Mind Association

Kripke Rigidity versus Kaplan Rigidity

Author(s): Robert Steinman
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 94, No. 375 (Jul., 1985), pp. 431-442
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254814 .
Accessed: 25/06/2014 00:38

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press and Mind Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Mind.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Kripke Rigidity versus Kaplan Rigidity

ROBERT STEINMAN

In a recent article in Mind A. D. Smith suggests that much of the confusion and
misunderstanding concerning issues that arise from Saul Kripke's claim that proper
names are rigid designators can be cleared up once it is determined exactly what his
notion of rigidity is. Like Smith I believe that it is important to pay close attention
to the concept of rigidity. My aim in this paper, however, is to put a rather different
slant on the sort of issues he considers, since a number of philosophers, following
the lead of David Kaplan, have pointed out that two distinct definitions of rigidity
can be found in Kripke's Naming and Necessity. (I shall refer to these as Kaplan
rigidity and Kripke rigidity.) The trend has been to argue that Kaplan rigidity is the
requisite sense of the notion for properly understanding Kripke's views concerning
proper names. Although I will not contest the claim that Kripke's notion of rigidity
is ambiguous, I will show that the attempt to understand rigidity in terms of Kaplan
rigidity fails. Finally, I will sketch out a solution to the kind of problem that started
this trend.
The term 'rigid designator', as originally introduced by Saul Kripke, was meant
to characterize an expression that designates the same thing with respect to every
possible world in which that thing exists and designates nothing with respect to
possible worlds in which that thing does not exist. (I shall hereafter refer to this
sense of rigidity as Kripke rigidity.) This definition is given, unequivocally, by
Kripke in 'Identity and Necessity' (p. 146), and seems clearly to be the understand?
ing of the concept that was uppermost in Kripke's mind in Naming and Necessity
(pp. 48-9). Other philosophers such as Leonard Linsky and Hilary Putnam have
characterized rigidity in a slightly different way. Linsky, for example, calls a term
rigid if it denotes the same thing in every possible world where it denotes anything
at all. It is unlikely, however, that either Linsky or Putnam intended to give a de?
finition of'rigid designator' that diverged in any significant way from the one given
by Kripke. David Kaplan in his unpublished monograph Demonstratives has, how?
ever, given a definition of rigidity that does differ significantly from the one cited.
According to Kaplan there is a second definition of'rigid designator' to be found in
Naming and Necessity which closely conforms to his own understanding of what it is
for a term to be 'directly referential'. An expression is a 'rigid designator' in this
sense if it designates the same thing in every possible world whether the thing
'exists' in that world or not. (I shall hereafter refer to this sense of rigidity as Kaplan
rigidity.) In his monograph Kaplan goes on to suggest that Kripke may have been
confused and misdescribed his own concept. According to Kaplan, not only did
Kripke, in spite of the textual evidence, intend this second understanding of rigidity,
but it is actually required in order to consistently represent an individual's con-
tingency. Kaplan does agree with Kripke that proper names are rigid designators,
but only in the sense that they are Kaplan rigid and not Kripke rigid.
There is an unfortunate confusion in the idea that a proper name would designate nothing
if the bearer of the name were not to exist. Kripke himself adopts positions which seem

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
432 Robert Steinman

inconsistent with this feature of rigid designators. In arguing that the object designated by
a rigid designator need not exist in every possible world, he seems to assert that under certain
circumstances what is expressed by 'Hitler does not exist' would have been true, and not
because 'Hitler' would have designated nothing (in that case we might have given the
sentence no truth value) but because what 'Hitler' would have designated?namely Hitler?
would not have existed (Kaplan 1977, p. n).

In his article 'Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice' (cf. especially appendix X) Kaplan
makes essentially the same point by drawing on what he takes to be the close analogy
between the formal semantics for quantified tense logic and the formal possible-
world semantics for quantified modal logic. The idea here is that what is expressed
by 'Saul Kripke is dead' would count as true, with respect to say the year 2099 only
if the name 'Saul Kripke' designates someone?namely Kripke?who does not
exist with respect to that time. If 'Saul Kripke' did not designate Kripke with
respect to the year 2099, then the sentence would lack a truth-value with respect to
that time.
Recently, Nathan Salmon (pp. 36-40) and A. D. Smith (p. 180) have made
similar claims and have given similar arguments, citing Kaplan as their source, and
a number of philosophers seem to have tacitly embraced Kaplan's position. Colin
McGinn, Esa Saarinen, and Lynne Rudder Baker, for example, all seem to simply
assume that proper names are Kaplan rigid?and not Kripke rigid?without ever
bothering to defend the claim. In this paper I will attempt to show that Kripke's
claim that proper names are rigid designators can only be properly understood in
terms of Kripke and not Kaplan rigidity. I will accomplish this by looking at the
most recent version ofthe 'Kaplan argument' given by Smith, and then argue that
accepting it leads to a number of problems and counterintuitive results which are
enough to warrant its rejection. Finally, at the end ofthe paper I will briefly sketch
out an alternative semantics for representing an individual's contingency that is
consistent with Kripke rigidity. This will not be a fully worked-out solution to the
problem, but it will show that other alternatives are possible.
A word of caution before proceeding. I am not in this paper concerned with
Kripke's distinction in Naming and Necessity between weak and strong rigidity
(a rigid designator is strongly rigid if what it designates is a necessary existent), nor
am I concerned with his somewhat belated distinction between dejure and defacto
rigidity. The issue that concerns us here is whether or not proper names (which for
the sake of argument we can assume are both weakly and dejure rigid) are Kripke
rigid or Kaplan rigid. The weak/strong and defacto jdejure distinctions deal with
different kinds of rigidity. The issue that concerns us here is the definition of rigidity
itself. Also, I am well aware, as is Kaplan, ofthe fact that an important feature ofthe
possible-world semantics for quantified modal logic that was developed by Kripke
(1963) is that free variables be understood as Kaplan rigid (i.e. the variables are
required to designate the same thing in every possible world whether the thing
'exists' in that world or not). Again, however, the issue that concerns us is not
whether free variables are to be understood as Kaplan rigid or Kripke rigid, but
whether individual constants?in particular proper names?are to be understood
as Kaplan rigid or Kripke rigid. Kaplan is certainly correct when he claims that free
variables cannot be accounted for unless they are rigid in his sense. But it is not clear
why he (as well as Salmon) thinks that this shows that proper names are Kaplan
rigid, since Kripke does not consider individual constants in 'Semantical Con-

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Kripke Rigidity versus Kaplan Rigidity 433

siderations on Modal Logic', and he does not allow one to quantify over objects not
actually existing in a given world. It simply does not follow that 'just as the value of
the free variable need not be in the domain over which bound variables range with
respect to that possible world, the "existent" objects of that world, so generally the
denotation of a nondescriptional designator (Kaplan rigid) with respect to a given
possible world need not be among the existing objects of that world' (Salmon, p. 37).

1. The ''Kaplan argumenf

The most recent version of the 'Kaplan argument' has been given by A. D. Smith
and goes as follows:

Consider Benjamin Franklin; since he is not a necessary existent, his name, according to
Kripke, is merely weakly rigid; i.e. it has no designatum at any possible world in which he
does not exist; but now consider the statement 'Benjamin Franklin might not have existed';
since Benjamin Franklin is a contingent entity, this statement is true; but according to our
possible world semantics, such a statement is true only if there is a possible world at which
'Benjamin Franklin does not exist' is true; but if'Benjamin Franklin' lacks a denotation with
respect to every world in which he does not exist, we are prevented from granting this latter
statement the truth-value true at any world, and hence are incapable of semantically
representing Ben Franklin's contingency. This shows that we need a rigid designator to have
constant designation with respect to all possible worlds; a term can name an individual with
respect to a world even though that individual does not exist in that world. (Smith, p. 180.)
Before I state my major reasons as to why I think this argument should be rejected I
would like to note what I take to be some awkward consequences of accepting it.
Suppose one holds the common-sense intuition that names of fictional entities are
ordinary proper names. It would then seem to follow that the names of fictional
entities denote their 'objects' whether we allow for their possible existence or not.
After all if'Benjamin Franklin' can denote Benjamin Franklin at a world where he
does not exist, why can't 'Pegasus' denote Pegasus at worlds at which he does not
exist? I realize that there is a lot of reason (which both Kripke and Kaplan would
acknowledge) for separating what is to be said about 'Benjamin Franklin' at a
different world from what is to be said about 'Pegasus' at either this world or any
other, but it should be noted that this is an issue that Kaplan himself raises.
I have argued that 'Aristotle' denotes something which, at the present time, does not exist.
I could now argue that 'Pegasus' denotes something which, in the actual world, does not exist.
I shall not. Pegasus does not exist and 'Pegasus' does not denote. Not here; not anywhere.
What makes 'Aristotle' more perfect than 'Pegasus'? (Kaplan 1973, p. 505.)

Once Kaplan allows for the possibility of a proper name designating a non-existent
object it seems that the discussion of fictional reference becomes 'fair game'. Now if
one also holds that by definition fictional objects do not exist (i.e. they are ever-
unactualized possibilia), then it will turn out that the only thing that can be truly
predicated of Pegasus is his non-existence. This is so since at any world of
evaluation the designatum of the name 'Pegasus' will not be part of the extension of
any predicate at that world. The statement 'Pegasus is a winged horse' will not only
be false, but it will be necessarily false.
This, of course, is not a problem for Kaplan since he argues that the names
of fictional entities do not denote?not in this world or in any possible world.

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
434 Robert Steinman

Essentially Kaplan argues that in order for a name to designate its object, a success-
ful dubbing would have to first take place; but how, for example, could one ever
succeed in dubbing some possible individual 'Pegasus'? Kaplan requires that the
dubbee be somehow uniquely specified, and considering the vast number of pos?
sible individuals it would seem that we could never succeed in picking out just one,
and then dubbing it 'Pegasus'. (See Kaplan 1973, appendix XI for a more complete
discussion ofthe issue.) If we adopt this position, then we are no longer committed
to holding that 'Pegasus is a winged horse' is necessarily false, but we do seem
committed to holding that 'Pegasus does not exist' lacks a truth-value, since
'Pegasus' will not designate Pegasus at any world where the winged horse does not
exist. Recall that, according to the argument under consideration, the only way
we can correctly express Benjamin Franklin's contingency is to have 'Benjamin
Franklin' designate a non-existent. (It is interesting to note that Kaplan himself
is aware of this difficulty and poses the problem as a homework exercise in 1973,
p. 508.) Now, I do not mean to imply that this is an insoluble problem, but I do want
to make it clear that some sort of account is required if we are to adopt the Kaplan
position.
Another awkward consequence of accepting the argument is that where <f> is any
'nontriviaP predicate other than existence and N is any proper name, </>Nwill be
false and ? <f>Nwill be true at any world where N does not exist. Since the name N
will designate N at some world W where N does not exist </>Nwill be false at W (the
?
designatum of the name N will not be part of the extension of </>at W), and <f>N
will be true at W. Hence, at any world where Benjamin Franklin does not exist the
statement 'Benjamin Franklin is not fat' will be true, but not because is he slender or
normal in weight. It will be true simply because what 'Benjamin Franklin' desig?
nates is not part ofthe extension of'is fat'. The theorem \-</>a 3 (3x) <f>xmust be
given up or modified in one of the standard ways. We simply cannot infer that
? ?
(3x) </>xholds at any world where </>Nis true. The difficulties here are clearly
reminiscent of Russell's problems concerning sentences like 'The present king of
France is not bald'. These may be difficulties that proponents of the Kaplan
argument are willing to live with, but they are not the only awkward consequences
of accepting the 'Kaplan argument'.
Certainly Benjamin Franklin might have had certain properties different from
the ones he actually had. It is also plausible, however, to hold that some of his
properties are necessary. For example it might be a necessary condition of someone
being Benjamin Franklin that he be a human being. Since, however, Franklin is a
contingent entity there will be some world where his name designates him and he
does not exist; and hence he will not be part ofthe extension of'is a human being' at
that world. All such properties will turn out to be merely accidental. There are, of
course, some trivial properties that will turn out to be necessary, but for the most
part this will be due to some niceties of ordinary modal semantics. If, for example,
we count self identity as a property, then d(N = N) will be true, since 'N = N' will
be true even at worlds where N does not exist. At such a world 'N = N' will be true
as long as each term in the identity statement designates the same thing at that
world. Accepting the Kaplan position that names can designate non-existents
eliminates the possibility that any of our properties are necessary (except for these
trivial ones). Of course, if d<?N (in W) means that </>Nis true in all possible worlds
(relative to W), then adopting the view that names are Kripke rigid will not help

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Kripke Rigidity versus Kaplan Rigidity 435

matters. But we can, however, interpret n<f>N(in W) to mean that </>Nis not false in
all possible worlds (relative to W). This understanding of the necessity operator is
of no help if names are Kaplan rigid. What I find most disturbing about this con-
sequence of accepting the Kaplan position is that a substantive philosophical issue
seems to be made moot by an artificial stipulation concerning the designation of
proper names. This is not to say that the Kaplan treatment can find no proper
account of essential properties. But since no such treatment is readily apparent it
should certainly be viewed as an awkward consequence of accepting his position.

2. Lack ofa uniform treatment of contingency

A major difficulty with the Kaplan position is that it does not seem to allow for
a uniform treatment of the problem of semantically representing an individual's
contingency. Recall that in order for 'Benjamin Franklin might not have existed' to
be true, 'Benjamin Franklin' would have to designate Benjamin Franklin at a world
at which he does not exist. It seems plausible, however, to hold that Franklin's
contingency can be truly predicated of him regardless of what kind of referring
expression is used to pick him out. Surely, 'The inventor of bifocals might not have
existed' is also true (this will be true when understood either de re or de dicto, but it is
only the de re sense that concerns us here). Now if we treat definite descriptions as
genuine referring expressions on a par with proper names, then, given any standard
account of determining the referent of a definite description, at any world where
Franklin does not exist (for the de re case) or where no one invented bifocals (for
the de dicto case) 'the inventor of bifocals' will fail to denote. Given the reasoning
employed in the 'Kaplan argument' we would then have to say that the sentence
'The inventor of bifocals does not exist' lacks a truth-value at any such world. On
the other hand, requiring that 'the inventor of bifocals' denote a non-existent object
in order to represent semantically the contingency of the inventor of bifocals
violates any standard conception of the semantics for definite descriptions. We
could, of course, solve the problem by adopting Russell's theory of definite
descriptions, but not only would this move be considered a defect by some (e.g.
Thomason 1969, pp. 128-30), it would also simply be a concession of my point that
Kaplan's position does not allow for a uniform treatment of the problem of
semantically representing an individual's contingency. At the end of this paper
I will suggest that a way of handling both kinds of cases can be given, that while not
novel in approach, is a way of uniformly treating the problem of semantically
representing an individual's contingency.
It is, I believe, worth pointing out that two of the more non-standard approaches
(free quantified modal logic and substitutional quantified modal logic) to the
general problem of singular terms and existence will not really help us semantically
represent the contingency of the inventor of bifocals. In a system of modalized free
logic such as Thomason's (1969 and 1970) a distinction is made between an 'outer'
domain which is a nonempty domain which contains only those individuals not
existing in any world in the set of all possible worlds, and an 'inner' domain which
'is a function taking worlds a into nonempty domains Da' (Thomason 1969, p. 132).
Constants are assigned values in either domain, and predicates are assigned rela-
tions on the union of the domains. This allows Thomason to assign a truth-value
(true or false) to a predication, say Fa, in circumstances where a has no value in the

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
436 Robert Steinman

inner domain in question, by assigning it a 'nonexistent' value in the outer domain.

Let us now return to our problem of semantically representing Franklin's con-
tingency when he is referred to by a definite description. Thomason's semantics for
definite descriptions is unexceptional when there is a unique individual satisfying
the description at the world in question. But that is not the sort of case that concerns
us here. We need to consider a world where 'The inventor of bifocals does not exist'
is true. According to Thomason's semantics, at such a world 'the inventor of bifocals'
would have as its value some arbitrary member of the outer domain, and the sen?
tence in question would count as true. But what is it that does not exist at this world?
It is Franklin's contingency that we want to represent semantically?not that of
some arbitrary, 'nonexistent' object. It just does not seem plausible to me to hold
that Thomason's semantics gives us an intuitive account ofthe truth of'The inventor
of bifocals might not have existed'.
Another possible solution to our problem would be to give a substitutional inter?
pretation to the quantifiers of our modal language in the manner suggested by Ruth
Barcan Marcus and others. A substitutional account of the existential quantifier
frees us from making any existence claims and is concerned instead solely with the
substitution of terms. For example, (3x) Fx would be read simply as saying some
substitution instance of 'Fx' is true. Now one might think that if we understand
existence in terms of the existential quantifier and then give it a substitutional
interpretation that we can adequately account for the truth of 'The inventor of
bifocals might not have existed'. The sentence we again need to consider is 'The
inventor of bifocals does not exist', which we would simply spell out as ? (3x)
(x = the inventor of bifocals). According to a substitutional interpretation of
quantification, this sentence will be true at any world where no substitution instance
for 'x = the inventor of bifocals' can be found. This, however, is precisely where
problems begin to emerge for the substitutional account. What would it mean on a
substitutional account to go to some possible world W and find at W that there is no
substitution instance for 'x = the inventor of bifocals'? Presumably on a substitu?
tional account the truth-values of all identities are fixed prior to the evaluation ofthe
formula. But this is done at our world?not at W. So at W we have to fix the truth-
value ofthe identity in question, but in the case of our definite description this could
only be done by seeing what, if anything, uniquely satisfies it at W. Thomason nicely
makes this point in his article 'Modal Logic and Metaphysics':
The definition of satisfaction under this interpretation of quantification presupposes that the
truth values of all identities are fixed beforehand, but the definition of identities involving
descriptions presupposes in turn the definition of satisfaction. This circularity is vicious: the
usual sort of inductive definition breaks down, and there is no straightforward way of
guaranteeing that a satisfaction function I exists, given an assignment of values to atomic
formulas and atomic terms. (Thomason 1969, p. 135.)
Thomason does go on to note that this problem could be solved by adopting Russell's
theory of definite descriptions, but as we have already seen this strategy simply
eliminates any need for a substitutional interpretation in the first place.

3. The name bearer paradox

The 'Kaplan argument' should also be rejected because it leads to a paradox. It is
well known by now that according to Kripke a sentence like 'Carnap might not have

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Kripke Rigidity versus Kaplan Rigidity 437

been Carnap' will count as false regardless of whether it is given a de re or de dicto

reading; while a sentence like 'The author of Meaning and Necessity might not have
been the author of Meaning and Necessity' will count as true when read de re and
false when read de dicto. Now this might lead one to suppose that the following
sentence is also true when read de re:

(1) The bearer of N might not have been the bearer of N.

If (1) is in fact true, then one of two possible situations has to hold. Let us briefly
examine each.
At first blush one might suppose that (1) is obviously true, since surely it is
possible for some individual who is actually the bearer of N to exist in a possible
world where he is not only not called N or has not been dubbed N, but has received
no name whatsoever. At such a world N would simply not be the bearer of N. We
can, for example, easily imagine a world where Benjamin Franklin receives a
different name and hence is not the bearer of 'Benjamin Franklin' at that world.
I shall refer to this set of circumstances as situation I. One might, however, also
hold that (1) is true in a situation where N simply does not exist at some possible
world. The reasoning here is that the name N would designate N at such a world
and what N designates would not be the bearer of N since nothing at the world
uniquely satisfies the description 'the bearer of N\ Thus if proper names are
Kaplan rigid, we should be able to imagine a possible world where Benjamin
Franklin does not exist, but the name 'Benjamin Franklin' designates him. At such
a world 'the bearer of "Benjamin Franklin"' will fail to denote him, making it true
that he might not have been the bearer of his name. I shall refer to this set of cir?
cumstances as situation II. It should be noted that I am assuming in both cases that
proper names are not ambiguous, thus ruling out the possibility of an improper
definite description.
Situation I, while plausible at first blush, cannot be sustained. To see this we
have to pay careful attention to a distinction between our language and their
language which both Kripke and Kaplan are fond of making (Kaplan 1973, p. 507
and Kripke 1980, p. 77). When we talk about possible worlds and determine the
truth-value of a sentence at a possible world it is our language with our meanings
that is used. As Kripke notes, this does not mean that there are not possible worlds
where a different language is spoken, but 'one doesn't say that "two plus two equals
four" is contingent just because people might have spoken a language in which "two
plus two equals four" means that seven is even' (Kripke 1980, p. 77). Now it seems
to me that on any intuitive account of what it means to bear a name it is something
that is done in a language. Hence at any possible world where you are not called by
your name or where you have not yet received any name you still bear your name.
Kaplan makes a similar point when he argues against the view that fictional names
can denote.

There is another interpretation ofthe world ofthe myth' which, I believe, better represents
the position of those who take the view that 'Pegasus' finds its denotatum in the world ofthe
myth. The myth is possible in the sense that there is a possible world in which it is truthfully
told. Furthermore, there are such worlds in which the language, with the exception of the
proper names in question, is semantically and syntactically identical with our own. Let us call
such possible worlds ofthe myth, lM worlds'. In each M world, the name 'Pegasus' will have
originated in a dubbing of a winged horse. The Friend of Fiction, who would not have

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
438 Robert Steinman

anyone believe the myth (even Ramsified), but yet talks of Pegasus, pretends to be in an
M world and speaks its language.
But beware the confusion of our language with theirs! \fw is an M world, then their name
'Pegasus' will denote something with respect to w, and our description 'the x such that x is
called "Pegasus"' will denote the same thing with respect to w, but our name 'Pegasus' will
still denote nothing with respect to w. Also, in different M worlds, different possible
individuals may have been dubbed 'Pegasus'; to put it another way, our description 'the x
such that x is called "Pegasus"' may denote different possible individuals with respect to
different M worlds.
I do not object to the inhabitants of one of the M worlds remarking that their name
'Pegasus' denotes something with respect to our world that does not exist in our world. But
I reserve the right to retort that our name 'Pegasus' does not even denote with respect to their
world. (Kaplan 1973, pp. 507-8.)

Kaplan's claim that our name 'Pegasus' would not denote anything with respect to
w in such a situation is simply a way of making my point coming from the other
direction. On the one hand, an object's bearing a name in another language is not
sufficient for the name in our language to denote it, and on the other, if an object
does bear a name in our language, then the name it bears will denote that object (in
our language), even at a world where it does not bear the name in the language of
that world. It might be true that you do not bear your name in the language of that
world, but it is our language that concerns us?not theirs. You still bear your name
in our language even if we are considering a possible world where you have
received no name whatsoever.
One might still feel, however, that (1) can be sustained whilst scrupulously
respecting the difference between our language and others, and that it is no different
from

(2) The man (actually) in the brown suit might not have been the man in the
brown suit.

Before I address this point it might prove helpful to clear up any possible mis?
understanding regarding scope ambiguity. When I claim that (1) cannot be sus?
tained I am not appealing to either the reading which gives both occurrences of the
definite description wide scope relative to the modal operator or the reading which
gives both occurrences of the definite description narrow scope relative to the modal
operator. Surely, on both readings (1) would be false. I am only concerned with the
mixed reading where the first occurrence of the definite description is given wide
scope relative to the modal operator and the second occurrence is given narrow
scope. It is this reading of (1) that I argue is false with regard to situation I. Now
given the mixed reading (2) is true as is

(3) The bearer of N might not have been named N.

(2) and (3), however, should not be confused with my (1). To hold that (1) is true
is to confuse our language with theirs. (2) and (3) involve us in no such confusion.
The crucial point to notice is that (3), if true, requires that 'the bearer of N' denote
some object at a world W which is not named N at W. Hence, if (3) is true, then that
object must bear the name N at that world, even when N is not its name in the
language of that world. To argue that it does not bear the name at that world is to
confuse their language with ours.

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Kripke Rigidity versus Kaplan Rigidity 439

If (1) is true, then only situation II will account for it. But if situation II is
allowed, the following claim is false:
(4) If a proper name N designates N, then, the definite description 'the bearer of
N' designates N.
Recall that according to situation II it is possible for a name N to designate N at
a world where N does not exist (i.e. N is Kaplan rigid) and 'the bearer of N' would
not designate N at that world. Thus (4) is false. But (4) it seems to me is true. For
one thing it seems plausible to suppose that if a name N designates N, then N has
been successfully dubbed N. The dubbing need not be a formal, public ceremony,
but its success does seem necessary for the name to designate. Kaplan, it is interest?
ing to note, is clearly committed to this claim (see Kaplan 1973, pp. 505-8). It also
seems plausible to hold that if N has been successfully dubbed N, then N bears the
name N, and that if N bears the name N, then 'the bearer of N' designates N. (I am
again assuming, of course, that proper names are not ambiguous.) But, now it
trivially follows that (4) is true. The only way to solve the paradox is to reject (1) and
along with it the view that names are Kaplan rigid.

4. Incompatibility with Kripke*s thesis concerning identity

My last objection to the 'Kaplan argument' focuses on Kripke's claim that true
identity statements between rigid designators are necessary. My objective here will
not be to cite textual evidence to show that Kripke rigidity was the intended notion.
Kaplan has already conceded that there is an abundance of textual support for the
claim (1977, p. 12 and note 6, p. 101). Rather it will be to show that Kripke's claim
must be given up if proper names are taken to be Kaplan rigid. But if Kripke is right
that it is a 'self evident thesis of philosophical logic independent of natural language'
(1980, p. 4), this might not be so easy to do.
Kripke in both 'Identity and Necessity' and Naming and Necessity holds that if
'a' and 'j3' are rigid designators it follows that the statement 'a = j3', if true, is a
necessary truth (i.e. where 'a' and 'j3' are rigid the following holds: 'a = j3' is true
zd n('a = jS'). Now let us consider a true identity statement like 'Cicero = Tully',
and take proper names to be Kaplan rigid. Obviously, since Cicero is not a necessary
existent, there is some possible world where he does not exist. We can still, however,
accept the inference that 'Cicero = Tully' is a necessary truth since given ordinary
modal semantics an identity statement will count as true with respect to some
possible world W if and only if the denotations ofthe two terms are the same with
respect to W. In the actual world 'Cicero = Tully' is true and the two names
designate the same object, and since they are by hypothesis Kaplan rigid they
denote the same thing with respect to every possible world whether Cicero exists in
that world or not. Hence, on the assumption that names are Kaplan rigid Kripke's
claim is nicely accounted for.
On the other hand let us suppose that proper names are only Kripke rigid. It
would seem that since there is some possible world where Cicero does not exist, that
'Cicero = Tully' will no longer be a necessary truth since the names 'Cicero' and
'Tully' will not designate Cicero at any world at which he does not exist. Notice,
however, that we can still say that the identity statement is true with respect to every
possible world where Cicero does exist, and it is not true (i.e., either false or lacks
a truth-value) with respect to those worlds where he does not exist. This means that

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
440 Robert Steinman

we can conditionalize the identity statement ('If Cicero exists, then he is identical
with Tully') and still have a necessary truth. This is, in fact, the kind of 'weak
necessity' that Kripke explicitly allows for in 'Identity and Necessity'.
It might at this point seem that the retreat to 'weak necessity' is simply another
reason for adopting the view that names are Kaplan rigid. To see that this is not
the case consider the true identity statement that 'Cicero = (tx)x = Cicero'. Now,
'(tx)x = Cicero' is a definite description which means that it denotes only at those
worlds where some object uniquely satisfies its sense (i.e. it can denote something
with respect to a given possible world only if that thing exists at the world). Let us
again assume that proper names are Kaplan rigid. That means that at some possible
world W where Cicero does not exist, the name 'Cicero' will still designate him
at that world. But since Cicero does not exist at W '(tx)x = Cicero' will not denote
him at that world. Hence, at W 'Cicero = (tx)x = Cicero' will be false. Hence,
n('Cicero = (ix)x = Cicero') is false. But, this means that we have to give up
Kripke's claim that true identity statements between rigid designators are
necessarily true. If we assume that 'Cicero' is Kripke rigid, no such concession has
to be made. The weaker conditionalized identity statement is still a necessary truth.
There are a number of responses that a defender of the Kaplan position that
names are Kaplan rigid might make to this last argument, but none of them I think
works. One might, for example, try to argue that '(tx)x = Cicero' is somehow a
'hokey' description and not legitimate, but the same argument can be run through
using the true identity statement 'Adam = the father of AbeP. There does not,
however, seem to be anything 'hokey' about the definite description 'the father of
Abel'. One might also argue that '(tx)x = Cicero' and 'the father of Abel' are not
really rigid, but I do not see how this could be made plausible. It would seem that
any argument that '(tx)x = Cicero' was not rigid would also be an argument to the
effect that 'Cicero' was not rigid. This is not to say that I think that '(ix)x = Cicero'
is dejure rigid. It is clearly defacto rigid since it uses a predicate that just happens in
each possible world to be true of one and the same unique object. This, however,
has no effect on Kripke's claim concerning true identity statements between rigid
designators. There is also, of course, the possibility of adopting a free modal logic
and assigning '(tx)x = Cicero' an arbitrary value, say +, in the outer domain when
it fails to have a value in the inner domain. This would still not help matters since it
does not seem plausible to hold that Cicero is identical with + just to save the claim
that 'Cicero = (tx)x = Cicero' is a necessary truth. Finally, a proponent of the
Kaplan position may simply hold that we have to give up Kripke's claim that
identity statements between rigid designators when true, are necessarily true. To do
so, however, would not only be tantamount to giving up the claim that Kaplan
rigidity is the required sense of rigidity for understanding Kripke's position on
proper names, but more importantly it would be to give up a claim that many hold
to be a 'self evident truth of philosophical logic'. Kaplan, it should be noted, is
clearly committed to at least some form of this claim in Demonstratives. There he
holds that 'k[dthat a! = dthat ?' id n(dthat a' = dthat 0')]' (i977, P- 82).

5. An alternative account of contingency

The time has finally come to make good my claim that an alternative account
of semantically representing an individual's contingency can be given that will

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Kripke Rigidity versus Kaplan Rigidity 441

uniformly handle both proper names and definite descriptions. What I suggest is
that we simply follow Quine in Word and Object (pp. 170-80) and reparse names
into indissoluble general terms or predicates when they occur in existence claims.
In this way we can replace existence with the existential quantifier and represent an
individual's contingency without raising any of the problems that singular terms
raise. Thus we can now represent 'Benjamin Franklin does not exist' as ? (3x) (x is
?
Benjamin Franklin) and 'The inventor of bifocals does not exist' as (3x) (x is the
inventor of bifocals). Both would be true at any worlds where the predicates 'is
Benjamin Franklin' and 'is the inventor of bifocals' are true of no objects. Now,
admittedly this sort of Russellian treatment is more compatible with a view of
proper names like Tyler Burge's (1973) then it is with Kripke's. It seems to me,
however, that my suggestion can be viewed as a kind of 'limited Russellian' account
that is not really incompatible with Kripke's view of proper names. One could argue
that names are to be reparsed as predicates only when they occur in existence claims
or their equivalent. No doubt, this suggestion will strike many as ad hoc, but I think
that upon careful reflection this charge will not ring true for as many philosophers as
one might at first suppose. After all if one holds the view that existence is not really
a property that is true of something over and above its having other properties, then
one is already committed to the view that there is something unusual about our use
of'existence' as a predicate. My suggestion that we treat proper names as predicates
only when they occur in existence claims is merely a consequence of the view that
existence is really not a property. If'existence' does demand special treatment (and
it certainly seems to be the case that there is already a widely acknowledged
consensus for holding that it does), then this fact should be reflected in our treat?
ment of existence claims. And if there really is something ad hoc about my sug?
gestion, then it is due to a prior ad hoc-ness in our treatment of existence, since
clearly a precedent has already been set for treating 'existence' in a special way.
Surely there are some problems with the above account that need to be worked
out, but none of them seems serious enough to prevent it from being considered
as a live option.
In conclusion I would like to make it clear that I am not in this paper attempting
to defend any of Kripke's views. I am merely attempting to show that Kaplan
rigidity fails to account for reasonable beliefs we have about names and definite
descriptions?beliefs which might also be held by Kripke. In this respect it should
also be noted that Kripke and his supporters need not accept my solution to the
problem of semantically representing an individual's contingency, in which case
they still have to face the problem that Kaplan raises. This, however, does not settle
the issue I raise concerning the two kinds of rigidity in favour of Kaplan rigidity.

Department of Philosophy robert steinman

Illinois State University
Normal, Illinois 61761
U.S.A.

Refer ences
Baker, L. 1982 'Underprivileged Access', Nous 16, pp. 227-41.
Burge, T. 1973 'Reference and Proper Names', The Journal of Philosophy 70.
Kaplan, D. 1973 'Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice', in J. Hintikka, J. Moravcsik, and

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
442 Robert Steinman

P. Suppes, eds., Approaches to Natural Language, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, pp. 490-518;

1977 Demonstratives, mimeographed, U.C.L.A.
Kripke, S. 1963 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic', Acta Philosophica Fennica 16,
pp. 83-94; I97I 'Identity and Necessity', in M. Munitz, ed., Identity andIndividuation,
New York, New York University Press, pp. 135-64; 1980 Naming and Necessity,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
Linsky, L. 1977 Names and Descriptions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Marcus, R. 1962 'Modalities and Intensional Languages', Synthese 27, pp. 303-22.
McGinn, C. 1982 'Rigid Designation and Semantic Value', The Philosophical Quarterly 32,
pp. 97-115.
Putnam, H. 1973 'Meaning and Reference', TheJournal of Philosophy 70, pp. 699-711.
Quine, W. 1960 Wordand Object, Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press.
Saarinen, E. 1982 'How to Frege a Russell-Kaplan', Nous 16, pp. 257-76.
Salmon, N. 1981 Reference and Essence, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Smith, A. 1984 'Rigidity and Scope', Mind 93, pp. 177-93.
Thomason, R. 1969 'Logic and Metaphysics', in K. Lambert, ed., The Logical Way of Doing
Things, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, pp. 119-46; 1970 'Some
Completeness Results for Modal Predicate Calculi', in K. Lambert, ed., Philosophical
Problems in Logic: Some Recent Developments, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, pp. 56-76.

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.38 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 00:38:53 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions