Public International Law
Case Digests Compilation
CASE TITLE FACTS
1. Abaya vs. Edane On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No.
PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH
Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This
resolution recommended the award to China
Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for
the implementation of civil works for Contract
Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the
improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-
Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of
79.818 kilometers, in the island province of
Catanduanes.
This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was
executed by and between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government pursuant to the
exchange of Notes executed by and between
Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines,
and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in
behalf of their respective governments.
ISSUES HELD
Whether or not the Loan The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction
Agreement No. PH-204 with the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999
between the JBIC and the between the Japanese Government and the Philippine
Philippine Government is a Government is an executive agreement.
kind of a treaty. An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine
agreement that has many similarities with the private
law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange
of two documents, each of the parties being in the
possession of the one signed by the representative of
the other.
…treaties, agreements, conventions, charters,
protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding,
modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to
international instruments binding at international law.
Although these instruments differ from each other by
title, they all have common features and international
law has applied basically the same rules to all these
instruments. These rules are the result of long practice
among the States, which have accepted them as
binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they
are regarded as international customary law.
That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14
2007.
What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded
projects also undergo the procurement process.
The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification
for the delay of the implementing rules for foreign
funded projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law If we
recall the decision of the Abaya vs Ebdane was used
by the DOJ when the DOTC Secretary was asking for
an opinion from the former, during the ZTE
controversy.as ruled by the Supreme Court in Abaya v.
Ebdane, an exchange of notes is considered a form of
an executive agreement, which becomes binding
through executive action without need of a vote by the
Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an
international instrument binding at international law,
The second issue involves an examination of the
coverage of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known

2. DBM vs. Kolonwel This is a petition for review, with a prayer for
Trading temporary restraining order to nullify and set
aside the Order dated Dec. 04, 2006 of the
Manila RTC.
In the middle of 2005, DepEd requested the
services of the DBM-PS to undertake
procurement project which is to be jointly
funded by the World Bank (WB), thru the
Second Social Expenditure Management
Program (SEMP2) of the RP-IBRD Loan
Agreement No. 7118-PH and the Asian
Development Bank (ABD) thru SEDIP Loan
No. 1654-PHI. In October 2005, the DBM-PS
called for a bidding for the supply of the
Makabayan textbooks and teachers manuals.
Of the entities, foreign and local, only eleven
(11) bidders submitted, including private
respondent Kolonwel.
Following the bid and the book content/body
evaluation process, DBM committee issued a
resolution disqualifying, among others,
Kolonwel for “failure in cover stock testing “.
Kolonwel was informed of this and
subsequently filed with RTC Manila a special
civil action for certiorari with a prayer for TRO.
In support of its TRO application, Kolonwel
alleged, among other things, that the supply-
awardees were rushing with the
implementation of the void supply contracts to
beat the closing-date deadline. After summary
Whether or not the foreign
loan agreements (Loan No.
7118-PH) with international
financial institutions, partake
of an executive or
international agreement and
shall govern the procurement
of goods necessary to
implement the project.
as the “Government Procurement Reform Act”. Section
4 of the said Act provides that it shall
apply to: … the Procurement of infrastructure Projects,
Goods and Consulting Services, regardless of source
of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches and
instrumentalities of government, its departments,
offices and agencies, including government-owned
and/or -controlled corporations and local government
units, subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 138. Any treaty or international or executive
agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to
which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be
observed.
This issue has been affirmatively answered in the case
of Abaya. In that case, the court declared that the RP-
JBIC loan agreement was to be of governing
application over the CP I project and that the JBIC
Procurement Guidelines, as stipulated in the loan
agreement.
Under the fundamental international law principle of
pacta sunt servanda, the RP, as borrower, bound itself
to perform in good faith its duties and obligation under
Loan No. 7118-PH. Applying this postulate, the IABAC
was legally obliged to comply with, or accord primacy
to, the WB Guidelines on the conduct and
implementation of the bidding/procurement process in
question.

hearing, the Manila RTC issued a 20-day TRO,
and later issued a decision wherein Resolution
001-2006-A of the DBM was annulled and set
aside. Hence this petition.
3. China National On 14 September 2002, petitioner China
Machinery & National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
Equipment Corp. vs. (Group) (CNMEG), represented by its
Santamaria chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with the North
Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail),
represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes,
Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a
possible railway line from Manila to San
Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of
China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of
Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30
MOU), wherein China agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine
government to finance the Northrail Project.3
The Chinese government designated EXIM
Bank as the lender, while the Philippine
government named the DOF as the borrower.
Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to
extend an amount not exceeding USD
400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20
years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the
rate of 3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador
to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb.
Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose
Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him
of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime
Contractor for the Northrail Project.
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG
executed a Contract Agreement for the
construction of Section I, Phase I of the North
Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to
Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract
Agreement).7 The contract price for the
Northrail Project was pegged at USD
1. Whether or not petitioner
CNMEG is an agent of the
sovereign People’s Republic
of China.
2. Whether or not the
Northrail contracts are
products of an executive
agreement between two
sovereign states.
The instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China
National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not
entitled to immunity from suit, and the Contract
Agreement is not an executive agreement. CNMEG’s
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and
academic.
The Court explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign
immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of
immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of
state immunity cannot be extended to commercial,
private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it
is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act
involved – whether the entity claiming immunity
performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
functions. As held in United States of America v. Ruiz
Admittedly, the Loan Agreement was entered into
between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government,
while the Contract Agreement was between Northrail
and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is
silent on the classification of the legal nature of the
transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire
undertaking, nonetheless reveal the intention of the
parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole
venture as commercial or proprietary in character.
Thus, piecing together the content and tenor of the
421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine
government and EXIM Bank entered into a
counterpart financial agreement – Buyer Credit
Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan
Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, EXIM
Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s
Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in
favor of the Philippine government in order to
finance the construction of Phase I of the
Northrail Project.
Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of
Understanding dated 14 September 2002, Amb.
Wang’s letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan
Agreement would reveal the desire of CNMEG to
construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely
commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of
its business.

On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a

Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary
Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts
and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of
Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the
Department of Budget and Management, the
National Economic Development Authority and
Northrail. The case was filed before the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC Br.
145). In the Complaint, respondents alleged
that the Contract Agreement and the Loan
Agreement were void for being contrary to (a)
the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184
(R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act; (c)
Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code; and
(d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code.
On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an
Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to
Dismiss and setting the case for summary
hearing to determine whether the injunctive
reliefs prayed for should be issued. CNMEG
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the
CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
 
  
Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated 4 April 2008.

the appellate court dismissed the Petition for

Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated 5 December
2008.
Petitioners Argument: Petitioner claims that the
EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to
Northrail because the bank was mandated by
the Chinese government, and not because of
any motivation to do business in the
Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing
provisions that the Northrail Project was a
purely commercial transaction.
Respondents Argument: respondents alleged
that the Contract Agreement and the Loan
Agreement were void for being contrary to (a)
the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184
(R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act; (c)
Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code; and
(d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code.

4. Commissioner of Several onion and garlic shipments imported
Customs vs. Eastern by respondent consignee from Hongkong and
Sea Trading Japan were seized and subjected to forfeiture
proceedings for alleged violations of Section
1363 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Allegedly, none of the shipments had the
certificate required by Central Bank Circulars
44 and 45 (requiring a Central Bank license
and a certificate authorizing the importation or
release of the subject good ) for their release.
The Collector of Customs of Manila rendered
judgment declaring the forfeiture of the goods
in favor of the Government. Upon appeal, the
Commissioner of Customs upheld the
Collector’s decision. Respondent filed a
petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals. The CTA reversed the
1. Whether the seizure and
forfeiture of the goods
imported from Japan can be
justified under EO 328 (which
implements an executive
agreement extending the
effectivity of the Trades and
Financial Agreements of the
Philippines with Japan) ---
YES.
2. Whether the executive
agreement sought to be
implemented by EO 328 is
legal and valid, considering
that the Senate has not
concurred in the making of
said executive agreement ---
Treaties are different from executive agreements. While
treaties are formal documents which require ratification
by the Senate, executive agreements become binding
through executive action without the need of a vote by
the Senate or Congress. Further, international
agreements involving political issues or changes of
national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take
the form of treaties; on the other hand, international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying
out well-established national policies and traditions and
those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature usually take the form of executive
agreements.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent

Commissioner’s decision. Hence, this present
petition.
NO. Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history we have
entered into executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity
of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.
Francis Saye, former US High Commissioner to the
Philippines, further states that xxx it would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements
under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character,
that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of
agreements entered into by the Executive without the
approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as
the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax
on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft,
customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of
trademarks and copyrights, etcetera. Some of them
were concluded not by specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies declared in
acts of Congress with respect to the general subject
matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly
those with respect of the settlement of claims against
foreign governments, were concluded independently of
any legislation
The Parity Rights Agreement, which was provided for in
the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution was the
subject of an executive agreement, made without the
concurrence of 2/3 of the Senate of the US.
Hence, the validity of the executive agreement in
question in this case is patent.
The authority to issue import licenses was not vested
exclusively upon the Import Control Commission or
Administration. EO 328 provided for export or import
licenses "from the Central Bank of the Philippines or
the Import Control Administration" or Commission.
Indeed, the latter was created only to perform the task

5. Bayan vs. The Republic of the Philippines and the United
Executive Secretary States of America entered into an agreement
Zamora called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
The agreement was treated as a treaty by the
Philippine government and was ratified by
then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of
the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops
and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such
visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S.
and the Philippine governments in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA
violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.”
of implementing certain objectives of the Monetary
Board and the Central Bank, which otherwise had to be
undertaken by these two (2) agencies. Upon the
abolition of said Commission, the duty to provide
means and ways for the accomplishment of said
objectives had merely to be discharged directly by the
Monetary Board and the Central Bank, even if the
aforementioned Executive Order had been silent
thereon.
Was the VFA NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
unconstitutional? Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must
be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred
in by the Senate and, when so required by congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in
a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two
requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . .
the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not
required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase
“recognized as a treaty” means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting
state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in
the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have
in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United
States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement

6. Lim v. Executive In the beginning of 2002, the personnel of
Secretary Armed Forces of the United States started to
arrive in the Philippines which will participate in
the Balikatan 02-1 pursuant to the VFA (Visitig
Forces Agreement) signed in 1999. The
Balikatan 02-1 is a simulation of joint military
maneuvers or exercises of Filipino and
American which was pursuant to MDT (Mutual
Defense Treaty) a bilateral agreement entered
into by the Philippine Government and United
States Government in 1951. The entry of the
American troops in the Philippines is partly
rooted from the campaign of US President
George W. Bush against international terrorism
as a result of terrorist attacks in United States
which was the cause of numerous loss of lives.
The petitioners, Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P.
Ersando, as citizens, lawyers, and taxpayers,
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition and
attacking the constitutionality of Balikatan 02-1
or the joint exercise. Subsequently, they were
joined by SANLAKAS and Partido ng
Manggagawa by filing a petition-in-intervention,
the claimed that some of their members were
situated in the places were the exercise are
being conducted.
However the Solicitor General, claimed that
there were lack of locus standi, does not invlve
tax spending, and there is no proof of direct
personal injury.
1. WON the Balikatan02-1 is
covered by the VFA.
2. WON the VFA is
constitutional.
because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as
long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement
is to be taken equally as a treaty.
The records reveal that the United States Government,
through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated
that the United States government has fully committed
to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the
United States of America accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with
its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
The VFA permits the US personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of
which was undefined. The permit under VFA grants US
personnel a wide scope of undertaking subject only to
approval of the Philippine Government. In general US
personnel must abstain from any activities inconsistent
with the agreement, and in particular, from an political
activities. All other activities, in other words, are fair
game.
In aid of the case at bar, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties Article 31 and 32 which contains the
provisions governing the interpretation of international
agreements. The cardinal rule of interpretation must
involve an examination of the text, which is presume to
verbalise the intentions of the parties.
The word activities in the view of the court it was
deliberately made that way to give both parties a
leeway for negotiations. In this manner, the US forces
may sojourn in the territory of the Philippines for
purposes other than military. Under these auspices, the
VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises.
It is only logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1, a
mutual anti-terrorism, advising, assisting and training
exercise falls under the context of the agreement.
From the facts obtaining, the court find that the
Balikatan 02-1 joint military exercises has not intruded
into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for
correction on the part of the court. The respondents did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Wherefore, the petition and

7. Pimentel vs. This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel
Executive Secretary and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court
to require the Executive Department to transmit
the Rome Statute which established the
International Criminal Court for the Senate’s
concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners contend that that ratification of a
treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate.
That under the treaty law and customary
international law, Philippines has a ministerial
duty to ratify the Rome Statute.
Respondents on the other hand, questioned
the legal standing of herein petitioners and
argued that executive department has no duty
to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence.
1. Whether or not petitioners
have the legal standing to file
the instant suit.
2. Whether or not the
Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs
have the ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the
copy of the Rome Statute
signed by the Philippine
Member to the United Nations
even without the signature of
the President.
petition-in-intervention are hereby dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of new petition sufficient in form
and substance in the proper regional trial court.
Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the
extent of his power as member of Congress. Other
petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a
direct injury from the non-transmittal and that they can
seek redress in our domestic courts.
Petitioners’ interpretation of the Constitution is
incorrect. The power to ratify treaties does not belong
to the Senate.
Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) prepares the ratification papers and forward the
signed copy to the President for ratification. After the
President has ratified it, DFA shall submit the same to
the Senate for concurrence.
The President has the sole authority to negotiate and
enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation
to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate.” The participation of the legislative branch
in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign
relations.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the
power to ratify is vested in the President subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The President has the
discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the
Philippine representative whether or not to ratify a
treaty.
The signature does not signify final consent, it is
ratification that binds the state to the provisions of the
treaty and renders it effective.
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its

8. Akbayan vs. Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the
Aquino full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto.The JPEPA,
which will be the first bilateral free trade
agreement to be entered into by the Philippines
with another country in the event the Senate
grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of
topics which includes trade in goods, rules of
origin, customs procedures, paperless trading,
trade in services, investment, intellectual
property rights, government procurement,
movement of natural persons, cooperation,
competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute
avoidance and settlement, improvement of the
business environment, and general and final
provisions.
1. Whether or not the claim of
the petitioners is covered by
the right to information.
2. Whether the executive
privilege claimed by the
respondents applies only at
certain stages of
the negotiation process.
3. Whether there is sufficient
public interest to overcome
the claim of privilege.
4. Whether the Respondents’
failed to claim executive
privilege on time.
consent, concurrence to the ratification. It is within the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or
having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to
ratify it. Such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by this
court via writ of mandamus,
Thus, the petition is DISMISSED.
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following
reasons:
1. To be covered by the right to information, the
information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. ‘Public concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a term
that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want
to know, either because these directly affect their lives,
or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is
for the courts to determine on a case by case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance,
as it relates to or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade
agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations
towards its execution are matters of public concern.
This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that
diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to
the right to information and the policy of full public
disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an
information is covered by the right to information, a
specific “showing of need” for such information is not a
relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a
matter of public concern. When, however, the
government has claimed executive privilege, and it has
established that the information is indeed covered by

 
the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to
overcome the privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its
curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably
participate in social, political, and economic decision-
making.

2. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to

information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.

3. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified

privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing
of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly
on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the
deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district
court must undertake a fresh balancing of the
competing interests," taking into account factors such
as "the relevance of the evidence," "the availability of
other evidence," "the seriousness of the litigation," "the
role of the government," and the "possibility of future
timidity by government employees.

In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present

the strong and “sufficient showing of need”. The
arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to
the subject documents fall short of this standard stated
in the decided cases.

There is no dispute that the information subject of this

case is a matter of public concern. The Court has
earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern,
not on the basis of any specific need shown by
petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as
an international trade agreement.

Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published,

 

9. Nicolas vs. Romulo On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith
committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He
was convicted of the said crime and was
ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment.
Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a
crime against our penal laws and the crime
was committed within the country’s jurisdiction.
But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the
US and Philippines, the US embassy was
granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together
with the other petitioners appealed before the
SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their
contention is that the VFA was not ratified by
the US senate in the same way our senate
ratified the VFA.
Is the VFA void and
unconstitutional & whether or
not it is self-executing
petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they
will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to
participate in decision-making unless the initial offers
are also published.
4. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the
first time only in their Comment to the present petition
does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be
credited.
Respondents’ failure to claim the privilege during the
House Committee hearings may not, however, be
construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch.
What respondents received from the House Committee
and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests
for information. The House Committee refrained from
pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena
duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de
Venecia’s alleged request to Committee Chairperson
Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to
refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials –
out of respect for their office – until resort to it becomes
necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not
a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do
not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege.
The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the
parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations
and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been
implemented and executed, with the US faithfully
complying with its obligation to produce Smith before
the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation
inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US
Congress that executive agreements registered under
this Act within 60 days from their ratification be
immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA
is not like other treaties that need implementing
legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards

10. Bayan Muna vs. Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered
Executive Secretary party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent
Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period
material to this case. Respondent Alberto
Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. Having a key determinative bearing on
this case is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the mostserious crimes of international
concern and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions
The serious crimes adverted to cover those
considered grave under international law, such
as genocide, crimes againsthumanity, war
crimes, and crimes of aggression.On
December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge
d·Affaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute
which, by itsterms,is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states.
As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92
out of the 139 signatory countries appear to
have completed the ratification, approval and
concurrence process. The Philippines is not
among the 92.
Whether or not the RP-US
Non Surrender Agreement is
void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either
immoral or otherwise at
variance with universally
recognized principles of
international law
the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under
it and this can only be done through implementing
legislation. The VFA itself is another form of
implementation of its provisions.
No. Petitioner urges that theAgreement be struck down
as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or
being at variance with allegedly universally recognized
principles of international law. The immoral aspect
proceedsfrom the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner
would put it, leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply
shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our
country from delivering an American criminal to the
ICC.
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners
earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends
that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually
abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess
undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome
Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this
regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly
described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by
the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes
under its national law. The agreement is a recognition
of the primacy and competence of the countrys
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws
and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner,
labors under the erroneous impression that the
Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to
escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly
incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts
penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted
and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the
consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming
that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries
to the Rome Statute have been met.
Perspective wise, what the Agreement contextually
prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals

11.
 Saguisag vs. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Whether or not the EDCA
Executive Secretary Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement
that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships
increased rotational presence in Philippine
military bases and allows the U.S. to build
facilities to store fuel and equipment there. It
was signed against the backdrop of the
Philippines' maritime dispute with China over
the West Philippine Sea.
The US embassy and DFA exchanged
diplomatic notes confirming all necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force.
The agreement was signed on April 2014.
President Benigno Aquino III ratified the same
on June 2014. It was not submitted to
Congress on the understanding that to do so
was no longer necessary.
Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the
Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of
the agreement. Herein petitioners now contend
that it should have been concurred by the
senate as it is not an executive agreement.
The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105
expressing a strong sense that in order for
EDCA to be valid and binding, it must first be
transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and
concurrence.
YES. The EDCA is an executive agreement and
between the Philippines and
the U.S. is constitutional.
to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With this
view, there is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the Philippines
of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-
surrender agreement over an offense considered
criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute
does not need the Senate's concurrence. As an
executive agreement, it remains consistent with
existing laws and treaties that it purports to
implement.
Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form
of a treaty duly concurred by Senate. They hinge their
argument under the following Constitutional provisions:
• Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least 2/3rds of all the
Members of the Senate.”
• Section 25, Article XVIII: “ xxx Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx ”
The President, however, may enter into an
executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument
that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty
In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading:
Executive Agreements
are defined as international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature.
Treaties are formal documents which require
ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding

12. Vinuya vs. This is an original Petition for Certiorari under
Executive Secretary Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the
DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA
LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape
by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have
approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who
WON the Executive
Department committed grave
abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims
for official apology and other
forms of reparations against
Japan.
agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage.
The Visiting Forces Agreement – a treaty ratified by the
Senate in 1999 – already allowed the return of US
troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose,
and framework of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the
VFA. The practice of resorting to executive agreements
in adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already
deals with the presence of foreign military forces is not
at all unusual in this jurisdiction.
In order to keep the peace in its archipelago and to
sustain itself at the same time against the destructive
forces of nature, the Philippines will need friends. Who
they are, and what form the friendships will take, are for
the President to decide. The only restriction is what the
Constitution itself expressly prohibits. EDCA is not
constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it
remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it
purports to implement.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective,
the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves
questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that
“the conduct of the foreign relations of our government
is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative–‘the political’–departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to

ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist
the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied
by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for
this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in
refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed
against them; and (b) compel the respondents
to espouse their claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the
Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s
Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical
and welfare support programs for former
comfort women. Over the next five years, these
were implemented by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.
judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those directly responsible
to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present
political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether
the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the Executive
Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals
for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts
to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity
of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He
has his confidential sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking
up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Department’s determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie.
As a general principle, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s
conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must
be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan,
from the standpoint of both the interests of the

 
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on
that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means

available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual
is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of
its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State
is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State

may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means
and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right
that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to
national law, if means are available, with a view to
furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these
questions remain within the province of municipal law
and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga

omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners
have not shown that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an
erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus
cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in

international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the
community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former

 

13. Pharmaceutical On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51
and Health Care (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Association vs. Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers
Duque granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law
seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From
1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and
health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides
that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality,
and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of
the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH
issued RIRR which was to take effect on July
7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR
was going beyond the provisions of the Milk
Code, thereby amending and expanding the
coverage of said law.
Whether or not respondents
officers of the DOH acted
without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and in violation
of the provisions of the
Constitution in promulgating
the RIRR
are the concern of all States. In view of the importance
of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers
to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus
cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense
that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and
can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the
petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative
Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared
NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department
of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions. The international
instruments pointed out by the respondents, UNRC,
ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the
land and therefore the DOH may implement them
through the RIRR. Customary international law is
deemed incorporated into our domestic system.
Custom or customary international law means “a
general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
“Generally accepted principles of international law”
refers to norms of general or customary international
law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a
verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not
prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the
general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other
marketing materials may be allowed if such materials
are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions

14. Province of North President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with
Cotabato vs. GRP the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
Peace Panel negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue
negotiating with the government. MILF,
thereafter, convened its Central Committee
and decided to meet with the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal
peace talks were held in Libya which resulted
to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security
aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.)
ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations
were held which led to the finalization of the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum
was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its
body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition,
1. Whether or not the MOA-
AD violates constitutional and
statutory provisions on public
consultation and right to
information
2. Whether or not the MOA-
AD violates the Constitution
and the laws.
adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and
legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or
non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior. Respondents have not
presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member
states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a
majority of the member states and obligatory in nature.
The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of
a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the
petitioners also failed to explain and prove by
competent evidence just exactly how such protective
regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all
the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply
equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the
Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f),
11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of
the Milk Code.
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the
lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid
symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of
Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section
28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements
the right of access to information on matters of public
concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the
duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a
concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public
affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the
people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a
mandate of the State to be accountable by following
such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise

has the freedom to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relation with foreign
countries. ―The sharing between the Central
Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in
favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides
for the extent of the territory of the
Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, including the aerial domain
and the atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region. With regard to governance,
on the other hand, a shared responsibility and
authority between the Central Government and
BJE was provided. The relationship was
described as ―associative. With the
formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver
that the negotiation and finalization of the
MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation, as mandated
by Executive Order No. 3, and right to
information. They further contend that it
violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the
filing of the petition.
of the freedom of expression and essential to hold
public officials at all times accountable to the people.
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public
disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As
Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely
directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.ǁ‖ The
complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-
hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to
information on matters of public concern is already
enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to
disclose its transactions involving public interest is not
enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents
cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing
legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An
essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the
people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin
rights to information and disclosure is the design for
feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public
consultation, as a species of the right to information, is
evident in the ―marching ordersǁ‖ to respondents. The
mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to
conduct public consultation regarding the peace
agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No.
3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares
that there is a need to further enhance the contribution
of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the
three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace
process is that it ―should be community-based,
reflecting the sentiments, values and principles
important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by
the government alone, nor by the different contending
groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.
Included as a component of the comprehensive peace
process is consensus-building and empowerment for
peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on

 
both national and local levels to build consensus for a
peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and
facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace
process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the
conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing”
consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that
plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.Further,
E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to
―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace
Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant
information, comments, recommendations as well as to
render appropriate and timely reports on the progress
of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3
mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the
principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace
Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from
the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned
sectors of society on both national and local levels, on
the implementation of the comprehensive peace
process, as well as for government[-]civil society
dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and
initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’
right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and
disclosure. In general, the objections against the MOA-
AD center on the extent of the powers conceded
therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers
granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond
those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of
the specific powers that would have been vested in the
BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a
general idea that serves as a unifying link to the
different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the
international law concept of association. Significantly,
the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept,
indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions
with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3
on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and
paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last
mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most
clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government.

 

 
4. The relationship between the Central Government
and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility
with a structure of governance based on executive,
legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the comprehensive
compact. A period of transition shall be established in a
comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the
BJE. The nature of the ―associative relationship may
have been intended to be defined more precisely in the
still to be forged Comprehensive Compact.
Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of
―association in international law, and the MOA-AD –
by its inclusion of international law instruments in its
TOR– placed itself in an international legal context, that
concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term ―associative in the
MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions
which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: the
BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the
Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation
in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing
responsibility of the Central Government over external
defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in
Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements, environmental protection, and
sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be
consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign
affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the
MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the
present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality,
not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an ―associativeǁ‖ relationship with the national

 

 
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that
go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to
any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-
AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions,
specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of
the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15.
There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the
status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship
between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not
surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M
OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in
conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X,
Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,

 

 
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region.
But even assuming that it is covered by the term
―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to
2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the
ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del
Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the
2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar,
Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the
BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to
the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier
in the overview. That the present components of the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted
for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render
another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution,
precisely because what these areas voted for then was
their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be
amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to
be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The
State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development. An associative arrangement
does not uphold national unity. While there may be a
semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act
of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status
which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the
provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until that framework is

 

15. Kuroda vs. Kuroda, Lieutenant General of the Japanese
Jalandoni Imperial Army, was prosecuted for war crimes
before the Military Commission set up by
Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines. Kuroda challenged the legality and
constitutionality of the Military Commission and
contended that it lacked jurisdiction to try him
for violation of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions on the Laws of War, since the
Philippines was not a signatory to these
conventions.
amended, the same does not cure its defect. The
inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace
panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President
herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a
usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the
only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of
the amendment process is through an undue influence
or interference with that process.
Whether or not the The court ruled that the Military Commission was legal
established Military and constitutional base on the citation of Article II,
Commission is legal and Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution declaring that
constitutional “the Philippine adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the nation”.
The court ruled that in accordance with the generally
accepted principles of international law of the present
day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva
Convention, and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all
those persons, military or civilian, who had been guilty
of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression
and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization,
were held accountable therefore. Although the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them, our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is
not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of
international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68, the President of the

16. Yamashita vs. Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the
Styer commanding general of the 14th army group of
the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines,
after his surrender became a prisoner of war of
the United States of America but was later
removed from such status and placed in
confinement as an accused war criminal
charged before an American Military
Commission constituted by respondent
Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding
General of the United States Army Forces,
Western Pacific.
Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition
against respondent, he asks that he be
reinstated to his former status as prisoner of
war, and that the Military Commission be
prohibited from further trying him. He
questions, among others, the jurisdiction of
said Military Commission.
17. Kookooritchkin v. In August 1941, appellee-petitioner
Solicitor General Kookooritchkin filed with the CFI of Camarines
Sur a petition for naturalization, supported by
(a) the affidavits of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes
and Dr. Salvador Mariano, residents of
1. Should the petitions for
habeas corpus and
prohibition be granted in this
case?
2. Was the Military
Commission validly
constituted by respondent,
therefore having jurisdiction
over the war crimes?
W/N
(1) appellee-petitioner’s
declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen was
valid and sufficient basis for
Philippines had acted in conformity with the generally
accepted principles and policies of international law
which are part of our Constitution.
1. No. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when
release of petitioner is not sought. It seeks no
discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his
restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to
be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to
the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of
military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the
jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue
against one not made party respondent. Neither may
the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen.
Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made
party respondent in this case, and although it may be
acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be
issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain
from trying the petitioner.
The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition even if the commission be joined
as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford
(pp. 50, 61, ante), “. . . an attempt of our civil courts to
exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before
such period (state of war) expires, would be considered
as a violation of this country’s faith, which this Court
should not be the last to keep and uphold.”
2. Yes. Under the laws of war, a military commander
has an implied power to appoint and convene a military
commission. This is upon the theory that since the
power to create a military commission is an aspect of
waging war, military commanders have that power
unless expressly withdrawn from them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the
Congress of the United States has explicitly provided,
so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or
offenses against the laws of war in appropriate cases.
(1) Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law applies
and provides that “[n]o declaration shall be valid until
entry for permanent residence has been established
and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of
his arrival has been issued.” While appellee-

Camarines Sur, (b) his declaration of intention
which was sworn in July 1940, and (c) notice of
hearing. The petition was filed in August 1941
but was not heard until August 28 and Sept.
30, 1947 when appellee-petitioner presented
his evidence, since the province was invaded
by the Japanese forces during WWI and the
case records had to be reconstituted after
being destroyed during the war. Appellant
SolGen cross-examined appellee-petitioner’s
witnesses but did not file any opposition and
did not present any evidence to controvert the
petition. The CFI granted the petition for
naturalization, finding that appellee-petitioner
was a native-born Russian who grew up as a
citizen of and was part of the military of the
defunct Imperial Russian Government under
the Czars. He had several stints while in
military service before he joined the White
Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought
against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the
latter force defeated the former. Refusing to
join the Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea to
Shanghai, and eventually went to Manila as
part of the group of White Russians under
Admiral Stark in March 1923. He finally
permanently resided in Iriga, Camarines Sur
except during his stint in the guerrilla force in
Caramoan from 1942 to July 1945. The lower
court also made findings of the establishment
of his family, employment, social life, his ability
to speak and write English and Bicol, his good
moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, and
being a stateless refugee belonging to no
State.
his petition for naturalization,
(2) appellee-petitioner
sufficiently established legal
residence in the Philippines
and could speak and write
any of the principal Philippine
languages, and
(3) appellee-petitioner was
stateless refugee.
petitioner’s declaration was reconstituted, the attached
certificate referred to in the declaration was not
reconstituted. The SC ruled that the law does not state
that the certificate is essential to the validity of the
declaration as the only requirement is for the said
certificate to be issued. There is the uncontroverted
fact of appellee-petitioner’s peaceful and continuous
residence in the Philippines for 25 years and statement
in his declaration that a certificate had been attached to
the said declaration. Hence, appellee-petitioner’s
declaration was valid under law in view of other
competent evidence showing the facts sought to be
established under the certificate that was not
reconstituted.
(2) Appellee-petitioner has sufficiently shown legal
residence in the Philippines for a continuous period of
not less than 10 years as required by Section 2 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. In addition, appellee-
petitioner had good command of both English and
Bicol. While there may be many standards out there,
none was set in the law on the required ability to speak
and write any of the principal Philippine languages.
Appellee-petitioner got along well with his comrades
during his hazardous days in the guerrilla movement
thus showing that he satisfied the requirement of the
law. There was also circumstantial evidence that
appellee-petitioner also ought to know how to write
Bicol, which uses the same alphabet used in English
and so widely used in the Philippines. Given his good
command of English as shown in his testimony,
appellee-petitioner could easily make use of the same
alphabet in the place where he had been residing for
25 years.
(3) Appellant SolGen asserted that appellee-petitioner
failed to show that he lost his citizenship under the laws
of Russia and that Russia granted to Filipinos the same
right to be naturalized citizens. However, the SC still
found that lower court did not err in finding appellee-
petitioner as a stateless refugee. Appellee-petitioner’s
testimony that he is not a Russian citizen and that he
has no citizenship is uncontroverted. There is also the
well-known ruthlessness of modern dictatorships giving
rise to a great number of stateless refugees or
displaced persons, without country or flag. The

 
tyrannical intolerance of dictatorships to opposition
translates into beastly oppression, concentration camps
and bloody purges, such that it is only natural that
those who flee to other countries to escape such a
situation, such as appellee-petitioner, lose all bonds of
attachments to their former fatherlands.

18. Poe-Llamanzares Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
vs. Elamparo Llamanzares was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the
parental care and custody over petitioner by
Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife,
she has been reported and registered as a
foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate
and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the
name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
When the petitioner reached the age of five (5),
celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley (aka
Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe
(aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her
adoption. The trial court granted their petition
and ordered that her name be changed to Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Whether or not Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may
be considered a natural-born Filipino.
It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines as there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already
impliedly so recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with
intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the
basic right to equal protection of the laws.
Foundlings are citizens under international law as this
is supported by some treaties, adhering to the
customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of
the country in which the foundling is found.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan

City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she
applied and was issued Philippine Passport by
the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her
passport.

She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to

continue her studies after enrolling and
pursuing a degree in Development Studies at
the University of the Philippines. She
graduated in 1991 from Boston College where
she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in
Political Studies.

She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.

Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to
flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She
 
  
gave birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.;
and her two daughters in the Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in

2001. She came back to the Philippines to
support her father’s candidacy for president in
the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her
youngest daughter. They then returned to the
U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed
back to the Philippines to attend to her ailing
father. After her father’s death, the petitioner
and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and
immediately secured a TIN, then her children
followed suit; acquired property where she and
her children resided.

In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA No.
9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
together with petitions for derivative citizenship
on behalf of her three children which was
granted. She registered as a voter; secured
Philippine passport; appointed and took her
oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after
executing an affidavit of Renunciation of
American citizenship before the Vice Consul of
the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss
of Nationality of the USA in 2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her

Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for
the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6
years and 6 months” to the question “Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number
of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16
May 2013.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC

for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections.
In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is
 
  
a natural-born citizen and that her residence in
the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months counted from 24 May 2005. The
petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit
Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship”
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public
in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to

deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since
she cannot prove that her biological parents or
either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC
en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she was in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in her
COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the

ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified
as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices,
however, abstained to vote on the natural-born
citizenship issue.