The "Bi-lā Kayfa" Doctrine and Its Foundations in Islamic Theology

Author(s): Binyamin Abrahamov

Source: Arabica, T. 42, Fasc. 3 (Nov., 1995), pp. 365-379
Published by: BRILL
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 THE BI-LA KAYFADOCTRINE AND ITS FOUNDATIONS
IN ISLAMIC THEOLOGY

BY

BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

s is well known, the anthropomorphic expressions in the

Qur'an and the Sunna were generally treated by Muslim
scholars in three different ways. Some scholars adopted the literal
meanings of these expressions saying, e.g., that God has hands,
face, legs and that He sits on His Throne and descends every night
to the lowest heaven, and that He is angry or is happy'. On the
basis of Qur'an verses that God is unlike anything2, some others,
mainly rationalist thinkers, interpreted these anthropomorphisms
in a figurative way. Thus, God's hand stands for His power and
His sitting on the Throne means His rule over the world3. A third
group embraced a middle way according to which one has to accept
the sacred text as it is without trying to interpret its modality
(kayfiyya), This last attitude toward anthropomorphism (tasbhh)
occurs in Islamic theological works through the formula bi-ld kayfa,
i.e., without asking how, or without comment4. An important con-
tribution to the understanding of bi-Id kayfa was made by R.M.
Frank (<<Elements)>,pp. 155-160) who proved that in Arabic the
question koyfa applies to corporeal features, therefore any reference
to anthropomorphic expression with the addition of the denial of

I See e.g., Qur'an

38.75, 28.88, 20.5, 4.93. The Sunna literature is replete with
anthropomorphic traditions. For example: <<Godcreated Adam in His image>,
<(The Almighty put His leg in the Fire,>, )(The believer's heart is between two of
God's fingers,>. Al-Bagdadi, Usuil, p. 74f. Al-Sahrastani, Nihayat, p. 103f. Id., K.
al-milal, p. 77, 11. 15-18. Al-Razi, Asa-sal-taqdis, passim. W.M. Watt, <<Createdin
His Image,), pp. 38-49. For extensive collections of such traditions see al-Lalaka'i,
Sarh, III, pp. 412-430. Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wUl, pp. 204-224, 270-276. Ibn
Uuzayma, K. al-tawhzd, pp. 6-230.
2 See e.g., Qur'an 42.11, 112.4.
3 Abrahamov, al-Qdsim, p. 27. Id., Anthropomorphism,introduction.
4 (Affirmation de l'existence des attributs en refusant de s'interroger sur leur
mode (kayf)>>,L. Gardet and M.M. Anawati, Introductiona la TheiologieMusulmane,
Paris 1948, p. 66, n. 5.

? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1995 Arab9ca, tome XLII

366 BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

kayfameans to accept this expression as it is without attributing cor-

poreal qualities to God.
In Laoust's view the bi-ld kayfadoctrine is traced back to the Han-
balites. The Hanbalite scholar al-Barbahari (d. 941) defines exactly
the Hanbalite approach saying that God should be described as He
describes Himself and as the Prophet describes Him, without com-
ment on ((how>)and ((why>).According to al-Barbahar1, the origin
of this doctrine is the teaching of Malik ibn Anas (d. 795) and other
fuqahd5. Malik is reported to have made the following statement,
which, according to some sources, is a tradition going back to
Muhammad or to one of the sahdba. (<God's sitting on the Throne
(istiwdl)6 is known (ma'luim), but its modality is unknown (al-kayf
maghul). The belief in the istiwa' is obligatory (al-fmdn bihi wdgib),
and the inquiry about it is an innovation?>(al-su Idl Canhubid'a)7. The
idea of the affirmation of anthropomorphisms without commenting
on them appears in a creed ('aqfda) ascribed to Ibn Hanbal. The
term bi-ld kayfa, however, does not appear in it. Ibn Hanbal deals
with God's face which appears in some Qur'anic verses8. (<God,
may He be extolled and exalted, has a face unlike shapes which are
formed (suwar musawwara) and substances which are limited (a!ydn
muhattata), but a face which He has described in His verse:
'Everything will perish except His face' (Qur'an 28.88). Whoever
changes the meaning of the verse, deviates from it (alhada 'anhu).
It is a face in reality (haqfqa) and not in a figurative way (magaz).
God's face is eternal and will not disappear, it is His attribute (sifa)
which will not perish. Whoever claims that His face means His
essence (nafsuhu)is a heretic and whoever changes its meaning is an
unbeliever. Face in the Qur'an is not interpreted to mean a body,
or a shape or a limit. Whoever says so is an innovator9.?) The consti-

H. Laoust, La Professionde Foi D'Ibn Batta, Damascus 1958, p. 102, n. 3, p.

87, n. 1. By fuqahd' al-Barbahari seems to refer to the imams of the jurisprudent
schools, namely, Ibn Hanbal, al-Safi'i and Abu- Hanifa.
6 This statement refers to Qur5dn 20.5: <(The All-compassionate sate Himself
upon the Throne,, (tr. Arberry).
Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 132f. Malik's statement has several versions. See e.g.,
al-Bada-di, Usul, p. 113 in which God's sitting is intelligible (al-istiwa' maCquil).
8 See e.g. Qur5an 2.115: ?To God belong the East and the West; whithersoever
you turn, there is the Face of God,, (tr. Arberry). For a discussion of this issue in
a work of a Zaydite imam prone to Mu'tazilism see my Anthropomorphism,intro-
(luction.
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 'Aqida (according to the version of Abu Bakr al-Hallal),
ed. 'Abd al-'Azlz Izz al-Din al-Sirawdn, Damascus 1988, p. 103.
 BI-LA KA YFA 367

tuents of the bi-ld kayfa doctrine can be derived from this passage.
First, it is the denial of tasbah,both in its <<crude))form, i.e., God
is not a body, and in its <(soft))form, God has not a shape of a body.
Second, the word ((face))represents a reality and therefore it should
not be interpreted in a figurative way (ta wi7) or changed in any
other way. Thirdly, the word ((face))is an attribute, which means
that it is equal to other attributes of God like (<God is hearing)> or
(<God is Omniscient>>. And fourthly, the change of the meaning of
a Qur'anic expression amounts to unbelief. To sum up, on the one
hand, this method manifests God's incorporeality (against tasbah)
and the authority of the Qur'an (against ta'wal which, according to
the adherents of this theory means also ta'tal-i.e., divesting God of
His attributes), and on the other, it attests to man's inability to
know God's essence'0.
The proponents of the bi-ld kayfadoctrine had to defend it against
both the musabbihunand the mu'awwilun. Whereas they used a stock
argument against anthropomorphism, already developed by the
Mu'tazilites, to the effect that if God were like the created beings
He would also be regarded as created and hence could not be eter-
nal and God1", they had to set forth arguments to show why the
Qur'an and the Sunna must not be interpreted figuratively in order
to eschew tasbah.
An examination of the works of several Muslim scholars, begin-
ning with Ibn Qutayba (d. 889) and ending with Ibn Taymiyya (d.
1328), reveals a variety of arguments in favour of bi-lIdkayfa. These
arguments, which are based on scriptural as well as linguistic,
rational and philosophical considerations, are proof beyond doubt
of the efforts made by Muslim scholars to render this doctrine
sound and hence acceptable. The seeds of the justification of bi-ld
kayfa were sown in the ninth century, and the <<tree>> has grown

'0 Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism,introduction.

"1 This argument can be formulated in another way: Since any body is com-
posed of parts, whereas God is one, and since any body is produced in time,
whereas God is eternal, it is inconceivable to liken God to a body. Al-Baqillani,
K. al-tamhid, pp. 191-193. Al-As"ari, K. al-lumac f l-radd cald ahl al-zayg wal-bidac,
ed. and tr. R.J. McCarthy, in the Theologyof al-Asjcarl,Beirut 1953, p. 8, 1. 1, p.
9, 1. 18-p.10, 1. 8, p. 17, 1. 14. Al-Sahrastani, Nihayat, p. 105, 11. 8-10. Al-
Maturidi, K. al-tawhfd, p. 38, 11. 3-7. Al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (?), K. al-cadl wal-
tawhJd wa-nafy al-gabr wal-tasbih, in Rasa-il al-cadl wal-tawhzid, ed. Muhammad
clmara, Cairo 1971, I, p. 103.
368 BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

during the ages. In the following an attempt will be made to bring

forth and analyze these arguments.
First we shall see how the Qur'an and the Sunna and their inter-
pretations serve the proponents of bi-ld kayfa. Qur'an 21.23 is set
forth to show that one should not engage himself in asking ques-
tions about God, because ((He is not to be questioned about His
acts, whereas people are questioned (about their acts)>>12.Another
justification of bi-ld kayfa is based on Qur'an 14.27 which reads:
<<God does what He wills>). Abui Bakr Ahmad ibn-Husayn al-
Bayhaqi (d. 1066) cites this verse as a corroboration for the thesis
of the impossibility of knowing God's modality. (<Goddoes what He
wills)>means, e.g., that He descends to the earth as He wills, and
the conclusion implied is that His will cannot be known by man.
According to al-Bayhaql, one should know the literal meaning
(zadhir)of the anthropomorphic expressions of the Qur)an, but one
cannot reveal their inner meaning (batin). These expressions are the
ambiguous (mutasdbih)part of the Qur'an as against the self evident
part (muhkam) of it which one can know its real meaning'3. Like-
wise, al-Guwayni uses the same verse to show that in the Qurdan
there are secrets which people cannot know. These secrets have no
connection to the carrying out of the religious precepts'4.
Orthodox Muslim scholars also deny interpretations of
anthropomorphic expressions in order to draw the conclusion that
interpretation cannot be applied to these expressions and that they
should remain as they are. Using the Kalam device of division

12 Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 194.

13 Al-Bayhaqi, al-Asma' wal-sitdt, Ddr Ihya' al-Turdt al-Arab1, Beirut n.d., pp.
453-457. Id., al-I'tiqdd wal-hiddya ild sabfl al-rasad ald ma4dhabal-salaf wa-ashdb al-
hadft, ed. al-Sayyid al-6umayli, Beirut 1988, p. 94. Qur'dn 3.7 is the basis of the
distinction between self-evident verses and ambiguous ones. It reads as follows:
,,It is He who brought down the Book; in it there are self-evident verses (muhkamdt)
that are the basis of the Book (umm al-kitdb) and others that are ambiguous
(mutasabihdt). Those who deviate from the right way follow the ambiguous verses
for the purpose of [bringing about] dissension and of interpreting them (the
ambiguous ones). Only God knows the interpretation of these verses (wa-md
yaclamu ta wliahu illd allah). And the most erudite persons (al-rasihu-nfil-cilm) say we
believe in them (the ambiguous verses), each one (every ambiguous or self-evident
verse) is from God, and only the clever people pay attention to [it]>. For further
details concerning this verse, see Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism,ch. 2.
1 Al-Guwayni, al-Sdmilfzusiil al-din, ed. cAll Sami al-Nassar, Alexandria 1969,
p. 550f.
 BI-LA KAYFA 369

(qisma)'5, al-A'sarli denies the possibility of interpreting God's

hands (Qur'an 38.75, 51,47) either as His organs, or His favours
or His ability, and hence affirms God's hand without interpreting
its meaning'6. To this he adds a hermeneutic rule directed toward
the proponents of the figurative interpretation (magaz and elsewhere
ta)wd): the literal meaning of a verse should not be replaced by a
figurative meaning unless there is a proof which necessitates such
a change'7. It is to be noted that those who adhere to the bi-Ia kayfa
doctrine have as their principal opponents the adherents of the figu-
rative interpretation and not the anthropomorphists, who were a
minority among Muslim scholars. A hermeneutic rule against
magaz, is, then, a rule in favour of bi-ld kayfa.
A similar procedure is taken by al-Maturid1. All the possible
interpretations of anthropomorphisms are cancelled on account of
Qur'an 42.11, for if God is unlike anything, no attribute of this
world can apply to Him. Moreover, in the case of many interpreta-
tions, no one can state definitely which is the true one'8. This point
was further elaborated by Ibn Taymiyya. The proponents of ta)wil,
says Ibn Taymiyya, base their use of ta'wil on the argument that
reason cannot accept such notions as the people's seeing of God in
the world to come, the uncreatedness of the Qur'an, the Resurrec-
tion and God's sitting on the Throne. However, reason is not a
consistent device for solving such problems. This is proved through
their using of reason; some of them claim that reason makes a cer-
tain notion possible or necessary, whereas others, concerning the
same notion, say that reason makes it absurd19.
Let us now show how Ibn Taymiyya interprets Qur'an verses in
a rational manner to deny the figurative interpretation. The
reference is to al-Gazali's interpretation of God's sitting on the
Throne. According to Ibn Taymiyya, al-Gazall is one of those who
deny God's raising Himself above the Throne. Al-Gazall states that
this raising should be interpreted to mean God's ability over and

15 For this term, see J. van Ess, ,The Logical Structure of Islamic
Theology>,
in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G.E. von Grunebaum, Wiesbaden 1970,
pp. 40-42.
16 Al-As"arl, al-Ibana, p. 37.

17 Ibid., p. 39.
18 Al-Maturidi, K.
al-Tawhfd, pp. 67-85. Cf. Ibn al-Gawzl, Naqd al-Cilm wal-
ulama-'aw talbzs iblWs,Idarat al-Tib5ca al-Muniriyya, Cairo n.d., p. 85.
19 Ibn Taymiyya, cAqjdahamawiyya, p. 440. Cf.
Abrahamov, <Jbn Taymiyya on
the Agreement of Reason with Tradition,,, MW, 82,3-4 (1992), p. 259f.
370 BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

overwhelming the Throne or God's being better than the Throne.

Notwithstanding God's being above everything in the meaning of
rule and power, He is near every existent, and He is nearer to man
than the jugular vein20. God's nearness to man is understood by al-
Gazdll as His knowledge of him. Ibn TIaymiyya does not agree with
al-Gazdli for several reasons: a. Nearness is not expressed in the
language only through knowledge or ability; b. It is well known
through Qur'an verses (67.13-14, 20.7, 9.78, 43.80, 58.7) that God
knows the overt and the hidden things, so that there is no reason
to particularize the jugular vein in order to prove God's knowledge
of man; c. The structure of the verse (see note 20) proves that God
first affirms knowledge, and then nearness. Thus, nearness should
not be interpreted as knowledge; d. The following two verses
(50.17-18) which read: <<When the two angels (al-mutalaqqiydni)
meet together, sitting one on the right, and one on the left, not a
word he utters, but by him is an observer ready)> prove that those
who are near to man are the angels, who write man's deeds every
day, and not God's essence21. Consequently, the interpretation of
God's nearness to man as God's knowledge of him is out of place
here22.
The method Ibn Taymiyya adopts is very interesting, for he
proves here and in the following pages23 that some scholars have
recourse to figurative interpretation without justification, since this
interpretation is wrong from either the rational or linguistic point
of view. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya denies the using of ta)wil. This denial
proves the necessity of understanding the Qur'an verses according
to their context, which, in other words, means to describe God as
he describes Himself. It seems that the polemics of Ibn Taymiyya
against ta)wil aims at paving the way for the bi-ld kayfa system.
The rational use of a tradition in order to interpret another tradi-
tion also serves as a device for abrogating ta)wfl. Concerning God's
attributes, says Ibn Qutayba, we reach the point which God's
messenger reached. This means that one should not say about
God's attributes more than what the Prophet said24. The reason
20 Qur'an 50.16: ,We indeed created man; and We know what his soul
whispers within him, and We are nearer to him than the jugular vein>>, (tr.
Arberry)
21 Cf. al-Tabarl, XI, 26, p. 100.
22
Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 368-371.
23 Ibn Taymiyya, op. cit., pp. 372-397.
24
Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wil, p. 208.
 BI-LA KAYFA 371

implicit in this assertion is the notion that the sacred texts are per-
fect and hence supply the believer with what he should know, and
any addition to them is superfluous and leads to absurdities. Ibn
Qutayba refers to a tradition which states that the believer's heart
is between two of God's fingers. On the basis of God's otherness,
he rejects the anthropomorphic perception of this tradition. But he
also does not accept its figurative interpretation which regards
God's finger as His favour. His repudiation of this interpretation
is based on another tradition which speaks of the Prophet's prayer.
The Prophet said: (<O He who turns about men's hearts (muqallib
al-qulzib)25,fasten (labbit) my heart to Your religion!> Then one of
his wives said: <(Do you fear for yourself?>>Muhammad answered:
<The believer's heart is between two of God's fingers)). Now, says
Ibn Qutayba, if, according to their view, the heart is between two
of God's favours, and Muhammad is guarded by these two favours,
why did he pray to God to fasten his heart to the religion, and why
did he argue against his wife by quoting a tradition which affirms
her question? If his heart had been protected by two of God's
favours, he should not have feared. Therefore God's finger is not
His favour26. After rejecting both the literal and the figurative
interpretation of the text, there is nothing left but to accept it as it
is.
This kind of argument appears in Ibn Huzayma (d. 925). He
rejects the interpretation of God's hands in the Qur'dnic phrase
((God's hands are outspread> as God's favours, because such an
interpretation would mean that God has only two favours, which
is absurd27. Both the preceding and the present examples have as
their point of departure the adherence to the text, which if it is
abandoned, will bring about irrational conclusions.
For the purpose of defending the bi-ld kayfa doctrine, the Safi'ite
scholar al-Ldlakad: (d. 1027) quotes a tradition on the authority of
'Umar ibn al-Hattab. It reads: <(Thinkon (tafakkard)God's creation
and do not think on God!>>28This prohibition to deal with God's

25 This phrase seems to be derived from Qur'dn

6.110: .We shall turn about
their hearts (wa-nuqallibu af'idatahum) and their eyes, even as they believed not in
it the first time; and We shall leave them in their insolence wandering blindly> (tr.
Arberry).
26 Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wdl, pp. 208-210.
27 Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawhfd, p. 85.
28 Al-Lalakadi, Sarh, III, p. 524. Ibn
Qudama al-Maqdisi, ItbJt sifat al-uluww,
ed. Ahmad ibn CAtiyya ibn 'All al-Gamidi, al-Madina 1407 H., p. 155.
372 BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

essence is further elaborated by another Safi'ite scholar Abiu al-

Qasim al-Taymi (d. 1140) who quotes Ibn Mandah (d. 1004) as
saying the following: ((God's messenger ordered not to deal with
and discuss God through rational arguments and to avoid what
would bring about doubts)>29. According to Abiu al-Qasim al-
Taymi, discussing God's names and attributes and not keeping
silent about what the Prophet's Companions (sahdba) and their
followers (tdbi'uin)kept silent amounts to an innovation (bid'a)30.
The end of this statement alludes to the principle of igma' (general
consensus), which is one of the bases of Islamic jurisprudence. Here
it is the consensus of the first two generations of Muslim scholars.
The Ascarite theologian al-Guwayni (d. 1085) plainly states that the
Prophet's Companions and their followers neither interpreted
anthropomorphic expressions nor did they deal with figurative
interpretation. One has to follow the igma' of those scholars31.
After presenting arguments based on the Qur'an, the Sunna and
the igma'c,we shall now turn to the linguistic or logical argument.
The essential part of this argument is the use of the term <<common
name)). A common name is a name which applies to some objects.
It can be either a name of different objects which have no common
traits, or which partake of one or more attributes32. A common
name may have a different meaning in each object to which it
applies. Ibn Huzayma brings examples from the Qur'an to
illustrate this phenomenon. The word ((mighty>>('azaz) applies in
the Qur'an both to God and to men; the master of Yuisuf in Egypt
as well as Yiusuf himself are named mighty33. Likewise other words
(e.g., powerful- cazim,gabbdr, knowing-'al/m) which apply to God
apply also to men and to created entities. The same rule should be
followed when dealing with words such as face and hand which
apply to God. Just as ((mighty>?apply both to God and to men but

29
Al-Taymi, al-Huga, vol. I, p. 98.
30
Ibid., p. 104.
31
Al-Guwayni, al- Aqfdaal-niza-miyya,ed. Muhammad Zahid al-Kawtari, Cairo
1948, p. 23f. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, CAqfdahamawiyya, p. 464.
32 For the various kinds of common name, see Maimonides, Introductionto Logic
in the Hebrew Versionof Moses ibn Tibbon, (Milot Ha-higayon), ed. L. Roth, Jerusalem
1965, ch. 13. On one kind of common name, an amphibolous name, see H.A.
Wolfson, <(The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and
Maimonides>>, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 1, Cambridge Mass.
1979, pp. 455-477.
33 Qur'an 12.30, 78.
 BI-LA KA YFA 373

in different meanings, so <face>>and ((hand))apply both to God and

to men in different meanings. One does not know the real meaning
of mighty when applying to God, and therefore one cannot know
the real meaning of face when applying to God. It follows that there
is no ground for the thesis of the interpretation of the anthropomor-
phic expressions in a figurative way, for if each word in the Qur'an
which has double application (both to God and to created things)
brings about tasbfh, then whoever believes in the Qur'an is a likener
(musabbih), which is absurd34. Ibn Huzayma's implied conclusion
that without common names one can know nothing about God, and
hence the use of common names is a necessity, is stated plainly by
al-Maturidi (d. 944).
According to al-Maturidl, abstaining from using common names
leads to divesting God of His attributes (ta 'tfl), which means
ignorance of God, whereas affirming the literal meaning of a word
applying to God means taibih. Therefore it is necessary to employ
a middle way; to adhere to the common name while denying the
application of the usual meaning to God. Thus, God is a knower
unlike other knowers. In like manner, both the reward and the
punishment of the world to come are perceived by the people
through the Qur'an's speaking of the pleasures and injuries of this
world35.
The notion that using common names does not necessitate liken-
ing God to created entities is further developed by Ibn Taymiyya.
He says that if God were like man because both God and man are
designated as being knowing, living and compassionate, then every
existent would be like every other existent, because all existents
share the attribute of existence. Thus, that a thing takes part in one
attribute with another thing does not entail total likeness of the two
things. If this statement is right with regard to two created things,

34 Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawh'd, pp. 24-36, 84-85.

35 Al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid, p. 42, 11. 14-22. Cf. al-Gazall, al-Maqsad al-asna-
fisarh asma' alldh al-husna, ed. Muhammad Mustafa Abiu al-'Ala, Cairo n.d., p.
41. It is worth noting that with regard to the notion that the Scripture does not
set forth the real meaning of the world to come al-Maturidi's stand resembles the
philosopher's. Cf. R. Walzer, Al-Fdrdbi on the Perfect State: Abui Nasr al-FdrdbUs
Mabddi'Ara'Ahl al-Madina al-Fddila, a rev. text with intr., trans., and commen-
tary, Oxford 1985, pp. 474-480. But whereas the philosopher thinks that the
descriptions of the world to come are no more than symbols of the truth, the
theologican does not know what are the meanings of these descriptions.
374 BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

the more so with regard to God in relation to the created entities36.

The knowledge of the hidden things, says Ibn Taymiyya, is
attained through the existent things. One cannot know what is
power, knowledge or speech of another unless one knows these
things through his own experience. If this process did not take
place, there would be no possibility of learning, and a man would
know only the objects of his senses. Like al-Maturdfi, he brings the
example of the world to come which is described in the Scripture
in terms known to every man in order to make people understand
God's promise. In some aspects there is agreement and similarity
between the existents of this world and the existents in the world
to come. However, the difference between these two kinds of
existents, which are created, is known only to God.
In this context, Ibn Taymiyya uses the verse quoted above
(Qur'an 3.7. n. 13 above); <only God knows its interpretation)> (wa-
mdyaClamuta'wUlahuiladallih). The verse continues as follows: wal-
rasiLhuinfil-'ilmyaquluna dmanndbihi. The last sentence can be inter-
preted to mean either that those who are well rooted in knowledge
know its interpretation (the wa being a conjunctive particle waw
al-'atJ), or that those who are well rooted in knowledge say: ((We
have believed in it)>(in its interpretation), which means that they
do not know its interpretation. Now, according to Ibn Taymiyya,
these two interpretations are right, although at first sight they seem
contradictory, but refer to two different aspects; the first interpreta-
tion refers to the meaning of the words, which is known to those
scholars, whereas the second refers to the modality (kayfiyya) of
these words which only God knows (In this case the wa of wal-
rasihun is waw al-ibtidd' in the meaning of (<whereas>)).Conse-
quently, the forefathers (al-salaf), like Malik ibn Anas, explains Ibn
Taymiyya, said: God's sitting upon the Throne is known, but its
modality is unknown. According to him, the forefathers combined
these two interpretations to create this famous formula37. Another
tradition is set forth to corroborate the bi-ld kayfa doctrine. Accord-
ing to this tradition the Qur'an interpretation is divided into four
aspects: a. interpretation which is known through the language,
i.e., the knowledge of the literal meaning of the words; b. inter-
pretation which no one can excuse because of his ignorance, i.e.,

36 Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 75-77, 84f.

37 Ibn Taymiyya, op. cit., pp. 104-108.
 BI-LA KAYFA 375

the knowledge of precepts; c. interpretation which is known to the

scholars; d. interpretation which is known only to God38.
As we have seen, the use of the common names is important
regarding the people's knowledge of the world. But more important
is the knowledge gained through the common names concerning
God. The outcome of this knowledge is belief in God and the desire
to worship Him (Sarh, p. 111). Thus, common names have an
important function from the religious point of view.
In his al-Nuagafr baydnal-mahaga wa-sarh Caqfdatahl al-sunna, the
Saficite scholar Abui al-Qasim al-Taym1 reasons the use of the mid-
dle way (the bi-ld kayfa) through understanding the relation between
God's essence and attributes. He states that the discussion of God's
attributes (sifat) branches off the discussion of His essence (ddt).
Now, the affirmation of God's essence is only an affirmation of
existence and not of modality, hence the affirmation of God's
attributes is also only an affirmation of existence39. Abiu al-Qasim
al-Taymi does not explain why the discussion of God's attributes
branches off the discussion of His essence. This was done later on
by Ibn Taymiyya.
According to Ibn Taymiyya, in reality there is no essence which
is free from its attributes40. An essence which is free from its
attributes exists only in one's intellect. No one can affirm the
existence of a man without qualifying him through life, power,
moving, speaking, etc. Therefore, the forefathers called the deniers
of God's attributes (nufdt al-sifdt) the abrogators (mu'atilla), because
they abrogated God's essence, even if they did not know that their
notion of abrogating God's attributes entailed the abrogation of
God's essence. The connection between God's essence and His
attributes demonstrates the idea that the attributes cannot be inter-
preted and hence known, that is, for if God's essence is unknown
according to reason and the Qur'an (42.11: <<Thereis no one like

38
Ibid., p. 109. Cf. al-Tabari, I, 1, p. 26. Y. Goldfeld, <<TheDevelopment of
Theory of Qur'anic Exegesis in Islamic Scholarship,,, Studia Islamica 67 (1988), p.
18f. It is not our concern to discuss the four aspects in this tradition, but attention
should be paid to the overlapping of them.
39 Al-Taymi, al-Hugga, I, p. 175.
40 Ibn Taymiyya, Dar' tacdrudal-caql wal-naql, ed. Muhammad Rasad Salim,
Riyad 1979, III, p. 20. Cf. H. Laoust, Essai sur les doctrinessociales et politiques de
Takf-D-Din Ahmad B. Taimjya, Cairo 1939, p. 160.
376 BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

Him)> and 112.4: ((No one is equal to Him))), His attributes should
also remain unknown41.
In al-Lalakal the impossibility of knowing God is derived from
the impossibility of knowing the world. If we cannot know the
created beings, all the more so we cannot know the Creator42. This
argument is formulated in a slightly different manner in Ibn
Taymiyya: ((The proof of the intellect's inability to know the true
meaning of God's attribute (tahqzqsyfatihi)is its inability to know the
attribute of the smallest of God's created beings>43. On the other
hand, the understanding of processes which take place in created
beings helps man to understand the impossibility of knowing God's
attributes. Ibn Taymiyya regards motion as a genus which has four
species. These are: a. motion concerning modality (harakaffl-kayf).
It means the change of an attribute in a thing: a thing which is red
turns to be black. In like manner, one's knowledge after one's
ignorance is deemed a motion; b. motion concerning quantity
(harakaff 1-kam),e.g., a body which is small becomes big; c. motion
concerning state (harakafifl-wad'), e.g., the rotation of a thing in one
place. The millstone rotates in one place, but its state changes every
moment; d. motion concerning place (4arakajfI-'ayn), e.g., the pass-
ing from one place to another44. The three last kinds refer to bodily
features, whereas the first one can apply to changes in one's soul.
There is a difference between the motion of the body and the
motion of the soul. The soul is qualified by attributes which cannot
qualify the body. The same rule applies to the angels, whose
attributes and motions are different from those of the soul. Now,
the possibility that God, the most perfect of all beings, has
attributes which are different from the attributes of the created
beings, is more likely than the possibility of the difference of
attributes among the created beings themselves. The body's des-
cent is different from the spirit's descent, and God's descent is more
sublime than the descent of the former. Therefore, it is not impos-
sible that God descends from the Throne while the Throne is not
empty of Him45. Faithful to the bi-ld kayfa method, Ibn Taymiyya

4' Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 72-74.

42
Al-Lalakd'i, Sarh usud, p. 530.
43 'Aqjda hamawzjyya,p. 443.
44 Cf. Ibn Sind, K. al-Nagdt, ed. Magid Fahri, Beirut 1985, p. 143.
45 Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, pp. 301-304, 400, 445-455.
 BI-LA KA YFA 377

does not trv to explain how God descends, but only to demonstrate
that it is possibly different from the descent of other entities.
Another attitude toward bi-ld kayfa is advanced by al-Gazdll (d.
1 1 1 1). Adhering to his way of differentiating between the common
people (al-Cawamm)and the elite (al-hawdSS)46 al-Gazali states that
al-cawamm cannot understand figurative interpretation, hence the
bi-ld kayfa system is dedicated to them. However, the learned ones
are able to use the figurative interpretation47. Al-Gazall, thus, does
not explain the bi-ld kayfadoctrine but applies it to a kind of people.
In doing this, he differs from the As'arite tradition in which bi-Ia
kayfa and tawUl occur without such a differentiation48.

46
H. Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in al-Ghazzdll, Jerusalem 1975, pp. 353-355.
47 Al-Gazdli, al-Iqtisddfl-iCtiqdd, Cairo 1971, p. 26f.
48 On the differences between al-Gazali's teachings and the A'sarites) see K.
Nakamura, <Was Ghazali an AshCarite?,,, Memoirs of the ResearchDepartmentof the
Toyo Bunko, Tokyo 51 (1993), pp. 1-24.
A different reference to the common people in connection with the issue of
God's corporeality is made by Ibn Rusd (d. 1198). In his Mandhig al-adillafr Caqdaid
al-milla, Ibn Rusd states that one should follow the religious way (minhag'al-sar')
in dealing with anthropomorphic expressions. According to this way, and contrary
to the bi-ld kayfa doctrine, it is forbidden either to deny or to affirm these expres-
sions, and whoever of the common people asks about them will be answered
through Qur'an 42.11, and will be prohibited from asking. Ibn Rusd, Mandhig,
p. 172. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh, p. 258. Three reasons are brought forward in
favour of this approach: a. The Mutakallimzin's proof that God is not a body is not
demonstrative (burha-nzyya).Ibn Rusd, ibid., pp. 138-145. (According to the
Mutakallimu-neach body is generated, since it is composed of atoms (gawdhir) and
accidents (aCrd . Accidents are generated, therefore bodies, which are not free of
accidents, must also be generated. Cf. H.A. Davidson, Proofsfor Eternity, Creation
and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, New York and
Oxford 1987, pp. 134-146.) If it were demonstrative, most of the common people
could not attain it. Furthermore, the Mutakallimun hold that God is an essence to
which attributes are added (sifa-t zadida 'ald al-dc-t). (Ibn Rusd refers to sifdt
ma nawjyya. Cf. al-Guwayni, K. al-Irsdd ild qawatic al-adilla ft usil al-iCtiqdd, ed.
Ascad Tamim, Beirut 1985, pp. 51f., 77ff.) This notion entails God's corporeality
more than the denial of it. That is, since there is an attribute and a substance
qualified by this attribute, and this is the state of a body. Ibn Rusd, Mandhig, p.
166f. As a result, the Scripture does not state plainly that God is not a body; b.
The common people consider the existent as that which is perceived by the senses
and imagination, and that which is not perceived by them is nonexistent. Thus,
if they are told that there is an existent which is not a body, they will not be able
to perceive this existent through imagination, and hence they will consider it as
nonexistent. The more so, if they are told that this existent is neither outside the
world nor inside it, neither above the world nor below it; c. The denial of God's
corporeality brings about doubts as to some religious issues, e.g., the Resurrection
and the people's seeing of God in the hereafter. Whoever denies God's cor-
poreality denies His movement, which means that God will not come to judge the
people contrary to Qur'an verses (e.g., 89.22). Likewise, in stating that God is not
378 BiNYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

In this article we have seen how bi-ld kayfa has developed from a
mere formula in the Hadit literature into a doctrine based on vari-
ous kinds of arguments, some of which seem to be very convincing.
As we have seen, these arguments had a dual function; on the one
hand, they served as a weapon against anthropomorphism and
against figurative interpretation, and on the other, they aimed at
strengthening the thesis of the unknowability of God's essence and
attributes. Al-Gazall is an exception, for he considered the bi-ld
kayfa doctrine as a good device only for a certain type of people.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism= B. Abrahamov, Anthropomorphismand Interpreta-

tion of the Qur'an in the Theologyof al-Qdsim ibn Ibrihim, K. al-Mustarshid, Leiden
(forthcoming).
Abrahamov, al-Qdsim = B. Abrahamov, Al-IKdsimB. Ibrdhfmon the Proof of God's
Existence, Kitab al-Dalt al-KabTr, Leiden 1990.
Arberry = A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted,Oxford 1983.
al-As"arl, al-Ibana = al-AsCari, al-Ibdna can usul al-dajyana,Idarat al-Tibd'a al-
Muniriyya, Cairo n.d.
al-Bagdadi, Usiil = al-Bagdddi, K. Usuil al-dan, Istanbul 1928.
al-Baqillani, K. al-Tamhfd = al-Baqillhni, K. al- Tamhfd, ed. R.J. McCarthy,
Beirut 1957.
Frank, <Elements>> = R. M. Frank, <,Elements in the Development of the
Teaching of al-Ash'arl,, Le Muse'on 104 (1991), pp. 141-190.
Ibn Huzayma, K. al-Tawhfd = Muhammad ibn Ishaq ibn Huzayma, K. al-
Tawhid wa-itbdt sifdt al-rabb, ed. Muhammad Halil Harks, Beirut and Cairo
1988.
Ibn Kutayba, Ta'wil = Ibn Kutayba, Tawfl muhtalif al-hadat, ed. Muhammad
Zuhri al-Naggr, Cairo 1966.
Ibn Rusd, ManJhig = Ibn Rusd, Mandhig al-adilla ft caqdaidal-milla, ed. Mahmuid
Qasim, Cairo 1969.

a body, it is impossible to interpret the tradition concerning God's descent to the

earth (hadit al-nuzfJ). To sum up, according to Ibn Rusd, from a religious point
of view, it is better not to cancel plainly the literal meanings of the Book, for they
are more persuasive, and hence more believable, than the non-demonstrative
views of the adherents of the figurative interpretation. Ibid., pp. 171-174. Thus,
Ibn Rusd justifies his stand on the grounds of its being a pedagogical device which
aims at benefiting most of the people. The figurative interpretation is rejected
because it cannot serve the common people.
A similar stand was adopted by Ihwdn al-Safa' who permitted the common
people (considered by them as the unlearned) to use anthropomorphic expressions
in order to make them believe in God's existence and hence carry out his precepts.
Rasa-il ihwdn al-safid, Beirut 1957 (rep. of Hayr al-Din al-Zirikli's edition, Cairo
1928, III, p. 515. I.R. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists, An Introductionto the Thought
of the Brethrenof Purity (Ikhwdn al-SafJ'), London 1982, p. 40.
 BI-LA KAYFA 379

Ibn Taymiyya, CAqfdahamawzyya = Ibn Taymiyya, al-CAqfdaal-hamawiyya al-kubra,

in Magmu`at al-rasd'il al-kubra-,Beirut 1972, I, pp. 425-478.
Ibn Taymiyya, Sarh = Ibn Taymiyya, Su'dlfh kadit al-nuziil wa-gawdbuhu aw sarh
hadit al-nuziil, ed. Muhammad ibn CAbd al-Rahman al-Hamis, Riyad 1993.
al-Lalakd'i, Sarh = Abfi al-Qasim Hibat Allah ibn al-Hasan ibn Mansuir al-
Tabari al-Ldlakd'l, Sarh usuilictiqdd ahl al-sunna wal-g'amaca,ed. Ahmad SaCd
Hamdan, Makka 1402 H.
al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid = al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid, ed. Fathalla Kholeif,
Beirut 1970.
al-Razli, Asa-sal-taqdis = Fahr al-Din al-Razi, Asas al-taqdfs fi cilm al-kaldm, Cairo
1935.
al-Sahrastani, K. al-Milal = al-Sahrastani, K. al-Milal wal-nihal, ed. W. Cureton,
Leipzig 1923 (rep. of London 1846).
al-Sahrastani, Nihdyat = al-Sahrastani, Niha-yat al-aqddmft cilm al-kaldm, ed. A.
Guillaume, Oxford 1931.
al-Tabarl = al-Tabari, Gdmical-bayanfttafszr al-Qurdn, Beirut 1986 (rep. of Bulaq
1323 H.).
al-Taymi, al-Huga = Abu al-Qasim Ismacil ibn Muhammad ibn al-Fadl al-
Taymi al-Isbahani, al-N.ugaafitbayanal-mahaggawa-s`ar4caqidatahl al-sunna, ed.
Muhammad ibn Rabic al-Madhall, Riyad. 1990.
Watt, <Created in His Image,, = W.M. Watt, <Created in His Image,,, The Tran-
sactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society 18(1962), pp. 38-49.