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Sanchez vs CA GR No 108947


“[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod,
Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of [herein private
respondent] Rosalia.
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez,
are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein
petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement
(Annex ‘D’, Petition) wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of
the late Juan C. Sanchez.

This compromise agreement was not approved by the probate court.


Is the Compromise Agreement partitioning the property of the estate without approval of
the probate court valid?


Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the
pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with
validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered
by said agreement. They add that Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all
minors represented only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus.
These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise
agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Being a consensual contract, it is
perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required
for its perfection. Petitioners’ argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of
judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals,]
where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
“It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A
compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting
of the minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599
[1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that
moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De
Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata
(Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa,
77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23 SCRA
762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76
SCRA 361).” (Italics found in the original.)
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a
valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they
each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was
executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second
drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969;
and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969,
followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process,
with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with
the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and
voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required
under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the
parties thereto.
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also
encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a “court shall
endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise.”
In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp
on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil
Code, they contend that the court’s approval is necessary in compromises entered into
by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children.
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already
consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their compromise. This Court
has consistently ruled that “a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it
has enjoyed its benefits.”By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from
questioning the validity of their compromise agreement.

Heirs of Reyes vs Reyes 139587 2000


Leoncia Reyes and three out of four children decided to execute a deed denominated
Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, hereby they sold the land and its existing
improvements to the Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco (Spouses Francia)
for P500.00, subject to the vendors right to repurchase for the same amount sa oras na
sila'y makinabang. Leoncia and her children did not repay the amount of P500.00.
Alejandro Reyes, one Leoncia’ grandchildren, repaid the P500.00 from the Spouses
Francia. By virtue of his payment, Alejandro executed a Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari,
wherein he declared that he had acquired all the rights and interests of the heirs of the
Spouses Francia, including the ownership of the property, after the vendors had failed
to repurchase within the given period. Nevertheless, Alejandro, Leoncia, and his father
Jose, Sr. executed a Magkakalakip na Salaysay, by which Alejandro acknowledged the
right of Leoncia, Jose, Jr., and Jose, Sr. to repurchase the property at any time for the
same amount of P500.00.

After Alejandro’s death, Amanda Reyes, the wife of Alejandro Reyes, asked his
deceased husband’s cousins to vacate the property because she and her children
already needed it. Respondents alleged that their predecessor Alejandro had acquired
ownership of the property by virtue of the deed Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin
executed on August 11, 1970 by the heirs of the Spouses Francia; that on the basis of
such deed of assignment, Alejandro had consolidated his ownership of the property via
his Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari; and that under the Magkasanib na Salaysay, Alejandro
had granted to Leoncia, his father Jose, Sr., and his uncles, Teofilo and Jose, Jr. the
right to repurchase the property, but they had failed to do so. he petitioners averred that
the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro
sale; that the mortgagors had retained ownership of the property; that the heirs of the
Spouses Francia could not have validly sold the property to Alejandro through the
Pagsasaayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin; that Alejandros right was only to seek
reimbursement of the P500.00 he had paid from the co-owners, namely: Leoncia,
Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr. and the heirs of Potenciana; and that Alejandro could not
have also validly consolidated ownership through the Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari,
because a consolidation of ownership could only be effected via a court order.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents declaring that Alejandro had acquired
ownership of the property in 1965 by operation of law upon the failure of the petitioners
predecessors to repurchase the property; that the joint affidavit executed by Alejandro,
Leoncia and Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr., to extend the period of redemption was
inefficacious, because there was no more period to extend due to the redemption period
having long lapsed by the time of its execution; and that the action should be dismissed
insofar as the heirs of Potenciana were concerned, considering that Potenciana, who
had predeceased her parents, had no successional rights in the property.

The CA reversed the finding of the trial court and ruled that that the transaction covered
by the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was not a pacto de retro sale but an equitable
mortgage under Article 1602 of the Civil Code; that even after the deeds execution,
Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and their families had remained in possession of the property
and continued paying realty taxes for the property; that the purported vendees had not
declared the property for taxation purposes under their own names; and that such
circumstances proved that the parties envisaged an equitable mortgage in the
Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are now barred from claiming that the transaction
under the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage by their failure
to redeem the property for a long period of time?

Held: No, considering that sa oras na silay makinabang, the period of redemption
stated in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, signified that no definite period had
been stated, the period to redeem should be ten years from the execution of the
contract, pursuant to Articles 1142 and 1144 of the Civil Cod. The acceptance of the
payments even beyond the 10-year period of redemption estopped the mortgagees
heirs from insisting that the period to redeem the property had already expired. Their
actions impliedly recognized the continued existence of the equitable mortgage. The
conduct of the original parties as well as of their successors-in-interest manifested that
the parties to the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli really intended their transaction to
be an equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.

Alaban vs CA


Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision
sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other
appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA.


W/N Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings

Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become
parties to the probate proceedings.

Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that
with the corresponding publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of

On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.

Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules.
Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or
to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported
infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.


Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for theprobate of a document alleged to be thelast will
and testament of HilarionRamagosa. Said document institutesMariano as the sole heir
of the testator.The petition was opposed by two SaturninaRamagosa, et. al, who
questioned the dueexecution of the document, claiming thatit was made under duress
and was notreally intended by the deceased to be hislast will and testament. Saturnino
andSantiago Ramagosa also claimed thatthey, instead of Mariano, were entitled
toinherit the estate of the deceased.After Mariano presented evidence andrested his
case, oppositors moved for thedismissal of the petition on the ground thatdecedent
revoked his will by implication oflaw six years before his death by selling theparcels of
land to Mariano Sumilang andhis brother Mario so that at the time of thetestator's death,
the titles to said landswere no longer in his name.On the other hand, Mariano moved
tostrike out oppositors pleadings on theground that the oppositors have no interestin the
probate of the will as they have norelationship with the decedent within thefifth degree.
The lower court ruled in favor of Mariano stating that the allegations ofthe oppositors go
to the very intrinsic valueof the will and since the oppositors have nostanding to oppose
the probate of the willas they are strangers, their pleadings areordered stricken out from
the record.

Whether the probate court should passupon the intrinsic validity of the will.
The petition being for the probate of a will,the court's area of inquiry is limited to
theextrinsic validity only. The testator'stestamentary capacity and thecompliance with
the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the onlyquestions presented
for the resolution ofthe court. Any inquiry into the intrinsicvalidity or efficacy of the
provisions of thewill or the legality of any devise or legacy ispremature (Nuguid vs.
Nuguid).To establish conclusively as againsteveryone and once for all, the facts that
awill was executed with the formalitiesrequired by law and that the testator wasin a
condition to make a will, is the onlypurpose of the proceedings . . . for theprobate of a
will. The judgment in suchproceedings determines and candetermine nothing more.
(Alemany, et al.vs. CFI of Manila)True or not, the alleged sale is no groundfor the
dismissal of the petition for probate.Probate is one thing the validity of thetestamentary
provisions is another. The firstdecides the execution of the documentand the
testamentary capacity of thetestator; the second relates to descentand distributionThe
revocation invoked by the oppositors isnot an express one, but merely impliedfrom
subsequent acts of the testatrixallegedly evidencing an abandonment ofthe original
intention to bequeath or devisethe properties concerned. As such, therevocation would
not affect the will itself,but merely the particular devise or legacy

Guevara v. Guevara Digest 98 Phil 249

1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his
wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a
natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there
any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the
land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did
nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a
portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and
based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not
probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its

Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Cuenco vs. CA G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973


Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed
a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but
this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have
acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied.
Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI


 Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

 Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings


The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.


Crispin Oben instituted special proceeding and prayed for the probate of the will
allegedly made by his deceased mother on May 13, 1924. The petition was opposed by Sabina
Rivera and prayed for the probate of the will of the deceased alleged made on May 11, 1930,
copy of which was attached thereto, and for the issuance, to that effect, of the order setting the
hearing thereof and directing such publications as required by law.
The court denied the motion for publication and ordered the Rivera to institute another
proceeding and apply separately for the probate of the alleged will. The respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and the court, on March 31, 19937, issued an order setting aside the
former one and directing that the will presented by the respondent be set for hearing, that the
publications required by law be made and that said will be heard jointly with the will presented
by the petitioner in the same proceeding instituted by the latter. Sometime later, the court
ordered that the expenses for the publications made in the newspapers be defrayed by the
The petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration which were denied and, finally,
instituted this certiorari proceeding. In order that the hearing and publications ordered by the
court may be carried out, the respondent, on July 20, 1937, deposited P24 and filed the original
of the will the probate of which had been sought by her.

Whether the court acquired no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter-petition for
the probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing of said will to be held in the same
proceeding jointly with the first will, on the ground that the respondent had not previously filed
her pleading nor paid the fees of the clerk of court.

YES. Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown by
evidence before it:
(1) That a person has died leaving a will;
(2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in the province where the court
exercises territorial jurisdiction;
(3) in the case of a nonresident, that he has left a estate in the province where the court is
situated, and (4) that the testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to the
court and is in the possession thereof.
According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that the court has
acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, in view of the presence of all the jurisdictional
facts above-stated. The respondent's counter-petition should, in this case, be considered as a
petition for the probate of the second will, the original of which was filed by her on July 20, 1937.
The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to be rendered by him in
connection with the probate of the second will and for the successive proceedings to be
conducted and others to be issued is not jurisdiction in the sense that its omission does not
deprive the court of its authority to proceed with the probate of a will