THE PERUVIAN MILITARY: ACHIEVEMENT

ORIENTATION, TRAINING, AND POLITICAL

TENDENCIES
CARLOS A. ASTIZ
State University ofNew York at Albany
and
JOSÉ Z. GARCÍA
California State University, Chico
EARLY four years after the Velasco government took power in Peru, stu-

dents and observers of Latin American politics are still exploring the extent
~ ~ to which the Peruvian military establishment is altering the distribution of
social, economic, and political power. Without presuming in this brief article to
reply definitively to these and other pertinent questions, we feel that it would be re-
warding to consider two institutional aspects that have been associated wih the
Peruvian military by those who have analyzed their political behavior: the degree to
which achievement within the military establishment plays a more important role
than in the rest of Peruvian society, and the type of intellectual orientation which
senior officers have received from the Center for Higher Military Studies. The first
item is relevant in practical terms because, if the military are in fact highly achieve-
ment-oriented and can impose (as they say they would like to) this orientation on
the rest of Peruvian society, such change by itself might within a few years realign
the still ascriptive social, economic, and political relations of the entire country. The
second item is more abstract, but, if the Center for Higher Military Studies has influ-
enced the thinking of the present regime, it may give us an idea of the ideological
guidelines those in political positions are receiving from the military institution, and
may help us in perceiving the internal preferences of the military establishment, as

well as some of the cleavages that exist within it.

ACHIEVEMENT IN THE PERUVIAN MILITARY

The role played by achievement in advancement and assignment within the
Peruvian military establishment is worthy of discussion. Luigi Einaudi, probably the
most knowledgeable student of the Peruvian military, has claimed that

NOTE : The authors wish to express their appreciation to Luigi Einaudi and Victor VIlanueva,
with whom they have had long discussions on the subject; both were kind enough to
make available documents, data, and their own manuscripts. The senior author also
acknowledges with gratitude the support his on-going research on the Peruvian military
establishment has received from the State University of New York Research Foundation,
the Department of Political Science, and the Center for Inter-American Studies. Special
thanks are given to Professor Herbert Gerjouy and graduate assistant Robert Novak for
their help in processing the data. The junior author expresses his appreciation for the
support made available by the University of New Mexico, from its Ford Foundation
grant, which made it possible for him to complete his field research in Peru for his
dissertation and for this article.
In the course of interviewing prominent members of the Peruvian armed forces, the
authors felt that many of the remarks made by those being interviewed were not intended
for attribution. This is not surprising, since most observers of the Peruvian military have
noticed a strong ethic of silence among officers in reference to their institution; for that
reason, some of the sources have to remain unidentified.
667

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 668

by relating this highly developed training system to the promotion process, the Peruvian mili-
tary leadership made educational activity and achievement the cornerstone of a rationalized
bureaucratic structure without parallel even in the major military powers....
As William F. White has suggested, most Peruvians do not believe that success in life is
based on merit. Within the military, however, the emphasis on professional training and educa-
tion in the promotion process has, for many years, made the military perhaps the most merit-
oriented sector at least of the state bureaucracy, if not of the society.’
His most important evidence is outlined in Table 1: according to it 80 percent
of those who reached the rank of Army general between 1940 and 1965 were in the
top 25 percent of their military academy graduating class, a record far superior to
that of the United States Army. Thus, Einaudi uses this evidence to convey the
notion that the Peruvian armed forces constitute the only island of achievement,
merit, emphasis on educational record, and hard work in what is otherwise a sea
of ascription, personal contacts, political pull, tarjetazos and plain acomodo.
We feel that this is not the case, and that a more specific analysis of the meaning of
&dquo;achievement&dquo; in the context of the Peruvian military establishment will reveal why
this is not the case.22

TABLE 1
RANK IN GRADUATING CLASS OF ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS, 1940-65

SouRcE: Prepared by the authors from data made available by Luigi Einaudi, &dquo;Coded Biographies,&dquo; and
reproduced in his manuscript &dquo;The Peruvian Military.&dquo; (See footnote 1. )

To begin with, &dquo;achievement&dquo; within the Peruvian military means something

totally different from &dquo;achievement&dquo; at an American university, in the British civil
service, or in an international organization. While in every bureaucratic organiza-
tion recognition and rewards are distributed in part in relation to each individual’s
ability to perceive and accept the customary operation of the organization (often
identified as discipline), this characteristic is paramount in the Peruvian armed
forces, as it is in all military establishments. The more vertical an organization is,
the more important discipline becomes; in the Peruvian military establishment disci-
pline then ceases to be a theoretical concept of secondary applicability and becomes
1
The quotations are from Luigi Einaudi, "The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analy-
sis" (Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-6048-RC, 1969), p. 7, and Einaudi,
"Peruvian Military Relations
with the United States" (The Rand Corporation, P-4389,
1970), p. 5. Similar remarks appear in "Latin American Institutional Development:
Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil" (The Rand Corporation, R-586-DOS,
1971), p. 23, and in "Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968"
(The Rand Corporation, P-4676, July 1971).
2
Einaudi does mention in passing the problem of conduct and discipline as part of "achieve-
ment" in the Peruvian military; but we feel that he fails to face the issue. See Luigi R.
Einaudi and Alfred C. Stephan, III, "Latin American Institutional Development: Chang-
ing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil" (The Rand Corporation, R-586-DOS,
1971), p. 23.

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 669

an essential principle. In a very real sense, as will be seen, it gains preeminence over
other criteria employed to identify and reward those who distinguish themselves.
While we are not prepared at this time to present and analyze the hard evidence
provided by access to some of the records kept by military training institutions in
Peru, it is possible to mention here some aspects that substantiate our contention that
discipline and certain patterns of behavior play a crucial part in determining who
are the top officer. For instance, the grading system of the military academy and

of the special officers’ schools provides multipliers assigned to each item to be graded,
a procedure which increases the weight of those items considered important by the
Peruvian military establishment and decreases the weight of those considered less
significant in the formation of the future officer. As could be expected, conduct car-
ries the highest multiplier; thus a high grade in conduct would be multiplied by
five while a high grade in, let us say, sociology might be multiplied by one. Conse-
quently, a low grade in sociology would not be too damaging to the cadet’s overall
average, while a similarly low mark in conduct would be.
At the same time, it seems that the directors of the military training institutions
have the authority to determine the rank order of the graduates, taking all circum-
stances into account. We have identified at least one specific instance in which
neither the first nor the second top academic averages at the War College were
ranked at the top of their class; in fact, the officer with the best academic record
was ranked sixth. We have reason to believe that this is not an isolated incident;

many top-ranked officers in Peru’s military training institutions are those who, in
addition to demonstrating intelligence, also got along with their superiors and with
the branch of the service to which they belong, who interiorized the values sub-
scribed to by the Peruvian military establishment, and who behaved in accordance
with their superiors’ interpretations of those values.
While nothing indicates that intellectually outstanding individuals are down-
graded (and it is perfectly possible for an officer to be both disciplined and intel-
lectually outstanding), the fact is that intellectually outstanding individuals tend
to be reluctant to accept the disciplinary requirements of a relatively small military

establishment, particularly one which frowns on dissent and places unity at the top
of its scale of values. Intellectually active individuals tend to be inquisitive, to de-
mand explanations of those things that do not make sense to them, and to search
for a rational justification for those things with which they do not agree. In a verti-
cal institution these attitudes often go unrewarded : things are done and procedures
are followed solely because someone in a position of authority so decided. It is not

implied here that irrationality prevails; rather, that there sometimes are different
ways to do something, and the selection of a way may be an arbitrary matter, at least
at the time the decision is made. Then, vertical and bureaucratic procedures take
over and changes are difficult; under these circumstances, the less inquisitive the

individual, the more bearable the situation becomes. Questioning of such things and
procedures are often embarrassing for those who may have inherited their enforce-
3
The authors possess copies of sets of grades and rankings for a number of years and ranks;
this data has not yet been organized, processed, and analyzed. The comments that follow,
however, are partially based on the information contained in these records.

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 670

ment. In an organization such as the military establishment the available mechan-

isms make it quite tempting for the individual in command to turn that embarrass-
ment against those posing the questions, particularly when no rational answer is
available. It is our impression that episodes of this type take place often enough
that they either discourage many intellectually outstanding cadets and junior officers,
or downgrade them in the rankings and evaluations.

Finally, in spite of the secrecy which surrounds the Peruvian armed forces, and
which all researchers have experienced at one time or another, there is evidence that
promotions at the senior level have been tampered with, very often for political
reasons, although personal biases have also entered into the picture. In discussing
the first Prado administration, a retired Army officer points out that the President,
in order to gain the support of the armed forces, &dquo;granted promotions, many of them
premature or contrary to law.&dquo; In the late 1940s a secret society within the oflicer
corps known as &dquo;Revolutionary Committee of Army Officers&dquo; (CROE after its
Spanish initials) denounced &dquo;those who go around politicking in order to be pro-
moted... those senior officers who carried out revolutions and moved upward
thanks to their policy of support and servility.&dquo; 5 During the Odria administration,
General Zen6n Noriega sat on the promotions board and saw to it that officers who
were not considered sufficiently reliable by the regime were not promoted; a distin-

guished officer told one of the authors that his promotion to colonel was held up for
more than ten years. Circumstantial evidence seems to confirm this assertion: after

Noriega left the Odria administration and the board in 1954, an unusually high
number of officers were promoted, most likely to compensate for the backlog: Table
2 provides the figures.
TABLE 2
PROMOTIONS TO THE RANKS OF ARMY COLONEL AND GENERAL FOR THE
PERIODS 1953-54 AND 1955-56

SouRcE: Prepared by the authors from information made available by the Peruvian Armed Forces.
The problem of promotions, or lack of them, surfaced once again during the
Belaunde administration; Air Force General C6sar Cordero Lynch, first on the pro-
motion list in terms of tenure in rank, top cadet in his graduating class, and one of
the few officers with combat experience, was passed over for promotion by the Air
Force Minister. Furthermore, there were loud public complaints when the list of
proposed promotions to the rank of Air Force colonel was made public; one officer
was arrested when he tried to see the President to protest.6

Victor Villanueva, El Militarismo en el Perú (Lima: Empressa Gráfica T. Scheuch, 1962),

4
p. 103.
5
Bulletin No. 20 of the Revolutionary Committee of Army Officers (mimeo., April 1944).
For press descriptions of some of these events, see La Prensa, October 24, 1964, p. 1 ; and
6
Extra, November 4, 1964, p. 2. We have dealt here only with promotion irregularities
within the military establishment; there have also been cases of civilian politicians’ in-
volvement. Under the Bustamante, Prado, and Belaúnde administrations, Congress occa-
sionally exercised its prerrogative to blackball the promotion of senior officers who had
been proposed by their services; some cases became political footballs.

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 671

Incidentally, there seems to be a significant relationship between &dquo;achieve-

ment&dquo; at the Peruvian Military Academy and the ability to direct or join in a
successful coup d’ etat, as well as in the general tendency to become involved in
coups. Table 3 summarizes the available data. Perhaps the ability to be a part of a
successful coup, or at least not to oppose it, is the missing link that connects &dquo;achieve-
ment&dquo; at the Academy and promotion to the top ranks. We have not explored this
possibility in detail yet.
TABLE 3
ACADEMY RANKING AND PARTICIPATION IN COUPS D’ £TAT OF PERUVIAN
ARMY OFFICERS, 1914-62

SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from data made available by Luigi Einaudi, &dquo;Coded Biographies,&dquo; and
reproduced in his manuscript &dquo;The Peruvian Military.&dquo;

One area where we can test our hypotheses against hard data is at the threshold
of the Peruvian Army officers corps : graduation from the Military Academy. Table
4 quantifies the apparent family ties between those who became senior officers in the
period 1961-71 and those who graduated from the Academy between 1931 and
1962. It should be emphasized that the data presented in Table 4 is likely to under-
estimate the extent of family connections within the Army and its role. It also
ignores the presence of many &dquo;military families&dquo; which are represented in more than
one branch. In looking at the Navy promotions of equivalent ranks for the same

period, in nearly every year we find at least one officer with a brother in the armed
forces, although a more scientific search will undoubtedly increase the number. This
is even more true of the Air Force, since many of its officers originally came from the
Army and Navy. The Luna Ferreccio, Barandiarin, and Schroth families are exam-
ples of those well represented in the top ranks of two or more branches of the Peru-
TABLE 4
PAMILY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMY OFFICERS PROMOTED TO THE RANK OF COLONEL OR
ABOVE IN THE PERIOD 1961-71 AND THOSE WHO GRADUATED FROM THE
MILITARY ACADEMY BETWEEN 1931 AND 1962

SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from information made available by the Peruvian Armed Forces.
NOTE ON METHODOLOGY: Since surnames have been used in apparent relatives, it should be
pointed identifying
out that the authors have excluded all &dquo;common&dquo; surnames, as well as all surnames that appeared at
least ten times Since it is quite likely that some of the officers with the surnames not counted are in fact related,
the authors believe that, if anything, the above table underestimates family relationships within the Peruvian
Army.

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 672

vian armed forces. In the Army, at least 35 percent of the brigadier generals in
active service in 1971 had brothers who were or had been officers in the Peruvian
armed forces.
It seems that, unless one is prepared to defend the proposition that the families
of those who have reached the rank of colonel and above have a near monopoly on
intelligence, it would have to be recognized that there are certain mechanisms which
can supercede the scores obtained in the entrance and course examinations; it also

seems that those mechanisms operate to the advantage of relatives of military officers,

very much like the mechanisms that have brought about numerous complaints and
a few scandals at San Marcos and lesser Peruvian universities. They seem to be the

same mechanisms that lead Peruvians of all socioeconomic levels to declare &dquo;it is not

what you know....&dquo;

If the Peruvian military establishment is no more achievement-oriented than
the society from which it originates, if names are added to and subtracted from the
proposed promotion lists at every stage of the process in accordance with non-
academic merit considerations, then one of the most important claims voiced by the
military establishment and by some of its students to forecast its success as the na-
tion’s developmental elite weakens considerably. What is perhaps more important,
the educational demands placed on the officers acquire a different dimension.

SCHOOLING IN THE ARMED FORCES : FROM ACADEMY TO CAEM

The Peruvian military officer is, on average, one of the most highly schooled in
the world. It is quite possible that this emphasis on training, sometimes of a high-
pressure, repetitive nature, is a consequence of the search for a role that the military
establishment has been carrying on. This search, and the doubts that motivated it,
can undoubtedly be traced to the defeat in the War of the Pacific and to the coun-

try’s backwardness. General Jose del Carmen Marin, first CAEM director, was
quoted as saying to some of his subordinates: &dquo;When we [the Peruvian military] have
’t
a solid school system, nobody will be able to stop us.&dquo;’

The Peruvian military officer is expected to complete four years of studies after
entering the military Academy (five since the mid-sixties, when a &dquo;preparatory year&dquo;
was added). After graduation he enters the officer corps as a second lieutenant, and

before he reaches the rank of captain, he is required to complete two specialized

courses in the Specialization School; these courses last six months and one year

respectively, and they need not be taken in succession. Those two courses satisfy
his required training, but he is clearly told that he may not get beyond the rank of
major if he does not continue.
The next step is the Superior School of War, where the oflicer applies when
he has reached the rank of captain or major. The selection process seems to be
strenuous, with approximately 500 applications at the present time, for 90 places
(10 more places are reserved for foreign officers, for a total class of 100). Since
interested officers can apply for admission up to four times, the overall ratio of
Peruvian Army oflicers who are admitted is estimated at between 30 and 50 percent

7
This statement was mentioned to Astiz by General Victor Miro Quesada Ureta, while visiting
the Superior School of War, in June 1971.

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 673

of all applicants.’ The course lasts two years, with 3,000 contact hours completed.
The five top students, as chosen by the director and his staff, are sent aboard for
further training and, upon their return, are required to teach at the school for one
year.
Military training may also include courses such as the School of Intelligence,
and training abroad (which has been fairly common in the Peruvian military), so
that senior officers can spend up to one-third of the 35 years they are allowed to
remain in active service in schools of one type or another. For those who serve long
tours of duty as instructors or school administrators, that figure may be higher than
50 percent; the authors know of one officer who has spent approximately two-thirds
of his military life in military training institutions.
The last educational step is the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM),
currently open to the three branches of the armed forces, as well as to the police and
to selected civilian bureaucrats and representatives of interest groups. Since it is
CAEM that has been identified by many writers as the source of military reformism,
and since so little hard information appears to be available on it, it may be worth
discussing the Center at length.
CAEM offers two courses: one, currently known as the &dquo;Joint General Staff&dquo;
course, lasts six months; of an essentially military nature, it is open to lieutenant
colonels or their equivalent, selected by their services. The other, presently known
as the &dquo;National Defense&dquo; course, lasts one year and is open to colonels and their

counterparts, as well as to police officers and civilians, as mentioned above.9 This

is the course that has made CAEM well known in political and military circles, both
in Peru and abroad. Admission to the Center is by selection and appointment, made
by the Commander in Chief of each branch of the armed forces and the various
police units. The director of CAEM issues invitations to civilian agencies and inter-
est groups, and their authorities appoint those who will fill the seats allocated to their
organizations. Table 5 provides a breakdown of the participants who have gone
TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPANTS IN CAEM NATIONAL DEFENSE COURSR. 1951-711

SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from information made available by the Peruvian Armed Forces.
NOTE: There are minor disparities with the figures made public by General Arturo Cavero Calixto, &dquo;El
Centro de Altos Estudios Militares&dquo; (mimeo, 1971), p. 1; he Fives a total of 476 participants while the data
above includes 483. It is possible that some participants started the course but did not 6nish it. How·ewer, he
also lists 15 civilians in 1971 and, when Astiz was there, there were 16.

8
These figures were mentioned to Astiz by the director and other authorities of the Superior
School of War in June 1971. It would appear that they did not have a precise idea of the
statistical chances of an officer to be admitted.
9
We are using the latest terminology; there have been some name changes: The CAEM was
founded as the Center for Higher Army Studies; the long course was called "of Higher
Military Studies" and the short one "of Military Strategy" in 1968. See "Discurso
Memoria Pronunciado por el General de Brigada Tomás Berenguel Burgos, Director del
CAEM, Durante la Ceremonia de Clausura del Ciclo Académico 1968" (mimeo., —

December 1968), p. 1.

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 674

through the Center for Higher Military Studies since its creation by decree-law in
July 1950. The smallest class, with eight participants, was that of 1952; there were
43 in 1971. The first civilians attended in 1955 and Navy officers did not participate
until 1957.
The Center for Higher Military Studies is an appendage of the Armed Forces
Joint Command, with the director appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; he plays
a commanding role in determining the substantive and procedural aspects of the
courses. The permanent directors have always been Army officers, although the

Navy and Air Force have been and are represented immediately below the top post.
In 1970, however, an Air Force officer was acting director for a few months.
The faculty has been made up of military officers and civilians, the latter only
as lecturers until 1971, when two young instructors were hired on a more perma-

nent basis. The military members of the faculty serve relatively short tours of duty,
but their assignment is full-time. It is clear that the military leadership and faculty
are almost entirely responsible for the topics actually covered at the Center. The

civilian instnictors and lecturers, responsible for a variety of social science subjects
related in one way or another to the genereal theme of &dquo;National Power,&dquo; have not,
with a few exceptions, been particularly distinguished. Furthermore, of the twenty-
one individuals so identified by the authors, five were members of the Club Nacional

(including the two who have taught there the longest) and five others have relatives
in that club. Thus, it is possible to maintain that, throughout the entire period of
its existence, the upper class has had access to and contact with CAEM.
Space limitations preclude discussing in detail the historical development of the
Center for Higher Military Studies and its changing role within the Peruvian armed
forces and, therefore, in Peruvian politics. to It is apparent that it was created in
1950 at the urging of the most intellectually active senior officers. During the first
few years there was widespread feeling, at least within the Army, that CAEM was a
&dquo;junkyard&dquo; designed to &dquo;dump&dquo; officers unwanted by those in command, or who
were politically unreliable to the Odria regime, then in power. Consequently, many

colonels resorted to influences and political-military contacts in order to avoid

assignments there. It is almost exclusively to the credit of its first directors, Generals
Marin and Romero Pardo, that by the late 1950s those considered by superiors as the
elite among the colonels (and equivalent ranks) were being assigned to take the
CAEM course, on the basis of their potential for promotion. Attracting more intel-
lectually inclined officers or, more specifically, those whom the military leadership
wanted to become the elite, CAEM became a prized assignment and, in the 1960s,
an important step toward the rank of general. Table 6 provides evidence of the

relationship between the completion of CAEM’s National Defense course and

promotion.
It should be noted, however, that completion of the CAEM course was not a
sine qua non for promotion. In the eleven years between 1952 and 1962, 213 Army
officers were promoted to colonel; of them 111 (52.1 percent) eventually were pro-
10
For a comprehensive discussion of the Center for Higher Military Studies, see Victor Vil-
lanueva, El CAEM y la Revolución de la Fuerza Armada (Lima: Instituto de Estudios
Peruanos, 1972). A brief but accurate description can be found in Einaudi and Stepan,
"Latin American Institutional Development," p. 24.

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 675

TABLE 6
OFFICERS PROMOTED TO GENERAL OR EQUIVALENT WHO ATTENDED CAEM
NATIONAL DEFENSE COURSE, 1965-711

SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from information made available by the Peruvian Armed Forces.

moted to general. A total of 121 of these officers went to CAEM and, of them,
84 (69.4 percent) were promoted to general. Of the 92 colonels who did not attend
CAEM, 27 (29.3 percent) became generals. It should also be understood that pro-
motion to the rank of general is not, by itself, tantamount to a major political role.
To put it in more precise terms, in the Peruvian armed forces, as in those of most
other countries, there are generals and there are generals. For example, of the 52
brigadier generals in active service in June of 1971~ only 12 (or 23 percent) had
direct command of troops; 11 were occupying important political positions (6 were
in the cabinet). The rest were assigned to staff positions or in charge of military
training centers.ll
As it is well known, the most reliable form of power within the military estab-
lishment, although not necessarily the only one, is direct command of troops. Fur-
thermore, while the CAEM alumni (who, incidentally, have organized themselves
into an Association) have received a majority of the promotions to the rank of
Army general and a majority of the cabinet posts since the military took over, there
are also some non-CAEM general officers who are occupying key positions, as Table

7 shows.

TABLE 7
ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS IN ACTIVE SERVICE WHO HAVE NOT COMPLETED
CAEM NATIONAL DEFENSE COURSE, 19722

SoURCE: Prepared by the authors from information made available by the Peruvian Armed Forces.

11
The data in this paragraph have been compiled by the authors from information made avail-
able by the Peruvian armed forces.

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 676

CAEM, then is clearly considered by the top hierarchy of the army to be an

important, if not vital, experience in the final preparation of an officer for a posi-

tion of top command. Although many observers have stressed the importance of
CAEM as a factor in explaining the &dquo;new mentality&dquo; of the Peruvian military, 12
we feel that most scholars have neglected two important questions: first, the ideologi-

cal content of the training received by colonels at CAEM; and, second, the relation-
ship between CAEM and the Velasco government.
The answer to the first question requires some historical perspective. As early
as the 1930s the top leadership in the Peruvian army recognized a need for a mili-

tary institution that would study national strategic concerns, broadly defined so that
national goals and capabilities could be incorporated into a national military stra-
tegy. This concern for a broader perspective is related to a certain uneasiness among
the officer corps about the role of the military in Peruvian society. In 1940 mili-
tary radio broadcasts geared to youth rather crudely expressed this view:
There are citizens ... who, misled by strange doctrines or by sentiments which they do not
confess ... may tell you that the Army is useless, that it does not fulfill its function as it should;
that it spends too much money without showing a return; that it is made up of lazy men....
To them you should reply that, without the Army and the other armed institutions which
collaborate with it, we would be easily conquered by foreigners; that the social disorder would
destroy everything ... and finally, that our country is one of those that spends less on the
military; although war equipment (necessary to every nation which wishes to conserve its inde-
pendence) is expensive, the officers are self-sacrificing and humble, since there are many blue
collar workers who earn more than many of them.... The disorder of Peru’s internal life and
its failures in some international struggles were always due, dear listeners, to the lack of mili-
tary equipment or of an Army adequately prepared since peacetime.’3
In the years that followed World War II national strategic concerns were insti-
tutionalized at CAEM, and gradually a &dquo;doctrine&dquo; was evolved which clearly articu-
lated a position with respect to the role of the Peruvian military. Shortly before the
1968 coup an officer writing in the official organ of the army officer corps summar-
ized this doctrine when he concluded that, in the absence of war, the military’s only
alternative role was to engage in a &dquo;war of development&dquo; with the objective of
improving the country. 14
It was CAEM that, as the main military institution for study and research, took
up through its director this concern and introduced the concept of the armed forces
as a developmental elite. General Romero Pardo pointed out that &dquo;the expenses,

generally charged to National Defense, have now a predominantly social character,

since they are determined not only in regard to possible armed conflicts, but mainly
in terms of the need to support and supervise an adequate national development, as
well as the order and efficiency that should lead it.&dquo; 15

In reference to the excellent book by Victor Villanueva ¿Nueva Mentalidad Militar en el

12
Perú? (2nd ed.; Lima: Libreria-Editorial Juan Mejia Baca, 1969). The question marks
are most expressive of his skepticism.
13
"Momento Patriótico No. 17; El Ejército," pp. 4-6, reproduced in Ministerio de Guerra,
Servicio de Prensa, Propaganda y Publicaciones Militares, Momentos Patrióticos (Lima,
1940).
14
Rómulo Sarango Zapata, "Hacia
una Nueva Filosofia Castrense," Revista Militar del Perú,
No. 704 (May-June 1968), pp. 78-81.
Marcial Romero Pardo, from a presentation made in Arequipa in 1959, quoted in Villanueva,
15
EL CAEM, p. 59. In the same speech the then Director of CAEM pointed out that the
concepts and notions of national defense were "practically melting" with those related
to the developmental struggle.

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 677

Further evidence, at a different level, of this sensitivity toward their role is the
creation, since 1943, of four military high schools, or more accurately, prep schools,
in spite of the fact that less than 10 percent of those who complete their studies in
them choose the military career. Their objective in supporting these high schools
is not to recruit future officers, but to develop a group of civilians who are likely to
move into leadership positions and who identify with and support &dquo;military posi-

tions&dquo; on national issues; that the alumni of these high schools have organized them-
selves and they have provided political support to the military establishment con-
firms the effectiveness of this tactic.&dquo;
Within CAEM the tendency has been to train officers in what could be called a
military approach to social science. This trend, which started with the first director
and, with methodological and procedural changes, has continued to this date, pre-
sents a vision of Peru’s national reality and national interests which leads to the ines-
capable conclusion that the civilian political system and its leaders and beneficiaries
have failed in leading Peru on the road toward development; the objective is defined
not only in terms of a greater production of higher quality goods and services, but
also in terms of a better distribution of socioeconomic rewards, in the direction of an
ideal which CAEM jargon calls the &dquo;common good.&dquo; 17 Recently, a former director
of CAEM felt required to emphasize, however, that this &dquo;common good&dquo; &dquo;... al-
though it implicitly carries the idea of welfare, it neither represents a mass of goods
to be distributed, nor implies the obligation by the State to satisfy directly the needs
of each of the members of the community.&dquo; 18
This approach has led to what could be called the doctrine of &dquo;development
as a counterinsurgency tactic,&dquo; and that is essentially what the Center for Higher

Military Studies has been teaching its military and civilian participants. Although
it is possible to find certain aspects of this doctrine mentioned prior to 1965, the strug-
gle against the guerrillas left a profound mark upon many officers who, until that
time, did not share the general idea of the military stepping beyond its narrowly de-
16
For a fuller treatment of the military high schools, see Luis Valdez Pallete, "Antecedentes de
la Nueva Orientación de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Perú," Aportes, January 1971, pp.
163-81; the section dealing with CAEM, however, is not totally reliable. For a fictional
description of one such high school see Mario Vargas Llosa, La Ciudad y los Perros (7th
ed.; Barcelona: Editorial Seix Barral, 1966).
17
Whether because of the secerecy surrounding the Peruvian military establishment or be-
cause "publish or perish" has not reached Peru yet, the fact is that the Center for Higher
Military Studies has produced little that is not limited to the Center itself and/or to the
Armed Forces Joint Command. We have seen only two such "semi-open" publications:
the first one, "Colonización y Desarrollo Económico de la Selva Central" (mimeo., Lima,
1958), presents a plan to develop the Central Selva region through an autonomous
agency controlled by the military; it was essentially a military-run operation, and land
was to be reserved for military personnel (pp. 46-48). The second publication, "El
Estado y su Politica General; Determinación de Objetivos Nacionales" (mimeo., Lima,
1963) analyzes the Peruvian situation in 1962 in very realistic terms, and proposes some
of the measures the present regime has enacted; this publication caused a negative reac-
tion and was withdrawn. It should be noted that both studies are said to have been
written by civilians (either faculty or participants) : yet, their style is military, a fact con-
firmed when one compares them with classified CAEM studies. Furthemore, the publica-
tions were reviewed by the entire CAEM administration, faculty, and participants before
publication.
18
General Arturo Cavero Calixto, "Planificación de la Seguridad Integral; Planeamientos Actu-
ales sobre la Doctrina y Metodología" (Lima: Asociación de Egresados del Centro de
Altos Estudios Militares, mimeo, July 1971), p. 2.

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 678

fined professional responsibility. The feeling was that, under different leadership
and different circumstances, better organized and equipped guerrilla bands might
have been successful or might have resisted long enough to tip the scales against the
armed forces, if not on the battlefields, at least within the society. The example
of Cuba, where what was left of the traditional military establishment was dismissed,
exiled, jailed, or executed, gave further impetus to the notion of &dquo;development as a
counterinsurgency tactic.&dquo; CAEM documents and discussions held there in mid-
1971 and early 1972 confirm this view. As described by faculty, staff, and partici-
pants, the military establishment is not revolutionary, is not in the business of carry-
ing out social, economic, and political change. It was forced to become a develop-
mental elite and to carry out those changes that have been carried out because it was
faced with a situation of potential insurgency, which to a degree materialized in
1965. The defeat of the three bands did not eliminate the &dquo;subversive potential&dquo;
and something had to be done, since military victory is never guaranteed, to defuse
the explosive situation, to eliminate the most dangerous causes of a popular revolt.
A CAEM document emphasizes that, if the popular sentiments for a &dquo;better deal&dquo;
&dquo;... are not properly directed and oriented in a sense favorable to development, they
may constitute grave danger to security, because they may be used as a banner by
those who consider that violent revolution is the only way to achieve social justice.&dquo;19
The answerthe second question, regarding CAEM’s influence in the Velasco
to

goverenment, is difficult to ascertain, but it is clear, after nearly four years of

more

the Velasco regime, that many of the policies brought about by the government were
not initiated at CAEM. It must be remembered that the group taking power in
1968 represented a small faction within the Army, and that this faction was com-
posed of the most progressive officers in the military. It went beyond offitcial CAEM
doctrine. At the present time, however, 88 percent of the Army generals have
attended CAEM and it seems safe to assume that few of these will go much beyond
the counterinsurgency doctrine acquired at CAEM. Although Velasco’s policies
do not originate at the Center for Higher Military Studies, they are still based upon
the CAEM strategy of preventive development.
longer the military regime remains in power, the more it must
In fact, the
react to contradictory political pressures, and the deeper it involves itself in the game
of politics, the more critical of it the Center for Higher Military Studies becomes.
In being critical of the measures taken by those fellow oflicers who occupy political
positions without in most cases offering alternative measures, CAEM increasingly
projects a negativistic, conservative image which, before too long, might become
annoying to those responsible for policy-making and problem-solving. It is indicative
of the relationship between CAEM and the government that, of ten research studies
sent to the Joint Command for submission to the political authorities, one has been

19
General Arturo Cavero Calixto, "Amenazas para la Seguridad Interna del Peru y su Reper-
cusión en la Seguridad Continental," in CAEM, "Conferencias Sustentadas con Motivo
de la Visita del Colegio Nacional de Guerra de los EE. UU. de N.A." (mimeo., April
1970), p. 11.

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 679

approved and another was &dquo;incorporated into the development plans prepared by
the government&dquo;; no action seems to have been taken on the rest.2o
It is possible, of course, to argue that change is change, regardless of the moti-
vations of those leading the process. This, of course, is true; but we maintain that
this rationale of &dquo;development as a counterinsurgency tactic&dquo; carries within itself
very definite limitations, limitations that many observers refuse to acknowledge be-
cause, for many years, they have been promising us military elites that will carry
out &dquo;revolutions from above.&dquo; 21 Revolutions, whether from above or below, demand
commitment to a revolutionary ideology per se or in terms of vague ethical concepts.
Developmental measures taken to placate potential or actual insurgencies will likely
be limited to the minimum required, according to the perception of those managing
the measures, to forestall such insurgencies. In the specific case of the Peruvian
military, these measures are further influenced by the desire to justify the existence
of their institution, not only as the defender of the country’s borders and against
overt threats to internal security, but as a developmental elite. It is this minimum

approach hat CAEM has popularized among the senior officer corps. The fact that
some military officers now occupying political positions would like to go further

only shows that they have been receptive to ideas from other sources. It should be
remembered again that, as Table 7 shows, some of the officers playing key political
roles have not taken the CAEM course; neither have Velasco Alvarado, Ricardo
P6rez Godoy, or Nicolis Lindley L6pez - the last two leading figures in the 1962-
63 regime.
It is only in these terms, and looking at the geographic background of Army
officers, provided in Table 8, that one can explain a land reform that, important and
effective as it is, allows up to 3,750 acres in the Costa to cattle growers, and in the
Sierra whatever is necessary to support up to 5,000 head of cattle. Only in these
terms is it possible to understand the repeated statements to the effect that there will
be no urban reform, in spite of the fact that a good portion of the wealth of both the
traditional and industrial sectors of the upper class is now in land and buildings in
the urban areas 22 A further explanation may be that most of the senior officers
remain in the Lima metropolitan area after retirement and invest in land and
rental property, as well as in business, in the cities. Of a sample of 40 Army general
officers who retired in the last 15 years, 32 (80 percent) lived in the very exclusive
residential areas of Miraflores, Monterrico, or San Isidro; 6 others (15 percent)
lived in adjoining neighborhoods which are only slightly less elegant.23 Thus, it is
not surprising that General Graham Hurtado, an important political figure as presi-

20
From the presentation by Major Dante Castro Moreno, "La Reforma Agraria en el Perú,"
in CAEM, "Conferencias," p. 46.
21
An example of this school of thought is provided by Victor Alba, El Militarismo (Ensayo
sobre un Fenómeno Politicosocial Iberoamericano) (Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones
Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1959), pp. 159-64.
22
The possibility of an urban reform was negated by Premier Montagne, El Comercio, Novem-
ber 30, 1968, p. 1, and La Prensa, same date, p. 2. Since then, this position has been
reiterated a number of times ; see statement by former Interior Minister Artola in La
Prensa, June 27, 1969, p. 2.
23
The data on residential preferences of retired Army officers was gathered by Garcia in 1971.

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680

dent of COAP, has been quoted as saying, &dquo;The upper classes are not going to lose
anything; they are just not going to earn quite as much as they used to.&dquo; 24
TABLE 8
PLACE OF BIRTH OF SAMPLE OF PERUVIAN MILITARY OFFICERS BY
YEAR OF COMMISSION AND BRANCH

SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from data made available by Luigi Einaudi, &dquo;Coded Biographies,&dquo; and
reproduced in his manuscript &dquo;The Peruvian Military.&dquo;

All available evidence tends to show that neither CAEM nor the Velasco poli-
cies sanction a drastic redistribution of social, economic, and political power. They
do legitimize adjustments to the status quo that would make Peru a modern and
stable society, while insuring the survival of the military establishment as one of the
deciding factors in national politics.
THE PERUVIAN MILITARY AS A DEVELOPMENT ELITE: COMMENTARY
From the previous portions of this paper it is possible to conclude that the
Peruvian armed forces do not appear to be any less ascriptive than the society from
which they come. The evidence also indicates that the ideas developed at the Center
for Higher Military Studies cannot be considered a source of revolutionary activity
or a military mandate for drastic change.

The two most important specific objectives of the military regime that devel-
oped from the 1968 coup d’ 6tat were to take away the source of economic and
political power of the traditional upper class and to reduce and make more manage-
able the level of outside penetration in the Peruvian political system. 2 The former
objective is to be achieved by the agrarian reform program enacted by the military
regime in 1969, although it will not cover the entire country until 1975. The latter
objective is to be achieved by significantly reducing the military dependence on one
country (the United States), by broader diplomatic contacts, and by tighter con-
trols and limitations of foreign commercial, financial, and mining enterprises. The
takeover of the International Petroleum Company’s oil fields and refinery was rooted

"
A former CAEM civilian instructor indicated that he had felt a period of relative radicaliza-
tion at CAEM during the early 1960s, but that it tapered off after 1965, when certain
CAEM instructors left. This statement coincides with the general tenor of the articles
published in the Revista Militar del Perú. See Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites
in Peruvian Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 142-43; for an exam-
ple of relatively recent trends, see Miguel Ibañez Pérez, "Socialización, Socialismo y
Communismo," Revista Militar del Perú, No. 705 (July-August 1968), pp. 87-91.
25
On these points see Astiz, op. cit., pp. 48-61 and 231-47.

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 681

in the very special history of this company in Peru and on the emotionalism which
surrounded the issue.
In spite of the reservations expressed elsewhere in this paper it would seem that
the agrarian reform program will achieve its primary political objective: to under-
mine the base of the traditional upper class At the same time, and this is some-
thing that many observers have neglected, the new agrarian reform legislation gives
those members of the traditional upper class who are so inclined a unique oppor-
tunity to join the industrial upper class, which, in spite of the Industrial Reform
Act, the military are pampering and need. In fact, all improvements on the land up
to approximately $22,000 (at the official exchange rate) will be paid in cash, all
cattle will be paid in cash, and the first $2,200 of the value of the land will be paid
in cash. The rest, which will be paid in twenty-year bonds at 6 percent interest, will
be convertible into cash, provided that it constitutes 50 percent of the investment in
an industry approved by the authorities. Taking into account the level of public

service in Peru and the difficulty of selling rural property in the 1960s, it could be
claimed that many of the landowners are doing quite well, particularly if they exer-
cise the option of investing in an approved industry. Apparently, one such case is
that of the Pardo family, which is said to be planning to use the bonds received from
the expropriation of the Truman plantation to set up a tractor assembly plant; they
are not new to this field, however, since they already own the largest Ford tractor

importing firm in Peru. ?7

Thus, the traditional upper class is being given the opportunity to become the
industrial upper class and to retain a sizable portion of their wealth, although not
their traditional sources of political power.
On the other hand, what is going to happen in the rural areas? It seems that
we can expect both a neutralization of the peasantry in terms of national politics

and the transfer of power to a rural bureaucracy made up of administrators of coop-

eratives and peasant leaders. For even this to occur in the Sierra, a great deal of
organization remains to be accomplished, but it seems to be taking place on the
Costa.28 In any case, as long as the military remain in power, the rural areas are not
likely to exercise a counterbalancing influence.
In the area of foreign presence, after the extreme cases of military, political,
and economic penetration have been solved, at least to the satisfaction of the Peru-
vian military leadership, the pressures of international economics will force signifi-
cant ideological compromises. After foreign debt renegotiation, the military regime
in 1970 faced debt service obligations that amounted to 18.3 percent of imports and
2.3 percent of the gross domestic product. It should be pointed out that the purchase

26
As indicated previously, it does not seem to be doing so well in the elimination of APRA
support. Three months after the Apristas were being written off plantation politics (
Oiga,
August 22, 1969, p. 10), they won a decisive victory in the Cartavio Cooperative, 1,117
to 557; Siete Dias de Perú y del Mundo, November 2, 1969, p. 7.
see

27
As reported in Latin America, 5 (April 23, 1971), 130-32. For an indication that at least
some Sierra cattle ranchers were being adequately compensated by the agrarian reform
program, see Caretas, October 15-24, 1969, p. 3.
28
For a comprehensive discussion of this point, see David Scott Palmer, ’Revolution from "

Above’: Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru, 1968-1972" (Ph.D.

dissertation, Cornell University, 1972), chapters 6, 7, and 8.

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 682

of new military hardware, reported to be in the neighborhood of $250 million from

the military takeover until mid-1971, has contributed significantly to the increase in
Peru’s foreign debt; the military budget shows sizable increases for the years 1970,
1971, and 1972. In 1970 Peru was spending 3.3 percent of its GDP on the military,
a percentage equalled only by Chile among the large Latin American countries.29

These debt service obligations are likely to increase until 1974, when they are
scheduled to peak. Since the military authorities have, from the very beginning,
decided to maintain the international credit of Peru and its access to world capital
markets, the margin of maneuver against economic penetrators has been significantly
restricted. Although supervision of the large mining enterprises has been increased,
and they can no longer do as they please, it seems apparent that the mining law is
the weakest of all reform measures; and the government has not hesitated in break-
ing miners’ strikes through the use of force. Perhaps the most important reversal in
this regard, however, is the recent grant of areas of exploitation to seven foreign oil
companies; each company received 2,500,000 acres in the Selva region, some run-
ning right to the Ecuadorean and Brazilian borders. There is evidence that the
area contains ample reserves and the conditions appear to be more favorable than
those available elsewhere. IPC is out, but Atlantic-Richfield, Amoco, British Petro-
leum, Phillips Petroleum, Getty, Occidental, Tenneco Union, Shell (U.S.), and
Transworld are in. 30
If, as we contend, the strategy of the military regime has been to undertake the
minimum reforms necessary to prevent insurgency, has it been successful? The
answer must be affirmative. Political tensions have diminished, there seems to be
almost no guerrilla activity,31 and the level of overt repression is, in general terms,
low. Development as a counterinsurgency tactic has been proved, at least in the
short run, to be effective in a political system that was experiencing growing stress
through the 1960s, reflected in widespread land invasion, anomic movement, and
guerrilla rebellion. While sporadic indications of stress have appeared under the
military regime, such as the upheavals and subsequent shootings caused by the
amendments to the secondary education laws in 1969 and the urban land invasions
and strikes in 1971, the threats were minor and were solved by a combination of
skillful compromise and force.
If the strategy of counterinsurgency has been successful, what does this imply in
terms of economic and political development? While the answer to this question

29
The increasing arms purchases were reported in Latin America, 5 (August 20, 1971). 269-70.
The weapons, mostly for conventional operations, include 5 or 6 more Mirage IV (on top
of the 14 purchased in 1967), 16 Buffalo STOL/VTOL troop carriers, 4 Hercules C-30,
100 French light tanks, and 2 rebuilt British destroyers. The budgetary data is from Ger-
trude E. Heare, Trends in Latin American Military Expenditures 1940-1970 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, 1971).
30
See the announcement in La Prensa, January 15, 1972; the New York Times of January
28,
1972, called the contracts "one bright spot for foreign investors" and "favorable" to them.
The arrangement was approved, among other agencies, by the Armed Forces Joint Com-
mand : the Joint Command is also represented in the supervisory committee which will
oversee the operations.
31
In remarks made in April 1970, General Cavero accused one of the 1965 guerrilla organiza-
tions, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, of trying to organize them anew (in
"Amenazas," pp. 12-13). His information proved to be accurate, as reports of minor
guerrilla activity appeared in 1972; see, for instance, Latin America,
6 (August 25,
1972), 266-68.

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 683

might be more controversial and require a number of qualifications, very briefly it

would seem that the military regime has intensified and widened the economic devel-
opment of Peru.32 It also has given impetus to the country’s social development and
may have planted the seeds of its political development. In the latter case, however,
as long as no test of popular sentiment takes place and no accurate mechanism is
devised to formally place demands before the political system, the seeds will remain
underground. For instance, measures to grant illiterates the right to vote and the
reapportionment of congressional seats would be important steps, provided that
Peru were returned to an electoral system: this is unlikely, as the military itself has
made quite clear.33
Revolution, however, seems to be quite another matter. If we understand revo-
lution as the transfer of political power from one class to another, then it has not
happened in Peru and is not likely to happen as long as the military remain in power.
Since the armed forces have always been an important element in Peruvian politics,
their openly becoming the deciding element does not radically alter the picture.
The argument of a new military mentality, with or without question marks, could
acquire revolutionary connotations only if the military were to serve as conduits for
the above-mentioned transfer of power; so far, it does not seem to be occurring. And
it is worthwhile to note that the Center for Higher Military Studies stays away from
the word &dquo;revolutionary&dquo; in defining the ideology of the present regime as &dquo;human-
istic, nationalistic, planned-minded, and developmentalist; it is inspired in the princi-
ples of our Western and Christian tradition.&dquo; 34
Luigi Einaudi has taken issue with us and maintains that the question of &dquo;revo-
lution&dquo; is a matter of perspective, if not semantics.35 We do not think so; it may be
a matter of semantics among political scientists writing in professional journals or

exchanging ideas in an academic environment, but it has real meaning in terms of

gaining popular support or in asking workers and peasants to refrain from striking
for higher wages and greater immediate benefits. It has meaning in reference to the
desire of many military officers to develop a revolutionary mystique around the
regime, a mystique which has not yet appeared.36 The observer only has to go
through the speeches of those occupying political positions to notice their desire to
be recognized as &dquo;revolutionary&dquo;; even the repetitive use of the word can be con-
sidered indicative of the political value attached to it by the military leadership.37
In any case, it is only fair to ask those who claim that the Peruvian military regime
is carrying out a real revolution, that they provide an acceptable definition of revo-
-

32
As stated in an internal CAEM study, "Trabajo en Comité No. 1/70; Realidad y Objetivos
Nacionales" (1970), in the conclusions of subcommittee 3, "Political Factor," section IV.
33
The same subcommittee stated that "there is no possibility of forthcoming elections, even at
the municipal level," ibid., p. 15.
34
Quoted from the conclusions of subcommittee 3, ibid., section IV, p. 1.
35
Einaudi, "Revolution from Within?" pp. 14-15; also personal discussions between Astiz and
Einaudi.
36The lack of a mass revolutionary mystique was recognized by General José Graham Hurtado
in an exchange with Astiz in June 1971; the members of the COAP did not disagree.
37
For the most important speeches by President Velasco, consult Velasco, La Voz de la Revo-
lución (Lima: Ediciones Piesa, n.d.).

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 684

lution and the necessary evidence to demonstrate that the requirements of such
definition are being met.38
The lack of the mystique alluded to above could, in our opinion, be traced
back to (1) a perception by most Peruvians that the probability of seeing a true
revolution led by the military establishment is low; and (2) the stuffy, faceless,
bureaucratic image projected by senior military officers who jealously guard against
promoting one of their kind to a strong position and giving the chosen one an oppor-
tunity to turn into a charismatic leader.
In reference to large sectors of the middle class, the lack of rapport with tht
military government is likely to be rooted in the high level of cynicism found in this
social stratum. This cynicism has not been dispelled by the widespread impression
that, so far, the main beneficiary of the policies pursued by the military government
is the military establishment. Examples that confirm this view include the increase
in the rate of Army promotions, both in absolute figures and in relative terms, taking
into account the size of the officer corps and the pool of those who can be promoted
(Table 9) ; 30 percent salary increases and 50 percent extra pay for decorations;
housing pattern of military officers; liberal awarding of decorations; the recurring
talk of scandal and collection of &dquo;commissions&dquo; by military officers in political posi-
tions ; and the appointment of relatives of military officers to high government
positions.311
TABLE 9
ARMY PROMOTIONS TO THE RANK OF COLONEL AND ABOVE,
BY ADMINISTRATION, 1959-71

’~A: Avemge absolute number of yearly promotions.

fiB: Number of second lieutenants in the graduating class which corresponds to the average number of years
needed to reach each rank, per each promotion. The lower the figure, the higher the number of promotions in
relation to the potential pool.
SOURCE: Prepared by the authom from information made available by the Peruvian Armed Forces.

Finally, it should be recognized that it is possible that the dynamics of the politi-
cal process put into motion by the coup d’ 6tat of 1968 may turn out to be less man-
ageable than the military leadership estimates. The demands of the Peruvian masses
38
Carlos Delgado, one of the best known civilian advisors of the military regime, has taken the
position that "here today we live an authentic revolution, that is to say, a process of sub-
stantial changes in the system of power relationships" (emphasis added). However, in
our view, he fails to provide the evidence. See his article "Militares y Civiles en el Perú
de Hoy," Oiga, March 5, 1971, pp. 11-12.
For supporting news, see Latin America, 5, July 9, 1971, 218-20. For events involving rela-
39
tives of President Velasco, see Caretas, May 23-June 12, 1969, pp. 20-22. On the matter
of military decorations, officers were being decorated for their role in the antiguerrilla
campaign four years after it was completed; see Oiga, September 5, 1969, p. 16.

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 685

may eventually go far beyond what the armed forces officers are willing to allow
now; satisfaction of these demands may imply the transfer of political power to freely
chosen leaders. If such a situation were to arise, the military would have to choose
between leading a real revolution and carving a place for itself in the new political
system that might emerge, or opposing the revolutionary demands and giving up
whatever popularity the present regime may have gained We do not feel compe-
tent to do any forecasting.

40
The military has perceived this possibility, as indicated by Cavero in "Amenazas," pp. 10-13.

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