AUTHORTITY TO SANCTION MEMBERS OF THE BAR

~epublic of tbe t)bilippines $upreme QCourt manila SECOND DIVISION IN RE: RESOLUTION DATED
AUGUST 14, 2013 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAG.R. CV NO. 94656, A.C. No. 10117 Present: -
versusCARPIO, Chairperson BRION, DEL CASTILLO, MENDOZA, and LEONEN,JJ. ATTY. GIDEON D.V.
MORTEL, Pro,QI\dg~t~d: Q fi Respondent. l :> JU l 2 1 :x-----------------------------------------------------------------
--- RESOLUTION LEONEN,J.: This resolves an administrative complaint charging respondent Atty. Gideon
D.V. Mortel (Atty. Mortel) with disobedience or defiance of lawful court orders, amounting to gross
misconduct and insubordination or disrespect. 1 The complaint arose from the proceedings before the
Court of Appeals in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Angelita De Jesus, through her Attorney-in-Fact Jim
Dulay,2 which Atty. Mortel handles.3 2 Rollo, p. 15, Statement of Facts Re: Suspension of Atty. Gideon V.
Mortel. This was signed by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid of the Sixth Division, Court of Appeals,
Manila. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 94656. Id.at 2, Court of Appeals Resolution. Resolution
2 A.C. No. 10117 On July 20, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Notice4 for Atty. Mortel to file an
appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, Angelita De Jesus,5 within the reglementary period of 45 days
from notice.6 Atty. Mortel recently moved out of his office at Herrera Tower, Makati City due to the high
cost of maintenance.7 Looking for a new office,8 he requested to use the address of his friend’s law firm
as his address on record for Bank of the Philippine Islands. 9 Atty. Marcelino Ferdinand V. Jose (Atty.
Jose), Managing Partner of MFV Jose Law Office, granted this request sometime in August 2010.10 Atty.
Mortel’s address on record was then listed at Unit 2106, Philippine AXA Life Center, 1286 Sen. Gil Puyat
Ave., Makati City,11 the same address as MFV Jose Law Office.12 All communication, court orders,
resolutions, notices, or other court processes addressed to MFV Jose Law Office were received by the
law firm’s staff.13 The staff would pass these to the desk of Atty. Jose for monitoring and checking. Atty.
Jose would then forward these to the handling lawyer in the office.14 The law firm’s messenger, Randy
G. Lucero (Lucero), was tasked with informing Atty. Mortel whenever there was a resolution or order
pertinent to Bank of Philippine Islands. 15 Bank of Philippine Islands was not included in MFV Jose Law
Office’s list or inventory of cases.16 Thus, Atty. Jose “simply attached a piece of paper with notation and
instructions on the same, advising [Lucero] . . . to forward it to Atty. Mortel.”17 Initially, Randy De Leon
(De Leon), Atty. Mortel’s messenger, went to MFV Law Office to inquire if it had received notices for
Atty. Mortel.18 None came at that time.19 Thus, De Leon left his number with Lucero, and the two
messengers agreed that Lucero would text De Leon should any court 4 CA. INT. RULES, Rule IV, sec.
4(a)(1.6) provides: SEC. 4. Processing of Ordinary Appeals. – (a) In Civil Cases. – . . . . 1.6 Within ten (10)
days from completion of the records, issue a notice to file appellant’s brief within forty-five (45) days
from receipt thereof. The notice shall require that a certified true copy of the appealed decision or order
be appended to the brief. 5 Rollo, p. 2. 6 Id. at 3. 7 Id. at 33, Omnibus Motion with Profuse Apologies. 8
Id. at 39, Atty. Jose’s Affidavit. 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 4. 12 Id. at 39. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. at 41, Lucero’s
Affidavit. 16 Id. at 39. 17 Id. 18 Id. at 41. 19 Id. Resolution 3 A.C. No. 10117 notice or order for Atty.
Mortel arrive.20 On August 16, 2010, instead of heeding the Court of Appeals Notice to file the
appellant’s brief, Atty. Mortel moved to withdraw Angelita De Jesus’ appeal21 in light of an amicable
settlement on the disputed property.22 After the Motion to Withdraw Appeal was filed, he stopped
communicating with MFV Law Office and instructed De Leon to do the same.23 In the Resolution dated
September 20, 2010, the Court of Appeals directed Atty. Mortel to secure and submit Angelita De Jesus’
written conformity to the Motion to Withdraw Appeal within five (5) days from notice.24 Atty. Mortel
did not comply.25 In the Resolution dated November 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals again directed Atty.
Mortel to comply with the September 20, 2010 Resolution and warned him of disciplinary action should
he fail to secure and submit Angelita De Jesus’ written conformity to the Motion within the
reglementary period.26 Atty. Mortel did not comply.27 Thus, on February 23, 2011, the Court of Appeals
resolved to “den[y] the motion to withdraw appeal; . . . reiterat[e] the notice dated July 20, 2010,
directing [Angelita De Jesus] to file appellant’s brief within . . . [45] days from notice; and . . . direc[t]
Atty. Mortel to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for non-compliance with [the Court
of Appeals] order.”28 The February 23, 2011 Resolution was sent to Angelita De Jesus’ address on
record, but it was returned with the notation “moved out” on the envelope.29 On March 28, 2011, the
Court of Appeals resolved to direct Atty. Mortel to furnish it with Angelita De Jesus’ present and
complete address within 10 days from notice. Atty. Mortel did not comply.30 In the Resolution dated
July 5, 2011, the Court of Appeals again ordered Atty. Mortel to inform it of Angelita De Jesus’ address
within 10 20 Id. 21 Id. at 44, Dulay’s Affidavit. 22 Id. at 34. 23 Id. at 24, Comment. 24 Id. at 2. 25 Id. 26 Id.
27 Id. 28 Id. at 2–3. 29 Id. at 3. 30 Id. Resolution 4 A.C. No. 10117 days from notice.31 Atty. Mortel did
not comply.32 In the Resolution dated October 13, 2011, the Court of Appeals directed Atty. Mortel, for
the last time, to inform it of Angelita De Jesus’ address within 10 days from notice.33 Still, Atty. Mortel
did not comply.34 In the Resolution dated January 10, 2012, the Court of Appeals ordered Atty. Mortel
to show cause, within 15 days, why he should not be held in contempt for non-compliance with the
Court of Appeals Resolutions.35 Atty. Mortel ignored this.36 In the Resolution dated May 16, 2012, the
Court of Appeals found Atty. Mortel liable for indirect contempt.37 It ordered him to pay ₱10,000.00 as
fine.38 Atty. Mortel did not pay.39 On August 13, 2012, the Court of Appeals resolved to (1) again order
Atty. Mortel to pay, within 10 days from notice, the fine of ₱10,000.00 imposed upon him under the
May 16, 2012 Resolution;40 (2) require Atty. Mortel to follow the July 5, 2011 and October 13, 2011
Resolutions that sought information from him as to his client’s present address;41 and (3) warn him that
failure to comply with the Resolutions within the reglementary period will constrain the Court of
Appeals “to impose a more severe sanction against him.”42 Atty. Mortel snubbed the directives.43
According to the Court of Appeals, the Cashier Division reported that Atty. Mortel still did not pay the
fine imposed despite his receipt of the May 16, 2012, August 13, 2012, and October 17, 2012
Resolutions.44 In the Resolution dated April 26, 2013, the Court of Appeals directed Atty. Mortel to
show cause why it should not suspend him from legal practice for ignoring its May 16, 2012 Resolution
(which fined him for ₱10,000.00).45 The April 26, 2013 Resolution was sent to his address on record at
Unit 2106, Philippine AXA Life Center, 1286 Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. 37
Id. 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. at 4. 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Id. Resolution 5 A.C. No. 10117 Makati City,46 as
shown in the registry return card.47 Despite having ignored 11 Court of Appeals Resolutions,48 Atty.
Mortel did not show cause for him not to be suspended.49 The Court of Appeals found that his “failure
or obstinate refusal without justification or valid reason to comply with the [Court of Appeals’] directives
constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of [the Court of Appeals], amounting to gross
misconduct and insubordination or disrespect.”50 In the Resolution dated August 14, 2013, the Court of
Appeals suspended Atty. Mortel from legal practice for six (6) months and gave him a stern warning
against repeating his actions.51 Atty. Mortel was also directed to comply with the previous Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, Atty. Gideon D.V.
Mortel, counsel for respondent-oppositor-appellant, is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, Atty. Mortel is DIRECTED to comply with the May
16, 2012 Resolution and other related Resolutions issued by this Court within ten (10) days from notice
hereof. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Supreme Court for its information and appropriate
action. SO ORDERED. 52 (Emphasis in the original) On October 2, 2013, pursuant to Rule 138, Section
2953 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals submitted before this Court a certified true copy of the
August 14, 2013 Resolution, which suspended Atty. Mortel from legal practice, together with a
statement of facts from which the suspension order was based.54 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 2–5. The ignored
Resolutions are dated September 20, 2010, November 11, 2010, February 23, 2011, March 28, 2011, July
5, 2011, October 13, 2011, January 10, 2012, May 16, 2012, August 13, 2012, October 17, 2012, and
April 26, 2013. 49 Id. at 5. 50 Id. at 15, Statement of Facts Re: Suspension of Atty. Gideon V. Mortel. 51
Id.at 5. 52 Id. at 5–6. 53 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 29 provides: SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court
of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. – Upon such suspension,
the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a
certified copy of the order or suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full
investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or
removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant. 54 Rollo, pp. 7–16. Resolution 6 A.C.
No. 10117 On October 23, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Report stating that it docketed
the Court of Appeals’ August 14, 2013 Resolution as a regular administrative case against Atty.
Mortel.55 In the Resolution dated January 20, 2014, this Court noted and approved the administrative
case, furnished Atty. Mortel a copy of the August 14, 2013 Resolution, and required him to comment
within 10 days from notice.56 This Court forwarded it to his address on record.57 On February 25, 2014,
Atty. Jose read this Court’s January 20, 201458 Resolution meant for Atty. Mortel,59 and saw that Atty.
Mortel had been suspended by the Court of Appeals.60 He “immediately tried looking for Atty. Mortel’s
mobile number” to inform him of this development. 61 On the following day, he was able to reach Atty.
Mortel through a mutual friend.62 Four (4) years passed since the Court of Appeals first sent a
Resolution63 to Atty. Mortel, through MFV Jose Law Office, in 2010. Atty. Jose asked Lucero, his
messenger, why these Resolutions were not forwarded to Atty. Mortel.64 Lucero stated that he would
usually text De Leon, Atty. Mortel’s messenger, whenever there was an order or resolution pertinent to
the case.65 However, after a few messages, De Leon no longer texted back.66 Lucero added that he
“had no other way of finding [De Leon]” and knew nothing of De Leon’s whereabouts.67 He hoped that
either Atty. Mortel or De Leon would pick up the mails sent by the Court of Appeals for Atty. Mortel.68
Not knowing how to contact Atty. Mortel’s messenger, Lucero simply kept the copies in the office racks
or on his table.69 On March 5, 2014, Atty. Mortel filed before the Court of Appeals an 55 Id. at 18,
Resolution dated January 20, 2014. 56 Id. 57 Id. at 39, Atty. Jose’s Affidavit. 58 Only the January 20, 2014
Resolution contained the information that Atty. Mortel was suspended by the Court of Appeals (Id. at
19). The Resolution dated February 9, 2015 did not contain this information (Id. at 48). 59 Rollo, p. 39.
60 Id. 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 Id. at 2. 64 Id. at 39. 65 Id. 66 Id. at 41. 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. at 39. Resolution 7 A.C.
No. 10117 Omnibus Motion and Manifestation with Profuse Apologies.70 He informed the Court of
Appeals of his present address at No. 2806 Tower 2, Pioneer Highlands, Mandaluyong City.71 He also
prayed for (1) the reinstatement of the Motion to Withdraw Appeal, (2) the acceptance of his
compliance with the September 20, 2010 and November 11, 2010 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
(which sought for his client’s conformity to the Motion), (3) the grant of his Motion, and (4) the recall of
all previous orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals.72 In his Comment73 dated March 7, 2014,
Atty. Mortel argues that he honestly believed that the case was already closed and terminated in light of
his Motion to Withdraw Appeal.74 Atty. Mortel avers that “[h]e did not expect that a requirement of
conformity of the client would be needed in as much as the act of counsel binds the client[.]”75
According to him, the filing of a motion to withdraw appeal is a matter of right, which did not need his
client’s conformity.76 Thus, he did not bother to visit MFV Jose Law Office again or send his messenger
to check with the law firm if there were resolutions or orders for him.77 According to Atty. Mortel, the
Court of Appeals Resolutions never reached him.78 He interposes the defense of “sheer lack of or
absence of knowledge . . . as all Resolutions of the Court [of Appeals] were received by the messenger of
MFV Jose Law Office but not forwarded to him.”79 Finally, he claims that he had no reason to refuse to
comply, had he known of the orders or resolutions.80 In the Resolution81 dated February 9, 2015, this
Court noted Atty. Mortel’s Comment and required the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals Manila to
file a reply within 10 days from notice. In the Resolution82 dated May 30, 2016, this Court dispensed
with the filing of the reply. For resolution are the following issues: 70 Id. at 32–38. 71 Id. at 37. 72 Id. at
32. 73 Id. at 20–27-A. 74 Id. at 20. 75 Id. 76 Id.at 21. 77 Id. at 34–35. 78 Id. at 34. 79 Id. at 20. 80 Id. 81
Id. at 48. 82 Id. at 52. Resolution 8 A.C. No. 10117 First, whether there are grounds for this Court to
probe into Atty. Marcelino Ferdinand V. Jose’s possible administrative liability; and Second, whether
respondent Atty. Gideon D.V. Mortel should be imposed a disciplinary sanction. I This Court has the
authority to discipline an errant member of the bar.83 Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by
the Supreme Court motu proprio[.]”84 However, the lawyer must have the “full opportunity upon
reasonable notice to answer the charges against him [or her,] among others.”85 Thus: RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR . . . . SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension.
— No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and
answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. Implicit in Atty. Jose
and respondent’s arrangement is that Atty. Jose would update respondent should there be any
communication sent to respondent through his law firm, and that respondent would regularly check
with the law firm if any court-delivered mail arrives for him.86 Yet, Atty. Jose failed to measure up to his
part of the deal. He delegated everything to his messenger without adequately supervising him. All
communication, court orders, resolutions, notices, or other court processes addressed to MFV Jose Law
Office go through Atty. Jose’s desk for monitoring and checking.87 Having monitored and checked at
least 12 envelopes88 from the Court 83 RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B 84 RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B,
sec. 1. 85 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 30. 86 Id. at 33. 87 Id. at 39. 88 Id. at 2–5. It is common
practice for Philippine courts to issue orders or resolutions in sealed envelopes. These 12 envelopes
contain the Resolutions dated September 20, 2010, November 11, Resolution 9 A.C. No. 10117 of
Appeals meant for respondent, Atty. Jose could have followed up with Lucero if respondent was actually
receiving the Court of Appeals’ orders or resolutions. This is a fairly simple task requiring a quick yes or
no, accomplishable in a few seconds. As Managing Partner of his firm, Atty. Jose can be expected to
have supervisory duties over his firm’s associates and support staff, among others. Alternatively, Atty.
Jose could have contacted respondent himself. That he did not know respondent’s number89 does not
suffice. It bears stressing that Atty. Jose and respondent are acquaintances and have common
connections.90 In the first place, Atty. Jose showed that he could easily get respondent’s new number
through a mutual friend. Yet, he only did so four (4) years later.91 In today’s age of email, social media,
web messaging applications, and a whole gamut of digital technology easing people’s connectivity
whenever and wherever they are, it is fairly easy to get connected with someone without even leaving
one’s location. Atty. Jose is fully aware of the importance of following court orders and processes. It is
reasonable to expect him to extend assistance to the lawyer to whom he lent his office address—and in
doing so, to the Court of Appeals—in the speedy and efficient administration of justice in Bank of the
Philippine Islands. Atty. Jose’s reading of this Court’s January 20, 2014 Resolution92 is also highly
questionable. While the Resolution was sent to his law firm,93 it was addressed to respondent, a lawyer
not under his employ.94 Canon 21, Rule 21.0495 of the Code of Professional Responsibility generally
allows disclosure of a client’s affairs only to partners or associates of the law firm, unless the client
prohibits it. Respondent is not a partner or associate of MFV Jose Law Office.96 2010, February 23,
2011, March 28, 2011, July 5, 2011, October 13, 2011, January 10, 2012, May 16, 2012, August 13, 2012,
October 17, 2012, April 26, 2013, and August 14, 2013. 89 Id. at 39. 90 Id. at 33. 91 A total of four (4)
years passed between 2010 and 2014. Atty. Mortel made the address request in 2010 (Id. at 40, Atty.
Jose Affidavit). He stopped communicating with MFV Jose Law Office after August 16, 2010 (Id. at 24,
Comment). Meanwhile, Atty. Jose began to look for Atty. Mortel’s number on February 25, 2014 (Id. at
41, Atty. Jose Affidavit). 92 Rollo, p. 39. 93 Id. 94 Id. at 41. 95 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon
21, rule 21.04 provides: Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners
or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client. 96 Rollo, p. 41. Resolution 10 A.C. No. 10117 Even
assuming that this Court’s January 20, 2014 Resolution is independent of Bank of Philippine Islands, the
present case being administrative in nature, Atty. Jose’s action still invites suspicion. Article III, Section
3(1) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that: ARTICLE III Bill of Rights . . . . SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of
communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Under Article 32 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: . . . . (11) The privacy of communication and
correspondence[.] Atty. Jose took hold of this Court’s correspondence meant for respondent and read
it.97 On February 25, 2014, he “look[ed] into the said case [and] noticed that the Resolution . . . was
already in the pink form issued by the Supreme Court. [He] saw the word ‘suspended’ and, upon
perusal, saw that [respondent] was now subjected to an administrative case[.]”98 Atty. Jose may claim
that he did so out of concern. However, if he were truly concerned, his proper recourse would have
been to inform respondent about receiving mail from this Court, not to read it. Moreover, he would
have informed respondent, as early as 2010, that his law firm received several Court of Appeals
correspondences, and that these letters kept arriving for respondent until 2013.99 Therefore, under
Rule 138, Section 30100 of the Rules of Court, this 97 Id. at 39. 98 Id. Emphasis supplied. 99 Id. at 2–4.
100 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 30 provides: SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he
has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself Resolution 11 A.C. No. 10117 Court directs Atty.
Jose to show cause, within 10 days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why he should not be
administratively sanctioned for failing to ensure respondent’s prompt receipt of the Court of Appeals
Resolutions, and for reading this Court’s Resolution addressed to respondent. II Atty. Jose stated under
oath that respondent requested to use MFV Jose Law Office’s address as his mailing address only in
August 2010,101 after respondent had already filed his appeal.102 The exact day in August is unknown.
Assuming respondent’s request was granted as early as August 1, 2010, this does not help him in any
way. The Court of Appeals Notice for respondent to file an appellant’s brief was issued one (1) month
earlier, on July 20, 2010, when respondent still presumably used his old address on record at Herrera
Tower, Rufino St., corner Valero St., Makati City.103 Thus, respondent’s sending De Leon, his messenger,
to the new forwarding address at MFV Jose Law Office to get updates anytime between August 1,
2010104 and August 16, 2010 (when he filed the Motion) would certainly have yielded no result. In this
hypothetical scenario, the Court of Appeals would have sent the Notice to his old address on record.
That he allegedly did not receive the July 20, 2010 Notice from the Court of Appeals was, therefore, his
own lookout. Assuming MFV Law Office accommodated respondent’s request after August 16, 2010,
there could have been no instance where respondent sent De Leon to MFV Law Office, if this Court were
to believe his statement that he stopped contacting MFV Law Office after he filed the Motion.105 In
either case, respondent had been remiss in his duty to keep himself informed on the status of the case.
Respondent presents a different version of the facts. According to or counsel. But if upon reasonable
notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex
parte. 101 Rollo, p. 39. 102 Although the records do not show when Atty. Mortel filed the appeal, it
certainly happened before July 20, 2010, the date when the Court of Appeals issued the Notice for Atty.
Mortel to file an appellant’s brief. Under Section 4(a)(1)(1.6) of the Court of Appeals Internal Rules,
issuing a notice to file appellant’s brief means that the appellate court has already received the appeal.
103 Rollo, p. 34. 104 In this hypothetical scenario, this would be the date when Atty. Mortel’s request
was granted by MFV Law Office. 105 Rollo, p. 24. Resolution 12 A.C. No. 10117 him, he requested to use
MFV Law Office’s address “as his mailing address for the [purpose of] filing of the appeal[.]”106 This
hints that he made his request before he even elevated Bank of the Philippine Islands to the Court of
Appeals, and precisely for that purpose. While the records do not show when respondent filed the
appeal, it certainly happened before July 20, 2010, the date when the Court of Appeals issued the
Notice107 for respondent to file an appellant’s brief. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals,
issuing a notice to file appellant’s brief means that it has already received the appeal.108 Thus, insofar
as respondent is concerned, the July 20, 2010 Notice reached MFV Law Office,109 not his old address on
record. Respondent further claims: [O]n the account of the Honorable Court [of Appeals] in its
Resolution dated 14 August 2013 the Court [of Appeals] issued already a “Notice” to file appellant’s brief
on July 20, 2010 signifying that there was already a notice received by the staff of M V F [sic] Jose Law
Office but was not forwarded to the undersigned counsel. This demonstrated that the very first Order
issued by the Court [of Appeals] was received by the aforesaid law office but was not forwarded to the
undersigned counsel and the same was true to all subsequent Orders or Resolutions issued by the Court
of Appeals[.]110 (Emphasis supplied) Respondent dates back his request to use MFV Law Office’s
address before July 20 2010, while Atty. Jose avows that it happened in August 2010.111 The
inconsistent narration of facts shows that one of them did not give a truthful account on the matter. In
any of the scenarios presented, respondent’s gross negligence and lack of foresight is apparent.
Respondent did not make it easy for MFV Law Office to reach him personally or through his messenger.
First, respondent personally stopped visiting and communicating with the law firm after August 16,
2010.112 A total of 12 Court of Appeals Resolutions arrived at MFV Law Office after that date. 106 Id. at
34. 107 Id. at 3. 108 Section 4(a)(1)(1.6) of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals states that as soon
as the Court of Appeals receives appellant’s appeal, the Civil Cases Section of the Judicial Records
Division shall, within ten (10) days from completion of the records, issue a notice to file appellant’s brief
within fortyfive (45) days from receipt thereof. 109 Rollo, pp. 27–28. 110 Id. 111 Id. at 39. 112 Id. at 24.
Resolution 13 A.C. No. 10117 Second, respondent asked De Leon to stop going to the law firm after
August 16, 2010.113 This may explain why De Leon no longer replied to Lucero, Atty. Jose’s messenger,
after a few text exchanges.114 Lucero states that he had no idea how to find De Leon, and had not seen
respondent for years.115 Third, Atty. Mortel did not update MFV Law Office of his or De Leon’s present
work or phone number(s).116 Atty. Jose had to look for respondent’s mobile number four (4) years
later117 just so he could inform respondent about this Court’s Resolution.118 Meanwhile, Lucero
assumed that De Leon changed his number as De Leon could no longer be reached.119 Fourth, there is
no allegation that respondent left other contact details to MFV Law Office, such as his home address, as
a safety net. What follows from all these is that respondent failed to adopt an “efficient and orderly
system of receiving and attending promptly to all judicial notices.”120 The fault was his to bear. In
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals: 121 We hold that an attorney owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt
an efficient and orderly system of receiving and attending promptly to all judicial notices. He and his
client must suffer the consequences of his failure to do so particularly where such negligence is not
excusable as in the case at bar. . . . Aside from his failure to adopt an organized and efficient system of
managing his files and court notices, we also note that petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Almadro, allowed one
year to lapse before he again acted on the appeal of his client. . . . Subsequently, the notice to file the
appellant’s brief was received by the househelp of Atty. Almadro, petitioner’s counsel, on February 21,
1996. It was only on July 11, 1996 that Atty. Almadro claims to have discovered the notice. . . . Atty.
Almadro apparently never bothered to check why he had not received any notice for the filing of his
client’s (appellant’s) brief.122 113 Id. at 24. 114 Id. at 41. 115 Id. 116 Id. at 42. According to Lucero, after
not receiving any reply from De Leon, he assumed that the latter changed his number. 117 Four (4)
years have passed from 2010 to 2014. Atty. Mortel made the address request in 2010 (Id. at 40, Atty.
Jose’s Affidavit). He stopped communicating with MFV Jose Law Office after August 16, 2010 (Id. at 24,
Comment). Meanwhile, Atty. Jose began to look for Atty. Mortel’s number on February 25, 2014 (Id. at
41, Atty. Jose’s Affidavit). 118 Rollo, p. 39. 119 Id. at 41. 120 450 Phil. 296 (2003) [Per J. Corona, Third
Division]. 121 Id. at 302. 122 Id. at 302–303. Resolution 14 A.C. No. 10117 Similarly, in this case,
respondent did not adequately inquire why he had not received any notice for the filing of Angelita De
Jesus’ appellant’s brief.”123 He should have assumed that the Court of Appeals would send him a notice
regarding his appeal. Yet, he instructed De Leon to go to MFV Law Office only initially,124 and cut
contact with the law firm after August 16, 2010.125 According to respondent, he was “completely
unaware of the existence of the Court [of Appeals’] Orders or Resolutions.”126 He claims that his failure
to comply was made in good faith and was not done intentionally.127 We are not convinced.
Respondent’s disobedience of court orders, while it may not have been malicious, was certainly willful.
He knew of the consequences of disregarding court orders, yet he did not take steps to prevent it from
happening. He used Atty. Jose’s office address for Bank of the Philippine Islands, but did not ensure that
he could actually receive the Court of Appeals Notices and Resolutions. That respondent was able to
receive this Court’s Resolution through MFV Law Office in 2014 shows that it was also possible for him
to have received the Court of Appeals Notice and Resolutions from 2010 to 2013, had he only cared to
do so. III Respondent attempts to escape liability by invoking Rule 50, Section 3128 of the Rules of Court,
which states that withdrawal of appeal is a matter of right before the filing of the appellee’s brief. He
claims to have honestly believed that the filing of the motion had the effect of withdrawal of appeal.129
Thinking that the case had been closed and terminated, he forgot all about it.130 Respondent prides
himself in wanting to become a judge, joining the 123 Id. at 303. 124 Id. at 24. 125 Id. 126 Id. at 23. 127
Id. at 27–A. 128 RULES OF COURT, Rule 50, sec. 3 provides: SEC. 3. Withdrawal of appeal. An appeal may
be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal
may be allowed in the discretion of the court. 129 Rollo, p. 24. 130 Id. Resolution 15 A.C. No. 10117 30th
Prejudicature program, and taking the “masterate [sic] and doctoral degree[s] in law[.]”131 In terms of
legal knowledge and conduct, more is expected of him. Filing a motion to withdraw appeal does not
result in automatic withdrawal of the appeal. The next-level court, before which a motion to withdraw
appeal is filed, still needs to resolve this motion. A motion prays for a relief other than by a pleading.132
As the court may either grant or deny a motion, or otherwise defer action on it until certain conditions
are met, lawyers have the obligation to apprise themselves of the court’s resolution, and not to simply
second-guess it. In this case, before the Court of Appeals acted on respondent’s Motion, it first required
proof133 of the client’s conformity.134 It is not unlikely that the Court of Appeals wanted to ensure that
Angelita De Jesus voluntarily agreed to the withdrawal of the appeal—that is, without force,
intimidation, or coercion—and that, despite losing the case before the lower court, she was fully
informed of the legal consequences of the contemplated action. Thus, respondent cannot excuse
himself from complying with the Court of Appeals’ July 20, 2010 Notice simply because he “belie[ved]
that the case has long been closed and terminated” when he filed the Motion to Withdraw Appeal.135
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance.136 Respondent could not safely assume that the
case had already been closed and terminated until he received the Court of Appeals resolution on the
matter. IV Both respondent137 and Atty. Jose138 point a finger at Lucero, Atty. Jose’s messenger, while
Lucero points a finger at De Leon, respondent’s messenger.139 131 Id. at 26. 132 RULES OF COURT, Rule
15, sec. 1 provides: SECTION 1. Motion defined. — A motion is an application for relief other than by a
pleading. 133 Id., Rule 138, sec. 21 provides: SECTION 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An
attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may. . . on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right
to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose,
whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make
such order as justice requires. 134 Rollo, p. 2. 135 Id. at 24. 136 CIVIL CODE, art. 3. 137 Rollo, p. 23. 138
Id. at 39. 139 Id. 41. Resolution 16 A.C. No. 10117 According to respondent, Lucero simply left the
Resolutions in MFV Law Office’s racks or in Lucero’s table[.]”140 Lucero states that he did not know the
relevance of the Court of Appeals Resolutions or the importance of these to respondent.141 For a law
firm messenger to have no clue about the importance of a court issuance is doubtful. What is more
plausible is that the messenger, being outside this Court’s disciplinary arm, is serving as a convenient
scapegoat. Even assuming that only the messengers are at fault, neither counsel can blame anyone but
themselves for assigning an important matter to “incompetent or irresponsible person[s].”142 In
Gonzales, “[i]f petitioner’s counsel was not informed by his house-help of the notice which eventually
got misplaced in his office files, said counsel has only himself to blame for entrusting the matter to an
incompetent or irresponsible person[.]”143 Respondent gave the MFV Law Office’s address to the Court
of Appeals. Thus, this is presumably where he wanted the orders of the Court of Appeals sent. He
cannot later excuse himself from complying with the court orders by stating that he did not actually
receive these orders for three (3) years. Respondent is estopped from raising it as a defense. As far as
courts are concerned, orders and resolutions are received by counsel through the address on record
they have given. It is well-noted that respondent informed the Court of Appeals of his present address
(No. 2806 Tower 2, Pioneer Highlands, Mandaluyong City) only on March 3, 2014.144 V Respondent’s
defiance of the Court of Appeals Notice and Resolutions shows a blatant disregard of the system he has
vowed to support.”145 When he took his oath as attorney, he has sworn to do as follows: I, do solemnly
swear that . . . I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein . . . and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God. 140 Id. at 21. 141 Id. at 41. 142 Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 450 Phil. 296, 302 (2003) [Per J.
Corona, Third Division]. 143 Id. 144 Rollo, p. 38. 145 Bantolo v. Castillon Jr., 514 Phil. 628, 633 (2005)
[Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. Resolution 17 A.C. No. 10117 (Emphasis supplied) An oath is not an
empty promise, but a solemn duty. Owing good fidelity to the court, lawyers must afford due respect to
“judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities[.]”146 Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility: CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION. . . . . . . . CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT. CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. CANON 12 - A
LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. In Bantolo v. Atty. Castillon Jr.: 147 Lawyers are particularly
called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that
willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary
sanctions as well. Such is the situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that
respondent lawyer’s commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually
punished by the lower courts.148 (Emphasis supplied) In its May 16, 2012 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals found respondent guilty for indirect contempt of court.149 On top of respondent’s punishment
for contempt, his willful disobedience of a lawful order of the Court of Appeals is a ground for
respondent’s removal or suspension. Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27.
Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from 146 Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, 528 Phil. 814, 821 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc]. 147 514 Phil. 628 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 148 Id. at 632–633. 149 Id. at 3.
Resolution 18 A.C. No. 10117 his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar, 150 this Court ordered the lawyer to file a rejoinder
within 10 days from notice, but she was able to file only after one (1) year.151 The lawyer was also
ordered to comment on the complainant’s manifestation, but instead of filing a comment, she
submitted a manifestation about four (4) months after.152 Suspending the lawyer for three (3) years,
this Court stated that the lawyer’s “cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.”153 In this case, respondent utterly
disrespected the lawful orders of the court by ignoring 12 Court of Appeals Resolutions.154 In Ong v.
Atty. Grijaldo: 155 [Respondent’s] conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A resolution of this
Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively. Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in
his character; it also underscores his disrespect of our lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is especially so, as in the
instant case, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his
comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.156 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted) In Richards v. Asoy, 157 the lawyer failed to comply with this Court’s Resolution
requiring him to file a comment and show cause why he should not be administratively sanctioned or
cited in contempt.158 He was also 150 559 Phil. 211 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. 151 Id. at 223. 152
Id. 153 Id. at 224. 154 Rollo, pp. 1–5. 155 450 Phil. 1 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 156 Id. at 12–13. 157
647 Phil. 113 (2010) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 158 Id. at 116. Resolution 19 A.C. No. 10117 asked to comply
with this Court’s other Resolution requiring him to reimburse the complainant within 10 days from
notice.159 This Court found that respondent “had gone into hiding and was evading service of
pleadings/orders/processes of this Court.”160 For the lawyer’s grave misconduct, this Court indefinitely
suspended him from legal practice.161 When the lawyer later sought to be readmitted to the bar, this
Court denied his Petition to be reinstated.162 The lawyer was found to have failed to justify the long
delay of nine (9) years in complying with this Court’s Resolutions to reimburse complainant:
Respondent’s justification for his 9-year belated “compliance” with the order for him to reimburse
complainant glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders,
qualities that do not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. The solemn oath which all
lawyers take upon admission to the bar to dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice is neither a mere
formality nor hollow words meant to be taken lightly, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times. The lack of any sufficient justification or explanation for the nine-year delay
in complying with the Court’s July 9, 1987 and March 15, 1988 Resolutions to reimburse complainant
betrays a clear and contumacious disregard for the lawful orders of this Court. Such disrespect on the
part of respondent constitutes a clear violation of the lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility[.] . . . .
Respondent denigrates the dignity of his calling by displaying a lack of candor towards this Court. By
taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement . . . he sent out a strong message that the legal processes
and orders of this Court could be treated with disdain or impunity.163 (Citations omitted) Here,
respondent failed to justify the long delay of at least three (3) years164 in complying with the Court of
Appeals Resolutions requiring his client’s written conformity to the Motion (2010)165 and information
on his client’s current address (2011).166 Respondent also failed to justify the long delay in complying
with other Court of Appeals Resolutions (a) requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited in
contempt, and to comply with the Court of Appeals’ earlier Resolutions;167 (b) citing him in indirect
contempt and ordering him 159 Id. 160 Id. 161 Id. 162 Id. at 122. 163 Id. at 120–121. 164 Rollo, p. 33.
Atty. Mortel belatedly presented Dulay’s Affidavit of Conformity and Compliance (Id. at 44) on March 5,
2014. 165 Id. at 1–3. 166 Id. at 3. 167 Id., citing Court of Appeals’ January 10, 2012 Resolution.
Resolution 20 A.C. No. 10117 to pay a fine of ₱10,00000;168 (c) reiterating the Resolutions that directed
him to pay the fine and inform the Court of Appeals of his client’s address, and warning him of a more
severe sanction should he fail to do so;169 (d) requiring him to show cause why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law for his refusal to pay the fine; and (e) ordering him to again to
comply with the Resolution that directed him to pay the fine. 170 Moreover, even after he found out
about the developments of the case,171 respondent still did not take immediate actions to observe all
of the Court of Appeals Resolutions. Nowhere in the records does it show that he complied with the
May 16, 2012, August 13, 2012, and October 17, 2012 Resolutions directing him to pay ₱10,000.00 as
fine for his non-compliance with the earlier Court of Appeals Resolutions. Thus, despite respondent’s
profuse apologies172 to the Court of Appeals, the “evidence of atonement for [his] misdeeds is sorely
wanting.”173 In Cuizon v. Atty. Macalino, 174 this Court disbarred a lawyer for his obstinate failure to
comply with this Court’s Resolutions requiring him to file his comment and for issuing a bouncing
check.175 Found liable for contempt of court, the lawyer was ordered imprisoned until he complied
with this Court’s Resolution to pay a fine and submit his comment: By his repeated cavalier conduct, the
respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court. As an officer of the
court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect
for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court orders and processes.176 (Citations
omitted) Respondent’s actions shatter the dignity of his profession. He exhibited disdain for court orders
and processes, as well as a lack of fidelity to the court. In “taking his sweet time to effect”177
compliance with the Court of Appeals Resolutions, he sends the message that he is above the duly
constituted judicial authorities of this land, and he looks down on them with condescension. This Court
agrees with the Court of Appeals that his acts constitute gross misconduct and insubordination or
disrespect of court. 168 Id., citing Court of Appeals’ May 16, 2012 Resolution. 169 Id., citing Court of
Appeals’ October 17, 2012 Resolution. 170 Id. at 5–6. 171 Id. at 39. 172 Id. at 32–38. 173 Richards v.
Asoy, 647 Phil. 113, 121 (2010) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 174 477 Phil. 569 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
175 Id. at 572. 176 Id.at 575. 177 Richards v. Asoy, 647 Phil. 113, 121 (2010) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
Resolution 21 A.C. No. 10117 Gross misconduct is defined as an “inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct”178 in administering justice, which prejudices the parties’ rights or forecloses a just
determination of the case.179 As officers of the court, lawyers themselves should be at the forefront in
obeying court orders and processes. Respondent failed in this regard. His actions resulted in his client’s
prejudice. VI Respondent states that “[t]he ironical truth on this legal controversy is that the client-
appellant represented by undersigned counsel was satisfied, contented and has fully benefited from the
legal services rendered by him.”180 Presenting the affidavit181 of Jim Dulay (Dulay), Angelita De Jesus’
Attorney-in-Fact, respondent brandishes his client’s pleasure with his legal services.182 According to
respondent, “[t]he client-appellant in the same affidavit expressed that [Dulay] was not prejudiced in
any manner.”183 This is not true. Angelita De Jesus was prejudiced by respondent’s willful disobedience
of the lawful orders of the Court of Appeals. Respondent’s failure to comply with the September 20,
2010 Resolution (requiring his client’s conformity to the Motion to Withdraw Appeal) and November 11,
2010 Resolution (reiterating the requirement of his client’s conformity to the Motion) resulted in the
denial of the Motion on February 23, 2011.184 The period within which to appeal the February 23, 2011
denial185 had clearly lapsed when respondent filed the Omnibus Motion before the Court of Appeals on
March 5, 2014.186 Dulay wanted to withdraw the appeal,187 but respondent’s negligence and lack of
prudence resulted in an outcome opposite of what Angelita De Jesus, through Dulay, sought his services
for. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility: 178 Flores v. Atty. Mayor Jr., A.C. No. 7314, August
25, 2015 4 [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 179 Id. at 5. 180 Rollo, p. 25. 181 Id. at 44. 182 Id. at 25. 183 Id. at 26.
184 Id. at 2–3, citing Court of Appeals’ February 13, 2011 Resolution. 185 Id. 186 Id. at 32. 187 Id. at 43.
Resolution 22 A.C. No. 10117 CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. . . . . Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information. In Ong, this Court found that the lawyer violated his duty to his client in failing to update
the client on the status of the case.188 The lawyer’s incompetence, neglect, and failure to update his
client, in addition to his misappropriation of his client’s money, led to his disbarment from the practice
of law.189 Here, respondent blindsided his client on the real status of Bank of Philippine Islands. He
failed to diligently attend to the legal matter entrusted to him. The case, instead of being closed and
terminated, came back to life on appeal due to his neglect and lack of diligence. As the Court of Appeals
correctly found: Failure of Atty. Mortel to comply with the Resolutions of [the Court of Appeals] has
prejudiced the right of his client, herein respondentoppositor-appellant, to a just determination of her
cause. His failure or obstinate refusal without justification or valid reason to comply with [the Court of
Appeal’s] directives constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of [the Court of Appeals],
amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect. The foregoing acts committed by
Atty. Mortel are sufficient cause for his suspension pursuant to Sec. 28, in relation to Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.190 Respondent’s “negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and
diligence required of every lawyer.”191 For his gross misconduct, insubordination, and disrespect of the
Court of Appeals directives, and for his negligence of his client’s case, respondent must be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely. WHEREFORE, Atty. Marcelino Ferdinand V. Jose is DIRECTED to 188 Id.
at 5–6. 189 Id. at 3. 190 Rollo, p. 5. 191 Ong v. Grijaldo, 450 Phil. 1, 9 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. . , .
Resolution 23 A.C. No. 10117 show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution,
why he should not be disciplined by this Court. Respondent Atty. Gideon D.V. Mortel is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ( 1) year for violating Canons 7, 10, 11, 12, and 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal
records as attorney, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country through the Office of the Court Administrator. SO ORDERED. / Associate Justice WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice Chairperson ((;b {/ff;~ ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice ~J.//~.,, ;;A~'

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015

[Formerly CBD 09-2555]

ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 10584

[Formerly CBD 10-2827]

ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of Canon
10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint4 against
Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty.
Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.5

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty.
Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990.6

Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7 executed by
Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by
Atty. Santos states:

Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of said
deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate.9 (Emphasis in the
original underscoring supplied)

Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 filed a
Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining
order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.12
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla,13 which
allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.15

In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:

ATTY. CARINGAL

....

Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she was
about four years old.

A : Yes, sir.

Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff, isn’t
it?

A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her cousins.

....

Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].

THE COURT

: What’s the name of the mother?

ATTY. CARINGAL

: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.

Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?

A : Of course.

Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.

You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you requested to
be marked as Exhibit B.

THE COURT

: Exhibit?
ATTY. CARINGAL

: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial settlement of
the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from you as you just
testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial.

A : Yes, sir.

Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics because it is
not the issue in this case.

....

ATTY. CARINGAL

....

Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly notarized on
or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book

number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the
document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I
read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed
to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any other
heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that you have drafted into this
document . . . true or false?

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn the
legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife
Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the subject
of my continuing objection from the very beginning.

THE COURT

: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened
the floodgate to . . . questions on this document.

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano Turla, your
Honor. That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents, your Honor.

THE COURT
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.

ATTY. CARINGAL

: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and impertinency and
relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.

THE COURT

: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent with the ruling
of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?

THE WITNESS

: No, that is not true.

ATTY. CARINGAL

: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have drafted a
document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

....

ATTY. CARINGAL

Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five
years later[,] that this is false, is it not?

THE WITNESS

: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu17 she is entitled [sic] to a
share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he
asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic]properties for
himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal).
This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that
Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.21 He also alleged that in representing Marilu
Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.22

Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s
Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of his
deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his
professional relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of privileged
communication[.]"24

Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate.26 In
other words, he engaged in forum shopping.27

In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that
Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29 Atty. Santos’ wife,
Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had
other heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:

14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago, he is fully
aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was
then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes due. There is some peculiarity
in the neat set up [sic] of a husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the document while the wife
who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the taxes due the government;

14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit of
Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or any
other heir entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the original)

Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit that
Rufina Turla had no other heir.33

Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own
benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to be
distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged
that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.35

In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He explained that the death
certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not
aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate.38

As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not
representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead.39 Further, "he [was]
representing Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s estate."40 Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that there was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla
was the sole heir of Rufina Turla."41

Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum shopping
because the various cases filed had different issues.42

As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his client as
the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43 According to Atty. Santos, payment of
attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds could be considered as "expenses of administration."44 Also,
payment of Atty. Santos’ legal services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to question.45

On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the
Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered.46

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that Atty.
Santos be suspended for three (3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was
falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty. Caringal
failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s estate.49

With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the
evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law."50 Further, Atty.
Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved different parties and prayed
for different reliefs.51

However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The Report and Recommendation53 of the Commission
on Bar Discipline stated:

. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes
members of the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has explained that "the
proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may
be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition
inoperative."

....

. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The
respondent has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand admitted that
he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that he was the sole heir of
Rufina Turla.

And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s daughter. To
substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent admitted that he relied on the
birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only the daughter of Mariano
Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla is
Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance
and was deprived of the same because of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano
Turla[,] stating that he is his wife’s sole heir.

. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a
position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only heir
of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)

In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission
on Bar Discipline.

Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in the Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.

This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July 15, 2014,58
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:

RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—

....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of law is
proper.

This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution. However,
this court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from three (3)
months to one (1) year.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his client.

....

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers
must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage
clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court
explained what conflict of interest means:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute
Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse,
he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission on Bar
Discipline:

Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil Case
for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I called the
attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of
properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me
to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself."
This very admission proves that the respondent was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a legal and rightful
heir to Rufina Turla’s estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla
that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent.

Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009.65
It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did
not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented Mariano
Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of
interest against respondent was sufficiently proven.

Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent violated Canon 10,
Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:

Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the
respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite
. . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the
respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and
protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only
was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in the original)

As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are expected
to be honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest. With full
knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.68

This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and
March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the authority to
impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.

The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution:
ARTICLE VIII

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

....

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s "plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys"70
and discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal
profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems
from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as
well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the
proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .

. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of
the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society.71 (Citations omitted)

This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:

RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR

....

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.73 Under
the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the
constitutional powers of this court.

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.74

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines . .
. upon the verified complaint of any person." However, this authority is only to assist this court with the
investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that may
be imposed on the erring lawyer.

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State—the
administration of justice—as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."76
(Citations omitted)

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority is
granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court.77 The Resolutions of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not be
equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty.
Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and recommendations of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and
ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their

information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

3Republic of tbe llbilippines $>upreme QCourt ;!ffila 11 ila EN BANC BARMATTERN0.1645 RE:
AMENDMENT OF RULE 139-B Whereas, Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution confers upon
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law.
Whereas, the Supreme Court's power relating to the admission to the practice of law inherently includes
the power to discipline and remove from the rolls, lawyers who have transgressed their oath and
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Whereas, dismissal of complaints filed against lawyers
is a power of the Supreme Court that cannot be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Whereas, the motive of the complainant and his or her action/inaction after the filing of a verified
complaint against a lawyer are not essential to the proceedings. Now therefore, Sections 1, 5, 12, 13,
and 15 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are amended to read as follows: RULE 139-B Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or upon the filing of a verified
complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts. ( • 0
QUANTUM OF EVIDNECE

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7649

SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, and

BENJAMIN DANDA, Complainants

- versus –

ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR.,

WENCESLAO PEEWEE TRINIDAD,

and ANDRESITO FORNIER, Respondents.

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION, SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

PEREZ,

Promulgated:

December 14, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban and Benjamin
Danda (complainants) against lawyers Salvador De Guzman, Jr., Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad, and
Andresito Fornier (respondents). Complainants claim that respondents instigated and filed fabricated
criminal complaints against them before the Iligan City Prosecutors Office for Large Scale and Syndicated
Illegal Recruitment and Estafa under I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835.1 Complainants pray for the
imposition of the grave penalty of disbarment upon respondents.2 Attached to complainants letter-
complaint is the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint3 allegedly submitted by complainants in
the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints.
The Facts

Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial Court Judge Salvador
P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in Cotabato City.4 De Guzman allegedly persuaded them to file an
illegal recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31, Lauban, et al. vs. Alvarez, Amante, Montesclaros, et al.)
against certain persons, in exchange for money.5 De Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that
his group, composed of Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty. Andresito Fornier
(Fornier), Everson Lim Go Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Stevenson Lim Go Tian (Go Tian Brothers),
were untouchable.6

In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De Guzman a prepared Joint
Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents, which they were directed to sign and file.7 The Joint
Complaint-Affidavit and supporting documents were allegedly fabricated and manufactured by De
Guzman.8

During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office, complainants
allegedly received several phone calls from De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers, all
of them continuously telling complainants to pursue the case.9 When complainants asked De Guzman
what would happen if a warrant of arrest would be issued, De Guzman allegedly replied, Ipa tubus natin
sa kanila, perahan natin sila.10

Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why they told De Guzman and
his group that they planned to withdraw the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31.11 Complainants
were allegedly offered by respondents ₱200,000.00 to pursue the case, but they refused.12
Complainants were once again allegedly offered by respondents One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) to
pursue the case until the end, but they refused again.13 For this reason, respondents allegedly
orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-1676
and I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants in Iligan City.14 On 30 November 2006, Aba claims to have
received a text message from De Guzman, saying, Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan
Warrant of Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck kayo.15

In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants submitted the allegedly
fabricated complaint,16 supporting documents,17 letter of De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor
Orlando Badoy,18 De Guzmans Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31,19 and other
relevant documents. Subsequently, complainants filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty.
Trinidad and Atty. Fornier,20 and prayed that the complaint be pursued against De Guzman.

Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court21 and Position Paper filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline,22 denied all the allegations in the complaint. Trinidad vehemently
declared that he has never communicated with any of the complainants and has never been to
Cotabato.23 He further claimed that the subscribed letter-complaint does not contain ultimate facts
because it does not specify the times, dates, places and circumstances of the meetings and
conversations with him.24 Trinidad asserted that the complaint was a fabricated, politically motivated
charge, spearheaded by a certain Joseph Montesclaros (Montesclaros), designed to tarnish Trinidads
reputation as a lawyer and city mayor.25 Trinidad claims that Montesclaros was motivated by revenge
because Montesclaros mistakenly believed that Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay
City.26 Trinidad also claims that he, his family members and close friends have been victims of fabricated
criminal charges committed by the syndicate headed by Montesclaros.27

Trinidad pointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing court processes by filing
fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated addresses of
defendants.28 Since the defendants addresses are fabricated, the defendants are not informed of the
criminal complaint, and thus the information is filed with the court.29 Consequently, a warrant of arrest is
issued by the court, and only when the warrant of arrest is served upon the defendant will the latter know
of the criminal complaint.30 At this point, Montesclaros intervenes by extorting money from the defendant
in order for the complainants to drop the criminal complaint.31 To prove the existence of this syndicate,
Trinidad presented the letter of Eden Rabor, then a second year law student in Cebu City, to the
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these institutions to investigate
the syndicate of Montesclaros, who has victimized a Canadian citizen who was at that time jailed in Cebu
City due to an extortion racket.32 Trinidad also presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac City on the illegal recruitment charge against his friend, Emmanuel Cinco, which charge
was dismissed because the charge was fabricated, as admitted by complainants themselves.33

Trinidad further claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate included some of their members
as respondents to divert suspicion.34 Trinidad pointed out that his wife was a victim of this fabricated
criminal charge of illegal recruitment filed in Marawi City.35 Fortunately, when the warrant of arrest was
being served in Pasay City Hall, Trinidads wife was not there.36 Lastly, Trinidad declared that
Montesclaros has perfected the method of filing fabricated cases in remote and dangerous places to
harass his victims.37

Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court38 and Position Paper filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline,39 claimed that in his 35 years as a member of the bar, he has conducted
himself professionally in accordance with the exacting standards of the legal profession.40 Fornier denied
knowing any of the complainants, and also denied having any dealings or communication with any of
them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed, either for himself or on behalf of a client, any case, civil,
criminal or otherwise, against complainants.41 Fornier claimed that he was included in this case for acting
as defense counsel for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal recruitment.42 Fornier
claimed that the Go Tian Brothers are victims of an extortion racket led by Montesclaros.43 For coming to
the legal aid of the Go Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the plan of the group of Montesclaros
to extort millions of pesos from his clients.44 Fornier claimed that the filing of the complaint is apparently
an attempt of the syndicate to get even at those who may have exposed and thwarted their criminal
designs at extortion.45 Fornier prays that the Court will not fall prey to the scheme and machinations of
this syndicate that has made and continues to make a mockery of the justice system by utilizing the
courts, the Prosecutors Offices, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration in carrying out their criminal activities.46 Lastly, Fornier claimed that complainants failed to
establish the charges against him by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, as complainants affidavits
are replete with pure hearsay, speculations, conjectures and sweeping conclusions, unsupported by
specific, clear and convincing evidence.47

De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Complaint48 on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint attached to the
Letter-Complaint, which was made the basis of this administrative complaint, are spurious.49 According
to the Certification issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan City, complainants Lauban,
Lumabao and Aba, who were charged for violation of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), which
charge was subsequently dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered by the Prosecutor, did not
submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection with the charge, nor did they file any Affidavit of
Complaint against any person.50

In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,51 De Guzman stated he is an 81-year
old retired Regional Trial Court judge.52 He pointed out that there are no details regarding the allegations
of grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery, falsification of documents, violation of
lawyers oath and other administrative infractions.53 De Guzman invited the attention of the Investigating
Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification which he submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 to deny any
participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint and to narrate in detail how he became involved
in this case which was masterminded by Montesclaros.54 In his Affidavit of Clarification,55 De Guzman
claimed that he had no participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31,
and he was surprised to receive a photocopy of the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, Atty. Nicanor G.
Alvarez, Lolita Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr., implicating him in the preparation of
the complaint.56 De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find his and his clients names in the
counter-affidavit, and for this reason, felt under obligation to make the Affidavit of Clarification.57 Lastly,
De Guzman declared that he has no familiarity with the complainants or Tesclaros Recruitment and
Employment Agency, nor with other respondents in the complaint, but he believes that Atty. Roque A.
Amante, Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal
recruitment business.58

During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 200859 and 13 March 2009,60 none of the
complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate the allegations in their
complaint despite due notice.61

Report and Recommendation

of the Commission on Bar Discipline

The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline reads:

In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and Fornier are deemed to be
without basis and consequently, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL of the charges against them.

As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court Judge, there is enough basis to hold him
administratively liable. Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for two (2) months is hereby
recommended.62
The Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint as well
as in the attachments, that complainants failed to substantiate their charges against respondents Trinidad
and Fornier.63 Other than bare allegations, complainants did not adduce proof of Trinidad and Forniers
supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts constituting the complaint.64 In
addition, complainants, on their own volition, admitted the non-participation and non-involvement of
Trinidad and Fornier when complainants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and
Atty. Fornier Only.65 For these reasons, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charges
against Trinidad and Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman failed to deny the allegations
in the Letter-Complaint or to explain the import of the same.66 Moreover, De Guzman failed to controvert
the truly vicious evidence against him:

But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for Respondent is the letter he sent to Orlando D.
Badoy, City Councilor, Cotabato City dated February 16, 2006. This letter was alleged in and attached to
the Joint Counter-Affiavit with Affidavit of Complaint. The letter had confirmed the allegation of his travel
to Cotabato City to file charges against persons he did not identify. He intriguingly mentioned the name
Ben Danda as the one to whom he handed the complaint. Danda, incidentally, was one of those who
executed the Letter of Complaint along with Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Benjamin Danda and Almasis
Lauban which was filed before the Supreme Court.67

The Decision of the Board of Governors of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation on the dismissal of the charges against
Fornier and Trinidad.68 In De Guzmans case, the Board of Governors increased the penalty from a
suspension of two (2) months to a suspension of two (2) years from the practice of law for his attempt to
file illegal recruitment cases to extort money:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED with modification, and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case against
Respondents Trinidad and Fornier is without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. However, Atty.
Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years for his attempt
to file illegal recruitment cases in order to extort money.69

The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be administratively disciplined
based on the allegations in the complaint.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal of the charges against Trinidad and Fornier.

We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with regard to De Guzmans liability, and likewise dismiss the charges against
De Guzman.

Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of crime or
wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.70

Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.71

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not determined
mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its
practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.72

Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest
level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by
substantial evidence, in that order.73 Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.74
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has greater weight than that of the other.75 It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.76 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a)
all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the
equipoise doctrine.77

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment
proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.

De Guzmans Liability

The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner regarding De Guzmans liability for the following reasons: (a) the documents
submitted by complainants in support of their complaint are not credible; (b) complainants did not appear
in any of the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint; and (c)
complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with
them for the purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of extortion.

The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First, complainants submitted a Joint
Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct against
De Guzman, Trinidad and Fornier. Complainants misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-
Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the
illegal recruitment charges against them. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint
purportedly appears to be subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman,
however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the submission of this
document by complainants:

This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO LUMABAO and
SIAO ALBA were among the respondents named and charged with Violation of Republic Act No. 8042
under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol. XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints
were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated December 29, 2006 rendered by the Office.

This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in
connection to the complaints filed against them, and neither did they file any Affidavit of Complaint
against any person.78 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and
Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn to
before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to the credibility of the other documents complainants
submitted in support of their administrative charges against respondents. Worse, complainants submitted
falsified documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and this Court.

Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidad all claim that complainants are part of a syndicate headed by
Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges. Given this claim that
complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated criminal charges supported by fabricated documents, this
Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents submitted by complainants.
Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the documents they submitted in support of
their allegations of misconduct against respondents are authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not
even attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner to identify the
documents and substantiate or narrate in detail the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by
respondents. To make matters worse, the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint complainants
attached to their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained all their allegations of misconduct against
respondents, is spurious, not having been submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan, despite
purportedly having the signature and seal of the prosecutor.

Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their communication with De Guzman.
If De Guzman really called and texted them that a warrant of arrest would be issued, what mobile number
did De Guzman use? Out of the voluminous documents that complainants submitted, where is the
warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or profession? Who are these complainants? These
questions are unanswered because complainants did not even bother to attend any mandatory
conference called by the Investigating Commissioner, despite due notice. For this reason, the allegations
of De Guzmans misconduct are really doubtful.

Lastly, the supposedly vicious evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he allegedly sent to
Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter states:

Dear Orly,

Thank you very much for a wonderful visit to Cotabato City. I learned much about the South and the way
of life there.

It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed charges
against us in Marawi City! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your man, Ben Danda, with
instructions for him and the other two complainants to sign the same before an assistant prosecutor and
file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to orchestrate the whole thing, from the
prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the warrants of arrest.
Thank you and best regards.79

The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported letter have material
discrepancies. At the same time, complainants did not even explain how they were able to get a copy of
the purported letter. Complainants did not present the recipients, Orlando Badoy or Atty. Francis V.
Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating
Commissioner to substantiate their allegations or authenticate the supporting documents.

The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and credibility into this purported
letter:

Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer denial of the letter or
explain the import of the same differently from what is understood by the Complainants. But even with
that effort, the letter is so plain to understand. Verily, the undersigned cannot ignore the same and the
message it conveys.80

Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that complainants, whom
respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are consistently involved in the fabrication of
evidence in support of their criminal complaints. Moreover, contrary to the Investigating Commissioners
observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the preparation of complainants criminal
complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of Clarification, De Guzman stated:

5. Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his surprise, he recently
received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c)
Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. (his records at the Surpeme Court
does not have any Daryll);

6. Undersigned counsels name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit of Atty. Nicanor
G. Alcarez (Montesclaros lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay RTC Judge Francisco Mendiola as
against the undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman of Montesclaros and a squatter at the
Monica Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and for this reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation
to make this affidavit of clarification for the guidance of the Investigating Prosecutor;

xxx

4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment Agency nor with the
complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City), nor with the other respondents, but he
believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L.
Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.81
For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in support of their
complaint against De Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the charges against De
Guzman.

De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or wrongdoing. Complainants have
the burden of proof to prove their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman. Complainants were not
able to discharge this burden because the documents they submitted were not authenticated and were
apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not appear in the mandatory conference proceedings to
substantiate the allegations in their complaint. In disbarment proceedings, what is required to merit the
administrative penalty is preponderance of evidence, which weight is even higher than substantial
evidence in the hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by preponderance
of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file fabricated charges
against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence of the parties are
evenly balanced, the Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to the equipoise doctrine. For
these reasons, the Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly dismisses the charges against De
Guzman.

Trinidads and Forniers Liabilities

The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with respect to Trinidads and Forniers liabilities:

A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Counter Affidavit with
Affidavit of Complaint reveals that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate their charges against
Respondents. Other than their bare allegations, the Complainants did not adduce proof of Respondents
supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts complained of. For instance, they
failed to prove though faintly that Respondents had gone to Cotabato City to personally induce and
persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment charges against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen
(16) others or that they have prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any form of
communication. The supposed telephone call the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made
during the proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office to the Complainants is unbelievable
and absurd. It is inconceivable that Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during
a serious proceeding such as the inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint before the
City Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly militates against the
reliabiity of Complainants charges against Respondents.

xxx

But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made unmistakable Respondents
non-participation or non-involvement in the charges they have filed when they wittingly filed their Motion
to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only. The undersigned realizes only too well
that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in this Commission, however, any such pleading must
be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A clear reading of the same reveals that the Complainants had
wanted to clarify that they have erroneously included Respondents Trinidad and Fornier as parties to the
case. In particular, they explained that they had no communication or dealings whatsoever with the said
lawyers as to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their charges. The undersigned finds
the affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to ignore the import of the same as a piece of
evidence.82

At any rate, we consider the case against Trinidad and Fornier terminated. Under Section 12(c) of Rule
139-B, the administrative case is deemed terminated if the penalty imposed by the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is less than suspension or disbarment (such as reprimand,
admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a petition with this Court within 15 days from notice:

c. If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is

less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing the charges against
Trinidad and Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Against
Trinidad and Fornier.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and DISMISS
the charges against Attys. Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad and Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit. We
REVERSE the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying and
increasing the penalty in the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. also for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 6580. August 3, 2005]

 DELA CRUZ vs. SALADERO

SECOND DIVISION

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 3 2005.

A.C. No. 6580 (CBD 03-1175) (Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz vs. Atty. Remegio D. Saladero, Jr.)

A complaint dated December 16, 2003 was filed by Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent of violating the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility by filing disbarment, criminal and administrative cases against complainant without legal
and factual bases, for submitting false affidavits, for refusing his invitation to have a "brotherly" talk as
fellow lawyer to clarify the matters between complainant and respondent's clients and for filing a
prohibited pleading.

Specifically, complainant accuses respondent of: filing, through Adoracion Losloso, a baseless
disbarment case against him supported by two false affidavits; sending complainant a letter charging him
of estafa and ignoring complainant's reply thereto; refusing complainant's invitation to a "brotherly" talk;
filing an estafa case through falsification of public document and four other criminal complaints against
herein complainant, through Losloso, which were eventually dismissed for being groundless; filing an
HLURB case in behalf of Losloso and Nestor Aguirre without verifying the truth of their claims; filing a
motion to dismiss the ejectment case filed by complainant against Losloso before the barangay knowing
that such is a prohibited pleading; and helping Losloso to file motions to inhibit a prosecutor in Pasig for
alleged bias.[1]cralaw

Respondent filed an answer contending that: he merely acted as counsel of the parties who filed cases
against complainant and out of the 17 cases filed by Adoracion Losloso against complainant, respondent
only handles four which are still pending resolution; it would be premature to say that said cases were
filed only to harass complainant; there is no showing that respondent is moved by malice or bad faith in
agreeing to act as counsel of Losloso; Losloso also alleged that it was a public attorney who was
assisting her in all her cases by preparing the various pleadings in court; and it is only because said
public attorney could not appear in court that she asked the assistance of respondent and eventually
engaged the legal services of respondent when the public attorney died.[2]cralaw

On February 17, 2004, complainant filed a Reply to the answer reiterating his earlier claims which
respondent countered with a Rejoinder asserting the same denials.[3]cralaw

A mandatory conference was held on April 16, 2004 and on said date, IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala directed the parties to submit their respective position papers.[4]cralaw On June 7,
2004, she submitted her report dated June 7, 2004, finding that:

...In the case at hand, complainant failed to present a clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to prove
that respondent has been moved by malice and bad faith in accepting to serve as legal counsel of Mrs.
Adoracion Losloso. Moreover, records show that the cases, where respondent acted as counsel for Mrs.
Losloso have not been resolved, and therefore, it could not be determined yet whether or not they are
meritorious.[5]cralaw

She then recommended that the instant case of disbarment filed against respondent be dismissed for lack
of merit.[6]cralaw

On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-349

CBD Case No. 03-1175
Atty. Miniano B. dela Cruz vs.
Atty. Remegio D. Saladero, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint lacks merit, the case is hereby
DISMISSED.[7]cralaw

On October 19, 2004, complainant filed before this Court a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds
that: the report and recommendation of IBP Commissioner Maala is not based on correct records of the
case; Maala's report and recommendation did not consider the violations of respondent under Sec. 20 of
Rule 138[8]cralaw of the Rules of Court, Canons 1,[9]cralaw 8[10]cralaw and 12,[11]cralaw and Rules
1.02, 1.03, and 1.04 of the Code of Professional Conduct;[12]cralaw the report and recommendation did
not discuss the failure of respondent to conduct an investigation to ascertain the veracity of the complaint
for Estafa, disbarment and complaint before the HLURB, among others; and the Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors erred in approving the incomplete and defective report of Maala and should therefore
be set aside.[13]cralaw

On December 28, 2004, complainant filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration emphasizing
the issue that respondent filed groundless cases against him.[14]cralaw

On April 13, 2005, respondent filed a Comment stating that: complainant, instead of filing a petition from
the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(c), erroneously filed a
motion for reconsideration; contrary to the allegations of complainant, respondent acted in good faith and
studied the supporting documents of Losloso first before sending complainant the demand letter;
respondent was not the one who filed the cases before the HLURB, the Prosecutors' Office and the IBP;
respondent came into the picture long after these cases have been filed; respondent agreed to handle the
said cases based on his honest assessment that there is a valid cause of action against
complainant;[15]cralaw the investigating IBP commissioner was not biased in requiring respondent to
submit his position paper despite his failure to attend the mandatory hearing on time; respondent agreed
to the order of Maala requiring both parties to submit position papers and it was only when the
commissioner dismissed his complaint that complainant raised the issue of bias; respondent enjoys the
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him and complainant has failed to convincingly
prove that respondent has acted in bad faith in the manner by which he has handled the cases pending
between complainant and Losloso, et al.; complainant himself has filed several cases against Losloso
(cancellation of contract, estafa and perjury) which have been dismissed; since these cases were also
found to be without merit, complainant, following his line of reasoning, should also be considered as
having harassed Losloso in violation of his oath as a lawyer.[16]cralaw

First of all, we are treating herein motion for reconsideration as a petition referred to in Rule 139-B, Sec.
12(c).

After reviewing the records of this case, we find the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, to be well-founded.

Well-settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations. If the complainant, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.[17]cralaw

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[18]cralaw But his guilt cannot be
presumed.[19]cralaw A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing will not suffice.[20]cralaw There must be
sufficient evidence to support the charge.[21]cralaw
In this case, complainant accuses respondent of filing baseless charges against him. Apart from his bare
allegations, however, complainant failed to show that respondent did in fact file baseless cases against
him. As borne by the records, the complaint, as well as the motions for reconsideration of the denial
thereof, for estafa through falsification of public document, was filed by Adoracion Losloso;[22]cralaw the
disbarment case before the IBP were filed by Losloso, Sheila Bones-Lei and Nestor Aguirre;[23]cralaw
while the HLURB case was filed by Losloso and Aguirre.[24]cralaw Aside from complainant's allegations,
there is no proof that respondent prodded said individuals to file cases against herein complainant.
Adoracion Losloso even executed a sworn statement expressing that it was Atty. Ramon Vera of the
Public Attorney's Office in Pasig who helped her in filing the cases before the fiscal, the HLURB and the
IBP. She also categorically stated that herein respondent only entered the picture after the said cases
had already been filed and that he did not have any participation in the drafting of said complaints. She
also explained that out of the 20 cases filed between her and herein complainant, respondent only
participated in four cases which are still pending resolution.[25]cralaw

Apart from complainant's naked assertions, there is also no proof anywhere in the records that
respondent filed false affidavits to support the disbarment case against complainant in the IBP. Neither is
there any showing that respondent filed a prohibited pleading, In any case, we cannot see how such
pleading, if ever one was filed, could be a basis for disbarment. Neither could respondent's refusal to
have a "brotherly talk over a cup of coffee" with complainant or respondent's act of helping Losloso file a
motion to inhibit a prosecutor in Pasig for alleged bias could be a basis for disciplinary action.

What is only clear is that herein respondent sent complainant a letter dated May 17, 2001 demanding that
complainant give Losloso, et al. their commission for the sale of a property in Antipolo based on a
Memorandum of Agreement, otherwise Losloso, et al. would be constrained to file appropriate criminal,
civil and administrative complaints against herein complainant.[26]cralaw We cannot, based on this letter
alone, say that respondent was moved by malice or bad faith.

We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, such as the case at bar, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. This Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if the complainant establishes his case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. In the absence of convincing or clearly preponderant
evidence, the complaint for disbarment against respondent is correctly dismissed[27]cralaw by the IBP
Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by Atty. Miniano Dela Cruz, is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG

Clerk of Court

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7687 December 3, 2014

RAUL C. LANUZA and REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants,

vs.
ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III and PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 7688

RAUL C. LANUZA and REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants,

vs.
ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III, PETER ANDREWS GO and PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court are two (2) separate administrative cases for disbarment filed by complainants Raul C.
Lanuza (Lanuza) and Reynaldo C. Rasing (Rasing), docketed as A.C. No. 7687, against lawyers Frankie
O. Magsalin III (Atty. Magsalin) and Pablo R. Cruz (Atty. Cruz) and A.C. No. 7688 against Atty. Magsalin,
Atty. Cruz and Atty. Peter Andrew Z. Go (Atty. Go) for alleged fraud, deceit, malpractice, and gross
misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The Court eventually consolidated the two cases as they both involve the same parties, revolve around
the sameset of facts, and raise exactly the same issues.

The Facts

These disbarment cases stemmed from a labor case filed by complainant Lanuza against Philippine
Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI), which operated the Dusit Hotel Nikko (Dusit Hotel), a client of respondents Atty.
Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Go, all from the law firm, P.R. Cruz Law Offices (PRC Law Office). Both the
Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)decided in favor of PHI. Lanuza
appealed the NLRC decision before the Court of Appeals (CA).

A.C. No. 7688

On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 92642, favoring Lanuza and directing
PHI to reinstate him with full backwages.

According to Lanuza, his legal counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia (Atty. Garcia), received the Notice of
Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on March 28, 2007 at his law office located in Quezon City.
Subsequently, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Compliance1 and Motion for
Reconsideration,2 both dated April 12, 2007, filed by PHI and signed by Atty. Magsalin. In the said
pleadings, PHI stated that it received Notice of Judgment with a copy of the CA decision on April 10,
2007. This information caused Atty. Garcia to wonder why the postman would belatedly deliver the said
Notice of Judgment and the CA decision to the PRC Law Office, which was also located in Quezon City,
thirteen (13) days after he received his own copies. Afterwards, Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City
Central Post Office (QCCPO) for a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the Notice of
Judgment with the CA decision by the PRC Law Office. In the October 31, 2007 Certification,3 issued by
Llewelyn F. Fallarme (Fallarme), Chief of the Records Section, QCCPO, it was stated that the Registered
Letter No. S-1582 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Rosendo Pecante (Postman
Pecante)and duly received by Teresita Calucag on March 29, 2007, supposedly based on the logbook of
Postman Pecante.

With the October 31, 2007 Certification as basis, the complainants lodged the disbarment complaint
against Attys. Magsalin, Go and Cruz, which was docketed as A.C. No. 7688.

A.C. No. 7688

In A.C. No. 7688, the complainants alleged that Teresita "Tess" Calucag (Calucag), secretary of PRC
Law Office, altered the true date of receipt of the Notice of Judgment withthe CA decision when she
signed and stamped on the registry return receipt the date, April 10, 2007, to mislead the CA and the
opposing party that they received their copy of the CA decision on a later date and not March 29, 2007.
The complainants added that the alteration was very evident on the registry return receipt which bore two
(2) stamped dates of receipt, with one stamped date "snowpaked" or covered with a liquid correction fluid
to conceal the true date written on the registry return receipt. They inferred that Calucag concealed
whatcould probably be the true date of receipt, and that the respondents must have induced Calucag to
alter the true date of receipt because they stood to benefit from the additional thirteen (13) days to
prepare their motion for reconsideration.

In their defense, the respondents denied the complainants’ allegations and countered that they actually
received the Notice of Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on April 10, 2007 based on the
Registry Return Receipt4 (1st return receipt) that was sent back to CA. Stamped on the 1st return receipt
was "RECEIVED APRIL 10 2007" and signed by Calucag in front and within the full view of Postman
Pecante. The respondents claimed that examining and finding that the return receipt had been faithfully
accomplished and the date indicated therein to be true and accurate, Postman Pecante accepted the said
return receipt. As borne out by the records, the 1st return receipt pertaining to the CA decision was duly
returned to the CA as the sender. Eventually, Atty. Magsalin filed the required Compliance. Considering
that Atty. Cruz was out of the country from April 5, 2007, to May 6, 2007, based on a Bureau of
Immigration certification,5 Atty. Magsalin requested Atty. Go, a senior associate in their law office, to
review PHI’s motion for reconsideration of the decision. Afterwards, Atty. Go signed the said motion for
reconsideration and had it filed with the CA.

Relying on the date indicated in the return receipt, respondents stated the date, April 10, 2007, in the filed
compliance and motion for reconsideration.

To oppose complainants’ assertion of Calucag’s application of "snowpake" in the 1st return receipt
allegedly to conceal the true date of receipt of the CA decision, the respondents secured a Certification6
from the CA, which stated the following:

This is to certify that the Registry Return Receipt dated March 23, 2007, attached to the dorsal portion of
page 209 of the rollo of the above-captioned case, asper careful observation, reveals no "snowpaked"
portion and that the white mark that appears on the upper, center portion of the subject Registry Return
Receipt bearing the stamp mark of receipt ofP.R. Cruz Law Offices is a part of the white envelope that
contained the decisionof this Court which stuck to the said Return Receipt.

A.C. No. 7687

As the records would show, PHI moved for reconsideration of the said CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its July 4, 2007 Resolution.

On July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Notice of Resolution from the CA.
Thereafter, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Compliance,7 dated July 26, 2007, filed by PHI,
through the PRC Law Office. In the said Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of Resolution was
received on July 23, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt8 (2nd return receipt) sent back to the
CA.

Again wondering about the delay in the delivery of the registered mail to the respondents, Atty.
Garciarequested the QCCPO to issue a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the said Notice
of Resolution by the PRC Law Office. Inthe October 25, 2007 Certification9 issued by the QCCPO, Chief
of the Records Section Fallarme, stated that the Registered Letter No. S-114 addressed to Atty. Magsalin
was delivered by Postman Pecante and duly received by Calucag on July 16, 2007, based on the logbook
of Postman Pecante.
The October 25, 2007 Certification became the basis of the other disbarment complaint against Attys.
Magsalin and Cruz docketed as A.C. No. 7687.

In A.C. No. 7687, the complainants claimed that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz must have induced Calucag to
alter the true date of receipt of the Notice of Resolution or at least had the knowledge thereof when she
signed and stamped on the 2nd return receipt the date- July 23, 2007. They contended that Attys.
Magsalin and Cruz stood to benefit from the additional seven (7) days derived from the alleged altered
date asthey, in fact, used the altered date in their subsequent pleading. Attys. Magsalin and Cruz falsely
alleged such in the compliance filed before the CA; the motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari;10 and the petition for review on certiorari11 filed before this Court. The complainants
insinuated that Atty. Magsalin and Atty. Cruz deliberately misled the CA and this Court by filing the above-
mentioned pleadings with the full knowledge that they were already time barred.

In their defense, Attys. Magsalin and Cruz denied the allegations in the complaint and retorted that they
actually received the subject Notice of Resolution on the date - July 23, 2007 as indicated in the 2nd
return receipt which was also duly accepted by Postman Pecante and appropriately returned to the CA as
sender. Relying on the date, July 23, 2007, as indicated in 2nd return receipt, Atty. Magsalin, on behalf of
PHI, filed the compliance and the other pleadings before the CA and this Court concerning CA-G.R. SP
No. 92642. The respondents asserted that the date in the 2nd return receipt deserved full faith and
credence as it was clearly indicated by Calucag, witnessed by Postman Pecante and ultimately
processed by the QCCPO to be duly returnedto the CA.

Referral to the IBP

In its April 2, 200812 and June 16, 200813 Resolutions, the Court referred the said administrative cases
tothe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)for investigation, report and recommendation.

The complainants and the respondents all appeared at the scheduled mandatory conference held before
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Thereafter, the parties filed their respective position papers.

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

A.C. No. 7687

In its March 9, 2009 Report and Recommendation,14 Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag

(Commissioner Hababag) recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
It gave more credence to the date indicated in the 2nd return receipt which bore no alteration and was
duly accepted by Postman Pecante than the October 25, 2007 Certification issued by the QCCPO. He
stated that the 2nd return receipt did not contain any alteration as to the stamping of the date - July 23,
2007, and that Postman Pecante would not have allowed and accepted the 2nd return receipt from
Calucag if it contained an inaccurate date other than the true date of receipt. Finally, the CBD ruled that
the complainants failed to demonstrate the specific acts constituting deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct by evidence that was clear and free from doubt as to the act charged and as to the
respondents’ motive.

On April 17, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the CBD report
and recommendation through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-176.15 The complainants moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied.

A.C. No. 7688

In its Report and Recommendation,16 dated March 10, 2009, the CBD recommended that the complaint
be dismissed for lack of merit. It gave credence to the date indicated in the 1st return receipt as the actual
and true date of receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the attached CA decision by the respondents. It
did not subscribe to the complainants’ theory that Calucag was induced by the respondents to conceal
the true date of receipt by applying a liquid correction fluid in the 1st return receipt. It found the the
Certification issued by Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen sufficient to explain the presence of the white
substance appearing on the 1st return receipt.

On April 17, 2009, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the CBD report and recommendation
through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-178.17 The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied.

With their motions for reconsideration in the two cases denied, the complainants filed their respective
petitions for review before this Court.

ISSUE

The vital issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and Go should be held
administratively liable based on the allegations in the complaints.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions lack merit.

The Court deems it appropriate to discuss A.C. Nos. 7687 and 7688 jointly as they essentially revolve
around the same circumstances and parties.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant.1âwphi1
The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly
preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An
attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his
oath.18

In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be inconclusive, thus, insufficient to hold
the respondents liable for the acts alleged in the complaint.

Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts as to the
dates of the CA receipt of the notices, decision and resolution by the respondents, there is no clear and
convincing evidence to prove that the respondents intentionally and maliciously made it appear that they
received the CA notices, decision and resolution later than the dates stated in the QCCPO Certifications.
The complainants would like to impress upon the Court that the only logical explanation as to the
discrepancy on the dates between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts was that
the respondents must have induced Calucag toalter the true date of receipt by the CA for the purpose of
extending the period to file, the otherwise time barred, motion for reconsideration. Verily, this leap of
inference proffered by the complainants is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not in any
way supported by clear substantial evidence required to justify the imposition of an administrative penalty
on a member of the Bar.

Even if the postmaster's certifications were to merit serious consideration, the Court cannot avoid the
legal reality that the registry return card is considered as the official CA record evidencing service by mail.
This card carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties which have been
regularly performed. Jn this sense, it is presumed to be accurate, unless clearly proven otherwise.

The Court finds merit in the respondents' argument that had Calucag stamped an inaccurate date on the
registry return receipts, Postman Pecante, who witnessed and had full view of the receiving and stamping
of the said registry return receipts, would have called her attention to correct the same or would have
refused to receive them altogether for being erroneous. Here, Postman Pecante having accepted two
registry return receipts with the dates, April 10, 200719 and .July 23, 2007,20 respectively, can only mean
that the said postman considered the dates indicated therein to be correct and accurate.
While the Court will not avoid its responsibility in meting out the proper disciplinary punishment upon
lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, the Court will not wield its axe against those the
accusations against whom are not indubitably proven.

Accordingly, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence, the complaint for disbarment should be
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaints against Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III and Pablo R. Cruz, in
A.C. No. 7687; and the administrative complaint against Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III, Peter Andrew S.
Go and Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No. 7688, are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10635, August 26, 2015

NOEL S. SORREDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before the Court is an administrative case filed by Noel S. Sorreda (Sorreda) against Atty. David L. Kho
(Kho) for malpractice and/or gross misconduct.

The Facts
The records reveal that on 3 October 2006 Marissa L. Macarilay (Macarilay), through her then counsel
Sorreda,1 filed an administrative complaint2 against Kho before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1866 (Macarilay's complaint). Sorreda withdrew as counsel for
Macarilay on 10 March 2007.3 On 5 December 2007, Sorreda filed with the IBP the present complaint4
against Kho, which contained exactly the same allegations in Macarilay's complaint. Sorreda alleged that:
(1) Macarilay, through him as counsel, filed an arbitration case against Candelaria Kholoma (Candelaria)
and Imelda Kholoma (Imelda), Kho's clients, before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC); (2) Kho notarized Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit in the arbitration case despite being
disqualified under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since Candelaria and Imelda are Kho's sister-in-
law and niece, respectively; (3) Kho did not furnish Macarilay and Sorreda a copy of his comment on their
motion for substitution of arbitrator; (4) Kho did not countervail the manifestation alleging the mendacity of
Kho and his clients; (5) Kho intentionally delayed the receipt of Macarilay's motion for time extension; (6)
Kho advised Robert Kholoma (Robert), the husband of Candelaria, to forcibly eject Macarilay's watchman
in the disputed property; (7) Kho notarized the answer filed by the Kholomas in the case for forcible entry;
(8) Kho also notarized the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by the Kholomas, which amounted
to "self-notarization," because "the one being given power is the law firm of Kho Antonio Velasco & Payos
Law Offices, of which [Kho] is the premier partner"; (9) Kho notarized the SPA with only one of the three
signatories exhibiting her cedula; (10) Kho also notarized the petition for review filed by Candelaria and
Imelda before the Court of Appeals; and (11) Kho and his clients deliberately failed to furnish the CIAC
with a copy their appeal.

In his Answer,5 Kho admitted that he notarized Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit, answer in the case for
forcible entry, SPA, and petition for review. Kho, however, alleged that he acted in good faith for he
believed that the decision in Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,6 where only "those convicted
of the crime involving moral turpitude were disqualified to notarize documents," was still the prevailing
rule. Kho pleaded for liberality in the application of the then recently enacted 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, since there was no damage caused by the notarization. He admitted that he was not yet fully
conversant with the new rules. As to the other allegations, Kho claimed that those were unsubstantiated
conclusions, conjectures and speculations. Kho admitted his failure to furnish Sorreda with a copy of the
comment on the motion for substitution of arbitrator and his failure to furnish the CIAC with a copy of his
clients' appeal. However, he alleged that no damage was caused and he immediately furnished the
copies of the pleadings upon discovery of his inadvertence.

Finally, Kho claimed that "Macarilay's penchant for deliberate forum shopping and splitting a cause of
action, albeit baseless and unfounded, must be sanctioned."7 In an Order8 dated 29 January 2009, IBP
Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (IBP Commissioner) denied Sorreda's motion to consolidate the
present complaint with Macarilay's complaint, because there was already a report and recommendation
by a different commissioner in Macarilay's complaint. On 4 August 2009, Kho filed an urgent
manifestation,9 pleading for the dismissal of the present case. Kho attached a copy of this Court's
Resolution10 dated 30 March 2009, where the Third Division of this Court resolved to close and terminate
CBD Case No. 06-1866 (docketed as A.C. No. 8161), considering that no motion for reconsideration was
filed against the IBP Resolution11 dismissing the case for lack of merit, and no petition for review was
filed before the Court.

The Ruling of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation dated 31 May 2011,12 the IBP Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the present complaint against Kho because Sorreda failed to establish his allegations by
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. The IBP Commissioner also found that Sorreda did not
establish how Kho's alleged violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, if proven, would damage
Macarilay. In Resolution No. XX-2013-10713 issued on 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, dismissing the complaint
for lack of evidence. In Resolution No. XXI-2014-22114 issued on 2 May 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Sorreda, since the Board found no
cogent reason to reverse its initial findings and the matters raised were reiterations of those which had
already been taken into consideration.
The Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the complaint against Kho. Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the
Court finds that the present administrative case becomes dismissible. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court enunciates the rule of res judicata or bar by prior judgment.15 It provides that a final judgment on
the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and
their privies, and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action.16 A.C. No. 8161 and the present case have substantially identical parties, refer to the
same subject matter, raise the same issue, and claim the same relief. The present complaint is a mere
duplication of Macarilay's complaint in A.C. No. 8161. Thus, the Resolution of this Court in A.C. No. 8161
is conclusive in the present case. Furthermore, Sorreda failed to discharge the burden of proving Kho's
administrative liability by clear preponderance of evidence.

The legal presumption is that an attorney is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is
proved.17 The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the
complainant,18 and the burden is not satisfied when complainant relies on mere assumptions and
suspicions as evidence.19 Considering the serious consequences of disbarment and suspension, this
Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalty.20 In the present case, Sorreda did not substantiate his allegations, and he relied
on his own assumptions and suspicions. Sorreda did not show how Kho's alleged actions amount to
malpractice or gross misconduct, which will subject Kho to administrative sanction. Sorreda cannot shift
the burden of proof to Kho by asking him to rebut his allegations. It is axiomatic that one who alleges an
act has the onus of proving it.21 If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his defense.22

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. David L. Kho. Costs against
complainant. SO ORDERED. Del Castillo, Mendoza Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9831, March 09, 2016

CHAN SHUN KUEN, Complainant, v. COMMISSIONERS LOURDES B. COLOMA-JAVIER, GREGORIO

O. BILOG III, RAUL TAGLE AQUINO AND ATTY. JOYRICH M. GOLANGCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

The instant disbarment case filed by Chan Shun Kuen (complainant), the General Manager and Chief
Executive Officer of Compromise Enterprises Corporation (CEC), against Commissioners Lourdes B.
Coloma-Javier, Gregorio O. Bilog III and Raul Tagle Aquino, and Deputy Executive Clerk Atty. Joyrich M.
Golangco (respondents), all from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), is an offshoot of the
labor case entitled Felisa B. Toribio, et ah, v. Compromise Enterprises Corporation and/or Margaret So
Chan.

The said labor case for illegal dismissal, unpaid service incentive leave and 13th month pay was decided
against CEC; hence, it was ordered to pay separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the sum of
P5,543,807.57.1 CEC, however, failed to appeal the said decision, thus it became final and executory.
The complainants in the labor case moved for the execution of the said decision, hence, a Writ of
Execution was issued and was duly served. Accordingly, the sheriff levied the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19784 belonging to CEC.

By a Decision2 dated October 16, 2007, the labor case was resolved by the NLRC Third Division in favor
of the complainants therein. CEC filed several motions and appeal before the NLRC but all were ruled
against it.

Instead of filing an appeal with the appellate court, the complainant opted to file a series of complaints,
administrative and criminal, against one or several of the respondents of the NLRC before different
bodies.3

Undaunted with the dismissal of all the cases he filed against the respondents, the complainant once
again came to this Court with a Verified Complaint4 for disbarment claiming that the respondents
connived with each other in writing its Decision dated October 16, 2007 for the said labor case and
alleging that Commissioner Tito F. Genilo's (Commissioner Genilo) signature was forged by a personnel
of the Third Division, as well as the December 10, 2007 Letter of Commissioner Genilo regarding his
inhibition in the said case.

In compliance with the Court's directive,5 the respondents filed their Comment6 asserting in the main that
the complainant committed forum shopping for having filed identical complaints in various forms, against
the same respondents before different bodies. The respondents branded the complaint as motivated by
malice and retorted that the complainant has been using the Court and several quasi-judicial bodies as a
means to overturn the decision of the Labor Arbiter in his desperate attempt to stop the execution
proceedings on his property by maliciously and repeatedly filing baseless, unfounded and frivolous
harassment suits against them.
After examining the instant complaint, the Court resolves to dismiss it outright.

To begin with, the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not a lawyer has committed serious
professional misconduct sufficient to cause disbarment. The test is whether the lawyer's conduct shows
him or her to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor; or whether it renders
him or her unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant; and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the
complaint with clearly preponderant evidence.7

Guided by the foregoing tenets, the disbarment complaint against the respondents has no leg to stand on.
The particular acts alleged by the complainant against the respondents, which to his mind, were grounds
for disbarment, have no merit and seem too far-fetched. The respondents cannot be disbarred merely on
complainant's bare allegation that the respondents connived with each other in writing its decisions,
resolutions and orders against his company, and that Commissioner Genilo's signature was forged by a
personnel of the NLRC Third Division. These acts particularized by the complainant are mere allegations
and he has nothing but hollow suppositions to bolster his complaint.

Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of the respondents, there was no evidence to show
that the respondents committed the acts complained of. No specific incidents and sufficient evidence can
be gathered to show that the respondents had committed misconduct, dishonesty, falsehood, or had
misused the rules of procedure. There was no indication whatsoever of any connivance or manifest
partiality to prejudice the complainant. Neither was there proof that the decisions, resolution, or orders of
the respondents were attended by bad faith, malice or gross negligence. As it turned out, the charges
levelled against the respondents were imaginary and unworthy of serious consideration because it was
clear from the start that the acts particularized in the complaint pertain to the respondents' capacity as
NLRC commissioners. Besides, the sincerity of the charge against the respondents is cynical.

Upon scrutiny of the records of this case, it would reveal that the complaint was an ill-motivated bid to
disbar the respondents, who were merely exercising their judicial function as NLRC Commissioners.
Hence, there is a veneer of truth in the allegation of the respondents that the complaint is a vindictive
charge of the complainant meant to vex, harass, humiliate and punish them in performing their duty, as
well as to get even with them for deciding the labor case against the complainant. The Court had already
held that "[t]o allow complainant to trifle with the Court, to make use of the judicial process as an
instrument of retaliation, would be a reflection on the rule of law."8

The Court also noted that the instant complaint is a virtual duplicate of previous administrative complaints
which this Court had already dismissed in A.C. No. 80409 and A.C. No. 8621,10 there being no prima
facie case. Clearly, all the cases filed by the complainant before the different bodies essentially revolve
around the same circumstances and parties involving the decisions, resolutions, and orders relative to the
abovementioned labor case.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the case should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Nonetheless, the
complainant's propensity in incessantly filing baseless complaints against the respondents should be
curtailed. To allow every party who lost in a case to file multiple suits against those who did not decide in
his favor would unreasonably clog the dockets of the court with unscrupulous cases. Considering that this
has already been complainant's third attempt to file a baseless suit against the respondents before this
Court, it is deemed proper to admonish him and sternly warn him that he shall be dealt with more
severely should he commit a similar act against a member of the Bar.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the disbarment complaint against Commissioners Lourdes
B. Coloma-Javier, Gregorio O. Bilog III, Raul Tagle Aquino, and Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco for lack of
merit. Complainant Chan Shun Kuen is hereby ADMONISHED for filing the malicious complaint, WITH
STERN WARNING that a repetition shall be dealt with more severely as indirect contempt of the Court.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S.

TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., AND ATTY.
ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.

A.C. No. 8725

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA,

JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek
the disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G.
Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order
that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice
of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedents

Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil action they
brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City
(Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their
affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of
defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.

In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the
complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres,
they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT-
64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they
immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.

It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-
07-59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and the
proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim
would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to
the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated
February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants'
lack of objection thereto and the defendants' willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim.7

The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008,
they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and visits to
his office; that they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new
annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-request
appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and
the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the arinotation of the decision dated
May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting
the complainants' Motion to Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter-request dated June 30,
2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant
Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.

Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of their
notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9,
respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or before such scheduled hearing.10
However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or remained
pending at the LRA.

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his
professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They submitted
that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order
specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy between Atty.
Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions as officials in the
Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting
Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.

On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified complaint.11

Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres had
been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the mediation
process; that the complainants, after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable
settlement, could not now claim that they had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same
way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did not commit any
abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the complainants
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held responsible for their representation in other
proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the only
payment he had received from the complainants were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for
every hearing in the RTC.

In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing
that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during
the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter-request dated June
30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said letter-request
had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present complaint was the second
disbarment case filed by the complainants against him with no other motive except to harass and
intimidate him.

Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another
Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that resulted in the
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the
cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in the exercise of
the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was performed in the
cancellation of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the case.

Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15

As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya,
Jr.'s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another sworn
disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of
Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was later on
consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints involved the same parties and rested on
similar allegations against the respondents.

Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted
Atty. Quilala's Comment.19

Ruling

We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are
similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional
Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any
censurable conduct against them.

Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the general
duties of the Register of Deeds, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x x x

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He
shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and that the same are
properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of
his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or
duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the
exercise of judgment.22

In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a merely ministerial
act of the Register of Deeds, explaining:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of
Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the
documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty.
Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16,
2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them
to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for registration was limited only to
what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC
order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with existing requirements, it
became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.24

Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty, complainants were not bereft of any
remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter by way of consulta
with the LRA, as provided by Section 11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated in
Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the province of a court of competent
jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a document registered by the Register
of Deeds.

The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each other
to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable settlement, and
then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on
TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause
since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008.

The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.

Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because
conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is nonetheless
essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in
this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired
with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the annotations,
they presented no evidence to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records
indicated their own active pjarticipation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they
had themselves entered into.

Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated in the settlement of
the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to do so,
pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and the defendants
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28

Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the
complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the
property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The
complainants did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio,
Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for
abandonment.

Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any
time during the engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal
representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession
did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition
of professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio,
Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts
to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to come under the
professional obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty.
Constante P. Caluya, Jr.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law
for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt
of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint.
On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the
scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of
documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed
if there was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution
based on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent
arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant
therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal
problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had
notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal
problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of
P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory
note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a
lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the
immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When
asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel
expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation.
Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda
Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the
one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this,
respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon
reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the
major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and
sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of
payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of
were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during
the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount
of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the
request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her
misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a
receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable
judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining
amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly
asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of
the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the
office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare
a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts
because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended;
and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message
from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same,
however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the
driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of
wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had
been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and
wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that
respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant
wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee
and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of
law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He
admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he
qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for
complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for
incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest
of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for
his services. The transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment.
As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said
amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental
expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the
money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same
vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from
complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would
rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the
possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a
bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel
was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action
and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of
contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just compensation for the services he
had rendered in other cases for the complainant.

Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts
in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint.
Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him.
While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte,
he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by
Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of
P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated
June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against
respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his
arrest had been issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but
modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three
(3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from
complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his
alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of
his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or
private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her
case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high
value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he
resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount
of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it
was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than
willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent
should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual
amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.”28 Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned.
A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by
his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from
complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged
filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a
lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the
lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money
to the client.31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client,
respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as
“representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a
favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P
25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that
necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his
client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of
his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and
the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost
fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that
would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be
overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given
gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was
indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the
public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the
case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of
misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he
likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he
requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited
his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored
her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but
was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by
respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a
lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that
these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00
were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion
that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no
loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans
from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair
dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing
so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times,
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations.32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to
one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with.
Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to
modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented
insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is
the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential
information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the
lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to
avoid representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are
at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the
prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from
all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable
for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a
corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that
respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being
questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil
Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the
proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the
complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of
respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the
validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised,
respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he
was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor
the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that
respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no
record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and
client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public
policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty
for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as
an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton
betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a
member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the
public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests,
respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his
private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return
money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases
have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which
the parties may choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are
filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from
the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is
required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence,
which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the
Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases
which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing
the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-
client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received
from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported
purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the
complainant. While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge
is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the
personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by
“purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and
ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, (Chief Justice), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Peralta, J., no part.
Bersamin, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and
unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-
Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was
adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201).
At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation,
Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3

In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that
respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the court
order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her
requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from
Pacita’s stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged a
commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of
Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust Agreement9
executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as
President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10
Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding
deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom,
but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had
already instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the
subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12

In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the
affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several
cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also
contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a
complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering the
same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of
moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.15

On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for
the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension of
the real facts surrounding their dispute."17

However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to weed
out erring members of the legal profession.19

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issuedhis
Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of
suspension for a period of six (6) months.21

On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to withdraw did
notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against
respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately,
the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are sui
generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the good
moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the demands of
Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging
the subject property without the former’s consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious
misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was
recommended.23

In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the
factual circumstances of each case.

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely
constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited by
Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case
No. 04-108887 which involves the subject property’s alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust
agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca – which she takes as
an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of mortgaging
the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his own assertion of the rights he believed
he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the Court’s
determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned
settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made
arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that
respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire
satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact
and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of "serious
misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty.1âwphi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by,
as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming
of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a
property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act
or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his
integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser
extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P15,000.00 within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and
unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-
Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).

The Facts

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was
adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201).
At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation,
Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3

In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that
respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the court
order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her
requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from
Pacita’s stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged a
commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of
Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust Agreement9
executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as
President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10
Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding
deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom,
but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had
already instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the
subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12

In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the
affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several
cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also
contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a
complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering the
same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of
moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.15

On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for
the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension of
the real facts surrounding their dispute."17

However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to weed
out erring members of the legal profession.19

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issuedhis
Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of
suspension for a period of six (6) months.21

On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to withdraw did
notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against
respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately,
the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are sui
generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22

On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the good
moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the demands of
Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging
the subject property without the former’s consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious
misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was
recommended.23

In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the
factual circumstances of each case.

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely
constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited by
Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case
No. 04-108887 which involves the subject property’s alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust
agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca – which she takes as
an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of mortgaging
the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his own assertion of the rights he believed
he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the Court’s
determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned
settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made
arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that
respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire
satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact
and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of "serious
misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty.1âwphi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by,
as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming
of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a
property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act
or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his
integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser
extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P15,000.00 within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
3Republic of tbe tlbilippineg ~upreme ~ourt ;illllanila FIRST DIVISION PLUTARCO E. VAZQUEZ,
Complainants, A.C. No. 9492 Present: •.:~,·~ · ..• •. ~·~.:::·.'"; :, ... ~-·.: :;~[.:~:~:~::·-; ... ~ ..... ~ ~ .. ,·,.: ... ·-
~ t.)"9 ·.~d· !t ·• ~, .... \ ~·'"'.. i ·" .. _;~ .. : 1· -.. -,..., .~" •• ~ I • I ; ... Ir-.' u . i I .u.:l LO· ' I ... t . ~ f ~ f .. , . .. . '
' . . '' ' l . \. i ~ '/ ~; AUG 1 8"'2016 t' \; , \ ' ' •I \ ·' II . .. '' ' : ' : '1. · ..... -r;{,'r"t,J~- ..,..,. -:r-"~., •• / ...
•~,~.,..,c...-·· .... -····- ~::.=::,::~---·- .. . ~il=~:-. - versus - SERENO, CJ, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN,
PERLAS-BERNABE, and CAGUIOA, JJ. ATTY. DAVID LIM QUECO KHO, Promulgated: JUL 11/2n
Respondent. __ -;::--,1 _______ - - x x------------------------------------ DECISION SERENO, CJ: This case for
disbarment was filed by complainant Plutarco E. Vazquez (Vazquez) against respondent Atty. David Lim
Queco Kho (Atty. Kho). In his verified Complaint1 filed with this Court on 11 July 2012, Vazquez alleges
that Atty. Kho violated the lawyer's oath that he "will do no falsehood. 2 " He further claims that
respondent transgressed Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 3 FACTS Vazquez and Atty.
Kho were both members of the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (Coalition),
an accredited ' Rollo, pp. 8-11. 2 Id. at 8. 3 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. ·( • Decision 2 A.C. No. 9492 party-list group that participated in the national elections
of 10 May 2010. The Complaint arose from an allegedly false statement made in respondent's Certificate
of Acceptance of Nomination for the Coalition. Complainant contested the truth of the statement made
under oath that Atty. Kho was a natural-born Filipino citizen.4 In his Complaint, Vazquez asserted that
respondent was a Chinese national. He reasoned that when Atty. Kho was born on 29 April 194 7 to a
Chinese father (William Kho) and a Filipina mother (Juana Lim Queco ), respondent's citizenship followed
that of his Chinese father pursuant to the 193 5 Constitution. Moreover, Vazquez argued that since
respondent has elected Filipino citizenship, the act presupposed that the person electing was either an
alien, of doubtful status, or a national of two countries. 5 Upon receipt of the Complaint, the Court
through its First Division issued a Resolution6 dated 26 November 2012 requiring Atty. Kho to file his
comment on the Complaint within 10 days from receipt of the Notice. Alleging he received the Court's
Resolution on 18 February 2013, he filed his Comment7 on 27 February 2013. As to the alleged falsity of
his statement, Atty. Kho countered that when he was born on 29 April 1947, his Filipina mother was not
yet married to his Chinese father, and that his parents only got married on 8 February 1977 or some 30
years after his birth. He then averred that according to the 1935 Constitution, his citizenship followed
that of his Filipina mother, and thus he was a natural-born Filipino . • 8 c1t1zen. . On the matter of his
electing Filipino citizenship, respondent il explained that since he was already a natural-born Filipino, his
subsequent election of Philippine citizenship on 25 February 1970 was superfluous and had no effect on
his citizenship. Having established his natural-born status, he concluded that he had not committed any
falsehood in his Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination, and that complainant had no cause of action
to have him disbarred.9 Apart from defending his natural-born status, Atty. Kho also moved to dismiss
the Complaint on the ground of forum shopping. He claimed that Vazquez had filed three (3) cases in
which the latter raised the issue of respondent's citizenship: (1) the present disbannent case; (2) a quo
warranto proceeding with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and (3) a criminal
complaint for perjury lodged with the City Prosecutor of 4 Rollo, pp. 8-9. 5 Id. at 9-10. 6 Id. at 16. 7 Id. at
18-24. 8 Id. at 20. 9 Id. at 21-22. f Decision 3 A.C. No. 9492 Quezon City. Atty. Kho alleged that both the
quo warranto and the perjury cases had already been dismissed by the HRET10 and the City Prosecutor
respectively. 11 Finally, he raised jurisdictional questions, arguing that the proper remedy to attack his
citizenship was not a disbarment case, but rather I" quo warrant a. - In answer to respondent's
Comment, Vazquez filed with the Court a Reply to Comment13 on 11 March 2013. He claimed therein
that at the time of election of Philippine citizenship by respondent on 25 February 1970, the latter's
mother was already a Chinese national by virtue of her marriage to respondent's father who was
Chinese. Complainant also opposed respondent's assertion that the latter's parents were not yet
married when he was born on 29 April 1947. 14 Complainant further cited respondent's Certificate of
Live Birth, which stated that the latter's parents were married at the time he was born. 15 That being so,
complainant averred that at the time Atty. Kho was born, his mother was already a Chinese national.
Thus, complainant concluded that respondent's election of Filipino citizenship was fatally defective,
since the latter's parents were both Chinese at the time of his election. 16 Furthermore, complainant
alleged that the marriage of respondent's parents on 8 February 1977 was just a ploy to put a semblance
of legitimacy to his prior election of Filipino citizenship. Lastly, complainant denied the forum shopping
charge, saying the three cases he had filed against respondent had different causes of action and were
based on different grounds. 17 On 8 April 2013, the Court issued a Resolution referring the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation or decision. 18 At the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the case was
docketed as CBD Case No. 13-3885. Commissioner Victor Pablo C. Trinidad (Commissioner Trinidad) was
designated as investigating commissioner. In a Notice dated 14 August 2013, he set the case for
mandatory conference/hearing oh 19 September 2013 and ordered the parties to submit their
mandatory conference briefs. 19 10 Id. at 34. 11 Id. at 35-37. 12 Id. at 22. 13 Id. at 38-43. 14 Id. at 38. 15
Id. at 44. 16 Id. at 39-40. 17 Id. at 41. 18 Id. at 47. 19 Records of the IBP-CBD, p. I. ( Decision 4 A.C. No.
9492 With both parties present at the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing, Commissioner
Trinidad ordered them to submit their respective position papers within ten ( 10) days, after which the
case would be deemed submitted for report and recommendation. 20 Only the respondent b . d .c b .
r21 d . . 22 su m1tte a con1erence ner an pos1t10n paper. IBP's REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION On 3
November 2013, Commissioner Trinidad promulgated his Report and Recommendation (Report)23
finding Atty. Kho "innocent of the charges" and recommended that the case be dismissed for utter lack
of merit. Upon weighing the evidence presented by both parties, Commissioner Trinidad found no merit
to the allegation that respondent had committed dishonesty and deceitfulness when he indicated in his
verified Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination that he was a natural-born citizen.24 Commissioner
Trinidad said that respondent Atty. Kho, as a naturalborn Filipino citizen, fell under the category of
someone who was born of a Filipino mother before 17 January 1973, and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. 25 On the matter of jurisdiction, the IBP-CBD said that it
had jurisdiction to hear the matter, since the issue was whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath
and the relevant provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although it acknowledged that
citizenship cannot be attacked collaterally, it ruled that it had to make a finding thereon, since the
alleged dishonesty hinged on that very matter. The IBP-CBD clarified though, that its ruling was limited
and "cannot strip or sustain the respondent of his citizenship."26 Lastly, the IBP-CBD found Vazquez
guilty of forum shopping since in all the three cases he had filed, he was questioning whether or not
lespondent was a natural-born citizen. It said that the actions filed by complainant involved the same
transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances, as well as identical subject matter and
issues.27 On 10 August 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-519, which
adopted and approved the Report and 20 Id. at 8. 21 Id. at 10-1 I. 22 Id. at 22-31. 23 Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, I 0 pages; penned by Commissioner Victor Pablo C. Trinidad 24 Id. at
2. 25 Id. at 6-7. 26 Id. at 5. 27 Id. at 8-9. ~ Decision 5 A.C. No. 9492 • Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case against Atty. Kho. THE RULING OF THE COURT We adopt
and approve the IBP Report and Recommendation and dismiss the instant administrative case against
respondent for lack of merit. This disbarment case centers on whether Atty. Kho violated his lawyer's
oath that he shall do no falsehood and that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct. According to complainant, a violation occurred when respondent declared in his
verified Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Although the
question of one's citizenship is not open to collateral attack,28 the Court acknowledges the IBP-CBD's
pronouncement that it had to make a limited finding thereon, since the alleged dishonesty hinged on
this issue. We have constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity. 29 A disbarment case is definitely not the proper venue to attack someone's
citizenship. For the lack of any ruling from a competent court on respondent's citizenship, this
disbarment case loses its only leg to stand on and, hence, must be dismissed. WHEREFORE, the instant
Administrative Complaint for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
filed against Atty. David Lim Queco Kho is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. MARIA LOURDES P.A.
SERENO Chief Justice, Chairperson • 28 Gov. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 191810.
22 June 2015. 29 Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 276 Phil. 758 (1991 ); Go v. Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 1918 I 0. 22 June 2015. Decision WE CONCUR: ,q. 6 j~ ~ it (ltuk
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice A.C. No. 9492 JA(,{1 ~ ESTELA M:TPERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

3Republtc of tbe llbiltpptneg ~upreme QCourt jflf[nniln FIRST DIVISION ._ ••...• · ~·: .;~,:i :.- ~·,,: ~·.·; ... ;
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' ' . I I. . ~.. . ........... I .... ~-· . I. '1 I ' t 't 1•j II ; . I 1' i ; I 1 \: \ :1 AUG 2 5 2016 ! : i : i . i: " .. \ \ ''l'.'''f'"'""l;.:y ,-
..,·~ • .-,~ ••. '; ,, j ,, -· ·p' . '"'""'-'"' t .. :.~~=. --- --~r--=-.. • BUDENCIO DUMANLAG, Complainant, A.C. No.
8825 - versus - ATTY. JAIME M. BLANCO, Jr., Respondent. Present: SERENO, CJ, Chairperson, LEONARDO-
DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, PERLAS-BERNABE, and CAGUIOA, JJ. Promulgated: AUG 0 3 2016 x------------------
----------------------- DECISION SERENO, CJ: Before this Court is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment
against respondent Atty. Jaime M. Blanco for rejecting complainant's claim over a parcel of land based
on a Spanish Title. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS Under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 79146, 1 El
Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc. (EMIDCI) appears to be the registered owner of the land it
occupies at the corner of Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard and C. de Dios Street in Sampaloc, Manila
(Sampaloc property). Complainant Budencio Dumanlag sent a letter dated 9 August 2010 to EMIDCI' s
President, Victoriano Chung, claiming to be an agent of the Heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro (the Heirs of
San Pedro) based on a Special 1 Rollo, pp. 41-45. ( • Decision 2 A.C. No. 8825 Power of Attorney dated
14 October 1999.2 Complainant asserted that the Heirs of San Pedro, and not EMlDCI, owned the
Sampaloc property, predicating such claim on a Spanish Title, Titulo de Propriedad No. (T.P.) 4136. 3 He
further stated in the letter that the Heirs of San Pedro were selling the Sampaloc property, and that he
had given EMIDCI the option to buy it. Victoriano Chung referred the matter to EMIDCI's counsel,
respondent 4 Atty. Jaime M. Blanco, Jr. (Atty. Blanco), who rejected the claim. In a letter5 dated 16
August 2010, the latter explained that the Supreme Court had declared T.P. 4136 null and void in
Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals.6 Demand was made
on Dumanlag and his principals to cease and desist from further harassing EMIDCI. 'it Complainant sent
another letter to Mr. Chung dated 1 September 2010. 7 While acknowledging the Court's decision, the
former alleged that Intestate Estate excluded the Heirs of San Pedro from the enumeration of persons
prohibited from selling lands covered by T.P. 4136, including the Sampaloc property. Atty. Blanco
rejected complainant's claim once more through another letter 8 dated 13 September 2010. He
reasoned that the Supreme Court Decision held that the heirs were specifically prohibited from
exercising any act of ownership over the lands covered by T.P. 4136. On 22 October 2010, complainant
filed this administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Blanco, alleging that Mr. Chung was a squatter
on the Sampaloc Property and Atty. Blanco had unjustly prevented the exercise of complainant's rights
over the same. 9 In his Verified Comment, 10 Atty. Blanco alleged that the Complaint was frivolous,
unfounded and retaliatory. He averred, among others, that complainant, in his second demand letter to
Mr. Chung, had attached two draft pleadings. The first was a draft petition for certiorari against the
latter; 11 the second, a draft complaint for disbarment against Atty. Blanco. 12 According to respondent,
these drafts were meant to intimidate him and Mr. Chung. True enough, after Atty. Blanco sent his
second letter to complainant, the latter filed with the Court of Appeals the draft petition, 2 Id, pp. 50-52.
3 Id. at 50. 4 Rollo, p. 21. 5 Id. at 11-13. 6 333 Phil. 597 ( 1996). 7 Annex "10." 8 Id. at 116-118. 9 Rollo, p.
6. to Id. at 20-40. 11 Annex "10-A", id at 89-94. 12 Annex "10-8", id at I 08-1 12. ( Decision 3 A.C. No.
8825 which was later dismissed. Complainant subsequently filed the Complaint for Disbarment. Atty.
Blanco also moved that the Court direct complainant to show cause why the latter should not be cited
for indirect contempt. Respondent stated that Intestate Estate declared in its fallo that agents of the
Heirs of San Pedro were disallowed from exercising any act of ownership over lands covered by T.P.
4136. FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER Investigating Commissioner Michael G.
Fabunan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) rendered a Report and Recommendation 13 for
the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the complaint was
patently frivolous, and 2) it was intended to harass respondent. He recommended that the Court issue
an order directing complainant Dumanlag to show cause why he should not be cited for . m d" 14 irect
contempt. The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-418 adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the • • • • • 15 mvestlgatmg commissioner. No petition for review has
been filed with this Court. RULING OF THE COURT The Complaint must be dismissed for utter lack of
merit. A lawyer is charged with the duty to defend "the cause of his client with wholehearted fidelity,
care, and devotion." 16 Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility circumscribes this duty
with the limitation that lawyers shall perfonn their duty to the client within the bounds of law. 17 In this
case, Atty. Blanco performed this duty to his client without exceeding the scope of his authority. As early
as 1996, this Court declared in Intestate Estate that T.P. 4136 was null and void. 18 In said case, the
Heirs of San Pedro claimed ownership of a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares on the
basis of a Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated 25 April 1894. The 13 ld. at 256-261. 14
Id. at 261. 15 Id. at 256. 16 Trinidad v. Villarin, A.C. No. 9310, 27 February 2013, 692 SCRA 1,6 citing
Pangasinan Electric Cooperative v. Montemayor, 559 Phil. 438 {?007) citing Natino v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 247 Phil. 602 (1991). 17 CPR, Canon 19. 18 Supra note 5. R

lRepublic of tbe flbilippines $->upreme @:ourt r:r .. . . . "5£-!'Y~' -77,,r-;-' ,, ' ' • ,,...._....,. ' ' f - . ·' '" ' ........
,,A,, jflllnniln ~t-=- '! \..) ·' ._ \ 2016 THIRD DIVISION TEODORO B. CRUZ, JR., Complainant, -versusATTYS.
JOHN G. REYES, ROQUE BELLO and CARMENCITA A. ROUS-GONZAGA, Respondents. A.C. No. 9090
Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, PEREZ, REYES, and JARDELEZA, JJ. Promulgated: August
31, 2016 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x ~~ RESOLUTION PEREZ,
J.: This is a Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the Resolution2 of the Court dated 22 August 2012 finding
respondent Atty. John G. Reyes guilty of "negligence of contumacious proportions" and suspending him
from the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year. The Facts The present case arose out of a petition
for disbarment filed by Atty. Teodoro B. Cruz, Jr. (complainant) charging respondent Atty. John G. Reyes
(respondent) with intentional misrepresentation, knowingly handling a case Rollo, pp. 284-288. Id. at
282-283. ~ Resolution 2 A.C. No. 9090 involving conflict of interest, falsification, knowingly alleging
untruths in pleadings and unethical conduct, based on the following incidents: The First Incident
(Intentional Misrepresentation and Knowingly Handling a Case Involving Conflict of Interest)
Complainant alleged that respondent entered his appearance as counsel for Mayor Rosi to Velarde
(Mayor Velarde) of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, in an election protest case that was on appeal before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The case, entitled "Racquel 'BIBI' Reyes de Guzman, Protestant,
versus Mayor Rosito Velarde, Protestee," originated from the Regional Trial Comi (R TC) of Calabanga,
Branch 63, Camarines Sur. According to the petition for disbarment, "an incident occurred" in the course
of the trial which forced Mayor Velarde to bring an incident up to the COMELEC on certiorari. 3 While
the case was being tried at the RTC level, protestant Raquel Reyes De Guzman (De Guzman) was
represented by the Sales Law Office ofNaga City, although Atty. Roque Bello (Atty. Bello), who indicated
in the pleadings that his address is in Cainta, Rizal, was the chief counsel. Mayor Velarde, on the other
hand, was represented by Atty. Gualberto Manlagnit (Atty. Manlagnit) from Naga City. Atty. Manlagnit
prepared the pleadings in connection with the appeal to the COMELEC but, according to complainant,
unknown to Atty. Manlagnit, another pleading was filed before the COMELEC, which pleading was
apparently prepared in Cainta, Rizal but was signed by respondent whose given address is in Quezon
City. 4 Complainant explained that De Guzman used to be allied with former Speaker Arnulfo
Fuentebella (Speaker Fuentebella) under the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) party, whereas Mayor
Velarde was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) party, led by Camarines Sur
Governor Luis R. Villafue1ie (Gov. Villafuerte). The Fuentebellas and the Villafue1ies are known to be
politically at odds with each other. However, De Guzman subsequently changed her political allegiance
and became affiliated with the Villafuertes by transferring to the LDP party. Mayor Velarde, on the other
hand, became an ally of the Fuentebellas under the NPC. 5 Id. at 3. Id. at 3-4. Id. at 4. ~ Resolution 3 A.C.
No. 9090 According to complainant, Atty. Bello agreed to represent De Guzman in the election protest
case because she was a political ally of Speaker Fuentebella. Complainant emphasized that Atty. Bello
has always represented the political interests of the Fuentebellas. There is, therefore, no doubt that
Atty. Bello is the lawyer of the Fuentebellas.6 As a result, with the sudden shifting of the political loyalty
of De Guzman and Mayor Velarde, Atty. Bello suddenly stopped appearing for De Guzman in the protest
case without formally withdrawing as her counsel. 7 Mayor Velarde now had to be defended by Atty.
Bello because he is already an ally of the Fuentebellas. However, Atty. Bello cannot actively defend
Mayor Velarde because he appeared for De Guzman before the RTC. 8 Thus, complainant concluded,
Atty. Bello found the expedient of passing the case to his clandestine partner, respondent Atty. Reyes,
making the latter guilty of representing conflicting interests,9 in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Second Incident (Falsification, Knowingly Alleging Untruths in Pleadings
and Unethical Conduct) On or before 15 December 2003, former Speaker Fuentebella filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur. Complainant also
filed a COC for the same position. Subsequently, a certain Ebeta P. Cruz (Ebeta) and a certain Marita
Montefalcon Cruz-Gulles (Marita) likewise filed their respective COCs for the aforementioned position.
The former is an indigent laundry woman from San Jose, Camarines Sur, while the latter was a former
casual laborer of the municipal government of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. 1 ° Clearly, both Ebeta and Marita
had no real intention of running for the position for which they filed their COC, but were merely
instigated to do so in order to confuse the electorate of the district, to the disadvantage of complainant.
Consequently, complainant filed a petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance d.d 11 can 1 ates. In
connection with the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates, complainant filed a
Memorandum with the COMELEC · 6 10 II Id. Id. at 5. Id. at 6. Id. at 8. Id. at 9. Id. at IO. ~ Resolution 4
A.C. No. 9090 through the Office of the Camarines Sur Provincial Election Supervisor (PES). Pertinent
portions of the Memorandum were quoted by the complainant in his petition for disbarment, 12 to wit:
1. Complainant received a copy of the Verified Answer of Marita signed by respondent as counsel,
whose given address is in Quezon City; 2. From the Answer, it was made to appear that Marita caused
the preparation thereof, read the allegations therein contained, and understood them. It was also made
to appear that Marita signed the verification; 3. During the hearing at the PES in San Jose, Pili, Camarines
Sur, on 23 January 2004, respondent appeared and: a.) on record, admitted that the signature appearing
on the Verified Answer is his; b.) officially manifested that he was hired by Marita as her counsel to
prepare the Verified Answer; c.) officially confirmed that the allegations in the Verified Answer were
supplied by Marita; and d.) said that Marita was in his office in Quezon City when she "signed" the
Verified Answer. 4. Marita arrived at the hearing to file a formal withdrawal of her COC. She was
immediately put on the witness stand wherein she testified that: 12 a.) she did not know respondent; b.)
she never solicited his legal services, particularly, to file the Verified Answer; c.) she never supplied the
allegations contained in the Answer; Id.at IO-II. ~ Resolution 5 A.C. No. 9090 d.) the signature appearing
in the Answer is not her signature; and e.) she could not have signed the verification in the Answer in
Quezon City on 15 January 2004 because she was in Bicol on that date. 13 The petition for disbarment
also alleged that respondent admitted to Attys. Adan Marcelo Botor and Atty. Manlagnit - complainant's
counsels in the petition for disqualification before the PES-COMELEC - that Atty. Bello merely gave the
Verified Answer to him already signed and . d 14 notarize . For his part, respondent narrated the
following version of the events: Anent the first incident, respondent alleged that he first met Atty. Bello
sometime in May, 2003 when the latter was introduced to him by a friend. A few months after their
meeting, Atty. Bello called him up to ask if he could handle a case to be filed with the COMELEC since
Atty. Bello had so many cases to handle. The case would be to secure a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) with application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction from the COMELEC. 15 According to
respondent, he informed Atty. Bello that he has never before handled an election case, much less one
with an application for a TRO with Preliminary Injunction. Atty. Bello assured him that things would be
difficult at first, but he would assist respondent and things will tum out easier. Due to the assurance
given and his desire for a more comprehensive experience in law practice, respondent agreed to accept
the case. Since he made it clear from the start that he has no knowledge or experience in election cases,
he was never part of the preparations in connection with the case. Atty. Bello simply called him up for a
meeting when the pleading was ready so that he could sign the same. They agreed to meet somewhere
in Timog, Quezon City and after he read the pleading and sensing that there was no problem, he signed
the same inside Atty. Bello's car. Thereafter, he attended the initial hearing of the case, during which,
the parties were required to submit their respective Memoranda. 16 13 14 15 16 I Id. at 14 and 17-19.
Id. at 20. Id. at 60. Id. at 60-61. ~ Resolution 6 A.C. No. 9090 Respondent claimed that up to that point,
there were no indications about the true nature of the case. However, when he was preparing the
required Memorandum, he found telltale signs. After his two appearances before the COMELEC and the
submission of the Memorandum, respondent declared that he never knew what happened to the case
as he formally withdrew therefrom immediately upon knowing the circumstances of the case. He
maintained that he cannot be held guilty of representing conflicting interests because he never handled
any previous case involving either of the parties in the COMELEC case. Moreover, he was not properly
apprised of the facts and circumstances relative to the case that would render him capable of
intelligently deciding whether or not to accept the case. He likewise did not receive a single centavo as
attorney's, acceptance or appearance fees in connection with the case. He agreed to handle the same
simply to accommodate Atty. Bello and to improve his skills as a lawyer and .c. 'd . 17 never ior
monetary cons1 erat10ns. With respect to the second incident, respondent related that he was at home
in Pangasinan on 17 January 2004 when he received a call from Atty. Bello asking him to attend a
hearing in Camarines Sur. He declined the request three times due to his tight schedule. Atty. Bello
pleaded, saying that even on Saturdays, hearings could be scheduled. Thus, even if he did not want to
attend the hearing due to its distance and because of his full calendar, he could not refuse because he
really did not schedule appointments and/or hearings on Saturdays. All that was told him regarding the
case was that a congressional candidate was being disqualified and a lawyer is needed to defend him
and his candidacy. Respondent alleged that according to Atty. Bello, the candidate was qualified and
financially capable of funding his campaign. Nevertheless, he clarified from Atty. Bello if the candidate is
not a nuisance candidate and Atty. Bello allegedly replied: "Qualified na qualified naman talaga eh."
Respondent added that it was not disclosed to him that the disqualification case involved a candidate
for the third congressional district of Camarines Sur. He was simply informed that the scheduled hearing
of the disqualification case would be on 23 January 2004 in Naga City. 18 Since respondent was in
Pangasinan and due to the fact that the deadline for the filing of the necessary pleading was nearing,
Atty. Bello advised respondent that he would just prepare the Answer and sign for respondent's name in
the pleading. Respondent maintained that he would not 17 18 Id. at 62. Id. at 63. Resolution 7 A.C. No.
9090 have agreed to Atty. Bello's proposal, had it not been for the pressed urgency, trusting that he
would not get into any trouble. 19 While waiting for the scheduled date of the hearing to arrive, he
wondered why he has not been furnished a copy of the pleading or given additional instructions relative
to the case. Atty. Bello, in the meantime, has ceased to communicate with him and suddenly became
inaccessible. He thus toyed with the impression that he was being left out of the case for reasons he
could not then understand. 20 According to respondent, he was able to get a copy of the Answer only
when he was already in Naga City and it was only then and there, while reading it, that he realized that
the case was, in reality, about a nuisance candidate and that the client he was to appear for was, indeed,
a nuisance candidate. What was even more surprising to him was that the copy of the Answer that was
given to him was unsigned: neither by him nor by his supposed client. It was likewise not notarized.
Finding the indefensibility of his client and in order not to make matters worse, he opted to appear and
just submit the case for resolution. To prove this point, respondent alleged that all he had with him for
the hearing were only the unsigned and unnotarized Answer, the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as
nuisance candidates, his case calendar and nothing else. He had not in his person any evidence
whatsoever in support of the defense of his client. Respondent added that even at this point, he had no
knowledge that his supposed client "had already jumped ship." More importantly, he did not know that
her signature on the Answer was forged, precisely because the copy of the Answer that was . h" . d 21
given to nn was uns1gne . Before the start of the hearing, respondent started looking for his client but
she could not be found. He, nevertheless, proceeded to the hearing for it was immaterial to him
whether she was present or not as he had already planned to simply submit the case for resolution.
Unfortunately, respondent claimed, the proceedings before the PES started as a casual conversation
with the lawyers for herein complainant and went on to a full trial, "wittingly or unwittingly."22
Respondent admitted that, during the hearing, he acknowledged that the signature appearing on the
Answer was his. He alleged that despite his personal aversion and objection to certain allegations in the
Answer, he~ 19 Id. 20 Id. at 64. 21 Id. at 65. 22 Id. at 66. Resolution 8 A.C. No. 9090 could not anymore
deny the signature above his printed name, even if it was only signed for and in his behalf, because he
had previously agreed, although unwillingly, that his name be signed in the pleading. It, therefore, came
as a surprise to him that of all the questions that can be asked of him during the trial, he was questioned
about his signature. Belatedly he realized that he should have objected to the line of questioning as he
was being presented as an unwilling witness for therein petitioner. However, without sufficient
exposure in the legal practice and wanting of the traits of a scheming lawyer, he failed to seasonably
object to the line of questioning. 23 Nevertheless, respondent vehemently denied complainant's
allegation that he admitted having seen Marita sign the document in his presence. According to him, he
vividly recalls his response to the then query whether or not Marita signed the document in his presence
as: "I suppose that is her signature." Likewise, when queried fmiher on the ideal that the pleading
should be signed by Marita in his presence as her counsel, he allegedly responded: "While it is the ideal,
sometimes we lawyers, like you and I, sign documents even if the client is not around due to our busy
schedules." He pointed out to the two lawyers of herein complainant that whether Marita signed the
Answer in his presence or not is inconsequential since he was not the notary public who notarized the
Answer. He argued that his signature pertains to the allegations in the Answer, while the signature of his
client forms part of the verification and certification and that it is the duty of the notary public to see to
it that the person signing the pleading as a party is really the person referred to in the
verification/certification. 24 Finally, respondent declared that except for the modest appearance cum
transportation fees that he received, there was no monetary consideration for handling the petition to
declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates. He explained that when the case was offered to him, it
was in haste and under a tenor of urgency that the only impression he got was that the client was well-
to-do and could wage a decent campaign and was really a qualified candidate. He repeated the words of
Atty. Bello: "qualified na qualifed sya." He emphasized that all he wanted was to expand l . . d . 1 25 11s
expenence an practice as a awyer. In his report and recommendation dated 1 7 April 2007, Investigating
Commissioner Edmund T. Espina found respondent guilty of the charges against him and recommended
that he be meted the penalty of suspension for one ( 1) month. The report, in part, reads: % Id. 24 Id. at
67. 25 Id. at 68. Resolution 9 A.C. No. 9090 It taxes the undersigned Commissioner's imagination,
however, that respondent disclaims any knowledge in the above incidents and that he was just a "willing
victim" of the rather scheming tactics of a fellow lawyer, who, surprisingly he did not even thought (sic)
of running after and holding liable, even after all these charges filed against him. Be that as it may, it
cannot be denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and allowed himself to be used by whoever
should be properly held liable for these fraud and misrepresentation. As regards the second incident,
respondent argues that he could not be held guilty of forgery, misrepresentation, and other related
offenses. x x x If at all, respondent was forced to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the
name of accommodation. Undersigned Commissioner disagrees. Respondent violated Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent should have evaluated the situation
first before agreeing to be counsel for an unknown client. x x x Undersigned Commissioner finds
sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for the various misrepresentations and
later, admissions before the COMELEC when confronted with his "supposed client", claiming that it was
Atty. Roque [sic] who merely gave him instructions and whose requests he merely accommodated. x x x
His shortcomings when he accepted to be a counsel for an unknown client in the COMELEC protest (first
incident) is in itself, already deplorable but to repeat the same infraction in the petition for
disqualification (in the second incident) constitutes negligence of contumacious proportions. It is even
worse that respondent has attempted to mitigate his liability by professing ignorance or innocence of
the whole thing, a matter that, too, is inexcusable. Clearly, it is a lame excuse that respondent did offer.
By his own confession, he was woefully negligent. 26 On 19 September 2007, Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
99 was passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolving to
adopt and approve the above report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It
thereafter forwarded the report to the Supreme Court as required under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.27 26 27 Id. at 223-225. SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - xx
xx (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines N. that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. Resolution 10 A.C. No. 9090 On 22 August 2012, the
Court issued the questioned Resolution adopting the above-quoted findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner. The Court, however, increased the period of suspension from the recommended one (1)
month to one (1) year. The same Resolution also resolved to: xx xx 2. IMPLEAD Aitys. Roque Bello and
Carmencita A. RousGonzaga in this administrative proceedings; and 3. REMAND the whole records of
this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further investigation, report and recommendation
with respect to the charges against A TTY. ROQUE BELLO and A TTY. CARMEN CIT A A. ROUS-GONZAGA.
Respondent is now before us seeking a reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution insofar as the
penalty imposed against him is concerned. Respondent points out that from the very start, he had been
very candid as to the factual backdrop of the present case. He never denied that he should have
evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be a counsel for an unknown client. He does not refute,
nor does he argue against, the finding of the Commission on Bar Discipline that he was remiss in his
duties as a lawyer when he accommodated the requests of a fellow lawyer to represent an unknown
client. However, respondent argues, such negligence is not the negligence "of contumacious
proportions" warranting the imposition of the penalty of suspension. Likewise, such negligence is not
tantamount to having knowledge of the alleged fraud and misrepresentation, for the simple reason that
he did not know the details of the election case until its hearing on 23 January 2004 in Naga City. He
maintains that if such fraud and misrepresentation really exists, his "only fault was that he allowed
himself to be duped to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the name of accommodation."
Our Ruling We find respondent's motion for reconsideration partially meritorious. Considering the
serious consequences of the disbarment or the '(/} suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary fb Resolution 11 A.C. No. 9090 to justify the imposition of the said
administrative penalties28 and the burden of proof rests upon the complaint. 29 "Preponderance of the
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as wmihy of
belief compared to the presented contrary evidence."30 In the case at bar, complainant failed to
present clear and preponderant evidence in support of his claim that respondent "knowingly" handled a
case involving conflict of interest, "knowingly" alleged untruths in pleadings, and that he "intentionally"
committed misrepresentation and falsification. In connection with the first incident, complainant alleged
that respondent perpetrated acts constituting intentional misrepresentation and knowingly handling a
case involving conflict of interest when he appeared as counsel for Mayor Velarde in the COMELEC case.
Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts." Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of this rule is
present in a given case, to wit: One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim
in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule. Another test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 31
(Emphasis omitted) Based on the foregoing criteria, there must be a previous lawyer-client relationship
in order for the liability to attach. Clearly, respondent cannot be held liable under any of the three
aforementioned tests because he was never 28 29 30 JI Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Saf.,71/Cio, 520 Phil. 538,
548 (2006) citing Berbano v. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 341 (2003). Rudecon Management Corp. v.
Camacho, 480 Phil. 652, 660 (2004) citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarcido, 449 Phil. 619
(2003). Ylaya v. Gacott, 702 Phil. 390, 407-408 (2013). Anifion v. Sahitsana, Jr., 685 Phil. 322, 327 (2012)
citing Quiambao v. Bamba, 505 Phil. 126, 134 (2005). Resolution 12 A.C. No. 9090 a counsel for either
party in the COMELEC case prior to the filing of the said action. Complainant, however, would have us
believe that respondent is the "furtive" or "clandestine" partner of Atty. Bello so as to justify his
accusation that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Complainant, however, failed
to present sufficient evidence in support of his allegation. The mere fact that respondent agreed to
handle a case for Atty. Bello does not - alone - prove that they are indeed partners. This Court is inclined
to give more weight and credence to the explanation proffered by respondent: that is, he accepted the
case without being fully aware of the real facts and circumstances surrounding it. His narration is
straightforward enough to be worthy of belief, especially considering that he withdrew from the case
after he realized its true nature, as evidenced by the "Withdrawal as Counsel"32 he filed before the
COMELEC. With respect to the charge of intentional misrepresentation, complainant failed to specify
which act of respondent constituted the alleged offense. If the alleged misrepresentation pertains to the
act of respondent of signing the pleading prepared by Atty. Bello, we do not agree with complainant and
the same cannot be considered as misrepresentation since respondent specified in his Comment that he
read the pleading before he affixed his signature thereto. He was, therefore, aware of the statements
contained in the pleading and his act of signing the same signifies that he agreed to the allegations
therein contained. On the other hand, if the misrepresentation alleged by complainant refers to the
allegations in the pleading filed by respondent before the COMELEC, again, it cannot be said that there
was "intentional" misrepresentation on the part of respondent since, as admitted by respondent and as
complainant himself asserted, the allegations therein contained were supplied by Atty. Bello, which
allegations, at that time the pleading was signed, respondent did not know were inaccurate. As pointed
out above, as soon as the true nature of the situation revealed itself, respondent withdrew from the
case. Regarding the second incident, complainant claimed that, in connection with the petition to
declare Marita as a nuisance candidate, respondent committed falsification and knowingly alleged
untruths, not only in Marita's Verified Answer to the disqualification case against her, but during the
hearing of the case, as well. As with the first incident, respondent maintained that he accepted the case
without being fully aware of the circumstances relative thereto, this time because of the insistence and
urgency with which Atty. Bello made the request. 32 Rollo, p. 72. ~ Resolution 13 A.C. No. 9090 We
earlier noted respondent's candor in explaining his cause. His · candidness about the events leading to
this administrative complaint against him is demonstrated by the following declarations he made: ( 1)
having agreed to have his name signed in the pleading on his behalf, he cannot now deny the signature
above his printed name; 33 (2) he believed the assurances of his fellow lawyers (counsels for herein
complainant) that whatever may have been said in confidence between them will not be revealed to
anybody for whatever reason; 34 and (3) he failed to seasonably object to the line of questioning
relative to his signature on Marita's Answer, thereby incriminating himself and making him an unwilling
witness for the opposing party, because of his insufficient experience in the legal practice and as a result
of his lack of the traits of a scheming lawyer. 35 These straightforward statements, coupled with the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proven, 36 keep us
from treating respondent's proffered explanation as an indication of mendacity. 37 This Court is,
therefore, compelled to give him the benefit of the doubt and apply in his favor the presumption that he
acted in good faith, especially considering the failure of complainant to present clear and convincing
evidence in support of his allegations. Thus, with respect to the charge that respondent "knowingly"
alleged untruths in the supposed Verified Answer of Marita, he admitted that Marita's Answer was
prepared by Atty. Bello, whom respondent likewise authorized to sign his name on the pleading on his
behalf. This statement was corroborated by complainant himself when he alleged in his petition for
disbarment that "Atty. John Reyes admitted to the two counsels of then candidate Teodoro Cruz, Jr.xx x
that the Answer was merely passed to him by Atty. Bello already signed and notarized." Consequently,
respondent cannot be held liable for "knowingly" alleging untruths for the simple reason that the
allegations in the Answer were not supplied by him. Neither can respondent be held guilty of
falsification in connection with the forged signature of Marita. "The basic rule is that mere allegation is
not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise
cannot be given credence."38 Complainant merely alleged that Marita's signature in the Answer "was
forged either by Attorney Roque Bello or respondent x x x"39 and that 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Id. at 66. Id.
at 67. Id. at 66. Ylaya v. Gacott, supra note 30 at 408. Maligaya v. Doronil/a, Jr., 533 Phil. 303, 310
(2006). De Jesus v. Guerrero Ill, 614 Phil. 520, 614 (2009) citing Manalabe v. Cabie, 553 Phil. 544, 551
(2007). Rollo, p. 20. ~ Resolution 14 A.C. No. 9090 respondent falsified or caused the falsification of the
signature because "he is the one who presented the same to the COMELEC, hence, presumed to be the
one who falsified the same."40 Other than this presumption and bare allegation, complainant has not
adduced any proof in support thereof. As a result, this Court cannot give any merit to his accusation. The
same is true in connection with complainant's allegation that respondent falsely testified and made
misrepresentations during the nuisance candidate case hearing before the PES by manifesting that he is
the lawyer of Marita, that the allegations in the Answer were supplied by Marita and that Marita was in
his office when she signed the Answer's verification. Apart from his allegations, complainant has not
presented any evidence, as for instance, the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the proceedings,
to prove that respondent indeed made the statements attributed to him and to enable this Court to
properly evaluate the transgressions ascribed to respondent. It is well to note that respondent
vehemently denied having admitted seeing Marita sign the Verification before his presence in his office
in Quezon City. He insisted that his response, when queried about Marita's signature, was that: "I
suppose that is her signature." This Court finds it unreasonable - illogical, even - that after having
admitted the blunders he committed in this case, he would now deny this particular circumstance,
unless he was in fact telling the truth. In any case, as explained by respondent, it is of no moment
whether or not he saw Marita sign the Verification since he was not the notary public who notarized the
Answer. Respondent's signature in the Answer refers to the allegations therein, whereas the signature
of Marita forms part of the Verification which states that "she has caused the preparation of the
foregoing Answer and has read the contents thereof which are true and correct of her own personal
knowledge." Respondent is, therefore, correct when he pointed out that it is the responsibility of the
notary public administering the oath to make sure that the signature in the Verification really belongs to
the person who executed the same. It must be emphasized that "the Court exercises its disciplinary
power only if the complainant establishes [his] case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. x x x
When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the
preponderance of evidence, the 40 Id. at 120. Resolution 15 A.C. No. 9090 equipoise rule dictates that
the decision be against the party carrying the burden of proof."41 The foregoing notwithstanding, it
cannot be said that respondent has no liability at all under the circumstances. His folly, though, consists
in his negligence in accepting the subject cases without first being fully apprised of and evaluating the
circumstances surrounding them. We, nevertheless, agree with respondent that such negligence is not
of contumacious proportions as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension. This Court finds
the penalty of suspension for one ( 1) year earlier imposed on respondent too harsh and not
proportionate to the offense committed. "The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great
caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty."42 The penalty to be meted out on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion taking into consideration the facts surrounding each case. 43 In this connection, the following
circumstances should be taken into consideration in order to mitigate respondent's responsibility: first
respondent exhibited enough candor to admit that he was negligent and remiss in his duties as a lawyer
when he accommodated the request of another lawyer to handle a case without being first apprised of
the details and acquainted with the circumstances relative thereto; and second, since this is his first
offense, respondent "is entitled to some measure of forbearance. " 44 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court dated 22
August 2012 is hereby modified in that respondent Atty. John G. Reyes is REPRIMANDED for his failure
to exercise the necessary prudence required in the practice of the legal profession. He is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. 41 42 41 44 SO
ORDERED. Ylaya v. Gacott, supra note 30 at 413. Ramos v. Ngaseo, 487 Phil. 40, 49 (2004). Lim-Santiago
v. Sagucio, supra note 28 at 552. Maligaya v. Doronil/a, Jr., supra note 37 at 311. Resolution WE
CONCUR: ~ 16 PRESBITERO ¥VELASCO, JR. Assoc}_ate Justice ~irperson ~ A.C. No. 9090 BIENVENIDO L.
REYES Associate Justice Associate Justice c:::::.:,rzF!ED TRUE COPY Divi:i'on Clerk )~ of Court Third
Division SEP Z O 2011·

l\,epublic of tbe !lbilippines ~upreme ([ourt ;ffflanila EN BANC CARRIE-ANNE SHALE EN CARLYLE S.
REYES, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. RAMON F. NIEVA, Respondent. A.C. No. 8560 Present: SERENO, C.J,
CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,* PERALTA, BERSAMIN,** DEL CASTILLO, PEREZ,
MENDOZA, REYES,*** PERLAS-BERNABE, LEONEN, JARDELEZA, and CAGUIOA,JJ Promulgated:
September 6, 2016 x---------------------------------------------------~~ --~~-~~..[------------------------x ~ le.._,,
O....,...-~. DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: For the Court's resolution is the Complaint1 dated March 3,
2010 filed by complainant Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes (complainant) against On leave. •• On
official leave. ••• On official leave. 1 Rollo, pp. 1-7. ~ Decision 2 A.C. No. 8560 respondent Atty. Ramon
F. Nieva (respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred for sexually harassing her. The Facts
Complainant alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP)
as an Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis since October 2004. Sometime in January 2009, she was
reassigned at the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under the supervision of respondent, who was
then acting as CAAP Acting Board Secretary. During complainant's stint under respondent, she would
notice that during office hours, respondent would often watch ''pampagana" videos saved in his office
laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic films. Complainant also averred that whenever
respondent got close to her, he would hold her hand and would sometimes give it a kiss. During these
instances, complainant would remove her hands and tell him to desist. According to complainant,
respondent even offered her a cellular phone together with the necessary load to serve as means for
their private communication, but she refused the said offer, insisting that she already has her own
cellular phone and does not need another one. 2 Complainant also narrated that at about 5 o'clock in
the afternoon of April 1, 2009, respondent texted her to wait for him at the office. Fearing that
respondent might take advantage of her, complainant convinced two (2) of her officemates to
accompany her until respondent arrived. Upon respondent's arrival and seeing that complainant had
companions, he just told complainant and the other two (2) office staff to lock the door when they
leave. 3 Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009, respondent called her
on her cellular phone, asked if she received his text message, and told her he would tell her something
upon his arrival at the office. At about 9:30 in the morning of even date, respondent asked complainant
to encode a memorandum he was about to dictate. Suddenly, respondent placed his hand on
complainant's waist area near her breast and started caressing the latter's torso. Complainant
immediately moved away from respondent and told him "sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead of asking
for an apology, respondent told complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own
pocket and even gave her a note stating ''just bet (between) you and me, x x x kahit na si mommy,"
referring to complainant's mother who was also working at CAAP. At around past 11 o'clock in the
morning of the same day, while complainant and respondent were left alone in the office, respondent
suddenly closed the door, grabbed complainant's arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then
attempted to 2 Id. at 2-3. Id. at 3-4. ~ Decision 3 A.C. No. 8560 kiss complainant. This prompted
complainant to thwart respondent's advances with her left arm, raised her voice in order to invite help,
and exclaimed "wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit, sir may asawa ako." After
respondent let her go, complainant immediately left the office to ask assistance from her former
supervisor who advised her to file an administrative case 4 against respondent before the CAAP
Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI). 5 Finally, complainant alleged that after her ordeal
with respondent, she was traumatized and was even diagnosed by a psychiatrist to be suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression. 6 Eventually, complainant filed the
instant complaint. In his defense,7 respondent denied all of complainant's allegations. He maintained
that as a 79-year old retiree who only took a position at the CAAP on a consultancy basis, it was very
unlikely for him to do the acts imputed against him, especially in a very small office space allotted for
him and his staff. In this regard, he referred to his Counter-Affidavit8 submitted before the CODI,
wherein he explained, inter alia, that: (a) while he indeed watches "interesting shows" in his office
laptop, he never invited anyone, including complainant, to watch with him and that he would even close
his laptop whenever someone comes near him; 9 ( b) he never held and kissed complainant's hand
because if he had done so, he would have been easily noticed by complainant's co-staffers; 10 (c) he did
offer her a cellular phone, but this was supposed to be an office phone which should not be used for
personal purposes, and thus, could not be given any sexual meaning; 11 (d) he did tell complainant to
wait for him in the afternoon of April 1, 2009, but only for the purpose of having an available encoder
should he need one for any urgent matter that would arise; 12 and ( e) he would not do the acts he
allegedly committed on April 2, 2009 as there were other people in the office and that those people can
attest in his favor. 13 Respondent then pointed out that the administrative case filed against him before
the CODI was already dismissed for lack of basis and that complainant was only being used by other
CAAP employees who were agitated by the reforms he helped implement upon his assumption as CAAP
consultant and eventually as Acting Corporate Board Secretary. 14 4 See Affidavit-Complaint dated April
2, 2009; id. at 8. Id. at 4-5. See also id. at 60. 6 See Certificate of Psychiatric Evaluation dated April 13,
2009. Signed by Juan V. Arellano, M.D., D.P.B.P., F.P.P.A.; id. at 9. 7 See Comment filed on June 16, 2010;
id. at 21-27. Id. at 42-55. 9 Id. at 48. 10 Id. at 48-49. 11 Id. at 49. 12 Id. at 49-50. 13 Id. at 50. 14 Id. at 22-
23. See also id. at 54. y Decision 4 A.C. No. 8560 The IBP's Report and Recommendation In a Report and
Recommendation 15 dated August 14, 2012, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint against respondent.
16 He found that complainant failed to substantiate her allegations against respondent, as opposed to
respondent's defenses which are ably supported by evidence. Citing respondent's evidence, the
Investigating Commissioner opined that since the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary was very small, it is
implausible that a startling occurrence such as an attempted sexual molestation would not be noticed
by not only the other occupants of said office area, but also by those occupying the office adjacent to it,
i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which is separated only by glass panels. Further, the Investigating
Commissioner drew attention to the investigation conducted by the CODI showing that the collective
sworn statements of the witnesses point to the eventual conclusion that none of the alleged acts of
misconduct attributed to respondent really occurred. 17 In a Resolution18 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP Board) unanimously reversed the aforesaid Report and Recommendation. As
such, respondent was found guilty of committing sexual advances, and accordingly, recommended that
he be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months. In view of respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, 19 the IBP Board referred the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
for study, evaluation, and submission of an Executive Summary to the IBP Board.20 In the Director's
Report21 dated July 8, 2014, the IBP-CBD National Director recommended that the current IBP Board
adhere to the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner as it is supported by the
evidence on record; on the other hand, the reversal made by the previous IBP Board is bereft of any
factual and legal bases, and should therefore, be set aside. In this light, the current IBP Board issued a
Resolution22 dated August 10, 2014 setting aside the previous IBP Board's Resolution, and accordingly,
dismissed the administrative complaint against respondent. 15 Id. at 179-187. Signed by Commissioner
Pablo S. Castillo. 16 Id. at 187. 17 Id. at 183-187. 18 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XX-2013-
555 signed by IBP National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 178, including dorsal portion. 19 Id.
at 188-190. 20 See id. at 208. 21 Id. at 208-211. Signed by IBP-CBD National Director Dominic C. M. Solis.
22 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXI-2014-531 signed by IBP National Secretary Nasser A.
Marohomsalic; id. at 206. ~ Decision 5 A.C. No. 8560 The Issue Before the Court The essential issue in
this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). The Court's Ruling Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides: CANON 1 -
A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The provision instructs that "[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."23 In similar light,
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR states: CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. xx xx Rule 7.03 -A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Good moral
character is a trait that every practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may be defined as "what a
person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which c01Tesponds to objective reality." 24 Such requirement has four (4)
ostensible purposes, namely: (a) to protect the public; ( b) to protect the public image of lawyers; ( c) to
protect prospective clients; and ( d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 25 23 See Spouses Lopez
v. Limos, A.C. No. 7618, February 2, 2016, citing Tabang v. Gacott, 713 Phil. 578, 593 (2013). 24
Advincula v. Macabata, 546 Phil. 431, 440 (2007), citation omitted. 25 Id., citing Dantes v. Dantes, 482
Phil. 64, 71 (2004). v Decision 6 A.C. No. 8560 In Valdez v. Dabon,26 the Court emphasized that a
lawyer's continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition to remain a member of
the Bar, viz.: Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral
character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar
and to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free
from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality. The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently, any
errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality,
not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their
good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law
or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 28 After due consideration, the Court
reverses the findings and recommendations of the IBP, and finds respondent administratively liable for
violations of the CPR, as will be explained hereunder. To recapitulate, the IBP found that as compared to
complainant's purposedly bare and uncorroborated allegations, respondent's evidence point to the
conclusion that none of the alleged sexual advances made by respondent against complainant actually
occurred. As such, it absolved respondent from any administrative liability. In support of such finding,
the 26 A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015. 27 See id. 28 Advincula v. Macabata, supra note 24, at 440,
citing Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 403 Phil. 1, 9 (2001). ~ Decision 7 A.C. No. 8560 IBP largely relied
on the following: (a) the five (5) photographs29 respondent submitted to the CODI to show that
respondent's office space was so small that any commotion caused by a sexual harassment attempt
would have been easily noticed by the other occupants thereof; 30 and (b) the investigation conducted
by the CODI per the Transcript31 submitted by respondent where the witnesses said that they did not
notice anything out of the ordinary on April 2, 2009, the date when respondent's alleged sexual
advances against complainant were committed. 32 However, the foregoing evidence, taken as a whole,
did not actually refute complainant's allegation that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2,
2009, respondent closed the door, grabbed complainant's right arm, uttered the words "let's seal it with
a kiss" and attempted to kiss complainant despite the latter's resistance. A careful perusal of the
aforesaid Transcript shows that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, there was a
time that complainant and respondent were indeed left alone in the office: Mr. Mendoza: Ngayon,
puwede mo bang idescribe sa amin nung 9:30 to 11 :00 sinu-sino kayo doon? Witness 1: Tatlo (3) lang
kami sir po dun. Si Ma'am Carrie Anne [complainant], si sir Nieva [respondent] tsaka aka po. Mr.
Mendoza: So ikaw fang ang witness, ang taong naroon 9:30 to 11? Witness 1: Yes sir. xx xx Mr.
Mendoza: Saan kayo kumakain ng lunch? Witness 1: Sa loob po kami nagf uf unch. Mr. Mendoza: Pag
nag-order ng pagkain minsan may natitira pa bang iba? Witness 1: !tong po yung dafawa yung natira
nung umalis po aka. Um ... pagbalik ko po wafa na po si Ma'am Caan [complainant] si Ma'am Amy
nafang po ang nandoon. Mr. Mendoza: So siya [complainant] nafang at tsaka si Atty. Nieva [respondent]
ang naiwan doon sa room? Eh nasaan na yung ibang OJT pa? Witness 1: Tatlo fang po kasi kami nun sir,
nasa Land Bank po yung dafawa. 29 See ro/lo, pp. 56-58. 30 See id. at 184-185. 31 Id.at75-123. 32 See
id. at 186-187. v Decision 8 A.C. No. 8560 Mr. Mendoza: So nasa Land Bank sila. So totoong may
nangyari na naiwan silang dalawa [complainant and respondent] na time na silang dalawa fang ang
naiwan sa kuwarto? Witness 1: Opo nung mga quarter to 12 siguro po nun. Mr. Mendoza: Jiang beses na
may nangyayaring ganun na silang naiiwan doon sa kuwarto? Witness 1: Yun fang po kasi yung
natatandaan ko po sir na time na naiwan sila eh. xx xx Mr. Abesamis: Umalis ka sa room para bumili ng
pagkain nandoon si Atty. Nieva [respondent]? Witness 1: Andoon pa po silang dalawa [complainant and
respondent]. Pero tapos na po silang magtype nun fas nag decide na maglunch na eh. Mr. Abesamis:
Saan? Sino ang naiwan? Witness 1: Dalawa pa fang sila sir pagbalik ko tatlo na sila pero wala naman po
si Ma'am Caan [complainant]. Nung umalis po aka si sir Nieva [respondent] tsaka si Ma'am Caan yung
nandoon then pagbalik ko po wala na si Ma'am Caan, si sir Nieva tsaka silang dalawa na po yung
nandoon. Mr. Abesamis: Ok. So wala na silang kasamang iba? Witness 1: Opo. 33 The same Transcript
also reveals that the CODI interviewed the occupants of the adjacent office, i.e., the CAAP Operations
Center, which, according to the IBP Investigating Commissioner, was only separated from complainant
and respondent's office, i.e. the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary, by glass panels. Pertinent parts of
the interview read: Mr. Borja: Nung oras ng mga alas onse (11) pagitan ng alas onse (11) hanggang alas
dose (12), nasaan ka joy [Witness 4]? Witness 4: Andun po sa ORCC [CAAP Operations Center]. Mr.
Borja: Si ano naman Donna [Witness 5] ganun din? Kasi sinasabi dito noong bandang ganung oras past
eleven (11) parang nag-advance yata si Atty. Nieva [respondent] kay Ms. Reyes (Caan) [complainant]
ngayon nung chinachansingan siya parang ganun ang dating eh "I raised up my voice also, so that the
OPCEN personnel will hear of the alann" may narinig ba kayo na sumigaw siya? Witness 4: Eh kasi sir
wala pong braket yun yung time na ano yung RPCC 764 so nag-cocoordinate kami ... 33 Id. at 83-84 and
89. y Decision 9 A.C. No. 8560 Mr. Borja: Ano yung 764? Witness 4: Yung sa Tuguegarao yung nawawala
siya so may alerfa tapos ditressfa so intransi po kami ... opo ... Mr. Borja: So busing-busy ka sa telepono?
Witness 4: Opo lahat kami. Mr. Borja: Pati ikaw? Witness 5: Opo. Mr. Borja: Sinong walang ginagawa
nun? Witness 4: Wala kasi kanya-kanya kami ng coordination lahat kami nasa telepono. Mr. Borja: Kaya
kapag kumakalampag yung pader [sa] kabila hindi niyo maririnig? Witness 4: Hindi siguro sir kasi kung
nakasara din sila ng pinto tapos kanya-kanya kaming may kausap sa telepono eh. Mr. Borja: Kung hindi
kayo nakikipag-usap ngayon wala kayong ginagawa, narinig niyo ang usapan doon sa kabila. Witness 5:
Yes sir. Atty. Gloria: Lalo na pag malakas. Mr. Borja: Pag malakas pero therein normal voice fang level.
Witness 4: Kasi minsan malakas din yung radio nila eh. Kung minsan kasi sir may mga music sila. Eto sir
yung time na kinuha ... Dami nila eh ... Lumabas nakita naming mga ano mga 10:45 na yan nabasa sir.
Mr. Borja: Pero ang pinag-uusapan natin lagpas ng alas onse (11) ha bago mag-alas dose (12) ang pinaka
latest message mo dito 02103106, 11 :06. So between 11 :06 to 12 wala kayong ... Witness 4: Kasi
nakikipag-coordination talaga kami kahit ... kami fang nandoon sa telepono. Mr. Borja: Written pero
voice coordination niyo sa telepono kayo? Witness 4: Tsaka naka log-in sa log book. xx xx Mr. Abesamis:
Ma'am Joy [Witness 4] sabi niyo kanina naririnig niyo si sir [respondent] sa kabila kung wala kayong
kausap lalong-lalo na kapag malakas yung salita? Witness 4: Opo. ~ Decision 10 A.C. No. 8560 Mr.
Abesamis: So ibig sabihin kahit hindi malakas may possibility na maririnig niyo yung usapan kung walang
radio? Siguro if intelligible or knowledgeable pero maririnig mo sa kabila? Witness 4: Kung mahina o
normal yung usapan? Mr. Abesamis: Normal na usapan, conversation. Witness 4: Hindi siguro pag
sarado sila. Mr. Abesamis: Pero kung halimbawa sisigaw? Witness 4: Maririnig siguro kasi kapag
nagdidictate si Attorney [respondent] minsan naririnig namin. Mr. Mendoza: Maski sarado yung pinto?
Witness 4: Ah opo. Mr. Mendoza: Naririnig? Witness 4: Kung malakas. Mr. Mendoza: Ah kung malakas?
Witness 4: Opo. Mr. Abesamis: So wala kayong naririnig man Zang kahit isang word na malakas doon sa
kanila during the time na nangyari ito? Witness 4: Nung time na iyan wala kasi kaming maalala ... Mr.
Abesamis: Walang possibility na narinig niyo pero mas busy kayo sa telephone operation. Witness 4:
Busy kami. Mr. Abesamis: Hindi makikilatis yung ano ... Witness 4: Kasi may time na sumigaw na babae
nga pero kala fang namin ah ... Mr. Abesamis: Nung date na iyon o hindi? Witness 4: Hindi, hindi pa
sigurado eh kasi ... Mr. Abesamis: Hindi yung date bang iyon ang sinasabi mo? Witness 4: Hindi kasi busy
talaga kami sa coordination nung ano eh nung time na iyon. Nasabay kasi eh nung time na iyon
hinahanap pa namin yung requirement. Mr. Mendoza: Pero bago yung bago mag April 2, meron ba kayo
na tuligan na nag-aanuhan ng ganun, nagrereklamo tungkol kay Atty. Nieva [respondent], wala? May
narinig kayong movie na parang sounding na porno ganun? ~ Decision 11 A.C. No. 8560 Witness 4: Wala
music Zang talaga sir. Mr. Mendoza: So music. Witness 4: Kung minsan kasi binubuksan nila yung door
pag mainit yung kuwarto nila. Mr. Borja: At that time hindi bukas iyon? Witness 4: Kami ano eh may
cover ng ano cartolina na white. Mr. Borja: Makakatestify Zang kayo sa audio eh, kasi wala kayong k"k"
34 na 1 1ta. The above-cited excerpts of the Transcript show that at around past 11 o'clock in the
morning of April 2, 2009, complainant and respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary as complainant's officemates were all out on errands. In this regard, it was error on the part of
the IBP to hastily conclude from the testimonies of complainant's officemates who were interviewed by
the CODI that nothing out of the ordinary happened. Surely, they were not in a position to confirm or
refute complainant's allegations as they were not physically in the office so as to make a credible
testimony as to the events that transpired therein during that time. Neither can the testimonies of those
in the CAAP Operations Center be used to conclude that respondent did not do anything to complainant,
considering that they themselves admitted that they were all on the telephone, busy with their
coordinating duties. They likewise clarified that while their office is indeed separated from the CAAP
Office of the Board Secretary only by glass panels, they could not see what was happening there as they
covered the glass panels with white cartolina. In light of their preoccupation from their official duties as
well as the fact that the glass panels were covered, it is very unlikely for them to have noticed any
commotion happening in the adjacent CAAP Office of the Board Secretary. Furthermore, the IBP should
have taken the testimonies of the witnesses in the CODI proceedings with a grain of salt. It bears noting
that all those interviewed in the CODI proceedings were job order and regular employees of the CAAP.
Naturally, they would be cautious in giving any unfavorable statements against a high-ranking official of
the CAAP - such as respondent who was the Acting Board Secretary at that time - lest they earn the ire
of such official and put their career in jeopardy. Thus, the IBP erred in concluding that such Transcript
shows that respondent did not perform the acts complained of. On the contrary, said Transcript proves
that there was indeed a period of time where complainant 34 Id. at 119-122. I Decision 12 A.C. No. 8560
and respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary which gave respondent a
window of opportunity to carry out his acts constituting sexual harassment against complainant. More
importantly, records reveal that complainant's allegations are adequately supported by a Certificate of
Psychiatric Evaluation35 dated April 13, 2009 stating that the onset of her psychiatric problems -
diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression - started after suffering the
alleged sexual molestation at the hands of respondent. Moreover, complainant's plight was ably
supported by other CAAP employees36 as well as a retired Brigadier General of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines 37 through various letters to authorities seeking justice for complainant. Perceptibly,
complainant would not seek help from such supporters, and risk their integrity in the process, if none of
her allegations were true. Besides, there is no evidence to establish that complainant was impelled by
any improper motive against respondent or that she had reasons to fabricate her allegations against
him. Therefore, absent any competent proof to the contrary, the Court finds that complainant's story of
the April 2, 2009 incident was not moved by any ill-will and was untainted by bias; and hence, worthy of
belief and credence. 38 In this regard, it should be mentioned that respondent's averment that
complainant was only being used by other CAAP employees to get back at him for implementing reforms
within the CAAP was plainly unsubstantiated, and thus, a mere self-serving assertion that deserves no
weight in law. 39 In addition, the Court notes that respondent never refuted complainant's allegation
that he would regularly watch ''pampagana" movies in his office-issued laptop. In fact, respondent
readily admitted that he indeed watches "interesting shows" while in the office, albeit insisting that he
only does so by himself, and that he would immediately close his laptop whenever anyone would pass
by or go near his table. As confirmed in the Transcript 40 of the investigation conducted by the CODI,
these "pampagana" movies and "interesting shows" turned out to be pornographic materials, which
respondent even asks his male staff to regularly play for him as he is not well-versed in using
computers.41 Without a doubt, it has been established that respondent habitually watches
pornographic materials in his office-issued laptop while inside the office premises, during office hours,
and with the knowledge and full view of his staff. Obviously, the Court cannot countenance such
audacious display 35 Id. at 9. 36 See undated Letter written by CAAP employees addressed to then-Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno; id. at 12. 37 See Letters written by Retired Brigadier General Miguel M. Villamor
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines addressed to: (a) respondent, id. at 17-18 (undated); and (b)
CAAP Director General Ruben F. Ciron (dated April 7, 2009); id. at 164. 38 See People v. Jalbonian, 713
Phil. 93, 104 (2013), citing People v. Manulit, 649 Phil. 715, 726 (2010). 39 See People v. Mangune, 698
Phil. 759, 771 (2012), citing People v. Espinosa, 476 Phil. 42, 62 (2004). 40 Rollo, pp. 75-123. 41 See id. at
91-93, 100, and 106-107. ~ Decision 13 A.C. No. 8560 of depravity on respondent's part not only because
his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the government agency he works for - the CAAP where he
was engaged at that time as Acting Corporate Secretary - but also because it shrouds the legal
profession in a negative light. As a lawyer in the government service, respondent is expected to perform
and discharge his duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill,
and with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. 42 However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to
showcase these standards, and instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of respect to the
government position he was entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by himself and
that he would immediately close his laptop whenever anyone would pass by or come near his table is of
no moment, because the lewdness of his actions, within the setting of this case, remains. The legal
profession - much more an engagement in the public service - should always be held in high esteem, and
those who belong within its ranks should be unwavering exemplars of integrity and professionalism. As
keepers of the public faith, lawyers, such as respondent, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those who
have taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the
consciousness and the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh, as respondent in this case. 43 In the
Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, the
quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was preponderance of
evidence. Preponderance of evidence "means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing
than that which is offered in opposition to it."44 Generally, under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, this evidentiary threshold applies to civil cases: SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how
determined. - In civil ~' the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (Emphasis supplied) 42 See Section 4 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES." 43 See Valdez v. Dabon, A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015, supra
note 26, citing Ui v. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691, 706 (2000). 44 Montanez v. Mendoza, 441 Phil. 47, 56
(2002). j Decision 14 A.C. No. 8560 Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon
45 cited by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the Court had pronounced that the burden of proof by
preponderance of evidence in disbarment proceedings is upon the complainant. 46 These rulings appear
to conflict with other jurisprudence on the matter which contrarily hold that substantial evidence is the
quantum of proof to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers. 47 The latter standard was
applied in administrative cases such as Foster v. Agtang,48 wherein the Court had, in fact, illumined
that: rTlhe quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence
required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of
evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." In
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a
mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.49 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Similarly, in Pena v. Paterno,50 it was held: Section 5, in [comparison with] Sections 1 [(Preponderance
of evidence, how proved)] and 2 [(Proof beyond reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules of Court states that
in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in
criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 51
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is
Cabas v. Sususco,52 which was promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced
that: In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof. Charges 45 589 Phil. 64 (2008). 46 See Spouses Rafols v. Barrios, Jr., 629 Phil. 213, 224 (2010);
Arma v. Montevilla, 581 Phil. 1, 7 (2008); Asa v. Castillo, 532 Phil. 9, 21 (2006). 47 See Sison v. Camacho,
A.C. No. 10910, January 12, 2016; Brennisen v. Contawi, 686 Phil. 342, 350 (2012). 48 A.C. No. 10579,
December IO, 2014, 744 SCRA 242. 49 Id. at 263. so A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 1. 51 Id. at
592-593. 52 See A.C. No. 8677, June 15, 2016. j Decision 15 A.C. No. 8560 based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence. "53 (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, this more recent
pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the proper evidentiary
threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of evidence - is more in keeping with the primordial
purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, "[
d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or
a prosecutor."54 With the proper application of the substantial evidence threshold having been
clarified, the Court finds that the present charges against respondent have been adequately proven by
this standard. Complainant has established her claims through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that is, that respondent had harassed her and
committed despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine, respondent should be
held administratively liable and therefore, penalized. Jurisprudence provides that in similar
administrative cases where the lawyer exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted penalties ranging
from reprimand to disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata, 55 the lawyer was reprimanded for his
distasteful act of suddenly turning the head of his female client towards him and kissing her on the lips.
In De Leon v. Pedrena, 56 the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years for rubbing the female complainant's right leg with his hand, trying to insert 53 Id., citing Dr. De
Jesus v. Guerrero III, 614 Phil. 520, 529 (2009). 54 Pena v. Aparicio, 552 Phil. 512, 521 (2007). 55 Supra
note 24. 56 720 Phil. 12 (2013). ( Decision 16 A.C. No. 8560 his finger into her firmly closed hand,
grabbing her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area, and pressing his finger against her private
part. While in Guevarra v. Eala57 and Valdez v. Dahan, 58 the Court meted the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs. Here, respondent exhibited his
immoral behavior through his habitual watching of pornographic materials while in the office and his
acts of sexual harassment against complainant. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court
deems it proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva is found GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of
this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance and be attached to
respondent's personal record as attorney. SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: ESTELA A~s-BERNABE Associate
Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice / ANTONIO ~ T. CAR Associate Justice TERESITA
~~~Ju~ J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice 57 555 Phil. 713 (2007). 58 A.C. No. 7353, November
16, 2015, supra note 26. PRESBITE~O J. VELASCO, JR. sociate Justice On leave ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Decision 17 ; ~~;:; Associate Justice JOSEC ENDOZA I\ / A.C. No. 8560 On official leave
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice On official leave BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice I~ -
FRANCISH .. Associate Justice S. CAGUIOA Cfari sf-ttD Xt:h;:.OX COPY: ~~~--~ '\:euPA B. ~NAMA CLERK
OF COURT, EN BANC SUPREME COURT