Morada is employed by a resident foreign corporation, an
international carrier, and some of the acts complained of
occurred in Jeddah. The trial court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter -- damage suit based on Art. 19 and 21 -- and over
the persons of Morada (plaintiff) and SAUDIA (voluntary
submission by filing answer). For characterization, the point of
contact considered is the lex loci actus or the place where the
tortuous act causing the injury occurred -- Manila, Philippines
since this is where SAUDIA deceived Morada. The State of the
Most Significant Relationship rule was also applied, SC holding
that the Philippines is where the over-all harm of the injury to
the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
Morada had lodged. IN SUM: Morada is entitled to recovery for
damages.
[G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990.]
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head
of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as
Executive Secretary, respondents.
FACTS:
The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement, as part of the indemnification to the Filipino people
for their losses in life and property and their suffering during
WWII. The Roppongi property became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to another site when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our
government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property
has remained undeveloped since that time. After many years, the
Aquino administration advanced the sale of the reparation
properties, which included the Roppongi lot. This move was
opposed on the ground that the Roppongi property is public in
character. For their part, the proponents of the sale raised that
Japanese law should apply, following the doctrine of lex loci rei
sitae.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conflict of law rule on lex loci rei sitae should
apply?
DECISION:
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when
no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises
only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of
an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity
and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private
International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law
on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with
a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to
determine which law should apply. In the instant case, none of
the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned with
validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of
the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging
to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect
its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs
does not apply. The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is
misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real
properties procured through reparations nor the existence in
what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are
capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that
it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the
properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of
lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring
whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss
who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that
it can be sold?
Northern P.R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 38 L. ed. 516
FACTS:
This was an action by Albert L. Babcock , as administrator of Hugh
M. Munro, deceased, against the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company (“the Company”), for damages for the death of said
Munro.
Munro was a locomotive engineer employed by the Company
within the territory of Montana. In January 10, 1888, Munro was
assigned to operate Train No. 161. During that day, there was a
severe snowstorm in progress yet it was alleged that the
Company negligently refused to send a snow plow ahead of Train
No. 161 to clear the snow and ice that had accumulated from the
track where the train was to pass. This made the passage of the
train unsafe and improper. As a result, the train got derailed
when it ran into an accumulation of snow and ice near Gray Cliff
(also in Montana), and Munro was instantly killed.
The estate of Munro filed a case for $25,000 in damages in the
district court of Minnesota.
ISSUE:
Was the amount of damage to be controlled by the law of the
place of employment and where the accident occurred (lex loci),
or by the law of the forum in which the suit was pending (lex
fori)?
* Under the law of Minnesota, when the death occurred, the
limit of recovery in case of death was $5,000, but at the time of
the trial of the case in the court below, this limit had been
increased to $10,000 by amendment of the Minnesota statutes.
**Under the law of Montana, where the death of a person is
caused by the negligence of another, the only limitation for the
amount of damages which may be given is “as under all the
circumstances of the case may be just."
DECISION:
The law of Montana applies. The statute of another state has, of
course, no extraterritorial force, but rights acquired under it will
always, in comity, be enforced if not against the public policy of
the laws of the former. In such cases, the law of the place where
the right was acquired or the liability was incurred will govern as
to the right of action, while all that pertains merely to the remedy
will be controlled by the law of the state where the action is
brought. The principle is the same whether the right of action be
ex contractu or ex delicto.
Therefore, as a general rule, where the lex locicontractus and the
lexfori are altogether different, and they are construed these
contracts and enforce rights under them according to their force
and effect under the laws of the state where made. As an
exception, which is to justify a court in refusing to enforce a right
of action which accrued under the law of another state because
against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is against
good morals or natural justice or that for some other such reason
the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the general
interests of our own citizens.
194 U.S. 451 (1904)
DAVIS
v.
MILLS.
Supreme Court of United States.
Facts: 'The plaintiff is a citizen of Montans, and the owner by
assignment of three causes of action (for goods sold and on a
promissory note) against the Obelisk Mining & Concentrating
Company, a Montana corporation. The defendants are and always
have been citizens and residents of Connecticut, and at all the
times mentioned in the complaint were trustees of the said
Obelisk Mining Company. The statutes of Montana provide that
within twenty days from the 1st day of September every such
company shall annually file a specified report, and if it 'shall fail to
do so, all the trustees of the company shall be jointly and severally
liable[194 U.S. 451, 452] for all of the debts of the company then
existing, and for all that shall be contracted before such report
shall be made.' Section 460 of chapter 25 of the 5th division,
Compiled Statutes of Montana, which was in force when the
cause of action arose. Re-enacted as 451 of the Civil Code of
Montana, which went into effect July 1, 1895
'The Obelisk Company failed to file certain of the required reports,
and the causes of action sued upon here, against the defendants
as trustees, to recover debts of the company, accrued September
22, 1893, or prior thereto. This action was brought to enforce the
joint and several liability of the defendants under the statute on
July 30, 1897.
Held: The general theory on which an action is maintained upon
a cause which accrued in another jurisdiction is that the liability is
an obligation, which, having been attached to the person by the
law then having that person within its power, will be treated by
other countries as accompanying the person when brought
before their courts. But as the source of the obligation is the
foreign law, the defendant, generally speaking, is entitled to the
benefit of whatever conditions and limitations the foreign law
creates. Slater v. Mexican National Railroad, 194 U.S. 120.
It is true that this general proposition is qualified by the fact that
the ordinary limitations of actions are treated as laws of
procedure and as belonging to the lex fori, as affecting the
remedy only and not the right. But in cases where it has been
possible to escape from that qualification by a reasonable
distinction courts have been willing to treat limitations of time as
standing like other limitations and cutting down the defendant's
liability wherever he is sued. The common case is where a statute
creates a new liability and in the same section or in the same act
limits the time within which it can be enforced, whether using
words of condition or not. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199. But the
fact that the limitation is contained in the same section or the
same statute is material only as bearing on construction. It is
merely a ground for saying that the limitation goes to the right
created and accompanies the obligation everywhere. The same
conclusion would be reached if the limitation was in a different
statute, provided it was directed to the newly created liability so
specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right.
It is said that a statute of limitations cannot take away an
existing right but only remedies, and therefore that, whatever
the effect of § 554 on subsequently accruing liabilities, it cannot
bar the plaintiff in this suit. Before considering this it is to be
observed in the first place that, so far as the State of Montana
was concerned, the only practical difference made by the
statute was to take away the allowance for absence from the
State while giving over a year for the prosecution of the action
within it. The cause of action accrued on September 22, 1893,
and the new statute went into effect on July 1, 1895, so that the
plaintiffs had at least until September 22, 1896, in which to sue
there. As to action within the State, it could not be contended
that the change took away constitutional rights. It did not
shorten liability unreasonably. The only way in which it could be
made out that the attempt to take away a remedy outside the
State after the same lapse of time was unconstitutional is
through the theoretical proposition which we have stated. It is
said that remedies outside the State can be affected only by
destroying the right, and that no statute of limitations can do
that.
In the case at bar the question comes up in the most attenuated
form. The law is dealing not with tangible property, but with a
cause of action of its own creation. The essential feature of that
cause of action is that it is one in the jurisdiction which created
it; that it is one elsewhere is a more or less accidental incident. If
the laws of Montana can set the limitation to the domestic suit,
it is the least possible stretch to say that they may set it also to a
foreign action, even if to that extent an existing right is cut
down. We can see no constitutional obstacle in the way, and we
are of opinion that they have purported to do it and have done
it.
The question is answered in the affirmative, and it will be so
certified.
[G.R. No. L-2363. September 23, 1948.]
GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., FRANCISCO JAVIER DE PITARQUE Y
ELIO, ISABEL MARIA DE YNCHAUSTI, and ANA MARIA DE
PITARQUE Y DE YNCHAUSTI,petitioners, vs. SOTERO RODAS,
Judge of First Instance of Manila, COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE
TABACOS DE FILIPINAS and CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE
TARLAC, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of this Court
dismissing the special civil action of certiorari and mandamus
filed by the petitioners against the respondents, which asked
that order of the respondent judge denying the petitioner's
motion to compel the other respondents to answer certain
interrogatories submitted by the former to the latter be set
aside, and that the respondent be ordered to issue an order
compelling the respondent corporation to answer said
interrogatories.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a rule of law which controls or guides the
respondent judge in deciding whether an interrogatory should
be allowed or not?
DECISION:
Since the scope of depositions and written interrogatories is
limited to matters which are not privileged and relevant to the
subject matter involved in a pending action, and the
determination of whether or not an interrogatory is privileged or
material is not left to the discretion of the court or judge, for
there is a law applicable which serves as norm or guide for the
court or judge to follow, the respondent judge could not commit
a grave abuse of discretion which it did not have in deciding
whether or not the interrogatories in question are immaterial to
the subject matter involved in the pending action, and therefore
they cannot be allowed. If the respondent judge has acted
contrary to law in deciding that the written interrogatories
propounded by the petitioners to the other respondents are
immaterial, he would have committed an error of law which this
court cannot correct in the present case; but not a grave abuse
of discretion.
What the resolution means to say, and we now expressly so hold
is
that certiorari does not lie at all for the reasons above stated,
andbut leaves it to the court to determine it in one way or
another at his discretion. Principle: When the law does not
provide a rule or norm for the court to follow in deciding a
question submitted to it. He must decide the question. .the
proper remedy is to rise the question of admissibility of such
interrogatories on appeal from the final judgment of the
respondent court or judge. not in accordance with law for there
is none. in view of the circumstances of the case. reason and
equity. Otherwise the court or judge would abuse his discretion.
but in conformity with justice. the judge is not absolutely free to
act at his pleasure or will or arbitrarily. It is obvious that the
question whether certiorari or appeal is the proper and adequate
remedy may only come up when the court has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction and the act complained of is appealable..
[G.R. No. L-5897. April 23, 1954.]
KING MAU WU, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FRANCISCO
SYCIP, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
This is an action to collect filed by King Maw Wu against Francisco
Sycip for the amount of P59,082.92, together with lawful
interests from 14 October 1947, the date of the written demand
for payment, and costs.
King Mau Wuu, agent of Francisco Sycip, sold and delivered 1,000
tons of coconut oil emulsion to Jas Maxwell Fasset. Fasset in turn
assigned it to Fortrade Corporation. Under an agency agreement
executed in New York, which was addresse and accepted by
Francisco Sycip on November 22, 1945, King Mau Wu was made
the exclusive agent of Sycip in the sale of coconut oil and its
derivaties outside the Philippines and was to be paid 2 ½ percent
on the actual sale price of sales obtained thru his efforts, in
addition to 50 percent of the difference between the authorized
sale price and the actual sale price.
King Mau Wu claims that for the sale to Fasset, he is entitled
under the agency contract to a commission of 2 ½ percent on the
total actual sale price of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion and
50 per cent of the difference between the authorized sale price
of $350 per ton and the actual selling price of $400 per ton. As
Sycip already made previous payments, King Mau Wu is just
collecting on balance payments due to him.
Sycip, on the other hand, contends that the sales transaction was
not covered by the agency contract dated November 22 as the
sales was agreed upon on October 16 and that it was an
independent and separate transaction for which King Mau Wu
had been duly compensated.
Lower Court Ruling: Rendered judgment in favor of King Mau Wu
and denied both the motion for reconsideration and new trial
filed by Sycip. Sycip filed an appeal, contending that the Court of
First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case as the
agency contract was executed in New York.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction?
DECISION:
CFI has jurisdiction. A non-resident may sue a resident in the
courts of this country where the defendant may be summoned
and his property leviable upon execution in the case of a
favorable, final, and executory judgment. It is a personal action
for the collection of a sum of money which the Courts of First
Instance have jurisdiction to try and decide. There is no conflict
of laws involved in the case, because it is only a question of DECISION:
enforcing an obligation created by or arising from contract; and
unless the enforcement of the contract be against public policy Jurisdiction, which finds its source in sovereignty, cannot be
of the forum, it must be enforced. bargained away by the parties. The State can assume jurisdiction
when there is a reasonable basis of exercising it. To be
The plaintiff is entitled to collect P7,589.88 for commission and reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum
P50,000 for one-half of the overprice, or a total of P57,589.88, contacts that will not offend traditional notions on fair play and
lawful interests thereon from the date of the filing of the substantial justice.
complaint, and costs in both instances. In the present case, the minimum contact considered is the
Philippine residence of the private respondents. In assuming
[G.R. No. 72494. August 11, 1989.] jurisdiction, SC held that the parties did not stipulate that only
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, jurisdiction.
DEODATO RELOJ AND THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents. (Because jurisdiction cannot be stipulated upon, the choice of
jurisdiction was treated as a choice of venue. And applying thus,
FACTS: the choice of venue is only permissive, in the absence of
restrictive words to lend exclusivity to the chosen forum.)
A Singaporean company applied with and was granted by the
Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft facility, secured by a Joint
and Several Guarantee executed by the former’s directors
(Filipino residents). In the Guarantee, there is a clause stipulating
that jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the transaction is
vested with the Singaporean courts. When the Singaporean
company defaulted, HSBC filed suit against the directors in the
Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the choice of law clause should be upheld?


[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000.]
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
(ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his
capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in
his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-
Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School),
pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The School
hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty
member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the
School and was the School responsible for bringing that
individual to the Philippines?
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded
local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are
also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-
hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely:
(a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School
grants such benefit to the foreign-hires because of economic
factor, better opportunities are often available in the country
where he foreign-hires are from. They have to adjust because
they have to leave their country, family and friends. The School
also reasoned that it is also their means of attracting competent
professionals and to stay competitive.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement
were held, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators,
"a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining
representative of all faculty members" of the School, contested
the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.
This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires
should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties. A notice of strike was
filed and DOLE eventually acquired jurisdiction because of the
failure to have a compromise. DOLE ruled in favor of the School.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is discrimination (equal protection) in the
hiring and compensation method used by the School?
DECISION:
YES. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed
by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates
of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered
by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of
according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public
policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this
Court.
The Court held that there must be “equal pay for equal work”
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international
character" notwithstanding. If an employer accords employees
the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by
logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee
less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why the others receive more. That would be
adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against
that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the
employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden.
There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to
entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the
distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal
work for equal pay.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-
hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the
prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same
services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation
factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as
valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation
factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately
compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not
enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for
committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention
against Karen Salvacion. He escaped from prison. In a civil case
filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral,
exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of
Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused
arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from garnishment. Salvacion therefore
filed for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby
required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil
case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in
such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the
favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and
her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore
present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies
those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and
oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted.
The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who
argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the
latter protection. The foreign currency deposit made by a
transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD
Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said
laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only
for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a
transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Chapter 2
G.R. No. L-2529 December 31, 1949
J. A. SISON, petitioner,
vs.
THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY and ROBERT ORR FERGUZON,
respondents.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 342, persons possessing
certificates as chartered accountants issued by various
incorporated private accountant's societies in England and other
parts of the British Empire, were, without examination, granted
by the respondents Board of Accountancy, certificates as public
accountants to practice their profession in this jurisdiction. The
respondent Robert Orr Ferguson was granted certificate No. 713-
W on January 14, 1939 pursuant to resolution No. 24 of the Board
of Accountancy, series of 1938.
J. A. Sison prays that this Court render judgment "ordering the
respondent Board of Accountancy to revoke the certificate
issued to Robert Orr Ferguson, a British subject admitted without
examination because there does not exist any reciprocity
between the Philippines and the United Kingdom regarding the
practice of accountancy."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can validly revoke the certificate issued
by the Board of Accountancy to Robert Orr Ferguson.
DECISION:
No, the certificate will remain valid.
We are bound to take notice of the fact that fact that the
Philippine and the United Kingdom, are bound by a treaty of
friendship and commerce, and each nation is represented in the
other by
corresponding diplomatic envoy. There is no reason whatsoever
to doubt the statement and assurance made by the diplomatic
representative of the British Government in the Philippines,
regarding the practice of the accountancy profession in the
United Kingdom and the fact that Filipino certified public
accountant will be admitted to practice their profession in the
United Kingdom should they choose to do so.
Under such circumstances, and without necessarily construing
that such attitude of the British Government in the premises, as
represented by the British Minister, amounts to reciprocity, we
may at least state that it comes within the realm of comity, as
contemplated in our law.
It appearing that the record fails to show that the suspension of
this respondent is . . . based on any of the cause provided by the
Accountancy Law, we find no reason why Robert Orr Ferguson,
who had previously been registered as certified public
accountants and issued the corresponding certificate public
accountant in the Philippine Islands, should be suspended from
the practice of his profession in these Islands. The petition is
denied, with cost.
G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS,
thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents
FACTS:
Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders
Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment
in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a
foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff
instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising
from the unexpired portion of their employment contract which
was prematurely terminated. They worked in Bahrain for BRII
and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their
employment contract.
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law
of the Private Sector of Bahrain: “a claim arising out of a contract
of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year
from the date of the expiry of the contract,” it appears that their
suit has prescribed.
Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should be 10 years
as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from
a violation of a contract.
The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of
prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides a different
view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a
3 years prescription period should be applied. The Solicitor
General expressed his personal point of view that the 1 year
period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bahrain law should be applied on the
question of prescription of action.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign
procedural law will not be applied in our country as we must
adopt our own procedural laws.
EXCEPTION:
Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the
Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Rule
stating “if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of
action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippines.” Thus, Bahrain law must be applied. However, the
court contends that Bahrain’s law on prescription cannot be
applied because the court will not enforce any foreign claim that
is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy and the 1 yr. rule on
prescription is against public policy on labor as enshrined in the
Philippine Constitution.
The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the
case should be Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
with a 3 years prescription period since the claim arose from
labor employment.
G.R. No. L-27429 August 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
OH HEK HOW, petitioner appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization
through his petition filed a motion alleging that he had complied
with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that
he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and
issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an
order authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same date,
petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued
to him. The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention
to appeal from said order of February9, 1966 and filed its record
on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to
judgment having been final and executory.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the oath is valid
- Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is
necessary from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China.
DECISION:
First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not — and up to
the present has not become final and executory in view of the
appeal duly taken by the Government.
2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and
that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of the Philippines,
is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by
any foreign law.
However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself
of that status is necessarily governed —pursuant to Articles 15
and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by those of
the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be
naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has complied
with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission
of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No.473 provides, however,
that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner
shall "solemnly swear," interalia, that he renounces "absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a
subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to
divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities
and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our
laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No.
2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino
citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-
American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his
Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same
privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty
between the Philippines and the foreign country from which
citizenship is acquired."
G.R. No. 55380 September 26, 1994
IN RE: PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE REGISTER
OF DEATHS OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY OF DAVAO CITY, FROM THE
NAME "FLAVIANO CASTRO ZAPANTA" TO "FLORENCIO B.
ZAPANTA," GLICERIA S. ZAPANTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OF DAVAO AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta.
When Florencio died, the local civil registrar of Davao City issued
a death certificate. However, she found that the name appearing
therein was “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” albeit the date of death
and all other circumstances and information reflected therein
clearly and conclusively revealed that the person referred to
therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio. Gliceria,
therefore, filed a petition for correction of entry in the register
of death. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground
that the correction of the name “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” to
“Florencio B. Zapanta” was not merely clerical but substantial in
nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error
DECISION:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
The general perception was that the judicial proceeding under
Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or clerical
errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being
corrected by mere reference to it, such as misspellings and
obvious mistakes.
However, in later cases, the Court has held that it adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.
Adversary Proceeding, defined
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as
follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an
ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it...”
Thus, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel has been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is
“appropriate.”
G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000
NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR.,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A.
NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO,
respondents.
FACTS:
The husband and wife, in order to avoid paying estate tax, while
they are alive, executed several Deeds of Sale in favor of their
children. The sale was proven to be without consideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties of the Deeds of Sale are
part of the estate of the deceased.
DECISION:
No, the children never acquired ownership because the sale was
void for lack of consideration. The sale to a Natividad, one of the
children, is deemed in trust for the other children of the
deceased. The properties should be collated as part of the estate.
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased,
respondent.
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate
through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate
an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half
(2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice
produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party
applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a
contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
DECISION:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial
personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate
for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except
for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service
of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of
property, rights and assets left by the decedent, directly
becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations
which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction,
that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person",
as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such
legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death
unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the
judicial administration of those rights and the fulfilment of those
obligations of his estate which survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished
by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his
estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if
any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and
fulfilment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his
death like his pending application at the commission.
G.R. No. L-42780 January 17, 1936
MANILA GAS CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
This is an action brought by the Manila Gas Corporation against
the Collector of Internal Revenue for the recovery of P56,757.37,
which the plainT³ was required by the defendant to deduct and
withhold from the various sums paid it to foreign corporations as
dividends and interest on bonds and other indebtedness and
which the plainT³ paid under protest.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue was justified in
withholding income taxes on interest on bonds and other
indebtedness paid to non-resident corporations
DECISION:
YES. The approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not
within its jurisdiction without violating the due process clause of
the constitution. The taxing power of a state does not extend
beyond its territorial limits, but within such it may tax persons,
property, income, or business. If an interest in property is taxed,
the situs of either the property or interest must be found within
the state. If an income is taxed, the recipient thereof must have
a domicile within the state or the property or business out of
which the income issues must be situated within the state so that
the income may be said to have a situs therein. Personal property
may be separated from its owner, and he may be taxed on its
account at the place where the property is although it is not the
place of his own domicile and even though he is not a citizen or
resident of the state which imposes the tax. But debts owing by
corporations are obligations of the debtors, and only possess
value in the hands of the creditors. The Manila Gas Corporation
operates its business entirely within the Philippines. Its earnings,
therefore come from local sources. The place of material delivery
of the interest to the foreign corporations paid out of the
revenue of the domestic corporation is of no particular moment.
The place of payment even if conceded to be outside of the
country cannot alter the fact that the income was derived from
the Philippines. The word "source" conveys only one idea, that of
origin, and the origin of the income was the Philippines.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
oppositors-appellants, national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that
vs. Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas,
the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national
FACTS: law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will,
which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not
United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the
(whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second national law of the deceased.
wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills,
apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his
seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions
to the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived
of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the
creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the

determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights
G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933
DECISION:
ALLISON G. GIBBS,
petitioner-appelle,
 vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
oppositor-appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-
appellant.
FACTS:
Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens
of
California and domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906.
There was no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties
and during the existence their marriage the spouses acquired
lands in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property. On
November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died and that in accordance with
the law of California, the community property of spouses who
are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to
that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband
without administration. In intestate proceedings, Allison D.
Gibbs, on September 22, 1930, filed an ex parte petition. The
court granted said petition and entered a decree adjudicating the
said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said
lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. When
this decree presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila and
demanded for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title, it
declined to accept as binding said decree of court and refused to
register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to
Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding
inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, Allison filed in the
said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of
deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner
without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the
owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands.
DECISION:
The second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code provides:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may
be situated. The second paragraph of article 10 applies only
when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the
Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine
Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the
order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in
other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked
only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest
in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke, the court said:It is principle firmly
established that to the law of the state in which the land is
situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent,
alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of
wills and other conveyances.
This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of
article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is
subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real
property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.”
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title
which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the
community lands here in question must be determined in
accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is admitted that the Philippine
lands here in question were acquired as community property of
the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title
equal to that of her husband. It results that the wife of the
appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a
descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the
Philippine lands covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336
and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the date of her
death.
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands
aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance
and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section
1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which
levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary in this proceeding
to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the
successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be
regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which
was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
G. R. No. 2935 March 23, 1909
THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK
FACTS:
In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a
contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank
was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the service of the
said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance
the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago
to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of
its terms on the part of Frank, he should become liable to the
Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the
one-half salary paid during such period.
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was
paid half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the
Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to
make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover
from Frank the sum of money, which amount the Plaintiff
claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling
from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the period
consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that
Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense,
alleging in his special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws
No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said
contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and
was therefore not responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor
of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars.
ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the
contract entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
DECISION:
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative
department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had
amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and No.
1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the
contract made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The
legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited
by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or
changing the terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant
had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been
changed in any respect by the fact that said laws had been
amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still
constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor
of the Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was
a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced against
him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was
entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the
laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims
that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine
Islands at the time the contract was made, made persons in said
Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the
age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending
that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that
at the time and place of the making of the contract in question
the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is
better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined b the law of the place where the contract is made.
Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a
remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence,
and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place
where the suit is brought.
In the matter of the petition of Vicente Rosal Pardo to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines.

G.R. No. 45144 April 3, 1939
M. E. GREY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
FACTS:
Insular Lumber Company is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of New York, licensed to engage in
business in the Philippines, with offices in the City of Manila, in
Fabrica, Occidental Negros, in New York and in Philadelphia. M.
E Gray is the owner and possessor of 6, shares of the capital stock
of the defendant corporation. The dispute arises when he asked
the offices of insular lumber in Manila and in Fabrica to permit
him to examine the books and records of the business of said
defendant, but he was not allowed to do so. According to Insular
Lumber, applying the law of New York, the rights of a stockholder
to examine the books and records of a corporation organized
under the laws of that State, have been, during the entire period
material to this action, only those provided in section 77 of the
Stock Corporation Law which substantially provides that only
stockholder owning at least three percent of the capital stock has
the right to examine the books and records of the corporation.
M.E Grey, not being a stockholder owning at least three percent
of the capital stock has not right to examine.
M.E Gray, contends that under our Corporation code, under
which insular lumber company was registered to do business in
the Philippines, he is entitled, as stockholder, to inspect the
record of the transactions of the defendant corporation (sec. 51,
Act No. 1459), and this right, which is recognized in the common
law, has not been altered by section 77 of the Stock Corporation
Law of New.
Lower Court’s Decision: The petition for mandamus compelling
the company to allow him examine the books and records was
denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not M.E Gray is entitled, as stockholder of the
Insular Lumber Company, to inspect
and examine the books and records of the transactions of said
company.
DECISION:
No. The decision of the CFI was affirmed denying the mandamus
against the company and
absolving it from the complaint.
1. The stipulation of facts is binding upon both parties and cannot
be altered by either of them.
On the strength of that principle M.E Gray is bound to adhere to
the agreement made by him with the Insular Lumber Co. in
paragraph four of the stipulation of facts, to the effect that the
rights of a stockholder, under the law of New York, to examine
the books and records of a corporation organized under the laws
of said State, and during the entire period material to this action,
are only those provided in section 77 of the Stock Corporation
Law of New York. Under this law, plaintiff has the right to be
furnished by the treasurer or other fiscal officer of the
corporation with a statement of its affairs embracing a particular
account of all its assets and
liabilities.
The right under the common law cannot be granted by insular
lumber in the present case,
since the same can only be granted at the discretion of the court,
under certain conditions, to wit;
(a) That the stockholder of a corporation in New York has the
right to inspect its books and records if it can be shown that he
seeks information for an honest purpose
(b) That said right to examine and inspect the books of the
corporation must be exercised in good faith, for a specific and
honest purpose, and not to gratify curiosity, or for speculative or
vexatious purposes.
The M.E Gray has made no effort to prove or even allege that the
information he desired to obtain through the examination and
inspection of defendant’s books was necessary to protect his
interests as stockholder of the corporation, or that it was for a
specific and honest purpose,
and not to gratify curiosity, nor for speculative or vexatious
purposes.
G.R. NO. L-2934 November 29, 1951
SY KIONG, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City
of Manila, respondent-appellant.
This is an action for declaratory relief filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the purpose of determining if petitioner is
liable to pay the municipal license tax upon his sales of flour to
bakeries under Ordinance No. 2723 of the city of Manila, as
amended.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in
the City of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to
bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail. Sometime in
September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed
against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged
deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales
of flour to bakeries after. deducting the sales made to retail
dealers for purposes of resale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to
bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or
wholesale.
DECISION:

The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and
to be resold to the public, in the absence of any express provision
of law on the matter, should be treated as a sale at retail and
should subject the vendor to the retail tax law.
G.R. No. L-2247 January 23, 1950
VICENTE ROSAL PARDO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
Vicente Rosal Pardo, a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895 and
residing in the Philippines since 1905, where he married a Filipino
woman and where he is at present employed, in Manila, with an
annual salary of P4,800, has been adjudged by the Court of First
Instance of Manila entitled to become a Filipino citizen. That the
appellee is unable to speak and write any of the principal Filipino
languages is the first ground of appeal by the Government.
The applicant testified that he knows enough Tagalog to be
understood in that language. Lino Gutierrez, a respectable citizen
who has intimately known the applicant for 27 years, having had
business relations with him, conformed the applicant's
testimony. Judge said the fact that the applicant arrived in the
Philippines when he was only ten years old and has lived here 44
years continuously except for a few months visit in Spain,
mingling and dealing by reason of his work with people who use
Tagalog in their daily intercourse, lends credence in his testimony
that he has acquired a good working knowledge of that language.
ISSUE:
Whether the certification of the supposed naturalization laws of
Spain made by the Spanish Consul General constitutes
competent proof of that law?
DECISION:
Yes. No specific procedure is indicated in the premises, it is only
necessary that the merits of the petition be passed on and a
decision reached on a far consideration of the evidence on
satisfactory proof. Accordingly, evidence of the law of a foreign
country or reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice by section
41 of Rule 123, may be allowed and used as basis for a favorable
action if, in the light of all circumstances, the court is satisfied of
the authenticity of the written proof offered.
G.R. No. L-6801 September 28, 1954
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., Attorney General of the
United States, as successor of the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MACARIO BAUTISTA, defendant-appellee,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellant.
FACTS:
On October 6, 1947, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator, hereinafter referred to as Administrator, issued
vesting order No. P-394, which was amended on February 2,
and July 14, 1949, vesting in himself, among others, one-half
undivided interest in the following properties: (a) five parcel of
land situate in the city of Baguio and one parcel situate in San
Clemente, Tarlac; (b) personal properties consisting of
furniture and household equipments; (c) the sum of P5,156.83
representing balance of a saving account with the People's
Bank and Trust Company, Baguio branch; (d) the sum of
P1,867.50 representing rents and income of the lands
mentioned above; and (e) the net proceeds of an insurance
policy in the amount of $1,451.81.
The vesting was made upon the claim that the one-half
undivided interest was owned by Carlos Teraoka and Marie
Dolores Teraoka who were found to be nationals of Japan, an
enemy country. After the vesting, the Administrator demanded
from their grandfather, Macario Bautista, who was in
possession of the aforementioned properties, the delivery to
him of the possession of one-half thereof. Because of such
refusal, the Administrator filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Mountain Province praying for the partition of the
properties and the delivery of one-half thereof to the plaintiff.
After hearing, the court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint, the court holding in effect that plaintiff failed to
prove that Carlos and Marie Dolores are Japanese Nationals;
that the evidence in fact shows that they are Filipino citizens;
and that the vesting of their interest in the property in question
was erroneous and, therefore, the vesting order issued by the
plaintiff in connection with said interest is illegal and did not
vest ownership thereof in the plaintiff.
On the other hand, there is no question that the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator can now invoke section 3 of the
Philippine Property Act of 1946 in order to secure the issuance
of any peremptory order from any court of first instance in this
jurisdiction to enforce a vesting order to enable said
Administrator to obtain possession of the properties vested.
(see: Thus in the case of Herbert Brownell, Jr. vs. Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada)
MAIN ISSUE:
Is the action taken by the Administrator, by its nature,
substance, and prayer, one that comes under said action
section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946?
RULING:
NO.
"The present action is not one, and could not be one, under
section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 viewed from
the standpoint of its form, substance and prayer. The present
action is clearly an action for petition of real estate, which
incidentally includes personal properties, under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court." This can be gleaned from the nature both of
the interest involved and the relief prayed for in the complaint.
It should be noted that the complaint prays for partition of the
properties and not merely for delivery of their possession.
Apparently, this is an action contemplated in Rule 71 wherein
the court, before proceeding with the partition, has to pass
upon the rights or the ownership of the parties interested in
the property (Section 2). In an action for partition the
determination of ownership is indispensable to make proper
adjudication. In this particular case, this acquires added force
considering that the titles of the properties appear issued in
the name of defendants, and the plaintiff contends that they
belong to enemy aliens. By filing this action of partition in the
court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has
submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his
vesting order. He cannot therefore now dispute this power. It
is true that the complaint does not specifically allege that the
Administrator is invoking the authority of the court under
section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and that the
failure to make mention of that fact should no militate against
the stand of the Administrator. But while we agree with this
contention, the fact however remains that the very averments
of the complaint show that the real purpose of the action is not
the recovery of possession but the partition of the properties.
This makes this case come, as already said, under Rule 71 of
our Rules of Court.
We are, therefore, persuaded to conclude, and so hold, that
the lower court did not err in passing upon the nationality of
Carlos and Marie Dolores Teraoka, or in determining the
validity of the vesting order issued by the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator, wherefore we affirm the decision
appealed from, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992
AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father
and legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos, vs. NORTHWEST
ORIENT AIRLINES and COURT OF APPEAL
FACTS:
Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private
respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign
corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and
licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the
Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip
ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the
petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San Francisco
airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous
confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had
no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had
to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA
for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s
destination was Manila?
DECISION:
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw
Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of
carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the
passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket
shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although
the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of
carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to
transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila
should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place
and not the destination.
Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and
an "agreed stopping place." It is the "destination" and not an
"agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes of
ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.
The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the
place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The
use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding
of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage
has one place of departure and one place of destination. An
intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not
regarded as a "place of destination."
CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC. v SHUTE
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. opposes a
suit by a passenger injured on one of their cruise ships, because
the cruise tickets contained an agreement that all matters
relating to the cruise would be litigated before a Florida court.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Forum-selection clauses forcing
individuals to agree to submit to jurisdiction in a particular place
are enforceable so long as they pass the test for judicial fairness.
FACTS:
Defendant Shute purchased passage for a seven day cruise on
the Tropicale, a ship owned by Plaintiff, through a Washington
travel agent. The face of each ticket contained terms and
conditions of passage, which included an agreement that all
matters disputed or litigated subject to the travel agreement,
would be before a Florida court. Defendant boarded the ship in
California, which then sailed to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico before
returning to Los Angeles. While the ship was in international
waters, Defendant Eulala Shute was injured from slipping on a
deck mat. Defendants filed suit in Federal District Court in
Washington. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that the clause in the tickets required Defendants to
bring their suit in Florida.
ISSUE:
Whether the court should enforce a forum-selection clause
forcing individuals to submit to jurisdiction in a particular state.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Court
of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the forum-selection
clause.
Forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are
subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness, but where
they are not lacking in fairness, they will be enforced. In reaching
its decision, the court noted that there is no evidence that
Plaintiff set Florida as the forum as a means of discouraging
cruise passengers from pursuing their claims. Such a suggestion
is negated by the fact that Plaintiff has its headquarters in
Florida, and many of its cruises depart from Florida.
LEDESMA v STEWARD PRODUCE INC.
Facts
On May 13, 1981, Alfonso Ledesma, Josephine Rodriguez,
Rafaela Gaytan, and Jennifer Santiago ("plaintiffs"), all California
residents, were injured on an Arizona highway when their van
was allegedly struck by a tractor driven by defendant John
Wayne Mize, an Arkansas resident, and owned by defendants
Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation with its
principal place of business in Oklahoma, and Jack Stewart, an
Oklahoma resident ("defendants"). On April 7, 1983, plaintiffs
filed a diversity action in the Eastern District of California, seeking
damages arising out of the accident. The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss arguing that the one-year California statute of
limitations applied and barred the action against them. The
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
action as time-barred. Plaintiffs appeal from the order of
dismissal.
Discussion
It is well-settled that in diversity cases federal courts must
apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.
the court must first determine if the laws of the two
jurisdictions differ. If they do differ, the court should determine
whether both states have an interest in applying their respective
law. If only one state has an interest, there is no "true conflict"
of laws and the court should apply the law of the interested
jurisdiction. If both states have an interest in having their
differing laws applied, a true conflict arises; in that case the court
should apply the law of the state whose interest would be more
impaired if its law were not applied.
Arizona's interest would be significantly impaired by a
failure to apply its statute of limitations. The Arizona legislature
has established a two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury claims arising out of highway accidents. Insofar as drivers
tend to be more careful when their chances of incurring liability
are more substantial, Arizona does have an interest in ensuring
that its statute of limitations is applied in any case that arises
from accidents occurring within its state borders. Were we to
apply the California statute of limitations in this case, we would
impede the legitimate interest of the state of Arizona in
promoting highway safety by allowing a cause of action for a two-
year period.
Applying the "governmental interest" analysis of California's
choice-of-law rules, we conclude that Arizona's interests would
be impaired by the failure to apply its statute of limitations more
than California's interests would be impaired by the failure to
apply its statute. California has little interest in applying its
statute of limitations when no California defendant is involved
and when California plaintiffs seek to recover for injuries that
occurred in a state in which the claim was not time-barred.
Arizona's legitimate government policy would be impaired by a
failure to allow the cause of action that it has established for
personal injury claims. Accordingly, we hold that the Arizona
statute of limitations should apply in the present case and that
the district court erred in dismissing the complaint.

[G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and
LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-
appellant.
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New
York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July1, 1901, on board the U.S.
Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City
of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the
Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,
during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines
for the United States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his
own country, and came back to the Philippines the following
year, 1939.
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament
(now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers'
offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's
Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Mr. Christensen was domiciled in the
Philippines at the time of his death.
DECISION:
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is
the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in
New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine
years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to
relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned
or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning
from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than
mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile,
as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he
may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with
two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides
in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which
would require his presence for several weeks or months, he
might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the
place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular
business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not
be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence,
however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and
it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
IN RE SHOOP
FACTS
- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the
Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of
Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was
shown in his application that he was practicing for more than 5
years in the highest court of the State of New York.
- The said rule requires that: New York State by comity confers
the privilege of admission without examination under similar
circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the
Philippine Islands. (Aside from comity, the satisfactory affidavits
of applicants must show they have practiced at least 5 years
in any (district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory of
it. But admission is still in the discretion of the court.)
- The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits
admission without examination in the discretion of the Appellate
Division in several cases:
1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member
of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or
territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia
2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose
jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English
Common Law (ECL).
ISSUE
WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of
comity is established
HELD
- The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US,
under a civil gov't. established by the Congress.
- In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws
of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT
covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies
upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases,
subject to the limited exception of those instances where the
remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil
law theories and of the few cases where such precedents are
inconsistent with local customs and institutions.
- The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL
in its present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to
an almost exclusive extent.
- New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys
admitted to practice in the Phils. similar to those privileges
accorded by the rule of this court.
- Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the
NY rule; doesn’t establish a precedent with respect to future
applications.

G.R. No. L-2363 September 23, 1948
GREGORIO ARANETA INC.
vs
SOTERO RODAS
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of this Court
dismissing the special civil action of certiorari and mandamus
filed by the petitioners against the respondents, which asked
that order of the respondent judge denying the petitioner's
motion to compel the other respondents to answer certain
interrogatories submitted by the former to the latter be set
aside, and that the respondent be ordered to issue an order
compelling the respondent corporation to answer said
interrogatories.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a rule of law which controls or guides the
respondent judge in deciding whether an interrogatory should
be allowed or not.
DECISION:
Since the scope of depositions and written interrogatories is
limited to matters which are not privileged and relevant to the
subject matter involved in a pending action, and the
determination of whether or not an interrogatory is privileged or
material is not left to the discretion of the court or judge, for
there is a law applicable which serves as norm or guide for the
court or judge to follow, the respondent judge could not commit
a grave abuse of discretion which it did not have in deciding
whether or not the interrogatories in question are immaterial to
the subject matter involved in the pending action, and therefore
they can not be allowed. If the respondent judge has acted
contrary to law in deciding that the written interrogatories
propounded by the petitioners to the other respondents are
immaterial, he would have committed an error of law which this
court can not correct in the present case; but not a grave abuse
of discretion.
What the resolution means to say, and we now expressly so hold
is that certiorari does not lie at all for the reasons above stated,
and the proper remedy is to rise the question of admissibility of
such interrogatories on appeal from the final judgment of the
respondent court or judge. It is obvious that the question
whether certiorari or appeal is the proper and adequate remedy
may only come up when the court has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction and the act complained of is appealable.
Principle:
When the law does not provide a rule or norm for the court to
follow in deciding a question submitted to it, but leaves it to the
court to determine it in one way or another at his discretion, the
judge is not absolutely free to act at his pleasure or will or
arbitrarily. He must decide the question, not in accordance with
law for there is none, but in conformity with justice, reason and
equity, in view of the circumstances of the case. Otherwise the
court or judge would abuse his discretion.
GR 133876 December 29, 1999
BANK OF AMERICA
vs
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION
FACTS:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security,
the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned
by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor who
pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign
corporations. The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed
collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan.
Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially
foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted. On 12 February
1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159,
an action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act
of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate mortgages despite
the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against
the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign
courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
DECISION:
Yes.
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two
remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can
by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage
creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an
election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this
purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit
for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such
remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing
of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of
the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.
In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which
is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies
are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may
opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the
rule against splitting a cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that
petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits before
foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose
the real estate mortgages constituted over the properties of
third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC.
Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually
foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect
transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-
enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
2. Conflicts of Law
Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which
according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the
principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security
interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.
We rule in the negative.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded
principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any
foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved
as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal
law. This is what we
refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on
the matter were properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law
would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to
a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up
of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of
the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
G.R. NO. L-41795 AUGUST 29, 1980
PHILLIPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
vs
HON. JUAN ECHIVERRI
FACTS:
On May 29, 1974, the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCOM for short), a banking corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines that has been engaged
in normal commercial banking transactions since 1939, filed a
complaint for the recovery, jointly and severally from therein
defendants, of over P25 million allegedly embezzled from it over
a period of 16 years by its said employees defendants, Yu Chiao
Chin, alias Nelson Yu, assistant manager, in-charge of the
Auditing Department; Paulino How, manager of the Business
Development Department; Faustino Carlos, Ildefonso Carino,
Conrado Galvez, Arsenic Lorenzo, Enrique Lorenzo, Ricardo
Carlos, Victoriano Salvador and Felizardo Albaira, bookkeepers.
PBCOM prayed for full restitution of the amount embezzled, and
payment of attorney's fees and exemplary damages. Upon its
application, the trial court issued writs of attachment and,
through the City Sheriff of Manila, attached various real and
personal properties of the. defendants.
Separately, each of the defendants, except Victoriano Salvador
who died in the meantime, filed responsive pleadings, either an
answer or a motion to dismiss, the last of which was filed on
August 15, 1974.
The Agreement was signed by the PBCOM represented by its
president, Edward S. Go, as PARTY OF THE FIRST PART and each
of the defendants in his own behalf as PARTIES OF THE SECOND
PART.
On March 17, 1975, the counsel for the PBCOM on one hand, and
the counsels for each of the defendants on the other, jointly filed
a "Motion for Judgment on the Basis of Attached Compromise
Agreement."
On April 17, 1975, respondent judge issued an order resetting the
hearing or the motion for judgment on the basis of the
compromise agreement and at the same time making the
observation motu proprio that "there are certain objectionable
features concerning the compromise agreement, as submitted,
such as matters pertaining to a proposed compromise involving
the criminal aspect of the case, 'Which is contrary to law.
Therefore, the parties who have already signed the said
compromise agreement are hereby instructed to go over the
same and see how it could be properly approved by the Court,
taking into consideration the provisions of law as well as public
morals and policy."
On April 26, 1975, tile parties — the PBCOM, thru its president,
and the defendants in their own behalf and each assisted by
counsel submitted a manifestation and motion in order to have
the phrase "and criminal charge hereinabove mentioned"
(contained in paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement) and
"and criminal charge" (contained in paragraph 10 of the
Compromise Agreement), supra, deleted and — praying that
judgment be rendered on the basis of the Compromise
Agreement as thus modified.
On May 12, 1975, the defendant Conrado Galvez thru his counsel
filed a Manifestation pointing out two alleged objectionable
features in the compromise agreement signed by him, which he
claimed to be "contrary to law, public policy and decency,"
namely, the provision thereof to the effect that said agreement
even after its approval by the court shall be without prejudice to
charging anew the same defendants on the basis of other
anomalies which might be discovered in the bank thereafter,
contrary to his expectation that the dismissal of the present
criminal and civil cases would terminate with finality any and all
litigations between the parties; and the provision regarding
quitclaim where said defendant would be considered as having
voluntarily resigned, waiving his right to reinstatement in the
service, his right to retirement with the corresponding gratuity
or compensation and his right to receive the benefits under the
Staff Provident Fund. But said defendant made no claim that he
did not voluntarily sign the compromise or that Ws consent had
been obtained through mistake, violence or fraud. 4 In fact, he
based his objection on his claim that "it was the plaintiff, from
the outset, who persuaded Galvez to turn state witness and
promised him reciprocal benefits should he agree to become
such, and to which Galvez agreed and had done his part, but
plaintiff had reneged on its promise and commitment.
Countering the manifestation of Conrado Galvez, PBCOM thru
counsel maintained the legality and validity of' the quitclaim duly
signed by said Galvez. As to the terms of the, Agreement, viz. that
it "shall not in any manner bar or preclude the Bank from
asserting the rights against the PARTIES OF THE SECOND PART in
the event that the Bank subsequently discovers such other
transactions on, dealings ill which any or all the PARTIES OF THE
SECOND PART are directly or indirectly involved and which are
prejudicial to the Bank's interest," said counsel explained that
the agreement was intended by the bank to cover only such
matters of transactions which were known or disclosed to it by
the defendants and not those of which it had no knowledge at
the time of execution thereof.
On July 3, 1975, respondent judge issued an order setting the
case for hearing "at which all the parties will be afforded the
opportunity to individually show whether or not there is
sufficient basis for the quitclaims in question viewed from the
standpoint of law, public policy and morals vis-a-vis employer-
employee relations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered is valid and
binding among the parties?
DECISION:
The present petition is found to be meritorious.
1. Contrary to the bare conclusion of respondent judge ordering
the deletion of the names of herein respondents-defendants
from the above-quoted Paragraph 7 of the compromise
agreement, whereby he would free them from their agreement
of voluntarily resigning from petitioner bank and waiving
whatever rights they may have against petitioner arising from
their employment or the case, including all benefits and rights
under petitioner's Staff Provident Fund and retirement plan in
consideration of petitioner's agreement to dismiss the P25
million case against them and discharging them from all
obligations and liabilities thereunder, there is nothing in said
resignation and waiver undertakings of respondents that
"transgresses the law" or is "contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy and public order and, therefore is
considered inexistent and void from the beginning" — and no
such law or authority was cited by respondent judge or
respondents to justify or support his erroneous assertion.

Respondent judge's "finding" that herein respondents-
bookkeepers "all occupied an inferior position in the negotiations
on the Compromise Agreement in question, with respect to the
plaintiff-bank and/or together with principal defendants Yu
Chiao Chin alias Nelson Yu and Paulino L. How. Be it remembered
that these principal defendants as early- as the year 1970, long
before the Complaint herein was filed, had admitted in writing
and 'assumed full responsibility for whatever consequences may
arise and that we declare the bookkeepers free from all
responsibility,or even his pre-judged subjective perception in his
earlier Order of July 3, 1975 hereinabove quoted that "there was
obviously an imbalance in [their] treatment" in the "unfair" and
"one-sided compromise agreement" do not at all warrant his
rash deletion of the respondents' reciprocal undertaking in
exchange of petitioner's dismissal of the case and waiver of its
claims as "contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy
and public order." This is so, particularly considering that
respondent judge approved the very same compromise
agreement in toto without any deletion of the provisions in
question as to defendants How and Yu, who were charged in the
complaint below together with herein respondents-defendants
as having connived and acted in concert with each other to
defraud petitioner of some P25 million and respondent judge in
his above-quoted "findings" found that "the admissions of the
several defendants-bookkeepers I herein respondents]
approximated this finding [of P25 million defrauded loss found
by Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Co., the independent auditors]; i.e.
P21 million alone by Nelson Yu." All of them being similarly
situated and having been charged with connivance and
conspiracy .n carrying out through the years the huge
defraudation of petitioner, respondent judge could not
arbitrarily declare the provisions in question void as to the herein
seven respondents-conspirators and valid as t6 the two others
above named.
2. Far from being "one-sided" and "unfair", it thus appears that
in exchange of herein respondents' voluntary resignation (which
employment they could not have clung to anyway considering
the huge defraudation of over P25 million carried out with their
connivance and covered by their admissions, as per respondent
judge's own "findings" in his decision, supra,which certainly
would warrant their dismissal even on the mere ground of total
loss of trust and confidence) and waiver of any dubious rights
arising from their employment and the case below, including all
benefits and rights under petitioner's Staff Provident Fund and
retirement plan (which they would nevertheless have lost and
forfeited upon separation from the service all of which involved
petty amounts compared to the over P25 million sought to be
recovered by petitioner, herein respondents got a pretty good
deal. Petitioner in consideration thereof and probably realizing
the futility of collecting any amount from them, agreed to dismiss
the case against them and discharge them from all liability and
required no assumption of monetary liability from them
contenting itself with the much lesser amounts of P600,000.00
and P6,610,000.00 undertaken to be paid it by the defendants
Paulino How and Yu Chiao Chin alias Nelson Yu, respectively. This
is the whole essence of a compromise as provided in Article 2028
of the Civil Code whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, whether of greater benefit or not to one or the
other party, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.

3. The parties therefore have every freedom to enter into a
compromise agreement, as in any other contract, the only
exceptions being certain prohibited subjects of compromise such
as the civil status of persons as provided in Article 2035 of the
Civil Code (none of which is applicable here) and the general
restriction in Article 1306 of the Civil Code that 'The contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.
The law and the precepts of morals or good customs need no
definition. They need only to be cited and none has or can be
cited as being transgressed by the cited provisions in question.
As to the remaining fields of public order and public policy, the
Court has since the early case of Ferrazzini vs. Gsell 15 pointed
out that the two terms are practically equivalent, citing Manresa
that "Public policy (order publico) — which does not here signify
the material keeping of public order — represents in the law of
persons the public, social and legal interest, that which is
permanent and essential of the institutions, that which. even in
favoring an individual in whom the right lies, cannot be left to his
own will." The Code Commission however in drafting our present
Code included the two terms, stating ill its report that "Public
order, which is found in the Spanish Civil Code, is not as broad as
public policy, as the latter may refer not only to public safety but
also, to considerations which are moved by the common good.
In Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, the Court enjoined that "courts
should not rashly extend the rule which holds that a contract is
void as against public policy" and laid down the following criteria:
"The term 'public policy' is vague and uncertain in meaning,
floating and changeable in connotation. It may be said, however,
that, in general, a contract which is neither prohibited by law nor
condemned by judicial decision, nor contrary to public morals,
contravenes no public policy. In the absence of express
legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in order to
declare a contract void as against public policy, must find that the
contract as to the consideration or thing to be done, has a
tendency to injure the public, is against the public good, or
contravenes some established interests of society, or is
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly
to undermine the security of individual rights, whether of
personal liability or of private property. Examining the contract
at bar, we are of the opinion that it does not in any way militate
against the public good. Neither does it contravene the policy of
the law nor the established interests of society.
Thus, the provisions in question which are neither prohibited by
law nor condemned by judicial decision nor contrary to morals
and good customs cannot be said to contravene any public policy
or to militate against the public good.
4. The Civil Code in fact contains salutary provisions that
encourage and favor compromises and does not even require
judicial approval. As the Court held in Cochingyan vs. Cloribel
"Pursuant to Article 2037 of the Civil Code, 'A compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata ...' and
this is true even if the compromise is not judicially approved."
Article 2032 of the Civil Code provides only that "the court's
approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians,
parents, absentee's representatives, and administrators or
executors of decedents' estates," and in no other case. Thus,
parties-litigants who have arrived at a compromise have many
times simply asked for and obtained the courts' dismissal of their
suit without submitting their compromise agreement for judicial
approval. Procedurally, it is preferable that such approval be
obtained, since as was held in Piano vs. Cayanong,"The
agreement ha(s) upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata (Art. 2037, New Civil Code; Yboleon v. Sison, 59 Phil. 281,
290; Hernandez vs. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599, 607; De Jesus v. Go
Quiolay, 65 Phil. 476, 482; Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34, 38;
Salazar v. Jarabe, 48 O.G. 2708, 2712; Morales v. Fontanos, 64
Phil. 19, 21), and the judgment rendered thereon ha(s) the
authority of res judicata from the moment it (is) rendered ... and
such judgment is more than a mere contract binding the parties
because having the sanction of the court, and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has all the force and effect
of any other judgment, it being conclusive upon the parties and
their privies (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74)" and as provided
by Article 2037, execution lies to exact compliance only with a
judicial compromise. Article 2029 of the Civil Code provides
further that "The court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants
in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise," and Articles
2039 and 2031 thereof provide for the suspension of pending
actions and mitigation of damages to the losing party who has
shown a sincere desire for a Compromise, in line with the Code's
policy of encouraging amicable settlements.
5. It is settled jurisprudence that neither the courts nor quasi-
judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a judgment different
from their compromise agreement (which as a valid contract is
the law between the parties themselves) or against the very
terms and conditions of their agreement.
We thus held in Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City vs.
Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. that "a judicial or quasi-judicial body
cannot impose upon the parties a judgment different from their
real agreement or against the very terms and conditions of the
amicable settlement entered into by them, without running the
risk of contravening the universally established principle that a
contract is the law between the parties."
We stressed therein that "(T)his Court, time and again, has ruled
that a compromise agreement entered into by party-litigants,
when not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good custom is a valid contract which is the law between the
parties themselves. (Juan-Marcelo, et al. vs. Go Kim Pah, et al.,
22 SCRA 309). It follows, therefore, that a compromise
agreement, not tainted with infirmity, irregularity, fraud or
illegality, is the law between the parties who are duty bound to
abide by it and observe strictly its terms and conditions. It is
incumbent upon the courts of justice to help develop and
inculcate in the minds of the parties- litigants proper respect for,
and obedience to, the terms and conditions of this kind of mutual
agreement whenever it does not exhibit any feature or taint of
illegality or fraud. Thus we would be enhancing the salutary
provisions of Section 1, Rule 20, of the Revised Rules of Court and
Article 2029, New Civil Code, which entrust to the courts the
function of enabling party-litigants in a civil suit to reach an
amicable settlement of their disputes," and cited our previous
ruling in Castro vs Castro that... Es principio universalmente
establecido que el convenio es ley entre las partes. No debe
imponerse un criterio por mas acertado que fuese sobre el
verdadero contrato de las Partes. Que utilidad puede
proporcionar la disposicion del articulo 2029 del nuevo codigo
civil que encomienda al Juzgado la funcion de persuader a los
litigantes en un asunto civil a que procuren illegar a un arreglo si,
despues de todo, el criterio del tribunal se ha de imponer sobre
su convenio?
The only case where the court may validly intervene is "ff the
parties and their counsel are to do it ... to assist them in attaining
precision and accuracy of language that would more or less make
it certain that any dispute as to the matters being settled would
not recur, much less give rise to a new controversy
6. As held in the case of Gonzales vs Gonzales, the court cannot
deny their approval to a compromise agreement, voluntarily
entered into by the parties, where there is no valid serious
objection, since "(T)he agreement, therefore, partaking of the
nature of a contract, is subject to the same legal provision
providing for the validity, enforcement, rescission or annulment
of ordinary contracts. In entering in said compromise, the parties
were free to make any stipulation not contrary to law, public
interest, or principles of morality, as much as in any other
contract."
As stated above, only two of herein respondent's, namely,
Conrado Galvez and Ricardo Carlos, had presented
manifestations as to the "objectionable features" of the
compromise agreement signed by them both following
respondent judge's telegraphed but baseless observations in his
Orders of April 17, 1975 and July 3, 1975 as to the waiver and
quitclaim provisions being "contrary to law, morals and public
policy," with Galvez complaining about petitioner having
reneged on its alleged promise to give him reciprocal benefits in
exchange of his agreement to turn state witness.
Aside from the totally untenable position in which respondent
judge placed himself by declaring the provisions of paragraph 7
of the compromise agreement void as to herein respondents but
valid in toto as to the defendants Paulino How and Yu Chiao Chin
alias Nelson Yu, his decision would arbitrarily substitute his own
terms for that agreed upon by the parties to the compromise
agreement and baselessly free herein respondents from their
undertaking thereunder. With their names ordered deleted from
paragraph 7 of the compromise, they would be bound to no
concession nor obligation (notwithstanding that pursuant
thereto they had in fact executed the corresponding waiver and
quitclaim therein provided), while petitioner had complied with
its part and discharged them from all obligations and liabilities,
despite their admission of complicity, pursuant to paragraph 8 of
the same agreement (subject only to the express exception that
petitioner was not waiving its rights as to any other anomalies
which might subsequently be discovered, notwithstanding
respondents' warranty that they had not participated in any such
prejudicial transactions other than those related to or included
in the civil case and criminal charge).
7. There can be no question that the parties voluntarily executed
and entered into the compromise agreement. The record shows
that all of the parties personally signed the agreement.
Respondents' voluntary consent to said agreement and its due
execution with assistance of counsel was confirmed when a week
thereafter, their respective-counsels all signed the "Motion for
Judgment on the Basis of the Attached Compromise Agreement.
The signatures of the parties, petitioner and respondents, and
those of their respective counsels, were again affixed on the
Manifestation and Motion dated April 26, 1975, reiterating their
prayer for approval of the compromise agreement as modified
pursuant to respondent judge's Order of April 17, 1978. Thus, not
one of herein respondents had ever assailed the compromise
agreement as not having been freely or voluntarily entered into.
When respondent judge issued his Order for hearing of April 26,
1975 advancing his own observation as to "certain objectionable
features" and mentioning that the compromise referred to
compounding a felony, which is contrary to law and directing the
parties to go over the same again so that he could approve the
same "taking into consideration the provisions of law, as well as
public morals and policy," supra, the parties deferred thereto by
filing their said Manifestation and Motion of April 26, 1975,
wherein they prayed that "The phrase 'and criminal charge
herein above mentioned' found in paragraph 7, page 5 and the
phrase land criminal charge' found in paragraph 10, page 6 of the
Compromise Agreement be deleted from the said Compromise
Agreement dated March 10, 1975," and reiterated the prayer for
judgment on the basis of the compromise agreement, as thus
modified. They made of record, though, that respondent judge's
view was in error, thus:
5. The parties wish to state that the reference to a criminal
charge in the said paragraphs is pure oversight on inadvertence
inasmuch as there is no criminal charge mentioned in the
paragraphs preceding paragraphs 7 and 10 of the Compromise
Agreement and consequently the phrase 'criminal charge
hereinabove mentioned' is meaningless. Besides, it has not been
the intention of the parties to compromise 'the criminal aspect
of the case', not only because it would be contrary to law to do
so but principally because the defendants are fully aware that
such a compromise may be taken as an admission of guilt and the
defendants entered into the 'Compromise Agreement' dated
March 10, 1975 with the clear understanding that by so entering
into such agreement, they are not admitting nor are they
deemed to admit the commission of any criminal act.
Notwithstanding respondent judge's said Order and subsequent
Order of July 3, 1975 setting the case anew for hearing and
directing the parties once more "to reconsider ... and reform" the
waiver and quitclaim provisions of paragraph 7 of the
compromise agreement and flatly announcing that the
modification deleting all reference to the criminal charge was
"unsatisfactory" and that "dropping the complaint is not enough"
concession for herein respondents, the stark fact remains that
not one of respondents ever repudiated the compromise
agreement nor moved to set aside or annul the same because of
alleged fraud, violence or vitiated consent - which is the remedy
available in such cases under Article 2038 of the Civil Code.
All that respondents ever asserted, following respondent judge's
line, was that the waiver and quitclaim provisions constituting
their reciprocal concession was "contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy and public order" — which we have held
to be totally untenable.
ACCORDINGLY, the modification of and deletions from the
compromise agreement ordered in respondent judge's decision
are hereby set aside as null and void, and in lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered approving the compromise
agreement in toto. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR TENCHAVEZ
vs
VICENTA ESCAÑO
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic chaplain.
The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
However, the two were unable to live together after the
marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged.
Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she
filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the
State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute”
was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an
American, lived with him in California, had several children with
him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta
F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he
charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against
the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid
and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s parents
were sufficient in form.
DECISION:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage
remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine Law.
Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid
under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound since in the
time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband,
was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying
with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any
justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure
a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again
are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal
separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez
about the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the court to be
merely conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by
Tenchavez’ own letters written before the suit had begun. An
action for alienation of affections against the parents of one
consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or
unworthy motives on their part.Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely
charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her
to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION
vs
HON. BLAS OPLE
FACTS:
Pakistan International Airline (PIA) is a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in the PH. 2 separate contracts of
employment with Farrales and Mamasig were entered into by
PIA in Manila. The contracts became effective in 1979. The
contracts contained provisions—
Providing for the term of 3 years extendible upon mutual
consent of the parties
That PIA reserves the right to terminate the employee
either by giving notice 1 month before the date of termination or
one month’s salary
“This agreement shall be construed and governed under
and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi,
Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising
out of or under this agreement.”
After their training period, Farrales and Mamasig
commenced their services as flight attendants with base station
in Manila.
1 year and 4 months before the lapse of the 3-year
period, counsel for the local branch of PIA sent Farrales and
Mamasig notices expressing that their services will be
terminated a month thereafter.
Farrales and Mamasig filed a joint complaint for illegal
termination and non-payment of company benefits before the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE)
PIA submitted a position paper claiming that Farrales and
Mamasig were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of
bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects";
and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had
been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private
respondents to discontinue that practice.
Regional Director ordered reinstatement and payment of
full back wages or in the alternative payment of their salaries for
the remainder of the 3-year period.
They have attained status of regular employees
The provision stipulating a three-year period of
employment is null and void for violating LAbor Code provisions
on regular employment
Dismissal without clearance from MOLE entitles
employees to reinstatement Deputy Minister affirmed the RD’s
order.
PIA filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
PIA’s relationship with Farrles and Mamasig was
governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the
general provisions of the Labor Code
ISSUES:
What law governs the relationship of the parties to the contract?
DECISION:
PHILIPPINE LAW
Art 1306 of the Civil Code provides: The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
The governing principle is that parties may not contract
away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory
provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public
interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such
an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations
by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to
appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in
terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and
regulations.
The employment contracts were inconsistent with Arts. 280-281
of the Labor Code
In the case of Brent School vs Zamora, the Court ruled
that contracts of employment providing for a fied period are not
necessarily unlawful. The presence or absence of a substantial
indication that the period specified in an employment agreement
was designed to circumvent the security of tenure of regular
employees which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the
Labor Code is crucial.
The provision in the contracts with PIA allowing for
termination of services upon notice or payment of one month’s
salary was intended to prevent any security of tenure from
accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited
period of three (3) years, and thus to escape completely the
thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code by rendering
their employment at the pleasure of PIA.
PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment
agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the
applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue
for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with
the agreement "only in courts of Karachi Pakistan".
The relationship is much affected with public interest and
that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations
cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some
other law to govern their relationship.
A cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will
show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine
law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship
between the parties, upon the other:
i. the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it
was also performed here, at least partially;
ii. private respondents are Philippine citizens and
respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is
licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence
resident in the Philippines;
iii. private respondents were based in the Philippines in
between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe.
All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and
administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of
contractual disputes between the parties. Under these
circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement
cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and
courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.
Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not
undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the
matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable
provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable
provisions of Philippine law
G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
TERESITA FABIAN
vs.
DESIERTO
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
which was engaged in the construction business. Private
respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the
bidding for government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair
lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent
gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it
in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner
tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing
acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and
meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After
private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman
discovered that the private respondent’s new counsel had been
his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself.
The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman
who exonerated private respondent from the administrative
charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals
in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is valid
DECISION:
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be
brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the
SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
G.R. No. L-5915 March 31, 1955
EAGLE STAR INSURANCE CO., LTD., KURR STEAMSHIP CO., INC.,
ROOSEVELT STEAMSHIP AGENCY, INC., and LEIF HOEGH &
COMPANY, A/S., petitioners,
vs.
CHIA YU, respondent.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1946, Atkin, Kroll & Co., loaded on the S. S. Roeph
Silverlight owned and operated by Leigh Hoegh & Co., A/S, of San
Francisco California, 14 bales of assorted underwear valued at
P8,085.23 consigned to Chia Yu in the City of Manila. The
shipment was insured against all risks by Eagle Star Ins. Co. of San
Francisco, California, under a policy issued to the shipper and by
the latter assigned to the consignee. The vessel arrived in Manila
on February 10, 1946, and on March 4 started discharging its
cargo into the custody of the Manila Terminal Co., Inc., which
was then operating the arrastre service for the Bureau of
Customs. But the 14 bales consigned to Chia Yu only 10 were
delivered to him as the remaining 3 could not be found. Three of
those delivered were also found damaged to the extent of 50 per
cent.
Chia Yu claimed indemnity for the missing and damaged bales.
But the claim was declined, first, by the carrier and afterward by
the insurer, whereupon Chia Yu brought the present action
against both, including their respective agents in the Philippines.
Commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
November 16, 1948, or more than two years after delivery of the
damaged bales and the date when the missing bales should have
been delivered, the action was resisted by the defendants
principally on the ground of prescription. But the trial court
found for plaintiff and rendered judgment in his favor for the sum
claimed plus legal interest and costs. The judgment was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, and the case is now before us on appeal
by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff's action has prescribed.
DECISION:
On the part of the carrier the defense of prescription is made to
rest on the following stipulation of the bill of lading:
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all
liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within
one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the
goods should have been delivered.
The stipulation is but a repetition of a provision contained in
section 3 (6) of the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea, Act
of 1936, which was adopted and made applicable to the
Philippines by Commonwealth Act 65 and by express agreement
incorporated by reference in the bill of lading. Following our
decision in Chua Kuy vs. Everett Steamship Corporation,1 G. R.
No L-5554 (May 27, 1953) and in E. R. Elser, Inc., et al., vs. Court
of Appeals,. et al.,2 G. R. No. L-6517 (November 29, 1954) giving
force and effect to this kind of stipulation in bills of lading
covering shipments from the United States to the Philippines, we
have to hold that plaintiff's failure to bring his action "within one
year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods
should have been delivered" discharged the carrier from all
liability. This dispenses with the necessity of deciding how much
could be recovered from the carrier under the terms of the bill of
lading.
The case for the insurer stands on a different footing, for its claim
of prescription is founded upon the terms of the policy and not
upon the bill of lading. Under our law the time limit for bringing
a civil action upon a written contract is ten years after the right
of action accrues. (Sec. 43, Act 190; Art. 1144, New Civil Code.)
[G.R. No. 119602. October 6, 2000.]
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents
FACTS:
In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing
through it must be piloted by pilots familiar to the river. Hence,
in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas, a
ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the
services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to
pilot the ship in the Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine
Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while being piloted by
Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels.
One such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC).
The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was
not able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the
RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it
incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento
General de la Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de
Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These two laws provide that the
master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the
pilot of the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he
failed to check on certain vibrations that the ship was
experiencing while traversing the river.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the
said Venezuelan laws.
DECISION:
No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact
before the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws were
presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document
to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
consular agent or Foreign Service officer, and with the seal of his
office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of
expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual
presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be the same as
Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon
cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and
Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the
vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited pilot in
Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES,
INC.
FACTS:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana
Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila
agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight
from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the
spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their
daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented
confirmed reservations.While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the
spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the
appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the
scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list
because the number of passengers who checked in before tem
had already taken all the seats available on the flight.
Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were
eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including
Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked
lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-
fare ticket were given first priority among the wait-listed
passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of
his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and
daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied
boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs.
Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because
it was full booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in
another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed
an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage
before
the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor
ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from
American Airlines together with moral damages and attorney’s
fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable
in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since
it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common
and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is
specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the
Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could be
imputed on TWA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal
Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith
on the part of TWA?
DECISION:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of
TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to
board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets.
The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has
never been proved. 1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor
can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal
of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its
customer service agent in her deposition that the Code of
Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication
of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding
that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal
Regulations has no basis in fact.
"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent
airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for
Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The
U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has
never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor
can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody.
The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms.
Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition
dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of
the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said
statement, no official publication of said code was presented as
evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no
basis in fact."
"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist,
the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with
the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of
the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied
by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of
the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines,
the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law."
Benedicto v CA
Facts:
September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for
some time thereafter, both the accused, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with the late president
Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents all of Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court did and then
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports
in the prescribed from and/or register with the foreign
exchange department of the central bank within 90 days from
October 21, 1983 as required of them being residents
habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign
change from whatever source or from invisibles locally or from
abroad, despite the fact they actually earned interests regularly
every six (6) months for the first two years and then quarterly
thereafter for their investment of $50-million, later reduced to
$25-million in December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar
denominated treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer
form, in the name of Bank Hofmann, AG, Zuring, Switzerland,
for the benefit of Avertina Foundation, their front organization
established for economic advancement purposes with secret
foreign exchange account Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211925-
02 in Swiss Credit Bank (also known as SKA) in Zurich,
Switzerland, which earned, acquired or received for the accused
Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of
$2,267,892 as of December 16, 1985 which was remitted to
Bank Hofmann, AG, through Citibank, New York, United States
of America, for the credit of said Avertina account on December
19, 1985, aside from the redemption of $25 million (one-half of
the original $50-M) as of December 16, 1985 and outwardly
remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of $7,495,297.49
and $17,489,062.50 on December 18, 1985 for further
investment outside the Philippine without first complying with
the Central Bank reporting/registering
requirements.1âwphi1.nêt
The Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318 which revised the
rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. It took
effect on January 20, 1992.
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the
government’s policy of further liberalizing foreign exchange
transactions, came out with Circular No. 1356, which amended
Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of
prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded
expenditures obtained from the banking system.
Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a
saving clause, excepting from their coverage pending criminal
actions involving violations of Circular No. 960
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners claimed that they did not incurred
any criminal liability for the violations of circular no 960 since
they were exempted from its coverage?
Ruled:
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No.
960 exempts from the reporting requirement foreign currency
eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign Exchange
Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended. But, in order to avail of the aforesaid exemption,
petitioners must show that they fall within its scope. Petitioners
must satisfy the requirements for eligibility imposed by Section
2, Republic Act No. 6426. Not only do we find the record bare of
any proof to support petitioners’ claim of falling within the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6426, we likewise find from a
reading of Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act that
said law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in
question. Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of "deposit
with such Philippine banks in good standing, as may…be
designated by the Central Bank for the purpose.” The criminal
cases filed against petitioners for violation of Circular No. 960
involve foreign currency accounts maintained in foreign banks,
not Philippine banks. By invoking the confidentiality guarantees
provided for by Swiss banking laws, petitioners admit such
reports made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly construed
and apply only so far as their language fairly warrants, with all
doubts being resolved in favor of the general proviso rather than
the exception. Hence, petitioners may not claim exemption
under Section 10(q).
With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by
petitioners, the rule is that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be alleged
and proved. Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon,
either by: (1) an official publication thereof; or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied by a certification from the
secretary of the Philippine embassy or legation in such
country or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent stationed in such country, or by any
other authorized officer in the Philippine foreign service
assigned to said country that such officer has
custody. Absent such evidence, this Court cannot take judicial
cognizance of the foreign law invoked by Benedicto and
Rivera.
[G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. September 30, 1975.]
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN,
presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II,
and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
FACTS:
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from
Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled here in
the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles
Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that
should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to
her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled
here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion
before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the
will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed
as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted
employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada
manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an
iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to
have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin
approved the motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate
was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same
estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the
said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was
granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno
refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn
over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is
her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended
that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien
testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional
rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas
law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of
legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to
Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at
the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court.
Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The
Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter,
is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however
emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law
applicable (and not said law at any other time). NOTE: Dynamics
of law.
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE
TRUST CO., executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY
LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
C. O. Bohanan, deceased, executed a will on April 23, 1944 in
Manila. The decedent was born in Nebraska and therefore a
citizen of that state. Notwithstanding the long residence of the
decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary,
and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United
States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the
rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile
in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire,
and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time
of his death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose
his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive
personal right.
The Philippine Trust Company was named as the executor of the
will. The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24,
1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the
following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to
the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's
grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several
mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to
the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B.
Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount
of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to
testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator)
son, Edward Gilbert Bohanan, and his daughter, Mary Lydia
Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly instalments; (4) legacies to
Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward,
P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her two children question
the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the
estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have
been deprived of the legitimes that the laws of the forum
conferred to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator,
Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to receive. The will
has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. The
court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the
ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may,
by last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the
same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and
that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime
in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this
marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator.
Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced
wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had
already found that there was no conjugal property between the
testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no
longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children,
Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount
of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their
shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the
forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.
ISSUES:
Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-thirds of the
estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the
laws of the forum valid?
DECISION:
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights
to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this
point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the extent of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old
Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
It was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of
Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his
permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra)
and the same was never questioned. So the question at issue is
whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the
children which are short of their legitimes given them by the Civil
Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws
of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will
(Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not
appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the
above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the
executor's duly to do.
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not
dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of
Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained
to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905
of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial
notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at
the hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity
of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national
law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State
of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to
dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at
bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition
made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be,
as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
[G.R. No. L-54204. September 30, 1982.]
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN
SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD,
HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE
C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.
FACTS:
The deceased, husband of complainant herein, was employed as
a Second Engineer by respondents and served as such in the
vessel, “M.T. Cherry Earl.” While at sea, he suffered apoplectic
stroke and died four days later. Complainant widow thus filed a
claim for death benefits and contended that in determining
amount of the claim, the law of Singapore, where the vessel is
registered, should be considered. For its part, the respondents
argue that Philippine laws should govern considering that the law
of Singapore was never presented and the NSB cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in the
case.
DECISION:
SC held in the affirmative.
On the issue that Singapore law was not presented before the
NSB, SC held that NSB, being an administrative and quasi-judicial
body, is not bound strictly by technical rules It has always been
the policy of this Board that in cases of valid claims for benefits
on account of injury or death while in the course of employment,
the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be
considered.
Moreover, the employment agreement stipulated that
compensation shall be paid under Philippine law or the law of
registry of the vessel, whichever is higher. Thus, the amount
under Singapore law being higher, the same should apply in
accordance with the stipulation.
Ibanez de Aldecoa vs. HSB
G.R. No. L-6889, August 26, 1915
TRENT, J.
Facts:
Under the Old Civil Code, the principle of Patria Potestad,
granted the parent of a child the administration and usufruct of
the property of their minor child until the formal emancipation
of said child upon reaching the age of majority. In 1901, the New
Civil Code impliedly repealed this law by introducing the concept
of guardianship and removing the parent’s administration over
the child’s property. Petitioners were formally emancipated by
their parents on 1903, thereupon obtaining full administration
over their property. Following subsequent events, Aldecoaand
Co., wherein petitioners were partners thereof, became heavily
indebted and entered into mortgage agreement with the HSB.
Upon the liquidation of said firm, petitioners filed a proceeding
and procured a judgment annulling the articles of co-partnership
with Aldecoaand Co., and decreeing that they were creditors and
not partners of the firm. It is contended by the petitioners that
under the New Civil Code, their emancipation was null and void
since they were no longer under the principle of Patria Potestad,
and thus had no capacity to enter into a mortgage agreement.
Issues:
WON Isabel Palet, mother of the petitioners, could legally
emancipate the plaintiffs under the law in force in the Philsin
1903, and thus confer upon them capacity to execute a valid
mortgage on their real property.
HELD: YES.
RATIO: That the patria potestad (parental authority) of the
mother did not terminate upon the enactment of the new Code
of Civil Procedure, but was saved from the operation of the
new law by section 581 thereof. Hence, her rights and duties as
to her children as well as theirs, should be regulated by the
provisions of the old Civil Code. Under the old Civil Code the
mother could validly emancipate the children, and, subsequent
to such emancipation, the children could execute a binding
mortgage upon their real property with the consent of their
mother. It is urged, lastly, that the mortgage contract is void as
to the plaintiffs by reason of a lack of consideration. It is asserted
that they executed the mortgage under the impression that they
were partners in the firm of Aldecoa & Co., when, as decided by
a final judgment of the Court of First Instance, they were not such
partners.
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice
declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due
to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed
his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation.
ISSUES:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it
seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be
given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of
Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
DECISION:
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told
this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the oral argument in
this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to
materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several
members of the House of Representatives" due, according to
him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because
of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon,
with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.
Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice
disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate.
Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the
people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the
Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of
having successfully passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with
no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime
opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as
counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his
cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of
said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence,
he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as
the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board
of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his
citizenship.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold
that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the
filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that
Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only
the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect,
but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of
his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e.,
situations and transactions existing even before the law came
into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise
the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law.
That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can
and should be made to take effect as of date of his application.
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar
this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result
from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee
shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people,
already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the
circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date
of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all
questions about his possession of the nationality qualification --
whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date
of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of
candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status
as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as
he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous
registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said
date.
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality.
This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized
by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable
in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
[G.R. No. L-14441. December 17, 1966.]
PEDRO R. PALTING, petitioner, vs. SAN JOSE PETROLEUM
INCORPORATED, respondent.
FACTS:
On September 7, 1956, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM filed with the
Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission a sworn
registration statement, for the registration and licensing for sale
in the Philippines Voting Trust Certificates representing
2,000,000 shares of its capital stock of a par value of $0.35 a
share, at P1.00 per share. It was alleged that the entire proceeds
of the sale of said securities will be devoted or used exclusively
to finance the operations of San Jose Oil Company, Inc. (a
domestic mining corporation hereafter to be referred to as SAN
JOSE OIL) which has 14 petroleum exploration concessions
covering an area of a little less than 1,000,000 hectares, located
in the provinces of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, La Union,
Iloilo, Cotabato, Davao and Agusan. It was the express condition
of the sale that every purchaser of the securities shall not receive
a stock certificate, but a registered or bearer-voting-trust
certificate from the voting trustees named therein James L.
Buckley and Austin G.E. Taylor, the first residing in Connecticut,
U.S.A., and the second in New York City. While this application
for registration was pending consideration by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM filed an amended
Statement on June 20, 1958, for registration of the sale in the
Philippines of its shares of capital stock, which was increased
from 2,000,000 to 5,000,000, at a reduced offering price of from
P1.00 to P0.70 per share. At this time the par value of the shares
has also been reduced from $.35 to $.01 per share.1
Pedro R. Palting and others, allegedly prospective investors in the
shares of SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission an opposition to registration and licensing
of the securities on the grounds that (1) the tie-up between the
issuer, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, a Panamanian corporation and
SAN JOSE OIL, a domestic corporation, violates the Constitution
of the Philippines, the Corporation Law and the Petroleum Act of
1949; (2) the issuer has not been licensed to transact business in
the Philippines; (3) the sale of the shares of the issuer is
fraudulent, and works or tends to work a fraud upon Philippine
purchasers; and (4) the issuer as an enterprise, as well as its
business, is based upon unsound business principles. Answering
the foregoing opposition of Palting, et al., the registrant SAN
JOSE PETROLEUM claimed that it was a "business enterprise"
enjoying parity rights under the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution, which parity right, with respect to mineral
resources in the Philippines, may be exercised, pursuant to the
Laurel-Langley Agreement, only through the medium of a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. Thus,
registrant which is allegedly qualified to exercise rights under the
Parity Amendment, had to do so through the medium of a
domestic corporation, which is the SAN JOSE OIL. It refused the
contention that the Corporation Law was being violated, by
alleging that Section 13 thereof applies only to foreign
corporations doing business in the Philippines, and registrant
was not doing business here. The mere fact that it was a holding
company of SAN JOSE OIL and that registrant undertook the
financing of and giving technical assistance to said corporation
did not constitute transaction of business in the Philippines.
Registrant also denied that the offering for sale in the Philippines
of its shares of capital stock was fraudulent or would work or
tend to work fraud on the investors. On August 29, 1958, and on
September 9, 1958 the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
issued the orders object of the present appeal.
ISSUES:
These concepts clarified, is herein respondent SAN JOSE
PETROLEUM an American business enterprise entitled to parity
rights in the Philippines?
DECISION:
The answer must be in the negative, for the following reasons:
Firstly — It is not owned or controlled directly by citizens of the
United States, because it is owned and controlled by a
corporation, the OIL INVESTMENTS, another foreign
(Panamanian) corporation.
Secondly — Neither can it be said that it is indirectly owned and
controlled by American citizens through the OIL INVESTMENTS,
for this latter corporation is in turn owned and controlled, not by
citizens of the United States, but still by two foreign (Venezuelan)
corporations, the PANTEPEC OIL COMPANY and PANCOASTAL
PETROLEUM.
Thirdly — Although it is claimed that these two last corporations
are owned and controlled respectively by 12,373 and 9,979
stockholders residing in the different American states, there is no
showing in the certification furnished by respondent that the
stockholders of PANCOASTAL or those of them holding the
controlling stock, are citizens of the United States.
Fourthly — Granting that these individual stockholders are
American citizens, it is yet necessary to establish that the
different states of which they are citizens, allow Filipino citizens
or corporations or associations owned or controlled by Filipino
citizens, to engage in the exploitation, etc. of the natural
resources of these states (see paragraph 3, Article VI of the
Laurel-Langley Agreement, supra). Respondent has presented no
proof to this effect.
Fifthly — But even if the requirements mentioned in the two
immediately preceding paragraphs are satisfied, nevertheless to
hold that the set-up disclosed in this case, with a long chain of
intervening foreign corporations, comes within the purview of
the Parity Amendment regarding business enterprises indirectly
owned or controlled by citizens of the United States, is to unduly
stretch and strain the language and intent of the law. For, to what
extent must the word "indirectly" be carried? Must we trace the
ownership or control of these various corporations ad infinitum
for the purpose of determining whether the American
ownership-control-requirement is satisfied? Add to this the
admitted fact that the shares of stock of the PANTEPEC and
PANCOASTAL which are allegedly owned or controlled directly by
citizens of the United States, are traded in the stock exchange in
New York, and you have a situation where it becomes a practical
impossibility to determine at any given time, the citizenship of
the controlling stock required by the law. In the circumstances,
we have to hold that the respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, as
presently constituted, is not a business enterprise that is
authorized to exercise the parity privileges under the Parity
Ordinance, the Laurel-Langley Agreement and the Petroleum
Law. Its tie-up with SAN JOSE OIL is, consequently, illegal.
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.]
CIRILO
R. VALLES, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents
|||
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier
Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of
fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she
has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as
a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In
1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental.
Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a
petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as
ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However,
finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her
Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc
dismissed the petition.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT the act of holding a foreign passport
and alien certificate of registration are acts constituting effective
renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
2. WHETHER OR NOT dual citizens are not allowed to run for
public office.
DECISION:
1. NO. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an
alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against
her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.8 As
held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application
for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The
application of the herein private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian
passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts
of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had
dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
2. NO. In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the
Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local Government
Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.9Recognizing situations in
which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as
an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained
that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens
with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
"xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and
in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual
allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship
did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public
office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.11 This
is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that
he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her
certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
Australian citizenship.
Re: Vicente Ching
Facts:
Vicente ching the legitimate child of the spouse Tat ching, a
Chinese citizen and Prescilla A Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Tubao, La Union april 11 1964. Since birth ching has resided in
the Philippines.
July 17 1998 ching completed his law degree at St. louis
university in baguio city and filed his application to take the bar
examination subject to the condition that he has to submit to the
S.C. of his proof of citizenship.
In compliance with the resolution ching only submitted the
following:
Certification issued by the board of accountancy showing that he
is a CPA
Voter certification
Certification issued by Elizabeth Cerezo issuing that he is a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of La Union.
April 5 1999 the result of the bar exams were released and Ching
was one of the successful examinees.
The oath taking was scheduled on May 5 1999 however Ching
was not allowed to take the oath because he was required to
submit further proof his citizenship pursuant to the resolution of
the court.
The OSG opined that Ching being the “legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935
constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship”.
“Commonwealth act 625 entitled “an act providing for the
manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall
be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen.”
The OSG further explained that “(a) what he acquired at the best
was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could
perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority.
“the clause upon reaching the age of majority “ has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority which has been interpreted by the secretary of justice
to be 3 YEARS. Said period may be extended under certain
circumstance as when a person concerned has always considered
himself as a Filipino, but in Cuenco it was held that an election
done after over seven (7) years was not made within a
reasonable time.”
In conclusion the OSG points out that ching has not formally
elected Philippine citizenship.
Aggrieved, on July 27 1999 ching filed a manifestation attaching
his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and his oath of
allegiance both dated july 15 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time?
Whether or not his citizenship by election retroacted to the time
he took the bar exam?
RULING:
NO.
The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made within 3 years from the age of
majority, however in Cuenco vs. Secretary of justice that the 3
year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age majority and that the
secretary of justice has ruled that the 3 years in the reasonable
time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted above, which period may be extended under
certain circumstance as when the person concerned has always
considered himself as a Filipino.
In the present case, ching was already 35 years old and it was
already 14 years after reaching the age of majority, chings
election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should
be stated that the special circumstance invoked by ching that his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and being a
CPA, a registered, a former elected officer of the sangguniang,
cannot vest him a Philippine citizenship by election.
Chings argument based on the in re: Florencio mallare is quite
different since mallare was born before the 1935 constitution
and the enactment of the C.A. 625.
Philippine Citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that
can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.
One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such he should avail such
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship
and as a result this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.]
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Antonio Bengson and Teodoro Cruz were rivals in the 1998
elections in the 2nd District of Pangasinan. They were running for
Congress. Cruz won by a significant margin over the incumbent
Bengson. Bengson then filed a quo warranto proceeding in the
HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) alleging that
Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he
should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET
subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson
filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that Cruz was indeed
born a Filipino and he is defined under the 1935 Constitution as
a natural born citizen. Cruz however lost his citizenship when he
enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore allegiance to the
US without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other
hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of
Republic Act No. 2630 which provides that:
Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the
United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines…
Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect such citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.
DECISION:
Yes. Bengson’s contention that Cruz is no longer a natural-born
citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the
term “natural-born citizen” was first defined in Article III, Section
4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
In Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
2630. Under said law, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a natural-born Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a natural-
born Filipino citizen.

[G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991.]
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE ONG, JR., respondents
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside
and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in
making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the seAcond legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative
of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in
its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen
of the Philippines.
2. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.
DECISION:
1. YES. There is no dispute that the respondent's mother
was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or
chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He
could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and
1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he
was nine years old.
2. YES.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The
absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter
how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of
that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
[G.R. No. L-24530. October 31, 1968.]
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS and
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners, vs. BEATO GO
CALLANO, MANUEL GO CALLANO, GONZALO GO CALLANO and
JULIO GO CALLANO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside
and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in
making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the seAcond legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative
of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in
its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen
of the Philippines.
2. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.
DECISION:
1. YES. There is no dispute that the respondent's mother
was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or
chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He
could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and
1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he
was nine years old.
2. YES.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The
absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter
how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of
that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO
BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside
and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in
making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second
district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the seAcond legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative
of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in
its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen
of the Philippines.
2. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.
DECISION:
1. YES. There is no dispute that the respondent's mother
was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or
chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He
could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and
1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he
was nine years old.
2. YES.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The
absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter
how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of
that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
[G.R. No. 86564. August 1, 1989.]
RAMON L. LABO,
JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC
) EN BANC AND LUIS LARDIZABAL, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His
rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against
Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence
disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he
married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has
dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed
became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen,
such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian
was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts
that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate
the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast
majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest
vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is
disqualified.
DECISION:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence
presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in
1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an
oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not
dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the
Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here.
It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance
to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared
as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that
his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the
electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have,
even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a
foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they
known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit
a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia,
or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of
their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over
their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo
warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by
reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the
second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant
to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.
[G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989.]
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU,
WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,
BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO
HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES AND JUN
ESPIRITU SANTO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued
a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and
renewed for the same period upon presentment before the
proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as
a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that
his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a
citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and
pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in
April 1980.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Petitioner’s acts constitutes an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
DECISION:
YES. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board
of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of
his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the
second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
[G.R. No. 132244. September 14, 1999.]
GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the
United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York
Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March
1996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to
regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic
Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK).
On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A.
8171. The motion was denied by the trial judge in his order of 12
July 1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996
to have the denial reconsidered was found to be meritorious by
the court a quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996.
After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996, another
order was issued by the trial judge on 04 October 1996
On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a
motion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that the
petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for
lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the
Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with
Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996,
issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the
Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing
agency of R.A 8171.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the trial court has jurisdiction over the
petition for repatriation.
DECISION:
No. R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995,
is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b)
of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account or political or economic necessity. The
pertinent provisions of the law read:
Sec. 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on
account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner
provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 631, as
amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with
any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance
of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude: or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath that the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially
in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The invoke Republic Act No. 965 16 and R.A. No. 2630 17 since these
Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien laws could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the
05 June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an petition, Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person
application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was
by natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship, to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created
pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11 April
1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued,
respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976.
Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President
Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of 27 March 1987, it was not
however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 9
the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of
President Aquino had merely directed the Special Committee on
Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10
The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that
Angat's petition should have been filed with the Committee,
aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction
thereover. The court's order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null
and void, and it did not acquire finality 14 nor could be a source
of right on the part of petitioner. 15 It should also be noteworthy
[G.R. No. L-30728. October 15, 1974.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ALBAY, BRANCH I, HON. PERFECTO QUICHO,
PRESIDING JUDGE, and DOMINGO ONG CHUA, respondents.
||
FACTS:
On March 30, 1959, respondent Court rendered a decision
granting the Petition for Naturalization of private respondent
Domingo Ong Chua. On April 6, 1961, respondent Court issued
an order allowing Domingo Ong Chua to take his oath as a Filipino
citizen, and directing the issuance to him of a Certificate of
Naturalization. Domingo Chua thereafter took his Oath of
Allegiance and was issued a Certificate of Naturalization. Copies
of the decision of March 30, 1959 and the order of April 6, 1961,
were, however, only served upon the Solicitor General on
September 29, 1966. On October 11, 1966, petitioner Republic
through the then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now
Associate Justice of this Court, filed with respondent Court an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of March
30, 1969, to declare null and void the order of April 6, 1961 as
well as the Oath of Allegiance, to cancel the Certificate of
Naturalization, and, pending final determination of Republic's
Omnibus Motion, to enjoin Domingo Ong Chua from using his
Certificate of Naturalization or acting in any manner as a citizen
of the Philippines.
Respondent Domingo Ong Chua opposed the Omnibus Motion
on the grounds that (1) by reason of inexcusable laches the State
could no longer question the decision of March 30, 1959, much
less appeal therefrom, said decision having already become final;
and (2) assuming that the State may still re-open the case, the
points raised in the motion do not have any factual and legal
basis.
ISSUE:
When is the 30-day period of appeal in naturalization cases
commenced to run?
DECISION:
There is no question that the 30-day period of appeal in
naturalization cases allowed the Government is counted from
notice of, or receipt by, the Solicitor General of the decision, and
not from the date of its receipt by the Provincial Fiscal. The
Naturalization Law prescribes that the Solicitor General shall
appear on behalf of the Government "either himself or through
his delegate, or the Provincial Fiscal concerned." It is evident that
the Fiscal appears not in substitution, but merely as
representative, of the Solicitor General who remains the counsel
of record for the Republic in the naturalization case. 1 In Lim v.
Republic, 2 We ruled that the validity of naturalization
proceedings is vitiated by the failure of the court to serve notice
of hearings to the Solicitor General, as required by law. This rule
applies even if the notices were sent to the Provincial Fiscal who
was duly authorized by the Solicitor General to appear in his
behalf. It is evident, therefore, that since the decision of the
respondent Court granting the petition for naturalization was
only served upon the Solicitor General on September 29, 1966,
the period to appeal should be counted from the aforesaid date.

[G.R. No. 99358. January 30, 1995.]
DJUMANTAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO,
COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON.
REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia
as a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On
May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic
rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez,
(two-year old Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in
Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that
he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely
repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage"
with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against
the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident
under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner
was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a
letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently
referred the letter to the CID.
The CID revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s power to deport petitioner had
prescribed.
DECISION:
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens
the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw
her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the
Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false
and misleading statements or without inspection and admission
by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to
deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has
a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years
after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940,
Sec. 37[b]).
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has
prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines
on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading
statements in her application and in the other supporting
documents submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo
C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980
about the manner petitioner was admitted into the country and
asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA
Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting
action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when
Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of
petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed
before the issuance of the order of her deportation on
September 27, 1990.
[G.R. No. L-24252. January 30, 1967.]
IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for naturalization
under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her
alien registry with the Bureau of Immigration, ZITA
NGO BURCA, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
||
FACTS:
On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca
— "as possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications
for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose
of cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of
Immigration".1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to
Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St.,
Ormoc City; that before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen,
subject of Nationalist China, with ACR No. A-148054; that she
was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder of
Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. After making a
number of other allegations and setting forth certain denials, she
manifests that "she has all the qualifications required under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications required under
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473" aforesaid.
The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the petition
on two main grounds, viz: (1) that "there is no proceeding
established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual"; and (2) that as an application for
Philippine citizenship, "the petition is fatally defective for failure
to contain or mention the essential allegations required under
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law", such as, among others,
petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence of the
affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Burca automatically became a Filipino citizen by
the mere fact of marriage.
DECISION:
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who
marries a Filipino citizen, does not — by the mere fact of
marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen.
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the import of the
constitutional and statutory precepts just quoted with a uniform
pronouncement that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not
acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is
proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized.2 Which
means that, in line with the national policy of selective admission
to Philippine citizenship, the wife must possess the qualifications
under Section 2, and must not be laboring under any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4, of the Revised
Naturalization Law.
Moreover, respondent failed to allege a former place of
residence. The case was also submitted solely on the testimony
of the petitioner. No other witnesses were presented. This does
not meet with the legal requirement.
Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed from
is hereby reversed and the petition dismissed, without costs.
Smith vs Smith 206 Pa. Super 310 213 A. 2d 94
Smith vs smith
Parties were married in 1956, on May 11 1961, the husband
filed a indignities to the person while the wife contested, Morris
Zimmerman, Esquire, was the appointed master. Hearings were
held before and testimonies were taken, prior to the transcript
of the testimony Mr. Zimmerman died without filing any report
and the court appointed another master and directed him to
review the testimony already taken and make his report. The
order was amended directing the master to review the
testimony and take such further testimony as he deemed
necessary, another order was issued by the court amending the
prior orders to provide that the parties might recall any witness
for additional examination and cross examination of the
evidence provided by the master. However the counsel of the
wife asked the master be directed a case de novo, the petition
was granted and the case was succeeded by another master
and directed to review the case. The successor master
proceeded the case base on the last order of the court and that
the husband be granted divorce.
The wife’s counsel argues that the successor should have heard
the testimonies of the case de novo
This she claims is required by Pa. R.C.P. No. 1133, which
provides, inter alia, that after an action is at issue "the court
shall hear the testimony, or . . . may . . . appoint a master to
hear the testimony and return the record and a transcript of the
testimony to the court, together with his report and
recommendation."
However the court of Pennsylvania convinced us that the rule
shall not compel retaking of the testimony of the successor
since it is not controlling because it would be a financial burden
to the husband.
The wife objected that the husband is not a bona fide resident
of the state of Pennsylvania for at least 1 year to file a divorce
complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband has complied with the residence
requirement of filing a divorce complaint?
Ruled;
Yes.
The law defines that domicile is meant that a person has a true,
fixed, permanent home and principal establishment to which
whenever he is absent he has the intention to return.
The husbands testimony has proved that he moved to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1933 and since that time always
intended to make Pittsburgh his home. Plaintiff owned an
apartment building there where he and his wife lived from
1956-1959.
They also travelled to Europe and New Jersey but Pittsburgh
was the place where he always returned.
[G.R. No. L-20997. April 27, 1967.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE NAME
OF ONG HUAN TIN TO TERESITA TAN, ONG HUAN
TIN, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS:
Petition to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan
(Special Proceeding 03521, Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court). Due publication was had. The petition was set for
hearing. But, be¬fore the petition could be heard on the merits,
the court, motu proprio, in its order of November 6, 1962
expressed the opinion "that an alien cannot avail himself of the
provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of name" and
thereupon denied the petition. A move to recon¬sider was
rejected in the court's order of November 24, 1962. Off¬shoot is
the present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien may petition for a change of name.
DECISION:
In a recent judicial test (In the Petition for the Change of Name
of JOSELITO YU, G.R. L-20874, May 25, 1966) we held that
Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a prerequisite for a
petition to change name; and that, accordingly, an alien may
petition for a change of name.
Nonetheless, we pause to consider whether every alien in this
country may petition for a change of name.
The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual
is governed and controlled by the lex domicilii.2 Implicit in this
precept is that an alien may be allowed to change his name here
only if he be domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means
"permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts
and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent."3
An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there
avail of the right to change his name.
We, accordingly, lay down the rule that only alien domiciled in
the Philippines may apply for change of name in the courts
thereof.
Considering that the petition herein complies with the requisites
set forth in the Rules of Court, we vote to set aside the orders of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of November 6, 1962
and November 24, 1962; and to direct said Court to proceed with
the hearing and determination of Special Proceeding 03521,
entitled "In the Matter of the Petition to Change Name of Ong
Huan Tin to Teresita Tan." No costs. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.]
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated
high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She
then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College
now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she
taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to
manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he
was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there
as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The
petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months
under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She
arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she
became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the
First District of Leyte.
DECISION:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District
of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in
the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became
Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence
of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile
because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country
clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin,
as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.
[G.R. No. 100150. January 5, 1994.]
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO,
AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued
and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing
the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of
the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and
ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to
dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that
Commissioners' authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case
were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in
business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners'
motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated
April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also
prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating
CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an"order to desist" within the extent of the
authority and power of the CRH?
DECISION:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent
of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1),
provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on
its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights
violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character
but an adjudicative power that it does not possess. The
Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for
it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said
so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction
to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be
issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or
by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby
prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.
[G.R. No. L-6379. September 29, 1954.]
In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippine.
WILFRED UYTENGSU, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. He began his primary
education at the Saint Theresa’s College in said municipality.
Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy,
then the San Carlos College and, still later the Siliman University
— all in the same locality — where he completed the secondary
course. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua
Institute of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the
United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the
Leland Stanford Junior University, in California, and was
graduated, in 1950, with the degree of Bachelor of Science. In
April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4)
months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present
application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to
the United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical
engineering, in another educational institution, in Fort Wayne,
Indiana. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return
to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of
the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had
to be postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for naturalization may be
granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the
Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not
return until several months after the first date set for the hearing
thereof.
DECISION:
No. The Government has not had any chance whatsoever to thus
keep a watchful eye on petitioner herein. Immediately after the
filing of his application — and — notwithstanding the explicit
promise therein made him, under oath, to the effect that he
would reside continuously in the Philippines "from the date of
the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship" — he returned to the United States, where
he stayed, continuously, until October 13, 1951.
In short, we are of the opinion that petitioner herein has not
complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him
in his application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present
proceedings, to a judgment in his favor. Wherefore, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed, and the case dismissed, with
costs against the petitioner, but without prejudice to the filing of
another application, if he so desires, in conformity with law.
[G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995.]
AGAPITO
A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON, and JUANITO
ICARO, respondents.
FACTS:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned
district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification,
he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections
dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for
reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on
Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of
Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified
for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of
residence.
ISSUE:
Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually
connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino
from the position in the electoral district.
DECISION:
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e.,
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose
is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage
of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous
(1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered
voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years
prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District
of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium
unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home
in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a
resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac
and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that
his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission
on Elections.
[G.R. No. 43592. May 17, 1935.]
JUAN L. ALCANTARA, MIGUEL VALDES, ADOLFO ALMEDA and
DIONISIO PANGILINAN, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, and the CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS, BALALA
ELECTORAL BOARD OF INSPECTORS, CULION,
PALAWAN, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners are confinees at the Culion Leper Colony in Culion,
Palawan, having voted in previous decisions in the Philippine
Islands. That after a public meeting, they adopted a resolution
demanding a right to vote in the upcoming Plebiscite and
requesting the electoral precincts be established within the
radius of the colony so that qualified voters therein could
register. The resolution was sent to the Governor-General who
referred the same to the Secretary of Interior, and through its
legal division ruled that no new electorate precincts could be
created because the Plebiscite was considered a special election.
Because of the ruling, Petitioners requested by telegram,
the Interior Department to authorize the Balala Electoral Board
of Inspectors to register the qualified voters of the colony. The
request was denied on the ground that Petitioners were not
bona fide residents of Culion Palawan, not having been residents
of Culion for six months next preceding the day of the plebiscite,
for they have not acquired residence in Culion as they are
confined as lepers against their will and having no intention to
reside therein as provided in Secs. 430-431 of the Administrative
Code, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners are residents of Culion, Palawan, and
as such, qualified to register and vote therein in the upcoming
plebiscite.
DECISION:
The Court ruled that, in the United States, the Constitution
limits the right of the States to discriminate against person by
reason of race, color or previous condition of servitude in their
exercise of the right of suffrage.
That at present, the closest thing the Philippines to a
Constitution is the Jones Law which only provision contained in
that law as to the qualification of voters are found under Sec. 15.
Also, the Philippine Legislature has prescribed the
qualifications and disqualifications of voters in Sec. 431 and 432,
respectively, of the Revised Administrative Code.
There being nothing in the above-mentioned provisions
which could provide a definite answer to the issue at hand, the
Court resorted to law and jurisprudence of similar issue from the
different States of the limited States. The Court found that in one
State, it held that 'for the purpose of voting, no person shall be
deemed to have gained or lost a residence while a student at any
seminary of learning.
In other jurisdictions, a contrary conclusion was reached
upon the theory that under such a constitutional provision, an
inmate of such institution may acquire a residence at the home.
In another case, it was held that 'in the absence of such
constitutional prohibition, the rule in is that a permanent
member of a soldier's home has a residence at such home for the
purpose of voting'.
After comparing such, the Court ruled that under our
liberal, petitioners are residents of Culion, Palawan, and entitled
to register and vote in the upcoming plebiscite, but the case must
be remanded to the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors to
determine if petitioners have the prescribed qualifications and
none of the disqualifications under Sec. 431 and 432 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
[G.R. No. 104960. September 14, 1993.]
PHILIP
G. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF
ELECTION INSPECTORS, PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA,
LEYTE, and the MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR COMELEC, TOLOSA,
LEYTE, respondents.
|||
FACTS:
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, the son of the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in
consonance with his decision to establish his legal residence at
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, 1 caused the construction of his
residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served as
Barangay Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan Election and
1986 "snap" Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the
Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte
where he voted. 2
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February,
1986, came or were about to come to a close, some relatives and
associates of the deposed President, fearing for their personal
safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the country. Petitioner
Romualdez, for one, together with his immediate family, left the
Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United States which the
United States (U.S.) government granted. 3 While abroad, he
took special studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and
international business finance.
When Romualdez arrived back in the Philippines, he did not delay
his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the
registration of voters conducted by the Commission on Election
("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992 for the Synchronized National
and Local Election scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner
registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte. The chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors,
who had known Romualdez to be a resident of the place and, in
fact, an elected Barangay Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed
him to be registered.
Romualdez's registration, however, was not to be unquestioned.
On 21 February 1992, herein private respondent Donato
Advincula ("Advincula") filed a petition with the Municipal Trial
Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from
the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under
BP 881 and RA 7166. 8 Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a
resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and
occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in
the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year
residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in
Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner have voluntarily left the country and
abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
DECISION:
No. The political situation brought about by the "People's Power
Revolution" must have truly caused great apprehension to the
Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and
welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-
exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow
stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure
from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as
"abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these
terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
We have closely examined the records, and we find not that
much to convince us that the petitioner had, in fact, abandoned
his residence in the Philippines and established his domicile
elsewhere.
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003.]
ATTY. ROMULO
B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
FACTS:
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the
validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189).
He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds,
among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an
immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee
voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects
the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it
violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered
to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.
DECISION:
No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters
are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the
period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood
in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used.
Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws
is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the
intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is
considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant
does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an
absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be
the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing
and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred
to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
CHAPTER THREE
CITIZENSHIP AND
DOMICILE
30. ALEEM VS PERRYMAN 114 F3D672 (1997)
FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Aleem are citizens of India. Mr. Aleem immigrated
to the United States and became a lawful permanent resident in
1977. Four years later, his wife followed suit. In 1984, Mr.
Aleem completed a Masters degree in Computer Science at
DePaul University in Chicago, but was unable to find work in his
field. Because of his mounting debt and inability to find work in
the United States, he applied and was accepted for a teaching
position at Gulf Polytechnic University (later named University of
Bahrain) in the country of Bahrain. He accepted this position
and left for Bahrain in September 1984 accompanied by his wife
and two children, a three-year-old and a newborn.2 When the
Aleems left for Bahrain, they abandoned their apartment,
disposed of their personal property, and had no relatives
remaining in the United States. Prior to leaving the United
States, Mr. Aleem obtained a reentry permit from the INS valid
for a two-year absence from the United States.
Upon their return from an extended stay in Bahrain, an
immigration judge determined that Mohammed Aleem and his
wife Rahmatunnisa, both of whom are permanent resident aliens
of the United States, should be excluded from this country,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20),1 because they had
abandoned their permanent resident status.
ISSUE:
Whether the Aleems' stay in Bahrain qualifies as a “temporary
visit abroad.”
DECISION:
The record is quite clear that the Aleems left the United States in
1984 because of mounting debt and Mr. Aleem's inability to find
suitable employment. He found that employment in Bahrain,
and when he left the States in 1984 he left no family here, he left
no real or personal property here, and he had no significant
business ties to the United States. At the time that the
exclusion proceedings were initiated in this case, the Aleems had
been in Bahrain for approximately five years and intended to
return so that Mr. Aleem could continue teaching under the
terms of a contract that had been extended for a third time.
This evidence substantially supports the Board's conclusion that,
“it appears that the applicant's employment with the University
of Bahrain would continue as long as he wished to remain there․
It appears that the applicant intended to work indefinitely with
the University of Bahrain, as long as the employment was
available.” Certified Administrative Record at 6. While Mr.
Aleem's employment with the University of Bahrain might not
have been “permanent,” that is not the pertinent inquiry.
Chavez-Ramirez, 792 F.2d at 936. His employment was plainly
indefinite and not fixed by any early event. Against this
backdrop of repeatedly renewing his teaching contract with the
University of Bahrain, Mr. Aleem testified that he intended to
return to the United States for good after serving out his fourth
contractual term with the University. Absent any indication
that Mr. Aleem's job prospects in the United States had changed,
we find no fault with the Board's failure to credit this self-serving
testimony.5 Notwithstanding his professed intention to return,
Mr. Aleem's course of conduct demonstrated that he had no
definite plan to return but was “merely planning to let future
events determine his course” and thus was not on a temporary
visit.
[G.R. No. L-7068. December 22, 1954.]
PERFECTO FAYPON, petitioner, vs.
ELISEO QUIRINO, respondent
FACTS:
Respondent was born in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to
pursue his studies; went to United States for the same purpose;
returned to the Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work
in Manila, and Iloilo. When he ran for the office of Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial
board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto
was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's
ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of
residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent
registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances
constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
DECISION:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence
or origin - domicile - to pursue studies, engage in business, or
practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener
pastures" to improve his lot. When election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to
return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or
business reason, he may not be absent himself from the place of
his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile
or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration
of a voter in another place has not been deemed sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
[G.R. No. L-8409. December 28, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio.
EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee, vs. AMANDA EUSEBIO,
VIRGINIA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO,
VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio
Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition
for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father,
Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing,
according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4,
1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all
surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they
are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore,
that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been
improperly filed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the late Andres Eusebio was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
DECISION:
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres
Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other
properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his
son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio
bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City
(Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house, soon
thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart
failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.
Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent
remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of
Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he
contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife,
Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he
died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to
hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years
(Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said
house at España Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin
of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided
for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained
such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of
satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a
domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained"
(Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on
Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78).
Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres
Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of
choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely:
(1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich,
Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig
vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220).
Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a
domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his
demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended
to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the
decedent appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely
in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness
stand, did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his
answer to the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein,
that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his
life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce
the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the
decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably,
the house and lot at No. 889-A España Extention was purchased,
and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This
notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent
to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the
acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging
thereto. This conclusion is untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent
because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the
very words of herein appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its
is very likely — that said advice was given and followed in order
that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more
effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own
health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never
again be able, on account of illness, to return home." (The
Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton
vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291
Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in
San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who
used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in
that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of
which said property at No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City,
was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month
before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga,
as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates
used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a
notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the
marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was
married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST
Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his
demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It
is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate
full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said
wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his
first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that
occasion and would have objected to said statement about his
residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's
failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to
establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly
and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any
rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old
domicile 1— which is particularly strong when the domicile is one
of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as
regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of
record.
[G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999.]
JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO,
JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondents.
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of
the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the election. 3
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr.,
Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio
P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course
to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA
No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC.
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his
declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much
less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he
seeks election.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT petitioner is a resident of the Province of
Sarangani.
DECISION:
It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the
law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. 21 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return. 22 "Domicile" is a question of
intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1)
that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
when once established it remains until a new one is acquired;
and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
23
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon,
Ilocos
Sur 24 and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of
choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City,
as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of
representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995
election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a
new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue
and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. 25 To
successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with
the
purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual. 27
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence
in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently
established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in
January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath
of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and
his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient
to show that from said date he had transferred his residence in
that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal
presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of
that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily
presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable
intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode,
one's home. 28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical
presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a
domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No
change of domicile will result if either of these elements is
absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence
in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does
the fact of physical presence without intention. 29
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does
not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract
may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani
but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to
prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere
absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter
how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in
loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and
lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997,
cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the
reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in
Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as
voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not
conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption
of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in
his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is
a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said
to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the
place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. 31
The fact that a party continously voted in a particular locality is a
strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
32
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and
was caused by events over which he had no control cannot be
sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the
May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive
weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22. 33
While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani
can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was
renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his
previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997, 34 and
that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to
Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997,
35 DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency
requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both
intent and actual presence in the district one intends to
represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. 36 Domino's failure to do so rendered him
ineligible and his election to office null and void. 37
[G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999.]
MARCITA
MAMBA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS an
d RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate
of candidacy for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan
in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30,
1998, petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a
petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a
candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the
district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of
the elections as required by Art. VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a
unanimous resolution, dismissed the petition for
disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified
to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.
ISSUE:
Whether “residency” in the respondent’s certificate of candidacy
for governor actually connotes “domicile” to warrant his
disqualification from the position in the electoral district.
DECISION:
No. As this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC: It is the
fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy,
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. There is substantial evidence supporting the
finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third
District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract
from the merit of this factual finding. The private respondent was
actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year
prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7)
years since July 1990.
[G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002.]
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PERICO V. JAO, respondents
|
FACTS:
Petitioner, allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother, filed a petition for repatriation claiming that
she is a Philippine citizen due to the invalid marriage of her
parents. Trial court issued an Order declaring the petitioner as
judicially repatriated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not repatriation through judicial proceeding is valid.
DECISION:
No, because there is no law requiring or authorizing such judicial
repatriation. All that is required for a female citizen of the
Philippines who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her
Philippine citizenship, is for her to take necessary oath in the
proper civil registrar, upon the termination of her marital status.
Decision revoked and set aside.
Davis V. Winship v. Phil. Trust Co., 90 Phil. 744 [1952]
Facts:
Prior to December, 1941, the Eastern Isles, Inc., a corporation
organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines, all of the capital stock of which was and has been
owned by American citizens, had a current account deposit with
the Philippine Trust Company.
On October 4, 1943, the Japanese Military Administration in the
Philippines issued an order requiring all deposit accounts of the
hostile people (including corporations) to be transferred to the
Bank of Taiwan, as the depository of the Japanese Military
Administration, which order the Philippine Trust Company was
specifically directed to comply with. In compliance with said
order, the Philippine Trust Company transferred and paid the
credit balances of the current account deposits of the Eastern
Isles Import Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. to the Bank
of Taiwan.
The pre-war current deposit accounts of the Eastern Isles Import
Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. were subsequently
transferred to S. Davis Winship who, on August 12, 1947,
presented to the Philippine Trust Company checks Nos. A-79212
and H-579401 covering the aforesaid deposits. The Philippine
Trust Company, however, refused to pay said checks,
whereupon, on September 6, 1947, S. Davis Winship instituted
the present action against the Philippine Trust Company in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, to recover upon the first cause
of action the sum of P51,410.91 and under the second cause of
action the sum of P34,827.74.
In its answer, the defendant Philippine trust Company invoked
the order of the Japanese Military Administration by virtue of
which it transferred the current deposit accounts in question to
the Bank of Taiwan as the depository of the Bureau of Enemy
Property Custody of the Japanese Military Administration.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Trust Company is liable to the
pre-war deposits from petitioner.
Ruling: It has been stipulated by the parties that the defendant
transferred the deposits in question to the Bank of Taiwan in
compliance with the order of the Japanese Military
Administration, the defendant was released from any obligation
to the depositors or their transferee. Appellant's contention that
there is no positive showing that the transfer was made by the
Philippine Trust Company in compliance with the order of the
Japanese Military Administration, and its logical effect is to make
such act binding on said company. At any rate, the defendant
corporation has not impugned its validity.
In the case of Filipinas Compañia de Seguros vs. Christern
Henefeld and Co., The SC ruled that the nationality of a private
corporation is determined by the character or citizenship of its
controlling stockholders; and this pronouncement is of course
decisive as to the hostile character of the Eastern Isles, Inc., as
far as the Japanese Military Administration was concerned, it
being conceded that the controlling stockholders of said
corporations were American citizens.
[G.R. Nos. 89095 & 89555. November 6, 1989.]
SIXTO P. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPOUSES SHOJI YAMADA and
MICHIYO YAMADA and SPOUSES TOMOTADA ENATSU and
EDITA ENATSU, respondents.
|
FACTS:
Sixto Crisostomo, Felipe Crisostomo, Juanito Crisostomo et al
were the original stockholders of the United Doctors Medical
Center (UDMC), which was organized in 1968 with authorized
capital stock of P1 million (later increased to P15 million in 1972).
They owned 40% of the outstanding stock while the majority
belonged to the members of the United Medical Staff Association
(UMSA)
1. Despite their minority status, the Crisostomo group has
managed UDMC from its inception with Juanito Crisostomo as
president and petitioner Sixto Crisostomo as director and legal
counsel
2. In 1988, UDMC defaulted in its obligation to pay P55 million to
DBP. In the last quarter of 1987, UDMC’s assets and those of the
Crisostomos which had been given to DBP as collateral, faced
foreclosure by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), which had
taken over UDMC’s loan.
3. As such, UDMC, through Ricardo Alfonso and Juanito
Crisostomo, persuaded the Yamadas and Enatsu (Shoji Yamada
and Tomatada Enatsu are Japanese doctors) to invest fresh
capital in UDMC. The wife of Enatsu is a Filipina. They invested
P57 million in UDMC
4. The investment was effected by means of a stock purchase
agreement and an amended memorandum of agreement
whereby the private respondents subscribed to 82.09% of the
outstanding shares of UDMC. Both transactions were authorized
by the BOD and stockholders of UDMC, and approved by BSP and
SEC
5. The said capital not only saved the assets of UDMC from
foreclosure but also freed the Crisostomos group their individual
and solidary liabilities as sureties for the DBP loan
6. However, petitioner Sixto Crisostomo filed an SEC case against
Juanito Crisostomo, Yamada and Enatsu to stop the holding of
the stockholder’s and BOD meeting and to disqualify the
Japanese investors from holding a controlling interest in UDMC
7. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case with RTC Makati seeking
a preliminary injunction and identical reliefs prayed for by him
in the SEC case.
8. Petitioner alleged that Yamada and Enatsu violated the
Constitutional prohibition against foreigners practicing a
profession in the Philippines (Sec 14, Art XII 1987 Constitution
ISSUE:
WON the investments made by Yamada and Enatsu constitute
illegal practice of profession by foreigners in the Philippines
DECISION:
No. The investments in UDMC of Doctors Yamada and Enatsu do
not violate the
Constitutional prohibition against foreigners practicing a
profession in the Philippines (Sec 14, Art XII, 1987 Constitution)
for they do not practice their profession (medicine) in the
Philippines, neither have they applied for a license to do so. They
only own shares of stock in a corporation that operates a
hospital. No law limits the sale of hospital shares of stock to
doctors only. The ownership of such shares does not amount to
engaging (illegally) in the practice of medicine, or, nursing. If it
were otherwise, the petitioner's stockholding in UDMC would
also be illegal.
[G.R. No. L-22238. February 18, 1967.]
CLAVECILLA RADIO SYSTEM, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON.
AGUSTIN ANTILLON, as City Judge of the Municipal Court of
Cagayan de Oro City and NEW CAGAYAN
GROCERY, respondents-appellees
||
FACTS:
1. New Cagayan Grocery (NECAGRO) filed a complaint for
damages against Clavecilla Radio system. They alleged that
Clavecilla omitted the word ―NOT‖ in the letter addressed to
NECAGRO for transmittal at Clavecilla Cagayande Oro Branch.
2. NECAGRO alleged that the omission of the word ―not‖
between the word WASHED and AVAILABLE altered the contents
of the same causing them to suffer from damages.
3.Clavecilla filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action and improper venue.
4.City Judge of CDO denied the MTD. Clavecilla filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary Injunction with the CFI praying that
the City Judge be enjoined from further proceeding with the case
because of improper venue.
5.CFI – dismissed the case and held that Clavecilla may be sued
either in Manila (principal office) or in CDO (branchoffice).
6.Clavecilla appealed to the SC contending that the suit against it
should be filed in Manila where it holds its principaloffice.
ISSUE:
WON the present case against Clavecilla should be filed in Manila
where it holds its principal office.
DECISION:
YES
It is clear that the case from damages is based upon a written
contract. Under par. (b)(3) Sec. 1 Rule 4 of the New Rules of
Court, when an action is not upon a written contract then the
case should be filed in the municipality where the defendant or
any of the defendant resides or maybe served upon with
summons. In corpo. Law, the residence of the corporation is the
place where the principal office is established. Since Clavecilla’s
principal office is in Manila, then the suit against it may properly
be file in the City of Manila. As stated in Evangelista v. Santos, the
laying of the venue of an action is not left to plaintiff’s caprice
because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court
[G.R. No. L-56763. December 15, 1982.]
JOHN SY and UNIVERSAL PARTS SUPPLY
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. TYSON ENTERPRISES, INC.,
JUDGE GREGORIO G. PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig Branch XXI and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1979, Tyson Enterprises, Inc. filed a collection suit against
Universal Parts Supply Corporation and its president John Sy. The
suit was filed in Pasig, Rizal. John Sy filed a motion to file for a bill
of particulars which was denied. Subsequently, Sy filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Sy alleged that
Tyson Enterprises should have filed the case either in Bacolod
City (business address of Universal Parts) or in Manila (business
address of Tyson Enterprises). Sy alleged that it is improper for
Tyson Enterprises to file the case in Pasig even if it is the
residence of Tyson’s president and general manager, Dominador
Ti.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals denied Sy’s motion
on the ground that he waived the defense of improper venue
when he filed his motion to file for a bill of particulars; that the
prior motion placed Sy under the jurisdiction of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a plaintiff-corporation may file a civil case not in
its business address nor the business address/residence of the
defendant but in the place of residence of its
incorporators/officers.
DECISION:
No. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its
incorporators. Its place of business is its residence and not the
residence of its president or any other officer. Hence, venue is
improperly laid in this case. The trial court of Pasig has no
jurisdiction.
Anent the issue that there was a waiver, as a rule, the defense of
improper venue is waived if it is not alleged in a motion to
dismiss. In the case at bar, Sy was able to file his motion to
dismiss in a timely manner. It is of no moment that there was a
prior motion for a bill of particulars that was filed. There is
nothing in the rule that states that no other motion should have
been filed prior to filing a motion to dismiss before a motion to
dismiss grounded on improper venue may be allowed.
[G.R. No. 112573. February 9, 1995.]
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Rolando Torres, allegedly on a special mission to purchase
firearms for the Philippine Senate, purchased a round trip ticket
from defendant Northwest Airlines for his travel to Chicago and
back to Manila. Via defendant’s flight, Torres left for the US. After
purchasing firearms and upon arrival in Manila, one of the
baggages could not be claimed, allegedly because Northwest
sent it back to the US for US Customs verification. The baggage
was eventually returned but when Torres opened it, the firearms
were missing. A Personal Property Missing Damage Report was
subsequently filed but Northwest continuously refused to settle
the case amicably, thus prompting Torres to file this claim for
actual, moral, temperate and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. For its part, Northwest argued that granting, arguendo, the
firearms were lost, its liability was limited to $9.07 per pound (or
$640 in total) under the Warsaw Convention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Northwest is entitled to the limited liability
under the Warsaw Convention
DECISION:
SC held that Northwest’s liability for actual damages may not be
limited to that prescribed in Sec. 22(2) of the Warsaw
Convention. As held in Alitalia v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
the Warsaw Convention does not operate as an exclusive
enumeration of the instances of an airline’s liability, or as an
absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Such a proposition is
not borne out by the language of the Convention. Moreover,
slight reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it should be
deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of
the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to
property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or
attended by any willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or
otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or
employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is
otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury.
The Convention’s provisions, in short, do not “regulate or
exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier” or
misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular
or exceptional type of damage.
[G.R. No. 37682. November 26, 1932.]
CLAUDE NEON LIGHTS, FEDERAL INC., U.S.A., petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE ADVERTISING CORPORATION and FRANCISCO
SANTAMARIA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
||
SUMMARY
Respondent Philippine agent filed a suit for damages against
petitioner foreign principal corp. An application for a writ of
attachment was also filed based on Sec. 242 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides that plaintiff may have the property of
the defendant attached "in an action against a defendant not
residing in the Philippine Islands.” RTC granted the writ. SC
reversed, stating that such provision applies only to natural
persons.
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation (agent) filed suit
against the petitioner (principal) in the CFI Manila, claiming
P300,000 as damages for alleged breach of the agency contract
existing between the said respondent and the petitioner. At the
same time, respondent filed an application for writ of
attachment duly verified in which it is stated that the petitioner
is a foreign corporation having its principal place of business in
the City of Washington, District of Columbia. It is not alleged in
said application that petitioner was about to depart from the
Philippine Islands with intent to defraud its creditors or that it
was insolvent or had removed or disposed of its property or was
about to do so with intent to defraud its creditors. The only
statutory ground relied upon is paragraph 2 of section 424 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that plaintiff may have
the property of the defendant attached "in an action against a
defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.”
The petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of
the District of Columbia; it had complied with all the
requirements of the Philippine laws and was duly licensed to do
business in the Philippine Islands on the date said writ of
attachment was issued.
CFI issued the writ of attachment, and the sheriff has attached all
the properties of the petitioner in the Philippine Islands. CFI also
appointed Manuel C. Grey as receiver of said properties of the
petitioner.
ISSUE:

W/N paragraph 2 of section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
applicable to this petitioner – NO, only for natural persons. Writ
of attachment set aside.
DECISION:
It may be observed at the outset that the words of section 424
taken in their literal sense seem to refer to a physical defendant
who is capable of being "arrested" or who is "not residing in the
Philippine Islands". It is only by a fiction that it can be held that a
corporation is "not residing in the Philippine Islands". A
corporation has no home or residence in the sense in which
those terms are applied to natural persons. For practical
purposes, a corporation is sometimes said, in a metaphorical
sense, to be "a resident" of a certain state or a "citizen" of a
certain country, which is usually the state or country by which or
under the laws of which it was created. But that fiction or analogy
between corporations and natural persons by no means extends
so far that it can be said that every statute applicable to natural
persons is applicable to corporations.
There is not the same reason for subjecting a duly licensed
foreign corporation to the attachment of its property by a
plaintiff under section 424, paragraph 2, as may exist in the case
of a natural person not residing in the Philippine Islands. The law
does not require the latter, as it does the former, to appoint a
resident agent for service of process; nor to prove to the
satisfaction of the Government before he does business here, as
the foreign corporation must prove, that he "is solvent and in
sound financial condition,” or to produce evidence of "fair
dealing.” He pays no license fee nor is his business subject at any
time to investigation by the Secretary of Finance and the
Governor General; nor is his right to continue to do business
revocable by the Government. His books and papers are not
liable to examination "at any time" by the Attorney General, the
Insular Auditor, the Insular Treasurer, "or any other officer of the
Government" on the order of the Governor General. He is not,
like a foreign corporation "bound by all laws, rules and
regulations applicable to domestic corporations,” which are
designed to protect creditors and the public. He can evade
service of summons and other legal process, the foreign
corporation never.
Corporations, as a rule, are less mobile than individuals. This is a
specially true of foreign corporations that are carrying on
business by proper authority in these Islands. They possess, as a
rule, great capital which is seeking lucrative and more or less
permanent investment in young and developing countries like
our Philippines. Some of them came here as far back as the
Spanish regime and are still important factors in our financial and
industrial life. They are anything but "flybynight" concerns. The
latter, we believe, are effectually excluded from our Islands both
by our laws and by our geographical and economic situation.
Paragraph 2 of section 424, supra does not apply to a domestic
corporation. Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to
assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business
here, to the status of domestic corporations. We think it would
be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a
discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner,
and subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by
attachment when it has complied not only with every
requirement of law made especially of foreign corporations, but
in addition with every requirement of law made of domestic
corporations.
[G.R. Nos. 79926-27. October 17, 1991.]
STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. and STATE FINANCING
CENTER, INC., petitioners, vs. CITIBANK, N.A., BANK OF
AMERICA, NT & SA, HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
FACTS:
Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI) obtained loans from Citibank,
Bank of America and HSBC, all foreign corporations but with
branches in the Philippines. Meanwhile, State Investment House,
Inc. (SIHI) and State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI), also creditors
of CMI, filed collection suits against the latter with writs of
preliminary attachment. Subsequently, the three banks jointly
filed with the court a petition for involuntary insolvency of CMI.
SHI and SFCI opposed the petition on the ground that the
petitioners are not resident creditors in contemplation of the
Insolvency Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign corporation with a branch in the
Philippines and doing business therein can be considered a
resident
DECISION:
Foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines are considered “residents” of the Philippines, as the
word is understood in Sec. 20 of the Insolvency Law, authorizing
at least three resident creditors of the Philippines to file a
petition to declare a corporation insolvent. The Tax Code
declares that the term “resident foreign corporation applies to
foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines” as distinguished from a “non-resident foreign
corporation” which is not engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines. The Offshore Banking Law sates that: “Branches,
subsidiaries, affiliates, extension offices or any other units of
corporation or juridical person organized under the laws of any
foreign country operating in the Philippines shall be considered
residents of the Philippines.” The General Banking Act places
“branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign banks” in the
category as commercial banks, rural banks, stock savings and
loan association making no distinction between the former ad
the latter in so far as the terms “banking institutions” and
“banks” are used in said Act.
[G.R. No. 60714. October 4, 1991.]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. JAPAN
AIR LINES, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
I957: JAL constituted PAL as its general sales agent in the taxation. The test of taxability is the ‘source’; and the source of
Philippines, whereby PAL sold for and in behalf of JAL plane an income is that activity which produced the income.”.
tickets and reservations for cargo spaces When JAL constituted PAL as its sales agent, there is no doubt
1959-1963 : JAL did not have planes that landed or lifted that JAL is a resident foreign corporation doing business in the
passengers and cargoes in the Philippines Philippines. Sale of plane tickets, after all, is the very lifeblood of
: having had no CPCN (certificate of public convenience and the airline industry.
necessity), CIR assessed against JAL deficiency income tax for the
years 1959-1963.
: JAL protested, claiming it was a non-resident foreign
corporation and, therefore, taxable only on income from
Philippine sources

DECISION:

For CIR, the Court adopted the BOAC doctrine: “The source of
income is the property, activity or service that produced the
income. For the source of income to be considered as coming
from the Philippines, it is sufficient that the income is derived
from activity within the Philippines. In BOAC’s case, the sale of
tickets in the Philippines is the activity that produces the income.
The tickets exchanged hands here and payments for fares were
also made here in the Philippine currency. The situs of the source
of payments is the Philippines. The flow of wealth proceeded
from, and occurred within, Philippine territory, enjoying the
protection accorded by the Philippine government. In
consideration of such protection, the flow of wealth should share
the burden of supporting the government.

The absence of flight operations to and from the Philippines is

not determinative of the source of income or the situs of income