Richard, Joselito and Darwin David, whom she saw for the first time, Joselito further said
lito further said that he and his childhood friend, Darwin David,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DARWIN DAVID,
RICHARD GACER and JOSELITO SUGALAN, accused,
DARWIN DAVID, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated February 6, 1995,
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136, in Criminal Case
Nos. 91-4009 to 11, convicting herein appellant Darwin David and his co-
accused Joselito V. Sugalan of the crime of rape as defined and penalized
by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Except for the sequence in the enumeration of the names of the
accused, the three separate informations for forcible abduction with rape
filed against appellant Darwin David and his co-accused, Joselito Sugalan
and Richard Gacer, were identically worded, as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of February 1991, and subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Darwin
David y Diaz, conspiring and confederating with Richard Gacer, who is still
at large, and one Joselito Sugalan and all of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, with lewd and unchaste design, lured aforenamed
victim Agnes A. Thomas into attending a certain party at 15353, Wawa,
Moonwalk, Paraaque, Metro Manila, when in fact, there was no such party
and upon arrival thereat, the accused by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the complainant against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Of the three accused, only appellant Darwin David and Joselito
Sugalan were arrested. Richard Gacer has remained at large.
Arraigned on September 13, 1991, appellant Darwin David and
Joselito Sugalan pleaded not guilty to the charge.[2]
As culled from the evidence of the prosecution, the facts were as
follows:
On February 5, 1991, 14-year-old Agnes Thomas was in front of her
employers house in Moonwalk, Paraaque when Richard Gacer and a
certain Ricky approached and invited her to attend a party later that night.
They agreed to meet at a nearby vulcanizing shop. Agnes knew Richard
as he used to deliver bread in the neighborhood.
At about 9:00 p.m. that evening, Agnes and her friend Pogi (the
brother of Ricky) met with Richard and Ricky at the designated place.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the house of Joselito Sugalan in Sto. Nio
St., San Agustin Village, Paraaque. Upon reaching the place, Agnes
asked where the party was but no one answered her. She asked to go
home but Richard and Joselito prevented her from leaving. Only brothers
Ricky and Pogi were allowed to leave. Agnes was then led to the sala (the
victim referred to this portion of the house as the terrace), after which
conferred with one another. A few minutes later, Joselito entered the sala
and offered Agnes a bottle of beer. When she refused to drink, Joselito
poked a fan knife at her and forced her to consume most of its contents.
After Joselito left, Richard came in and started to undress her. She tried to
resist but by then she was starting to feel dizzy. Before losing
consciousness, she felt that Richard was already on top of her. When she
regained consciousness, she found herself naked and Richard was
gone. Instead, she was alone with Darwin who poked a knife at her and
forced her to sit down. Then he took his turn raping her. She saw blood
oozing from her private part even before Darwin could insert his penis.
Agnes could only cry in pain after having been ravished twice.
After Darwin left, Joselito came in and asked her masarap ba? Then, he
raped her too.
While the whole incident was taking place, Joselitos mother,
grandmother, brother and cousin were in a room inside the house.
Subsequently, Agnes heard Joselito arguing with Darwin as to who
would take responsibility for their acts. The following day, Joselito told his
mother that Agnes would be staying with them. Joselitos mother asked her
if she wanted to marry her son but Agnes refused. Nevertheless, she
stayed with the Sugalan family for about two months during which Joselito
made her a sex slave. She complained about Joselitos physical abuses
but Joselitos mother who was herself afraid of her son, advised her to
endure her suffering. She was never allowed to go out alone. In one
instance, she attempted to escape when she attended mass with the
Sugalan family but Joselitos mother prevented her from doing so.
On April 5, 1991, Agnes succeeded in fleeing from the Sugalan
residence after Joselito physically maltreated and threatened to kill
her. From Paraaque, she proceeded to her Auntie Fe in
Malibay, Pasay City. She told her aunt that she came from work and that
she met an accident in Baclaran. It took her more than a month before she
could muster the courage to reveal what really happened, because of fear
of the Sugalans. Accompanied by her aunt, she reported the incident to
the police authorities and subjected herself to a medical examination.
The examination report on Agnes Thomas, prepared by Dr. Roberto
Simbalon, Jr., NBI medico-legal officer, showed the following: (1) there
were no extra-genital injuries at the time of the examination; (2) a healed
laceration was found compatible with the date of the first alleged rape and
(3) there were signs of probable pregnancy. Dr. Simbalon concluded that,
under normal circumstances, the healed laceration of the hymen was
caused by sexual intercourse.
Darwin and Joselito denied the charges against them. Joselito, 20
years old and single, claimed that he met Agnes on January 22, 1991 in
a peryahan. She became his girlfriend and live-in partner from January 29,
1991 up to the first week of April 1991. They stayed in Paraaque with
Joselitos mother, grandmother, brother and sister. He considered her as
his wife and the rest of the family treated her very well. To prove his claim,
he presented three pictures of Agnes with handwritten notes indicating her
birthday and a list of some of the clothes she left in their house.
Joselito alleged that in the evening of February 5, 1991, he and
Agnes slept in their room. Sometime in March, they had an argument
because of her jealousy. He slapped her, prompting the latter to leave the
house and file the present charge against him.
were members of a fraternity called NAKAJEDU or NK but denied having
known their co-accused Richard Gacer.
Julieta Valdez, Joselitos mother, testified that her son
and Agnes lived together as husband and wife in her house since January
29, 1991 up to the first week of April 1991. She met Agnes for the first
time in the early morning of January 30, 1991. Upon learning that Agnes
wanted to live with Joselito, she asked her if she wanted to marry him but
the former replied that she was too young and that she was afraid of her
aunt.
Darwin testified, in essence, that on February 5, 1991, he was with
his girlfriend (now his wife) from 6:00 p.m. up to about 12:30 midnight. He
came to know Agnes only through his friend Joselito.
After a thorough evaluation of the evidence, the trial court convicted
Darwin and Joselito of rape and sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of its decision read:
WHEREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing, the
Court finds both accused, Joselito Sugalan and Darwin David, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Rape and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua,
and to jointly and severally indemnify the offended party of the (sic) sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
As regard the accused, Richard Gacer, who remains at large and had not
been apprehended by the agents of the law since the filing of this case in
Court, let the case as against said accused be archived within a period of
ninety (90) days from today; thereafter, the same to be automatically
calendared for trial. In the meantime, let an alias warrant of arrest be
issued for his apprehension.
So ordered.
Hence, this appeal.
Meanwhile, Joselito Sugalan escaped from detention and has not
been re-arrested ever since. Thus, in a resolution dated October 14, 1996,
we dismissed the appeal of Joselito Sugalan considering that he was at
large.
Appellant Darwin David raised a single assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT
TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED VICTIM AGNES A. THOMAS AND
IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION IS WEAK AND NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following
principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult
to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (b) in view of the nature of the crime in which only two persons
are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with Q When this Joselito Sugalan poked you a fan knife, what A I did not know sir, I just felt that as if he was on top of me
extreme caution and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall happened next? sir.
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense.[3] The conviction or acquittal of A I drank the beer, and after a while he left the terrace, and I COURT
an accused, therefore, depends almost entirely on the credibility of the felt dizzy and then Richard Gacer came to the terrace.
victims testimony since, by the intrinsic nature of this crime, it usually Who was on top of you?
involves only two persons the victim and the accused.[4] Q And after that what happened next?
A Richard Gacer, your Honor.
A He told me to take off my clothes.
In this regard, the rule is well-settled that the trial courts conclusions FISCAL LANOT
on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great xxx xxx xxx
weight and respect, and at times even finality, unless there appear in the Were you wearing a party (sic) at that time.
record certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the lower Q Did you undress?
court overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, A I did not know.
would alter the result of the case.[5] The trial court is in a better position to A No, sir.
assess the credibility of witnesses, considering its firsthand opportunity to Q Why did you not know that?
observe their demeanor and manner of testifying during the trial. Q When you refused to undress, what happened next?
A Because I feel asleep, because at that time I was already
After a careful review of the testimonies of the witnesses in this A He forced me, he pulled my jacket. dizzy, sir.
case, we find no reason to overturn the trial courts assessment of the
COURT Q What did Ricky do on top of you?
victims credibility. We find her account to be truthful and credible, having
convincingly narrated in detail how the three accused took turns in Who did that? A I do not know, sir.
sexually abusing her that fateful night. In the words of the trial court, the
offended partys story is so replete with details, picturing in a step-by-step A Richard Gacer, Your Honor. Q Miss witness you said that this Darwin David followed, what
fashion how the three accused took turn(s) in ravishing her, thus: do you mean that he followed when you said he
Q What else transpired? followed?
FISCAL LANOT
A At that time I was fighting, I was fighting against him but I A After Richard abused me, Darwin followed him, sir.
Q Who actually detained you in the balcony? was already dizzy, I fell asleep, sir.
Q Miss witness why do you say that you were abused by
A Darwin told me to go to the terrace, sir. FISCAL LANOT Richard Gacer and Darwin David?
Q What exactly did Darwin tell you or when he asked you to For the record your Honor may I place that the witness is A Because when Darwin asked me to sit down, I was naked,
go to the terrace? crying, or her tears is (sic) falling down from her eyes. and at that time I was looking for my clothes but I did
not find my clothes.
A He said, Sandali lang, may pag-uusapan lang kaming tatlo. COURT
Q Did you feel anything when you saw yourself naked?
Q And when you said kaming tatlo to whom was he referring? Alright place that on record.
A Yes, sir.
A Richard Gacer, Darwin David and Joselito Sugalan. FISCAL LANOT
Q What did you feel?
Q After you were detained at the terrace, what happened And when you feel (sic) asleep, did you regain
next? consciousness? No answer
A One of them entered the terrace and asked me to drink A No sir, I did not regain consciousness. FISCAL LANOT
beer.
COURT Your Honor, for the record, the witness is crying unceasingly.
Q And did you drink beer?
When did you gain your consciousness? COURT
A I did not want to drink beer, but they threatened me to drink
beer thats why I drank the beer. A When Darwin followed Richard, Your Honor. Alright make that of record that she is crying unceasingly.
Q Who threatened you? FISCAL LANOT xxx xxx xxx
A Joselito Sugalan, sir. When Darwin followed Richard, what did Darwin David do to FISCAL LANOT
you?
Q How were you threatened? Now Miss witness you said you regained consciousness,
A I did not know, I just felt pain, sir. and when you regain (sic) consciousness your clothes
A He poked a fan knife at me sir. or you were naked and Darwin David was there, now
Q Miss witness, this Richard Gacer you said that he pulled Miss witness what did you feel, I was asking you then
xxx xxx xxx your jacket, and after he pulled your jacket, what else if
what did you feel on any part of your body?
anything did he do to you, before you loss (sic)
consciousness? ATTY. PUNSALAN
Your Honor may I object to that, on the ground that my Q And what did he do with his penis?
compaero here is actually leading the witness Your
Honor. The witness in fact, she has not felt any pain. xxx xxx xxx
COURT A He inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.
She felt pain, over-ruled. Q And how about Darwin David, you said he also poked a
knife on you before you were abused, now, was he
A I felt pain in my vagina. naked or was he dressed up?
COURT A He was still dressed up.
Now earlier you said you were abused by Richard followed Q What next did he do?
by Darwin, in what way did they abused (sic) you?
COURT
A They forced me, Your Honor.
You can shorten that fiscal, she said that the other guy also
FISCAL LANOT abused her, you are bringing her again to the same line
of . . . . .
In the case of Darwin David, how did he force you in abusing
you? FISCAL LANOT
A He threatened me with the use of a fan knife, he was poking Now Miss witness, I was asking you what exactly did Darwin
the fan knife at me. David do to you when you said after Richard abused
you?
COURT
A When I was still lying (sic) he asked me to sit down and
What did he want to do? then he poked the fan knife at me and he was already
taking off his clothes, he also inserted his penis into my
A He wanted to do it to me.
vagina, sir.
FISCAL LANOT
Q When Darwin inserted his penis into your vagina, what did
May I ask that the word pagsasamantala be quoted. What do you feel if anything?
you mean by pagsasamantala, you said gagalawin,
A I felt pain, sir.
what do you mean by gagalawin, what part or parts of
your body was to be touched or gagalawin. xxx xxx xxx
A My vagina, sir. FISCAL LANOT
xxx xxx xxx Okay, Miss witness after Darwin inserted his penis into your
vagina, what happened next, no, no., after he finished
FISCAL LANOT
abusing you and after he finished inserting his penis
Going back to my question to you Miss witness, you said that into your vagina, what happened next?
firstly this Richard Gacer abused you, now before he A After Darwin David left, I cried because I was already
abused you, what did you observed (sic) on him.
feeling pain then I saw Joselito Sugalan there.
COURT Q What did Joselito Sugalan do to you, if anything?
You know abused is still a conclusion. A He asked me masarap ba? but I did not answer him sir.
FISCAL LANOT
Q What else happened after that?
Was he naked or was he dressed up?
A He abused me too.
A Yes, sir, Richard Gacer was naked when he abused me. xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he was naked, what did you see on him, if
FISCAL
anything, aside from the knife that was being poked at
you? You said that Joselito Sugalan was there already and you said
he asked you did you enjoy, what happened next after
A His penis sir.
that?
A He forcibly abused me again but I tried to fight back but I
could not because he was strong, then because of that I
fell to the ground then on the ground I continued fighting
back and could not because he is (sic) strong and he
succeeded to (sic) insert his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q When Joselito Sugalan succeeded inserting his penis into
your vagina what did you feel?
A I still felt pain in my vagina.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL LANOT
After you were abused, you were raped by Joselito Sugalan,
what happened next?
A He told me if I would continue to fight back he would stab
me with the fan knife.
Q What happened next after that?
A After my head hit a stone on the floor, I stopped fighting
back and I decided not to fight back because he might
stab me.
Q After that what happened next?
A After he inserted his penis into my vagina, he left then he
talked with Darwin David, they said Richard Gacer had
already left.
Q Why did you say that Darwin David and Joselito Sugalan
were talking?
A I heard sir.
Q Did you see them talking?
A No sir.
Q Where were they when you heard them talking?
A Outside sir.
Q What happened next after that?
A One of them said who would answer for the thing that
happened but I did not see who said that, I heard they
decided that it was Joselito Sugalan who would answer
for what happened.[6]
Appellant points out alleged inconsistencies in the victims testimony
which purportedly negated any guilt on his part for the crimes charged:
1. The victim stated that when Richard Gacer and Ricky
invited her to attend a party on February 5, 1991,
appellant David was with them. However, in the later part
of her testimony, she declared that it was only Richard
and Ricky who accompanied her to Joselitos house.
 2. The victim stated in her direct testimony that she stayed in
the house of Joselito for one (1) month. But later on she
contradicted her former statement when she averred that
she left the house of Joselito only on 5 April 1991 or about
two (2) months from the date of the alleged rape.
3. The victim testified that when Richard ordered her to
undress and she refused, the latter pulled off her jacket,
and while fighting him off, she felt dizzy and lost
consciousness. However, in the later part of her
testimony, she declared that she saw Richard naked and
thereafter, the latter inserted his penis into her private
part.
The above inconsistencies were minor and trivial, and did not affect
the victims credibility. In her testimony, she consistently declared that: (a)
it was Richard and Ricky who invited her to the party and accompanied
her to Joselitos house and (b) it was there at Joselitos house where she
saw Darwin:
COURT
Who were your companions who were allowed to go?
A Ricky and his brother.
Q Where was Darwin David at that time?
A He was at the house of Joselito Sugalan, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Miss witness, will you please tell the Honorable Court on
that particular time of 9:45 in the evening of February 5,
1991, who were in the house of Joselito Sugalan?
A Darwin, Joselito, Richard Gacer, mother of Joselito
Sugalan, his grandmother, the brother of Joselito
Sugalan and his cousin.
FISCAL LANOT
What happened next after you were not allowed to go home?
Ah, you said you were detained?
A Yes sir.
Q Who actually detained you in the balcony?
A Darwin told me to go to the terrace, sir.
Q What exactly did Darwin tell you when you or when he
asked you to go to the terrace?
A He said, Sandali lang, may pag-uusapan lang kaming tatlo.
Q And when you said kaming tatlo to whom was he referring?
A Richard Gacer, Darwin David and Joselito Sugalan.
Regarding her stay at the Sugalan residence, the victim immediately
corrected herself by declaring that she stayed there for about two months,
not just one month. At any rate, Joselito confirmed her stay with his family
when he stated that he and the victim lived as husband and wife for two
months.
The victim likewise categorically testified that she saw Richard
naked and felt his organ in her private part before losing consciousness:
FISCAL LANOT
Going back to my question to you Miss Witness, you said that
firstly this Richard Gacer abused you, now before he
abused you, what did you observe on him?
COURT
You know abused is still a conclusion.
FISCAL
Was he naked or was he dressed up?
A Yes sir, Richard was naked when he abused me.
Q You said that he was naked, what did you see on him, if
anything aside from the knife that was being poked at
you?
A His penis sir.
Q And what did he do with his penis?
xxx xxx xxx
A He inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.[7]
In the case of People vs. Arafiles,[8] we ruled that protracted
examination of a young girl, not accustomed to a public trial, can produce
contradictions which are insufficient to destroy her credibility. On the
contrary, they may in fact serve as badges of truth, indicating that the
witness was unrehearsed.
Appellant contends that the absence of extra-genital injuries on the
victim was contrary to her testimony that she had been constantly
subjected to physical brutality from February 5, 1991 until her escape
on April 5, 1991.
We do not agree. The absence of any extra-genital injuries on
Agnes Thomas was explained by the fact that Dr. Simbalon physically
examined her only on June 14, 1991 or more than four months after she
was raped. Moreover, while there were no extra-genital injuries on the
victim, Dr. Simbalon nonetheless found a healed laceration in her vagina
and signs of probable pregnancy.[9] These circumstances were consistent
with her allegation that she was raped on February 5, 1991.
Appellant likewise disputes the presence of drugs in the beer that
was given to the victim, arguing that the record did not support this
fact. Our ruling in People vs. Del Rosario[10]squarely applies:
True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of any
sedative or drug in the drinks given to the victims which caused them to
lose momentary control of their faculties. But this is of little consequence
as the same is not an indispensable element in a prosecution of rape.
Under the circumstances, it suffices that the victim was found to have
been unconscious at the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her.
(underlining ours)
Appellant insists that he cannot be held guilty of rape because there
was no real struggle or determined effort on the part of the victim to resist.
She did not even shout for help or create any disturbance which could
have roused the other occupants of the house.
We are not persuaded. Rape is perpetrated when the accused has
carnal knowledge of the victim through the use of force or
intimidation.[11] Agnes testified that before she was sexually abused, the
three accused brandished a knife at her and threatened to kill her if she
did not give in to their lustful desires. The act of holding a knife, by itself, is
strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the
victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her to submission. [12] As stated in
the case of People vs. Paranzo:[13]
The Court has repeatedly held that rape is committed when intimidation is
used on the victim and the latter submitted against her will because of fear
for her life or personal safety. It is not necessary that the force or
intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could not be
resisted because all that is required is that it be sufficient to consummate
the purpose that the accused had in mind.
The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual
advances of the rapists was not tantamount to consent. Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation
are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attackers because of
fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether
a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. [14] Rape
victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while
others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. [15]Here, the
victim categorically testified that she was cowed into submission because
appellant pointed a knife at her and threatened to kill her. Moreover, she
was too helpless to resist the molestation as she was dizzy and weak
because of the beer she was forced to drink.
Finally, appellant questions Agnes credibility for reporting the
incident only after more than a month from the time she arrived at her
aunts place, when she could no longer hide her pregnancy.
The Court has consistently held that delay in reporting rape because
of threats of physical violence should not be taken against the victim. A
rape victim is oftentimes controlled by fear rather than reason. It is through
fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build up a
feeling of extreme psychological terror which will, he hopes, numb his
victim to silence and submission.[16] The present case of Agnes is no
exception. She was physically abused and constantly threatened with
death by Joselito. A girl merely 14 years old when she was sexually
assaulted could not be expected to act like an adult with the courage and
intelligence to disregard a threat to her life. We note that the only reason
for the victims prolonged stay in the Sugalan residence was the continued
presence of Joselitos relatives who were watching her and preventing her
from leaving.
Appellants defense of alibi cannot prevail over Agnes unwavering
positive identification of him as one of her abusers and tormentors. He
failed to establish the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the
crime. He merely claimed that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was with
his girlfriend (Glenda Mendoza, now his wife) in her house
until midnight. While Glenda executed an affidavit, nothing was mentioned
therein to corroborate appellants declaration that they were together at the
time the rape of Agnes took place. For his alibi to prosper, appellant must
prove not only that he was not at the scene of the crime but that it was
physically impossible for him to be there.[17] It was not physically
impossible for the appellant to be at the crime scene considering that his
house was within walking distance from that of Joselito.
Likewise, the defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of the
victim to falsely implicate appellant in a very serious case. As we have
said in a number of cases, no woman will concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private part and expose herself to the stigma
and humiliation of a public trial if she is not motivated by an earnest desire
to seek justice against the one who defiled her.[18]
The trial court failed to rule on the issue of conspiracy. We have
consistently held that conspiracy need not be established by direct proof
of an agreement by the parties to commit the crime. The conduct of the
malefactors before, during or after the commission of the crime is
sufficient to prove conspiracy.[19] In the present case, the following
concerted acts of the appellant and his co-conspirators revealed their
common criminal intent: (a) Joselitos house served as the hideout where
the accused raped the victim; (b) Richard was designated to lure Agnes to
Joselitos place; (c) Joselito forced Agnes to drink a drug-laced bottle of
beer purposely to weaken her resistance to the rape; (d) appellant and his
co-accused conferred with one another, before and after raping Agnes, to
decide on what to do with her and (e) there appeared to be a pre-arranged
order among the accused in raping the victim first Richard, then Darwin
and finally Joselito. These acts were indicative of a concerted design to
accomplish a common purpose to ravish and defile the victim.
Appellant Darwin David and his co-accused, Joselito Sugalan,
should be held responsible not only for their own unlawful acts but also for
the act of their co-accused Richard Gacer. In a conspiracy, the act of one
is the act of all. Hence, appellant should be held guilty of three counts of
rape.[20]
Under our penal law, whenever rape is committed by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death, a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on the appellant.[21]
The trial court awarded only P50,000 as moral damages in favor of
the victim. Moral damages are separate and distinct from the civil
indemnity awarded to rape victims. Hence, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, the amount of P50,000 should likewise be awarded to the
victim as civil indemnity in addition to the P50,000 already awarded as
moral damages. [22]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated February 6, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 in Criminal Case Nos. 91-4009
to 11 is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty and award of damages. The
appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and
ordered to pay the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral
damages for each count of rape or a total of P300,000. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-
Morales, JJ., concur.
COSCA
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
PER CURIAM:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo,
and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and
Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court
II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with
the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of
an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.[1]
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their
respective Comments.[2] A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by
complainants.[3] The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge
David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation
report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to First
Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited
himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge
Palaypayon, Jr.[4]
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents
of this administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out
under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even
without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were
able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano
P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte.
As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate
the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait
for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were
not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who
prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the
lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the
latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of
Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially
complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest
against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she
discovered that the court had a Marriage Register which is in the custody
of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the
marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and
that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for
this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file
copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy; but the
latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by
the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but
he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between
Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy
of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the
latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license
and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the
civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative
complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts
were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of
marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias ande Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay
and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were
not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence
of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina
Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests
but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains
unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of
marriages solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized
seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do
so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents
likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents
for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one
hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that
month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for
each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed
to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all
marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the
exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is
the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein;
that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as
solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She
further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial
Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged
difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those
payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she
collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50
is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary
Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme
Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report
were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in
charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of
marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that
the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on
solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for
are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only
six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with
the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who
should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees
because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this
case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to
be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge
contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly
report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court,
respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of
Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were
surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on
October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one
appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she
purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of
court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed
the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The
installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent
of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the
position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole
authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the
appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning
unit was bought from his co-respondent on installment basis on May 29,
1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He
claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item
which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza,
et al.," bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to
change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of
P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to
appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse
of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that
it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the
former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and,
later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is
deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to
withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archived for
failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite
notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond
as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention
prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is
accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former
escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the
case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated
April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never
employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate household help;
and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending
for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the
Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is
exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the
corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her
personal account.
Respondent Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon
Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed
her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank
issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine
National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit
the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the
same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted
P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge
Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and
Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative
matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably
impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of
the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating
judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said
report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by
logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the
material portions thereof.
xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a
marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte
(Exh. A), Alano Abeliano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D),
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage
contracts to show the number of the marriage was solemnized as required
by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting
parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge
Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except
that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their
marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under
Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract
and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage
certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized
by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of
Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge
Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show
that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days
after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage
license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband
and wife believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied
with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license.
He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was
no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did
not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they
merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a
simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened
because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties
that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing
the marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was
already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties
where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers
away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact
alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did
not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not
furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show
that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared,
among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and
whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his
table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c, K-4-d, K-5,
K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to
show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may
convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all
those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon
would allows himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a
marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for
the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of
him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it
appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and
in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge
Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that
it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not
required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they
have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was
solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two
(2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living
together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they
got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve)
been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin
as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve)
been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty
to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve)
executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by
avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage
license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he
solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he
did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the
Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Samba
did not follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage
certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and
Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise
to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only
made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as
there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed
the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage
under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required,
why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license when he
solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano
and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not
state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well
taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and
38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning.
Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the
marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his
personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under
Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties
(a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh.
C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and
Carrido and Sabater and Nacario executed joint affidavits that Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both
Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a
marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they
did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by
a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas,
to just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there
which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh.
f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2)
witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2).
Like the other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also
paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent
Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay
and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part,
respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When
she was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a
witness she answered that she thought the marriage was already
solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon.
She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two
principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not
even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This
is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the
marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their
witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization
fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due
to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of
William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony
(Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit
has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that
before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in
order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to
whom he assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already
let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what
happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others.
His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing
marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12; 2-
1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be
first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other
as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at
least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage
contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his
alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true
as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and
Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy
herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to
let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract
only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was
really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the
contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court
had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven
(7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases
for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4)
marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent
Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several
marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons
who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the
marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge
Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally
also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the
monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in
the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and issuing
the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently
proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July
and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for
July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for said month there
were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as
Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the
MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were
actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly
report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized
documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not,
however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the
notarial fee for the six (6) documents were paid. Besides, the monthly
report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should
not be based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial
fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and
checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he
relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has
assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the
monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is
required to have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report
of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is
personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil.
Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge
behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of
the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly
assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the
preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and
the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to
complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to
her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find
out the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly
report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that
he only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her,
still it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody
of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among
other things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was
supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all court records
including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for
Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she
was already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts
(TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this case in connection with the charge of
falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account
for what happened to the notarial fees received for those documents
notarized during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence
adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond
deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond
deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been
notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said
month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial
register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents
reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s)
that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for
each document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50.
Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being
charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the
Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent
to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document
notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of
P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself
declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own discretion
to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted
for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances
where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license
the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting
parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that
he did not know of any instance when solemnization fee was returned
when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her
some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only
because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference
of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows
that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she was
taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the
collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo
did not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and
September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she
made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his
possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this
matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing
memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-
3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond
deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash
bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit
this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it
in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case
where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle
the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned
cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case was
already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows
that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only
on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it
were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when
she finally deposited it because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara,
she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court.
It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she
withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993
respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an
annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept
this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not
deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her
explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that
they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost
two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release
of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond
deposits and other payments and collections she received. She further
admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to
place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X
(TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to
use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February,
1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing
official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed
Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift.
The evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August
24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen
Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same
was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air
conditioner was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of
Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought
and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment
of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents
presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt
was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was
bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant position
of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October,
1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991
until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet.
The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten
receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt
could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who
signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is
between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these
circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should
avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs.
Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond
deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara
without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this
charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00
cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no
probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00
found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a
temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention
prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped while in his
custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against
said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence
adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case
No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe,
accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on april 12, 1991 and
placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines sur (Exhs. O, 0-1, 0-2
and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by
Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was
confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is
solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of
the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants
should have presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that
Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he
was under detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of
Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim.
Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order
states: "This case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that
the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this
moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued
against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however,
show that in fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest
dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-
3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving
Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at
large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other
accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should
have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail,
but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is
true that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case
archived was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This
explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if
the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have been
required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the
explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an
order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be arrested when
the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this
case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another
circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really
escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not present
records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees
on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing
laws and that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy
in her personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on
February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for
collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section
14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from)
the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed
against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the
filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who
received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave.
On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The
records, however, show that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the
manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank
would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex
6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of
Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to
Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its
cases be submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the
payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer
on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with
her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the
complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having
been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his
clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being
submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and
September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two
(2) months were falsified with respect to the number of documents
notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or
similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license,
there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they
were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage
contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the
marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone
a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the
one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal
requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply
with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of
the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly
report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation tht he
only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court
already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely
supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly reports
prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held
that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence
of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-
Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of
cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the
number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the
notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed
to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not
solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for
unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued
unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991
in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued
only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank
of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five
months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for
withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April
29, 1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing it only on
July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary
receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the
Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the
Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4,
1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that
said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from
the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of
court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn
except by order of the court, x x x." (Revised Manual of Instructions for
Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A
circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an
official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter
deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer
and their deposits can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of
the court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of
Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982,
also provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including
rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court
concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of
such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court
exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars,
or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her
conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and
accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her
constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from
office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court,
MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it
was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her
custody; monies received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon
receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme
Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December
3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine
she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of
said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found
guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the
service.
xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee
should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.[5] Integrity in a
judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.[6] It applies, without
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its
personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics
and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently
provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein.[7] Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect
the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.[8]
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected
by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to
the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides tht "(p)riests or
ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." [9] This is
of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be
imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one,
with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's
concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from
civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses
charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious
degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on
respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., with a stern warning that any
repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be
severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the
Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground
(in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although
this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and
lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled
— exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case,
finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which
declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as
a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended
on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife
in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the
family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child,
and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would
be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on
April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert
Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than
three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her
child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well
as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code)
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding
that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application
of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct
on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause
the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives
of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses
to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it
did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court
of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us
that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to
be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based
on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically
fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was
a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of
the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court
takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative
and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3,
1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to
our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also
be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima,
Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban
but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I
maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on
the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage.
The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a
similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual
millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor
General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the
husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental
illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short
of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code
Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the
essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity
is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced
the following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent,
"it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable.
. . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February
9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase."
He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion
of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning. that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with "Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law. nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of
proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
the time of the ceremony.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in
opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions
the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
lack of valid consent.
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing. The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was
an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
causes.
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
— freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
live-in relationships. intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code —
and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
initio or totally in existent from the beginning. incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal
required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an
the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and
adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are
distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion'
rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity
and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the
for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a
person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in
isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other
spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to
the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to
the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for
an annulment on any other terms. A situation that
does not fit into any of the more traditional categories
often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are
already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to
exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage
(lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out
their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure
out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V.
marriage was entered into.4 Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines
that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the
failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is the time of the celebration, was psychologically
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting. incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this
solemnization.
Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in
declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the
husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the
wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the
fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
the lower court to declare the marriage null.
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the provision was taken from Canon Law.1
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law —
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
contracting marriage; (those) —
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is 1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
sign of psychological incapacity.
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
We declared:
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage —
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court. an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory
enactment.2
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid
and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses. provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one
must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care
VITUG, J., concurring:
must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in
nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur
only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned
Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of
absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to
divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed
turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself,
no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant
not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set.
The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be
considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the
constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to
be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience,
but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban
but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appealsand Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I
maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on
the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage.
The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a
similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual
millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor
General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the
husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental
illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short
of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the
marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code
Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the
essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity
is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
 marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced
the following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent,
"it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable.
. . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February
9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase."
He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion
of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity
becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage
as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence its special
treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with
the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in
the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into
another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
— freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but
yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into
live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code —
and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab
initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while
it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized
the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of
the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and
fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in
order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two
distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion'
and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the
person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
weddingand therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means
that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of
proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid
consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who
had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this
change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves
shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at
the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was
an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an
adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are
rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity
for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a
physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in
isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other
spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to
the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to
the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on
any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
category.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.
was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem
to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their
responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due VITUG, J., concurring:
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V.
someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promisedat the
time the marriage was entered into.4 Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines
that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the
failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this solemnization.
Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in
declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the
husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his
U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it
was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to (T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the
fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
the lower court to declare the marriage null. tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.1
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded: Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law —
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, contracting marriage; (those) —
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is 1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
sign of psychological incapacity. duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
We declared: 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage —
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
 that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as
an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory
enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several
provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one
must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care
must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in
nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur
only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned
Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of
absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to
divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed
turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself,
no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant
not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set.
The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be
considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the
constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to
be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience,
but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of
Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved
to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the
two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound,
La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he
was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long.
It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work
as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after
her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first
time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April
up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding
of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case
No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it
was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of
their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in
its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of
the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for
its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least
to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the
import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon
Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that
one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is
more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet
the latter would make the marriage null and void and
the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested
that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party
who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was
wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which
is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also
a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity"
only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in
insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is
the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages,
while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but
to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted,
with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7)
refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with
another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies
in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment
in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages
under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean
Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the
defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is
"insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the
phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of
the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known
these completely, he might not have consented to the
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit
added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the
case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect
in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable. He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.)
Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to
the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general
is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a
valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of
the validity of the marriage celebration and the
obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they
require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of
age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice
Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is
still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there
should be no prescription. In other words, as long as
the defect has not been cured, there is always a right
to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is
still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect
in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that
there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of
the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of
the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical
incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to
a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked
that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply
with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is
still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to
be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, which incapacity
continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out
that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on
he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to
remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be
substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization"
be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental
and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are
vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not
a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter
in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz
indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of
some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express
it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word
"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special
case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there
having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not
reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground
even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the
church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37
should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity
because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a
vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero
were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof.
Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be
filed in court. The Committee approved the Those who cannot assume the
suggestion.7 essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-
sexual anomaly (ob gravem
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
anomaliam psychosexualem) are
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
unable to contract marriage
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new
its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
canon, novus);
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
then a broader one followed:
The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of . . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob
examples would limit the applicability of the provision gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the canon 1049);
Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
then the same wording was retained in the text
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the finally, a new version was promulgated:
provision was taken from Canon Law.
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon causas naturae psychiae).
Law,9 which reads:
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
marriage: altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect
to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of marriage.
judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
(Emphasis supplied.)
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid,
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on This particular type of incapacity consists of a
how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states: real inability to render what is due by the contract.
This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which
The history of the drafting of this canon does not
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed,
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
proposed first:
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation
and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
 difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could
be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person
from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to
R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to
be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and consequently of the possibility of
being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso,
a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is
that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus
of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we
still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave
Separate Opinion
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr.
Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of
this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that
there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does
not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the
intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the
grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the
doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their
marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this
contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to
my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the
United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract
expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is
there any showing that she informed her husband
(herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a
mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to
 "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts
on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on
the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5)
years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans
to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court,
Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who
has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and
submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is
a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part
of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may
also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and
wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses
always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such
cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband,
or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she
does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has
she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations, although these indications were made
manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the
transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to
non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner,
an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage
between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to
have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee
of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated
April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of
the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee
had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of
the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and
the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years
of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a
decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft
of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated
the definition of marriage as —
"a special contract of permanent
partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in
accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the
marriage within the limits
provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did
not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law
of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid
the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as
found in the present Civil Code and those proposed
by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was
the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in
the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil
Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted
by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a
marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a
 final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice
to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for
the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages
in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as
well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz
of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that,
in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the
foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly.
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to
those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-
to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of
what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee
feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that
the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested
later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other
provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the
judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be
guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the
inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal
which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties,
fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of
putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision
since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the
manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and
distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr.
Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of
this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that
there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does
not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the
intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the
grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the
doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their
marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this
contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to
my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the
United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract
expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is
there any showing that she informed her husband
(herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a
mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to
"touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts
on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on
the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5)
years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans
to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court,
Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who
has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and
submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is
a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part
of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may
also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and
wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses
always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such
cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband,
or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she
does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has
she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations, although these indications were made
manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the
transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to
non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner,
an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage
between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to
have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee
of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated
April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of
the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee
had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of
the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and
the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years
of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a
decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft
of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated
the definition of marriage as —
"a special contract of permanent
partnership between a man and a
woman entered into
accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the
marriage within the
provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did
not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law
of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid
the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as
found in the present Civil Code and those proposed
by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was
the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in
the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil
Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted
by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the
celebration."
in as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a
marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice
that
to the provision of Article 34."
limits "Art. 33. The action or defense for
the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages
in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as
well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz
of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that,
in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the
foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly.
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to
those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-
to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of
what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee
feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that
the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested
later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other
provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the
judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be
guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the
inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal
which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties,
fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of
putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision
since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the
manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and
distinct from the other.
ARSENIO DE LORIA AND RICARDA DE LORIA,
PETITIONERS, VS. FELIPE APELAN FELIX,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of
the validity of the marriage in articulo mortis between. Matea de la Cruz
and Felipe Apelan Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two
persons lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City.
They acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the
liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea became seriously ill.
Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to
the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra[1] visited
and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo
Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the
penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of
marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of
his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of
the bedridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the
Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with
Felipe Apelan Felix in articilo mortis,[2] Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30,
1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not
to be denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same
Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this
complaint to compel defendant to render an accounting and to deliver the
properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la
Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the
latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance,
but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider
the legal question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed
brief whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in
the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.
"There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo
Bautista, solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan
Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the
circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a
respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no reason to side one or the
other. * * * Notwithstanding this positive evidence on. the celebration or
performance of the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that
that the same was not in articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was
not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, however, that
her condition at the time was bad; she was bedridden; and according to
his observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive
was he about her condition that he decided in administering to her the
sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing her confession, x x x .The
greatest objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the validity of
the marriage tinder consideration, is the admitted fact that it was not
registered.'
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929
(Act No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936)
specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21. There is no question about the
officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage.
There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract
marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales
and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple
the witnesses and the priest, as required by section 3 of the
Marriage Law; and
The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the
(b)
local civil registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition no signing may seriously be
doubted. The Court of Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if
anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage contract to have been
executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the
only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send
copies of the certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar
and to register the said marriage in the Record of Marriages of the Pasay
Catholic Church * * * renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the
only issue tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on
Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign
the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the
Marriage Law which provides:
"Sec.3. Mutual Consent. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage
is required, but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must
declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of
two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and
wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed
by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. * * *." (Italics ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30
enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the
marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the
parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife"
which in this case actually occurred.[3] We think the signing of the marriage
contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of
evidencing the act.[4] No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited
making it an essential requisite not the formal requirement of evidentiary
value, which we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof
by which it may be established is quite another.
"Certificate and Record. Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage
usually provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the
registration or recording of marriage * * * Generally speaking, the
registration or recording of a marriage is not essential to its validity, the
statute being addressed to the officials issuing the license, certifying the
marriage, and making the proper return and registration or recording."
(Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)
"Formal Requisites. * * *The general rule, however, is that statutes which
direct that a license must be issued and procured, that only certain
persons shall perform the ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses
shall be present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be signed,
returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the conditions shall be
guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority to
secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage
contract. Such statutes do not voidcommon-law marriages unless they do
so expressly, even where such marriage are entered into without obtaining
a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of these statutes to
discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the
guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties who live
together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the
marriage. * * *." (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-
189.) Italics Ours. (See also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several formal requirements of this Act * * *." (Section
27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the
parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him
for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such
"certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit
upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's
omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing
disorder during the liberation of Manila and its environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit
required by sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-
compliance with it, should bring no serious consequences lo the married
pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by the emergency.
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural
father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not
invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration
thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a
copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites."
(Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55
Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but
it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains
the data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The
first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated
without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),[5] this marriage should
not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men
and women who have lived publicly in a state of concubinage [6], (section
22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the
deceased than the plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister
Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of
the former, * * * the surviving spouse * * * shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased." (Art 952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.
LABRADOR, J.:
The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate
Administration known as lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816,
1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282, 2284, 2378, 2412, 2682, 2683, 2685,
2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate
located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn
(camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of strong materials in
General Trias, Cavite and sets of household furniture. The plaintiff claims
participation in the said properties on the ground that the same were
acquired by him and 'f the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff
contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel,
all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with
her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and
Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C.
Ferrer.
The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between
himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal
partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San
Francisco de Malabon estate with the following interest therein: 71% in lot
No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080,
64% in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of
one-half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the
death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-
owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust
as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described,
acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C.
Ferrer, be partitioned and one-half thereof be given as share therein of
plaintiff.
The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the
plaintiff to the properties described in the complaint, or that said properties
had been administered by the defendants in trust as co-owners with the
plaintiff, and by way of special and affirmative defense they alleged that
the properties subject of the complaint had been inherited by the
defendants from their deceased father Mariano Trias and deceased
mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession and full enjoyment
thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and
adversely under a claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and
that plaintiff is estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or
participation in the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for lack
of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint that he was
married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to the death
of the latter in 1934. They further presented a counterclaim against the
plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what was contributed
by them in support of the candidacies of plaintiff when running for the
office of provincial governor of Cavite. They also filed a counterclaim for
30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in value to
the total sum of P50,000 and a counterclaim for P100,000 which is the
value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which the
plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.
The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the
properties mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were joint properties of the
plaintiff and the defendants. They also allege that the properties had gone
to the management and control of the defendants Trias who should be
required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof during the
administration by them of said properties. As crossclaim against their co-
defendants, they allege that they are each entitled to one-eighth of the
properties left by their mother as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the
complaint, as well as a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of
the San Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad,
Litlit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.
Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the
defendants Trias, answering the cross-claim of their co-defendants
Pugeda, denied all the allegations contained in the answer of the
defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that the cross-claim is improper
as the same should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the
defendants ii Pugeda are estopped and barred by prescription from
claiming any further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is
the alleged existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria C.
Ferrer. The second is the claim of the plaintiff to various lands acquired
from the Friar Lands Estate under certificates of sale issued first in the
name of Mariano Trias and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for
in part during the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer, A third but
minor issue is the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have been
bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff
claims is in the possession of the defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness
Ricardo Ricafrente testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on
the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness
Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two
witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado
Prudente, deceased; that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the
parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after the witnesses
had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the contracting; parties
and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at
that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff and his
witnesses explained that no celebration of the marriage was held inspite of
the prominence of the contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy
campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board and Maria C.
Ferrer was already on the family way.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a
photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario,
Cavite, in the month of January 1916, which showed that no record of the
alleged marriage existed therein; but this absence was explained by the
Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the register forgot
to make an entry of the marriage in the registry.
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage
plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the house of
spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted
to the effect that the first issue was baptized on August 26, 1917 and the
one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The
baptismal certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue
of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of said
birth was also submitted and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and
the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.
It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the
deceased wife, as husband and wife, until the death of the latter, publicly
and openly as husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of
Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by the parties defendants
themselves. The document contains the following significant statement or
admission.
"Whereas, the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the
said deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gahriel,
all surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with
Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed
Pugeda y Ferrer, are the children of her second marriage with Fabian
Pugeda.
"x x x That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that Lots
Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the Buenavista property will be
administered by one of the parties to be agreed upon and for said purpose
they appoint Miguel F. Trias, and all earnings, rentals and income or
profits shall be expended for the Improvement and welfare of the said
property and for the payment of all claims and aecounts of our deceased
mother Maria C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and education of Teofilo
and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer."
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of the , testimonial and
documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff Fabian
Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this
conclusion being borne out not only by the chain of circumstances but also
by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the marriage, who
appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that plaintiff and deceased
Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for eighteen years
(1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption that they were actually
married.
On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the
marriage we cite the following authority:
"ART. 53. As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a
certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such
books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises
in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by evidence of
any kind." (p. 27, Civil Code)
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural
father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis,failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not
invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration
thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding of
a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites."
(Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1)
"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the
fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage." (55 C. J. S.,
p, 900).
In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said marriage
subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the latter, and we affirm
the finding of the trial court to that effect.
On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the
lands subject of the action were formerly Friar Lands included in the San
Francisco de Malabon Estate, province of Cavite, which were acquired
under certificates of sale in the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910
and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The
different lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to said Maria
C. Ferrer, widow, are set forth in a table appended to this decision as
Annex "A".
On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge
Lucero declared that the lots in question, were conjugal properties of
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2
thereof, should be adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the latter's share in the
conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the rate of 1/6
each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal
properties, to be assigned to her children by both marriages at the rate of
1/9 each and the balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct.
From this judgment the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the
defendants presented a motion for new trial on the ground that they
discovered copies of four documents namely Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D"
and "E" Record on Appeal, pp. 108-117, (The last document is a copy of a
court order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the project of
partition in Case No. 860, Intestate of Mariano Trias) which if admitted
might alter decision. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the
consideration of said evidence.
Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo
Gonzales who then presided the court, rendered a new decision. Judge
Gonzales found that the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer on the lots in question amount to only P8,911.84, while the
installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and 3178
were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer in the total sum of
P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages
should participate in the ownership of the lands, according to the actual
contributions made by each marriage in the installments in payment of the
lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now subject of the appeal is as
follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby
renders judgment:
1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816, 1832,
2264,, 2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680,
2718, 2764, (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda and Maria
C. Ferrer in the proportion of percentage and indicated in each
individual lot;
2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same
were fully paid during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C.
Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the couple Pugcda and
Ferrer; and even some of the installments for these two lots
were paid after death of Maria G. Ferrer, they do not lose the
character of conjugal property for payments were :nade from the
crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer
contributed in the "payment for the installments of these 21 lots
amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must be reimbursed in
favor of the children or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid from
the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other
half of P4,455.92 to be distributed among all the children of
heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage to be
deducted from the mass of her estate;
4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the
installments for these six (6) lots were fully paid during marriage
of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared
to be conjugal between them one half of which must go to the
children or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go
to the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second
marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which
commenced after the death of his mother who died on February
11, 1934, must render an accounting of his administration within
three (3) months time from the date this judgment has become
final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action." (Record
on Appeal, pp. 154-156)
Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-
appellants claim that Judge Gonzales had no power or authority to change
the decision of Judge Lucero, as it was not he but Judge Lucero himself,
who had heard the evidence. They have also assigned before Us a set of
errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues set forth above.
As the issue of marriage has already been considered we will now pass to
the second and more important question as to whether the lands subject
of the action may be considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or
of the second or of both.
A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the
various lots is necessary that the issues in the action may be justly
determined.
A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120 ) discloses
that the friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual
occupants (actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands' are
acquired by the Government). (Paragraph 3 of Declaration of Purposes,
Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the lands are not
public lands in the sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act,
and their acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the Public Land
Act (Par. IV, Declaration of Purposes, Id.)
The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows:
"Sec. 12. x x x. When the costs thereof shall hav« been thus ascertained,
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler, and
occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government
has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held
by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the office of
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United States
or its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of the
final installment together with all accrued interest the Government will
convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become
effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of
the Land Registration Act. x x x."
"Sec. 13. The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate
shall be considered as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price so
fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the certificate,
and he shall by such acceptance become a debtor to the Government in
that amount together with all accrued interest. x x x Provided, however,
That every settler and occupant who desires to purchase his holding must
enter into the agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the said
certificate and executing the said receipt whenever called on so to do by
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the part of the
settler and occupant to comply with this requirement shall be considered
as a refusal to purchase, and he shall be ousted as above provided and
thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case of unoccupied
lands: x x x."
"Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every
parcel of land sold under the provisions of this Act until the full payment of
all installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been
made, and any sale or incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in all
respects subordinate to its prior claim."
"Sec. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance
of which isr provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of
a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to
receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she
has complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same.
In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and
does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate
shall descend and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of
the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected
before the death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders
thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the certificate. In
case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land
before having complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from
the holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the holder of
the certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau
of Public Lands for registration." (Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).
A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the
conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called
certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property,
subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be canceled if
the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale
certificates were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they
were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the law
provides that when the buyer does not leave a widow, the rights and
interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are left to the buyer's heirs
in accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the Director of
Lands, et al., vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al., 87 Phil., 806, this court thru Mr.
Justice Montemayor held:
"x x x All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
purchaser, even before the payment of the full price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the !aw as the
actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full the
purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a
mere lien holder or mortgagee.
"x x x In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or
parcel under Act 1120, pending payment in full of the purchase price, altho
the Government reserves title thereto, merely for its protection, the
beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any accretion
received by the lot even before payment of the last installment belongs to
the purchaser thereof."
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely
different from a sale of public lands under the provisions of the Public
Land Act. In the case of public lands, a person who desires to acquire
must first apply for the parcel of land desired. Thereafter the land is
opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant or to a qualified
bidder the successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land
and cultivate and improve it, (Sees. 22-28, Commonwealth Act 141). It is
only after satisfying the requirements of cultivation and improvement of 1/5
of the land that the applicant is given a sales patent. (Sec. 30)
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance
of the certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in
case the price agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public 'lands if
the applicant dies and his widow remarries both she and the second
husband are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as
his wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of
Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before the payment of the price in
full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not
leave a widow, the right to the friar land is transmitted to his heirs at law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now
subject of the action none was paid for in full during the marriage of
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in installments
continued to be made even after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C.
Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage
the certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments
for the lots after said marriage continued in the name of Maria C. Ferrer;
also all the amounts paid as installments for the lots were taken from the
fruits of the properties themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda himself, thus:
"Mr. Viniegra:
De los productos de esos terrenos, durante la administration por
Q
loa demandados, recibia Vd. su participacion?
A No, senor.
Q Nunca?
Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of
A Lands, and I have been informed that the obligations have been
paid annually from the products of the land.
Therefore, from the products of these lands the proceeds the
Q
obligations to the Bureau of Lands are being discounted from the
said proceeds and after the remainder, as in palay, are equally
divided, is that what you mean to say?
Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products
A
ofthe lands the obligations to the Bureau of Lands would be paid.
Court:
Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna
Q
participacion?
No senor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the
A obligations to the Bureau of Lands were being paid from the
products of the lands.
Mr. Viniegra:
You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products
Q
after paying the Bureau of Lands?
How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to
the Bureau of Lands that was until the Japanese time, and I knew
A
some obligations were not paid, as a result of which the sales
certificates of some big lots were cancelled.
Court:
Q Como se mantenia Vd?
Mi Madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My
mother helped me. (Session of November 20, 1951, before Judge
A
A. G. Lucero, pp, 259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-
Appellants, pp. 49-51).
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the
case at bar, and that is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias, which was instituted in
August 1915, the inventory of the estate left fey said deceased included
the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the
project of partition in said especial proceedings submitted to the court as
Exh, 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of Mariano Trias in
the conjugal properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable
conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above described and paid for,
had the character of conjugal properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling lejgal reason for this conclusion
as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement : on said nature of the
lands in question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff
and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was appointed administratrix of
the estate of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860
of the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the
estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929, was
submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of partition of the
properties was submitted. The project includes the friar lands subject of
the action, and in accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the
inventory was adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and
f the other half adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share
of Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This
project of partition was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order
dated February 11,1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as Annex "E",
pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Mariano Trias must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda,
who is a lawyer. It does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege,
that he ever appeared in said proceedings to claim participation in the
properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the
proceedings to claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to
himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that
the said friar lands actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer, and that he had no interest therein. The project of
partition was approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and
defendant had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiffs
failure to assert any claim to the properties in the said intestate
proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely from asserting
the claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.
We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that the lands in question
had, through the joint effort of himself and his wife, increased in
productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400 cavans of rice because of the
introduction therein of improvements such as a system of irrigation for the
lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments remaining unpaid
were taken from the produce or the yield of the said lands and if it be
taken into account that one-half of said lands already belonged to the
children of the first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated in the
settlement of the estate of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the
only portion of the products or produce of the lands in which plaintiff could
claim any participation is the one-half share therein produced from the
paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce
belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the
lands is not shown, but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in continuous
political campaigns, ever since his marriage in 1916 (he had devoted most
of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the
products of the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer must have been
used in these political campaigns as well as in meeting the expenses of
the conjugal partnership. The value of the useful improvements introduced
on the lands, joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her children, was not
proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old
Civil Code, to the effect that useful expenditures for the benefit of the
separate properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties,
cannot be applied. But even if such useful improvements had been
proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff's action to recover his share
therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present action
was instituted by plaintiff only in the year 1948. After the death of Maria C.
Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard
from for 14 years, that is, until he instituted this action in 1948. His claims
for the improvements, if any, is therefore also barred.
The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the
improvements in the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is
also applicable to the claim of the plaintiff herein for the construction
alleged to have been made and the furniture supposedly bought by him
and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character of conjugal
partnership property of said spouses. In the year 1935, defendant herein
presented a project of partition to plaintiff for his signature (the project of
partition is dated March, 1935 and is marked Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this
project of partition of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer,
mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff's children with the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of any
participation that plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or otherwise, or in
any building or improvement. This deed of partition was shown to plaintiff
but the latter did not sign it.
The express omission of the name of plaintiff herein in the above deed of
partition as one of the heirs of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer was enough
notice to plaintiff that defendants had intended to deprive him of any share
or participation in the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer,
even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. But in spite of his
knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him until February, 1948
when plaintiff demanded his share in the properties and later brought this
action.
The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted
this action. Consequently, whatever rights he may have had to any portion
of the estate left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or
otherwise, must be deemed to have prescribed. As a consequence, we
find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the plaintiff herein one-ninth
share in the estate of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be
set aside and the objection to the grant of such share to plaintiff on the
ground of prescription is sustained.
Having disposed of the claims of paintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now
proceed to consider the cross-claim of his children, namely, Teofilo
Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge Lucero decreed that the properties
left by the deceased Maria C. Pugeda be divided among her children,
including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda,
and decreed one-ninth of the properties of the said deceased Maria C.
Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the plaintiff and assigning
also to the plaintiff one-ninth share in the said estate left by her in usufruct.
In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the
estate of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of
limitations, the decree entered by Judge Lucero declaring that heir
properties be divided into nine parts, one part belonging to each heir and
one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the share in
usufruct of the plaintiff therein and increasing the share of each of her
heirs to one-eighth.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint
is hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Hon. Antonio G. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the
properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and
plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be
divided among her eight children at the rate of one-eighth per child. As
thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without
costs.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon,
JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., and Padilla, J., took no part.
A N N E X "A"
Lands included in action Dates of acquisition and assignment.
RESOLUTION
July, 24, 1962
Labrador, J.:
This resolution concerns a motion for the reconsideration of the decision
rendered by this Court. The main argument in support of the motion is that
the lots not fully paid for at the time of the death of Miguel Trias, which lots
were, by provision of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120), subsequently
transferred to the widow's name and later paid for by her out of the
proceeds of the fruits of the lands purchased, and for which titles were
issued in the name of the widow, belong to the latter as her exclusive
paraphernal properties, and are not conjugal properties of her deceased
husband and herself. In our decision we laid down the rule that upon the
issuance of a certificate of sale to the husband of a lot in a friar lands
estate, purchased by the Government from the friars, the land becomes
the property of the husband and the wife, and the fact that the certificate of
sale is thereafter transferred to the wife does not change the status of the
property so purchased as conjugal property of the deceased husband and
wife. The reason for this ruling is the provision of the Civil Code to the
effect that properties acquired by husband and wife are conjugal
properties. (Art. 1401, Civil Code of Spain.) The provision of the Friar
Lands Act to the effect that upon the death of the husband the certificate
of sale is transferred to the name of the wife is merely an administrative
device designed to facilitate the documentation of the transaction and the
collection of installments; it does not produce the effect of destroying the
character as conjugal property of the lands purchased. Hence the
issuance of tne title, after completion of the installments, in the name of
the widow does not make the friar lands, purchased her own paraphernal
property. The said lands, notwithstanding a certificate of sale, continue to
be the conjugal property of her deceased husband and herself.
The case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654, cited by the movants, is
not applicable to the case at bar because it refers to the superior rights of
the widow recognized in Section 16 of Act No. 1120 over transfers made
by the husband which have not been approved by the Director of Lands.
As a matter of fact the syllabus in said case is as follows:
"Widow's Rights. The widow of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar
lands acquired by the Government has an exclusive right to said lands
and their fruits from her husband's death, provided that the deceased has
not conveyed them to another during his lifetime and she fulfills the
requirements prescribed by the law for the purchase of the same."
A minor ground for the reconsideration is that the decision of Judge
Lucero, having been set aside by the Court of Appeals, could not be
affirmed by Us. The setting aside of the said decision was due to the fact
that newly discovered evidence was found regarding the partition of the
estate of the deceased. The setting aside of the decision was not aimed or
directed at the judge's ruling that the properties acquired by the husband
during his lifetime from the friar lands estate were conjugal properties of
the husband and the wife.
The third ground raised is that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal
assets of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. One of the arguments
adduced in favor of the claim of the movants that the properties in
question, which were acquired during the lifetime of Mariano Trias, were
never partitioned is that, according to the records of the Register of Deeds
and according to the friar lands agents, the alleged partition of the said
properties as conjugal properties of the deceased Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer had not been registered in said offices. The failure to
make the registration is perhaps due to the neglect of the heirs. The fact,
however, remains that the exhibits presented in Court, especially Exhibit
"3-Trias" and Annex "E", which are the project of partition and the approval
thereof, cannot be ignored by this Court. The neglect of the parties is not
actually partitioning the properties does not argue in favor of the fact that
partition was not actually decreed. Adjudications may be made pro
indiviso without actual division or partition of the properties among the
heirs.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the
judgment rendered declared final. So ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,and Dizon,
JJ., concur
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS ET AL. v. CESAR
SYQUIA
DECISION
58 Phil. 866
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar
Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco,
infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering
from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as
damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage
promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as
natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the
maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month,
together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the
defendant, the trial court entered a decree requiring the defendant to
recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for
him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in
other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs
from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them,
and the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to
recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar
Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of a
prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in
his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a
barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for
tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely
unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this
barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and
amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was
gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The
defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early
months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in
her hands a note directed to the padre who was expected to christen the
baby. This note was as follows:
"Saturday, 1.30
p. m.
"February 14,
1981
"Rev. FATHER,
"The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given
to it.
"CESAR SYQUIA"
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve
of his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on
this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in
the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in
good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, jr.")
might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at
the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were made
by the defendant. To this end he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano
Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the
hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of
Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonia was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her
mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila,
where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all
household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by
Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and,
when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy, the defendant
decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that should
here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the
defendant, who had charge of the arrangements for this ceremony,
caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar
Syquia, jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to
the padre, quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the
defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of
paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil
Code, Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the
acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of
jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact
that it is as yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The
problem here presented of the recognition of an unborn child is really not
different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a
child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and
resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child
requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with
the name used.
It is contended, however, in the present case that the words of description
used in the writings before us are not legally sufficient to identify the child
now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well
founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are
not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived
which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be
presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end
given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, jr., its identity
as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any
doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibits F, G,
H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference
to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed,
was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with
good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter
(Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the
defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the
sufficiency of the acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment
contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be
made in a single document or may be made in more than one document,
of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this
point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting
together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the
admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in
another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in
the note to the padre and the other letters suffice to connect that
admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There
is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or
any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be
indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial
court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case
should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2
of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in
our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we
may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the
defendant had acknowledged this child in the writings above referred to
must be taken in connection with the facts found by-the court upon the
second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant
supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the
defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia
became enceinte a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's
head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must
be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the
period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to
concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and
child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word
"continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not
mean that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it
shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's
appeal. With respect to the appeal of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion
that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff,
Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise
is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain
such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby,
Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to
the amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael
Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions
change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the
order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So
ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
ELOISA GOITIA Y DE LA CAMARA, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
DECISION
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the
conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer
upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a
cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff
declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant
cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house,
unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915,
and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San
Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff
returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the
complaint are as follows:
"That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the
plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of
the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other
successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife,
the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff
exasperated the defendant and induced him to maltreat her by word and
deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her
body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating
her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the
home of her parents."
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and
with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its
civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties.
(Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.)
Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is
formed between the parties. (Sy Joe Lieng vs.Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep.,
137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary
contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new
relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution,
in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It
is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period
by virtue of any contract they may make. The reciprocal rights arising from
this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from
time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is
merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled
by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit
of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into
the status of the law touching and governing the question under
consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine
Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of
the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended
to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883
(Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law
read:
"Art. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to
mutually assist each other.
"Art. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second
paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.)
"Art. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him
when he changes his domicile or residence.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may
for just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his
residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
"Art. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to
the whole extent specified in the preceding article.
"1. The consorts.
*******
"Art. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option,
satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving
and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same."
.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to
give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is
not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil
Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be
faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and
protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow
him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes
to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife
may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his
conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the
pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute?
The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:
"That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its
decisions dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the
option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence,
between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own
house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to
prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would
be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the
existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the
party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood
as being thereby restricted.
"Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this
appeal was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the
option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to
furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who
is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or
discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo,
which he has not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural
father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to
her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing
the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to
demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact of the
marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to
maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such
a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case,
without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard
to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion
should be expressed at this time."
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De
Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid
down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." But it is insisted that
there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases
which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true
that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the
child and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the
second the right to support had already been established by a final
judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts, the two cases
clearly established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of
the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision
of the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don
Benso Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order not to
prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of
her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title,
mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to
the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself
of all his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want.
Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then
living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore
granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In
her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally
in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred
and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the
plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife
appealed to the Audiencia Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was
rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff
appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the
judgment of the Audiencia Territorial, said:
"Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the
spouses are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot
but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates
the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated,
among which duties are those of their living together and mutually helping
each other, as provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and
taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to
furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for
subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in
accordance with law, their separation has been decreed, either
temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband, cannot
occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is
culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and
of the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership;
and
"Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it
would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate
from each other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the
legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status
entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard
of the duties inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in
opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has
established; and
"Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Dona Adela
Galindo are not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford
each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the
former has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from
her without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of her
conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in
order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those
of his own support without need of going to his wife; wherefore the
judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for
support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine
invoked in the assignments of error land 5 of the appeal."
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears
quite clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an
agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this
effect, for the court says, "Should the doctrine maintained in the appeal
prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and
separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis
upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the
doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of
the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or
where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks
to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision
of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife
brought an action for support against her husband who had willfully and
voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever.
The supreme court, in reversing the judgment absolving the defendant
upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
"In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito
who left the conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving
his contention, that the person responsible for this situation was his wife,
as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that
it is the wife who is the party abandoned, the husband not having
prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he therefore finds
himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable
obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in
article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so
holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of
this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the
manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three
grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual
support is compatible and en forcible in all situations, so long as the needy
spouse does not create any illicit situation of the sort above described."
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of
Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as
contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration,
that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the
conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the
injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or
holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that
the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in
Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in
force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law
governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country
are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870. In Spain the
complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various
causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case
and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife
results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults:
violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to
change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the
attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their
daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the
condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this
jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la
Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was
announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive
examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this
court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken
the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce.
And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in
December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been
announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this
jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to
granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the
question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living
separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to
decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate
maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in
the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is
dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent
upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations
of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part
of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much
on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of
which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the law will not permit
him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is
not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in
the strict legal sense of that term, but rather a judgment calling for the
performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign.
This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace
and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands
upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro
tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so
sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling
a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as
a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it
does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for
judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., see concurring opinion.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Misamis, on the 17th of December, 1910. It was not presented to the
Supreme Court until the 11th of January 1916. Its purpose was to recover
of the defendant the sum of P516, together with damages estimated in the
sum of P350 and interest, and costs.
In support of his claim the plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November,
1909, he and the defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms
of which he was to pay to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the
marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the
defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer; that later, in the month of August, 1910, he
completed his obligation under said contract by paying to the defendant
the said sum of P500, together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or
token of future marriage," that, notwithstanding said agreement, the said
Bonifacia Bolifer, in the month of August, 1910, was joined in lawful
wedlock to Laureano Sisi; that immediately upon learning of the marriage
of Bonifacia Bolifer he demanded of the defendant the return of the said
sum of P516 together with the interest and damages; that the damages
which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum
of P500, was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him, located
in the Province of Bohol, at a great sacrifice.
To the complaint the defendant presented a general denial. He also
alleged that the facts stated in the complaint do not constitute a cause of
action. Upon the issue thus presented the cause was brought on for trial.
After hearing the evidence the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, in
an extended opinion in which all of the evidence adduced during the trial
of the cause is carefully analyzed reached the conclusion "of fact that
plaintiff delivered to defendant the sum of P516 sued for and that Carlos
Bolifer and Laureana Loquero received and did not return the said
amount," and for the reason that the evidence did not sufficiently show
that the plaintiff had suffered any additional damages, rendered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in said sum
of P516 together with the interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of
December, 1910, and costs.
From that judgment the, defendant appealed to this court and made the
following assignments of error:
"1. In holding to be proven the fact of the delivery by the plaintiff of the
sum of P516 to the defendant, Carlos Bolifer; and
"2. In holding to be valid and effective the verbal contract entered into by
the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage."
The first assignment of error presents a question of fact. The lower court
found that a large preponderance of the evidence showed that the plaintiff
had delivered to the defendant the sum of P516 in substantially the
manner alleged in the complaint. Taking into consideration that the lower
court saw and heard the witnesses, together with the further fact that there
is an abundance of uncontradicted proof supporting the findings of the
lower court, we are not inclined to disturb its judgment for any of the
reasons given by the appellant in support of his first assignment of error.
With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant calls our
attention to the provisions of paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions. The appellant argues that by virtue of the
provisions of said paragraph and by virtue of the fact that the agreement
upon which the plaintiff relies and under which he paid to the defendant
the sum of P516 had not been reduced to writing, he could therefore not
recover. The appellant contends that a contract, such as the one relied
upon by the plaintiff, in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing. We
have examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial
of the cause objected to any proof or any part thereof, presented by the
plaintiff, which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged
contract. That part of said section 335 which the appellant relies upon for
relief provides:
"In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement can not be received without
the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:
"1. * * *
"2. * * *
"3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a
mutual promise to marry."
It will be noted, by reference to said section, that "evidence" of the
agreement referred to "can not be received without the writing or
secondary evidence of its contents." As was said above all of the
"evidence" relating to said "agreement" was admitted without the slightest
objection.
Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may
be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to
prove it Said section provides that the contract shall not be enforced by
an action unless the same is evidenced by some note or memorandum.
Said section simply provides the method by which the contracts
mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contracts
are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those
mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may be a
perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary
form. If it is not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot be
proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to evidence
presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to
the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an
action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility
of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit
the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just
as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing. (Anson on
Contracts, p. 75; Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil. Rep., 387;
Gallemit vs. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. Rep., 241, 246; Kuenzle &
Streiff vs.Jiongco, 22 Phil. Rep., 110, 112; Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil.
Rep., 485, 489.)
For the foregoing reasons we find nothing in the record justifying a
reversal or modification of the judgment of the lower court based upon
either assignment of error. Therefore the judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in
its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his
lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3)
children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married
Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan,
Maria, Sofronia, and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his
second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita
Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his
children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia,
all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also
deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his
children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano
Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son
George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already
dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children
Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe
Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only
child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition," whereby they
partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B,
807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental
Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had
second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which
complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the children
of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another
partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They
alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the
defendants to execute the document in question through
misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots
which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong; and that the
five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate
and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido,
who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965,
annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition."
However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the
plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio
Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all
the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido;
and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as
follows: declaring the following as the legitimate children and
grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido,
Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia
Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde
and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido,
deceased; great grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo
Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate
children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido,
Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa
Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A.
Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring
all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be
divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because
of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to
Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido,
of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age,
married to Norma Villalba; 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to
Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz;
1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but
because she is now dead the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo
Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is
already dead leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted
as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo
Perido, of age, married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but
he is already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age,
single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita
Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is
already dead with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted
as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age,
married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to
Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Teresa Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to
Fidel dela Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already
dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married
to Salud Salgado; 1/8 goes to Maria Perido, of age, married to Julio Pirote;
1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo
Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the
11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio
Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as
follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal
shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5)
equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by
the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner
of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined
accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs
which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without
adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and damages, they being
members of the same family, for equity and justice."
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court
erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido,
Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio
Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part,
807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and
in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that
11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido
and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of
Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were
turned down. Thereupon they instituted the instant petition for review
reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments in the brief
they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido
with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were
illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even
before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also
born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or
after their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita
Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as testified
to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora
Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on
the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio
Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as
allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there
was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's first wife, Benita Talorong, died
during the Spanish regime. This finding is conclusive upon Us and
beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had
no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their
first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates
of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the
statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to
Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married
to each other. This presumption, especially where the legitimacy of the
issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof
on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs.
Cheong Seng Gee,[1] this Court explained the rationale behind this
presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut
the presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be
noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass
upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the
matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew
that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely
replied that she knew it because "during the celebration of the marriage by
the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in
the altar." Evidently, she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that
the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during
their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or
not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807 and 808 were the
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the
petitioners that said lots belonged to the conjugal partnership of spouses
Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:
"x x x. We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted
that the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all
declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing
that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n.,
p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties
of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second
marriages. By fiat of law said properties should be divided accordingly
among his legal heirs."
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the
aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother
and contend that they were able to establish through the testimonies of
their witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong
acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be
sustained. The question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is
within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which are
not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was
the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate court:
"With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered
conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need not be
disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio
Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in
the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property registered in the
name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48
Phil.144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922),
the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the
spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else,
like in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that Lot No.
458 belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear
proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is the
conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat."
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were
able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of
spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the
purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of
sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of
the first marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue raised
here also involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the
finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this
Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all
the evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the
credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the case,
their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an
appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish
the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review
on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter
procedure has been established.[2]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the petitioners.
In re Instate of the deceased Marciana
Escaño.
ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-
appellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-
appellant-appellee.
Salvador E. Imperial for petitioner-appellant-appellee.
Vicente L. Faelnar , Hipolito Alo and Ciriaco S. Salazar for oppositor-
appellant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken from the order issued by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on March 14, 1935 , in the intestate proceedings of the
deceased Marciana Escaño, denying thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a
new administrator and (2) to set aside the order of May 9, 1932, declaring
the heirs of said deceased; (3) holding it unwarranted to declare that the
properties of the intestate estate are paraphernal properties of said
deceased, but reserving to the parties the right to discuss which of said
properties are paraphernal and which are conjugal; (4)setting aside the
order of January 10, 1933. granting to the administrator fees in the sum of
P10,000, and that of June 26, 1933, approving the project of portion and
the final account; and (5) ordering the presentation of another project of
partition and final account.
As Marciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was
appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate, and in an order issued
on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and
Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second marriage, were declared her
only heirs. In a motion filed with the conformity of the guardian of the
heiress Angelita Jones, Felix Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his
fees, as such, be fixed at P10,000 which was granted by the court in its
order of January 10, 1933. The administrator later presented an inventory
of the properties left by said deceased Marciana Escaño, a final account
of his administration, and a project of partition of the intestate estate
wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment of his
share of the conjugal properties and his usufructuary right, and the
remaining part to Angelita Jones. The latter, who was a minor, was
represented in the proceedings by her guardian Paz Escaño de
Corominas. The project of partition and final account were approved in an
order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the
respective grantees by virtue thereof.
On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto
Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother,
the deceased Marciana Escaño; that there never was a valid marriage
between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been
celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix
Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the
inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that during the hearing of
the intestate proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was
represent by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said
proceedings there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies
which impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000 charged by the
administrator were highly unreasonable and unconscionable. She prayed:
(a) for the reopening of the proceedings; (b) that her husband appointed
special administrator without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged marriage
to Felix Hortiguela be declared null and void; (d) that the partition of the
properties made by administrator or Hortiguela be declared null and void
that petitioner be declared the only universal heir of her deceased mother;
and (e) that in case there was a valid marriage between Felix Hortiguela
and Marciana Escaño, Hortiguela be declared not entitled to the widower's
usufruct; the errors in the administrator's account be corrected; the latter
be granted a remuneration of only P4 a day, and new partition of the
properties be made.
After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and the evidence for both parties
received, the court issued the order of March 14, 1935, the provisions of
which are stated in the first paragraph of this decision. Both parties
appealed therefrom.
The principal question upon the resolution of which depends that of the
others, is whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana
Escaño was celebrated.
It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W.
Jones in the suburban catholic church of San Nicolas, Province of Cebu.
On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and
thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In October, 1919, proceedings
were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the
instance of Marciana Escaño, to have her husband judicially declared an
absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court issued an order declaring
Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the
provisions of article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said
judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after
its publication in the official newspapers. Said order directed the
publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper "El Ideal".
Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official Gazette during
the month of December, 1919, and January, February, March, April, May
and June, 1920. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the
taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been
made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Felix
Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño were married before the justice of the
peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage.
Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be
understood to have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in
that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the
date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed;
and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No.
68, the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño
is null and void. This court does not believe so. For the purposes of the
civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of
the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does
not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the
time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General
orders, No. 68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana
Escaño's former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the
date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received,
and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said
marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
For some unknown reason not attributable, of course, to the fault or
negligence of Felix Hortiguela or Marciana Escaño, the marriage
contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage register of the
municipality of Malitbog. Angelita Jones assigns as one of the errors of the
court its having declared that failure to record said marriage does not
affect the efficacy and validity thereof.
On this point, the court a quo very correctly stated as follows:
Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides
that the person solemnizing the marriage must transmit the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, and failure to
transmit such certificate shall be fined not less than twenty-five
and not more than fifty dollars; but does not provide that failure
 to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the
marriage. Interpreting this legal provision, the Supreme Court, in
its decision of September 5, 1931 (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55
Phil., 1 ) said:
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the
plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter
was in articulo mortis failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does
not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear
that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its
validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate not being one said requisites."
In another case (U. S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil., 105), the court said:
"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section 20 of the
Municipal Code by municipal secretaries, marriages recorded in
their respective registers, are not the only ones that can attest
and prove such facts to such an extent that other proofs
established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial,
when through the omission or fault either of the municipal
secretary himself or of the person who solemnized the marriage,
it was not duly entered or recorded in the municipal register."
Furthermore, Marciana Escaño believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when
she contracted her second marriage. Her daughter Angelita Jones herself
was of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had
married Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived
and traveled with him together with her mother. She certainly would not
have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead. Still
furthermore, according to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be
dead.
Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño
and was divorced from her at the time of her death there is no doubt that
he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate
succession, as in the present case (6 and 7 Manresa, pages 497-499 and
134-141, respectively).
Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring
that the heirs of the deceased were her widower and her daughter
Angelita Jones. Neither is there any reason to annul the order of June 26,
1933, approving the partition of the properties of the intestate estate.
The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator Felix Hortiguela
in Angelita Jones' motion and alleged therein as one of the grounds for
asking for the reopening of any assignment of error. It should, therefore,
be considered that the petitioner has desisted from her intention relative to
this alleged ground for the nullity of the proceedings.
As to the administrator's fees, the evidence shows that of the P10,000
granted by the court to Hortiguela as his own sum of P8,000 for the latter's
professional services in this as well as in other cases affecting the estate
of his deceased wife. Taking into consideration the nature of and the
amount involved in this and in the other cases wherein Attorney Faelnar
has rendered his services this court is of the opinion that the sum of
P8,000 paid by the administrator is a reasonable and moderate
compensation. Angelita Jones' objection to the effect that she had no
reason to contribute to the payment of Faelnar's fees is untenable,
considering the fact that said attorney's professional services were
rendered for the benefit of the administration of the estate of the deceased
Escaño prior to the controversy provoked by said heiress. As to the
remainder of P2,000, said administrator is entitled to collect the sum of P4
for every day employed by him as such, and considering the importance of
the inheritance in question and the time elapsed since the inception of the
administration proceedings this court is of the opinion that the sum of
P2,000 is an adequate compensation for said administrator's services.
Lastly, had the court jurisdiction to set aside, as it did, the order of January
10, 1933, approving the administrator's fees and the order of June 26,
1933, approving the partition and the final account? Had the court
jurisdiction to order the presentation of another project of partition and final
account? These are the questions raised by Felix Hortiguela and this court
is of the opinion that said orders having therefrom, the court has lost
jurisdiction that no appeal was ever taken therefrom, the court has lost
jurisdiction over the case and it could not resume it under section 113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure or under section 598 thereof because the
above-cited section refer to grounds other than those upon which Angelita
Jones' motion of May 3, 1934, is based.
For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order
of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the order of January 10, 1933,
relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933,
approving the final account and the project of portion, and in so far as said
order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new project of
partition; denied the appointment of Angelita Jones husband as
administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932, relative to declaration of
heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the
properties of this intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the
deceased Marciana Escaño reserving to the parties the right to discuss
which are paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz and Laurel, JJ., concur.
12 Phil. 731
WILLARD, J.:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the
defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the
justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the own of Palompon in the Province
of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de
matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition
directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907,
signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they
have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the
justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the
marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by
the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias
Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above
mentioned; that the persons who signed it were actually present in the
office of the justice on the day named; that they ratified under oath the
contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there
asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the
marriage, they presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband
and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate
of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias
Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September 1907, in
which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married
by the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that
the parties were legally married on the day named. The evidence in
support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff
admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who
testifies that he and the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace
at the time named, together with the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and
Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above
mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-
named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita
Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the
document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who
testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the
bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff,
the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the
peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time
mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that
she never appeared before the justice of the peace and never was
married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in
question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it,
and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper
authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her
case, but which we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to
much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of
Palompon, her married brother and was there for about two weeks. The
wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the
house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination
that she herself went to school every morning and that on one occasion
the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this
witness loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is
considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day
named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a
Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that
she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany
her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining some
dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two girls left the
store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to
the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that
after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the
mother was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office
of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother
later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by
the justice of the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and
before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not
sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the
defendant.
The testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticised by counsel for the
appellant in his brief. It appears that during her first examination she was
seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her
examination was adjourned to a future day and was completed in her
house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her
collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely
in stating that the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the
municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not
think that the record justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as
to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards
corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts
substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the
plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said she did not appear before
the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the
defendant claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that
she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was
proven. No. 9 is as follows:
"ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very
angry and if he be informed that we have been married civilly, I am sure
that he will turn me out of the house.
"Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
"Should I be able to go tomorrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can
not remain here.
"Yours, ROSAL."
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written
on the morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"ANGEL : It, is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning
because my sister-in-law will not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe
that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
"Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing,
and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don't like to
go without Pacita.
"The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should
know anything about it.
"Yours, ROSAL. "
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita
Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the
Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written
after the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come
here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high
because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading
lumber.
"Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you
are willing to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don't like her to
know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told
me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we
must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I
must do it right.
"Tell her also that you have asked me to marry you.
"I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do
what he washes.
"Yours, ROSAL."
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as
follows:
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"Angel: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday on the
steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my father's permission for our
marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem
proper, and, if lie does not wish us to marry without his permission, you
must request his consent.
"Tell me who said that my sister-in-law knows that we are civilly married;
my brother's ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every thing may
be carried out, with patience."
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the
steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the
same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no
communication with the defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and
the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her
arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and
commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring
the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The
evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below
to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at
the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the
peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to,
did not constitute a legal marriage. General Orders, No. 68, section 6, is
as follows:
"No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but
the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife,"
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in
question the justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was
signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said,
"You are married." The petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant
contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be
married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the
marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice,
the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were
produced. A marriage took place as shown by the certificate of the
justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificate
gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in
due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they
took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such
presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the
woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the
document signed by her, which admission can only mean that the parties
mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the
said document which so states before the justice of the peace who
authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that
they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case we are satisfied, and so hold, that
what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted
to a legal marriage.
The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations
contained in the complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that
the parties had agreed to be married on condition that the defendant
obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents.
The defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was
a denial of all the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the
condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to
the allowance of this amendment. After the trial had commenced the
defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an
admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which
related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second
amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the
defendant's lawyer stated that what he had alleged in his second
amendment was what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but by
reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had
unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what lie had intended to
state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment. We are
satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do
not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with
the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint
is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant
Arellano, C J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
 LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of
Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in
beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved
to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the
two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound,
La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he
was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long.
It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work
as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after
her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first
time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April
up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding
of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case
No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it
was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of
their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in
its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of
the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for
its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least
to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the
import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon
Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that
one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is
more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet
the latter would make the marriage null and void and
the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested
that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party
who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was
wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which
is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also
a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity"
only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in
insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is
the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages,
while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but
to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted,
with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7)
refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with
another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies
in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment
in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages
under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean
Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the
defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is
"insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the
phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of
the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known
these completely, he might not have consented to the
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit
added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the
case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect
in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable. He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.)
Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to
the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general
is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a
valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of
the validity of the marriage celebration and the
obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they
require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of
age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice
Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is
still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there
should be no prescription. In other words, as long as
the defect has not been cured, there is always a right
to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is
still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect
in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that
there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of
the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of
the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical
incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to
a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked
that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply
with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is
still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to
be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, which incapacity
continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out
that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on
he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to
remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
 Art. 37. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be
substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization"
be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental
and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are
vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not
a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter
in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz
indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of
some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express
it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word
"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special
case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there
having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not
reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground
even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the
church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37
should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity
because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a
vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero
were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof.
Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be
filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in
its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid,
at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on
how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not
leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed,
to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the
essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-
sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new
canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
 . . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text
submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob
causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect
to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms.
This particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the contract.
This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation
and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could
be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person
from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to
R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to
be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and consequently of the possibility of
being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso,
a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is
that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus
of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we
still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr.
Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of
this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that
there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does
not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the
intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the
grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the
doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their
marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this
contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to
my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the
United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract
expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is
there any showing that she informed her husband
(herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a
mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to
"touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts
on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on
the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5)
years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans
to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court,
Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who
has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and
submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is
a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part
of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may
also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and
wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses
always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such
cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband,
or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she
does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has
she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations, although these indications were made
manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the
transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to
non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner,
an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage
between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to
have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee
of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated
April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of
the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee
had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of
the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and
the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years
of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a
decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft
of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated
the definition of marriage as —
"a special contract of permanent
partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in
accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature,
 consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the
marriage within the limits
provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did
not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law
of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid
the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as
found in the present Civil Code and those proposed
by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was
the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in
the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil
Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted
by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a
marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice
to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for
the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages
in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as
well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz
of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that,
in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the
foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly.
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to
those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-
to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of
what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee
feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that
the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested
later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other
provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the
judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be
guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the
inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal
which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties,
fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of
putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision
since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the
manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and
distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr.
Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of
this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that
there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital
obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does
not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the
intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the
grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the
doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their
marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this
contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to
my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the
United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract
expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is
there any showing that she informed her husband
(herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a
mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to
"touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts
on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on
the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5)
years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans
to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court,
Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who
has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and
submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is
a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling
reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part
of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may
also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and
wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses
always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such
cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband,
or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she
does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has
she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an
unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her
essential marital obligations, although these indications were made
manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to
continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the
transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has
sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to
non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner,
an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage
between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to
have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee
of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated
April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of
the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee
had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of
the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and
the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years
of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a
decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft
of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated
the definition of marriage as —
"a special contract of permanent
partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in
accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the
marriage within the limits
provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did
not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. It was thought that such an action would not only
be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also
solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law
of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid
the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as
found in the present Civil Code and those proposed
by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was
the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in
the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil
Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted
by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the
 essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a
marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the
marriage void, without prejudice
to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for
the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages
in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as
well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz
of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that,
in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for
divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages;
marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the
foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands
are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly.
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the
Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to
those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage,
thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the
provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every
petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-
to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of
what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee
feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that
the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested
later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other
provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover, the
judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be
guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the
lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the
inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal
which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties,
fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of
putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision
since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to
separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the
manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and
distinct from the other.
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G.
MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There
is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage
between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig
City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best
interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this
Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1)
on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H.
Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983
which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain,
at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila
(Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C,
D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command
in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on
the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine
Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702
Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired
from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987
and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however
prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a
good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment,
they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat
her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for
several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In
1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling"
and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make
deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang.When she was
discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994,
when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she
did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she
saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who
came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at
the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as
contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver,
went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child,
Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat]
her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a
house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them
(Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan,
Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while
the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towardsappellee and their
children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had
not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It
ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of
the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as
set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code
and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the
petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about
the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the
parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would
make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged
in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert.Similarly, there is no evidence at
all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity
which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the
incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set
aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various
tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been
brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had
not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on
other sources of information in order to determine the psychological
capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in
Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
 explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of
the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the
common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough
to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced
that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is
no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he
is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds
for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law,
this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation
in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by
her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding
no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29,
1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage
Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036
issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage
with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and
still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23
1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she
used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-
month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983
up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-
month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about
this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-
in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-
in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership
over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no
force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and administration of
the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated
no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted
after a first marriage by a man with another woman is
illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage
(citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033;
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the
Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage
contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a
first marriage with another woman is illegal and void.
However, as to whether or not the second marriage
should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an
issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms,
thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed
to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage
was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the
previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has
no property in his possession is an issue that may be
determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application
of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy
as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria
denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It
explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that
of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these
cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the
instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration
of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent
distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only
upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between
said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of
suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that
private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage
such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the
Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have
been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People
v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be
dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his
own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for
purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should
therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage,
but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la
Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their
marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by
petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however,
dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former
marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that
marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved
to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order
forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the
marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a
judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for
that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this
declaration of such nullity." they say: is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand
since it might result in confusion if they change the
phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied The validity or invalidity of a
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the marriage may be invoked
first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the only . . .
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing
that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent away with collateral defense as well as collateral
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the
and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the provision is that there should be a final judgment
invalidity of a void marriage." The invalidity of a marriage may declaring the marriage void and a party should not
be invoked only . . . declare for himself whether or not the marriage is
void, while the other members affirmed. Justice
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court
Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband cannot determine for himself whether or not his that there are actions which are brought on the
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void marriage is valid and that a court action is needed.
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked:
still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision Are they depriving one of the right to raise the
all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married be modified to read: defense that he has no liability because the basis of
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they
Heinz Wiegel."
The invalidity of a marriage may cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
be invoked only on the basis of a validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting final judgment annulling the taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage or declaring the unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground marriage void, except as marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought provided in Article 41. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal reworded as follows:
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15 Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is
no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that,
even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to The absolute nullity of a marriage
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision produce the judgment. for purposes of remarriage may
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines be invoked only on the basis of
took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to final judgment . . .
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified
be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of The invalidity of a marriage may as follows:
the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees be invoked only on the basis of a
where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed. final judgment declaring the
marriage invalid, except as The absolute nullity of a previous
provided in Article 41. marriage may be invoked for
B. Article 39. —
purposes of establishing the
validity of a subsequent marriage
The absolute nullity of a marriage Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is only on the basis of a final
may be invoked only on the basis declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a judgment declaring such previous
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is marriage void, except as
of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, except as void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean provided in Article 41.
provided in Article 41. Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the
marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision provision.
should include not only void but also voidable
For the purpose of establishing
marriages. He then suggested that the above
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the the validity of a subsequent
provision be modified as follows:
provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a marriage, the absolute nullity of a
void marriage and not annullable marriages, with previous marriage may only be
The validity of a marriage may be which the other members concurred. Judge Diy invoked on the basis of a final
invoked only . . . added that annullable marriages are presumed valid judgment declaring such nullity,
until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other except as provided in Article 41.
 Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision
is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof.
Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a
subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on
the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring
the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent
marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that
they go back to the original wording of the provision
as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage only on
the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article
41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is
also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot
be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage
before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The
Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged
with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior
marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is
for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is
meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise
intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely"
would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one
can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action
for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of
the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has
previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to
enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by
law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may
do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it
"shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it
void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so,
this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would
rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of
marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from
new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when
and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the
Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to
enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of
the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be
misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage."
Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on
the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera
suggested that they use the legal term "solely"
instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality,
the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be
clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership.
In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or
partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with
private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised
together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other
specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
 Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share
of the net profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage
or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain
valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage
in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation
of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage
acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the
other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences
of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No.
1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March
20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro,
who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision,
Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in
1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw
respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told
by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro.
Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the
house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even
alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn
statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that
respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated
argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De
Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to
complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De
Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that
he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave
Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was
the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko
went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on
April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage
license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965.
Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as
a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los
Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith
and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first
marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second
marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code
does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965
and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent
has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a
mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to
cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to
the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured
any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license
is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko
were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license
on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment

as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with
De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of
his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There
is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance
of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts
too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture

of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in
any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of
the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared
null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the
Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead,"2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent
the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that
he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England
during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6)
months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose,
Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,
Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the
Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration,
he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife
with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while
working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing
him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed
him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then
immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived
in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that
all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later
married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her
family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give
him such information even after they were married. He also testified that
he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the
Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness.
She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a
desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry
Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law
might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that
Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique.
Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from
leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when
she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her
expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further
claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October
1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order
No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as
presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco,
without prejudice to her reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial
court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because
respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded
belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his
absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a
Petition for Review where the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's finding that there existed a well-founded belief
on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was
already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
Court's declaration that the petition was a proper case
of the declaration of presumptive death under Article
41, Family Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not
Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code,
which it superseded,7 the following crucial differences emerge. Under
Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard
than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that
there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee
is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code.9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief
that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that
respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for
his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded
belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence
required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant
Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court
held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the
whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made
inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he
fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did
not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived
in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of
securing information concerning her whereabouts. He
admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife
was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . .
. 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica
Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or
well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San
Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose,
Antique, did you exert efforts to
inquire the whereabouts of your
wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with
the ship and we had a trip to
London and I went to London to
look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for
Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in
England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily
know the geographical difference between London
and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the
two places could mean one — place in England, the
port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave
home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or
Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives,
"We're going to Manila." This apparent error in
naming of places of destination does not appear to be
fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring
cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as
pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350)
kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like
Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one
particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did —
can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to
give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to
locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters
respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned
to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under
unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion
that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering
that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of
Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with
credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's
credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely
tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate
with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter
sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return
to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9)
months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his
captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without
inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also,
respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the
police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his
wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that
Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is
a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate
it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and
never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage.
The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled
before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the
parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through
existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry
Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail.
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.
The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the
Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the familyand
an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law
 and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need
to protect.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the

family in the preservation of which the State bas the
strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of
the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution there is set forth the following basic
state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity

of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. . . .

The same sentiment bas been expressed in the

Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:

The family, being the foundation

of the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy
cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations
are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect. 24

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief

required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain
the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February

1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
 NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and
LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO, respondents.
Abbas and Associates for petitioner.
Rolfando P. Quimbo for private respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
1 favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24893, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the
decision of the court below dated August 29, 1989 is
REVERSED. The deed of sale executed by the late
Aurelio Camacho in favor of defendant Nenita T.
Bienvenido and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
issued in her name are ANNULLED and in lieu
thereof, a new transfer certificate of title in the name
of the spouses Aurelio P. Camacho and Luisita C.
Camacho shall ISSUE, herein declaring said spouses
the owners of the property described in par. 8. of the
complaint and DISMISSING the other prayers in the
complaint as well as the defendant's counterclaim as
baseless or without sufficient evidence in support
thereof. With costs against the appellee. 2
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but her motion was denied in a
resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 19, 1993. 3
The background of this case is as follows:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3,
1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco
being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with
respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living
since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis
Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was
solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living
since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when,
because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long
periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various
times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been
estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and
apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on
May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84
Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed
with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year
in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street
in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and
Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his
name, Aurelio was described as single.
On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in
virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in
petitioner's name on January 11, 1985.
Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other.
How they did is the subject of conflicting versions. Luisita claims that
Nenita called her (Luisita's) residence several times, looking for Aurelio
because the latter had allegedly left their dwelling place. Petitioner,
according to Luisita, introduced herself as Mrs. Nenita Camacho.
On the other hand petitioner claims it was the other way around — that it
was respondent Luisita who had called up their residence many times,
also looking for Aurelio to urge him to file an application for American
citizenship.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and
Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements.
Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito,
having gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to
look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin
them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came
home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred from
the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church and later to
the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for the funeral services.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed
ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita
had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts
to settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of
the property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita
alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
In answer petitioner claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased
the property in question using their joint funds which they had
accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that the sale of the
property by the late Aurelio to her was with respondent Luisita's consent;
and that she was a purchaser in good faith.
On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale
of the property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It
found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be genuine and
respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the
property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who
had represented himself to be single. Respondents moved for a
reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared respondents
to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute. Although Luisita had
admitted that as early as 1985 she knew that Nenita had been staying in
the premises, the appellate court held that respondents' action was not
barred by laches because Luisita allegedly did not know that Nenita had
obtained title to the property. On the merit, the Court of Appeals ruled that
in the absence of proof to the contrary, Aurelio's first wife must be
presumed to have been absent for seven years without Aurelio having
news of her being alive when Aurelio contracted a second marriage. On
this premise, it held (1) that the property in dispute belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and (2) that the sale of the
property to Nenita was void for the same reason that donations between
persons who are guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under
Art. 739 of the Civil Code.
Hence this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner claims that
I THE COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING THE
VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN AURELIO
AND LUISITA [RESPONDENT HEREIN];
II THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 739
OF THE NCC AND DECLARING INVALID THE
DEED OF SALE BETWEEN AURELIO AND NENITA
[PETITIONER HEREIN];
III THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY FORMS PART OF THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF AURELIO AND
LUISITA.
IV THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT (sic) A PURCHASER IN GOOD
FAITH AND LAWFUL OWNER OF SUBJECT
PROPERTY.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The resolution of this case hinges on the validity of Aurelio's marriage to
respondent Luisita. If that marriage was valid then the property was
property of their conjugal partnership and Luisita is the proper party to
question the validity of the sale to Nenita. Otherwise, if the marriage is not
valid, Luisita can not bring this suit.
On the question of validity of Luisita's marriage to Aurelio, the Court of
Appeals ruled:
There is no dispute on the fact of appellant Luisita's
marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. What is in question is the
validity of that marriage considering Aurelio's
purported previous marriage to Consejo Velasco. The
appellee had attacked the validity of appellant's
marriage in the trial below, on account of the previous
marriage of Aurelio to Consejo Velasco, presenting
evidence to that effect (Exhs. 43 and 44) to bolster
her claim. Appellee likewise proved that Consejo
Velasco although then a resident of Australia, is still
alive.
The burden of proof on the legality of appellant's
marriage with Aurelio must rest on the appellee as the
party who stands to benefit from a declaration of its
invalidity. But appellee failed to prove that such
second marriage (appellant's) was not valid because
it was contracted at a time and on the assumption that
the first spouse had been absent for seven years
without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive.
This Court finds that the presumption of the validity of
the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita has not
been successfully assailed by appellee.
The Court of Appeals thus presumed the validity of Aurelio's second
marriage from the failure of petitioner to prove that at the time of such
marriage Aurelio's first wife, Consejo, had not been absent for at least
seven years and that Aurelio did not have news that his first wife was still
alive.
Petitioner had shown that on February 6, 1962, when Aurelio married
Luisita, Aurelio's previous marriage to Consejo Velasco was still subsisting
and, therefore, his second marriage was bigamous. It was the burden of
herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second marriage to
respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent
for at least seven years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive.
To assume these facts because petitioner has not disproved them would
be to stand the principle on its head.
Thus, Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he
has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
As this Court has already explained, the general rule is that stated in the
first sentence of this provision: "Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance." The exceptions are those stated in paragraphs 1 and 2.
The burden is on the party invoking any of the exceptions. 4
Paragraph 2 mentions three cases when the subsequent marriage will not
be considered void: (1) when the absent spouse has not been heard from
for seven consecutive years and the present spouse has no news that
he/she is alive; (2) when, although he/she has been absent for less than
seven years, the absent spouse is generally considered to be dead and
believed to be by the spouse present; and (3) when he/she is presumed to
be dead after four years from the occurrence of any of the events
enumerated in art. 3915 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that
Luisita and Aurelio's marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order
to be considered valid. They failed to discharge this burden. Instead the
contrary appears.
It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage
of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse,
after the period of seven years had lapsed.6 This exception cannot be
invoked in this case in order to sustain the validity of Aurelio's marriage to
Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the
time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been
living together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot
a child, in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962.
What applies in this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e., since Aurelio
had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent
marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question
was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio
because there was no such partnership in the first place.
The Court of Appeals held that the sale of the property to Nenita is void on
the principle embodied in Art. 739(1) of the Civil Code which declares
donations made between persons who are guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation to be void. In the first place, an
action for declaration of the nullity of such donations can only be brought
by the innocent spouse, perhaps in this case by the first wife, but certainly
not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is itself void. The last paragraph
of Art. 739 clearly provides:
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullify may be brought by the spouse of
the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and
donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence
in the same action.
In the second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the
sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced
by a deed of absolute sale7 executed with all the solemnity of a public
document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due
course in her name.8 Petitioner is in possession of the property. It was
error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of
one whose marriage to the seller is void.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long
period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-
1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son way
back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married
to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far
as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a
woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of
Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property
because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and another
one is entered, DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner and
DECLARING the deed of sale executed in her favor and Transfer
Certificate of Title
No. 326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to
be VALID.
SO ORDERED.
144 Phil. 514
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two
marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second
with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second marriage
the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from
the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by
purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of
P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No.
25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February
1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez."
On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived
only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia
Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present suit,
praying for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao property in
favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil
Code, the Spanish text of which provides:
"La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al
ser declarado nulo.
"El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad,
no tendra parte en los bienes gananciales."
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that
the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied
the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed
property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial
court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of
the second marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio;
and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable
in this case.
The first error has not been committed. The controlling statute is Act 3613
of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became effective on
December 4, 1929 and was in force when the two marriages were
celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
"SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages.- Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being
valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. - The action to obtain
a decree of nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding
section, must be commenced within the periods and by the parties as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b): by either party during the life
of the other, or by the former husband or wife.
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that his
marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an
action for that purpose, which in the light of Section 31 could be filed only
by either party thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by the former
spouse.
However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this case,
particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says that "any marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance." This is the general rule, to which the only two
exceptions are those mentioned in sub-sections (a) and (b) of the same
provision.
There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria
Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he
married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under
the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party
invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant
has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having
been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second
marriage less than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that
his first wife was then generally considered dead or was believed by him
to be so.
The second error bears closer analysis. Is Article 1417 of the Spanish
Civil Code applicable under the facts of this case?
There is one primordial fact which must be considered, namely, that since
the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor
has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner
in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in
the husband's share in the property here in dispute, even if it was acquired
during the second marriage, of which interest she would be deprived if his
share should be declared forfeited in favor of the second wife.
There is a difference of opinion among the members of this Court as to
whether such resulting prejudice to the first wife is within the
contemplation of the Spanish Civil Code when it decrees in general terms
in Article 1417 that the spouse who in bad faith has given cause for nullity
(of the marriage) shall have no share in the conjugal properties,
considering that in the present case the first marriage has not been
terminated and therefore likewise impresses the conjugal stamp of that
marriage upon whatever properties are acquired during its existence. We
believe, however, that it is not necessary to resolve that question here
inasmuch as the facts do not call for the application of Article 1417. The
first paragraph of this Article states two causes for the termination of the
conjugal partnership: (1) dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of
nullity. Under the second paragraph of the same Article it is upon the
termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of
the share of the guilty spouse takes place. Now then, when did the
conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the marriage of the defendant to
the deceased Isidra Gomez terminate? Obviously when the marriage was
dissolved by the latter's death in 1958. By that time Article 1417 was no
longer in force, having been eliminated in the new Civil Code, which took
effect in 1950. The legal situation arising from these facts is that while
insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having acted in good faith,
her marriage produced civil effects and gave rise, just the same, to the
formation of a conjugal partnership wherein she was entitled to an equal
share upon dissolution,[1] no action lies under Article 1417 for the forfeiture
of the husband's share in her favor, much less in favor of her estate, with
respect to which there are after all no children, but only collateral relatives,
who are entitled to succeed.
It would not do to say that since the second marriage in this case was
void ab initio the application of Article 1417 should be reckoned as of the
date it was celebrated in 1935. This article speaks from the moment of
the termination of the conjugal partnership (either by the dissolution of the
marriage or by the declaration of its nullity); and it would be self-
contradictory to consider that the conjugal partnership was formed and
terminated at the same time and by the same act, that is, by the
celebration itself of the marriage. Colin y Capitant[2]comments on this
provision as follows:
"Disuelven matrimonio y, por tanto, la sociedad de gananciales,
la muerte de uno de los conjuges y la declaracion de nulidad."
x x x
"En caso de declaracion de nulidad,
la sociedad de gananciales se extingue al
ser declarado nulo el matrimonio, es decir, en
el momento en que sea firme la sentencia declarativa de la nulidad."
It may thus be seen that if the nullity, or annulment, of the marriage is the
basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that
purpose. In the instant case, however, the conjugal partnership formed by
the second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and
there has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very
action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and when Article
1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.
There is, to be sure, a statement of Manresa[3] that in case of nullity it is
presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither
the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and hence such
spouse has no right to a share in the conjugal properties; but this legal
effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is
still in force, and in any event is of doubtful application if it would be in
derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the
first marriage in the conjugal partnership formed thereby, which includes
properties acquired by the husband during its existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired
by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
 BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA,
PACITA, MARIA LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO,
LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed
CONSUEGRA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY
DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE,
COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, and ROSARIO
DIAZ, respondents-appellees.
Bernardino O. Almeda for petitioners-appellants.
Binag and Arevalo, Jr. for respondent-appellee Government Service
Insurance System.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents-appellees.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special
Proceeding No. 1720.
The pertinent facts, culled from the stipulation of facts submitted by the
parties, are the following:
The late Jose Consuegra, at the time of his death, was employed as a
shop foreman of the office of the District Engineer in the province of
Surigao del Norte. In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages,
the first with herein respondent Rosario Diaz, solemnized in the parish
church of San Nicolas de Tolentino, Surigao, Surigao, on July 15, 1937,
out of which marriage were born two children, namely, Jose Consuegra,
Jr. and Pedro Consuegra, but both predeceased their father; and the
second, which was contracted in good faith while the first marriage was
subsisting, with herein petitioner Basilia Berdin, on May 1, 1957 in the
same parish and municipality, out of which marriage were born seven
children, namely, Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Rodrigo, Lenida
and Luz, all surnamed Consuegra.
Being a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for
short) when Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, the proceeds of his
life insurance under policy No. 601801 were paid by the GSIS to petitioner
Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the
policy. Having been in the service of the government for 22.5028 years,
Consuegra was entitled to retirement insurance benefits in the sum of
P6,304.47 pursuant to Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186 as
amended by Republic Acts 1616 and 3836. Consuegra did not designate
any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due
to him. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a in the amount of Six Thousand Three Hundred Four
claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid Pesos and Fourty-Seven Centavos (P6,304.47) due
to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra, considering that the deceased to the deceased Jose Consuegra from the
did not designate any beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance Government Service Insurance System or the amount
benefits. Petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar of P3,152.235 to be divided equally among them in
claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the the proportional amount of 1/16 each. Likewise, the
life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to respondent Rosario Diaz Vda. de Consuegra is
receive the retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra. hereby declared beneficiary and entitled to the other
Resolving the conflicting claims, the GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the half of the retirement benefit of the late Jose
late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage Consuegra or the amount of P3,152.235. The case
who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on with respect to the Highway District Engineer of
the one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and Surigao del Norte is hereby ordered dismissed.
their seven children, on the other hand, who are entitled to the remaining
one-half, or 8/16, each of them to receive an equal share of 1/16.
Hence the present appeal by herein petitioners-appellants, Basilia Berdin
and her children.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing ruling and apportionment made by the
GSIS, Basilia Berdin and her children1 filed on October 10, 1966 a petition
It is the contention of appellants that the lower court erred in not holding
for mandamus with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of
that the designated beneficiaries in the life insurance of the late Jose
Surigao, naming as respondents the GSIS, the Commissioner of Public
Consuegra are also the exclusive beneficiaries in the retirement insurance
Highways, the Highway District Engineer of Surigao del Norte, the
of said deceased. In other words, it is the submission of appellants that
Commissioner of Civil Service, and Rosario Diaz, praying that they
because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to designate the
(petitioners therein) be declared the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries
beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the appellants who were the
of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra, and that a writ of
beneficiaries named in the life insurance should automatically be
preliminary injunction be issued restraining the implementation of the
considered the beneficiaries to receive the retirement insurance benefits,
adjudication made by the GSIS. On October 26, 1966, the trial court
to the exclusion of respondent Rosario Diaz. From the arguments
issued an order requiring therein respondents to file their respective
adduced by appellants in their brief We gather that it is their stand that the
answers, but refrained from issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
system of life insurance and the system of retirement insurance, that are
prayed for. On February 11, 1967, the parties submitted a stipulation of
provided for in Commonwealth Act 186 as amended, are simply
facts, prayed that the same be admitted and approved and that judgment
complementary to each other, or that one is a part or an extension of the
be rendered on the basis of the stipulation of facts. On March 7, 1967, the
other, such that whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance is
court below rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which are quoted
also the beneficiary in the retirement insurance when no such beneficiary
hereunder:
is named in the retirement insurance.
This Court, in conformity with the foregoing stipulation
The contention of appellants is untenable.
of facts, likewise is in full accord with the parties with
respect to the authority cited by them in support of
said stipulation and which is herein-below cited for It should be noted that the law creating the Government Service Insurance
purposes of this judgment, to wit: System is Commonwealth Act 186 which was enacted by the National
Assembly on November 14, 1936. As originally approved, Commonwealth
Act 186 provided for the compulsory membership in the Government
"When two women innocently and in good faith are
Service Insurance System of all regularly and permanently appointed
legally united in holy matrimony to the same man,
officials and employees of the government, considering as automatically
they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be
insured on life all such officials and employees, and issuing to them the
regarded as legitimate children and each family be
corresponding membership policy under the terms and conditions as
entitled to one half of the estate. Lao & Lao vs. Dee
provided in the Act.2
Tim, 45 Phil. 739; Estrella vs. Laong Masa, Inc., (CA)
39 OG 79; Pisalbon vs. Bejec, 74 Phil. 88.
Originally, Commonwealth Act 186 provided for life insurance only.
Commonwealth Act 186 was amended by Republic Act 660 which was
WHEREFORE, in view of the above premises, this
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on June 16, 1951, and, among
Court is of the opinion that the foregoing stipulation of
others, the amendatory Act provided that aside from the system of life
facts is in order and in accordance with law and the
insurance under the Government Service Insurance System there was
same is hereby approved. Judgment, therefore, is
also established the system of retirement insurance. Thus, We will note in
hereby rendered declaring the petitioner Basilia
Republic Act 660 that there is a chapter on life insurance and another
Berdin Vda. de Consuegra and her co-petitioners
chapter on retirement insurance. 3 Under the chapter on life insurance are
Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Jr., Rodrigo,
sections 8, 9 and 10 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended; and under
Lenida and Luis, all surnamed Consuegra, beneficiary
the chapter on retirement insurance are sections 11, 12, 13 and 13-A. On
and entitled to one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefit
May 31, 1957, Republic Act 1616 was enacted by Congress, amending
section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186 as amended by Republic Act 660,
by adding thereto two new subsections, designated as subsections (b)
and (c). This subsection (c) of section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186, as
amended by Republic Acts 660, 1616 and 3096, was again amended by
Republic Act 3836 which was enacted on June 22, 1963.lâwphî1.ñèt The
pertinent provisions of subsection (c) of Section 12 of Commonwealth Act
186, as thus amended and reamended, read as follows:
(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member,
regardless of age, who has rendered at least twenty
years of service. The benefit shall, in addition to the
return of his personal contributions plus interest and
the payment of the corresponding employer's
premiums described in subsection (a) of Section 5
hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity equivalent
to one month's salary for every year of service, based
on the highest rate received, but not to exceed
twenty-four months; Provided, That the retiring officer
or employee has been in the service of the said
employer or office for at least four years, immediately
preceding his retirement.
xxx xxx xxx
The gratuity is payable by the employer or office
concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the
necessary appropriation to pay the same from any
unexpended items of appropriations.
Elective or appointive officials and employees paid
gratuity under this subsection shall be entitled to the
commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave,
based on the highest rate received, which they may
have to their credit at the time of retirement.
Jose Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, and so at the time of his
death he had acquired rights under the above-quoted provisions of
subsection (c) of Section 12 of Com. Act 186, as finally amended by Rep.
Act 3836 on June 22, 1963. When Consuegra died on September 26,
1965, he had to his credit 22.5028 years of service in the government, and
pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of subsection (c) of Section 12 of
Com. Act 186, as amended, on the basis of the highest rate of salary
received by him which was P282.83 per month, he was entitled to receive
retirement insurance benefits in the amount of P6,304.47. This is the
retirement benefits that are the subject of dispute between the appellants,
on the one hand, and the appellee Rosario Diaz, on the other, in the
present case. The question posed is: to whom should this retirement
insurance benefits of Jose Consuegra be paid, because he did not, or
failed to, designate the beneficiary of his retirement insurance?
If Consuegra had 22.5028 years of service in the government when he
died on September 26, 1965, it follows that he started in the government
service sometime during the early part of 1943, or before 1943. In 1943
Com. Act 186 was not yet amended, and the only benefits then provided
for in said Com. Act 186 were those that proceed from a life insurance.
Upon entering the government service Consuegra became a compulsory
member of the GSIS, being automatically insured on his life, pursuant to
the provisions of Com. Act 186 which was in force at the time. During
1943 the operation of the Government Service Insurance System was
suspended because of the war, and the operation was resumed sometime
in 1946. When Consuegra designated his beneficiaries in his life
insurance he could not have intended those beneficiaries of his life
insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because
the provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came about only
when Com. Act 186 was amended by Rep. Act 660 on June 16, 1951.
Hence, it cannot be said that because herein appellants were designated
beneficiaries in Consuegra's life insurance they automatically became the
beneficiaries also of his retirement insurance. Rep. Act 660 added to Com.
Act 186 provisions regarding retirement insurance, which are Sections 11,
12, and 13 of Com. Act 186, as amended. Subsection (b) of Section 11 of
Com. Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660, provides as follows:
(b) Survivors benefit. — Upon death before he
becomes eligible for retirement, his beneficiaries as
recorded in the application for retirement annuity filed
with the System shall be paid his own premiums with
interest of three per centum per annum, compounded
monthly. If on his death he is eligible for retirement,
then the automatic retirement annuity or the annuity
chosen by him previously shall be paid accordingly.
The above-quoted provisions of subsection (b) of Section 11 of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660, clearly indicate
that there is need for the employee to file an application for retirement
insurance benefits when he becomes a member of the GSIS, and he
should state in his application the beneficiary of his retirement insurance.
Hence, the beneficiary named in the life insurance does not automatically
become the beneficiary in the retirement insurance unless the same
beneficiary in the life insurance is so designated in the application for
retirement insurance.
Section 24 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660,
provides for a life insurance fund and for a retirement insurance fund.
There was no such provision in Com. Act 186 before it was amended by
Rep. Act 660. Thus, subsections (a) and (b) of Section 24 of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660, partly read as
follows:
(a) Life insurance fund. — This shall consist of all
premiums for life insurance benefit and/or earnings
and savings therefrom. It shall meet death claims as
they may arise or such equities as any member may
be entitled to, under the conditions of his policy, and
shall maintain the required reserves to the end of
guaranteeing the fulfillment of the life insurance
contracts issued by the System ...
(b) Retirement insurance fund. — This shall consist of
all contributions for retirement insurance benefit and
of earnings and savings therefrom. It shall meet
annuity payments and establish the required reserves
to the end of guaranteeing the fulfillment of the
contracts issued by the System. ...
Thus, We see that the GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of
benefits to its members — one is the life insurance and the other is the
retirement insurance. These two distinct systems of benefits are paid out
from two distinct and separate funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to
whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the
case of a life insurance provided for in the Insurance Act (Act 2427, as
amended), the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS may not
necessarily be a heir of the insured. The insured in a life insurance may
designate any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to be so under the
provisions of the Civil Code.4 And in the absence of any beneficiary
named in the life insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to
the estate of the insured.
Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee
— to provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the
government for a required number of years. If the employee reaches the
age of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement
insurance. The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the
proceeds of the retirement insurance if the employee dies before
retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of
his retirement insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to his estate
and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case
of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy.
It is Our view, therefore, that the respondent GSIS had correctly acted
when it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose
Consuegra should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario
Diaz, on the one hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children
by her, on the other; and the lower court did not commit error when it
confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the
second marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in
good faith. The lower court has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in
the case of Lao, et al. vs. Dee Tim, et al., 45 Phil. 739 as cited in the
stipulation of facts and in the decision appealed from. 5 In the recent case
of Gomez vs. Lipana, L-23214, June 30, 1970,6 this Court, in construing
the rights of two women who were married to the same man — a situation
more or less similar to the case of appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee
Rosario Diaz — held "that since the defendant's first marriage has not
been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by
that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished
her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code,
entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or
as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the
property here in dispute.... " And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage
was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage
was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and
her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
petitioners-appellants. It is so ordered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor
Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy
and sentencing him to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6
months and 1 day to 6 years, with costs.
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and
Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during
the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga
Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On
August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with
Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to
his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14,
1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted
while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in
effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19,
1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place
after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues
that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is
void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous
judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs.
Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of
Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the
defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage
for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his
factual contention to be without merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with
Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with
Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the
time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as
follows:1âwphïl.nêt
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void
by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted
by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is here no
pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted
in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for
seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render
said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent
court.1âwphïl.nêt
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
100 Phil. 1033
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding
appellant guilty of bigamy. The facts are not disputed and, as found by the
trial court, are as follows:
"On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso
Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine
Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits'"}" and "1-A"). While his marriage
with Maria. Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of
Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on
August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
"The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who
was then an employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo,
and a certain Emilia Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A", and
testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said
marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As
the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo
where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his
first wife, Maria Gorrea. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939
(Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the coast was
clear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940,
where she worked, as a teacher-nurse.
"It would seem' that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy
marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in 1949 and I960, Maria Faicol
suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the
hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria
Faicol to Iloilo; allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her
eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted & third marriage
with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga,
Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F").
"The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C.
Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3, 1953. Although the accused
made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the
Court, however, believes that the attempt is. futile for the fact of the said
second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the
said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio
Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the
accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33,
40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954)."
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an
express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for
judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could
not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the
dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter
or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance
of the latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651;
35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs.
Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil.,
845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majoirty of this Court
declared;
"The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613)
plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of Ms first spouse illegal and void from its performance) and. no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's
second marriage "with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first
spouse, Joyita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or
generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until
declared null and void by a subsequent court."
We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by Justice Alex
Reyes in his dissent in the case above-quoted But these weighty reasons
notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of
penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore,
seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza.
Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule
enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity
of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature,
an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in
the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation
already adverted to.

It is to be noted that,the action was instituted upon complaint of the

second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the
death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into.
Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for
contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby

reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio,
without prejudice to his prosecution for .having contracted the second
bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Pwras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L.t

Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.