G.R. No.

150898 April 13, 2011

OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., and/or DENNIS HAO, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders
Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City.

On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao
(Hao), the company’s general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company’s "barracks"
where he lives free of charge.

Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the
company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a
co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest.
Informed by Silangga of Bladimir’s intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to
instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga
Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the
office of the company.

The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined, with Narding keeping
watch over him. The next day, April 13, 1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding that they needed
to talk to Bladimir’s parents, hence, on Silangga’s request, their co-workers June Matias and Joel Edrene
fetched Bladimir’s parents from Tarlac.

At about 8 o’clock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995, Bladimir’s parents-respondent spouses
Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred
Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was placed in the intensive care unit and
died the following day, April 14, 1995.

The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir’s immediate cause of death as cardio-
respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate
issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure,
septicemia and chicken pox.

Bladimir’s parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of
negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir’s condition leading to his death.

By Decision of April 14, 1997,1 Branch 66 of the Tarlac RTC at Capas dismissed the complaint, holding
that Hao was not negligent. It ruled that Hao was not under any obligation to bring Bladimir to better
tertiary hospitals, and assuming that Bladimir died of chicken pox aggravated by pneumonia or some
other complications due to lack of adequate facilities at the hospital, the same cannot be attributed to
Hao.
On respondents’ appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 22, 2001, reversed the trial court’s
decision, holding that by Hao’s failure to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article
161 of the Labor Code. It went on to state that Hao should have foreseen that Bladimir, an adult, could
suffer complications from chicken pox and, had he been brought to hospitals like St. Luke’s, Capitol
Medical Center, Philippine General Hospital and the like, Bladimir could have been saved.

Thus the appellate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 349
dated April 14, 1997 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered holding the
defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs-appellants for the following:

1. P50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub;

2. P584,630.00 for loss of Bladimir’s earning capacity;

3. P4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at Quezon City General Hospital as

evidenced by Exhibits "E" to "E-14" inclusive;

4. P18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake covered by Exhibits "F" to "F-
17";

5. P30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homes covered by Exhibit "I";

6. P6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at Sto. Rosario Memorial Park covered by Exhibit "J";

7. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

8. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;

9. P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees and

10. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

The motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution3 of November 26, 2001, hence this petition.

Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what the law requires, hence, they are
not liable for damages.

The petition is meritorious.

At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-
employee relationship being merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts,
three elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed
decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical
assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.

Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 161. Assistance of employer. – It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary
assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an
injured or sick employee in case of emergency. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase "adequate and immediate"
medical attendance means in relation to an "emergency." It would thus appear that the determination of
what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse or physician are available
on-site as required, also under the Labor Code, specifically Art. 157 which provides:

Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. ─ It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish
his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of:

(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50)
but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous
workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the
protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where
the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order,
hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;

(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an
emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than
three hundred (300); and

(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a
dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred
(100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300). (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are hazardous. Neither is there any
allegation on the number of employees the company has. If Hao’s testimony 4 would be believed, the
company had only seven regular employees and 20 contractual employees ─ still short of the minimum
50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to have a full-time registered nurse.

The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill
amounted to the "necessary assistance" to ensure "adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance" to
Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.

As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Hao’s advice for Bladimir to, as he did,
take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted "adequate and
immediate medical" attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an
emergency.

Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be thus
expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the
Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate court’s ruling.

AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death
of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred.5 An injury or
damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the
case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence
of the act or omission.6

Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The dissent, apart from adopting the appellate
court’s findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in
not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well. This finding is not,
however, borne by the records. Nowhere in the appellate court’s or even the trial court’s decision is there
any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker. At best, the only allusion
to another employee being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal
within three days as was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it
happened.7

On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, the dissent, noting that Dr. Frias
attended to Bladimir during his "last illness," holds that the certificate which he issued ─ citing chicken
pox as antecedent cause ─ deserves more credence.

There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on the immediate cause of
Bladimir’s death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to complications ─ from pneumonia per
QCGH, septicemia and chicken pox per Dr. Frias’. In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes of death in
both certificates were the same.8

Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimir’s attending physician, he having merely
ordered Bladimir’s transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the Caybiga Hospital. He thereafter left
Bladimir to the care of doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 o’clock the following morning or
eight hours after seeing Bladimir. As he himself testified upon cross-examination, he did not personally
attend to Bladimir anymore once the latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH. 9

It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the entries
therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence
establishing otherwise.10 The QCGH death certificate was received by the City Civil Registrar on April 17,
1995. Not only was the certificate shown by positive evidence to be inaccurate. Its credibility, more than
that issued by Dr. Frias, becomes more pronounced as note is taken of the fact that he was not around
at the time of death.

IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are not guilty of
negligence.1avvphil

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED,
and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989

JOSE B. SARMIENTO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(National Power Corporation), respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC
Case No. 2134 on August 25, 1983 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits as surviving spouse of the late Flordeliza
Sarmiento.

The findings of the respondent Commission are as follows:

The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power
Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on
August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's
illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a small wound over
the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass
revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." The employee
sought treatment in various hospitals, namely, Veterans Memorial Hospital, United
Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In March 1981, a soft tissue mass
emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became deformed and she
was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her last treatment at the
Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of swallowing food and
her general debility. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due
to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old.

Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during
employment was service-connected, appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS,
through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that parotid
carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland (salivary gland)" and that its
development was not caused by employment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied
with the respondent System's decision of denial, claimant wrote a letter dated October 8,
1982 to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees'
Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation. (At pp. 17-18, Rollo)

On August 25, 1983, the respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision. It found that the
deceased's death causation by parotid carcinoma is not compensable because she did not contract nor
suffer from the same by reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth.
It may be noted that the petitioner was earlier paid GSIS benefits in the amount of P142,285.03 but the
claim for employee's compensation was disallowed.

Hence, the instant petition.

The petitioner, while principally stressing the compensability of the deceased's ailment, attacks the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the law on employees' compensation which
superseded the Labor Code and the of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He alleges that provisions the
said law infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social justice, substantive due process, and equal
protection of laws, and also permits unjust discrimination and amounts to class legislation in its
enforcement. He prays for the application of the Old Workmen's Compensation Act which provided for a
presumption of compensability whenever an ailment supervened during the course of the employment.

We dismiss the petition.

We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attach against the constitutionality of the new
law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions
of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of
this law on appeal by certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according
to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights. It is now settled
jurisprudence (see Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA
192; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92) that the new law discarded the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" to restore what the law believes is a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the
employees' rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.

In the case of De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation, (supra), this Court explained the new scheme of
employees' compensation as follows:

The new law establishes a state insurance fired built up by the contributions of
employers based on the saries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to
litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of
injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new
neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the
employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may
be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The
amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to
the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not
have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a find under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it
has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from
an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
 Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on
presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. (At pp. 99-
100)

The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. These is no serious attempt to
assail it on constitutional grounds.

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to
the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation
program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is
preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was
enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous
to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve
or amend the law, our duty is to apply it.

Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease and
listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions (Bonifacio
v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).

Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an
occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as manager of
the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by her
employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness.

The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and
was, naturally, exposed to the elements. According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips
necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in her ears.
This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston
Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory canal."

We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of
parotid carcinoma is still not known. A medical authority, however, declares that:

SALIVARY GLANDS —

Painless swelling of the parotid glands is often noted in hepatic cirrhosis in sarcoidis, in
mumps, following abdominal surgery, or associated with neoplasm or infections. The
common factors may be dehydration and inattention to oral hygiene. The latter promotes
the growth of large numbers of bacteria which, in the absence of sufficient salivary flow,
ascend from the mouth into the duct of a gland. Another cause of a painful salivary gland
is sialolithiasis (salivary duct stone). The submandibular glands are most commonly
affected. Pain and swelling associated with eating are characteristic. Saliva promotes
retention of artificial dentures because of its mucin content. Thus, conditions
characterized by diminished saliva flow often adversely affect the ease with which
dentures may be worn. Calcium phosphate stone tend to form because of a high pH and
viscosity of the submandibular gland saliva which has a high mucin content. Stones are
removed by manipulation or excision.
 Autoimmune sialosis is the Mikulics—Sjogren Syndrome, a unilateral or bilateral
enlargement of the parotid and/or submandibular gland, and often the lacrimal glands.
Occasionally painful, it is associated with xerostomia (dry mouth) due to impaired saliva
formation that is most common in older women. Beriow et al., The Merek Manuel, 14th
Edition, pp. 2095-2096).

Another author states the following regarding squamous cell carcinoma:

Moreover, when the salivary gland is almost totally destroyed and replaced by
epidermoid cancer it may be difficult or even impossible to ascribe the origin of the
growth to salivary gland tissue. Indeed many squamous cell carcinomas, especially of the
parotid, may be metastatic lesions that develop in lymph nodes included within the
parotid. And it is important to stress that the juxtaparotid and intraparotid lymph nodes
are not merely accumulations of lymphoid tissue but nodes with efferent and afferent
lymphatics.

Squamous cell carcinomas of the major salivary glands are generally fixed to the skin and
the underlying tissues and, in the case of the parotid, are often the cause of facial palsy.

Epidermoid cancers grow swiftly and the clinical course is usually rapid. A few tumours,
however, have been present for as long as two years before the patient seeks advice.
Some patients remain alive and asymptomatic after radical surgery, but ordinarily the
lesions are highly malignant, infiltrating locally and metastasizing to the regional nodes
Distant metastasis is seldom a prominent clinical feature. In the case of the
submandibular gland the tumor may simulate osteomyelitis of the mandible or an
abscess in the gland itself, and if such lesions are incised a chronic sinus is liable to
persist until radical treatment is undertaken. (Evans and Cruickshank, Epithelial Tumours
of the Salivary Glands, Vol. 1, p. 254)

Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents which found no
proof that the deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk of her contracting
her illness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and
the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990

MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school teacher which the
public respondents disallowed on the ground that the cause of death was not work-connected.

Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in
Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for
eleven (11) years. Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.

On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom teacher,
Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom
floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she
continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but,
heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to
the school because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her
accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).

Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. She
was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found
that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was
discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died
three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old, survived by
her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the youngest, her newborn
infant (p. 9, Rollo).

On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14, 1984, it was
denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post partum the
cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment
was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have
precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a
result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).

On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution No. 3913 dated July
8, 1988 holding:

We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum
septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting from the entrance
into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution of
the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of intoxication. The
cause of this condition in the instant case was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting
from the decedent's delivery of her child which took place at home. The alleged accident
in school could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly
 caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working conditions of the
deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

Hence, this petition for review.

After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the comments of the
public respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents' peremptory denial of the petitioner's
claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the grounds for
compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as follows:

Sec. 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer.

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with
the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.

The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not
listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as
pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident
and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom
floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of
recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic
consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused
the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate
or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.

. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however, as
might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or relation, but rather,
[is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be
that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere preexisting
condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been adequate to
produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause .
(Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.)
 The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)

Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:

. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening

upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur.
132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-
279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from the
primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.)

Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom
teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the
premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death, are compensable.

There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's post partum
septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child at
home" for the incident in school could not have caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary
precautions to avoid infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).

The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a disease of childbirth,
and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom.

It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room instead
of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she had been attended by specially trained
doctors and nurses, she probably would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably
would not have contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5) days
in the hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably would not have died. But who is
to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses? The
court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries that the Government pays its public school teachers.
Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor the
services of trained doctors and nurses when they or members of their families are in. Penury compelled
the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at home instead of in a hospital.

The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty.
Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate
social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7,
Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and
underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to
ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the means to
afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC,
164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of his
wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of Government, and thereby committed a grave
abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees Compensation
Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered to pay death benefits to the
petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the filing of
the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989

CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondents.

Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:

This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission
("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v. Government Service Insurance System [Armed Forces
of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS")
denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's son, Sgt.
Lemick G. Hinoguin

The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to military training
by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At the time of
his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of Sergeant per Special Order P-4200, HPA dated
15 October 1985, in "A" company 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters of
the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was Detachment Non-
Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A" Company being stationed at
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.

On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft.
Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A"
Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter
thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms
with them, considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and order
problems due to the presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the vicinity of
Aritao.

Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on 1 August 1985
and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the same day. 3 They proceeded to the
home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About 4:00 o'clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers
with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin
and two (2) large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the soldiers left the
Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a motor-
driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog
occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted,
walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that
the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger,
firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower
abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3)
steps forward, cried that he had been hit and fell to the ground.

His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Their
Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being notified of the shooting and there
talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been
accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon
City and there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of
death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his sustaining a gunshot
wound.

An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985 concluded that the
shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." 4 On 19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty
Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of
[the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due
to Gun Shot Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-5009
(Inf.) PA ... ." After receiving and deliberating . g on the Investigation Report dated 11 August 1985
together with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some further
questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and
recommendation:

Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan

detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft. Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinoguin and
Cpl. Clavo to his home to celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked permission to
go on overnight and to allow them to carry their firearms with them because the place
where they were going is critical. They were given such permission verbally by their
Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental as the
Investigation Report presented here proved beyond reasonable [doubt] the fact that Dft.
Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin

RECOMMENDATION:

The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the
members contain the following:

The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death
of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of Duty.

The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt.
Lemick Hinoguin be given. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as
amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This was
denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing his
duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the GSIS. This denial
was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a Decision dated 24 May 1988
which stated that:

[F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive where
the work-connection of the events that led to appellant's son's death lies. Under the law,
death resulting from injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in the course
of employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of employment .
Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of work nor was he performing
official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just came from a
merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is
compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.

Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four,
Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of the
Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on
Employees' Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows:

SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. — (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee

shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;

(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and

(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness
which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death
occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any
harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated considerably on the simple
and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads:

SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following grounds:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of
employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness. The
concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a
soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a
factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed.
In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being
approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo
and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to
us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally
speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the
three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on
vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably
they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from
Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed,
if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired
upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent
GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he
sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of
Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt.
Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty
status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law
24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week,
except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we think
that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by
the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier
under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing "official functions" because
he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks
was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions.
Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to
have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an
approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be preterminated by
superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired
upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that he is
compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons
around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a
soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably
regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental
discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course
of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence
compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official functions of
members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the specific purpose at hand, that is,
the interpretation and application of the compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable
related regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the
interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor
Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee dated 20 November
1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No.
3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in respect
of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

May a moonlighting policemans death be considered compensable? This is the crux of the controversy
now at bar.
The records[1].1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegres deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio
A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within
the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the
Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre
allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued
between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer.
On account of her husbands death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its
decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2
Alegres death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal
to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9,
1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS.
Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on February 28,
1997, the appellate court reversed[2] the ECCs decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegres death was work-
connected and, therefore, compensable. Citing Nitura v. Employees Compensation
Commission[3] and Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals ,[4] the appellate court
explained the conclusion arrived at, thus:

[T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a workplace cannot always be literally applied to a person
in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a
clerk in a particular fixed office.

It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not confined to the police
precinct or station but to any place where his services, as a lawman, to maintain peace and security, are
required.

At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the Imelda Commercial
Complex where the police assistance center is located. There can be no dispute therefore that he met his
death literally in his place of work.

It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was accosted by
another police officer. This would lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in
the performance of official duty at the time.

However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by the nature of
their functions, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty.

Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2
Alegres death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at
the time of death must be work-connected.
 We grant the petition.
As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Courts resolution is whether the death of SPO2 Alegre
is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.
Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that for the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer.[5]
Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules application in the case of police
officers. Nevertheless, owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to keep peace and order, and the risks
assumed, the Court has treated police officers similar to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
with regard to the compensability of their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin v. Employees Compensation
Commission,[6] a case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow soldier, we held
in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,[7] that members of the national police are by
the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day because policemen are subject to call at
any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace
and security of the community.
Upon examination of the Court of Appeals reasoning, we believe that the appellate court committed
reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited cases. While we agree that policemen, like
soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty as peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock,
the same does not justify the grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre based on the
facts disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at hand is in order.
In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together with two other
members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission by the commanding officer of their
company to leave their station in Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya. As they were returning to their headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his M-16
rifle was on semi-automatic mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin who then died as
a result thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation benefits, this Court held:

The concept of a workplace referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a
soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in assembly line in a factory
or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the
instant case, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being
approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo
and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to
us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally
speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the
three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on
vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably
they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from
Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed,
if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired
upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent
GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.
 Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army, Pfc. Regino S.
Nitura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. At the time he met his death, he
was instructed by his battalion commander to check on several personnel of his command post who were
then attending a dance party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his way back to the camp, he
passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death. Reversing the
ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the deceaseds widow, the Court ruled:

A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nituras station was at
Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the
permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In
carrying out said directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held
in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be
very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer.

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the incident, it
has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is
subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his
superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave
status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on approved vacation leave.

The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision is Employees
Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals. This time, the claim for death compensation benefits was
made in behalf of a deceased police officer, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a
member of the Mandaluyong Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail. Findings showed that
the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview because the latter was
involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased was approached by another
policeman and shot him to death. Both the GSIS and the ECC denied the claim by the deceaseds widow on
the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was plainly acting as a father to his son and that he was in a place where he
was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed said denial which decision was affirmed by this
Court, declaring that:

But for claritys sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police,
like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when
they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at anytime and may be asked by their superiors
or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.

xxxxxxxxx

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P. D. No. 626, as amended,
policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.

While it is true that, geographically speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not actually at his assigned post at the
Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son -
-- as a suspect in a case --- to the police station for questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he
was not merely acting as father but as a peace officer.

From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of death benefits
merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are virtually working round-
the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the
absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident that led to his death.
 In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned and the place
where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp
commander to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, a place which soldiers have secured lawful
permission cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their
commanding officer and, hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his official
functions.
The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his station on
permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel of his command who were
then attending a dance party.
As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees Compensation Commission case, although he was not given
any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there
was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time that
he was attacked and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime, a
basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform.
Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death
benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that
the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained
elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to
understand then why SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the
matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee,
was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or
permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases
of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he
died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran,
there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines.That
he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock
duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that
he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In
fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail.[8] At any
rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact
validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to
benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine
should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but
only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in
character.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CELERINO VALERIANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To be compensable, an injury must have resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment. It must be shown that it was sustained within the scope of employment while the claimant
was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto or while following the orders of a
superior. Indeed, the standard of "work connection" must be satisfied even by one who invokes the 24-
hour-duty doctrine; otherwise, the claim for compensability must be denied.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the January 30, 1998 Court of Appeals [1] (CA)
Decision,[2] as well as the September 25, 1998 Resolution[3] in CA-GR SP No. 31141. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads as follows:[4]

"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated April 1,

1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto."

The September 25, 1998 Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are summarized in the assailed Decision as follows: [5]

"Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire
Station. Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was standing along Santolan
Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of Alexander Agawin. They
decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their
way home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a
head-on collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway
streets in Quezon City. Due to the strong impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown
out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was
brought to several hospitals for treatment.

"On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626, with the
Government Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the
ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his
work. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial by the System but the
same was turned down on the ground that the condition for compensability had not been
satisfied. Petitioner then interposed an appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC for short). In a decision dated April 1, 1993, the ECC ruled against
herein appellant, the pertinent portions of which are stated in the following wise:

After a study of the records of the case under consideration, we find the decision
of the respondent System denying appellants claim in order.
 Under the present compensation law, injury and the resulting disability or death
is compensable if the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment. It means that the injury or death must be sustained while
the employee is in the performance of his official duty; that the injury is
sustained at the place where his work requires him to be; and if the injury is
sustained elsewhere, that the employee is executing an order for the employer.
The aforementioned conditions are found wanting in the instant case. The
accident that the appellant met in the instant case occurred outside of his time
and place of work. Neither was appellant performing his official duties as a
fireman at the time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the Bonanza
Restaurant where he and his friends had dinner. Apparently, the injuries
appellant sustained from the accident did not arise out of [and] in the course of
his employment. Considering therefore the absence of a causal link between the
contingency for which income benefits [are] being claimed and his occupation as
fireman, his claim under PD 626, as amended, cannot be given due course."

The CA Ruling

The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the Employees Compensation Commission that
petitioners injuries and disability were not compensable, emphasizing that they were not work-connected.

"Turning to the case before us, the evidence on record shows that herein petitioner was
injured not at the place where his work required him to be. Neither was he executing an
order from his superior, nor performing his official functions at the time of the accident.
It must be recalled that at the time of the accident, petitioner was already dismissed
from his regular 8-hour daily work. He was walking along Santolan Road when he met
his friend and they decided to go to Bonanza Restaurant for dinner. Notwithstanding his
claim that he can be called to report for work anytime in case there is a fire, or that his
position is akin to that of a military man, a contention we cannot support, still the
circumstances leading to the accident in which he was injured reveals that there is no
causative connection between the injury he sustained and his work. Petitioners
invocation of the ruling in Hinoguin vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 is misplaced. In that case,
petitioner Sgt. Hinoguin was a member of the Armed Forces and soldiers are presumed
to be on official duty 24 hours a day. In the case at bar, petitioner is a fireman with a
specific tour of duty. To sustain petitioners contention of compensability would, in effect,
make the employer, in this case the State, the insurer against all perils. That is not the
intendment of our lawmakers in enacting the Workmens Compensation Act." [6]

Hence, this Petition.[7]

The Issues

In his Petition,[8]Petitioner Celerino Valeriano urges the Court to resolve the following questions:

"I

WHETHER PETITIONERS INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED.

"II

WHETHER PETITIONER FIREMAN, LIKE SOLDIERS, CAN BE PRESUMED TO BE ON 24-

HOUR DUTY."[9]
These questions point to the sole issue of the compensability of Petitioner Valerianos injuries and
resulting disability.

The Courts Ruling

We find no merit in the Petition.

Main Issue: Compensability of Valerianos Injuries and Resulting Disability

Disability benefits are granted an employee who sustains an injury or contracts a sickness resulting in
temporary total, permanent total, or permanent partial, disability.[10] For the injury and the resulting
disability to be compensable, they must have necessarily resulted from an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment.[11]

Were Petitioners Injuries

Work-Connected?

Citing Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmens Compensation Commission,[12] the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioners claim on the ground that he had not been injured at his work place, executing an
order of his superior, or performing official functions when he met the accident.

We agree. In Iloilo, the Court explained the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" in
this wise:

"The two components of the coverage formula -- "arising out of" and "in the course of
employment" -- are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied;
however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is
unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of
the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. The words "arising
out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character,
while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under
which the accident takes place.

"As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of
employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where
the employee may reasonably x x x be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged
in doing something incidental thereto."[13]

Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied.
The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of
the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was
acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or
incidental thereto.[14]

Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to
the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social
function -- having dinner with some friends -- is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not
acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of
his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by
the appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not
compensable.

Applicability of Hinoguin and Nitura

Petitioner debunks the importance given by the appellate court to the fact that he was not at his work
place and had in fact been dismissed for the day when he met the accident. He argues that his claim for
disability benefits is anchored on the proposition that the exigency of his job as a fireman requires a
constant observance of his duties as such; thus, he should be considered to have been "on call" when he
met the accident. He underscores the applicability of Hinoguin v. ECC[15] and Nitura v. ECC[16] to his case.

In Hinoguin and Nitura, the Court granted death compensation benefits to the heirs of Sgt. Limec
Hinoguin and Pfc. Regino Nitura, both members of the Philippine Army. After having gone elsewhere on
an overnight pass, Sgt. Hinoguin was accidentally shot by a fellow soldier during the formers return trip
to their headquarters. Pfc. Nitura, on the other hand, died after falling from a bridge during his trip back
to his camp. At the time of his death, he had just accomplished his commanders instruction to check on
several personnel of his command post who were then at a dance party.

Both cases espoused the position that the concept of "work place" cannot always be literally applied to a
soldier on active duty status who, to all intents and purposes, is on a 24-hour official duty status, subject
to military discipline and law and at the beck and call of his superior officers at all times, except when he
is on vacation leave status.[17]

This ratiocination, later applied to police officers in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of
Appeals,[18] was dissected in the more recent GSIS v. Court of Appeals.[19] In the latter case, the
deceased police officer, SPO2 Florencio Alegre, was moonlighting as a tricycle driver at the time of his
death. The Court reviewed Hinoguin, Nitura and ECC and noted that in each case death benefits were
granted, not just because of the principle that soldiers or policemen were virtually working round the
clock. More important, there was a finding of a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased
from his assigned place of work and the incident causing his death. The Court explained:

"In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned
and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and
his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass. According to the
Court, "a place [where] soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different,
legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding
officer" and hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his
official functions.

"The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his
station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel
of his command who were then attending a dance party.

"As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees Compensation Commission case, although he
was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong
Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature
of the matter he was attending to at the time x x x he was attacked and shot to death,
that is, [while] bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime [--] a basic
duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform."[20]
Ruling that the death of SPO2 Alegre was not compensable, the Court pointed out that the 24-hour-duty
doctrine should not embrace all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer, but only
those that can be categorized as police service in character. It further held:

"Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to
claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his
work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2
Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter
SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers
for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no
particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior
authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peace-keeping nature of the act
attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or
directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for
holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may
be called upon at anytime to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-
the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion
arrived at[,] considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to
exercise his authority and duty as policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one[,]
pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty
doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation
of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than [as] a blanket
license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words,
the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances
causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line
of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character." [21]

We recognize the importance and laud the efforts of firemen in our society. Indeed, the nature of their
job requires them to be always on alert, like soldiers and police officers, and to respond to fire alarms
which may occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances in the present case do not call
for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty
doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in
pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important justification for
the Courts stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or
any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any reasonable
connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver.

While we sympathize with petitioners plight, we cannot grant his Petition. True, the policy is to extend
the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 626 to as many qualified employees as possible, [22] but this
must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for
compensation.[23] Considering the circumstances in petitioners case, he cannot be deemed qualified for
disability benefits under the law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988

GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera
resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of

Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from
7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a
ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and
run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She
is survived by her four sons and a daughter.

On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for
in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim
was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which
compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions
prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the
system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to
this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12)

The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated
that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that:
"For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the
injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions." (Rollo, p.
13)

According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the
aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the
deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually
waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal
nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed.

The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's
accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment."

The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on
employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and
is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere
while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)
The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring the
parties to submit their memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case
because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto.

We rule in favor of the petitioner.

This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees'
Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court
held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way
to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the
school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he
had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve
of his death.

The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point

reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such
injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the
place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place
of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of
the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case
that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No.
L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a
proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees'
Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said
System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of
Implementing Rules)."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two
Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990

SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents.

Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC
Case No. 2883 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its
main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00
o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon
to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the
petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked
permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.

On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the
petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was
taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National
Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.

For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His
claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that —

It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to
10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M.
of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior
you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of bringing
home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that
resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you
were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. 1

It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied.

Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision
since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was
attending to a personal matter.

Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home
from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus,
compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case
of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court awarded compensation
to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way home from his official station at Pagadian
City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye was hit
by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.

Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not
applicable to the present case.

The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the
petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give
effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way
to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the
school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he
had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve
of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a
point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work,
such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

Again in Alano v. ECC, 5

it was reiterated:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of

Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from
7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a
ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and
run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ...

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work.
She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to
be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal
about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because
her employment required her to be there.

More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, 6

this Court, applying the above quoted decisions, enunciated:

Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31,
1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as
backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day,
Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle
skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's
railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where
he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.

We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two
(2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case at bar
was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is
compensable under the law as an employment accident.

In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come
from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in
an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at
Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...." 7 Baldebrin, the Court said:

The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and
intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2,
Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S.
Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission,4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an
employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of
the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the
ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to
have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is
compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee
boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent,
where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later
case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA
102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work,
but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from
the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with
the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in
practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in
the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee
was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his
regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After
permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated
from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under the New Labor
Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As
agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the
Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding
claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work
connection to the accident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as
embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall
be resolved in favor of labor.'

The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail
of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum
aid and protection to labor. 9

There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time
prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the
employer's premises. 10
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work
station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental
injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station.

We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law
liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's
Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and
women in our society.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the
ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183054 September 29, 2010

NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC./BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT

LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
ESMERALDO C. ILLESCAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated October 23, 2007 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97941, and its Resolution dated May 9, 2008 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), and ordered petitioners to pay respondent the amount of US$90,000.00 as disability
benefit. The Resolution dated May 9, 2008 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and awarded
respondent attorney’s fees.

The facts are as follows:

On September 6, 2002, respondent Esmeraldo C. Illescas entered into a Contract of Employment with
petitioner NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., acting for and in behalf of its foreign principal, co-
petitioner Barber Ship Management, Ltd. Under the contract, respondent was employed as Third Officer
of M/V Shinrei for a period of nine months, with a basic monthly salary of US$854.00. The employment
contract complied with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Contract for
Seafarers, and the standard terms and conditions governing the employment of Filipino seafarers on
board ocean-going vessels under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000.

After respondent passed the pre-employment medical examination, he boarded the vessel and started
performing his job on October 6, 2002.

On May 16, 2003, when respondent had been on board the vessel for seven months, Captain Jaspal
Singh and Chief Officer Maydeo Rajev ordered respondent to carry 25 fire hydrant caps from the deck to
the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps. The next day, while carrying a heavy
basketful of fire hydrant caps, respondent felt a sudden snap on his back, with pain that radiated down to
the left side of his hips. He immediately informed the ship captain about his condition, and he was
advised to take pain relievers. As the pain was initially tolerable, he continued with his work. After a few
days, the pain became severe, and respondent had difficulty walking.

On May 27, 2003, when the vessel was in Japan, respondent was brought to the Higashiogishima Clinic.
Respondent was diagnosed to be suffering from lumbago and sprain. The doctor gave respondent
medication and advised him to wear a corset, avoid lifting heavy objects and get further examination and
treatment if the symptoms persisted.2

Despite the lighter work assigned to respondent, he continued to experience excruciating pain. On June
13, 2003, petitioner was referred to a doctor upon arrival of M/V Shinrei at the port of Hay Point,
Australia. The doctor declared that respondent was unfit to work, and recommended that respondent
return home for further management.3

On June 14, 2003, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines. On June 17, 2003, respondent was
referred to the Alegre Medical Clinic under the care of Dr. Natalio G. Alegre II. Dr. Alegre advised
respondent to undergo a lumbo-sacral x-ray, and later a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of his
lumbo-sacral spine. The MRI revealed multi-level disc dessication, broad-based central and left-sided
posterior disc herniation, L4 L5, with severe canal stenosis. 4 Dr. Alegre recommended laminectomy and
discectomy.5

On August 27, 2003, respondent underwent a laminectomy with discectomy at the St. Luke's Medical
Center. He was discharged from the hospital on September 6, 2003. Thereafter, he underwent physical
rehabilitation. Nevertheless, medical examinations showed that there was still restriction in respondent’s
truncal mobility and in the lifting power of his trunk.

As his condition did not improve, respondent sought the expertise of Dr. Marciano F. Almeda, Jr., a
specialist in occupational medicine and orthopedics, at the Medical Center Muntinlupa for the assessment
and evaluation of his health condition and/or disability. Dr. Almeda found that respondent sustained
partial permanent disability with an impediment Grade of 11 (14.93%), described as "slight rigidity or
one-third loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk" under the POEA Standard Contract for
Seafarers.6 Dr. Almeda declared that respondent was unfit to work at sea in any capacity as a seaman. 7

On December 29, 2003, petitioners received a letter8 dated December 16, 2003 from respondent’s
counsel, demanding the payment of disability benefit. The claim was referred to Pandiman Philippines,
Inc., the local correspondent of the P&I Club with which petitioner Barber Ship Management Ltd. was
affiliated. In the meantime, respondent filed a Complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

During the preliminary conferences in this case, the parties explored the possibility of settlement. In a
letter9dated April 12, 20004, Pandiman Philippines, Inc, in behalf of petitioners, offered to pay respondent
disability benefit in the amount of US$16,795.00, corresponding to Grade 8 disability under the POEA
Standard Contract for Seafarers. Respondent, through counsel, refused the offer on the ground that the
injury sustained by him was caused by an accident, which was compensable in the amount of
US$90,000.00 under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), thus:

If a seafarer/officer, due to no fault of his own, suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident
while serving on board or while traveling to or from the vessel on Company's business or due to marine
peril, and as a result, his ability to work is permanently reduced, totally or partially, the Company shall
pay him a disability compensation which, including the amounts stipulated by the POEA's Rules and
Regulations Part II, Section C, shall be maximum of US$70,000 for ratings and US$90,000 for officers .10

Since the parties failed to arrive at an agreement, the NLRC directed them to file their Position Papers.

In his Position Paper,11 respondent submitted that Section 20 (B.6) of the POEA Standard Contract for
Seafarers provides:

xxxx

In case of permanent total or partial disability of a seafarer during the term of employment caused by
either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits
enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from the illness or disease
shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease
was contracted.

However, respondent stated that he is a member of the Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union
of the Philippines (AMOSUP), which has a CBA with petitioners. Under the CBA, he is entitled to a higher
disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00, since his injury resulted from an accident while carrying
a basketful of heavy fire hydrant caps on board the vessel.12
Respondent prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him disability benefit in the amount of
US$90,000.00, illness allowance equivalent to 120 days, as well as moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.

In their Position Paper,13 petitioners countered that it is the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers, and
not the CBA, that governs this case. They stated that Black’s Law Dictionary defined "accident" as an
unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for event. They argued that respondent's
disability was not the result of an accident, as respondent was merely performing his normal duty of
transporting fire hydrant caps from the deck to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the
caps. During the performance thereof, no unusual, unforeseen and unexpected event transpired as
proved by the absence of any accident report. Moreover, respondent’s Affidavit did not mention the
occurrence of any accident which gave rise to his injury. Petitioners argued that, since no accident took
place, the disability benefits under the CBA do not apply to this case.

Petitioners further averred that based on the assessment of its accredited-clinic, the Alegre Medical Clinic,
respondent suffered from Grade 8 disability, described as "moderate rigidity or two-thirds (2/3) loss of
motion or lifting power of the trunk." During the preliminary conference, they offered to pay respondent
disability benefit in the amount of US$16,795.00 for the Grade 8 disability under Section 32 of the POEA
Standard Contract for Seafarers.14

The main issue for resolution before the Labor Arbiter was whether the disability of complainant
(respondent) was compensable under the provision of Article 13 of the CBA in the amount of
US$90,000.00.

On January 6, 2005, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 15 finding respondent entitled to disability
benefit under the CBA in the amount of US$90,000.00 as 100% compensation; US$3,456.00 (US$864 x
4) as sickness allowance equivalent to 120 days; and US$9,345.60 as attorney's fees, or a total of
US$102,801.60. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents NFD
International Manning Agents, Inc. and Barber Ship Management Ltd. to jointly and severally pay
complainant Esmeraldo C. Illescas the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
ONE US DOLLARS & 60/100 (US$102,801.60) in its equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of actual payment representing his disability benefits, sickness wages and
attorney's fees.

All other claims are DlSMISSED for lack of merit.16

The Labor Arbiter held that the injury suffered by respondent was the result of an accident arising out of,
and in the course of, his employment while carrying the heavy fire hydrant caps, and that his injury was
unexpected and unforeseen by him.

Moreover, the Labor Arbiter stated that respondent was declared unfit to work by the physician who
treated him in Australia, which was confirmed by Dr. Marciano Almeda, Jr. of the Medical Center in
Muntinlupa when he declared complainant "unfit to work back at sea in any capacity as a Seaman." The
Labor Arbiter also noted that both Dr. Natalio Alegre, the company physician, and Dr. Marciano Almeda,
Jr., respondent’s independent doctor, assessed respondent’s disability as "partial and permanent
disability." Hence, the Labor Arbiter held that respondent’s disability was 100% compensable under the
CBA in the amount of US$90,000.00, and not merely under the Standard Crew Contract.

Petitioners appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC.

In a Decision17 dated July 13, 2006, the NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter, as it awarded
respondent disability benefit under Section 32

of the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers.18 The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby modified by deleting the award of
US$102,801.60 and instead ordering respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. and Barber Ship
Management Ltd. to jointly and severally pay complainant Esmeraldo C. Illescas the amount of Sixteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Five US Dollars (US$16,795.00) at the prevailing rate of exchange at
the time of actual payment representing his disability benefit.19

The NLRC held that the injury sustained by respondent was not the result of an accident, although it
arose out of his work. It stated that the task of carrying hydrant caps was not a fortuitous, unusual or
unforeseen event, or a marine peril. According to the NLRC, back pains or chest-trunk-spine injuries are
inherent in the job of carrying heavy objects, and the injury may occur over a period of time or on the
spot depending upon the physical strength and posture of the workers.

The NLRC deleted the award for sickness allowance based on the letter dated June 9, 2004 of petitioner
NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. to Pandiman Philippines, Inc. The letter stated that respondent's
illness allowance from June 15, 2003 to October 14, 2003 (120 days) had already been processed and
remitted to respondent’s bank account. The NLRC held that the payment of the sickness allowance may
be presumed, since respondent did not dispute the letter.

The NLRC also deleted the attorney's fees awarded to respondent on the ground that there was no
unlawful withholding of payment of benefits in view of petitioners’ compromise offer of US$16,795.00,
which was the amount of disability benefit awarded by the NLRC to respondent.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration20 was denied by the NLRC for lack of merit in a
Resolution21 dated December 7, 2006.

Respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that his injury
was not the result of an accident on board the vessel; in not applying the pertinent provisions of the CBA;
and in deleting the award of attorney’s fees.

On October 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision22 in favor of respondent. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, We hereby GRANT the same. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the NLRC are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are ORDERED to pay
petitioner the amount of US$90,000.00 as disability benefits.23

The Court of Appeals, citing Jarco Marketing v. Court of Appeals,24 held that respondent’s disability
resulted from an accident as the injury was unforeseen and happened without any fault on his part.

The appellate court declared that the Labor Arbiter correctly applied Article 13 of the CBA25 in awarding
respondent disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00. It ruled that the NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disregarding the CBA.

Petitioners and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration. Petitioners contended that the
absence of an accident report negated the appellate court’s finding that the injury suffered by respondent
was the result of an accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment. Respondent’s motion
for partial reconsideration sought an additional award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total
monetary award.

In a Resolution dated May 9, 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioners, but granted the motion for partial reconsideration of respondent. The dispositive portion of
the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the same is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated October 23, 2007 is MODIFIED in that private respondents are
further ordered to pay TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total monetary award as attorney’s fees.

The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.26

The Court of Appeals justified the award of attorney’s fees under Article 111 27 of the Labor Code and
Article 220828 of the Civil Code, as respondent was forced to litigate and has incurred expenses to protect
his right and interest.

Petitioners filed this petition raising the following issues:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION
WAS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT DURING THE TERM OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH PETITIONERS, AND
HENCE, COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE CBA.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO RESPONDENT.29

The issues raised before this Court are: (1) whether or not the disability suffered by respondent was
caused by an accident; (2) whether or not the disability is compensable under the CBA; and (3) whether
or not respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees.

Petitioners contend that respondent did not suffer a disability as a result of an "accident" as defined
under existing laws or jurisprudence. They argue that Jarco Marketing v. Court of Appeals,30 the case
citied by the Court of Appeals to support its decision, defined an "accident" as:

x x x an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens."

Petitioners point out that the above definition of the word "accident," subscribed to by the Court of
Appeals, explicitly states that it pertains to a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening.31 Petitioners
cited Lasam v. Smith,32 which defined "fortuitous event" as "an unexpected event or act of God which
could neither be foreseen or resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning,
compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of
similar nature." Petitioners contend that the term "accident," as contemplated by the subject CBA
provision, refers to a separate event or incident which gives riseto the injury of the seafarer.

Petitioners argue that in this case, no such unusual, fortuitous, unexpected or unforeseen event took
place or was reported. Respondent merely went about his normal duties when he transported fire
hydrant caps from the deck to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps. The sudden
snap respondent felt on his back while carrying the fire hydrant caps cannot, by itself, qualify as an
accident.

Hence, petitioners assert that respondent is not entitled to the benefits provided under the CBA. They
add that if the ruling of the Court of Appeals would be sustained, it would open the floodgates for absurd
claims for double or higher indemnity, especially in insurance cases, considering that an employee who
suffers a stroke, congenital heart failure, or even appendicitis, while at work, would now be considered as
resulting from an accident, since the same may be regarded as an unusual and unexpected occurrence
which happened without the employee’s fault.

Petitioners also contend that there is no basis for the award of attorney's fees, as they did not act in
gross and evident bad faith. They merely acted in the interest of what was just and right, since
respondent was not entitled to full disability benefit under the CBA.

The petition is denied.

The provisions of the CBA, which are relevant to this case, are as follows:

Art. 13 (Compensation for Death and Disability)

If a seafarer/officer, due to no fault of his own, suffers permanent disability as a result of an

accident while serving on board or while traveling to or from the vessel on Company's business or due to
marine peril, and as a result, his ability to work is permanently reduced, totally or partially, the Company
shall pay him a disability compensation which including the amounts stipulated by the POEA's Rules and
Regulations Part II, Section C, shall be maximum of US$70,000.00 for ratings and US$90,000.00 for
officers.

The degree of disability, which the Company, subject to this Agreement, is liable to pay, shall be
determined by a doctor appointed by the Company. If a doctor appointed by the Seafarer and his Union
disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Company and the
seafarer and his/her Union, and third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

A seafarer who is disabled as a result of an injury, and whose permanent disability in accordance with the
POEA schedule is assessed at 50% or more shall, for the purpose of this paragraph, be regarded as
permanently disabled and be entitled to 100% compensation (USD90,000 for officers and USD70,000 for
ratings).

A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50%
permanently disabled, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be
entitled to a 100% compensation.

xxxx

The applicable disability compensation shall be in accordance with the degree of disability and rate of
compensation indicated in the table hereunder, to wit:
 RATE OF COMPENSATION
DEGREE OF DISABILITY
% OFFICERS
RATINGS
US$

100 70,000 90,000

75 52,500 67,500

60 42,000 54,000

xxxx

Any payment effected under any section of this article shall be without prejudice to any claim for
compensation made in law, but such payments shall be deducted from any award of damages. 33

Was respondent’s disability the result of an accident?

Black’s Law Dictionary34 defines "accident" as "[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence;
something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated,
x x x [a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or
misconduct."

The Philippine Law Dictionary35 defines the word "accident" as "[t]hat which happens by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."

"Accident," in its commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary sense, has been defined as:

[A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual
and unexpected by the person to whom it happens x x x.

The word may be employed as denoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable or
unfortunate happening; any unexpected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or
occurrence; any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or death; some
untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events." 36

The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent was not an accident, but an injury sustained by
respondent from carrying the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability.
The injury cannot be said to be the result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or
fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the performance of a duty. Although respondent may
not have expected the injury, yet, it is common knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause back
injury, as what happened in this case. Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the
circumstances, and is not synonymous with the term "accident" as defined above.

Although the disability of respondent was not caused by an accident, his disability is still compensable
under Article 13 of the CBA under the following provision:

A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50%
permanently disabled, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be
entitled to a 100% compensation.
The Court notes that the CBA states that the degree of disability, which the company is liable to pay,
shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the company. In this case, the POEA schedule is the basis
of the assessment whether a seafarer’s permanent disability is 50 percent or more, or less than 50
percent.37 The Alegre Medical Clinic, petitioners’ accredited clinic, found that respondent had a Grade 8
disability (33.59%), described as "moderate rigidity or two-thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of
the trunk." Dr. Almeda, respondent’s independent doctor, on the other hand, found respondent to be
suffering from Grade 11 disability (14.93%), described as "slight rigidity or one-third (1/3) loss of motion
or lifting power of the trunk."

In HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar,38 the Court held that a claimant may dispute the company-designated
physician’s report by seasonably consulting another doctor. In such a case, the medical report issued by
the latter shall be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court based on its inherent merit. 39 In this case,
petitioners never questioned the weight given by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals to the
findings of respondent’s independent doctor in regard to the disability of respondent.

Dr. Almeda, respondent’s independent doctor, and petitioners’ accredited medical clinic, both assessed
respondent’s disability in accordance with the POEA schedule as less than 50% permanently disabled.
Moreover, Dr. Almeda, who is a specialist in occupational medicine and orthopedics, found that
respondent was unfit to work in any capacity as a seaman. The Medical Report 40 of Dr. Almeda states:

xxxx

He is now three months post surgery, but still, Mr. Illescas continue to have back pain. There is still on
and off pain and numbness on his left thigh. He is also unable to tolerate prolonged standing and
walking. With his present complaints, Mr. Illescas cannot withstand the demands of his previous work at
sea. Doing so could aggravate his existing back problem. I therefore recommend a partial permanent
disability with Grade 11 Impediment based on the POEA Contract.

Justification of Impediment:

Grade 11 (14.93%)

Slight rigidity or one-third (1/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk.

Mr. Illescas started having back problems in a workplace incident where he lifted a basketful of hydrant
caps. He underwent surgery which he claimed as afforded him partial relief initially. However, up to the
present time, the residual symptoms continue to bother him. This has restricted him in the active
performance of certain tasks.

Often, symptoms following surgery are relieved only to recur after a variable period. The causes may
include insufficient removal of disc material and further extrusion, rupture of another disc, adhesions
about the nerve root and formation of an osteophyte at the site of removal of bone. Even a successful
disc removal, therefore, does not guarantee a permanent cure as fibrosis can produce a dense
constricting scar tissue, which is presumed to be a prime cause of recurrent symptoms.

Diagnostic imaging studies, although important, is but a single facet of the overall evaluation of patients
with suspected disc herniation or spinal stenosis, which must include thorough history taking and physical
examination. It is not surprising to encounter some variation between the neurologic symptoms and the
result of the patient's imaging studies. Each individual has a different spinal canal diameter. While a mild
herniation may not produce any symptom at all in one person, it may be significant in one with a narrow
spinal canal.
Surgery can never stop the pathological process nor restore the back to its previous state. Similar poor
results have been found with repeated attempts at surgical intervention for the relief of chronic low back
pain. If long term relief is desired, continued mechanical stress of postural or occupational type must be
avoided. Resuming his usual work, which includes increased loading, twisting, or bending and extension
of the back, will further expose Mr. lllescas to dangers of enhancing his discomfort even more. 1avvphi1

It is for this reason that I find him UNFIT to work back at sea in any capacity as a Seaman.41

The Court finds merit in the reasons stated by Dr. Almeda in his Medical Report for declaring respondent
unfit to work in any capacity as a seaman. Respondent is, therefore, entitled to disability benefit in the
amount of US$90,000.00 under the CBA, thus:

A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50%
permanently disabled, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be
entitled to a 100% compensation.

xxxx

The applicable disability compensation shall be in accordance with the degree of disability and rate of
compensation indicated in the table hereunder, to wit:

RATE OF COMPENSATION
DEGREE OF DISABILITY
% OFFICERS
RATINGS
US$

100 70,000 90,000

75 52,500 67,500

60 42,000 54,000

xxxx

In regard to the award of attorney’s fees, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that respondent is
entitled to the same under Article 2208 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:

xxxx

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest;

xxxx

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
This case involves the propriety of the award of disability compensation under the CBA to respondent,
who worked as a seaman in the foreign vessel of petitioner Barber Ship Management Ltd. The award of
attorney’s fees is justified under Article 2208 (2) of the Civil Code. Even if petitioners did not withhold
payment of a smaller disability benefit, respondent was compelled to litigate to be entitled to a higher
disability benefit. Moreover, in HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar42 and Iloreta v. Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc.,43 the Court sustained the NLRC’s award of attorney’s fees, in addition to disability benefits
to which the concerned seamen-claimants were entitled. It is no different in this case wherein respondent
has been awarded disability benefit and attorney’s fees by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals. It
is only just that respondent be also entitled to the award of attorney’s fees. In Iloreta v. Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc.,44 the Court found the amount of US$1,000.00 as reasonable award of
attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97941, and its Resolution dated May 9, 2008 are AFFIRMED insofar as respondent is awarded
disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00, as well as attorney’s fees, which is reduced to
US$1,000.00. Petitioners NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. and Barber Ship Management Ltd. are
hereby ORDERED to jointly and severally pay respondent Esmeraldo C. Illescas disability benefit in the
amount of NINETY THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$90,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of ONE
THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$1,000.00) in its equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of actual payment.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980

GLORIA D. MENEZ, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE), respondents.

Gloria D. Menez in her own behalf.

Manuel M. Lazaro for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of the Employees'
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service
Insurance System of the claim of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title II
the New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim.

The records disclose that petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of
Education & Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement
plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis.
Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a
dirty creek.

On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (p. 1, ECC rec.).

On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments,
rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature
of her particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved:

Upon evaluation based on general accepted medical authorities, your ailments are found
to be the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We believe that our
ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-connected.
Moreover, the evidences you have, submitted have not shown that the said ailments
directly resulted from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja Soliman High School, Manila
(Letter-Resolution, p. 4, ECC Case No. 0462).

On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a letter-request for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial of her
claim, which request was denied by the GSIS in its letter-resolution of November 28, 1976 therein
reiterating that on the basis of the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner has not established that
her employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailments (p. 6, ECC rec.).

On March 7, 1977, petitioner again requested for reconsideration of the second denial of said claim, still
alleging that her ailments arose out of and in the course of employment (p. 11, ECC rec.).

On March 11, 1977, respondent GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and elevated the entire records
thereof to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review (p. 12, ECC rec.).
On March 1, 1978, respondent Commission issued a decision en banc thus stating:

... Despite assertions to the contrary by herein appellant, this Commission fully agrees
with the respondent system that appellant's employment has nothing to do with the
development of her disabling illnesses. Appellant's ailments are not listed as occupational
diseases for the employment she was engaged in as to merit compensation under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (p. 13, rec.).

On July 7, 1978, petitioner filed this petition seeking a review of aforesaid decision of respondent
Commission (p. 2, rec.).

Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid
arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment which are
permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected (p. 2, rec.).

She specifically alleged that —

... said sickness and/or disabilities arose out of or in the course of employment and is
aggravated by the condition and nature of the work in school, that appellant belonged to
the afternoon and night shifts as shown by her time record, Annex D, subjecting her to
varying climatic (sic) temperature at noon and night time; and that the place of work,
Raja Soliman High School, is surrounded by the Divisoria market at the north, Sta.
Helena Bridge and Creek which is heavily polluted; in the Northeast, is the presence of
many squatter houses too, and in the south — gasoline stations, bakery, Textile market
as stated before and a fact. That as a teacher of social studies handling 250 students
more or less a day, she is subjected to infections from students who have flu, colds and
other respiratory infections which aggravated her ailments (p. 3, rec.).

Petitioner now maintains that her ailments arose in the course of employment and were aggravated by
the condition and nature of her work. Specifically, she asserts that "pneumonitis or baby pneumonia
which has become chronic that led to bronchiectasis which is irreversible and permanent in nature is
compensable under No. 21 of compensable diseases (Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977) as
conditions were present as attested to by doctor's affidavits and certifications."

Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis are not among the occupational diseases listed as compensable under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended, or under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and, that
respondent Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the form of accepted medical
findings thus making said decision final and conclusive on the matter (p. 33 & 68, rec.).

Article 167 (1) of the new Labor Code provides that —

(1) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. ...

Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation thus provides:

xx xx xx
 (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with
the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.

Rule III, Section 1 (c) of said Rules states:

(c) Only inqiury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.

The aforequoted provisions clearly establish that for an illness to be compensable, it must either be:

1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease; or

2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature is meant
conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural
incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the
usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general" (Goldberg
vs. 954 Mancy Corp., 12 N. E. 2d 311; Emphasis supplied).

To be occupational, the disease must be one "due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and
constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which science and
industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same industry is alike
constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational disease" (Seattle Can Co. vs.
Dept. of Labor, 265, p. 741; Emphasis supplied).

An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain occupations, due
to toxic substances (as in the organic solvents industry), radiation (as in television repairmen), repeated
mechanical injury, emotional strain, etc. (Schmidts Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine, p. 561).

From the foregoing definitions of occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis
can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner,
admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional
strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers especially young boys, and harassed
as they are by various extra-curricular or non- academic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans
until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the petitioner,
her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a
tough area - Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further
aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero
de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The
pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford
nutritious food.

In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like the inclement weather —
heavy rains, typhoons — as well as dust — and disease-ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary
slum area.
These unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present in" or are the "hazards peculiar to"
the occupation of a public high school teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of petitioner's occupation as such public high school teacher.

But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof that
petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to
her exposure to the adverse working conditions above-mentioned.

Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid
arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched and the consequent "chilling during the course of
employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected." Undoubtedly,
petitioner's ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule 111, Section
1 (c) of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and
the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules."

It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of the Raja Soliman High School which is located
in the heart of Binondo District. She was constantly exposed to the heavily polluted air and congestion
(squatter's area) characteristic of the area. She was not only exposed to the elements - varying degrees
of temperature throughout the day and night - but also had to withstand long hours of standing while
performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to regularly negotiate long trips from her home in Project
2, Quirino District, Quezon City (her residence) to said high school in Binondo, scampering from one ride
to another, rain or shine, and sweating in the process.

Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a typhoon belt and that
yearly we experience torrential rains and storms. Needless to say, in her daily rides from Quezon City to
Binondo and back, she had to go through the ordeal of perspiring and getting wet from downpours or
heavy rains, thus making her susceptible to contracting her ailments. Moreover, petitioner was always in
contact with 250 students who might have been carriers of contagious respiratory diseases like flu and
colds and who were themselves inadequately nourished, residing as they do in a depressed and
congested area. And adding to the unhygienic working atmosphere was her malnutrition or
undernourishment. More often than not, a teacher who has no other source of income takes to — aside
from the poor man's staple diet of tuyo, daing and rice — legumes like mongo, vegetables and fruits with
edible seeds which contain much uric and.

Acute arthritis is inflammation of a joint marked by pain, swelling, heat and redness; the result of
rheumatism or gout (p. 56, The Simplified Medical Dictionary for Lawyers). Gout is a disease
characterized by painful inflammation of the joints, in excessive amount of uric acid in the blood Poor
man's gout is caused by hard work, poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It may thus be seen that
uric acid eventually causes arthritis, aside from excessive mental and physical stresses to which teachers
are subject of reason of their duties.

Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to have substantially shown that the risk of contracting her
ailments had been increased by unfavorable working conditions.

In Dimaano vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (78 SCRA 510 [1977]), WE ruled that illnesses of
rheumatic arthritis with sub-acute exacerbation and hypertension of therein petitioner, who was herself a
teacher, as service-connected, after WE considered her working conditions and nature of employment
which are substantially the same as those of herein petitioner.

Significantly, also, the Employees' Compensation Commission, in its Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432,
respectively dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977, adopted a more realistic construction of the
provisions of the New Labor Code by including in the list of compensable ailments and diseases,
cardiovascular disease which comprehends myocardial infarction, pneumonitis and bronchial asthma
(Sepulveda vs. WCC, et al., L-46290, Aug. 25,1978).

Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application for retirement is a clear
indication that she was physically incapacitated to render efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-44088,
Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., supra). Petitioner was allowed to retire under the disability
retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory retirement age
of 65. Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the retirement shall be recommended for approval
only when "the employee applicant is below 65 years of age and is physically incapacitated to render
further efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason of her ailments.

Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized
the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical,
mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions
that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with
existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers's health shall be recognized
as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al.. L-43317,
December 29, 1978).

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS

HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY
ORDERED

1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P 6,000.00] PESOS AS

DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND

2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY

SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro concur.

Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-47521 July 31, 1987

CAROLINA CLEMENTE, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM Department of Health (Dagupan City) and
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No.
0509 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and denied the
claim for death benefits filed by Carolina Clemente, widow of the late Pedro Clemente,

The undisputed facts of the case are summarized in the memorandum for the respondent Government
Service Insurance System, as follows:

Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for ten (10) years a janitor in the Department
of Health (Dagupan City), assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Laoag City. He was
hospitalized from November 3 to 14, 1976 at the Central Luzon Sanitarium, Tala Sanitarium, Tala,
Caloocan City, due to his ailment of "nephritis," as per medical certification of his attending
physician, Dr. Winifredo Samson. He was also found to be suffering from such ailments as portal
cirrhosis and leprosy, otherwise known as Hansen's Disease.

On November 14, 1976, Pedro Clemente died of uremia due to nephritis. Thereafter, petitioner
filed with the GSIS a claim for employees' compensation under the Labor Code, as amended.

On February 4, 1977, the GSIS denied the claim of the petitioner because the ailments of her
husband are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of his work and/or
(sic) or were not in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work.

On March 9, 1977, petitioner requested for reconsideration of the GSIS' denial of her claim,
stating that the ailments of her husband were contracted in the course of employment and were
aggravated by the nature of his work. Petitioner alleged that her husband, as janitor of the Ilocos
Norte Skin Clinic (Laoag City), worked in direct contact with persons suffering from different skin
diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt which contributed to his ailment of
Hansen's disease. Citing further the cases of Seven-Up Bottling Co., of the Phil. v. Rimerata, L-
24349, December 24, 1968 and Avana v. Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27, 1968. Petitioner stated
that her husband's ailment recurred in the course of employment presumably due to his direct
contact with persons suffering from this ailment.

Acting upon petitioner's request for reconsideration, the GSIS, on April 11, 1977, reiterated its
previous denial of her claim.

On April 14, 1977, treating the request for reconsideration as an appeal, the GSIS forwarded the
records of the petitioner' claim for review by the ECC.

On October 26, 1977, respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS' action of denial and rendered its own
decision dismissing petitioner's claim (ECC Case No. 0509).

Respondent ECC's decision was anchored upon the findings that the ailments are not listed as
occupational diseases; that there was no substantial evidence of causal connection; and that, in
 fact, the evidence was that the deceased had already contracted the Hansen's disease before his
employment. In the exact words of the ECC:

In the case at bar, since the deceased's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases,
appellant herein must prove that such ailments were caused by deceased's employment
and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions in
order to be compensable.

A mere cursory reading of the evidences on record, however, will disclose that appellant
failed to submit the required proof of causation. There is no substantial proof in the
record from which we could draw the conclusion that indeed the nature of deceased's
employment as Janitor of Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic could be traced as the direct cause of
his ailment. Hence, in the absence of such evidence, we are not disposed to disturb on
appeal the findings of the respondent System.

On the contrary, we find the records that the deceased, prior to his employment in this
office, was already suffering from his ailment of Hansen's disease. This proves that his
working conditions did not increase the risk of his contracting the same. If at all, his
employment merely aggravated his ailments. Unfortunately, however, aggravation of a
preexisting illness, a rule under the old law, is not anymore a ground for compensation
under the new law. Thus, the cases cited by the appellant cannot be raised as authorities
to support her claim.

Petitioner now seeks a review of the ECC decision. (pp. 76-78, Rollo)

There is no question that the claim falls under the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Under
Article 167(L) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (b) Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must
be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions (De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92, 96).

As the illnesses of the deceased are admittedly, not listed under Annex "A" of the Rules as occupational
diseases, the petitioner bases her claim under the theory of increased risk. She alleges that the deceased,
as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, was exposed to patients suffering from various kinds of skin
diseases, including Hansen's disease or leprosy. She avers that for ten years, the deceased had to clean
the clinic and its surroundings and to freely mix with its patients. She claims that it was during this time
that he was attacked by other dreadful diseases such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and nephritis.

On the other hand, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission contends that the petitioner
failed to prove by substantial evidence that the deceased's ailments were indeed caused by his
employment. It maintains that the deceased merely had a recurrence of a pre-existing illness aggravated
possibly by the nature of his employment and that there is no evidence on record showing that the
nature of the deceased's employment was the direct cause of any of his illnesses.

The respondent Government Service Insurance System concurs with the views of the respondent
Commission. It, however, argues that it should be dropped as a party respondent in this case. It claims
that the petitioner has no cause of action against it, the subject of judicial review being the adverse
decision of the respondent Commission.

We rule for the petitioner.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (144 SCRA 421, 46) we held that:

Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (San Valentin v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 160; Better Building, Inc., v. Puncan, 135 SCRA 62). There
are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626; is merely
substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion" (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra,
citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635; and
Acosta v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209). The claimant must show, at
least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the
conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work-
connection and not a direct causal relation (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
supra; Sagliba v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 723; Neri v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672; Juala v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128
SCRA 462; and De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685). It is enough
that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the
contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-
connection (Delegente v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 67; and Cristobal v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). Probability not certainty is the touchstone (San
Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra).

In this case, we find sufficient evidence on record to sustain the petitioner's view. The records disclose
that in resisting the petitioner's claim, the respondent Commission cited the following medical authorities:

Uremia refers to the toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency and retention in the
blood of nitrogenous urinary waste products (azotemia). Renal insufficiency may be due to (1)
nephritis, bilateral pyelonephritis, polycystic kidney disease, uretral or bladder obstruction, SLE,
polyarteritis, amyloid disease, or bilateral cortical necrosis; (2) acute tubular necrosis resulting
from transfusion reaction, shock, burns, crushing injuries, or poisons; (3) sulfonamides
precipitated in the kidneys or ureters; (4) nephrocalcinosis resulting from extreme alkalosis,
diabetic acidosis, dehydration, or congestive heart failure may result in azotemia, or may
predipitate (sic) severe uremia in the presence of already damages kidneys.

Reference: Lyght, Charles E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy; M.S. & D. Research
Lab.; 11th Edition, 1966, pp. 257-258.

Portal Cirrhosis: A chronic disease characterized by incresed connective tissue that spreads from
the portal spaces, distorting liver architecture and impairing liver functions. Etiology, Incidence
and pathology: Portal cirrhosis occurs chiefly in males in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed
to be a predisposing if not a primary etiology factor. The role of alcohol is not clearly established.
Alcohol probably exerts a direct toxic effect on the liver, and also increases malnutrition by
providing calories without essential nutrients. Cirrhosis has been produced in animals by diets low
in protein and specifically low in choline. The addition of choline to these diets prevents cirrhosis.
Chronic poisoning with carbon tetrachloride or phosphorus produces changes similar to those
from portal cirrhosis. The liver is diffusely nodular, scarred and dense. Microscopic section shows
parenchymal degeneration cellular infiltration, proliferation or scar tissue and areas of
regeneration. Fatty changes are present in the early states.

Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy: M.S. & D. N.J. 11th Edition,
1966, p. 928.
 Hepatoma (Liver cancer) refers to malignant primary tumor of the liver destroying the
parenchyma arise (sic) from both liver cell and bile duct elements. It develops most frequently in
the previous cirrhosis liver. A higher fraction of patients with post necrotic cirrhosis develop
hepatoma than those with portal alcoholic cirrhosis. This may reflect the more active necrotic and
regenerative processes in the post necrotic cirrhosis liver. Most large series indicate that 60% or
more of hepatomas develop in a previously cirrhotic liver. The cirrhosis of hemochromatosis
seems particularly liable to hepatomas as high a fraction as 20% of patients with
hemochromatosis die from this cause.

Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill; N.Y., 5th Ed.; 1966, p.
1072.

Leprosy is a chronic, mildly contagious, infectious disease characterized by both cutaneous and
constitutional symptoms and the production of various deformities and mutilations. The causative
organism is an acid fast rod. Mycobacterium leprae, first described by Hansen in 1874. The mode
of transmission is obscure, although infection by direct contact appears likely. The disease is
found predominantly in tropical and sub-tropical Asia, Africa, and South America. It is endemic in
the Gulf States of the USA, Hawaii, the Philippines and Puerto Rico.

Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merk Manuel of Diagnosis and Therapy; " M.S. & D.; 11th Ed.; 1966,
p. 847.

The nature of nephritis, however, was discussed by Mr. Daniel Mijares, GSIS Manager, Employees'
Compensation Department, in his letter dated February 4, 1977, denying petitioner's claim, as follows:

Nephritis is an acute, diffuse inflammation of the glomeruli or kidneys. It usually follows previous
streptoccocal infection mostly in the upper respiratory tract. Because of this, it is always thought
that nephritis is the result of an auto-immune or allergic reaction to infection, usually
streptococcal. (Rollo, p. 20)

The foregoing discussions support rather than negate the theory of increased risk. We note that the
major ailments of the deceased, i.e. nephritis, leprosy, etc., could be traced from bacterial and viral
infections. In the case of leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is the discharge from lesions of
persons with active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body through the skin or through the
mucous membrane of the nose and throat (Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine
and Nursing, (1972), p. 530).

On the other hand, infectious diseases which give rise to nephritis are believed to be as follows:

Table 294-1

Causes of acute glomerulonephritis

Infectious diseases

A. Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis

B. Non-Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis

1. Bacterial: Infective endocarditis, "Shunt nephritis," sepsis, pneumococcal

pneumonia, typhoid fever, secondary syphilis, meningococcemia
 2. Viral: Hepatitis B, infectious menoneucleosis, mumps, measles, varicella,
vaccinia, echovirus, and coxsackievirus

3. Parasitic: Malaria, taxoplasmosis

(Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th edition, p. 1633)

The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Mr.
Clemente was exposed to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself
where patients with different illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipments that
had been used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each working
day. He was the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected materials, and not
being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to avoid infection. It is, therefore, not unreasonable
to conclude that Mr. Clemente's working conditions definitely increased the risk of his contracting the
aforementioned ailments. This Court has held in appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the
respondents is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice
guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanes v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, et al., L-50255, January 30, 1982; and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
et al., supra). It clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) that, as a rule,
doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee (Mercado, Jr., v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 139 SCRA 270, 277).

The respondents admit there may have been aggravation of an existing ailment but point out that
aggravating is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law. They contend that the
compensable factor of increased risks of contracting the disease is not present in this case.

The fallacy in this theory lies in the failure to explain how a sick person was able to enter the government
service more than ten years before he became too ill to work and at a time when aggravation of a
disease was compensable. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Clemente was hired inspite of having an
existing disease liable to become worse.

The petitioner's arguments of recurrence of an already cured disease or the contracting of the disease
due to increased risks become more plausible. When there are two or more possible explanations
regarding an issue of compensability that which favors the claimant must be chosen. 1avvphi1

We also do not find merit in the respondent GSIS' contention that it should be dropped as a party in this
case. This Court has passed upon this issue on several occasions. Thus, in the case of Cabanero v.
Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413, 419), this Court citing Lao v. Employees'
Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 782), held:

xxx xxx xxx

... This Court is of the opinion that respondent System, as the ultimate implementing agency of
the ECC's decision, is a proper party in this case. The fact that this Court chose to require
respondent GSIS to comment is an indication that it is a necessary party. It must be noted that
the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation (including
enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules.) (at p. 793).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the
respondent Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay the petitioner:
 1) The sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) as death benefits; and

2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.
 AMALIA NARAZO, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Provincial Governor’s Office, Negros
Occidental), Respondents.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) dated 19
May 1987, 1 denying petitioner’s claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended, for the
death of her husband, Geronimo Narazo.

Geronimo Narazo was employed for thirty eight (38) years as Budget Examiner in the Office of the
Governor, Province of Negros Occidental. His duties included preparation of the budget of the Province,
financial reports and review or examination of the budget of some provincial and municipal
offices.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

On 14 May 1984, Narazo died at the age of fifty seven (57). His medical records show that he was
confined three (3) times at the Doña Corazon L. Montelibano Hospital in Bacolod City, for urinary
retention, abdominal pain and anemia. He was thereafter diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive
nepropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy", commonly known as "Uremia."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) for death benefits for the death of her husband, under the Employees’ Compensation Law (PD
626, as amended). However, said claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death of Narazo is
not listed as an occupational disease, and that there is no showing that the position and duties of the
deceased as Budget Examiner had increased the risk of contracting "Uremia." 2 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of said decision, claiming that although the cause of her husband’s death is not
considered as an occupational disease, nevertheless, his job as Budget Examiner which required long
hours of sedentary work, coupled with stress and pressure, caused him many times to delay urination,
which eventually led to the development of his ailments. The GSIS denied said motion for
reconsideration.

On appeal, the Employees’ Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS on the ground
that the ailments of the deceased could not be attributed to employment factors and as impressed by
medical experts, benign prostatic hypertrophy is quite common among men over fifty (50) years of age,
regardless of occupation, while uremia is a complication of obstructive nephtropathy due to benign
prostatic hypertrophy; 3 hence, this petition.

Petitioner avers that the nature, length of time, and circumstances of the occupation of the deceased
were not considered in determining whether the work of the said deceased had increased the risks of
contracting the ailments which caused his death. The work of the deceased, which required long
sedentary work under pressure, aggravated the risk of contracting the disease leading to his hospital
confinement and death. 4

In controversion, the ECC argues that petitioner failed to show proof that the disease which caused the
death of her husband is work-connected; and that no credence could be given to petitioner’s claim that
her husband’s delayed urination gave rise to the development of his ailments, for lack of medical bases.
All that petitioner has shown, according to the ECC, are mere aggravation, and not work-connection
causes. 5

Rule III, section 1, paragraph 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, defines a "compensable
sickness" as any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC or any illness
caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions. 6 The ECC is empowered to determine and approve occupational
diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of
employment. 7

Thus, a sickness or death caused by said sickness is compensable if the same is listed as an occupational
disease. If it is not so listed, compensation may still be recovered if the illness was aggravated by
employment. However, it is incumbent upon the claimant to show proof that the risk of contracting the
illness was increased by his working conditions.

The death of petitioner’s husband was caused by "Uremia due to obstructive nephropathy and benign
prostatic hypertrophy," which is admittedly not among those listed as occupational diseases. 8 As per
finding of the ECC, "Uremia is a toxic clinical condition characterized by restlessness, muscular twitchings,
mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with renal insufficiency brought about by the
retention in blood of nitrogeneous urinary waste products." One of its causes is the obstruction in the
flow of urinary waste products. 9

Under the circumstances, the burden of proof was upon petitioner to show that the conditions under
which her deceased husband was then working had increased the risk of contracting the illness which
caused his death.cralawnad

To establish compensability under the increased risk theory, the claimant must show proof of reasonable
work-connection, not necessarily direct causal relation. The degree of proof required is merely substantial
evidence which means such relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and convincing
evidence. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable. To require proof of actual causes or factors which
lead to an ailment would not be consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social
justice guarantee in favor of the workers. 10 Although strict roles of evidence are not applicable, yet the
basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. 11

The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor dealt with the
detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports and review and/or examination of the budget of
other provincial and municipal offices. Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in
the budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that the deceased had to sit for hours, and
more often that not, delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the flow of concentration.
In addition, tension and pressure must have aggravated the situation. In the case of Ceniza v. ECC, 12
the Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . . It may be added that teachers have a tendency to sit for hours on end, and to put off or postpone
emptying their bladders when it interferes with their teaching hours or preparation of lesson plans. From
human experience, prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the urine. This
encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial
multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention and
survival of micro-organisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the urinary tract. These are predisposing
factors to pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus, while We may concede that these illnesses are not directly
caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is certainly aggravated
by their working habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the foregoing circumstances, we are persuaded to hold that the cause of death of petitioner’s
husband is work-connected, i.e. the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the nature of the
work, so much so that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation benefits for the death of her
husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission
denying petitioner’s claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended, arising from the death of her husband,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. LIMBO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL

SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision, promulgated on October
24, 2000, and the resolution, promulgated on January 29, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51528.
Petitioner Ruben T. Limbo was employed at Nestl Philippines, Incorporated from November 25, 1966
to December 31, 1996, first, as a salesman until he was promoted as Area Sales Supervisor in 1977.
Sometime in December 1994, Limbo was confined for one week at the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH) because of joint pains. His work-up revealed that he had elevated BUN, creatinine and anemia. When
Limbo was subjected to a renal ultrasound, it was further discovered that he had chronic renal disease and
he was forthwith referred to a nephrologist and was advised to undergo a kidney transplant. On January
2, 1995, Limbo underwent a renal transplant at the PGH and was discharged therefrom on January 13,
1995.
Limbo filed a claim for compensation benefits before the Social Security System (SSS), invoking
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended. However, the claim was denied on the ground that Limbos
illness, end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy, had no causal relationship to his job
as Area Sales Supervisor. Limbo promptly appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). In
a decision, dated December 2, 1998, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS and dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit.
Unsatisfied with the decision, Limbo went to the Court of Appeals for relief. However, in the now
assailed decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Limbos motion for reconsideration was later
denied.
Hence, the present recourse.
The only issue here is whether or not end-stage renal disease secondary to uric acid nephropathy is
compensable under P.D. 626, as amended.
We grant the petition.
Under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, (f)or the sickness and the resulting disability
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. [1]Concededly, end-stage renal disease
secondary to uric acid nephropathy is not among the Occupational Diseases under Annex A of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation.This, however, would not automatically bar petitioners claim for as long
as he could prove that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions.
 Petitioners job description showed that he was responsible for the following:
(1) Territorys collection, merchandising, market hygiene and promotion goals;
(2) Nestls principal satisfaction provider to the companys customers and business partners,
government and other significant entities;
(3) Principal Liason of the territory with the National Sales Manager, Areas Sales Manager and
other Nestl units;
(4) Leads and manages territory sales force and 3rd party support as follows:

Field Staff - 8 - 15
Contractuals (promo) - 10 - 20
Contractuals (PDD) - 20 - 40[2]

Petitioners areas of responsibility included Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga and Nueva Ecija.
Considering the workload and areas of responsibility of petitioner in this case, it is not unlikely for him
to develop hypertension, which in turn led to uremia. It should be stressed that in determining whether a
disease is compensable, it is enough that there exists a reasonable work connection. [3] It is sufficient that
the hypothesis on which the workmens claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone.[4]
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the findings of petitioners attending
physician supported the claim that his disease was work-related. Thus:

MEDICAL ABSTRACT:

Mr. Ruben Limbo is a 58 year-old male who was first seen by me in 1994.

He presented with a long history of hypertension requiring multiple drug therapy. He also had gout which
was complicated by a urethral obstruction in 1997 due to a uric acid stone.

At the time of consult, he already had marked azotemia, metabolic acidosis and diffuse renal
parenchymal disease. He was advised that he will eventually need dialysis or transplant.

In January 1995, he underwent a living related kidney transplant. He has gone well since then. He
continued to have gout and hypertension post transplant, otherwise, his kidney function has been stable.

DISCUSSION:

Mr. Limbo suffered from a long history of hypertension and gout. This has led to several complications
like hypertensive heart disease, hypertensive nephrosclerosis and eventually renal failure. He was
hypertensive while still employed and certainly, the stress at work could have aggravated his condition.

AGNES D. MEJIA, M.D.

Nephrologist[5]

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, a physicians report is the best evidence of work-connection of
workmens ailments and can be the basis of an award even if the physician was not presented as a
witness.[6] We have no reason to doubt the findings of Dr. Mejia who is an expert in her field of work. Verily,
petitioner was able to show that his ailment was work-related.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals, promulgated on October 24, 2000, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court orders the Social
Security System to pay petitioner the compensation benefits due him under P.D. 626.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47294 April 8, 1987

HILARIA DABATIAN, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (General Services Department, Cagayan de Oro
City), respondent.

Mando Z. Tagarda and Longino G. Tagarda for petitioner.

Nicasio S. Palaganas and Jose G. de Vera for respondent ECC.

GANCAYCO, J.:

A petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated June 27, 1977 in
ECC Case No. 0217 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
denying the claim for death benefits of Hilaria Dabatian, widow of the late Sigfredo A. Dabatian, was filed
on September 26, 1977. However, for failure to file the necessary docket fees, this Court denied the
petition in a Resolution dated September 30, 1977.

A Motion for Reconsideration together with a motion to litigate as pauper was filed by the petitioner and
this Court, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1977, gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to file simultaneous memoranda, The Employees' Compensation Commission, which was not
formally impleaded as respondent in the petition, filed its memorandum and so did respondent GSIS.
Petitioner failed to file her memorandum. The case was submitted for decision on August 30, 1978.

The undisputed factual background as found by the ECC which should have been made the proper
respondent in this case, is as follows:

At the time of his death Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage Truck Driver in
the General Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan de Oro City. As
Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned mostly in the night shift. In fact, at the time of
his death, his time of duty started from 10:00 o'clock at night to 6:00 o'clock in the
morning the next day. It was gathered from the evidence on record that the deceased
was a heavy coffee drinker which was his way of warding off sleepiness.

Prior to his death, he was observed by his co-employees to have been getting paler and
weaker while at work until the time he collapsed and became unconscious while on his
tour duty and was brought to his residence by his companions. Despite hospitalization,
he died two weeks later on July 3, 1976.

A claim for income benefits under the Employee's Compensation Program was filed by
the widow, the herein appellant. The Government Service Insurance System decided
 against the compensability of the claim on the ground that decedent's ailment, Peptic
Ulcer, is not definitely accepted as an occupational disease, as listed under the present
law on compensation. Neither was there a showing that the same was directly caused by
his employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working
conditions attendant to the deceased's employment. 1

The case was then elevated to the ECC which ruled that:

... Peptic ulcer, the deceased's main ailment, is a sharp circumscribed loss of tissue
resulting from the digestive action of acid gastric juice. Aggravating factors are ingestion
of alcohol, coffee, tea and cola drinks. Cigarette smoking has also been documented to
be a definite cause of delayed healing of peptic ulcer. Some drugs also contribute to its
occurrence. Another factor in the production of peptic ulcer is the hereditary
predisposition which seems to play a major role in the occurrence of peptic ulcer.
Intractable bleeding is a complication of peptic ulcer. Death will ensue due to irreversible
shock as a result of a bleeding peptic ulcer. (Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison).

Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, the deceased's ailment
was found not to be in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work. His
ailment was principally traceable to factors which were definitely not work-connected,
specifically, his inherent predisposition to drinking coffee heavily which could have
aggravated his contraction of the disease resulting to his death. However, aggravation of
an illness is not a ground for compensation under the present compensation law. 2

On these considerations, the ECC found no sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the GSIS denying
petitioner's claim. Hence, this petitioner certiorari.

The sole issue which the Court must determine is whether or not under the premises the death of
Sigfredo A. Dabatian is compensable.

The petition obviously addresses itself to the presumption of compensability and the principle of
aggravation which were sufficient grounds for entitlement under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In
fact, all the cases cited by the petitioner were decided under the old compensation law.

The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when the old compensation law had already been
abrogated. No competent evidence whatsoever was submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was
contracted prior to January 1, 1975 in order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old
compensation law. 3 There are no medical findings, affidavits, reports or any other evidence that
deceased suffered from pain or any discomfort prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code. No
allegation was even made to this effect. True it is, that strict rules on evidence do not apply in cases such
as this and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor. However, We cannot over-extend the
limits of such rules. Justice and fair play dictate otherwise. The new law on compensation should be
applied to this case.

The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule
on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of employment, the reason being — "to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right
to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability ... " 4 It was found, and rightly so, that the
old law, the Workmen's Compensation Act, destroyed the parity or balance between the competing
interests of employer and employee with respect to workmen's compensation. The balance was tilted
unduly in favor of the workmen since it was possible to stretch the work-related nature of an ailment
beyond seemingly rational its. 5
Thus, under the present law, 6 in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the
sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted from either a) any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or b) any illness caused by employment
subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission,
then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work increased the risk of
contracting the disease.

Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of warding
off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her husband's work
increased the risk of contracting the ailment.

Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is no
longer a ground for compensation under the present law.

This Court takes notice of the fact that the conditions in this case are not peculiar to the work mentioned
herein. Many, if not most, employees are equally exposed to similar conditions but have not been victims
of peptic ulcer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 48664 May 20, 1987

GLICERIA C. CASUMPANG, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
AND BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No.
0713 entitled "Gliceria C. Casumpang v. Government Service Insurance System (Bureau of Prisons) "which
affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System and denied the claim for death
benefits of Gliceria C. Casumpang, widow of the late Jose Casumpang.

The assailed decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is as follows:

The questioned decision denied the claim for compensation originally filed by the
deceased employee. Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard of the Bureau of
Prisons with assignment at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, Zamboanga City.
Upon its conversion to a claim for income benefits for death following the demise of said
Jose Casumpang due to Cancer of the Stomach, the claim is now being prosecuted (sic)
on appeal to this Commission by the herein appellant-widow, Gliceria Casumpang.

The System's denial of the appellant's claim was predicated on the ground that the cause
of death is not an occupational disease nor the result of the deceased's nature of
 occupation as Prison Guard, This is the gist of the System's letter-denial dated August 5,
1976, reiterated in its resolutions dated October 4, 1976 and August 18. 1977,
respectively, therein further denying the requests for reconsideration of the appellant.

The preponderance of mandatory legal postulate requiring proof of causation once an

ailment upon which a claim is based is not considered an occupational disease as defined
and understood under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, would subserve the
respondent System's findings that the above-titled claim is not compensable. The
conclusion of the respondent System cannot be faulted. From even the cursory reading
of the record, the evidences (sic) submitted by the appellant in support of her claim
would fail to indicate that the cause of death is in occupational disease, noting further
thereon that the work of the deceased did not involve handling of wood products such as
those of wood workers, loggers, carpenters and employees of plywood, pulp and paper
mills. Neither did these evidences (sic) measure up to the substantial and positive
evidence requirement for a determination of compensability, since there is no showing
that the risk of contracting gastric carcinoma was increased by the deceased's working
conditions.

The contention of the appellant that compensability is presumed once the ailment is
shown to have supervened in the course of employment cannot be accorded merit. The
doctrine of presumptive compensability which was then expressly provided under the old
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) is not recognized under Presidential Decree No.
626, as amended, the present law on employees' compensation. In the latter law, proof
of causation by the claimant is imperative, such burden being incompatible with the
presumption of compensability.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
AFFIRMED, and the instant claim dismissed. (Original Records, Decision of ECC).

The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not cancer of the stomach is an occupational disease and
hence, compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

This case falls under the New Labor Code, which fact is admitted by the petitioner herself (Casumpang's
Petition for Certiorari, p. 3).

After a close perusal of the records of the case, nowhere does it appear that Jose Casumpang contracted
his disease or ailments before January 1, 1975. There are no medical findings. reports, affidavits or any
indication that he was suffering from any pain or discomfort prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code
which by liberal interpretation may have worked in his favor.

There is no dispute that prior to his demise Jose Casumpang had ruptured duodenal ulcer with
generalized peritonitis. 'This condition according to medical findings on record, worsened into cancer of
the stomach which disease finally caused his death. The former ailment was officially diagnosed in June
28, 1976. In his medical history, this was traced to hematemesis and melena which began in November
1975. In other words, all of his ailments were after January 1, 1975.

It is Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, therefore, which is applicable in this case and not the
Workmen's Compensation Act.

It is important to determine which law is applicable.

Under the former Workmen's Compensation Act or Act No. 3428 as amended. the claimant was relieved
of the duty to prove causation as it was then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the
employment'. under the presumption of compensability (Tortal v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,
124 SCRA 211).

However, under the new law, the principles of aggravation and presumption of compensability have been
stricken off by the lawmaker as grounds for compensation (Milano v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 142 SCRA 52).

Under Article 167 (b) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule Ill of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions (De Jesus v. Employees Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92).

Under the Labor Code, cancer of the stomach is not an occupational disease considering the decedent's
employment as prison guard.

We agree with the Solicitor General that:

... In ECC Resolution No. 247-A dated April 13, 1977, cancer of the stomach and other
lymphatic and blood forming, vessels was considered occupational only among
woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and
paper mills and plywood mills. The complained illness is therefore not compensable
under the first group provided in the Labor Code.

Under the second ground for compensability, it should be shown that an illness is caused
by employment and that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. In her letter dated December 6, 1977 to respondent ECC (Annex B),
petitioner claims that her deceased husband escorted inmates to work in the hinterlands
of San Ramon; that at times he was overtaken by rain; that he had to work at night in
case of prison escapes, and that he missed his meals owing to the nature of his duties. It
should be noted however, that said conditions do not bring about cancer of the stomach.
On the ailment of Jose Casumpang, the GSIS found that the evidence (you have)
submitted are not sufficient for us to establish that his ailment is the direct result of your
occupation or employment as Prison Guard in the Bureau of Prisons, Zamboanga City
(GSIS letter dated August 5, 1976, supra.) This was reiterated by the GSIS in its letter
dated October 4, 1976 denying a request for reconsideration. Thus: 'On the basis,
(however), of the papers and evidence on record which you have submitted, it appears
that you have not established that your employment had any causal relationship with the
contraction of the ailment.' Petitioner did not demonstrate that the adverse conditions
mentioned above had direct causal connection with his job which would develop into
cancer of the stomach. (Rollo, pp. 125-126).

The case of Aninias v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, (83 SCRA 806) cited by the petitioner is
not applicable to the cast at bar as the former case applied the Workmen's Compensation Act. The
petitioner's arguments more properly apply claims falling under the old law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED., The decision of the Government Service Insurance System and
the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46454 September 28, 1989

NICETAS C. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (BUREAU OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION), respondent.

Rodrigo V. Coquia for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner's late husband, Hector P. Rodriguez, was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan Elementary
School in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19, 1975 he went on sick leave and was confined at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after complaining of severe stomach pains accompanied by nausea and
vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending
Colon." His ailment called for a surgical operation which was performed on November 27,1975 but this
proved unavailing. A few days thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he expired.

On January 28, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for death compensation under the Labor Code with
respondent Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as GSIS). In a letter-decision
dated February 23, 1976, the GSIS denied the claim finding that the cause of the death of petitioner's
husband is not an occupational disease since the nature of his duties as a teacher, as well as the working
conditions of his employment, could not have directly caused his ailment which eventuated in his
subsequent death. 1 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, dated August 11, 1976, was denied upon the
finding that the evidence failed to establish that the decedent's employment had any causal relationship
with the contraction of the ailment and there was no showing that the same directly arose therefrom or
resulted from the nature thereof. 2 A second motion for reconsideration filed on October 18, 1976 having
been denied by the GSIS, petitioner's claim was elevated for review to the respondent commission where
it was docketed as ECC Case No. 0266.

On March 16, 1977, respondent commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS and denied the claim of
petitioner. The case is now before us on a petition for review.

The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence concerning claims based on the provisions of the
Labor Code on employees' compensation, particularly on death benefits under Article 194, is that they
must result from an occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed
by the Employees' Compensation Commission or any illness caused by the employment subject to proof
by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. 3

If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on
Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required. However, if it is not so listed, it has been
held that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive proposition,
that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The fact that the
cause of the disease was not positively identified does not dispense with this burden of proof. 4

The observations heretofore made do not mean that proof of direct causal relation is indispensably
required. It is enough that the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the
development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job.
Strict rules of evidence are not demanded, the degree of proof required being merely substantial
evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion. 5

After the surgical operation performed by Dr. Arturo de Vera, he gave the clinical impression that the
deceased was suffering from "Intestinal Obstruction Partial, due to Lipomatosis of the Colon and
Adhesion," explained by respondent commission as follows:

... As established in medical science, intestinal obstruction is a condition in which the

passage of intestinal contents is arrested or seriously impaired. This is due to causes
which are either mechanical, vascular or neurogenic. Mechanical causes are intrinsic
factors as adhesions and tumors, such as what happened in the instant case, and hernia,
and such factors as impacted foreign body or feces, parasites and gallstones. Vascular
causes include embolism or trombosis of a large blood vessel. The neurogenic causes
consist of those seen in pneumonia and peritonitis and following abdominal surgery or
injuries to the spinal cord. (The Merck Manual-8th edition: Principles of Internal Medicine
by Harrison). ... 6

Public respondent GSIS in its letter-decision also gave this explanation to petitioner:

Intestinal Obstruction is failure of progression of intestinal contents due to mechanical

causes or to inadequacy of intestinal muscular activity. In your husband's case, it was
due to Lipomatosis and Adhesions. Lipomata are benigned (sic) tumors characteristically
found in middle adult life, although they may have been growing slowly for many years
before making clinical mischief. They arise from adipose or fatty tissue anywhere in the
body. The mesentery of the colon contains a large amount of such tissue and this may
produce obstruction by compression of the intestinal wall. Worthy of note is the fact that
the abdomen of your late husband was markedly obese. 7

Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her husband as a classroom teacher alone
would not have any connection with his disease. However, she posits that the deceased's auxiliary
activities as a classroom teacher directly affected his physical constitution and indubitably caused him to
have sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body. According to petitioner,
the deceased was a member of the basketball team of the public school teachers in their school for the
last five years prior to his death and had served as a coach in basketball for three years. He was also said
to have been an active member of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines serving as committee chairman of
Unit 671 of the Pangasinan council. 8

It is our considered view that the circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she presented
are not enough to discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as
to when the disease commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceased's colon
may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a teacher. Neither was there
any indication as to what really caused the disease: in fact, the nature of the disease as described
militate against a finding of a causal nexus. The "trauma" that was supposed to have caused or at least
contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved. Surely, the activities
relied upon by the petitioner, being outside the regular or primary functions of a teacher, could not have
been done every working day. It is safe to assume that they were done only for certain limited periods of
time and on isolated occasions as, for instance, during competitions. Thus, it cannot be said that
decedent's work as a teacher exposed him to hazards different or greater from those involved in ordinary
or normal life-styles. There is no showing that he did not engage in other extraneous activities, aside
from playing basketball or being a member of the Boy Scouts. Of further note is the observation that the
abdomen of the deceased was markedly obese, which circumstance may also have been a causative or
contributive factor considering the etiological and pathological particulars of said ailment.

Additionally, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that said co-curricular activities can be considered as
"hazards," as theorized by petitioner, exposure to the same was on the voluntary choice of the deceased.
As pointed out by respondent commission, the decision to engage therein was at decedent's option since,
not forming part of his work as teacher, there was no compulsion on him to participate in said activities.

UNDER THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of
respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46654 August 9, 1988

LUPO S. CARBAJAL, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Municipality of San Julian, Eastern Samar),
and EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

Pompeyo V. Tan.

PARAS, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the decision of respondent Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 0168 dated June 27, 1977, which affirmed the decision
of respondent Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for benefits under the
New Labor Code as amended (P.D. No. 626) for the death of his spouse, Nenita P. Carbajal (Rollo, Annex
"A," p. 14).

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

The late Nenita P. Carbajal was employed as Campaign Clerk in the Municipal Treasurer's Office of San
Julian, Eastern Samar. On February 2, 1976 while typing tax declarations and making entries in their
books, which were her duties aside from campaigning for tax collections, she suffered from bleeding per
vaginum due to incomplete abortion. Her hospitalization and treatment at the Bagacay Mines Hospital
due to profuse hermorrhage of one month duration secondary to complete abortion and shock were of no
avail for on March 8,1976, petitioner's wife died.

On May 12, 1976, he filed his claim for benefits for the death Of his wife with the respondent
Government Service Insurance System under P.D. No. 626, as amended.

On June 3, 1976, the Senior Assistant General Manager of the Underwriting and Claims Department of
GSIS, Mr. Domingo N. Garcia, denied the petitioner's claim stating that the ailments of his wife were not
occupational.

Petitioner requested reconsideration of respondent's adverse ruling. However, his request was also
turned down by respondent GSIS reiterating its previous stand that ailment which resulted in his wife's
death is not causally related to her duties and conditions of work. From this decision, a petition for review
was filed by petitioner before the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC).

On June 27, 1977, the respondent ECC rendered its questioned decision in ECC Case No. 0168 based
upon the findings of its Medical Officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, that there is no proof to establish the
compensability of the sickness in relation to claimant's occupation. Neither was there an increased risk
arising from the working conditions affirming the GSIS decision denying the claim.

Hence, this petition.

The sole issue raised in the case at bar is the compensability of petitioner's wife's ailments.

Section 1, P.D. No. 626, amending Article 165 of the Labor Code, defines a compensable sickness as "any
illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the
working conditions."

Respondent ECC in its decision denying petitioner's claim, stressed that the causes of abortion are: (1)
fetal, as when there is defective development of the fertilized ovum; (2) maternal, as in acute infections,
disease, and when the spermatozoa is inadequate to give ovum the necessary generative impulse
(Obstetrics, J.P. Greenhill, 12th Edition, 1060).

Respondent ECC asserted that there is absence of any proof that the abortion suffered by petitioner's
wife was caused by her employment and that petitioner failed to establish risk of his wife's contracting it
was increased by working conditions attendant in her employment.

Petitioner contends that the decision of the ECC overlooked the nature and conditions of employment of
his late wife. Petitioner claims that the risk of contracting the disease was aggravated/increased by the
working conditions as evidenced by Report of Injury/Sickness/Death, Municipal Mayor Matilda A. Operario
of San Julian, Eastern Samar (ECC, Records, p. 11); Medical Certificate of the two attending physicians of
the deceased (ECC, Records, Annex "A," p. 15; Annex "B," p. 14); and the affidavit of the Municipal
Treasurer of the aforementioned town (ECC, Records, Annex "C," p. 13) which confirmed that the illness
was connected with her work as Campaign Clerk in the Municipal Treasurer's Office.

Further, petitioner cites the travels of his wife and the of heavy tax declaration books in connection with
her work thereby causing her "two attacks of vaginal bleeding and hypogastric pain."

Claimant's contention is meritorious.

Under Article 1167 (I), Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, a "compensable sickness means (1) any
illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC; or (2) any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions."

Records reveal that petitioner's wife while working as Campaign Clerk in the Treasurer's Office of San
Julian, Eastern Samar, suffered "two attacks of vaginal bleeding and hypogastric pain" attributing said
ailment to the lifting of heavy tax declaration books, due to abortion incomplete.

This opinion of the decedent's physicians is in accord with the findings/analysis of medical authorities
which read as follows:

Pregnant women become tired more readily, therefore, the prevention of fatigue must be
stressed very emphatically. The body is made up of various types of cells, each type with
a specific function. Depletion of nerve-cell energy results in fatigue, and fatigue causes
certain reactions in the body that are injurious. (Maternity Nursing 12th Edition, by
Fitzpatrick, Reeder and Mastroianni, Jr.).

It is not considered desirable for pregnant women to be employed in the following types
of occupation and they should, if possible, be transferred to lighter and more sedentary
works:

(a) occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy work;

(b) occupation involving continous standing and moving about. (One of

the Standards for Maternity Case and Employment of Mothers
 recommended by the Children's Bureau of the United States). (Rollo, p.
12,).

Moreover, spontaneous abortion may result from the influence of periodicity as the uterine muscle
reaches a certain state of detention; or in various accidents as a fall, strain or overmuscular exertion
when the uterus reacts and expels its load. (Emphasis supplied; "Anatomy and Allied Sciences for
Lawyers, W.F. English, p. 181).

Therefore, the opinion of the ECC Medical Officer (ECC Record, p. 20) that there was no causal relation
between the ailment of petitioner's spouse and the nature and/or conditions of his wife's employment
cannot overcome the substantial evidence submitted by petitioner (See Calvero v. ECC et al., 117 SCRA
461 [1982], cited in Parages v. ECC, 134 SCRA 73; Ovenson v. ECC, GSIS; G.R. No. 65216, December 1,
1987).

Additionally, medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially when there is some basis in
the facts for inferring a work connection (Delegente v. ECC, 118 SCRA 67; San Valentin v. ECC, 118 SCRA
160 cited in Sarmiento v. ECC, Sept. 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 421).

Thus, in the cases of Mercado, Jr. v. ECC, 139 SCRA 270 and Mora v. ECC and GSIS, G.R. No. 62157,
December 1, 1987 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, this Court ruled as follows:

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation espoused under the
Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code
(the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the
liberality of the law in general still subsists.

... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by
both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in
deciding claims for compensability specially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work connection. (Cristobal v. ECC, supra).

Moreover, "this kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit
of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'" (Cristobal v. ECC, supra). The policy is to extend the
applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under law,
which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor
(Acosta v. ECC, 109 SCRA 209 cited in Sarmiento v. ECC and GSIS, L-65648, September 24, 1986, 144
SCRA 421).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent
Employees Compensation Commission is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering respondents
to pay herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-45910. April 28, 1980.]

ELIGIO P. MIRASOL, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Department of Education and
Culture), Respondents.

DECISION

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employee’s Compensation Commission in ECC Case No.
0134 entitled "Eligio Mirasol, Claimant, versus, Government Service Insurance Commission (Department
of Education and Culture), Respondent" affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance
System denying the claim for compensation of Eligio P. Mirasol on the ground that the claimant’s
ailments, hypertension and rheumatic infection in both knees, are not occupational diseases arising from
the employment. 1

The petitioner, Eligio P. Mirasol, while in good health, was appointed as classroom teacher on August 1,
1945 in the public school in Libmanam, Camarines Sur. In 1960, he was appointed as District Food
Production Coordinator and Attendant Teacher in the same school. He became a District Revolution
Coordinator. The district was composed of forty eight (48) central-barrio schools, eighteen (18) of which
were in the mountains which could be reached only on foot. Eight (8) schools were 30 kilometers and the
nearest was 10 kilometers from the petitioner’s headquarters in the town proper of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur. It was the petitioner’s duty to visit monthly all the district schools. On August 25, 1973, he
experienced for the first time symptoms of malignant hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis. The ailments
of the petitioner persisted. He was under continuous dedical treatment until he retired on February 28,
1976 after having been in the government service for thirty one (31) years, more or less. His retirement
was brought about by ailments diagnosed as high blood pressure and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees. 2

The petitioner applied for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) in 1976. In a letter dated March 8, 1976, the Senior Assistant General Manager,
Domingo N. Garcia, of the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the ailments of hypertension and
rheumatic infection, both knees, are not occupational diseases and that the working conditions of the
petitioner’s employment could not have directly caused such ailments. 3

The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the Senior Assistant General
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System in a letter dated May 17, 1976. 4

The petitioner appealed to the Employee’s Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System denying the claim.

It is a fact that part of the duties of the petitioner was to make monthly visits to various schools which
are not accessible by road. To reach these mountains schools, the petitioner had to hike through muddy
ricefields and climb slippery mountains during sunny and rainy days. During these monthly visits, the
petitioner fell down many times because of the slippery paths in the ricefields and trails in the mountains.
The ailments of hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees, must have been caused by the
exposure to the elements of the muddy ricefields and on slippery mountain trails under all kinds of
weather conditions on his way to the barrio schools not accessible by road.

There is sufficient substantial evidence of record to show that the ailments of the petitioner were caused
by the duties of his employment and that the risk of contracting said ailments was increased by the
working conditions. He is entitled to permanent total disability compensation.

The record also discloses that the petitioner received medical treatment

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employee’s compensation Commission sought to be reviewed is hereby
set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) To pay the petitioner the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as disability benefit;

2) To reimburse the petitioner the medical expenses he incurred, supported by proper receipts; and

3) To pay the petitioner the amount of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44031 February 14, 1980

SONIA VILLONES, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
and the SILAY GENERAL HOSPITAL, respondents.

Sonia Villones in her own behalf.

Manuel M. Lazaro for the GSIS.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission
dated October 15, 1975 which affirmed the denial of petitioner's claim for compensation by the
respondent Government Service Insurance System on the ground that her illness is not an occupational
disease, it having been merely aggravated by the nature of her work as a nurse and, therefore, not
compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626.

Petitioner was and still is the only nurse incharge of the emergency room and outpatient department of
the Silay General Hospital, Silay City, Philippines, her employment dating back to December, 1965. From
October, 1974 and continuously up to July, 1975, petitioner suffered from recurrent functional bleeding,
thus prompting her to go on sick leave from her work from April 1, 1975 and up to August 31, 1975,
during which period she was hospitalized at the Philippine General Hospital, Manila and underwent
operation for "total hysterectomy, bilateral salphingo oophorectomy and lysis of adhesions." Her
confinement at the Philippine General Hospital lasted for 17 days, that is, from April 17, 1975 to May 4,
1975.

Petitioner filed with the respondent GSIS her claim for ,sickness benefit supported by the "Report of
Injury/Sickness" signed by Dr. Rogelio B. Cuevas, Chief of the respondent Silay General Hospital, Silay
City, and the complete records of her illness. The claim was, however, denied by Mr. Domingo N. Garcia,
Assistant General Manager, Medicare-Employees Compensation of respondent GSIS on August 5, 1975 on
the ground that her illness is not an occupational disease and that petitioner's duties as a nurse could not
have directly caused her illness, at most, her duties could have only aggravated the same.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the denial of her claim for sickness benefits but the same was
denied on August 13, 1975 still on the ground that her ailment is not an occupational disease.

On August 20, 1975, petitioner filed an appeal with the respondent Employees Compensation Commission
from the decision of the respondent GSIS, the appeal docketed as ECC Case No. 0012, entitled "Sonia
Villones, appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System, respondent." As indicated earlier,
respondent ECC rendered a decision in the aforesaid ECC Case No. 0012, sustaining the dismissal of
petitioner's claim for sickness compensation benefits, primarily because the ECC "is not convinced that
the working conditions of appellant's Employment have increased the risk of her contracting her ailment
of recurrent functional bleeding." The ECC further ruled that these working conditions could only have
aggravated, but definitely could not have caused petitioner's illness, and since aggravation under P.D.
No. 626 is not a ground for compensation, petitioner is not entitled to any employee's compensation
benefits.
In her petition, petitioner submits for adjudication the following questions, to wit: (1) whether the
working conditions under which petitioner was employed could have caused the illness of recurrent
functional bleeding: and (2) if the answer to the above is in the affirmative, whether in the particular
case of petitioner her working conditions did cause her aforestated illness and not merely aggravated the
same. Petitioner, however, in her Memorandum rests her present appeal on the resolution of the
following question: whether or not the illness of petitioner is service-incurred and not merely service
aggravated.

Respondent GSIS contends: (1) that the petitioner has no cause of action against the respondent GSIS
which should not have been made a respondent in the first place, (2) that the findings of the respondent
ECC sought to be reviewed are findings of facts which are supported by substantial evidence and are no
longer open for review; and (3) that petitioner's illness of recurrent functional bleeding could not have
been caused by her working conditions.

On the part of the respondent ECC, it is contended that the factual finding of the respondent Commission
shows that there was no direct causal link between petitioner's ailment and the working conditions
obtaining in her employment and this factual finding of the respondent Commission is deemed
conclusive, it being based on substantial evidence.

The factual finding of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission state the following:

The appellant has been employed as a nurse at the Silay General Hospital, Silay City,
since December 1965. As such, her duties consist of attending to emergency cases,
giving injections and treatment; moving patients by stretcher and wheel chair to and
from the emergency room; "teaching health"; assisting doctors on minor operations and
examinations; procuring supplies; sterilizing instruments and doing other aspects of
nursing work. From April 1, 1975 to August 31, 1975, she went on leave from her work,
presumbly due to her ailment, the subject-matter of this claim, which is recurrent
functional bleeding. She attributes her increased and prolonged vaginal bleeding to her
alleged constant exposure to infection, fatigue due to excess work and stress and strain
during emergencies.

On August 5, 1975, her claim for compensation was denied by the respondent System on
the ground that her illness is not an occupational disease, it having been merely
aggravated by the nature of her work as a nurse and, therefore, not compensable. In its
letter of affirmation dated August 13, 1975, following appellant's motion for
reconsideration, the respondent held that her recurrent uterine bleeding is actually
caused by several diseases that afflicted her reproductive organs, such as chronic
cervicitis with squamous metaplasia and surface erosions, endometrial proliferation,
cystic follicles of both ovaries, and hydatid cysts of Morgagni of left fallopian tube. In her
appeal to this Commission, the appellant insists that while it is true that these several
pathologies affecting her reproductive organs were the actual causes of her recurrent
bleeding, the working conditions of her employment, such as infection, fatigue and stress
and strain, increased the risk of contracting the ailment.

Upon the above finding, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission ruled:

We are not convinced that the working conditions of appllant's employment have
increased the risk of her contracting her ailment of recurrent functional bleeding. We
believe that the maladies in her reproductive organs, working alone and independently of
the working conditions cited by her, are solely responsible for bringing about the ailment.
This is even admitted by the appellant herself in her letter of appeal. These pathologies
 are not shown by the evidence on record to have been caused by such working
conditions that would have otherwise justified a finding of a causal connection between
the consequent illness and the work. In fact, it is medically recognized that chronic
cervicitis with a squamous metaplasia and surface erosions, which affect the cervix found
at the junction of the vagina and the uterus, are caused by frequent sexual contact or by
infection of venereal disease: and that endometrial proliferation, which also affects the
uterus, and cystic follicles of the ovaries and hydatid cysts of Morgagni of the fallopian
tube, all result from dysfunction of the ovarian and pituitary hormones. This hormonal
imbalance is in turn brought about by natural causes and definitely not by infection due
to exposure to disease persons, or by fatigue or by stress and strain. Hence, it is difficult
to relate the recurrent functional bleeding of the appellant, which is caused directly by
these diseases, to the kind of work she is engaged in.

What surfaces from the facts as established by the evidence on records is that this illness
is caused by these diseases of the reproductive organs of the appellant and is merely
aggravated by the working conditions cited by her. However, as correctly pointed out by
the respondent System, aggravation under Presidential Decree No. 626 has been taken
out as a ground for compensation.

In her Letter dated August 7, 1975 requesting reconsideration of the denial of her claim for compensation
by the Assistant General Manager, Medicare-Employees Compensation, GSIS, petitioner discribed the
working condition of her employment which increased the risk of contracting her illness, thus —

I have been working with the hospital for the past ten years and my menstrual bleeding
has always been normal meaning it is moderate and lasts only 3 to 5 days.

I am in charge of both the emergency room and the outpatient department. Now with
the advent of the new society people have become health conscious and the number of
patients have multiplied four times and still I am the only one nurse assigned in the same
departments so much so that I have go go back and forth to the emergency room and to
the outpatient department and due to the many emergency cases I have to be standing
for long hours. Lately due to acute lack of personnel the institution worker assigned with
me was transferred to the main building. There was no helper and I have even to push
the stretcher and wheelchair and also lift patients bodily up the examining or the
emergency table.

Last January 8, 1975 we have so many patients and I have to push the stretcher back
and forth to the wards and back to the emergency room and vice-versa. After helping lift
a semi conscious patient from the stretcher to the emergency table I started to bleed
profusely so much so that I was admitted and given intravenous hemostatics. After
discharge I went back to work but every time I exert so much effort in helping patients
and also when I am kept standing for so long assisting in emergencies I begin to have
profuse bleeding. It became recurrent every time I exerted effort that the doctors in the
hospital advised me to stop working and seek treatment. All during the times that I was
bleeding on and off was taking premarin, a hormone add several hemostatics but to no
avail because every time I'm extremely busy I begin to bleed. I can honestly say that my
illness is directly caused by my employment because I only bleed profusely when there is
extra ordinary pressure of work which I have to perform as an emergency room nurse
and outpatient and treatment room nurse plus the fact that I have no more institution
worker with me. I can honestly conclude that my illness is not a case of aggravation
because the illness so named does not exist before but only after the increase of my
 working condition in the hospital that I have to do so many extra work which I do not
usually do before.

All these past years I have normal menstruation. Now hysterectomy was done due to
prolonged and profused bleeding unrelieved by hormones hematinics and hemostatics
which proves that it is not hormonal in nature but due to exerting efforts and long
standing while doing my duties as emergency room nurse and outpatient nurse whose
duties are innumerable and unlimited.

Petitioner reiterates in her Letter of August 20, 1975 appealing to the ECC and stressing that her ailments
were not pre-existing, but were acquired by her in the course of employment and that the risk of
contracting them were increased by her working condition, that is, constant exposure to infection, fatigue
due to excess work, and stress and strain during emergencies.

In affirming the decision of the GSIS which dismissed petitioner's claim, the respondent Employees
Compensation Commission committed an error Respondent ECC's ruling is not correct for under present
jurisprudence as enunciated in Corrales vs. Employees Compensation Commission, L-44063, February 27,
1979, 88 SCRA 547, that where the injury or illness accrued prior to January 1, 1975, the same shall be
decided under the Workmen's Compensation Act, not under the New Labor Code and that the Employees
Compensation Commission is duty-bound to apply the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
with respect to claims accruing as in the present case prior to the New Labor Code, as successor to the
defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission.

As the record shows, petitioner began suffering from functional bleeding from October, 1974 to July,
1975 as stated in the "Report of Injury/Sickness/Death" signed by Dr. Rogelio B. Cuevas, Chief of the
Silay General Hospital. Hence, petitioner's claim for illness compensation accrued in October, 1974. Article
292 of the New Labor Code which requires that Workmen's Compensation claims accruing prior to the
New Labor Code shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of Labor not later
than March 31, 1975, otherwise they shall forever be barred, does not apply to petitioner who filed her
claim on July 24, 1975 with the GSIS because the Supreme Court has held repeatedly in a long line of
decisions that the prescriptive period for claims which accrued under the W•rkmen's Compensation Act,
as amended, is ten years, it being a right founded on statute. Petitioner's right accrued as early as
October, 1974 and, therefore, is a vested right. (Corrales vs. Employees Compensation
Commission, supra).

Since the law applicable and governing petitioner's claim is the Workmen's Compensation Act, the
jurisprudence and the Act itself recognize as ground for compensation illness directly caused by such
employment, or either aggravated by or the result of such employment. Thus, Section 2 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, provides:

Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When an employee suffers personal injury from
any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis
or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result
of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and
to the persons hereinafter specified. The right to compensation as provided in this Act
shall not be defeated or impaired on the ground that the death, injury or disease was
due to the negligence of a fellow servant or employee, without prejudice to the right of
the employer to proceed against the negligent party.

It is not also disputed that since claimant's illness supervened in the course of or during her employment
which began in December, 1965 as shown in her service record as nurse in the Silay General Hospital, a
disputable presumption arises that the illness arose out or or was aggravated by her employment and
consequently compensable without need of further proof. The burden to overcome such presumption is
shifted to the door of the employer which the latter must do so by substantial evidence. (Caoili vs.
Republic and WCC, L-43006, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 736; Metropolitan Waterworks, et al., vs. WCC,
L-43555, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 745; Manila Times Publishing Co. vs. WCC, L- 42774, February 28,
1979,88 SCRA 729).

The claim of the petitioner is supported not only by the presumption. We have stated above but by clear,
convincing and substantial evidence which she has presented. We find in the records Annex "A" (Report
of Injury/Sickness/Death) signed by Dr. Rogelio B. Cuevas describing petitioner's sickness as recurrent
functional bleeding, stating the date of her illness as from October, 1974 to July, 1975 (which is
admittedly during the period of employment of petitioner as Staff Nurse of the Silay General Hospital)
and the medical finding that the recurrent functional bleeding or increased and prolonged vaginal
bleeding was due to pressure of work while attending to patients in the Outpatient Department and
Emergency Room. The records also include the certification of Dr. Josefina Aragon of the Philippine
General Hospital, attesting to the hospitalization claim for payment of the petitioner who was admitted in
said hospital from April 17, 1975 to May 4, 1975; also the medical certificate on the history, laboratory
examination and prescription given to petitioner by her attending physician, Dr. Wevina Legarda. The
above certificates are found in the Records of the case docketed as Case No. 0012 of the Employees
Compensation Commission.

The case of Almaiz vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission L-42794, August 31, 1978, 85 SCRA 144, is
very similar to the case at bar, where petitioner, Nenita Almaiz, a Senior Resident Physician of the
Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital, Negros Occidental, filed a claim for compensation due to
her illness diagnosed as Myoma Uteri which necessitated a surgical operation known as panhysterectomy,
resulting in the removal of the uterus, both ovaries and tubes, and ultimately depriving the patient of her
reproductive system. As Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, Dr. Almaiz attended to at
least 50 to 60 patients everyday and her daily routine required climbing several flights of the stairways
from her office at the second floor of the hospital. While on hospital duty, she suffered excruciating
stomach pains which her physician diagnosed as Myoma Uteri and certified by the physician as the result
of the nature of her employment or due to pressure of work. She went on sick leave and although
charged to her sick leave credit, she was granted a maximum compensation of P6,000.00 plus attorney's
fees by the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

In said Almaiz case, the Supreme Court said:

Moreover, the presumption of compensability under Section 44 of the Workmen's

Compensation Act has not been overcome, there being no substantial evidence
presented by respondent employer to the contrary. A bare denial of the causal link will
not suffice. There must be positive proof to show that the illness was caused primarily by
factors extraneous to the employment, such as conditions inherent in petitioner's physical
constitution and that aggravation thereof was due to circumstances of her personal life
and habits, including negligence or fault. In the instant case, petitioner's daily routine as
a resident physician, particularly in conducting her regular rounds to some 50 to 60
patients a day in the hospital and her frequent use of the stairways, involve considerable
physical exertion and movement that aggravated her illness.

That petitioner's illness supervened in the course of employment is beyond dispute,

hence the establishment of a causal link between the nature of employment and the
illness is not anymore necessary, for the presumption of causation or aggravation
applies. In other words, that the illness arose out of the employment, or was aggravated
by or the result of the nature of said employment. The function of a presumption is
precisely to dispense with the need for proof, and the burden to overthrow the
 presumption and to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from
employment, is laid down by the statute at the door of the employer.

We granted compensation to the petitioner in the Almaiz case in the amount of P6,000.00, the maximum
amount allowed by law pursuant to Section 18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, interpreting the
same as to include the injury or loss suffered by her (removal of her ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes)
under its coverage within the term "in all other cases of this kind of disability not mentioned yn other
sections of this Act.

In the case at bar, petitioner Sonia Villones was similarly operated upon for the removal of her ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes. There is no reason why We should not grant her the same right to recover
compensation therefor. She is also entitled to the reimbursement of her expenses for such medical,
surgical, and hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness may require in
accordance with Section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. Petitioner is also entitled
to the benefits provided under Section 13 of the Act, as amended, which provides that "immediately after
an employee has suffered an injury or contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability,
the employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies
as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that which will promote
his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity ..."

The evidence submitted by her and found in the records elevated from the ECC, ECC Case No. 0012,
consisting of the receipts and the amounts paid by her for hospital bills, medical attendance, surgical
operation, clinical and laboratory services, medicines and drugs purchased and nursing attendance total
the sum of Three Thousand Six Hundred Fourteen and 15/100 Pesos (P3,614.15) which the petitioner is
entitled to reimbursement.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
set aside, and a new one is hereby entered ordering the respondent Government Service Insurance
System:

1. To pay the petitioner compensation in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), the maximum
amount allowed by law pursuant to Section 18 of the Act;

2. To reimburse petitioner her expenses for medical, surgical, nursing and hospital services, including
medicienes and drugs in the total amount of Three Thousand Six Hundred Fourteen Pesos and Fifteen
Centavos (P3,614.15); and

3. To pay the administrative costs.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989

ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among
the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees' compensation law. The strongly
lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the
defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme
has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof of increased
risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of
contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant's working
conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work
connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if
there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says
so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years later,
she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take
sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder
in the Bureau.

The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that
time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees'
Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.

The following issues are raised in this petition:

1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is
compensable under the present compensation laws.

2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the

present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17,
Rollo)

The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet, positively
identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of
a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly
paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes the difference
whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a
housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.

It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases
prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely —

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

xxx xxx xxx xxx

16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and blood
forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp and
paper mills and plywood mills.

17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers.

(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl
chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which
are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in
Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific
cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting
specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.

The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.

Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines "sickness" as follows:

ART. 167. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For this purpose, the Co
on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and work- related illnesses that
may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May
1, 1978).

Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are
entitled. It provides:

SECTION 1.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules with the
 conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by
employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that
since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal
requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be
presumed .

In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court
recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes; people in all walks of
life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific
working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that
it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .

To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of decisions interpreting
the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of the defunct law has been stricken from
the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and
the present scheme.

On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new
Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and
"aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service Insurance System and Social
Security System — under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right
to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851
[1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et
al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).

Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social
insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid
from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity of the new law
by explaining the present system as follows:

We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the

constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the
petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his
claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by
certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected
claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's
constitutional rights.

xxx xxx xxx

 The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of
employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to
litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is no notice of
injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new
neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the
employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may
be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The
amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to
the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for
compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not
have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it
has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from
an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on
presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no
serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should
be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the
former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions,
adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must
be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it
better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the
greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to
improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)

The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the

present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the
might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable
presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits
are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to
have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that
the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and
integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee,
this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting
the is increased by working conditions.
The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it from
the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout the
country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for
their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was
being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would
probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the said fund and
making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased
amounts fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are
inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion
for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the
trust fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever
covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must
be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the
law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex
subject with such far reaching implications.

We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the
actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and other
excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be
recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit
payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this
Court to accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision expressly
supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473
(1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public respondents is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
NORMA ORATE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS,
INC.), respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 14,
1997 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 42280, and its January 29, 1998
Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On December 5, 1972, petitioner Norma Orate was employed by Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc., as a
regular machine operator.[4] Her duties included the following:

A) Doffing:

1) Obtain empty cones from storage prior to doffing; incl. patrol round trip.

2) Prepare empty cones to each spindle prior to doffing; incl. attention to condition of
empty cones.

3) Doff full cones to bank over machine.

4) Take empty cones by L. H. drop ends inside cone or wrap around cones and load to
spindle then start spindle.

B) Creeling:

1) Remove empty bobbins from creel pin to conveyor.

2) Obtain one-full cop from bank and remove tail ends.

3) Fit full cop to creel pin and thread to guides

4) Find end from running cone and joint-end from full cop; incl. keep clearer free from
accumulated cone.

5) Remove tail from empty bobbin when necessary. 20%

6) Stop spindles. (occasionally when stop motion malfunction. 10%)

C) Repair Breaks:

1) Patrol to break-end.

2) Stop spindle. (occasionally) 10%

3) Get end from full cop and thread to guides.

 4) Find end from running cone by R.H. and joint ends by knotter on L. H., then start
spindle; including keep cleaner free from accumulated cone.

D) Machine Cleaning Duties once per shift (start of shift):

1) Patrol to obtain brush.

2) Brush ends of machine.

3) Brush creel bar.

4) Brush frame beam and stand.[5]

On March 22, 1995, she was diagnosed to be suffering from invasive ductal carcinoma (breast,
left),[6] commonly referred to as cancer of the breast. Consequently, she underwent modified radical
mastectomy on June 9, 1995.[7] The operation incapacitated her from performing heavy work, for which
reason she was forced to go on leave and, eventually, to retire from service at the age of 44.
On November 17, 1995, petitioner applied for employees compensation benefits [8] with the Social
Security System (SSS), but the same was denied on the ground that her illness is not work-related. On
January 22, 1996, she moved for reconsideration contending that her duties as machine operator which
included lifting heavy objects increased the risk of contracting breast cancer. [9] The SSS, however,
reiterated its denial of petitioners claim for benefits under the Employees Compensation Program. Instead,
it approved her application as a sickness benefit claim under the SSS, [10] and classified the same as a
permanent partial disability equivalent to a period of twenty-three (23) months.[11] Thus

Respectfully referred is a letter and copies of EC-Sickness Benefit Claim of subject employee for your
further evaluation and review.

Said claim was not considered as EC, however, sickness and disability benefit claims under SSS were
approved, computer print-out hereto attached.[12]

Petitioner requested the elevation of her case to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC),
which affirmed on June 20, 1996, the decision of the SSS in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296. The ECC ruled
that petitioners disability due to breast cancer is not compensable under the Employees Compensation
Program because said ailment is not included among the occupational diseases under Annex A of the Rules
on Employees Compensation; and it was not established that the risk of contracting said ailment was
increased by the working conditions at Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc.[13] The dispositive portion of the ECCs
decision reads

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant case is
accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42280. On
May 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC, and granted petitioners claim for
compensation benefit under the Workmens Compensation Act (Act No. 3428). [15] It held that petitioners
breast cancer must have intervened before the effectivity of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code on
Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund on January 1, 1975, hence, the governing law on
petitioners claim for compensation benefit is Act No. 3428, which works upon the presumption of
compensability, and not the provisions of the Labor Code on employees compensation. The Court of
Appeals further ruled that since Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. failed to discharge the burden of proving
that petitioners ailment did not arise out of or in the course of employment, the presumption of
compensability prevails, entitling her to compensation. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision (ECC Case No. MS-7838-296) is hereby set aside;
petitioner instead should be entitled to the benefits under Act No. 3428, as amended, together with the
medical-surgical expenses, including doctors bill.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[17] arguing that it is the Labor Code which should be
applied to her case inasmuch as there is no evidence that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred
before January 1, 1975. She claimed that the basis of the computation of her compensation benefits should
be the Labor Code and not the Workmens Compensation Act.
On January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied her motion for reconsideration. [18]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that her disability should be compensated under
the provisions of the Labor Code and not under the Workmens Compensation Act.
The resolution of the instant controversy hinges on the following issues: (1) What is the law applicable
to petitioners claim for disability benefits? and (2) Is she entitled under the applicable law to be
compensated for disability arising from breast carcinoma?
The first law on workmens compensation in the Philippines is Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the
Workmens Compensation Act, which took effect on June 10, 1928. This Act works upon the presumption
of compensability which means that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the course of employment,
it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the provisions of the law. Simply put, the
employee need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or
injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment.[19]
On November 1, 1974, the Workmens Compensation Act was repealed by the Labor Code (Presidential
Decree No. 442). On December 27, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 626 (which took effect on January 1,
1975) was issued. It extensively amended the provisions of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code on
Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund.[20] The law as it now stands requires the claimant to
prove a positive thing that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions.[21]It discarded, among others, the concepts of presumption of
compensability and aggravation and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present
system is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System and
Social Security System under the Employees Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees
right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.[22]
In Sarmiento v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al .,[23] we explained the nature of the new
employees compensation scheme and the State Insurance Fund, as follows

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the
salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No
employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick
worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees Compensation Commission which then
determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not
compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low.
The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employers duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It
does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its
own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or
long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmens compensation. The
Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does
not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits.
The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant
suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of
compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus
one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant,
is now absent. . . .

In workmens compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date when the claimant
contracted the disease. An injury or illness which intervened prior to January 1, 1975, the effectivity date
of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while those
contracted on or after January 1, 1975 shall be governed by the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No.
626.[24] Corollarily, where the claim for compensation benefit was filed after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626
without any showing as to when the disease intervened, the presumption is that the disease was contracted
after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626. [25]
In the case at bar, petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on March 22, 1995. No
evidence, however, was presented as to when she contracted said ailment. Hence, the presumption is that
her illness intervened when P.D. No. 626 was already the governing law.
The instant controversy is not on all fours with the cases where the Court applied the presumption of
compensability and aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act, even though the claim for
compensation benefit was filed after January 1, 1975. In the said cases, the symptoms of breast cancer
manifested before or too close to the cut off date January 1, 1975, that it is logical to presume that the
breast carcinoma of the employee concerned must have intervened prior to January 1, 1975. Thus
(1) In Avendao v. Employees Compensation Commission,[26] the Workmens Compensation Act was
applied to a claim for disability income benefit arising from breast carcinoma, though the said claim was
filed only in 1976, after the effectivity of the Labor Code. Per certification of the physician of the claimant,
her breast cancer was contracted sometime in 1959, although the clinical manifestations thereof started
only in 1969.
(2) In Cayco, et al. v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[27] the deceased employees breast
carcinoma first showed up in 1972 or 6 years before she died on April 26, 1978.We ruled therein that the
presumption on compensability under the Workmens Compensation Act governs since her right accrued
before the Labor Code took effect.
(3) In Ajero v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[28] the claimant was confined and treated
for pulmonary tuberculosis and cancer of the breast from January 5 to 15, 1976.In granting the employees
claim for income benefit, it was held that her ailments, especially pulmonary tuberculosis, must have
supervened several years before, when the Workmens Compensation Act was still in force.
(4) In Mandapat v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al .,[29] we held that since the deceased
underwent radical mastectomy on May 10, 1975, it is obvious that the tumor in her right breast started to
develop even before 1975. We further noted [t]hat the onset of cancer is quiet and gradual, in contrast
[to] many diseases It takes six to twelve months for a breast cancer to grow from a size which can just be
found to the size actually encountered at the time of surgery.
 (5) In Nemaria v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[30] the deceased employee was
confined for cancer of the liver, duodenal cancer, and cancer of the breast, from September 8-25, 1978,
before she succumbed to death October 16, 1978. In the said case, we recognized that cancer is a disease
which is often discovered when it is too late. Hence, we surmised that the possibility that its onset was
even before the effectivity of the New Labor Code cannot be discounted.
(6) In De Leon v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[31] we ruled that the governing law on
the claim for income benefit filed by the mother of the deceased on June 8, 1976 is the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The modified radical mastectomy conducted on the deceased on September 16, 1968
obviously showed that she contracted breast carcinoma before the effectivity of P.D. No. 626.
Clearly therefore, the presumption of compensability and aggravation under the Workmens
Compensation Act cannot be applied to petitioners claim for compensation benefit arising from breast
cancer. We are not experts in this field to rule that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred prior to
January 1, 1975, or almost twenty years ago. Hence, the provisions of the Labor Code govern. For breast
carcinoma and resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence,
either of two things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A
of the Rules on Employees Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting
the disease was increased by the claimants working conditions.[32]
There is no dispute that cancer of the breast is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex A
of the Rules on Employees Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the causal relationship between her illness and her working conditions.
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.[33] In the case at bar, petitioner argued before the SSS and the ECC that her job
as machine operator, which required lifting of heavy objects increased the risk of her contracting breast
carcinoma. In addition, she contended that her job in the winding department exposed her to cancer-
causing dyes used in coloring threads.[34] In support thereof, she cited the following:

Some industrial chemicals create a cancer hazard for people who work with them. Such chemicals include
aniline dyes, arsenic, asbestos, chromium and iron compounds, lead, nickel, vinyl chloride, and certain
products of coal, lignite, oil shale, and petroleum. Unless industrial plants carefully control the use of such
chemicals, excessive amounts may escape or be released into the environment. The chemicals then
create a cancer hazard for people in surrounding areas. (World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, 1992 ed., p.
119)[35]

Regrettably, however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not constitute such
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal
relationship between her illness and her working conditions. Awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations and presumptions. The claimant must prove a positive proposition.[36] A perusal of the records
reveals that there is no evidence that she was indeed exposed to dyes. Even assuming that she was dealing
directly with chemicals, there is no proof that the company where she worked did not implement measures
to control the hazards occasioned by the use of such chemicals.
Indeed, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a persons employment
appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who
works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is
employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller
or a resident of a rural area.[37]
It is not also correct to say that all disability or death resulting from all kinds of cancer are not
compensable. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific
causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer,
certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as
increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.[38] This was
not satisfied in the instant case.
Hence, while we sustain petitioners claim that it is the Labor Code that applies to her case, we are
nonetheless constrained to rule that under the same code, her disability is not compensable. Much as we
commiserate with her, our sympathy cannot justify an award not authorized by law. It is well to remember
that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the
integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered
by law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of
workers and their families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths
occur. This stems from the development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against
the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable
presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not
the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law.[39]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
42280, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Employees Compensation Commission in ECC
Case No. MS-7938-296, dismissing petitioners claim for compensation benefits under the Employees
Compensation Program is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94167 January 21, 1991

MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD., petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) AND CECILIA
SENTINA, respondents.

Victorino Alba for petitioners.

Rodolfo B. Dizon for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:p

The employer is exempted from liability for burial expenses for a seaman who commits suicide. How
about in a case of one who ran amuck or who in a state of intoxication provoked a fight as a result of
which he was killed? Is the employer similarly exempt from liability? This is the issue in this case.

Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI) for
and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a period
of one year. He reported for duty aboard said vessel on July 13, 1987.

On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona Pier, Piraeus,
Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from shore leave visibly drunk. He went to the messhall and took
a fire axe and challenged those eating therein. He was pacified by his shipmates who led him to his
cabin. However, later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to the messhall. He became violent. He
smashed and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating. Ero touched
his head and noticed blood. This infuriated Ero which led to a fight between the two. After the shipmates
broke the fight, Sentina was taken to the hospital where he passed away on January 17, 1988. 1 Ero was
arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus.

On October 26, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for payment of death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid
salaries on board and overtime pay with damages docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 88-10-896. After
submission of the answer and position papers of the parties a decision was rendered by the POEA on July
11, 1989, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to pay complainant
Cecilia S. Sentina the sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00)
representing the deceased's death benefit and burial compensation, the sum of THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS (US$350.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment
 representing unpaid shipboard pay and fixed overtime pay plus ten percent (10%) of the
total judgment award by way of and as attorney's fees.

All other claims are ordered dismissed

SO ORDERED. 2

A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed by petitioners which the respondent First Division of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) disposed of in a resolution dated March 31, 1990
dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision. 3

A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied by said public respondent in a
resolution dated June 29, 1990.

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari wherein the following grounds are invoked:

The Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that "The payment of Death
Compensation Benefit only requires that the seaman dies during the term of the contract,
and no other."

That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that even if the subject
seaman's death resulted from the fight he himself created, such nonetheless does not
constitute a "deliberate or wilfull act on his own life."

That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding, that the death of the late
4/Engr Romulo Sentina is compensable. 4

The petition is impressed with merit.

Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format for Filipino seamen employed in ocean going
vessels states that —

No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death

resulting from a deliberate or willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided
however that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is
directly attributable to the seamen.

The same provision of the standard format also provides —

In case of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay
his beneficiaries the amount of

b. P210,000.00 for other officers including radio operators and master electrician. (Memo
Circular No. 5 effective March 1, 1986)

In interpreting the aforequoted provision in its decision, the POEA held that payment of death
compensation benefits only requires that the seaman should die during the term of the contract and no
other. It further held that the saving provision relied upon by petitioners refers only to suicide where the
seaman deliberately and intentionally took his own life. 5

Public respondent in affirming the said POEA decision made the following disquisition
 It is not difficult for us to understand the intent of the aforequoted "Part II, Section C,
No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format" that to avoid death compensation, two conditions
must be met:

a) the subject death much have resulted "from a deliberate or willful act on his own
life by the seaman;" and

b) such death "directly attributable to the seaman" must have been proven by the
"employer."

Thus, even if arguendo, the appellants may successfully prove that the subject seaman's
death resulted from the fight he himself created, such, nonetheless does not constitute a
"deliberate or willful act on his own life." On this ground alone, the instant appeal would
already fail. 6

The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not automatically give rise to
compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and
the right and obligation of the employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance
with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability
to pay death benefits.

When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own life, and it is directly
attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No doubt a case of suicide is covered by this
provision.

By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck, or committed
an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own defense the
latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the circumstances of the death of the seaman
could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. First he
challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the messhall picked up and broke
a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus provoked, the oiler fought back The death of
seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable.

Even under Article 172 of the Labor Code, the compensation for workers covered by the Employees
Compensation and State Insurance Fund are subject to the limitations on liability.

Art. 172. Limitations of liability. — The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for the
compensation to the employee or his dependents except when the disability or death
was occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful intent to injure or kill himself or
another, notorious negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title.

Private respondent pointed out that petitioner MSSI endorsed the claim for compensation of private
respondents. Said petitioner admits this fact but asserts that it was not favorably acted upon by its
principal, petitioner Skippers Maritime Co., Inc. because of the circumstances that led to the death of
Sentina.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the POEA dated July 11, 1989 and the
resolutions of public respondent dated May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990 affirming the same are hereby
set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73441 September 4, 1987

NAESS SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ZENAIDA R. DUBLIN, respondents.

Rhodora Banaga Javier for respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The decisive issue in this special civil action of certiorari is whether or not the POEA and the NLRC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adjudging that under a
contract of employment of a crewman of an ocean-going vessel providing — as "compensation for, (the
crewman's) loss of life" — for the payment of "CASH BENEFITS" to his "immediate next of kin," said
crew-man's death by suicide is compensable.

On the night of September 3, 1983, while the vessel M/V DYVI PACIFIC was plying the seas enroute from
Santos, Brazil to Port Said, Egypt, Pablo Dublin the vessel's chief steward, fatally stabbed the second
cook, Rodolfo Fernandez, during a quarrel, then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard.
An alarm was immediately raised, and the vessel turned to comb the surrounding area for Dublin. After
some time his floating body was briefly sighted, but it disappeared from view even as preparations to
retrieve it were being made, and was never seen again although the search went on through the night
and was called off only at 6:00 o'clock the next morning. 1

There is no dispute that Dublin had been hired by NAESS Shipping, Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter called
NAESS) to serve aboard the M/V DYVI PACIFIC under an employment contract which incorporated as
part thereof the Special Agreement between the International Workers Federation (ITF) and NAESS
Shipping (Holland) B.V. of Amsterdam, the mother company of NAESS (Philippines). Said Agreement
bound NAESS to pay cash benefits for loss of life the of workers enrolled therein, pursuant to the
following provisions.

Article 8

For the purpose of this Special Agreement the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the ITF-Affiliated Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP-PTGWO) and Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc., dated April 16, 1983 in respect
of all Philippine seafarers has been approved by the ITF,

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph 17-CASH BENEFITS

Compensation for Loss of Life:

i) to immediate next of kin-US$24,844.00

ii) to each dependent child under the age of 18 —

US$7,118.00 2
For the death of Dublin his widow Zenaida, by whom he had one child, Ivy, born January 22, 1971,
collected the amount of P75,000.00 under Clause A of the ITF Collective Bargaining Agreement. 3 She
also filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a complaint against
NAESS 4 for payment of death benefits to US$74,512.00 under both paragraph 17 of the cited Special
Agreement and what she claimed to be the also applicable Singapore Workmens' Compensation
Ordinance. 5

After answer was filed by NAESS denying liability on the ground that Pablo Dublin had taken his own life
and that suicide was not compensable under the Agreement invoked, the parties agreed to submit the
case for decision on the basis of position papers. 6 Thereafter, the POEA rendered judgment for the
complainant, holding Dublin's death compensable under said Special Agreement and ordering NAESS to
pay complainant and her child compensation benefits totalling US$31,962.00 and her attorneys of record
fees amounting to US$3,196.00, the equivalents of said sums in Philippine pesos at prevailing rates of
exchange. 7

NAESS filed a motion for reconsideration. Said motion was referred to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and was treated by the latter as an appeal which it dismissed for lack of merit, with
an express affirmance of the POEA decision. 8 NAESS thereupon came to this Court on a petition for
certiorari charging grave abuse of discretion and/or lack or excess of jurisdiction in both the rendition and
the affirmance of judgment of the POEA and raising the sole issue of ". . . whether death caused by
suicide (jumping overboard) is compensable. 9

NAESS argues the thesis that suicide is not compensable under the employment contract
of Pablo Dublin because said agreement did not constitute it the insurer of Dublin's life,
that to allow the payment of death benefits in the particular circumstances of this case
would amount to paying a price or reward for murder, and that the NLRC incurred in
serious error in finding that there was no conclusive proof that Dublin had intentionally
killed himself .

At first blush these arguments would seem to possess some merit. They fail, however, to stand closer
scrutiny. There is no question that NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face makes it
unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for Dublin's death while in its service, regardless of
whether or not it intended to make itself the insurer, in the legal sense, of Dublin's life. No law or rule
has been cited which would make it illegal for an employer to assume such obligation in favor of his or its
employee in their contract of employment.

The attention of the Court has been invited to the fact that the agreement in question also provides for
payment of disability benefits, 10 but that in contrast to compensation for death the right to such
benefits is conditioned on lack of fault on the part of the employee concerned for the accident causing
disability, thus evincing an intent to treat the two classes of benefits differently. This, it is likewise
suggested, militates against reading into the provision for death benefits conditionalities not explicitly
stated therein; and, indeed, it does, because it is only logical to assume that if it had been intended to
subject NAESS' liability for death benefits to any condition, such as one barring compensation for death
by the employee's own hand, whether intentional or otherwise, the contract would have specifically so
provided, just as it did in incorporating the lack-of-fault proviso in the disability benefits clause referred
to.

... Thus, contract, ... which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be
fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and
leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are
obligatory, no matter what their form may be, whenever the essential requisites for their
validity are present. .... 11
 To start with, a few basic principles on the interpretation of contracts should be
reiterated. When there is no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, its literal
meaning shall control. Article 1372 of the New Civil Code further provides that however
general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree. Therefore, a meaning other than that expressed or an interpretation
which would alter its strict and literal significance should not be given to it. Moreover, the
entirety of the contract must be taken into consideration to ascertain the meaning of its
provisions. 12

In view of what has already been stated, it makes no difference whether Dublin intentionally took his
own life, or he killed himself in a moment of temporary aberration triggered by remorse over the killing of
the second cook, or he accidentally fell overboard while trying to flee from imagined pursuit, which last
possibility cannot be ruled out considering the state of the evidence. It may be noted parenthetically that
these conjectures sound equally plausible because the events surrounding the death of Dublin have not
been established with any degree of certitude. As already observed, this case was submitted to the POEA
for decision on the basis of position papers only. Testimony as to the circumstances of the two deaths on
board the M-V DYVI PACIFIC, though presumably available, was never presented. To be sure, NAESS in
its position paper adverted to certain declarations of crewmen on the matter supposedly " ... culled from
the Official Report of the Master of the vessel ... " but the POEA was furnished only a xerox copy of that
document. 13 Proof of this kind, if it may be called such, which at best is at least twice removed from its
primary source, cannot be accepted as indubitably establishing the context within which Dublins death
should be viewed. The POEA and the NLRC had every reason to declare that there was lack of conclusive
or credible proof that Dublin intentionally took his own life. In any case, this Court is not prepared to rule
that a contract contravenes public policy and is therefore void which, by not specifically excepting suicide
in a clause obligating one of the parties to pay compensation for the death of the other, may in theory
enable the latter's estate, or his heirs, to profit from his self-immolation.

It is also argued that to compel payment of death benefits in this case would amount not only to
rewarding the act of murder or homicide, but also inequitably to placing on NAESS the twin burdens of
compensating both the killer and his victim, who allegedly had also been employed under a contract with
a similar death benefits clause. This argument, in confusing the legal implications and effects of two
distinct and independent agreements, carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation. On Dublin's
part, entitlement to death benefits resulted from his death while serving out his contract of employment;
it was not a consequence of his killing of the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez. If the latter's death is also
compensable, that is due to the solitary fact of his death while covered by a similar contract, not precisely
to the fact that he met death at the hands of Dublin That both deaths may be related by cause and effect
and NAESS is the single obligor liable for compensation in both cases must, insofar as the factual and
legal bases of such liability is concerned, be regarded as purely accidental circumstances. NAESS would
have had no reason whatsoever to introduce into the present dispute the matter of compensation
benefits for Fernandez had Dublin after killing Fernandez, succumbed to a stroke or a heart attack
instead of allegedly taking his own life, because the contract of Fernandez, if the same as that of Dublin
as regards death benefits, would unquestionably cover death by murder or misadventure. There would
still be no reason to do so, that is, relate the killing of Fernandez to the present compensation claim,
merely on the assertion, even if true, that Dublin had committed suicide.

The further claim that payment of death benefits would be premature because, Dublin's body never
having been actually recovered, he can only be considered missing, must be rejected, and not only
because it so openly conflicts with NAESS' insistence that he committed suicide. The Court has no doubt,
from such of the circumstances of the night of September 3, 1983 as to which the parties offer no
dispute, that Dublin in fact met his death at that time. 14
The award of attorney's fees, however, merits reconsideration and must be set aside. It has not been
made to appear that the contract of employment sued upon incorporates any stipulation for payment of
attorney's fees in case of breach thereof and the injured party is compelled to litigate for relief
thereunder. Neither does the record clearly show any circumstances that would justify an award of such
fees in the absence of stipulation. 15

WHEREFORE, modified only to set aside and vacate the award of US$3,196.00 for attorney's fees made
in the decision of the POEA and affirmed in the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
herein complained of, said Resolution is affirmed, with costs against petitioner NAESS.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87590 November 12, 1991

PURIFICACION R. QUIZON, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
and PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petiticner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Petitioner, mother of Rolando R. Quizon, a Technical Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, seeks a reversal
of the Decision 1 of 23 November 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) which
affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying her claim for death
benefits arising out of the death of Rolando due to the absence of conclusive proof that he died of cardio-
pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident.

The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as follows:

Rolando Quizon joined the Philippine Air Force on 30 June 1967. He was assigned to the Southern
Command in Zamboanga City. On 15 December 1981, he was promoted to the rank of Technical
Sergeant and held such position until his demise on 17 July 1986. He had been on continuous active duty
since his enlistment Medical records show that on 15 July 1986 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening,
due to his inability to speak, stand up or walk, Rolando was brought by his fellow soldiers to the Regional
Unified Command General Hospital in Camp Navarro, Zamboanga City. As shown in the Clinical History
prepared by the Medical Officer thereat, Maj. Jose del Rosario, dated 23 July 1986, the following were
the findings made, the medicines given, and the course taken at the ward until Rolando died on 17 July
1986:

This is a case of Tsgt. Rolando R. Quizon who was brought in at this hospital by his
fellow soldiers on 15 July 1986 at 2100H because of inability to talk, walk or stand up
after they allegedly claimed the patient had been drinking the night prior to this
confinement.

On P.E. the patient is semi-unconscious with a blood pressure of 110/70mm Hq EENT,

pupils readed (sic) to light normally, not dilated nor (sic) constricted. Heart is normal
GUT-there is involuntary micturition Reflexes Knee jerk absent. Plantan or Babinoks
reflex is hyperactive in both.

Medicines given or ordered: D5LR, Bemtex-CO2 inhalation and a close observation was
done. An indwelling catheter retained. On 16th July 1986 Pen G. Sodium 3,000,000 "U"
was started of 6 hrs I-V-T.T. ANST. Anaroxyl and Bipyrine in action were also
administered, Constant follow-up of I-V-Fs using Normosol -M Suction of throat and oral
secretion was done. CBC & Urinalysis were ordered.

Course in the Ward: On 17th July 1986 at 0830H the patient developed severe coma with
no urine out put a (sic) anymore. Pupils appears (sic) dilated with a blood pressure of
120/80 mm Hq. At 1420H there was no respiration nor (sic) cardiac sounds whatsoever,
there was complete uremia.
 At 1440H a Cardio pulmonary resuscitation was done with the following findings:

BP/0/0 mm Hq

C R-Absent

Pupils dilated

Nailbeds Cyanotic

Pronounced Death: Cardio

Pulmonary/Arrest secondary to

cerebro-Vascular Accident. 2

As stated in said history, the cause of death is cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular
accident.

Petitioner filed a claim for payment of benefits with the GSIS. 3 At the back of the claim, Maj. del Rosario
wrote in his own hand the clinical history, and on the space for diagnosis, he made the following entry:
Cardio-Pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular (CVA) accident. 4

In a Summary of Finding and Recommendation evaluated and reviewed on 21 October 1986, the Medical
Services Center of the GSIS denied due course to the claim "since there is no conclusive proof that the
claimant died of above illness," and that "there was not ( sic) ecg done to the claimant while he was still
alive. There was no history of hypertension, or any record of treatment or by hospitalization for
hypertension." 5 The "above illness" referred to is cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to CVA.

Petitioner appealed this denial to the ECC. In its decision of 23 November 1988, 6 ECC sustained the
GSIS, holding:

We scrutinized the records of this case and uphold the respondent's denial decision. It is
very clear that appellant was apparently well as the records show that there was no
history that he was treated or hospitalized for hypertension, and no ECG was done to
prove the existence of a heart disease, hypertension or CVA, during his stint as
serviceman of the Philippine Air Force. Without these proofs, this claim cannot be given
due course. The information given by his fellow soldiers that the deceased has (sic) been
drinking alcoholic drinks the night before his confinement, led us to conclude that the
excessive intake of alcohol had aggravated the death of the former soldier. This claim
therefore, does not fall within the purview of P.D. 626, as amended.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and this instant
case is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition for review raising this lone issue:

 WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT(S) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THIS CLAIM DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF P.D. 626, AS
AMENDED. 7

Petitioner argues that respondents' ruling to the effect that there was no substantial proof that Rolando
died of cerebro-vascular accident, an illness included in the List of Occupational Diseases and thus
compensable, is not supported by the records of this case, On the contrary, the Clinical History issued by
the attending government physician of the hospital where Rolando was confined and later died,
categorically stated that the cause of death was cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular
accident.

Petitioner further contends that respondents' conclusion that Rolando's death was aggravated by
excessive intake of alcoholic drinks the night prior to his confinement is not supported by evidence. The
Clinical History prepared by Maj. del Rosario makes no observation that Rolando was indeed drunk. It
does not indicate the percentage of alcohol in the deceased's body to determine whether or not he was
intoxicated. Respondents' only basis for assuming the intoxication of the deceased was the allegation of
his fellow soldiers which was not even reduced into writing and, therefore, should not have been taken
into consideration in the absence of any medical examination that would lead one to conclude that there
was an excessive intake of alcohol.

In Our Resolution of 12 February 1990, We required the respondents to comment on the petition. 8

In the Comment filed on 6 April 1990 for respondent ECC, 9 the Office of the Solicitor General argues
that although it is true that death arising from cerebro-vascular accident is among the occupational
diseases included in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, compensation may
be granted subject to the following conditions:

a. There must be a history, which should be proved, or trauma at work (to the head
specially) due to unusual and extra-ordinary physical or mental strain or event. or undue
exposure to noxious gases in industry.

b. There must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of
the employment and the worker's collapse.

c. If the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage, the injury may
be considered as arising from work. 10

Respondent ECC submits that there is no showing in the records that the foregoing conditions concur in
the instant case, hence the claim for compensation must be denied.

In Our Resolution of 17 April 1991, 11 We ordered the Comment of respondent GSIS expunged from the
records for having been filed out of time notwithstanding the numerous extensions given by this Court,
gave due to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which GSIS
complied with on 7 May 1991 12 and the petitioner on 24 May 1991. Respondent ECC was allowed to
adopt its Comment as its Memorandum. In its Memorandum, the GSIS argues that no reversible error
was committed by respondents since: (1) Petitioner failed to prove casual relation between the death of
the deceased and his work as technical sergeant in the Philippine Air Force. Furthermore, she failed to
show compliance with the conditions for compensability set forth in the Implementing Rules. (2) Payment
of Petitioner's claim is prohibited by Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules on
Employees'Compensation which reads, to wit:
 1. Limitation. — No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his
dependents when the injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of the
following:

(1) his intoxication;

(2) his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; or

(3) his notorious negligence.

(Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondents have adopted new theories to justify their
respective prior actions. When the case was at their level, they denied the claim for reasons other than
that which they now espouse before Us. GSIS disapproves. the claim primarily because "there is no
conclusive proof 'that the claimant died of the above illness — meaning cardiopulmonary arrest secondary
to cerebro-vascular accident. In upholding the GSIS' denial, the ECC ruled, in effect, that for recovery of
claims there should be proof that there was a history that Rolando was treated or hospitalized for
hypertension, and that an ECG was done to prove the existence of a heart disease, hypertension or CVA
during his stint as serviceman of the Philippine Air Force. None was offered. Besides, the "excessive
intake of alcohol," as he had been drinking alcoholic drinks the night before his confinement per
information given by his fellow soldiers, had aggravated his death. Before Us, however, the GSIS pursues
a new tack: denial of the claim because petitioner failed to prove the causal relation between the death
of Rolando and his work as Technical Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force and show the compliance with
the conditions for compensability. Moreover, it is alleged that payment of the claim is prohibited by
Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules aforesaid because of Rolando's intoxication. On the other hand,
ECC demands proof of concurrence of the conditions for compensability of cerebro-vascular accident.

If respondents GSIS and ECC had already in mind these theories at the time they separately acted on the
claim, they should have expressly asserted them instead of treating the claim in a cavalier fashion,
leaving the petitioner at a loss as to why the death of her son, who had served his country for nineteen
(19) years, would be for naught.

Under the law, 13 a compensable sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. Otherwise stated, for sickness and the
resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result
of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. 14

Undoubtedly, cerebro-vascular accident is an occupational disease in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules. In
such a case, proof of causal relation between the disease which resulted in Rolando's death and his work
is not necessary. In Rodriguez vs. ECC, 15 We ruled:

If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex "A" of
the Rules on Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required. . . .

In Abellara vs. Secretary of Labor, 16 We held:

 . . . The new scheme of employees' compensation establishes a state insurance fund
built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees and
applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The open
ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. . . .

It is to be noted, however, that although cerebro-vascular accident is a listed occupational disease, its
compensability requires compliance with all conditions set forth in the Rules, to wit: (a) there must be a
history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specially) due to unusual and
extraordinary physical and mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry, (b)
there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and
the cerebro-vascular attack, and (c) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage.
In short, cerebro-vascular accident is a qualified occupational disease.

Only substantial evidence is required to prove the concurrence of the conditions. This is consistent with
the liberal interpretation accorded the provisions of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in
favor of the workers. 17 For, it is a well-settled rule that in carrying out and interpreting these provisions
of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration, and any doubt as to its proper interpretation and application must be resolved
in favor of the employee whose rights must be protected. 18

The foregoing notwithstanding, where there is no compliance whatsoever with any of the conditions set
forth in the Rules, as in this case, We cannot justify a pronouncement of compensability.

However, it is apparent from the records of the case that the GSIS acted on the claim solely on the basis
of the evaluation of the clinical history prepared by Maj. del Rosario. Petitioner was not given the
opportunity to submit any other evidence or be heard. As earlier stated, the denial was made in a very
cavalier fashion. There was undue haste in denying the claim. Worse, despite an absence of credible
basis, the GSIS and ECC have in effect, although unintentionally, blackened the memory of Rolando by
insinuating that excessive intake of alcohol, or intoxication, as bluntly put by the GSIS in its
Memorandum, caused or aggravated his death. This is a rather unfair attribution which Rolando can no
longer rebut as death has sealed his lips. Petitioner was deprived of due process.

The demands of simple justice, taken in the light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the
1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances, 19 dictate that under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
where it is shown beyond cavil of doubt that Rolando did in fact die of cardiopulmonary arrest secondary
to a cerebro-vascular accident, which is a listed occupational disease, petitioner be allowed to present
evidence to prove the concurrence of the conditions for compensability of the subject disease.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the Resolution of the GSIS denying due
course to the claim of petitioner and the challenged Decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission of 23 November 1988 in ECC Case No. 3365, and REMANDING this case to the Employees'
Compensation Commission for further proceedings, more specifically for the reception of petitioner's
evidence on the basis of which it shall render a decision.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43674

YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CELSO AVELINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First
Instance of Cebu and SPOUSES FELIX C. LIM and CONSTANCIA GEVEIA respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari raises the question of whether the compensation remedy under the
Workmen's Compensation Act [WCA], and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or
injuries sustained by an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies available under the Civil Code.

It appears that on December 22, 1971. Rolando G. Lim, single, a licensed second mate, was on board the
vessel M/S Rajah, owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation, when the same ran ground and
sank near Sabtan Island, Batanes. Rolando perished as a result of that incident.

Claiming that Rolando's untimely death at the age of twenty- five was due to the negligence of petitioner,
his parents, respondents Felix Lim and Consorcia Geveia, sued petitioner in the Court of First Instance on
January 28, 1972 for damages [Civil Case No. R-12861].

In its answer, petitioner-defendant alleged by way of affirmative defenses [1] that the complaint stated
no cause of action; [2] that respondent-plaintiffs had received P4,160 from petitioner and had signed
release papers discharging petitioner from any liability arising from the death of their son, and [3] that
most significantly, the respondents had already been compensated by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission [NCC] for the same incident, for which reason they are now precluded from seeking other
remedies against the same employer under the Civil Code.

A protracted legal battle over procedural points ensued. Finally, on July 30, 1975, the case was set for
pre-trial. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

In his order of December 29, 1975, respondent Judge Avelino upheld respondents' vigorous opposition
and denied petitioner's motion to dismiss for being unmeritorious. Its motion for reconsideration having
met the same fate on February 3, 1976, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, contending that respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he refused to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. This Court subsequently granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting the trial court from
proceeding with the hearing of the case.

At issue is the exclusory provision of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act reiterated in Article
173 of the Labor Code 7

Sec. 5 Exclusive right to compensation. — The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury,
 Art. 173 Exclusive of liability. — Unless other wise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic
Act No. 1161, as amended, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, Republic Act No. 610, as
amended, Republic Act No. 4864, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered
by the System, during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and
conversely.

In the recent case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141,
involving a complaint for damages for the death of five miners in a cave in on June 28, 1967, this Court
was confronted with three divergent opinions on the exclusivity rule as presented by several amici
curiae One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to
recover damages [not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular courts on
the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view, as enunciated in
the Robles case, is that the remedy of an employee for work connected injury or accident is exclusive in
accordance with Section 5 of the WCA. A third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his
heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the
election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In
other words, the employee cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. This latter view was adopted by
the majority, in the Floresca case, reiterating as main authority its earlier decision in Pacaña vs.
CebuAutobus Company, L-25382, April 30, 1982, 32 SCRA 442. In so doing, the Court rejected the
doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the Robles case.
'Three justices dissented.

It is readily apparent from the succession of cases dealing with the matter at issue * that this Court has
vacillated from one school of thought to the other. Even now, the concepts pertaining thereto have
remained fluid. But unless and until the Floresca ruling is modified or superseded, and We are not so
inclined, it is deemed to be the controlling jurisprudence vice the Robles case.

As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present
action to recover additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent
Consorcia Geveia admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had
received the compensation payable to them under the WCA [Rollo, pp. 22-23, 29-30]. It is therefore clear
that respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the
very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a
first election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second
option. "Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, [he] is precluded from pursuing the alternate
course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission." [See Separate Opinion
by Justice Teehankee in Robles vs. Yap Wing, supra on pp. 281-282].

In the light of this Court's recent pronouncement in the Floresca case, respondent Judge Avelino's denial
order of petitioner's motion to dismiss is adjudged to be improper.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Avelino's orders dated December 29, 1975 and February 3, 1976 are
reversed and set aside, Civil Case No. 12861, entitled "The Spouses Felix C. Lim, and Consorcia Geveia
vs. Ysmael Maritime Corp." is hereby ordered dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on May 5, 1978 enjoining respondent Judge Avelino from conducting further proceedings in said
case is made permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85024 January 23, 1991

DOMINGO VICENTE, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

Olandesca Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Central to this petition for certiorari which assails the decision 1 dated August 24, 1988 of the Employees'
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 3764, affirming the decision of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), is the question on whether the petitioner suffers from permanent total
disability as he claims, or from permanent partial disability as held by the respondent Commission.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

The petitioner, Domingo Vicente, was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the Veterans
Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City. On August 5, 1981, at the age of forty-five, and after having
rendered more than twenty-five years of government service, he applied for optional retirement (effective
August 16, 1981) under the provisions of Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 1616, giving as reason
therefor his inability to continue working as a result of his physical disability. 2 The petitioner likewise filed
with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for "income benefits claim for
payment" under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended. Both applications were accompanied by
the necessary supporting papers, among them being a "Physician's Certification" issued by the
petitioner's attending doctor at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center, Dr. Avelino A. Lopez, M.D.,
F.P.C.S., ** F.I.C.S. *** (Section Chief, General, Thoracic & Peripheral Surgery, Surgical Department,
Veterans Medical Center, Hilaga Avenue, Quezon City), who had diagnosed the petitioner as suffering
from:

Osteoarthritis, multiple;
Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease;
Cardiomegaly; and
Left Ventricular Hypertrophy;

and classified him as being under "permanent total disability." 3

The petitioner's application for income benefits claim payment was granted but only for permanent partial
disability (PPD) compensation or for a period of nineteen months starting from August 16, 1981 up to
March 1983. 4

On March 14, 1983, the petitioner requested the General Manager of the GSIS to reconsider the award
given him and prayed that the same be extended beyond nineteen months invoking the findings of his
attending physician, as indicated in the latter's Certification. 5 As a consequence of his motion for
reconsideration, and on the basis of the "Summary of Findings and Recommendation" 6 of the Medical
Services Center of the GSIS, the petitioner was granted the equivalent of an additional four (4) months
benefits. 7 Still unsatisfied, the petitioner again sent a letter to the GSIS Disability Compensation
Department Manager on November 6, 1986, insisting that he (petitioner) should be compensated no less
than for "permanent total disability." On June 30, 1987, the said manager informed the petitioner that his
request had been denied. Undaunted, the petitioner sought reconsideration and as a result of which, on
September 10, 1987, his case was elevated to the respondent Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC). Later, or on October 1, 1987, the petitioner notified the respondent Commission that he was
confined at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center for "CVA probably thrombosis of the left middle
cerebral artery." 8

There was nothing he could do but wait and hope.

Finally, on August 24, 1988, the respondent rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the GSIS
Employees' Disability Compensation and dismissed the petitioner's appeal.

Hence this recourse.

Before us, the petitioner maintains that his disability is "permanent total" and not "permanent partial" as
classified by the respondent Commission. In support of his position, the petitioner points to the clinical
evaluation and certification earlier adverted to issued by his attending physicians at the Veterans
Memorial Medical Center. He likewise contends that contrary to the respondent's ruling, his subsequent
confinement in the hospital from August 31, 1987 to September 6, 1987, when he was found suffering
from "CVA probably thrombosis," was a direct result of his other ailments as previously diagnosed (before
his retirement) by his attending physician and the Personnel Physician of the Center, Dr. Salud C.
Palattao.

On the other hand, the respondent Commission argues that the petitioner only suffers from "permanent
partial disability" and not from "permanent total disability." The findings of the petitioner's attending
physician is not binding on the GSIS, nor on the Commission, as the proper evaluation of an employee's
degree of disability exclusively belongs to the GSIS medical experts who have specialized on the subject.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Employee's disability under the Labor Code is classified into three distinct categories: (a) temporary total
disability; 9 (b) permanent total disability; 10 and (c) permanent partial disability. 11 Likewise, in Section 2,
Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, it is provided that:

Sec. 2. Disability—(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the
employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120
days, except as otherwise provided in Rule X of these Rules.

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is
unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as
otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

(c) A disability is partial permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a
permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body.

Here, there is no question that the petitioner is not under "temporary total disability" as defined by law.
The respondent Commission's decision classifying the petitioner's disability as "permanent partial" attests,
albeit indirectly, to this fact. Our focus therefore, as stated earlier, is only in resolving out whether the
petitioner suffers from "permanent total disability" as he claims, or from "permanent partial disability" as
the respondent Commission would have us believe.
On the subject of "permanent total disability," the Court has stated, on several occasions, that:

Other authoritative comments on the coverage of the term "permanent total disability" as used in
the Workmen's Compensation Act, are (a) Comments and Annotations on the Workmen's
Compensation Act by Severo M. Pucan and Cornelio R. Besinga, that "total disability does not
mean a state of absolute helplessness, but means disablement of the employee to earn wages in
the same kind of work, or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for, or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do;" (b)
Philippine Labor and Social Legislation by Justice Ruperto Martin, that "permanent total disability
means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar
nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any other kind of work which a
person of his mentality and attainment could do . . .;" and (c) Labor Standards and Welfare
Legislation by Perfecto Fernandez and Camilo Quiason that "permanent total disability means an
incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. This status does not
require a condition of complete helplessness. Nor is it affected by the performance of occasional
odd jobs" (cited in Marcelino vs. Seven-up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 47 SCRA 343). 12

It may therefore be inferred from the Court's pronouncements that while "permanent total disability"
invariably results in an employee's loss of work or inability to perform his usual work, "permanent partial
disability," on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part
of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or
not an employee suffers from "permanent total disability" is a showing of the capacity of the employee to
continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury
or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days
and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability
(which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said
employee undoubtedly suffers from "permanent total disability" regardless of whether or not he loses the
use of any part of his body.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's permanent total disability is established beyond doubt by several
factors and circumstances.1âwphi1 Noteworthy is the fact that from all available indications, it appears
that the petitioner's application for optional retirement on the basis of his ailments had been approved.
The decision of the respondent Commission even admits that the petitioner "retired from government
service at the age of 45." 13 Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and
still entitled, under good behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement
application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment. 14 For optional retirement is
allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to render sound
and efficient service. 15

Further, the appropriate physicians of the petitioner's employer, the Veterans Memorial Medical Center,
categorically certified that the petitioner was classified under permanent total disability. On this score,
"the doctor's certification as to the nature of the claimant's disability may be given credence as he
normally would not make a false certification." 16 And, "[N]o physician in his right mind and who is aware
of the far-reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a
government agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests
and protection." 17

The fact that the petitioner was granted benefits amounting to the equivalent of twenty-three months
shows that the petitioner was unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period
exceeding 120 days. This kind of disability is precisely covered by Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensability which we again quote, to wit:
 Sec. 2. Disability—(a) . . .

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is
unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as
otherwise provided for in Rule X of those Rules.

xxx xxx xxx

There being no showing, as we mentioned earlier, that the petitioner's disability is "temporary total" as
defined by the law, the inescapable conclusion is that he suffers from permanent total disability.

The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government
workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose patience, industry, and dedication to duty have often
gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed
tasks. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and
the law, by its own terms, 18 requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise for
this reason that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingman's struggle for his just dues.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and
another one is hereby ENTERED declaring the petitioner to be suffering from permanent total disability.
Respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is accordingly ORDERED to award the petitioner the
benefits corresponding to his permanent total disability.

SO ORDERED.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ROSA BALAIS, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision[1] rendered by the
Court of Appeals dated October 17, 1994 which reversed the decision issued by the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 6462 dated November 17, 1993, affirming the decision
of petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) that private respondent Rosa Balais is not
entitled to conversion of compensation benefits from partial disability for a 9-month period after retirement
to total disability.
Private respondent started working as an emergency employee of the National Housing Authority
(NHA) in 1952. She then rose from the ranks until she was promoted to Chief Paying Cashier in 1984. [2]
Medical records disclose that on December 17, 1989, private respondent suddenly experienced chills,
followed by loss of consciousness. She was brought to the Capitol Medical Center where she was sedated
but allowed to go home after three hours. Later, on the same day, however, she vomited several times
and suffered from parie-occipital pains. She was again rushed to U.E.R.M. Medical Center where she
underwent a thorough medical examination. She was diagnosed to be suffering from Subarachnoid
Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm. After undergoing craniotomy, she was finally discharged
from the hospital on January 20, 1990.[3]
Despite her operation, private respondent could not perform her duties as efficiently as she had done
prior to her illness. This forced her to retire early from the government service on March 1, 1990 at the
age of sixty-two (62) years.[4]
On March 13, 1990, private respondent filed a claim for disability benefits with the GSIS for the above-
described ailment. Her illness was evaluated as compensable by the GSIS Medical Evaluation and
Underwriting Group. Accordingly, the GSIS granted her temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for the
period starting from December 17, 1989 to January 31, 1990 and subsequently, permanent partial disability
(PPD) benefits for nine months starting on March 2, 1990.[5]
In a letter dated November 17, 1992, private respondent requested the GSIS for the conversion of the
classification of her disability benefits from permanent partial disability (PPD) to permanent total disability
(PTD).[6]
Such plea, however, was denied by the GSIS in a letter dated December 8, 1992 on the ground that
the GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department which evaluated her claim found no basis to
alter its findings. She was informed that the results of the physical examination conducted on June 5, 1990
did not satisfy the criteria for permanent total disability. Moreover, she was told that the pension granted
to her was the maximum benefit due her under the Rating Schedule established by the ECC. [7]
The denial of her request then prompted private respondent to file on May 4, 1993 a request for
reconsideration of the earlier denial of her application for the conversion of her disability benefits from
permanent partial disability to permanent total disability, explaining that since the time of her operation
she continued to suffer from dizziness, headaches, loss of memory and inability to properly sleep. Moreover,
she contended that there were instances when she felt extremely weak and could not walk without support.
She further stated that she was required to take medication for life.[8]
The GSIS, however, denied reconsideration which denial was later affirmed on appeal by the ECC in
its decision dated November 17, 1993.[9]
 Undaunted, private respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which promulgated
a decision favorable to her on October 17, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this petition for review is granted and the decision of the Employees Compensation
Commission in ECC Case 6462 dated 17 November 1993 should be, as it is hereby REVERSED. [10]

Petitioner GSIS now comes to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the
Court of Appeals erred:

1. In reversing and setting aside the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission which
affirmed the decision of herein petitioner GSIS.

2. In considering the ailment of Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm as

permanent total disability.[11]

The sole issue to be resolved here is whether private respondent is entitled to conversion of her
benefits from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability.
Both petitioner and the Solicitor General argue against private respondents request for the conversion
of her disability benefits on the ground that she had already been awarded the benefits commensurate to
the degree of her physical condition at the time of her retirement. They contend that her ailment
Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm only entitled her to receive benefits for
permanent partial disability and such illness does not satisfy the criteria for permanent total disability.
Furthermore, they aver that private respondents request for conversion cannot be granted because other
than alleging abnormalities and non-improvement of memory she failed to show sufficient medical basis
that would warrant said conversion.
Petitioner also maintains that, although private respondent was awarded permanent partial disability
benefits for nine (9) months commencing on the day of her retirement, it does not automatically follow
that petitioner recognized her disability as permanent and total because the period of 120 days mentioned
in Sec. 2, Rule 7 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is not the determining factor. Petitioner
contends that an injury or illness that goes beyond the said 120 days may still be considered as permanent
partial disability pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 10 of the same rules.
The Court has already dismissed the same arguments before in similar cases. Petitioners insistence
must therefore suffer the same fate in the instant case.
While it is true that the degree of private respondents physical condition at the time of her retirement
was not considered as permanent total disability, yet, it cannot be denied that her condition subsequently
worsened after her head operation and consequent retirement. In fact, she suffered afterwards from some
ailments like headaches, dizziness, weakness, inability to properly sleep, inability to walk without support
and failure to regain her memory. All these circumstances ineluctably demonstrate the seriousness of her
condition, contrary to the claim of petitioner. More than that, it was also undisputed that private respondent
was made to take her medication for life.
A persons disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of
time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become
permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same
cause.[12]
In the same vein, this Court has ruled that disability should not be understood more on its medical
significance but on the loss of earning capacity.[13] Private respondents persistent illness indeed forced her
to retire early which, in turn, resulted in her unemployment, and loss of earning capacity.
 Judicial precedents likewise show that disability is intimately related to ones earning capacity. It has
been a consistent pronouncement of this Court that permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality and attainment could do. [14] It
does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do substantially all material acts necessary
to prosecution of an occupation for remuneration or profit in substantially customary and usual manner. [15]
The Court has construed permanent total disability as the lack of ability to follow continuously some
substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to
life.[16] It is, therefore, clear from established jurisprudence that the loss of ones earning capacity
determines the disability compensation one is entitled to.
It is also important to note that private respondent was constrained to retire at the age of 62 years
because of her impaired physical condition. This, again, is another indication that her disability is permanent
and total. As held by this Court, the fact of an employees disability is placed beyond question with the
approval of the employees optional retirement, for such is authorized only when the employee is `physically
incapable to render sound and efficient service x x x.[17]
In the case at bar, the denial of the claim for permanent total disability benefit of private respondent
who, for 38 long years during her prime had rendered her best service with an unblemished record and
who was compelled to retire on account of her worsening condition, would indeed subvert the salutary
intentions of the law in favor of the worker. The Court, therefore, affirms the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals decreeing conversion of private respondents disability from permanent partial disability to
permanent total disability.
One final note. The GSIS and ECC should be commended for their vigilance against unjustified claims
that will deplete the funds intended to be disbursed for the benefit only of deserving disabled
employees. Nevertheless, we should caution them against a too strict interpretation of the rules lest it result
in the withholding of full assistance from those whose capabilities have been diminished, if not completely
impaired, as a consequence of their dedicated service in the government. A humanitarian impulse, dictated
by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic
approach to the legitimate appeals of disabled public servants like the herein private respondent.
Compassion for them is not a doleout but a right.[18]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 17, 1994 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88573 June 25, 1990

CONSORCIA F. MANUZON, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
(Mindanao State University MSU, Marawi City), respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Both parties argue that the only issue in this case is whether or not an employee who has been declared
or acknowledged by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as permanently and totally
disabled, who was forced to retire from the service and who died four and a half (4-½) years later, this
time of a different but related ailment, is entitled to death benefits under Article 194(b) of Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended.

In a letter dated March 20, 1988, petitioner requested the GSIS for a continued pension considering that
her husband died of a lingering illness which was found to be work connected by the GSIS and that her
husband became paralyzed while in service. Her husband was granted monthly pension, but it stopped in
1985. She was granted additional pension up to January of 1988 only. 1

The GSIS denied petitioner's request in the letter dated June 10, 1988, as follows:

Madam:

This has further reference to your request for continuance of your monthly pension
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, which ended on January 21, 1988.

In this connection, please be informed that no additional benefit could be paid to you in
view of the fact that your husband's death due to Myocardial Infraction was evaluated
not compensable having occurred 4-½ years after his retirement from the service. What
was paid to you up to January 21, 1988, seven months after his death on June 17, 1987
is the balance of the five years guaranteed period (January 21, 1983 to January 21,
1988).

Please be guided accordingly.

Very truly yours,

SGD. FELICISIMO M. FERNANDEZ

Manager 2

The case was appealed (ECC Case No. 4630) to the Employees' Compensation Commission. In a decision
dated April 12, 1989, approved unanimously in a meeting held on April 12, 1989 under Resolution No.
89-04-0130 and certified correct by Executive Director Jorge B. Contreras, 3 the Commission affirmed the
decision of the GSIS and dismissed the case.

The antecedents of the case alleged by petitioner and not disputed by public respondents are as follows:
Petitioner's late husband started his government service as a national language
researcher in December 1957 at the Institute of National Language. Later he transferred
to the Mindanao State University in Marawi City as an instructor in June 1974. He rose to
become assistant professor and he was holding this position when in October 1982
disaster struck. He was hospitalized at the Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for
hemiparesis (R). His attending physician, Dr. Levi H. Pagunzan described the patient's
complaint, thus:

Chief Complaints — Hemiparesis (R)

— The present condition started a few hours prior to

admission when he was found just lying in bed in his
room, unable to move his (R) side, urinary incontinance
and spasm of (R) upper and lower extremities. No
medication was given and admission was rough.

The diagnosis of the doctor was cardio-vascular accident — hemorrhage. Subsequently,

Mr. Manuzon underwent rehabilitation at the National Orthopedic Hospital. His physician
Dr. Sylvia Velasco diagnosed his illness as "Hemiparesis (L) Post CVA thrombosis."

Because of his illness, Mr. Manuzon retired from the service effective January 22, 1983.
For this ailment, hemiparesis, post cardio vascular attack, the System recommended Mr.
Manuzon for temporary total disability benefit from January 22, 1983, up to February 24,
1983 and permanent total disability benefit from Feb. 25, 1983 up to December 1983.
Subsequently, the System recommended that his PTD benefits be continued to January
198(4). This was subsequently extended to January 1985. On June 17, 1987, Mr.
Manuzon died of acute myocardial infraction.

Mrs. Manuzon, herein petitioner filed an Income benefits Claim for Payment in behalf of
herself and her 4 minor children for the death of her husband. The System on July 3,
1987 recommended payment of additional permanent total disability benefits from
February 1985 up to the end of the guaranteed period. However, the death claim was
disapproved by the System on the ground that the contingency occurred after retirement
where there is no longer an employer-employee relationship.

On appeal with the Employees Compensation Commission, respondent ECC affirmed the
adverse decision of the GSIS for the following reasons:

"... For a cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction, to be

compensable under the Employees Compensation rules, any of the
following conditions must be satisfied:

1. If the heart disease was known to have been present during

employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly
precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work.

2. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of

sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty-four hours by the
clinical signs of a cordial injury to constitute causal relationship.

3. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting

himself to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury
 during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs
persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.

None of these conditions had been satisfied in the instant case, obviously
because the (death) occurred more than four years after his retirement
from the service. Further, the myocardial infraction which caused his
death, is a different illness and cannot be considered a complication of
the cardio vascular attack for which the deceased had been properly and
fully compensated with Permanent Total Disability up to the guaranteed
period. 4

Petitioner now claims that a proper interpretation of Article 194(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626 will
entitle her dead husband to death benefits in favor of primary beneficiaries.

The petition is meritorious.

Article 194(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, provides:

b. Under such-regulations as the Commission may approve, the System shall pay to the
primary beneficiaries upon the death of a covered employee who is under permanent
total disability under this title, eighty percent of the monthly income benefit and his
dependents to the dependents' pension: Provided, that the marriage must have been
validly subsisting at the time of disability: ... Provided, finally, that the minimum death
benefit shall not be less than fifteen thousand pesos.

We agree with the interpretation of the Solicitor General that generally speaking, the term "covered
employee" refers to an employee who at the time of his death is still an employee covered by the GSIS. 5

At the same time, we cannot ignore the implementing Rules and Regulations of the Employees
Compensation Commission that to be entitled to death benefits, the employee need not be an actual
employee of the public or private sector at the time of his death; he can be a retired employee whose
retirement was brought about by permanent disability.

The rules are as follows:

Sec. 3(a), Rule XIII. "... If the employee has been receiving income benefits for
permanent total disability at the time of his death, the primary beneficiaries shall be paid
the monthly income benefit equivalent to eighty percent plus the dependent's pension
equivalent to 10 per cent thereof for every dependent child but not exceeding five
counted from the youngest and without substitution."

Sec. 3(b), Rule XIII. "... If the employee has been receiving monthly income benefit for
permanent total disability at the time of death, the secondary beneficiaries shall be paid
the monthly pension excluding the dependent's pension of the remaining balance of the
five year guaranteed period."

We agree that a permanent and totally disabled employee who is receiving pension cannot work. He was
compelled to retire from the service because of disability that was work-oriented. Permanent total
disability means an incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. The covered
employee referred to in Section 194(b) Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, includes an employee
who has retired from work because of permanent and total disability and who subsequently dies.
Article 194(b) applies to a retired person as contemplated in Art. 194(d) which allows for funeral benefits
upon the death of a covered employee or permanently totally disabled pensioner.

We interpret this social legislation in favor of the employee. Any doubt as to its proper interpretation
must be resolved in favor of the employee whose rights must be protected.

In this case, the Employees Compensation Commission denied petitioner's claim because the cause of
death, myocardial infraction, came four and one half years after his retirement caused by work-oriented
paralysis arising from cerebrovascular attack. The reasoning of both public respondents is that his death
was not caused by a work-oriented cause.

We believe otherwise. The evidence clearly shows that during his employment, the deceased suffered
from a stroke, a cardio vascular accident. It was caused by "thrombosis," or blockage of arteries. He had
to retire because of paralysis caused by that cardio vascular attack when he was an assistant professor.
He died after his compulsory retirement due to total disability, caused by cardio vascular attack or
myocardial infraction. Stated otherwise, the cause of his compulsory retirement due to paralysis arising
from cardio vascular accident is closely related to the cause of his death, which was also a cardio vascular
attack or myocardial infraction. That heart disease developed when he was still working as a professor. It
caused his paralysis and his total permanent disability. The disease was work-oriented because of the
nature of his employment as a professor. The same disease eventually caused his death, contrary to the
conclusion of both the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission. The Court holds that the
heirs of Mr. Manuzon are entitled to the benefits they are claiming.

This Court is aware that death benefits must be granted to the primary beneficiaries of the decedent to
help the family of a permanent and totally disabled person who was so disabled because of causes that
are work-oriented. The rule applies all the more when that disabled person later dies because of the
same cause or related cause.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees
Compensation Commission in E.C.C. Case No. 4630 are REVERSED, and a new one is rendered declaring
and directing that death benefits be granted to petitioner, including dependent's pension for children who
were minors at the time of their father's death in 1987, until they reach the age of 21 pursuant to Article
194(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, funeral benefits in the amount of P3,000.00 pursuant
to Article 194(cc) of the same law, and all other benefits to which petitioner and her children are entitled
under the said decree.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM), petitioner, vs.
EDMUND SANICO, respondent.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Through this petition for review, the Employees Compensation Commission seeks to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 47804, dated 28 May 1998, reversing petitioners
decision, dated 20 March 1997, in ECC Case No. 8342 and granting Edmund Sanicos (private respondents)
claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (Book IV, Title II of the
Labor Code).
Private respondent was a former employee of John Gotamco and Sons. He worked in said company
as wood filer from 1986 until he was separated from employment on 31 December 1991 due to his
illness. His medical evaluation report, dated 31 September 1991, showed that he was suffering from
pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB). Subsequent chest x-rays taken on 9 October 1994 and 3 May 1995
diagnostically confirmed his illness.
On 9 November 1994, private respondent filed with the Social Security System (SSS) a claim for
compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended. On 23 April 1996, the SSS denied private
respondents claim on the ground of prescription. The SSS ruled that under Article 201 of the Labor Code,
a claim for compensation shall be given due course only when the same is filed with the System three (3)
years for the time the cause of action accrued. In private respondents case, the SSS reckoned the three-
year prescriptive period on 21 September 1991 when his PTB first became manifest. When he filed his
claim on 9 November 1994, the claim had allegedly already prescribed.
On appeal, petitioner affirmed the decision of the SSS. Private respondent then elevated the case to
the CA, which reversed petitioners decision and granted private respondents claim for compensation
benefits. In ruling that private respondents claim was filed well within the prescriptive period under the
law, the CA reconciled Article 201 of the Labor Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code. Under the latter
provision of law, an action upon an obligation created by law must be filed within ten (10) years from the
time the cause of action accrues. Thus, while private respondents illness became manifest in September
1991, the filing of his compensation claim on 9 November 1994 was within, even long before, the
prescriptive period.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondents claim for compensation
benefit had already prescribed when he filed his claim on 9 November 1994.
We rule in favor of private respondent.
This Court has consistently ruled that disability should not be understood more on its medical
significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do.It
does not mean absolute helplessness.[1] This Court has also held that:

In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to
work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity.[2]

Petitioner thus seriously erred when it affirmed the decision of the SSS denying private respondents
claim on the ground of prescription. In determining whether or not private respondents claim was filed
within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 201 of the Labor Code, petitioner and the SSS
reckoned the accrual of private respondents cause of action on 31 September 1991, when his PTB became
known. This is erroneous.
 Following the foregoing rulings, the prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should be
reckoned from the time the employee lost his earning capacity, i.e., terminated from employment, due to
his illness and not when the same first became manifest. Indeed, a persons disability might not emerge at
one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. [3] In this case, private respondents
employment was terminated on 31 December 1991 due to his illness, he filed his claim for compensation
benefits on 9 November 1994. Accordingly, private respondents claim was filed within the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 201 of the Labor Code.
In this light, the Court finds no need at this time to rule on the seeming conflict between the
prescriptive period for filing claims for compensation benefits under Article 201 of the Labor Code and
Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code.
In conclusion, the Court takes this opportunity to once again remind petitioner that P.D. No. 626, as
amended, is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working
class against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of income. Thus:

As an official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the
Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the
incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law
as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should
be resolved in favor of labor.[4]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42808 January 31, 1989

ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, petitioner,

vs.
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Bureau of Public Highways), respondents.

Dante Q. Barbosa for petitioner.

Jose A. Oliveros for respondent Provincial Engineer of Batangas.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

The petitioner asks the Court to review and set aside the decision dated 31 December 1975 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC) R04-WC Case No. 163691, entitled Rosario Vda. de
Suanes, claimant versus Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways), respondent.

Artemio A. Suanes was a government employee for most of his life. From 1933 to 1945, he served as
market collector of the Municipal Government of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. He served as a
Municipal Councilor in Rosario, Batangas from 1956 to 1959. From 2 January 1964 until 30 June 1970,
Artemio was a construction capataz of the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH), Batangas Provincial Office.
His Service Record 1further shows that thereafter, from 1 July 1970 up to the time of his death on 21
June 1973. Artemio Suanes was a construction capataz in the Office of the Provincial Engineer, Batangas
Province. The certificate of death issued by Dr. Salvacion Altamira of the Magsino General Hospital in Lipa
City, Batangas, attributed Artemio's demise to 'Cardio-respiratory Arrest due to Cerebrovascular
Accident'. 2

On 5 March 1975, petitioner, as surviving spouse of Artemio Suanes, filed with Regional Office No. IV of
the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU), Department of Labor, a claim for compensation under the
applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended). In this claim, the
decedent's illness was described as "Internal Hemorrhage due to Hypertension. 3 Petitioner's claim was
referred by the WCU to the BPH which, however, controverted the claim of petitioner. In a letter dated
26 June 1975, BPH asserted that there was "[l]ack of causative relation of the illness alleged in
[petitioner's] claim with the nature of the decedent's employment" and that petitioner had failed to
comply with the requirements of Section 24, Act No. 3428, as amended, regarding the giving of notice
and subsequent filing of claim.

BPH, further, asked the WCU Regional Officeto dismiss petitioner's claim upon the ground that claim had
been filed against the wrong party, Artemio's employer at the time of his death being the Provincial
Engineer's Office of the Provincial Government of Batangas, rather than the BPH.

In an Order dated 29 August 1975, the Referee of the WCU dismissed petitioner's claim "for lack of
interest, claimant having failed to appear for the scheduled hearing despite notice. 4 Petitioner
moved, 5 on 24 September 1975, to set aside the order of dismissal, denying that she had lost interest in
the prosecution of her claim and asserting that she had left her old address at No. 73-J Panay Ave.,
Quezon City having moved to a new address at 2829 Felix Huertas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and that she
had left her new forwarding address at her old residence but that apparently no one had received the
WCU notice of hearing or that no one at the old address had informed the process server of the
claimant's new address.

The respondent Commission denied petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal upon the
ground that that Motion had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits setting forth the facts
constituting fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence as required under the Rules of the
Commission. 6

Hence, the present Petition, which was filed on 15 March 1976.

Petitioner claims that respondent Commission erred in denying her Motion to Set Aside the Order of
Dismissal, since there was no law which required an affidavit of merits to be attached to her Motion, and
that she had a valid claim for death benefits considering that at the time of her husband's death, he was
a permanent employee of the BPH and considering further that the compensable nature of his death had
not been effectively controverted by the BPH. The BPH upon the other hand, took the position that an
affidavit of merits was an indispensable requirement for setting aside the order of dismissal and that, in
any case, there was no employer-employee relationship between Artemio Suanes and the BPH at the
time of the former's death since he was then employed by the office of the Provincial Engineer of
Batangas Province.

Nine years later, on 29 February 1985, this Court issued a Resolution which, after reciting very briefly the
facts described above, went on to state that:

A perusal of the copies of the Statement of Service Record in the government of the late
Artemio A. Suanes and of the Information for Membership Insurance in the Government
Service Insurance System shows that said Artemio A. Suanes was employed as
construction capataz of the Provincial Engineer's Office of Batangas and not an employee
of respondent Bureau of Public Highways, particularly the Office of the Highways District
Engineer in Batangas.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to consider the Provincial Engineer of Batangas as

IMPLEADED party respondent, to direct the Clerk of Court to FURNISH him with a copy of
the Petition for Review and to REQUIRE him to file a comment thereon within ten (10)
days from receipt. ... (Emphasis supplied)

We consider first the procedural issue of whether or not petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of
Dismissal issued by the WCC Referee was properly denied simply upon the ground that it had not been
accompanied by an affidavit of merits.

We believe that this issue has to be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Section 3 of Rule 22 of the Rules
of the respondent Commission provides as follows:

Sec. 3. Time for Filing Petition; Contents and Verification. — The petition under Section I
hereof must be verified, filed within thirty (30) days after the petitioner learns-of the
decision, award, or order or other proceedings sought to be set aside and not more than
three (3) months after such decision or award was entered or such proceedings were
taken, and must be accompanied with (sic) affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake' or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no dispute that petitioner did not attach an affidavit of merits to her Motion to Set Aside the
Order of Dismissal. It scarcely needs to be pointed out, however, that the basic purpose of such a
requirement was to enable the Commission to evaluate the merits of the Motion or Petition to set aside
the dismissal order. Petitioner did clearly allege in her Motion the grounds she relied upon for setting
aside the order dismissing her claim for failure to attend the scheduled hearing: (a) she had failed to
attend the scheduled hearing because the notice of said hearing was sent to her old address and not to
her new forwarding address and hence was not received by her; and (b) her husband was a permanent
employee of the BPH whose death was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. To our
mind, the allegations in petitioner's Motion constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of
Section 3 of Rule 22 of the Commission's Rules. That petitioner's Motion was not a sworn motion is not a
fatal defect in the circumstances of this case. There is no suggestion in the record that petitioner had not
in fact changed her address or that she had not left her forwarding address at her old residence. If the
Commission felt that an affidavit of merit was absolutely indispensable to enable it to resolve petitioner's
Motion, then the Commission should have required petitioner to supplement her Motion with an affidavit
of merit or to simply verify her Motion, instead of dismissing that Motion out of hand. We believe that
there is here an appropriate occasion for invoking the principle that rules should not be so interpreted as
to "sacrifice substantial rights in the sophisticated altar of technicalities with [consequent] impairment of
[the] sacred principle of justice, 7 a principle which is embodied in the Rules of the Commission itself.
Section 1 of Rule 10 of the Commission provides as follows:

Rule 10. — General Rule to Govern Proceedings

Section 1. The hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy in

workmen's compensation cases shall be without regard to technicalities, legal forms and
technical rules on evidence. Substantial evidence shall be sufficient to support a decision,
order or award.

The next issue to be resolved relates to the legal consequences if any, of the fact that petitioner's claim
had been originally filed against "the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways)' and not
against the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province, the employer of Artemio Suanes at the
time of his death.

Once more, we believe that this issue should be resolved in favor of petitioner, in line with the principle
which enjoins a liberal rather than a technical view of pleading and procedure in Workmen's
Compensation cases. It is true that the petitioner's original claim (on a mimeographed form of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission) named the BPH as the decedent's employer. However, in her
Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal, petitioner designated the Republic of the Philippines. as the
respondent, while parenthetically referring to the Bureau of Public Highways, as part of the caption which
the Commission itself had adopted in R04-WC Case No. 163691. It is appropriate to recall that the
"Republic of the Philippines" or "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" is a comprehensive term
which has been defined in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, in the following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines' is a term which refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the function of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the
various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the central Government or the provincial or municipal branches or
other form of local government.

xxx xxx xxx

 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the BPH, which is an instrumentality of the Central or National Government and the Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Batangas, and office under the supervision of the Chief Executive Officer (the
Governor) of the Province of Batangas, are both governmental offices and both are embraced in the term
Republic of the Philippines,' for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The funds of the BPH and
the fund of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas, are equally government funds.

It must be recalled that the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act are extended not only to
employees in the private sector but also to all officials and employees of both the national government
and of provincial, municipal and other local governments. Section 3 of Act No. 3812, as amended,
provides:

Section 3. Applicable to Government. This Act shall also be applicable to all officials,
employees and laborers in the service of the National Government and its political
subdivisions and instrumentalities: Provided, however, that officials, laborers and
employees insured with the Government Service Insurance System, and their dependents
when entitled to the benefits of the said insurance system shall, in addition to the same,
be entitled to the benefits granted by this Act.' (Italics supplied)

The BPH was quite aware of the fact that Artemio Suanes, previously an employee of the BPH, was, just
before his death, an employee of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province. The BPH
conveyed this fact to the respondent Commission, when it (BPH) notified the Commission through the
Office of the Solicitor General of the filing of the claim against the BPH. In a "third indorsement, August
6, 1975' to the WCU, the BPH said:

Respectfully returned thru the Honorable Solicitor General, Department of Justice,

Manila, to the Chief, Workmen's Compensation Section, Department of Labor, Regional
Office No. IV, Manila, the within papers relative to the claim for compensation in R04-WC
Cass No. 16391, filed by Mrs. ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, widow of ARTEMIO SUANES,
alleged to be a former Construction Capataz under the Office of the Highway District
Engineer, Batangas City, inviting attention to the 2nd indorsement dated July 25, 1975 of
the District Engineer of Batangas City informing that the decedent was an employee of
the Batangas Provincial Engineer's Office at the time of his death.

It is informed that officials and employees of the Provincial Engineer's Office are not
under the administrative jurisdiction of this Department but under the Executive Head of
the Province to which they are assigned.

In view thereof, it is requested that steps be taken to dismiss the case against the
Republic of the Philippines (BPH) for lack of employee-employer relationship.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Since both the BPH and the WCU are presumed to know the law-in this case, the Workmen's
Compensation statute including Section 3 thereof-one or the other office or the Office of the Solicitor
General, should have notified the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province of the filing of
the claim by petitioner and referred such claim to that office. Instead, the BPH simply asked for the
dismissal of the case against the BPH 'for lack of employee-employer relationship" and, worse, neglected
to inform petitioner of the asserted lack of an employer-employee relationship between the decedent and
the BPH and where the claim should have been filed. In fact, petitioner's claim was denied by the
Referee, as already noted, not on the ground of lack of an employer-employee relationship between the
BPH and Artemio Suanes but rather because of petitioner's failure to attend a scheduled hearing and her
failure to attach to her Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal an affidavit of merits. Both the respondent
Commission and the WCU Referee failed to inform petitioner of her error in designating the specific
employer of her deceased husband, and in effect waited for this Court to issue its Resolution of 29
February 1985 considering the Provincial Engineer of Batangas as having been impleaded as a party
respondent.

In view of the foregoing circumstances and considering particularly that no prejudice was sustained by
the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province by the misdirecting of petitioner's claim, we
hold that the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province may be held liable on petitioner's
claim.

The respondent Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province, in his Comment dated 8 April 1985, asserts
that petitioner's claim against his office has already prescribed. The ordinary rule is that the statutory
right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act prescribes in ten (10) years 8 counted
from the time of accrual of the claim, in this case from the time of the death of Artemio Suanes. Artemio
Suanes died, as noted earlier, on 21 June 1973; the court impleaded the Office of the Provincial Engineer
of Batangas Province on 29 February 1985, i.e., about twelve (12) years later. We do not, however,
believe that petitioner's claim may be so cavalierly defeated, given the circumstances of this case. In the
first place, petitioner's original claim was filed, again as already noted, on 5, March 1975. While this
original claim designated the wrong employer, we believe that, given the insistent demands of substantial
justice in this case, such original claim should be regarded, as we hereby so regard it, as having
effectively tolled the running of the prescriptive period. We note that the petitioner lost no time in filing
her Petition for Review with this Court on 15 March 1976 when her claim was denied by the respondent
Commission on 13 December 1975. This Court was able formally to rectify the erroneous designation of
the respondent BPH only after almost nine (9) years from filing of the Petition for Review. Under the
principle of nunc pro tunc, we do not believe that this failure to act earlier on the part on the Court itself
may be allowed to prejudice the petitioner. The defense of prescription must, therefore, be rejected.

Turning, finally, to the merits of petitioner's claim, there is no dispute about the fact that Artemio's
ailment supervened in the course of his employment either with the BPH or the Office of the Batangas
Provincial Engineer. It is well settled that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 9 petitioner is
accordingly relieved of the burden of proving causation between the illness and the employment in view
of the legal presumption that said illness arose out of the decedent's employment. 10 The burden of
proving non-compensability of the cause of death is shifted to the employer. Respondent Batangas
Provincial Engineer had failed to discharge this burden. Indeed, none of the respondents even attempted
to present any evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability; all of them chose to rely upon the
formal defenses discussed above. But those defenses do not constitute evidence to overthrow the
statutory presumption. In legal effect, no evidence was introduced by the respondents to offset that legal
presumption. The Court, therefore, is left with no alternative but to rule in favor of petitioner's claim. 11

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 31 December 1975 of respondent Workmen's Compensation

Commission is hereby REVERSED. The Petitioner is hereby AWARDED the Pl,500.00 claimed as
reimbursement for the doctors, medical and hospital bills incurred in connection with the decedent's last
illness, in addition to any other applicable death benefits under Act No. 3428, as amended. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-63535 May 27, 1985

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BRIGIDO SAMSON,
represented by wife, NORMA S. SAMSON, respondents.

Gamaliel G. Bongco for petitioner.

Doroteo A. Dadal for private respondent.

ALAMPAY, J.:

The case at bar stems from a claim for disability compensation benefits and hospitalization expenses
under employment contract, filed by private respondent herein, Brigido Samson, against the petitioner
before the National Seaman's Board (NSB).

On April 2, 1981, a decision was rendered on by the Executive Director of the NSB, ordering petitioner
herein to:

1. Pay complainant the sum of US $3,800.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency as

disability compensation benefits; and

2. Pay complainant's counsel Atty. Doroteo A. Dudal, the sum of US $380.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency as attorney's fees.

Payment of these amounts should be coursed thru the National Seamen Board.

Not satisfied with the foregoing judgment, petitioner appealed to the NLRC. During the pendency of said
appeal, petitioner offered P18,000.00 to private respondent. On May 7, 1981, private respondent
received said amount and executed a "Release" document stating therein the following:

RELEASE

I, BRIGIDO SAMSON, do hereby certify to the following facts and circumstances:

1) That I had been employed by the PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING

CORPORATION (PISC) as 2nd Engineer on its vessel the M/V "ASEAN KNOWLEDGE" from
May 31, 1980 to February 12, 1981.

2) That my last day of service on board was on February 12, 1981.

3) That for a just, legal and valid cause, I had been repatriated due to illness after arrival
in Manila on February 12, 1981.

4) That I received all salaries, wages and other compensation due me during the period
of my incapacity.
 5) That I assumed responsibility of paying the services of the Lawyer who represents my
case with the NSB against PISC in claiming for my compensation benefits which
amounted to P18,000.00.

6) That I hereby declare and affirm that I accept the validity and legality of my
separation and express my desire and intention to release the Philippine International
Shipping Corporation (PISC) for any claim that may accrue to my favor whether
contractual, equitable or legal in character in the course of my employment with said
company and whatever right I have against the same in consequence of the termination
of my employment.

SIGNED THIS 7th DAY OF May, 1981 in Quezon City.

(SGD.)
BRIGID
O
SAMSO
N

WITNESS:

______________ (SGD.)

(Annex B, Petition, Rollo 15).

When private respondent executed the aforestated Release document, he was then undergoing Medical
treatment for the injury he sustained while on board petitioner's vessel M/V Asean Knowledge as a
Second Engineer therein.

On December 17, 1981, the appealed decision was affirmed by the NLRC. After the said decision reached
finality, the corresponding writ of execution was issued and served on petitioner. On April 28, 1982, the
Sheriff who served the writ submitted a report to the Board, stating that petitioner had paid P18,000.00
to private respondent herein which the latter accepted and evidenced by a voucher and a "Release"
document dated May 7, 1981; and that because of said payment, the Sheriff had in the meantime
refrained from collecting the balance of the award until the Board shall have passed upon this matter.

On May 19, 1982, the Board issued an Order calling the parties to a hearing, During the scheduled
hearing on June 7, 1982, private respondent maintained that the P18,000.00 was accepted by him only
as partial payment of the award since he badly needed the money for his on-going medical treatment.
Petitioner herein, however, insisted that said amount constituted full payment of the award.

On June 17, 1982, an Order was issued by the Board:

Considering all the foregoing, the Board is of the opinion and so hold that the amount
paid and the circumstances surrounding the payment of P18,000.00 to complainant do
not appear to be full compliance of the decision award rendered by this Board in its
decision dated April 2, 1981, as affirmed on appeal by the NLRC in its decision
promulgated December 17, 1981. At most, the sum of P18,000.00 paid to complainant
would constitute only as partial compliance with the said decision but not a waiver of the
balance including the attorney's fees.
 WHEREFORE, let an amended writ of execution issue as to the balance of the unpaid
decision award and as to the attorney's fees.

Pursuant to the said Order, an amended Writ of Execution was forthwith issued. Petitioner herein
however, filed a motion to quash the amended writ of execution. In a Resolution dated July 26, 1982, the
Board denied the said motion. Petitioner appealed the denial of its motion to herein respondent NLRC. On
December 20, 1982, the NLRC rendered a resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal.

Hence, this instant petition for certiorari, with petitioner attributing to the NLRC the commission of the
following alleged errors, namely.

1. The respondent NLRC erred in not quashing the amended writ of execution despite
the release already executed by private respondent.

2. The respondent NLRC erred in recognizing a clearly illegal decision, because said
decision orders payment in the dollar standard in violation of law.

We find no merit whatsoever in the petition.

The only issue in this case that may be said to approximate and raise a question of law is the submission
of petitioner that the directive in the decision, affirmed by the NLRC, ordering payment of the award
using the dollar standard is in violation of law. We find however this petition taken by petitioner to be
untenable.

While it is true that Republic Act No. 529 makes it unlawful to require payment of domestic obligations in
foreign currency, this particular statute is not applicable to the case at bar. A careful reading of the
decision rendered by the Executive Director of the NSB dated April 2, 1981 and which led to the Writ of
Execution protested to by petitioner, will readily disclose that the award to the private respondent does
not compel payment in dollar currency but in fact expressly allows payment of "its equivalent in Philippine
currency." (Rollo, p. 14)

Moreover, as pointed out by public respondent, without any subsequent controversion interposed by
petitioner, the fixing of the award in dollars was based on the parties employment contract, stipulating
wages and benefits in dollars since private respondent was engaged in an overseas seaman on board
petitioner's foreign vessel. (Comment of respondent NLRC to the Petition, pg. 10, Rollo, 49)

Accordingly, we fail to see any violation of R.A. No. 529.

As to petitioner's principal contention that its payment of P18,000.00 under the document of release
executed by private respondent constitutes full satisfaction of the award, We uphold the ruling of the
public respondent NLRC on this matter and find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent NLRC in rejecting such assertion.

In the case of MRR Yard Crew Union versus Philippine National Railways, 72 SCRA 88 (1976), this Court
held that the fact that the employee "has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in waiver; the law
does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than that the worker is entitled to
recover."

Moreover, from the records it appears that there was a hearing on June 7, 1982 called by the National
Seamen Board precisely to consider and resolve whether the payment of P18,000.00 admittedly made by
petitioner was in full or partial satisfaction of the award for disability compensation benefits due to the
private respondent. The said Board gave credit to the manifestations of private respondent that the latter
was constrained to accept the payment of P18,000.00 and execute the release of document as at that
time he was still undergoing on-going medical treatment for which apparently he needed funds for his
expenses. (Order of June 17, 1982 of the National Seamen Board; Annex C of Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-17).
A decision on a question of fact by an administrative body is entitled to respect. Courts, as a rule, refuse
to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of
administrative functions, absent any showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition or mistake. (Nera vs. Titong, Jr., 56 SCRA 40, 44, citing Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745;
Venancio Lim, Sr., vs. Secretary of Agriculture, 34 SCRA 751). It was also stated in Kapisanan ng
Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes vs. Camara Shoes, 112 SCRA 689, that findings of fact of National Labor
Relations Commission are generally entitled to respect except when there is grave abuse of discretion, a
circumstance which however we do not find attendant in the case at bar.

Aside from the reasons above-stated, we also note that the release document was executed by private
respondent on May 7, 1981 during the pendency of the appeal made to the NLRC by petitioner Philippine
International Shipping Corporation from the decision of the National Seamen Board, dated April 2, 1981.
Despite the execution of said release document, the petitioner herein did not file any motion to dismiss
its appeal or to have said appealed case declared terminated due to the alleged satisfaction of the
judgment. This omission negates an inference that the parties had actually agreed that the payment of
the P18,000.00 would be equivalent to a full satisfaction of the award and/or a waiver of the balance on
the award.

It is also worth noting that the questioned decision of the NLRC dated December 17, 1981, affirming the
decision of the National Seamen Board, does not appear to have been the subject of any challenge or
appeal whatsoever. It was only after the National Seamen Board had issued its order of June 17, 1982
directing petitioner to pay the balance still remaining on its previous decision award and directing the
issuance of an amended writ of execution that petitioner took exception to the decision of the NLRC
which had long become final by alleging that the decision of the National Seamen Board which the NLRC
had affirmed, is in violation of law. Petitioner may not now evade the effects of a final NLRC decision by
assailing the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80918 August 16, 1989

JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPE, petitioner

vs.
PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. and CHUAN HUP AGENCIES, PTE.
LTD., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYEES
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

R. C. Carrera Law Firm for petitioner.

Eladio B. Samson for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Once again this Tribunal is faced with the issue of the validity of the quitclaim executed by the
employee's heir in favor of the employer.

Petitioner is the widow of the late Abelardo Principe who was then the Chief Engineer of M/V OSAM
Falcon, a commercial vessel of Singaporean registry owned by Chuan Hup Agencies, Pte. Ltd. (Chuan
Hup for brevity), one of the private respondents herein, who is the principal of Philippine-Singapore
Transport Services, Inc. (PSTSI), also a private respondent herein. The contract of employment of the
deceased with private respondent Chua Hup provides, among others, that Principe would receive
Singapore $2,800.00 a month to commence on September 7, 1982, medical benefits and insurance
coverage through group hospitalization and surgical insurance and group and personal accident insurance
for a capital sum of US$75,000.00. It also provides that the laws of Singapore shall apply in cases of
disputes arising out of the said appointment and that said disputes are to be resolved by the courts of the
Republic of Singapore. 1

On September 15,1982, while Principe was on duty in Malintoc Field, Palawan, Philippines, he suddenly
contracted a serious illness which eventually resulted to his death. 2

On July 5, 1983, petitioner filed a complaint 3 against PSTSI with the Workers Assistance and
Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), seeking the payment
of death compensation benefits and other benefits accruing to her deceased husband. While the
aforesaid case was pending, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. On December 22, 1983,
petitioner executed a release and quitclaim in favor of PSTSI in consideration of the sum of Seven
Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00) together with hospital, burial and other incidental expenses previously
disbursed by PSTSI in favor of petitioner's deceased husband. 4 Consequently, Atty. Wellington Lachica,
counsel for petitioner, with the latter's conformity, filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice
against PSTSI and without prejudice as against Chuan Hup 5

On the basis of the compromise agreement and the motion to dismiss dated November 23, 1983, the
POEA issued an order dated December 27, 1983, dismissing petitioner's complaint with prejudice against
PSTSI.

On April 21, 1986, petitioner filed with the POEA another claim for death benefits against PSTSI, this time
including Chuan Hup. The new case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 86-04-328. In the decision dated
January 27, 1987, the POEA dismissed the complaint on the ground that there exist identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action between the previous case, POEA Case No. L-635-83 and the new
case, and that the present case is barred by prior judgment based on a compromise agreement in the
previous case. 6

Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).lâwphî1.ñèt In a resolution dated
September 25, 1987, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. 7

Hence, the present petition.

It is the position of the petitioner that the release and quitclaim that she signed in favor of private
respondent PSTSI is null and void on the ground that the consideration given in exchange thereof in the
amount of P7,000.00 is extremely low and unconscionable. Petitioner added that she was merely misled
to sign the quitclaim due to the assurance given by PSTSI that it will help her recover the death
compensation and insurance proceeds due her deceased husband. She argued that even on the
assumption that the quitclaim is valid, the release should benefit PSTSI alone and should not include
Chua Hup as the quitclaim was executed only in favor of PSTSI. Further she contended that
notwithstanding the quitclaim executed in favor of PSTSI, the latter may still be held liable since it is an
agent of Chuan Hup here in the Philippines. 8
The Solicitor General supports petitioner's view stating that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable to
the case at bar since petitioner and PSTSI agreed that the dismissal of the suit against the latter is
without prejudice insofar as the principal Chuan Hup is concerned; that the quitclaim is null and void as
the consideration given is unconscionably low as it is not even equal to one percent (1%) of petitioner's
claim; and that the quitclaim is inequitable and incongrous to the declared policy of the State to afford
protection to labor, citing Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. 9

We rule for the petitioner.

The release and quitclaim in question reads as follows:

JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPLE, of legal age,

widow, and resident at 1287-E, G.

Tuazon

St., Sampaloc, Manila

in favor of

PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANS-

PORT SERVICES, INC., a domestic

corpo-

ration domiciled and having its principal

place of business at 205 Martinez Bldg.,

Dasmarinas, Manila.

WITNESSETH, that:

WHEREAS, on July 5, 1983, Josefina M. Principe fled a complaint for death benefits
against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. as a shipping agency of Chuan Hup
Agencies Pte. Ltd. of the Republic of Singapore for the death of her husband, Engr.
Abelardo D. Principe, on September 15, 1982 in Matinloc Field, Offshore Palawan,
Philippines while in the course of as employment as Chief Engineer of OSAM Falcon' in
POEA Case No. (L) 635-83 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
entitled Josefina M. Principe vs. Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.;'

WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle the above- entitled case amicably.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P7,000.00), Philippine currency and of the hospital, burial and other incidental expenses
previously disbursed by Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., receipt of which in
full is hereby acknowledged to her full and complete satisfaction, JOSEFINA M.
PRINCIPLE have (sic) released and discharged, as she hereby releases and discharges,
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers, employees, principals
and agents from any and all claims, actions obligations and liabilities which she have or
might have against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. in connection with the
 death of her husband Abelardo D. Principe on September 15, 1982 in Matintoc Field,
Offshore Palawan under the circumstances narrated in the aforementioned case.

That she hereby represents and warrants to Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.
that she is the surviving spouse legally entitled to claim for damages/support which may
arise from the death of said Abelardo D. Principe, and further, that she hereby manifests
that any and all rights or claims which she, as a surviving forced heir of the late Abelardo
D. Principe might have against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its
directors, employees, principals and agents arising out of or by reason of the death of
said Abelardo D. Principe are hereby deemed waived and discharged and she have (sic)
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers, employees, principals
and agents and whoever may be held liable, completely free and harmless from any
claim and/or liabilities that may arise from the death of said Abelardo D. Principe (sic).

That in the event that any other person/persons, as surviving spouse of the deceased
Abelardo D. Principe should claim against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.
for such damages/support arising from the death of Abelardo D. Principe, and the claim
is held valid, then Josefina M. Principe hereby undertakes and agrees to reimburse to
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. the amounts hereunder received, plus legal
interest therein.

That she further states that the foregoing consideration is voluntarily accepted by her as
a full and final compromise, adjustment and settlement of any and all claims that she
may have against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers,
employees, principals and agents; and she hereby irrevocably affirm (sic) that Philippine-
Singapore Transport Services, Inc. has made this settlement solely to buy peace, avoid
litigation and on human consideration, and she acknowledges that the payment of said
consideration is not and shall never be construed as an admission of liability or obligation
by Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its officers, directors, employees,
principals and agents. 10

It is true that a compromise agreement once approved by the court has the effect of res
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
However, settled is the rule that the NLRC may disregard technical rules of procedure in order to give life
to the constitutional mandate affording protection to labor and to conform to the need of protecting the
working class whose inferiority against the employer has always been earmarked by disadvantage. 11

The Court finds that the compromise agreement entered into by the petitioner in favor of PSTSI was not
intended to totally foreclose her right over the death benefits of her husband. First, the motion to
dismiss, filed by petitioner through Atty. Lachica before the POEA, which cited the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties, clearly and unequivocally reflects the undertaking that the release
is without prejudice as regards private respondent Chuan Hup. This fact was acknowledged in the
decision of POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in POEA Case No. (L) 86-04-328. It is surprising why
both the POEA and the NLRC failed to consider this aspect in the resolution of the second complaint filed
by the petitioner against PSTSI and Chuan Hup.

The second complaint was filed by petitioner to enforce the joint and several liability of PSTSI and Chuan
Hup per joint affidavit of responsibility executed by said parties in entering into a principal agent
relationship after PSTSI failed to live up to its commitment to assist petitioner in the recovery of death
compensation. 12 This observation is supported by the provisions of the release signed by the petitioner
wherein the parties referred to therein were only the petitioner and PSTSI. The release is from any claim
against PSTSI. Chuan Hup is not a party thereto. He cannot be considered covered by the release.
Moreover, the Court sees no reason why petitioner, with the assistance of a counsel would ever agree to
foreclose her right against Chuan Hup over the death benefits of her husband in exchange for a very
measly sum of Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00). They must have been aware that should she pursue
her case, she was assured of getting at least One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Singapore dollars
(US$100,800.00). This Court has laid down the rule in similar cases that applying the Singapore Maritime
Laws in case of a seaman's death, the heirs of the seaman should receive the equivalent of 36 months
wages of the deceased seaman. 13

The fact that petitioner received the sum of P7,000.00 only should not be taken to mean as a waiver of
her right. The circumstances she was confronted with during that time left her with no other alternative
but to accept the same as she was in dire need of money due to the sudden death of her husband. PSTSI
contends that it was precisely because of her need for cash that petitioner thereby totally waived her
right over the death benefits of her husband. We do not think so. What is plausible is the protestation of
petitioner that PSTSI took advantage of her financial distress and led her to signing the release and
quitclaim without explaining the consequences to her. While it may be true that her counsel assisted her
in the process, said counsel must have been persuaded by the assurance of PSTSI that it shall help
obtain for her the corresponding benefits from Chuan Hup.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim had foreclosed petitioner's right over the
death benefits of her husband, the fact that the consideration given in exchange thereof was very much
less than the amount petitioner is claiming renders the quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public
policy. 14 The State must be firm in affording protection to labor. The quitclaim wherein the consideration
is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her legitimate
claim. 15 Equity dictates that the compromise agreement should be voided in this instance.

Lastly, it must be noted that the first complaint of petitioner was merely an action against PSTSI whereas
in the second complaint Chuan Hup was already included. The POEA ruled that the second complaint was
merely an afterthought, and that it was a product of a pre-conceived mind considering the interval of
time from the issuance of the order of dismissal in the previous case and the institution of the second
complaint. We do not think so. On the contrary, the Court holds that the delay was due to PSTSI's failure
to make good its promise to assist the petitioner in recovering the death benefits of her husband. We see
no other reason thereby. Hence, even if the second action was filed beyond the three (3) year
reglementary period as provided by law for such claims, We cannot buy PSTSI's argument that the claim
is already barred. The blame for the delay, if any, can only be attributed to PSTSI.

On the other hand, PSTSI argues that it cannot be held responsible on the ground that the aforesaid
affidavit of undertaking with Chua Hup is applicable only to those members of the crew recruited by
PSTSI in the Philippines for and in behalf of its principal Chuan Hup and that since Principe was directly
hired by Chuan Hup, PSTSI cannot be held responsible as it has no privity of contract with those
personnel recruited in Singapore.

The argument is untenable. This is the first time PSTSI raised this defense when it had all the chance to
do so below. Moreover, if PSTSI honestly believed it had no privity of contract with Principe who was
directly recruited by Chuan Hup, then there is no reason why it entered into a compromise agreement
with herein petitioner. From the very start, it should have asked for the dismissal of the case against it on
the ground of lack of cause of action, but it did not do so. What is obvious is that Principe was actually
recruited by PSTSI and that he signed the employment contract with the principal Chuan Hup. Thus,
private respondents stand jointly and severally liable for the claim of petitioner.

Anent the argument that the Philippine courts are without jurisdiction over the subject matter as
jurisdiction was, by agreement of the parties, vested in the courts of the Republic of Singapore, it is well-
settled that an agreement to deprive a court of jurisdiction conferred on it by law is void and of no legal
effect. 16 In this jurisdiction labor cases, are within the competence of the National Labor Relations
Commission.

With respect to petitioner's monetary claim, since the parties agreed that the laws of Singapore shall
govern their relationship and that any dispute arising from the contract shall be resolved by the law of
that country, then the petitioner is entitled to death benefits equivalent to 36 months salary of her
husband. 17 As the wage of deceased Abelardo Principe was S$2,800.00 a month, then petitioner is
entitled to a total of S$100,800.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The resolution of the NLRC dated September
25,1987 is hereby set aside and another decision is hereby rendered ordering private respondents PSTSI
and Chuan Hup Agencies, Pte. Ltd. to jointly and severally pay petitioner the sum of S$100,800. 00 in its
equivalent in Philippine pesos. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48576 August 11, 1989

MANSUETA T. TIBULAN, MARIO TIBULAN and ULYSSES TIBULAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Acting Minister of Labor, and LUZON STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, respondents.

Romualdo M. Jubay for petitioners.

Manuel C. Peralta for respondent Lusteveco.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioners here seek to set aside (a) a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission dated 29
November 1975 which reversed the Decision of the Acting Referee awarding to petitioner Mansueta
Tibulan and her children Mario and Ulysses, both surnamed Tibulan, compensation benefits by reason of
the death of Pedro Tibulan, as well as (b) the orders dated 19 July 1977 and 7 June 1978 of the
Secretary and Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor denying petitioners' first and second Motions
for Reconsideration, respectively.

Pedro Tibulan started working for private respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation as Barge Patron of
one of its barges sometime in 1930, and remained there until his death in 1965. In 1963, he began to
suffer from high blood pressure, hypertension and heart ailment.

On 23 December 1965, when Pedro Tibulan returned home from work, he complained to his wife of chest
and stomach pains. The latter brought him to the Philippine General Hospital for treatment. Pedro died
the very next day. The cause of his death was diagnosed as myocardial infarction, aortic insufficiency and
hypertension. 1

On 13 September 1966, in representation of herself and her two (2) minor children, Mansueta Tibulan
through her then counsel, Atty. Felizardo Moreno, filed a claim for compensation benefits under the
pertinent provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended) docketed as Case
No. RO-4-WC-5412. On 29 September 1966, without any authority from Mansueta, Atty. Moreno filed a
motion to dismiss claiming that the filing of said motion was authorized by petitioner Mansueta and that
petitioner was no longer interested in prosecuting her claim against respondent company. The Acting
Referee granted said motion in his order dated 29 September 1966.

On 9 November 1966, Mansueta through another counsel, Atty. Gaspar Tagle filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, claiming that she had not consented to the filing of the motion
to dismiss, not having understood its contents, that she never had intention of asking for dismissal of her
claim and had not received any pecuniary benefits by reason of the said dismissal; that the said dismissal
had prejudiced her interest and that of her children. The Acting Referee denied the motion for having
been filed out of time. This order of denial was served on the petitioners' through their new counsel on 1
February 1967.

On 6 February 1967, petitioner interposed a Petition for Review on the following grounds, namely: that
the order dismissing the claim was null and void considering that the motion to dismiss dated 29
September 1966 was filed without the authority of Mansueta and her children; that the Acting Referee's
order dated 29 September 1966 did not start the running of the period to file the petition for review since
the same was not served on petitioners' counsel; that the Petition for Review was filed under the
provisions of Section 38 of the Rules of Court which had supplemental effect under Section 2, Rule 7 of
the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. This Petition for Review (or for relief) remained
formally unacted upon despite the fact that the Commission in October 1971 remanded the case to its
Regional Office No. 4 for further proceedings.

Several years went by without any further proceedings being taken. On 29 November 1974, petitioners
refiled their claim which was docketed as RO-4-WC Case No. 160991. A copy of the re-filed claim was
furnished to private respondent corporation which, on 14 January 1975, filed its Employer's Report of
Accident or Sickness controverting petitioner's claim on grounds of "(a) lack of employer-employee
relationship; (b) cause of death not service-connected; and (c) claim is time-barred." The Acting Referee
then required the parties to file their respective affidavits. Only petitioner Mansueta filed her affidavit to
which she attached a certification of her marriage to the deceased and the baptismal certificates of her
minor children. Respondent corporation filed nothing.

In his decision 2 dated 25 August 1975, the Acting Referee awarded to petitioners the sum of P5,990.40
as compensation benefits, P200.00 as burial expenses and P300.00 as attorney's fees.

Not satisfied with the decision, private respondent corporation filed with the Workmen's Compensation
Commission a motion for reconsideration on the ground of pendency of another, similar claim filed by
petitioners.

In its decision 3 dated 29 November 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Commission reversed the
decision of the Acting Referee. The Commission ruled that there was no causal connection between the
work of the deceased and the cause of his death, petitioners having failed to show that the deceased was
incapacitated for work prior to his death; and, that the Certificate of Marriage and the Baptismal
Certificates submitted by petitioners were insufficient to prove their relationship with and filiation to the
deceased. Petitioners filed two (2) motions for reconsideration both of which were denied by the
Secretary and the Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor, respectively.

In the instant Petition for Review, the petitioners assail the decision of the Commission for not having
entertained their two (2) motions for reconsideration although meritorious.

In turn, respondent company urges that, under the provisions of the Labor Code, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Commission dated 29 November 1975 was filed out of time, having
been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. It must be observed that petitioners' claim was filed
under the pertinent provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and not of the Labor Code, and that
under the former Act, the reglementary period was fifteen (15) days.

The records show that while the claim was pending before the Commission, Atty. Hermoso, petitioners'
previous counsel, was appointed to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) and at the time the
decision was received in his house on 22 December 1975, he was away at Mactan Airbase serving as its
Provost Court Officer. It was only on 5 January 1976, when he came back to Manila that he had learned
of said decision. Consequently, he was able to file the motion for reconsideration only on 13 January
1976. In view of this excusable negligence, we believe that the period should be considered to have had
started to run from 6 January 1976 and not from 22 December 1975. Under this view, the first motion for
reconsideration may be regarded as filed seasonably. As is well-known, the Workmen's Compensation Act
is a piece of social welfare legislation which seeks to give effect to the concept of social justice, 4 and the
provisions of which should accordingly be liberally construed in favor of the employee or the claimant. 5

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioners are entitled to the compensation
benefits under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
It appears that petitioners' claim was not just denied by the Commission on the ground of lack of causal
connection between Pedro's death and the conditions of his work, but also for the reason that the
petitioners had allegedly failed to establish their relationship to the deceased. As observed, however,
petitioner Mansueta Tibulan had in fact attached to her affidavit filed with the Acting Referee several
documents to support her claim, namely: a medical certificate, the baptismal certificates of petitioners
Mario and Ulysses Tibulan, a certification of Mansueta's marriage to the deceased issued by the parish
priest who had solemnized the marriage. Mansueta had also attached to her motion for reconsideration
which she had filed with the Commission copies of the birth certificates of Mario and Ulysses Tibulan. The
totality of this evidence was, in this case, quite sufficient to establish petitioners' relationship to the
deceased. In any case, it is merely commonplace to note that strict observance of the technical rules of
evidence is not properly demanded in Workmen's Compensation cases. 6 Moreover, respondent
corporation did not present any evidence controverting petitioners' documentation.

Respondent company, whatever else it may have stated in its earlier "Employer's Report of Accident and
Sickness," does not dispute before this Court that Pedro Tibulan had been in its employ as Barge Patron
during his lifetime. The records further show that Pedro's illness had begun in 1963 while still employed
by the respondent company. Considering that the claim was filed under the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, petitioners are entitled to the presumption of compensability which, under the
provisions of said act, arise under the aforementioned circumstances. 7

Because Pedro Tibulan's illness is presumed to be compensable, his employer, respondent corporation,
had the burden of controverting and overcoming such presumption with competent evidence showing
that the deceased's illness was not in fact work-connected and had in fact not been aggravated by the
conditions of his employment.

We do not believe that respondent company was successful in discharging the burden of disproving the
work-relatedness of Pedro Tibulan's illness. Respondent company merely argued that because the
deceased was occupying a supervisory position, therefore, the cause of his death could not be directly
traceable to his employment. To overcome the legal presumption of compensability, evidence must do
more than merely create a doubt. 8 In the instant case, no substantial doubt was generated by
respondent company's contention.

Upon the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the conditions under which Pedro Tibulan had served
as Barge Patron had some connection with the emergence and development of the disease which caused
his death. Petitioners pointed out that the deceased had worked for respondent company for almost
thirty-five (35) years, from 1930 up to his death on 24 December 1965. The barge to which the deceased
was assigned was being used to transport heavy cargoes up and down and around the Pasig River and
had under his supervision only two (2) sailors. These conditions lead us to the inference that while the
position of the deceased was not one requiring mainly manual labor, nonetheless, he could not have
avoided strenuous physical activity in carrying out his duties. Certainly, the captain or patron of a cargo
barge was not expected to, and would not have been allowed to, live his life behind a desk.

Further, it appears that when Pedro Tibulan first joined respondent company, he was in fact in good
health. Where an employee entered employment in good health and suffered an illness in the course of
employment which illness he never had before said employment, he has in his favor the statutory
presumption that his disease or illness is compensable. Once more, respondent corporation was unable to
overturn the applicable statutory presumption of compensability and of the work-related character of
Pedro Tibulan's illness. 9

Finally, since respondent company failed to submit any affidavit or counter-affidavit to the Acting Referee
as required by the provisions of Department Order No. 3, it must be deemed to have renounced its right
to challenge petitioners' claim and to have waived all non-jurisdictional defenses. 10
The Acting Referee's award in 1975 in favor of petitioners was clearly in order. It is difficult to understand
why private respondent corporation should have felt compelled to appeal that award which came after
the claim had been pending for nine (9) years; that appeal was frivolous and insubstantial. It is even
more difficult to comprehend the reversal of that award by the Commission in a decision notable only for
its failure to apply the simple and widely-known statutory presumption of compensation, and which
compelled petitioners to come to this Court and which resulted in the further prolongation of this case.
Under these circumstances, petitioners are entitled to legal interest on the amount of the original award
computed from the date of rendition of that award by the Acting Referee. 11

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the Decision dated 29 November 1975 of
respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission in WCC Case No. R04-160991 the Order of the
Secretary of the Department of Labor dated 19 July 1977 and the Order dated 7 June 1978 by the Acting
Secretary of the Department of Labor are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
is hereby DIRECTED to pay petitioners the award rendered by the Acting Referee on 25 August 1975 in
the amount of P5,990.40 as compensation benefits and P200.00 as funeral expense, together with legal
interest on these amounts computed from 25 August 1975 until full payment thereof and 10% ofthe
resulting aggregate amount as attorney's fees. Costs against public and private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 71604 August 11, 1989

JOSE B. ATIENZA, petitioner,

vs.
PHILIMARE SHIPPING AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, TRANS OCEAN LINER (Pte) LTD.,
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.

Linsangan Law Office for petitioner.

Prudencio Cruz for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The facts of this case are not disputed. Even the legal issues are simple and are soon resolved.

Joseph B. Atienza was engaged by Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply, as agent for Trans Ocean
Liner Pte. Ltd. of Germany, based on Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board the MV Tibati for the
stipulated compensation of US$850.00 a month from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1982. 1 The, Crew
Agreement signed by the parties on January 3, 1981, provided for insurance benefits "as per NSB
Standard Format" and was validated and approved by the National Seamen Board on January 14,1981. 2

On May 12, 1981, Atienza died as a result of an accident which befell him while working on the vessel in
Bombay, India. 3 In due time, his father, the herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits computed
at the rate of 36 months times the seaman's monthly salary plus ten per cent thereof in accordance with
the Workmen's Compensation Law of Singapore, for a total of $30,600.00. The, private respondents,
while admitting liability, contended that this was limited to only P40,000.00 under Section D(1) of the
NSB Standard Format.

On November 6, 1984, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration sustained the private
respondent and held that the applicable law was Philippine law. 4 On appeal, the decision was affirmed
by the National Labor Relations Commission except that it increased the award to P75,000.00 pursuant to
NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, Series of 1981. 5

In the petition before us, we are asked to reverse the public respondent on the ground that Singaporean
law should have been applied in line with our ruling in Norse Management Co. v. National Seamen
Board, 6 where the foreign law was held controlling because it provided for greater benefits for the
claimant. For their part, the private respondents question the application of NSB Memorandum Circular
No. 71, Series of 1981, which they say became effective after the seaman's death. 7

On the first issue, our ruling is that Norse is not applicable to the present petition. The, reason is that in
that case, it was specifically stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement that "compensation shall be
paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act
of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is
greater. 8 That was why the higher benefits prescribed by the foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no
such stipulation appears in the Crew Agreement now under consideration. Instead, it is clearly stated
therein that the insurance benefits shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death of the
seaman during the term of his contract, over and above the benefits for which the Philippine Government
is liable under Philippine law. 9
The petitioner argues that the Standard Format prescribed only the minimum benefits and does not
preclude the parties from stipulating for higher compensation. That may be true enough. But the point is
that the parties in this case did not provide for such higher benefits as the parties did in the Norse case.
There was no stipulation in the Crew Agreement of January 3, 1981, that the employee would be entitled
to whichever greater insurance benefits were offered by either Philippine law or the foreign law; on the
contrary, it was plainly provided that insurance benefits would be determined according to the NSB
Standard Format then in force. The consequence is that the petitioner cannot now claim a higher award
than the compensation prescribed in the said format.

As We said in Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. NLRC : 10

We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract
provides that the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000.00 over and above
the benefits' for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine Law.

Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the applicable law. The, case of Norse
Management Co. v. National Seaman Board, G.R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117
SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment
contract in that case that the workmen's compensation payable to the employee should
be in accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country
where the vessel is registered "whichever is greater."

The next issue involves the effectivity of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, which appears to have been
retroactively applied by the NLRC in increasing the compensation from P40,000.00 The amended award
was based by the POEA on NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46, which became effective in 1979. 11 The
NLRC, apparently laboring under the belief that Memorandum Circular No. 71 was already effective at the
time of the seaman's death on May 12, 1981, increased the death benefits to P75,000.00 as provided
thereunder. The fact, though, is that the new rule became effective only in December 1981, as certified
by the POEA itself, 12 or seven months after Atienza's fatal accident.

On the petitioner's claim that the award should be adjusted in view of the decrease in the purchasing
power of the Philippine peso, it suffices to cite the following relevant ruling of the Court in Sta. Rita and
Well Run Maritime SA Ltd. v. NLRC: 13

Regarding the third contention of the petitioners, the records show that when Sta. Rita
died on September 14, 1981, NSB Memorandum Circular No. 46 (Series of 1979) was the
applicable law. Pursuant to this circular, in case of a seaman's death during the terms of
his contract, the company shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of P30,000.00. On
November 18, 1981 or more than one month after Sta. Rita's death the administrative
regulations were amended to increase death compensation for seamen to P50,000.00,
effective December 1, 1981.

Considering that the applicable law governing death compensation for seamen at the
time of Sta. Rita's death was Memorandum Circular No. 46, Series of 1979, the
petitioner's liability should be limited to P30,000.00. Moreover, if manning agents or
shipping corporations secure employer's insurance to cover their liabilities for death, total
disability and sickness of officers and ratings on board foreign going vessels, the extent
of the coverage is based on the applicable law at the time. It would be unjust to compel
them to pay benefits based on a law not yet in effect at the time the contingency occurs.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 15 July 1985 is SET ASIDE and that of the POEA is
REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-46613 February 26, 1990

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY, petitioner,

vs.
LUCIO BENARAO, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Region VII, and the SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.

Jose V. Montebon, Jr. for petitioner.

Fructuoso S. Villarin for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, Silliman University, an educational institution duly organized and registered
under Philippine laws with principal office at Dumaguete City, seeks the annulment of a decision rendered
by the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC, for brevity) on 28 July 1975, solely on jurisdictional
grounds.

The antecedents are uncontroverted:

Private respondent Lucio Benarao was employed as a carpenter, on a piece work basis, for Silliman
University thru a job contract executed between the latter and Petronilo Nazareno. On 29 May 1969,
while repairing the university's shop building, a falling piece of wood hit and broke Benarao's spinal cord
resulting in his temporary disability which lasted for one hundred fifty (150) days. A claim for
compensation benefits was filed by him before public respondent WCC, docketed as WCC Case No. R-
13632 against Nazareno. On 5 April 1974, an award of Three Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Pesos and
Fifty One Centavos (P3,512.51) was rendered in Benarao's favor. 1

More than five (5) months thereafter, or on 9 October 1974, Benarao, thru a "Memorandum of
Settlement" entered into by him and Nazareno, accepted the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos (P1,200.00) as final, complete and full settlement of the award he (Benarao) previously obtained. 2

Later, Nazareno appealed from the order or award granting compensation benefits to Benarao. Nazareno
reasoned, among others, that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 3 he could not be made liable for
Benarao's claim because his (Nazareno's) contract with the Silliman University was merely a "labor only"
contract and that his capital was below P1,000.00. 4 After a review of the petition, the WCC rendered a
decision on 28 July 1975, finding the petitioner university liable for the compensation claim of
Benarao. 5 The following statements in the WCC decision were the basis of the ruling against Silliman
University, to wit:

We hold that Silliman University was the statutory employer and therefore liable for the
compensation claim (Republic v. WCC, et al., L-22650, April 28, 1967). Whether the term
used to describe the kind of actual work of the claimant at the time of the accident was
'remodelling' or 'repairing', such services of a carpenter are indispensable in any
institution of learning. ... .

It is evident that what was entered into by and between Petronilo (Nilo) Nazareno and
the Silliman University was labor-only contract. That made Petronilo Nazareno virtually a
laborer if not an agent of Silliman University.
 WHEREFORE, the award appealed from should be, as it is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new
decision entered finding the Silliman University the statutory employer of the claimant
liable to pay the latter's compensation benefits ... .

Thereafter, a writ of execution dated 8 October 1976 was served by the Department of Labor upon
petitioner University in the amount of Three Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Pesos and Fifty one
Centavos (P3,512.51 ) 6 followed by an alias writ of execution issued on 21 February 1977. 7 In response
to said writs of execution, an Urgent Motion to Quash was not resolved by the Writ of Execution was filed
by petitioner 8 on the ground that the school never became a party in WCC Case No. R07-13632 and,
therefore, the WCC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. It further alleged that the 'University had no
knowledge or information of an existing compensation case against it, as it never received copies of any
complaint, summons, award or decision.

The said Urgent Motion to Quash was not resolved by the Department of Labor which instead delivered
to petitioner in November 1976, a copy of the WCC decision i.e. the 28 July 1975 decision in WCC Case
No. R08-13632, 9 and basis of the questioned writs of execution.

Hence this petition for certiorari. 10

Public respondent WCC submitted its Comment reiterating the statements it made in the 28 July 1975
decision. 11Private respondent Benarao likewise filed his Comment wherein he averred that the filing of
the instant petition is premature in the absence of a prior motion for reconsideration of the questioned
WCC decision. 12

The vital issue in the instant case centers on the jurisdiction of the WCC over petitioner Silliman
University. We find the petition impressed with merit.

The WCC's second decision dated 28 July 1975 is void for two (2) evident reasons. First, it was a
substantial amendment of a prior ruling which had already become final and, in fact, already
executed. Second, it is a decision rendered in violation of the rules on jurisdiction and due process.

It will be noted that the first WCC award was issued on 25 April 1974. While an appeal therefrom was
interposed by Nazareno (respondent therein), this was after he had entered into a settlement agreement
with Benarao (claimant) on 9 October 1974 or more than five (5) months after said WCC award. The next
event that took place was the rendition by the WCC of a second decision in the same case dated 28 July
1975, or after one (1) year and three (3) months from the date of the first decision.

Given the above antecedents, there is no other way but to view the second decision as an entire reversal
of the first ruling, which could no longer be disturbed. And, Nazareno had unconditionally settled his
liability thru the execution of the "Memorandum of Settlement", the existence of which was never denied
nor its validity questioned. A portion of the said memorandum reads as follows:

... and by way of full settlement of the claim of Lucio Benarao, and to his entire
satisfaction, Petronilo Nazareno, by these presents, tenders and presents the amount of
ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) unto Lucio Benarao, who hereby
accepts and acknowledges this amount, and further states that this said amount
represents final, complete and full settlement of whatever award he might obtain from
his claim ...

The above stipulations point to only one thing, i.e. the award of the WCC on 25 April 1974 was accepted
by the parties thereto. And this acceptance of said award, on the part of Nazareno, rendered his later
appeal therefrom moot from the beginning.
It should also be stated that during the hearings in the case, there was no instance when Nazareno
challenged the averment that he was Benarao's employer. Why then was he later allowed for the first
time to invoke numerous non-jurisdictional defenses in his petition for review before the respondent
Commission He is deemed to have renounced his right to controvert the claim for the reason that he
never denied being Benarao's employer and more, because of his voluntary discharge of hability in his
capacity as employer of the claimant.

But even assuming arguendo that the Commission could still alter its first ruling, the 28 July 1975
decision is still null and void for having been issued without any jurisdiction first acquired over Silliman
University and for lack of due process. Records show that the respondents never contested the allegation
of petitioner that it was never notified of any disability claim filed against it.

Pertinent to this issue is a section in the Workmen's Compensation Act, to wit:

Section 49. Procedure. — Any dispute or controversy concerning compensation under

this Act shall be submitted to the Commissioner as provided herein.

... He shall cause reasonable notice of such hearing to be given to each party interested,
in service upon him personally or mailing a copy thereof to him ... . All parties in interest
shall have the right to be present at any hearing in person or by counsel or by any other
agent or representative, to present such testimony as may be pertinent to the
controversy before the Commissioner and to cross-examine the witness against them. ...

Quite clearly, the above provision was not followed vis-a-vis Silliman University. Fully aware that the
latter was not made a party to the case at the instance of either Benarao, the claimant, or Nazareno, the
respondent Commission nevertheless held it liable for the payment of disability benefits. At the very least,
WCC should have notified the petitioner of its involvement in the case before it rendered any decision
against it; WCC should have given petitioner an opportunity to refute the burden clearly being shifted to
it, as required by due process. As petitioner never became a party to the case, logically, it can not be
bound by the judgment subsequently rendered against it by the respondent WCC which, in the first place,
acquired no jurisdiction over it.

Lastly, it is incorrect to state that since petitioner had not resorted to a prior motion for reconsideration of
the decision, subject of controversy, its filing of the instant petition for certiorari is procedurally
erroneous. While we support respondent Benarao's reasoning that a motion for reconsideration is needed
to enable a judicial body issuing the questioned order, in the first instance, to pass upon and correct its
mistakes without the intervention of a higher court, we, however, held in BA Finance Corporation v.
Pineda, et al. 13 that in case of a final order or judgment, a motion for reconsideration, prior to taking an
appeal, is not always required. In the case at bar, the 28 July 1975 order was not interlocutory; it was a
final one as it disposed of the action for compensation benefits and there was nothing more to be done in
the proceedings as to the merits of the case. On the other hand, in the cases cited by respondent
Benarao, 14 in his effort to justify and support his arguments, the orders complained of were merely
interlocutory and, therefore, a motion for reconsideration had to be filed before certiorari could be availed
of.

Likewise, the theory of exhaustion of administrative remedies can not be invoked or applied where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal (as in the present case) amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. 15

Having ruled that the questioned decision of 28 July 1975 is a void judgment, we do not find any need to
resolve or even discuss the matter of whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between
Benarao and Silliman University.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 28 July 1975 decision of respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.