Ejectment

[G.R. No. 164246. January 15, 2014.]

HERMINIA ACBANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 01, SECOND JUDICIAL
REGION, TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, and SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI L. LOPEZ, respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J p:

To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment case, the defendant must perfect an appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and
periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon motion of the
plaintiff.

The Case

By petition for prohibition, the petitioner, a defendant-appellant in Civil Case No. 6302 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, in Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan, assails the order issued on March 31, 2004 by respondent Judge Jimmy H.F. Luczon, Jr. (Judge Luczon) granting the motion for
execution against her and her co-defendants on the ground that she had not posted anysupersedeas bond to stay the execution. 1 TCSEcI

Antecedents

Respondent Spouses Maximo and Heidi Lopez (Spouses Lopez) commenced an ejectment suit against the petitioner, her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr.
and his wife Jean (Acbangs) in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Alcala, Cagayan (Civil Case No. 64). The defendants did not file their answer. Thus,
the MTC rendered its decision on January 12, 2004 in favor of the Spouses Lopez, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and as against defendants as follows:

a) The plaintiffs are the true and lawful owners of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-139163.

b) The defendants are directed to vacate immediately the land in suit which is covered and described in TCT No. T-139163, copy of the title is marked
as Annex "A" of the complaint.

c) The defendants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

d) The defendants are ordered to pay the costs. 2

The petitioner appealed to the RTC.

In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal in the RTC, 3 alleging that the defendants had not filed
a supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion for execution pending appeal, 4 insisting that the failure of the Spouses
Lopez to move for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing
to stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond unnecessary. aASEcH

In his assailed order dated March 31, 2004, Judge Luczon granted the motion for immediate execution, viz.:

The Motion for Execution is hereby granted, there being no Motion to Fix Supersedeas bond filed by [the Acbangs] as of the date of the filing of the
Motion.

The opposition of [the spouses Lopez] on the appeal taken by [the Acbangs] is hereby denied because under the rules the loosing [sic] party may
appeal the case even if they did not post their supercedeas [sic] bond. [The spouses Lopez] then are given 15 days from today within which to file
their memorandum and [the Acbangs] are also given similar period to file their reply on the memorandum of [the spouses Lopez].
Afterwhich (sic) the case shall be submitted for decision with or without the memorandum from the parties.

SO ORDERED. 5

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, 6 stressing that the filing of the supersedeas bond was for the purpose of staying the execution; and that
she as a defendant would not be placed in a position to stay the execution by filing a supersedeas bond unless she was first notified of the filing of
the motion for immediate execution.

The RTC denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on April 26, 2004, 7 viz.:

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendant Herminia Acbang is denied, for the reason that the Court finds no cause or reason to recall the
order granting appellees' motion for execution.

There was no supersedeas bond filed by [the Acbangs], so the execution of the decision is proper.
As the office of the supersedeas bond is to stay the execution of the decision, the same should be filed before the Motion for Writ of Execution is
filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 THDIaC

The petitioner then brought the petition for prohibition directly in this Court on July 2, 2004, submitting that Judge Luczon thereby committed grave
error in granting the motion for immediate execution of the Spouses Lopez without first fixing the supersedeas bond as prayed for by the Acbangs.

It appears that the RTC rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 6302 on July 30, 2004, 9 finding that the petitioner had not received the summons,
and that the sheriff's return did not show the steps taken by the server to insure the petitioner's receipt of the summons, like the tender of the
summons to her; that the non-service of the summons on her resulted in the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over her; and that the MTC's decision
in Civil Case No. 64 dated January 14, 2004 was void as far as she was concerned. Thus, the RTC disposed as follows: SDEHIa

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court declares that the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, Cagayan dated
January 14, 2004 is null and void, as far as defendant Herminia Acbang is concerned.

The MTC of Alcala is Ordered to reopen the case and served [sic] the summons to Herminia Acbang and conduct the proceedings without any delay.

It is so adjudged. 10

In the petition, the petitioner insists that the Spouses Lopez's motion for execution pending appeal should be filed before she posted
a supersedeas bond. She argues that even if the MTC's decision was immediately executory, it did not mean that a motion for execution was
dispensable; and that the Spouses Lopez waived their right to the immediate execution when they did not file a motion for execution in the MTC.

On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez claim that the issuance of a writ of execution was ministerial because of the defendants' failure to file
a supersedeas bond prior to or at the time of the filing of their notice of appeal in the MTC.

Ruling

Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads: HAaScT

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately
upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed
from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial
Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment
of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal
Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there
until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of
opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above
prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure,
shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the
appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be
disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has
been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.

Here, there was no indication of the date when the petitioner filed her notice of appeal. Her petition stated simply that she had filed a "timely
notice of appeal which was given due course without the respondents filing a motion for execution in the Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, the court a
quo." 11 On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez filed in the RTC their motion for execution pending appeal on February 19, 2004. caAICE

The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals 12 is instructive on the means of staying the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him
arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending
the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond;
and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of
these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative."
Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would
automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected.
Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must:
(1) perfect an appeal; (2) file asupersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal.

Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an
order for the immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled to the immediate
execution of the judgment in view of the Acbangs' failure to comply with all of the three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate
execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the
sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals. ACETID

The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the RTC favored the petitioner because it declared the judgment of the MTC void as far as she was
concerned for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The RTC thus directed the MTC to cause the service of the summons on her and to conduct
further proceedings without any delay. In effect, the supervening declaration of the nullity of the judgment being sought to be executed against
her has rendered moot and academic the issue in this special civil action as far as she was concerned.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for prohibition for being moot and academic, without pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

|||

Ownership

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, petitioner, vs. DIONISIO UGAY, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the June 13, 2012 Decision 1 and the December 5, 2012 Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122153, entitled "Dionisio Ugay v. Anacleto C. Mangaser, represented by his Attorney-in-fact Eustaquio
Dugenia," a case of forcible entry and damages.

The Facts

On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Eustaquio Dugenia (petitioner), filed a complaint for
Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay (respondent) before the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union (MTC). In his
complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an
area of 10,632 square meters and covered by OCT No. RP-174 (FP-13787) and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707; that on October 31, 2006, petitioner,
discovered that respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a residential house thereon without his
knowledge and consent; that he referred the matter to the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa for conciliation, but no settlement was reached, hence,
a certification to file action was issued by the Lupon; and that demand letters were sent to respondent but he still refused to vacate the premises,
thus, he was constrained to seek judicial remedy. 3 AaEcHC

Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up the following defenses, to wit: that he had been a resident of Samara,
Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached the age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of land in that place then known as Sta. Lucia,
Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of land was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union due to a survey made by the
government; that he introduced more improvements on the property by cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a"bahay kubo"; that in
October 2006, he installed a fence made of "bolo" to secure the property; that in installing the fence, he was guided by the concrete monuments
which he knew to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner's property; that while he could not locate some of the monuments, he based the
boundaries on his recollection since he was around when these were installed; that he knew the boundaries of petitioner's property because he
knew the extent of the "iron mining" activities done by a company on the said property; that petitioner was never in actual possession of the
property occupied by him, and it was only on October 31, 2006 when he discovered the alleged intrusion; that it was not correct to say that he
refused to vacate and surrender the premises despite receipt of the demand letters because in his letter-reply, he assured petitioner that he would
voluntarily vacate the premises if he would only be shown to have intruded into petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to him;
and that instead of showing the boundaries to him, petitioner filed an action for forcible entry before the MTC. 4

MTC Ruling

On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent. 5 It stated that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied by
respondent was within his lot titled under OCT No. RP-174(13789). The MTC opined that petitioner could have presented a relocation survey, which
would have pinpointed the exact location of the house and fence put up by respondent, and resolved the issue once and for all. 6 It also explained
that petitioner failed to prove his prior physical possession of the subject property. The OCT No. RP-174(13789) registered under petitioner's name
and the Tax Declaration were not proof of actual possession of the property. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff (petitioner) having failed to establish his case by preponderance of evidence, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. 7

RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union (RTC) and the case was raffled to Branch 33.

In its August 23, 2011 Decision, 8 the RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. It relied on the cases of Barba v. Court of
Appeals 9 and Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 10 which held that in ejectment cases, possession of the land did not only mean actual or
physical possession but also included the subject of the thing to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right. The RTC stated that petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the property as evidenced by his OCT No. RP-174(13789)
issued in March 1987 and tax declaration, dating back as early as 1995. 11 It added that the boundaries of the property were clearly indicated in
the title, thus, there was no need to conduct a survey. As the owner, petitioner knew the exact metes and bounds of his property so that when
respondent intruded stealthily, he filed the subject suit. 12 STEacI

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, after a thorough perusal of the facts and evidence in this case, this Court reverses the decision of the MTC, Caba, La Union, dated
April 26, 2011 and rules in favor of plaintiff-appellant (petitioner) and against defendant-appellee (respondent), ordering the latter and all other
persons claiming rights under him to:

1. VACATE the portion of the subject property encroached by him;

2. SURRENDER actual physical possession of the subject portion peacefully to plaintiff-appellant;

3. REMOVE all the improvements he introduced therein;

4. PAY attorney's fees in the amount Php20,000.00 to plaintiff-appellant, and pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 13

Undaunted, respondent appealed to the CA.

CA Ruling

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Citing Quizon v. Juan, 14 it emphasized that petitioner must allege and prove that he was in
prior physical possession of the property in dispute. The word "possession," as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing
more than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. The CA wrote that petitioner was not in physical
possession despite the presentation of the OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax declarations. 15 It reiterated that when the law would speak of
possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de jure. What petitioner
proved was legal possession, not his prior physical possession. Furthermore, the CA stated that the RTC misquoted Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix
Solutions 16 by giving the wrong notion of what kind of possession was contemplated in forcible entry cases. In other words, physical possession
was the crux in forcible entry, not possession that stemmed upon ownership. 17

The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED, accordingly, the Decision dated August 23, 2011 and Order dated October
25, 2011, of the RTC Branch 33, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 2029-BG are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC dated April 26,
2011 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. 18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 dated July 6, 2012, but it was subsequently denied by the CA in a Resolution, 20 dated December
5, 2012. It reads:

This Court, after a meticulous study of the arguments set forth in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent, finds no cogent reason to
revise, amend, much less reverse, the assailed Decision dated June 13, 2012. The Motion for Reconsideration is, thus, DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 21

Hence, this petition, anchored on the following:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER WHICH MAY ESTABLISH PRIOR
POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY BY HEREIN PETITIONER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS VALID. 22

Petitioner argues that in ejectment cases, possession of the land does not only mean actual or physical possession or occupation but also by the
fact that a land is subject to the action of one's will or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right; that the CA should
have considered OCT No. RP-174(13789) his tax declaration as proofs of prior physical possession over the property; and that the issuance of the
same are considered to by law as proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Petitioner cited Tolentino, as one of the
authors and experts in Civil law, stating that the "proper acts and formalities" refer to juridical acts, or the acquisition of possession by sufficient
title, inter vivos ormortis causa, onerous or lucrative. These are the acts which the law gives the force of acts of possession. ETCcSa

Petitioner also avers that the December 5, 2012 CA Resolution was not valid as it did not state the legal basis required by the Constitution.

On May 28, 2013, respondent filed his Comment 23 before this Court. He stated that the issues raised and the arguments presented by petitioner
have been thoroughly resolved and ruled upon by the CA. The appellate court did not err in reversing the RTC decision because petitioner was never
in prior physical possession of the property in dispute. Respondent asserts that he has been in prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive
and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner of the property in dispute. 24

On March 28, 2014, petitioner filed his Reply, 25 reiterating the case of Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 26 where a party was able to
demonstrate that it had exercised acts of ownership over the property by having it titled in its name and by paying real property taxes on it.
Petitioner also laments the wrongful insistence of respondent that his possession over the property was one in the concept of an owner. To
petitioner's mind, respondent failed to adequately adduce evidence to show proof of his right to possess the property when his possession came
under attack with the filing of the subject case. 27

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they
were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the
time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. 28

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises, that is, to possession de
facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible,
except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. 29

As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not
possession de jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the
courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case." 30

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases 31 that while prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible
entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent's position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right. The case of Quizon v. Juan, 32 which surprisingly was relied on by the CA, also stressed this doctrine.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations,
succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. 33 The reason for this
exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession. 34 It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.35 Here, respondent
failed to show that he falls under any of these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was leased to him except that he
promised that he would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case of Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 36 the subject parcel was acquired by the respondent by virtue of the June 4, 1999 Deed of
Assignment executed in its favor by Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The petitioner in the said case argued that, aside from the
admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, the respondent's claim of prior possession was clearly negated by
the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof since 1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and said:

Although it did not immediately put the same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in its
name as of February 27, 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon alongside the sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in
the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003,
petitioner had already been occupying the land since 1999.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Hence, in that case, the Court ruled that such juridical acts were sufficient to establish the respondent's prior possession of the subject property.

The case of Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 37 also involves an action for forcible entry. On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji,
Inc. acquired a residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City, which was covered by TCT No. T-82338. On June 13, 1981, it transferred the said lot to
respondent DMC. Alleging that the petitioner forcibly entered the property in December 1993, the respondent filed on March 28, 1994 a complaint
for forcible entry. One of the issues raised therein was whether respondent DMC had prior possession of the subject property, to which the Court
answered in the affirmative. It ruled that:

Prior possession of the lot by respondent's predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution and registration of public
instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises
and deprived the former of possession thereof.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the subject property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance
of a free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987. 38 HaECDI

Before the Court continues any further, it must be determined first whether the issue of ownership is material and relevant in resolving the issue
of possession. The Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an
exception and is allowed only in this limited instance — to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. 39

This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership should be provisionally determined in this case. First, the juridical act from which the
right of ownership of petitioner arise would be the registration of the free patent and the issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the
Torrens title suggests ownership over the land. Second, respondent also asserts ownership over the land based on his prior, actual, continuous,
public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner of the property in dispute. 40 Because there are conflicting claims
of ownership, then it is proper to provisionally determine the issue of ownership to settle the issue of possession de facto.

Returning to the case, this Court cannot agree with the CA that petitioner's OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax declarations should absolutely be
disregarded. The issuance of an original certificate of title to the petitioner evidences ownership and from it, a right to the possession of the property
flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to the possession thereof. 41

Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession. 42 Together with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated 1995 onwards presented by petitioner strengthens
his claim of possession over the land before his dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent.

The CA was in error in citing the case of De Grano v. Lacaba 43 to support its ruling. In that case, the respondent tried to prove prior possession, by
presenting only his tax declarations, tax receipt and a certification from the municipal assessor attesting that he had paid real property tax from
previous years. The Court did not give credence to his claim because tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession.
The situation in the present case differs because aside from presenting his tax declarations, the petitioner submitted OCT No. RP-174(13789) which
is the best evidence of ownership from where his right to possession arises.

Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that he had prior, actual, continuous, public,
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of
ownership, the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of the subject property.

When petitioner discovered the stealthy intrusion of respondent over his registered property, he immediately filed a complaint with the Lupong
Tagapamayapa and subsequently filed an action for forcible entry with the MTC. Instead of taking the law into his own hands and forcefully expelling
respondent from his property, petitioner composed himself and followed the established legal procedure to regain possession of his land.

If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession, then it would create an absurd situation. It
would be putting premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens title holders, who spent months, or even years, in order to register their land,
and who religiously paid real property taxes thereon. They cannot immediately repossess their properties simply because they have to prove their
literal and physical possession of their property prior to the controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to resort to ordinary civil procedure
by filing either an accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria and undergo arduous and protracted litigation while the intruders continuously enjoy
and rip the benefits of another man's land. It will defeat the very purpose of the summary procedure of an action for forcible entry.

The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession
to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can speedily
settle actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances. 44
As to the other requirements of an action for forcible entry, the Court agrees with the RTC that petitioner had sufficiently complied with them.
Petitioner proved that he was deprived of possession of the property by stealth. The complaint was also filed on October 30, 2007, within the one
year reglementary period counted from the discovery of the stealthy entry by respondent to the property on October 31, 2006.

The second issue raised is the validity of the CA Resolution dated December 5, 2012. Petitioner alleges that the CA denied his reconsideration
without indicating its legal basis in violation of the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that no petition for review
or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. This
requirement, however, was complied with when the CA, in its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, stated that it "finds no
cogent reason to reverse, amend, much less reverse the assailed Decision, dated June 13, 2012." 45 aDIHTE

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2012 Decision and the December 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union, is
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

||| MINDA S. GAERLAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 11, 2010 and the Resolution2dated May 20, 2010 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CV No. 00319–MIN. The CA had reversed and set aside the Judgment3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, in LRC No. 92–05 and dismissed the application for registration of
title filed by petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan.

The records bear out the following factual antecedents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application 4 for original registration of title over a parcel of land known as Lot
18793, Cad–237 of Cagayan Cadastre, with an area of 1,061 square meters, more or less, and particularly described
as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A parcel of land situated at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City. Bounded on the North, by Lot 835, Cag. Cad; on the East,
by Lot No. 4342–A of Subd. Plan; on the South, by Lot 4342–K of Subd. Plan; and on the West, by lot 4342–C of Subd.
Plan with an area of ONE THOUSAND SIXTY ONE (1,061) SQUARE METERS more or less (Lot 4342–B – Sketch Plan).5

In her application, petitioner alleged that she acquired the above–mentioned property from Mamerta Tan in November
1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land.6 She had the property declared for taxation purposes
under her name and was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 7 and 058351.8 Attached to the application are the following
documents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Original Tracing Cloth Plan together with the three (3) Blue print copies; 9
(b) Technical Description of the parcel of land; 10
(c) Surveyor’s Report of Survey or Surveyor’s Certificate; 11
(d) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land; 12 and
(e) Tax Declaration No. 99893.13

After finding petitioner’s application sufficient in form and substance, the trial court set the case for initial hearing.

On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
Opposition14 to petitioner’s application for registration on the ground that (1) neither petitioner nor her predecessors–
in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; (2) the muniments of title and tax declarations attached to the petition do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fideacquisition of the subject land; (3) the claim of ownership based on
Spanish title is no longer available for purposes of registration; and (4) the subject land is a portion of the public
domain, hence, not registrable.

During the hearing, petitioner testified that (1) she is the applicant for registration of a parcel of land located at
Buenavista Village, Carmen, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, known as Lot 18793, Cad–237, Cagayan Cadastre, containing
an area of 1,061 square meters; (2) that she acquired said land through sale on November 28, 1989 from Mamerta
Tan; (3) that after the sale, she declared the property for taxation purposes under her name; (4) that she was issued
Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351; (5) that she has been religiously paying taxes thereon since 1989 up to
1991; and (6) that she took possession of the land and caused its survey. 15

Petitioner also presented Mamerta Tan who testified that she is the vendor of the land subject of the present application
and that she sold the land to petitioner in 1989. Mamerta averred that she became the owner of the said property in
1975 after she bought the land from Teresita Tan. She declared the property under her name for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 36942.16

Another witness, Mr. Honesto Velez, the City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, testified that he issued certifications or
certified copies of records on file in his office and he identified the certified photocopy of the Land History
Card17 pertaining to Cadastral Lot 4342, Case No. 4 situated at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City under the name of cadastral
claimant Potenciano Abragan. The history card started with Tax Declaration No. 1645 in the name of Potenciano
Abragan. Later, another tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 37129 in the name of Presentacion Eviota, was
issued. This tax declaration was subsequently replaced by Tax Declaration No. 37130. He stated that based on the
records in their office, it appeared that petitioner is the owner of Lot 4342. Another claimant is Presentacion Eviota
and the remaining portion was in the name of Potenciano Abragan. Presentacion Eviota was also issued a tax
declaration, Tax Declaration No. 124750 covering an area of 897 square meters, but not involving the same parcel of
land. Eviota’s land was only a portion of Lot 4342. The original area of the land claimed by Abragan is 12,293 square
meters.18

City Assessor Velez further testified that their records showed that petitioner possessed a 1,061–square meter portion
of Lot 4342 covered by Tax Declaration No. 058351. All the transfers made over portions of this parcel of land were
all recorded in the land history card on file with their office, thus paving the way for the issuance of corresponding tax
declaration to its new owners.19

Petitioner also presented and offered the following exhibits 20 to support her application for registration of title, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land,

2) Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351,
3) Tax Receipts,
4) Certified True Copy of Land History Card,
5) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano Abragan,
6) Tax Declaration in the name of Presentacion T. Eviota,
7) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano Abragan.

On November 20, 2001, the trial court rendered Judgment 21 granting petitioner’s application for registration of
title. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

There being no evidence presented by the oppositor, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding applicant Minda S. Gaerlan
as owner in fee simple of the land subject of this application and hereby decreeing that Lot 18793, Cad–237, Cagayan
Cadastre, containing an area of One Thousand Sixty One (1,061) square meters, more or less, be registered in her
name [in] accordance with the technical description attached to the application.

SO ORDERED.22

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed from the aforementioned decision asserting that the trial court erred in ruling
that the subject parcel of land is available for private appropriation. The appeal was docketed as CA–G.R. CV No.
00319–MIN.

On March 11, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision23 reversing and setting aside the ruling of the trial court and dismissing
the application for registration of title filed by petitioner.

The CA found that petitioner failed to present any proof to establish that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
The CA stressed that the applicant for land registration must prove that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable and that the land subject of the application falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or Community Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (CENRO). In addition, the CA held that the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. Moreover, the CA observed that there is no evidence on record to establish that petitioner, by herself or
through her predecessors–in–interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land and that she possessed the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Thus, the
appellate court ruled that petitioner is not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529.24

Hence, petitioner is now before us claiming that the CA erred in denying her application for registration of title.

Petitioner asserts that her predecessor–in–interest, Potenciano Abragan, possessed the subject property as early as
1929. She claims Potenciano was the one who asked for the original survey of Lot 4342, Cad–237 with an original
land area of 12,293 square meters, situated in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City. She averred that the property subject of
the present application consisting of an area of 1,061 square meters and known as Lot 18793, Cad–237, is a portion
of Lot 4342, Cad–237. In support of her claim, petitioner seeks to submit as additional evidence Bureau of Lands (BL)
Form No. 700–2A25 of the Land Management Services which conducted a survey on Lot 4342, Cad–237 on November
28, 1929 with Potenciano Abragan as the Cadastral Survey Claimant.

Petitioner also maintains that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and this land
classification has long been approved by the DENR Secretary. She points out that during the entire period of possession
of Potenciano Abragan, the subject land had already been classified as alienable and disposable land. To support her
claim, petitioner submits as additional evidence the Certification26 issued by the CENRO stating that a parcel of land
designated as Lot 4342, Cad–237 located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City containing a total area of 12,293 square
meters more or less falls within an area classified as Alienable and Disposable under Project 8, Block I and Land
Classification (LC) Map No. 585 certified and approved on December 31, 1925. She prays that she be allowed with
leave of court to submit the aforementioned document in support of her application for registration.

Furthermore, petitioner claims that she and her witnesses had testified on the issue of actual, open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, including the act of declaring the subject lot
for tax purposes in their names and religiously paying the taxes of the land to the government. Thus, petitioner argues
that the CA erred in not declaring that she is entitled to registration of the subject land.

Respondent, through the OSG, filed a Comment 27 asserting that only questions of law may be raised in a petition filed
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Respondent posits that in the present case, petitioner,
for the first time and only in the present appeal, seeks the admission to evidence of the following: (1) the Certification
dated July 16, 2010 issued by the CENRO in Cagayan de Oro City to prove that Lot 4342, Cad–237 located in Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City falls within the alienable and disposable area under Project No. 8, Block I and LC Map No. 585
which was certified and approved on December 31, 1925 and (2) BL Form No. 700–2A which shows that Potenciano
Abragan was the original claimant of the entire land denominated as Lot 4342 since 1929, to prove her supposed
acquisitive prescription of the contested lot.

Respondent argues that petitioner’s attempt to introduce additional evidence is impermissible as its introduction would
involve a review and assessment of the evidence on record. Respondent adds that the determination of the probative
value of evidence is a question of fact which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari . Petitioner
should have offered the aforementioned documents before the land registration court and while the case was pending
appeal before the CA as it is an appellate court with authority to receive evidence.

Moreover, respondent points out that BL Form No. 700–2A submitted by petitioner named Potenciano Abragan as the
original claimant of the entire area known as Lot 4342 but the same document does not show that petitioner is likewise
a claimant of a part of Lot 4342 or that she derived title to the lot in question from Potenciano Abragan. Petitioner’s
possession only started in 1989 when she acquired the lot from Mamerta Tan who in turn acquired the lot from Teresita
Tan. But there is no clear evidence showing how, when and from whom Teresita Tan acquired the subject lot.

Respondent cites the rule that the applicant for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his
predecessor–in–interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier. It is respondent’s contention that even if said BL Form No. 700–2A were considered in this appeal,
it would not help petitioner’s cause because the document is bereft of any information showing that petitioner has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Hence, respondent maintains that the CA properly reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling granting petitioner’s
application for land registration since petitioner failed to offer in evidence the necessary certification that the parcel of
land applied for registration is alienable and disposable in character during the proceedings below. Petitioner also did
not present any certification from the DENR or a certified copy of any land classification map in order to establish
irrefutably the fact that the subject parcel of land is, in fact, alienable and disposable. Respondent claims that in the
absence of such classification the land remains an unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.
Also, respondent avers that petitioner failed to present specific acts that would show the nature of her possession and
that of her predecessors–in–interest. The trial court’s decision merely relied on the testimony of petitioner and her
witnesses regarding the transfer of possession of the subject property from one possessor to another without, however,
adverting to the particulars of their respective possession thereof. To prove adverse possession, it is not enough to
simply declare one’s possession and that of the petitioner’s predecessors–in–interest to have been adverse, continuous,
open, public, peaceful and in the concept of owner for the required number of years. The applicant should present
specific acts that would show such nature of possession. Thus, according to respondent, petitioner has failed to
positively establish a registrable title to the subject parcel of land.

Essentially, the main issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s application for registration
of title.

Prefatorily, we address the issue raised by respondent that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari . Indeed, the principle is well established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be
raised.28 The distinction between a “question of law” and a “question of fact” is settled. There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and the question does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties–litigants. On the other hand, there is
a “question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put,
when there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is
a question of law.29 In Republic v. Vega,30 the Court held that when petitioner asks for a review of the decision made
by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their
sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.

In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented before us calls for a
review of the CA’s conclusion that the documents and evidence presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her
application for registration of title. Hence, the petition is properly filed.

Now, on the merits. Petitioner asserts that the land subject of her application has been declared alienable and
disposable in 1925 and that her possession through her predecessors–in–interest started in 1929. However, after a
careful examination of the evidence adduced by petitioner, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing
petitioner’s application for registration of title for the failure of petitioner to prove satisfactorily the requirements for
registration provided under the law.

P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, 31 as
amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 107332 specifies those who are qualified to apply for registration of land. Section
14 of P.D. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended provide
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

x x x x

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in–interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Based on the above–quoted provisions, applicants for registration of title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors–
in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3)
that his possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.33 Each element
must necessarily be proven by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence; otherwise the application for
registration should be denied.34

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable.35

To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a
certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must
show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original classification
of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. 36

To comply with the first requisite, petitioner submitted a CENRO Certification stating that Lot 4342, Cad–237 located
in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City falls within the alienable and disposable area under Project No. 8, Block I. Petitioner
also submitted LC Map No. 543 which was certified and approved on December 31, 1925. We, however, find that the
attached certification is inadequate to prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable. We held in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.37 that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the
land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the
land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable. We ruled in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.38

Thus, as it now stands, aside from the CENRO certification, an application for original registration of title over a parcel
of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land is indeed alienable and
disposable.39

In Republic v. Medida,40 the Court explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be considered prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached
an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.–Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of
a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS–DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect “entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer,” x x x. The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not
even records of public documents. x x x41

Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by petitioner to her petition deserves scant consideration since it was not
presented during the proceedings before the trial court or while the case was pending before the appellate
court. Petitioner only presented the said certification for the first time before this Court. The genuineness and due
execution of the said document had not been duly proven in the manner required by law.42 Also, generally, additional
evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or
where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. 43 In the present case, petitioner did not
offer any explanation why the CENRO certification was not presented and submitted during the proceedings before the
trial court to justify its belated submission to this Court.

As to the second and third requisites, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner failed to establish that she and
her predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land on or before June 12, 1945. Based on the records, the earliest evidence of possession that petitioner and
her predecessor–in–interest Mamerta Tan had over the subject property was only in 1975 when Mamerta Tan
purchased the subject lot from Teresita Tan. While Mamerta Tan testified that she purchased the property from
Teresita, the records are bereft of any evidence to show Teresita’s mode of acquisition of ownership over the subject
lot or from whom she acquired the property and when her possession of the subject lot had commenced.

In addition, Honesto Velez, City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, merely testified on the tax declarations issued to
certain persons including petitioner and Mamerta Tan as enumerated in the Land History Card of Cadastral Lot 4342
but his testimony did not prove their possession and occupation over the subject property. What is required is open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by the applicant and her predecessors–in–interest, under a bona
fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 44Here, it is not shown by clear and satisfactory evidence that
petitioner by herself or through her predecessors–in–interest had possessed and occupied the land in an open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious manner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Notably, petitioner attempted to convince this Court that Potenciano Abragan is her predecessor–in–interest and was
in possession of the subject property even before 1929. However, there was absolutely no evidence proffered by
petitioner that she derived her title to the property from Potenciano Abragan. Moreover, BL Form No. 700–2A attached
by petitioner to her present petition and sought to be submitted as additional evidence, does not in any way prove
that Potenciano Abragan was in possession and occupation of the property before 1929. At best, it merely shows that
it was Potenciano who requested for an original survey of the lot. More importantly, just like the CENRO certification,
BL Form No. 700–2A could not be given any evidentiary weight and value since it was not presented before the trial
court and its genuineness and due execution has not been duly proven. It must be emphasized that any evidence
which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it
is excluded and rejected.45

In fine, since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain; and (2) she and her predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier, her application for registration of title of the subject property under P.D. No. 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 11, 2010 and Resolution dated May 20, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 00319–MIN are AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.