CASE 201

G.R. NO. 114323. JULY 23, 1998

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION VS COURT OF APPEALS AND PACIFIC
CEMENT COMPANY, INC.

FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil
Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and
against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. Petitioner is a
foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while private respondent is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

They entered into a contract on February 26, 1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to
supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement.
In consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the amount of
FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS
($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the
latter. The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao
City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the
shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point
of destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already received payment
and despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil
well cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the private
respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class G cement cost free
at the petitioners designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class G cement did not conform to
the petitioners specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was
referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he
venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.

The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting
forth the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before
the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made
"the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit
the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the
private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance
therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing
to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for
the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved
to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The
petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did
not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties; thus, the foreign court could not validly
adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

HELD: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude
the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact
that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that
of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court
mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary
docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's
complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED.
 CASE 202
G.R. NO. 81006. MAY 12, 1989
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS

FACTS: An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out as an
ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely presented to the Court is the validity of
the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution.

On May 21, 1984, Victorino C. Francisco (petitioner) leased his apartment in Makati to Winai
Permskul (respondent) for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month.
Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of
P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by
reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He
thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for
the additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this
request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills
and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original
condition.

Winai Permskul sued in the MTC of Makati. The MTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of
Permskul which was affirmed by the RTC of Makati. Defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his
petition for review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration,
on December 1, 1987. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court violates Article VIII Section 14 of the Constitution in sustaining the
memorandum decision of the RTC.

HELD:

This provision reads as follows:

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has
been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973
Constitution but has been virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to
all courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to inform the
person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after
consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.

Decisions and resolutions of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of
fact and the conclusions of law on which they are based. Such findings may be contained in the
decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or
resolution appealed from. This provision of BP 129 authorizes a memorandum decision. This kind of
decision is one rendered by an appellate court and incorporates by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decision or under review. The reason for allowing the
incorporation by reference is to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court
in the decision of the higher court. It is also to avoid repeating the findings or conclusions of the lower
court, which are being adopted or approved. To be valid however, such decision must not simply
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of a lower court by remote reference. For
the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law
being adopted, which must be contained in statement attached to the said decision. In other words,
the memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
lower court in an annex attached to it and made an indispensable part of the decision.
 CASE 203
G.R. No. L-59606. JANUARY 8, 1987
EDMUNDO ROMERO, FELIZA F. ROMERO, JOSE ADORABLE AND GERONIMO
CASAES
VS
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS AND
TIMOTEO IBARRA

FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision promulgated on January 26, 1982 by
the Ninth Division of respondent Court of Appeals affirming in full the decision rendered on August
31, 1981 by Branch II of respondent Court of Agrarian Relations, Tenth Regional District, Naga City,
petitioners allege violation of their constitutional rights to due process and the equal protection of the
laws.

On March 8, 1979, Timoteo Ibarra (private respondent) filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations an
action for reinstatement with damages against Edmundo Romore, Feliza F. Romero, Jose Adorable
and Geronimo Casaes (petitioners).

The agrarian court found and the parties agree that the main issue raised in said case was factual in
character — whether or not private respondent was the bona-fide agricultural tenant- farmer (now
agricultural lessee) on the two parcels of agricultural land subject-matter of the complaint. As a
matter of fact, this is the crucial issue because the resolution of all the other issues depends upon its
resolution.

The Court of Agrarian Relations ruled in favor of private respondents that he is the bona-fide tenant-
farmer, now agricultural lessee of the two (2) parcels of land in question. The petitioners appealed to
the Court of Appeals and said Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

No notice of the receipt of the records from the Court of Agrarian Relations was issued by respondent
Court of Appeals. Neither was any notice issued by respondent Court of Appeals that it was dispensing
"with the usual practice of requiring the parties to submit to Us their memoranda in lieu of briefs."

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether not there is violation of petitioners constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of laws.

HELD: In addition to alleging violation of their constitutional rights to due process and to equal
protection of the laws, petitioners contend that the findings of fact in the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, as affirmed in toto by respondent Court of Appeals, are not supported by
substantial evidence and the conclusions stated therein are clearly against the law. Petitioners claim
that had respondent Court of Appeals not dispensed with the usual practice of requiring the parties to
submit simultaneous memoranda in the of appeal briefs they could have pointed out to respondent
Court of Appeals which findings of fact in the decision of the lower court are not supported by
substantial evidence and which conclusions stated therein are clearly against the law.

In the case at bar, petitioners had the right to appeal from the decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations to the Court of Appeals. And since Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 provides, following the
general rule, that "the decisions or orders of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari only on questions of law," petitioners should be given the
opportunity to correct errors in the findings of fact made by the trial court. And this is particularly
necessary in agrarian cases where no motion for rehearing or reconsideration is allowed in the Court
of Appeals (Section 18, Ibid.)

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the intrinsic validity of a decision is the
perception by the parties-litigants that they have been accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a
fair and responsible magistrate before j judgment is rendered. It is this perception, coupled with a
clear conscience, which enables the members of the judiciary to dispassionately charge the awesome
responsibility of sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals affirming in full the
decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals to enable the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of
fifteen days from notice, after which respondent Court shall render a decision upon the points raised
and discussed in said memoranda that were not touched upon in the decision of the agrarian court
which was adopted by the appellate court as basis for its original judgment of affirmance.
 CASE 204
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075. OCTOBER 9, 2007
ATTY. UBALDINO A. LACUROM VS JUDGE JUANITA C. TIENZO

FACTS: On the second charge relating to Civil Case No. 4884, complainant alleges that respondent
judge rendered a decision in violation of the Constitutional mandate to state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court echoing the same
requisite.

Complainant further charges that respondent judge issued an order written in English language, and
in fashion that does not benefit an RTC Judge which thereby demonstrates her incompetence and lack
of diligence. However, complainant discloses that the inclusion of the foregoing matter in his
administrative complaint was merely at the behest of his former colleague, Feliciano Buenaventura, a
retired judge of RTC, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City.

In this case, respondent judge ruled in this wise, to wit: “After a cursory study of this appealed case of
Unlawful Detainer, this Court finds that the procedural due process has been complied with under the
Summary Procedure. The Decision of the Lower Court cannot be disturbed by this Court.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge rendered decision in violation of the constitutional
mandate to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

HELD: YES.
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court likewise reflects the foregoing mandate, thus:

SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. – A judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of court.

Although we have sustained the validity of memorandum decisions on several occasions, we laid
down specific requirements for the proper utility thereof:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must
provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually
embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex
attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay suspicion that no study was made of the
decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper
examination of the facts and law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the
annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is,
of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply
with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its
violation.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be
sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional
condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted only in cases where
the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge
and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple
litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously
groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

It is obvious that the decision rendered by respondent judge failed to conform to this requirement.
The cryptic decision simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC and forthwith found the
same as compliant with procedural due process under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Nowhere in
the decision does respondent judge make a statement of the facts, which led to the filing of the appeal.
More importantly, the decision does not contain respondent judge’s factual findings, albeit affirming
those of the MTCC, from which she based her conclusions of law. Ineluctably, respondent judge
transgressed the constitutional directive.
 CASE 205
G.R. NO. 81006. MAY 12, 1989
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL AND THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
**CASE REPEATED
 CASE 206
G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN VERGARA,
JONA SARVIDA, MILAGROS MAJOREMOS, MAJORIE JALALON, MAY JOY MENDOZA
(@ May Joy Sandi), and JOY SABALLA (@ Josephine Saballa),
MABELYN B. VERGARA, RIO SARVIDA, FRANCISCO MAJOREMOS, in their respective
behalves and in behalf of ROY JALALON, ROMMEL MENDOZA and DELFIN
SABALLA, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Ormoc, Branch 12; SPO3ANGELO S. LLENOS and the CITY JAIL
WARDEN OF ORMOC; and ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO

FACTS: Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave.,
Paraaque City. On December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City policemen by authority of a
Warrant of Arrest dated November 19, 2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona in Sp. Proc. No.
3695-0 for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution and Partition pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12).
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao, as Special
Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners be held guilty of
indirect contempt for not complying with the probate courts order dated October 9, 1999 directing
them to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.
It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers, respondent Bolao
included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of the estate. The probate court
issued the assailed Order dated October 5, 1999, portions of which read as follows:
…………

7. Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are directed to pay their
respective monthly rental regularly starting the month of August, 1999, including
arrears if any, to the duly appointed Special Administratrix Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolao,
until further notice.

Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolao, as Special Administratrix, the probate court
issued a writ of execution on March 3, 2000 to enforce the aforesaid order dated October 5, 1999. The
Sheriff submitted a return dated August 10, 2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he met with
petitioners but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had already collected from
them three months advance rentals.
On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolao filed a motion to require petitioners to explain why they
should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of the probate court.
It was granted. Petitioners were cite in contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each
and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate courts order for them to pay rentals.
They stated that their failure to attend the May 11, 2001 hearing was due to financial constraints, most
of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and repeated that the reason why
they are freezing the monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it.

Upon motion of respondent Bolao, the probate court, per its Order dated November 16, 2001,
issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On December 24, 2001, petitioners were arrested.

On December 26, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. On January 3, 2002, the appellate court ordered the temporary release of
petitioners. After due proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on March 26, 2002
denying the petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in not holding that the motion for indirect contempt of court
filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao against the lessees is not the proper remedy and that the order
of the court a quo granting said motion and declaring that the lessees are guilty of indirect contempt is
a reversible error.

HELD: YES.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court to wit:

SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to
do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of
the court concerned until he performs it. (7a) because herein subject order is not a special judgment
enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39, which provides:

SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the performance of any act other
than those mention in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of judgment shall be attached to the
writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered,
or upon any other person required thereby, or by law to obey the same, and such party or person may
be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.

Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:

SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand.
The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment
obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful
fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or
any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper
receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of
payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn
over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the
judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn
over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court
that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in
the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court of the locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of
the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment
obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor
while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no
case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall
levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the
personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient
to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment
obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either
real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of
attachment.
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor and
other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal
property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be
made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or control such
credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only such amount as
will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from service of the
notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or credits to
satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the report shall state how much funds or credits the
garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check
issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee within
ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee requiring such delivery, except the
lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to indicate the garnishee or
garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by
the judgment obligee.
 The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with respect to
delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a) while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to
execution of judgments for specific acts such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific acts
vesting title; sale of real or personal property, delivery or restitution of real property, removal of
improvements on property subject of execution and delivery of personal property.
The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted
above. Until and unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and
failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by
the courts. In Sura vs. Martin, Sr., we held that:

Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court (for failure to
satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency) would, in effect, violate the Constitution.

Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to
comply with the probate courts order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be held guilty
of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court, which directs therein the
Sheriff, thus:

Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the goods and chattels of
said lessees you may cause to be made the sum sufficient to cover the aforestated amounts, but if no
sufficient personal properties are found thereof to satisfy this execution, then of the real properties
you make the sums of money in the manner required by law and make return of your proceeding
under this writ within the reglementary period.

It was the sheriffs duty to enforce the writ.

Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for payment
of money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other
mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not
otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or
part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not
exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell
only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor, which has been
levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal
property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and
with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect from
petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from petitioners
personal/real properties sufficient to cover the amounts sought to be collected. It was not addressed
to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments, and it
was due to the latters failure that the writ was not duly enforced.
In fine, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the Decision dated
November 16, 2001 of the trial court.
 CASE 207
G.R. Nos. L-32450-51 June 10, 1971
HONORABLE ARMANDO B. CLEDERA in his capacity as Provincial Governor of
Camarines Sur, MARIANO S. TRINIDAD, in his capacity as Provincial Vice Governor of
Camarines Sur, EMILIO C. TIBLE JR., HILARIO R. ABONAL and NICANOR A. ORINO
in their capacities as Members of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur; The
PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of Camarines Sur; the PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of
Camarines Sur, and the PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE ULPIANO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Camarines Sur, and
PLUTARCO CAMANO, et al., respondents

FACTS: This case is about the order issued by the respondent judge giving due course to and
granting the motion for reconsideration, allegedly defective for want of notice of hearing filed by
private respondents herein as Petitioners. The private respondents herein were employees of the
provincial government of Camarines Sur and paid under the plantilla of personnel of the road and
bridge fund budget. The provincial board of province of Camarines Sur passed a resolution which
approved the road and bridge fund budget of the province for the fiscal year 1968-1969 and abolished
the positions of herein private residents, who as a consequence filed Civil Cases before the respondent
judge sitting at Naga for prohibition and/or mandamus with damages seeking their reinstatement and
payment of back salaries as well as the restoration of their respective positions previously occupied by
them in the plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund budget. After the pre-trial, the parties
were given five (5) days from July 14, 1969 or until July 19, 1969 to submit their respective
memoranda, after which the two cases would be deemed submitted for decision Private respondents
filed a motion to re-open the cases and to allow them to present additional evidence consisting of the
budget and plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund for the fiscal year 1969-70 to which on
July 25, 1969 herein petitioners filed an opposition dated July 24 1969. Respondent Judge denied the
said motion of herein private respondents seeking to reopen the two cases. Private respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order dated September 10, 1969, which motion does not
contain any notice at all setting the time, date and place of hearing. Private respondents filed a
request addressed to the clerk of court to set for hearing on November 24, 1969, Respondent Judge
issued an order requiring herein petitioners to submit within five (5) days from receipt their
opposition to herein private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the order dated September
10, 1969, but Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique Amador did not file any opposition to the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration.

Respondent judge issued its order, reopened the two cases and allowed them to present their
evidences. The respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of the respondents declaring the
resolution null and void. The Provincial Fiscal as counsel for herein petitioners received a copy of the
aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970. The petitioners, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique A.
Amador, filed a 15 page motion dated June 6, 1970 for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
together with a notice of hearing address to the clerk of court. Private respondents filed a motion for
execution on the ground that the decision had already become final since no appeal therefrom had
been interposed and perfected by herein petitioners within thirty (30) days from their receipt on May
12, 1970 of the aforesaid decision. Petitioner filed their opposition on the ground that they had
complied with Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Respondent Judge granted herein private respondents motion for execution, relying on the
cases of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Bath Construction, Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila
Railroad Co.,Magno vs. Ortiz, in Re Disciplinary Action vs. Atty. Vicente Raul AImacen in L-27654,
Cal ero vs. Yaptinchay, and Sebastian vs. Cabal, et al., where this High Tribunal repeatedly enunciated
that the requirements of Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory in relation to
See. 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration
of the said order which granted the motion for execution. The branch clerk issued a writ of execution.
The petitioner filed a supplement to their urgent motion. The respondent judge denied the petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari contending that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in considering the subject motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of
paper, and that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard" citing Borja vs. Tan, Duran Embate vs. Penolio and Sun,
Un Giok vs. Matusa.

ISSUE: Whether the notice accompanying the motion dated June 6, 1970 and filed on June 8, 1970
for the reconsideration of the decision dated April 27, 1970, complies with the requirements of Section
2 of Rule 37 in relation to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.
HELD: NO, but the deficiency of the notice of hearing in the case was cured when the clerk of court
set the motion for hearing and the court took cognizance of the motion on the date set for hearing
thereof by the clerk of court.

In the 1960 Canonoy case, counsel for the defendants received a copy of the order of dismissal on
October 7, 1955, and on October 31, they moved to reconsider the said Order. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain a notice of hearing, but on December 6, 1956, a motion was presented
asking the clerk of court to set the motion for reconsideration for hearing on December 22. The
motion was opposed on the ground that it contained no notice of hearing and therefore should be
considered as a mere scrap of paper, which did not toll the running of the period for the judgment to
become final. Nevertheless, the court reconsidered and set aside its order of dismissal. It is patent in
the Canonoy case that the failure on the part of counsel to set the date of hearing of his motion was
not due to neglect or negligence on his part but because he could not do so as he did not know the
date or the month when the next yearly section of the court in Pagadlian would take place as there was
no showing that at the time he filed his motion the court had already fixed the date for the next term.
It is evident therefore that the circumstances which compelled the court to regard the notice of
hearing in the Matusa case; as having been remedied or which justified the failure inability of the
counsel in the Canonoy case to fix a date for the hearing of his motion, dip not obtain in the instant
case. Here, the clerk of court did not set the motion of herein petitioners for reconsideration of the
decision for hearing on a definite date, much less did the respondent Judge take cognizance of the
said motion for reconsideration. And the respondent Judge holds hearing every business day
throughout the year in Naga City, unlike the Judge in the Canonoy case. Neither did herein private
respondents file an opposition to the aforementioned motion of herein petitioners for the
reconsideration of the decision, so as to bring the case at bar within the purview of the doctrine in the
case of Macasero vs. Saguin; 23 much less were the merits of the said motion for reconsideration of
the decision argued. The hearing and argument were limited to the motion for the reconsideration of
the order granting the motion for execution.

To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of
the Revised Rules of Court are as mandatory as they are clear and simple; and non compliance
therewith is fatal to the cause of the movant, because the mere filing of the motion for
reconsideration, without the requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for
appeal. Unless the movant has the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves the adverse party
with the same, the court would have no way to determine whether the party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period
within which to file his reply or opposition. The rules commanding the movant to serve of the adverse
party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of hearing "shall be
directed to the parties concerned, and shall estate the time and place for the hearing of the motion"
(Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions. To deviate from the
peremptory principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases aforecited in, and to exempt from the
rigor of the operation of said principle, the case at bar would be one step in the emasculation of the
revised rules and would be subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon — all to
the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons as well as the general public who
would thereby be subjected to such an irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the
rule and when their requirements may be ignored. We had to draw a line where and did when we
promulgated on January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of court wherein WE delineated in a language
matchless in simplicity and clarity the essential requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any
motion, to eliminate all possibilities of equivocation or misunderstanding.
 CASE 208
G.R. No. L-35858 August 21, 1979
LIBRADA N. FIRME and FLORENCIO FIRME, petitioners,
vs.
ARSENIO REYES, HON. SIMEON M. GOPENGCO, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXV of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, G. A. MACHINERIES, INC., SHERIFF OF MANILA
and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

FACTS: The procedural issue in this case, which had already been resolved by the Court of Appeals in
a decision from which the petitioners did not appeal, is whether the petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the lower court's adverse judgment against them was a mere scrap of paper
because it had no notice of hearing and, hence, the said judgment had become executory.

In Civil Case No. 62906 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision dated March 1, 1971,
declaring Arsenio Reyes the owner of a 165-square-meter lot and the house standing thereon located
at 2371 Del Pan Street, Sta. Ana, Manila and ordering the spouses, Librada N. Firme and Doctor
Florencio Firme, to pay Reyes rentals for the use and occupation of the house plus P1,000 as
attorney's fees.

The Firme spouses received on March 27, 1971 a copy of that decision. On April 13, they filed a motion
for reconsideration, which did not contain any notice of hearing. Copies of that motion were furnished
the adverse parties.

Reyes, the winning party, filed a motion dated May 3, 1971, praying that the decision be declared
executory and that a writ of execution be issued. He contended that the motion for reconsideration
was a mere scrap of paper because it was not set for hearing. The Firme spouses opposed the motion
for execution but the Trial Court denied it on August 30, 1971. Hence, the lower court’s judgment was
regarded as executory and a writ of execution was issued on October 7, 1972.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by the Firme spouses be given merit.

HELD: NO.

Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial or reconsideration should
contain "a written notice" which should be served on the adverse party. "Notice of a motion shall be
served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof."
The notice shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. "No motion shall be acted
upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that
the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected. " (Secs. 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court).

In the leading case of Manakil and Tison vs. Revilla and Tuano, 42 Phil. 81, 84, it was held that a
motion for new trial, sans notice of hearing, did not merit any consideration. "It was nothing but a
piece of paper filed with the court. It presented no question which the court could decide. The court
had no right to consider it, nor had the clerk any right to receive it without a compliance" with Rule
15. "It was not, in fact, a motion. It did not comply with the rules of the court." (See Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan, 44 Phil. 866 and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).

The written notice referred to in section 2 of Rule 37 is that prescribed in sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15.
The provision in section 6 of Rule 15 that no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service of such notice is intended to enable the court to find out whether or not the adverse party is in
conformity with the motion and, if he objects to it, to give him an opportunity to file his opposition
(Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 974,
982-983).

The trial court may properly decline to act on a motion for the reconsideration of its decision when
such motion lacks the notice of the time and place of hearing (Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., 121 Phil. 1221).

Without such a notice of hearing, the motion to set aside the judgment does not suspend the running
of the period within which to perfect an appeal (Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L-
31869, August 8, 1973, 52 SCRA 246, 257-8)
 CASE 209
G.R. No. 70895 May 30, 1986
HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA
& CO., LTD., and SHUYA NODA, respondents.

FACTS: Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division
of the Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
and set aside the order of respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.

HELD: Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the period
for appeal from final orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance) from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and provides a uniform period of fifteen days for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court counted from notice
thereof, except in habeas corpus cases where the period for appeal remains at forty- eight (48) hours.
To expedite appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal is no longer required
except in appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in these
exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a record on appeal is required.
Moreover Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be required for an
appeal, and Section 4 thereof disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment.

All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly states, to avoid
the procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice under the Rules of Court which are
intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.

However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court resolved
that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision were applied
prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of
their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly
prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on
certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final
disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order.

The Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:

1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the
court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal may be filed
within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of Nantes vs.
Court of Appeals, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court denies the motion for extension, the
appeal must be taken within the original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135),
inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, November
20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for
appeal provided it was filed within the original period. (Valero vs. Court of Appeals, June 28, 1973, 51
SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228).

All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.
 CASE 210
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ, FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO,
JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO
VS
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO AND HON. ANTONIO
N. ROSALES

FACTS: Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later,
in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal and, on the 15th day
thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days
later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received
by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied
in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court,
petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received
the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order
was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal of the
Motion for Reconsideraiton.

HELD: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to
Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus held that
petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from
July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules, which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should,
as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.

Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal
(in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The
fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court that rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final
at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

**Additional Info only reading purposes**

The Neypes Rule

STATEMENT OF THE RULE

The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the “Fresh Period Rule,” states that “a party litigant may
either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file
it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.” (Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524 September
14, 2005)
PURPOSE OF THE RULE
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. (supra)

The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules
and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-
day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day
period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon.
Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES

Before the Supreme Court promulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal; and that an appeal should be taken
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. While the period to file an
appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does not have the
full fifteen (15) days. The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the
notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on appeals are:

Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however,
that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x

SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel
at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution. (Neypes, supra)

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41,
Section 3. (Neypes, supra)

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final
at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes, supra)

APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129
categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize
any distinction.17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the
same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this
situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it
did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by
certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme
Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction)
and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to
appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases
under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a
litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a situation
that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It
suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at
stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this
double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with
almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law – Quod est
inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.18 (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa
Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively
apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was
promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural
laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage,
there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.17 Amendments to procedural rules are
procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.18

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested
retroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no
vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an
appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to
pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not
absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the
year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in
1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders
issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the
lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.19

Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August 2000, at the same month as
the relevant incidents at bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that
in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R.
No. 173942, 25 June 2008)

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of
the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in
the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to
the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes, supra)

NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED

Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional penalty. Under Article 9 of
the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the
penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light felony or offense contemplated by
Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the
judgment.

To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25
August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of a light offense
that a promulgation may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. In case the
accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the failure to
appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules
against the judgment. One such remedy was the Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of the
MTCC filed by petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to avail of the remedies
against the judgment, the MTCC should not have entertained petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or until 9 September 2009 to file his Motion
for Probation. The MTCC thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the motion
instead of immediately denying it. xxx

Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail himself of the remedies prior to filing his
Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave would have been the proper
opportunity for the parties to allege and contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing
on 25 August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed justifiable. If granted, petitioner would have
been allowed to avail himself of other remedies under the Rules of Court, including a motion for
reconsideration. xxx
As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the rule in Neypes is also applicable to
criminal cases regarding appeals from convictions in criminal cases under Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable to this case, considering that petitioner’s Motion for
Probation was filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People of the Phils., G.R. No.
192164 October 12, 2011)

SOURCE: http://winlawdesigntemplate.blogspot.com/2012/11/the-neypes-rule.html
 CASE 211
G.R. No. L-28486 September 10, 1981
FRANCISCO MAGNO, ESPERANZA MAGNO, EULOGIO MAGNO, AMELIA MAGNO
VASQUEZ, ULPIANO VASQUEZ, JOSE O. MAGNO, NICANOR P. MAGNO, FELECITAS
O. MAGNO, and LOURDES O. MAGNO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE MARIANO BENEDICTO of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija and DONATO M. VERGARA, respondents

FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
December 2, 1967.

Before the Bulacan Court of First Instance, in Civil Case No. 3198- M (Bulacan Case), which was an
action between members of the same family for partition of war damage payments received from the
United States Government, judgment by default was rendered on September 9, 1966 in favor of
petitioners herein, as the plaintiffs in the said case, and against private respondent Donato M. Vergara
and his father-in-law, Meliton Magno, jointly and severally, as defendants therein. Judgment having
become final, the corresponding Writ of Execution was issued and the properties of private
respondent were levied upon and scheduled for sale at public auction.

Private respondent resorted to an action for annulment of judgment and of Writ of Execution before
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 275 (Annulment Suit) against petitioners
and the Nueva Ecija Provincial Sheriff, as defendants, upon the main contention that judgment in the
Bulacan Case was procured by means of extrinsic fraud committed by petitioner Francisco Magno
against private respondent. Essentially, the extrinsic fraud allegedly consisted in assurances made by
Francisco Magno to private respondent during a confrontation between them that it was never the
intention of petitioners to involve private respondent in the suit and that he would be excluded
therefrom. Convinced, private respondent was lured into inaction only to discover later that judgment
was rendered against him and execution against his properties ordered. Private respondent also
prayed for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain the enforcement of the judgment and of the
Writ of Execution pending the determination of the Annulment Suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the Complaint filed before the Nueva Ecija Court constitute
extrinsic fraud as to justify said Court in exercising its jurisdiction to interfere with and set aside the
judgment of the Bulacan Court and to enjoin the execution thereof.

HELD:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing allegations contain ultimate facts which, if
substantiated, could constitute extrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud is one which prevents the losing party
from defending the action brought against him.

We think it sufficiently appears from the testimony of Baker that he was misled by the statement of
Judge Walker, who was the attorney of Craddock and Stotts He had a right to assume from his version
of their conversation that the case would not be taken up without notifying him. It appears that he
thought that the court had no jurisdiction because an attempt was made to foreclose in the same
action a mortgage on real estate which was situated in another district in the same county. He says it
was understood that he should be notifed when the case was to be taken up, and did not appear at the
adjourned term because no depositions had been taken by either party, and he relied upon his
understanding that the case would not be taken up without notice to him. He stated that Craddock
was only present during a part of the conversation that he had with Judge Walker. Judge Walker was
not a witness in the case, and there is nothing to contradict the testimony of Baker. It is true Craddock
contradicted his testimony in regard to some other matters which occurred during the conversation,
but we do not think there is any contradiction of Baker's testimony with regard to the postponement
of the trial. There was no negligence on his part in placing reliance upon the statements made to him,
and, while we do not think that any fraud was intended to be practiced upon Montague, the result was
that Montague was deprived of his right to appear and defend the action and this constituted a
fraud in law. This principle has been recognized in the case of Lawson v. Bettison 12 Ark. 401. Relief
against fraud in judgment and decrees has also ' been recognized as a ground for equitable
jurisdiction Where by mistake or fraud a party has gained an unfair advantage in proceedings in a
court which must operate to make that court an instrument of injustice, courts of equi ty will
interfere and restrain him from reaping fruits of the advantage thus improperly gained In the
application of the principle an injunction will be granted against ajudgment taken in violation of an
agreement to continue the case, where there is a good defense to the action. Beams v. Denham 2
Scam. (111) 58; Sanderson v. Voelcker 51 Mo. App. 328; Brooks v. Twitchell 182 Mass. 443, 65 N.E.
843, 94 Am St. Rep. 662.
 CASE 212
G.R. No. L-22822 August 30, 1968
GREGORIA PALANCA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE AMERICAN FOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANY and TIBURCIO EVALLE, in his
capacity as Director of Patents, respondents-appellees.

FACTS: On May 14, 1958, petitioner-appellant Gregoria Palanca filed with the Philippine Patent
Office, Department of Commerce and Industry, an application to register the trademark, "LION and
the representation of a lion's head," alleging that she had been using the trademark since January 5,
1958 on bechin (food seasoning). The application was opposed by herein respondent-appelee. The
American Food Manufacturing Company, on the ground that petitioner's trademark was similar to its
(respondent's) trademark "LION and representation of a lion" previously adopted and used by it on
the same type of product since August 3, 1953.

After hearing, the Director of Patents, on June 14, 1961, rendered a decision in favor of American
Food Manufacturing Corporation due to prior use. The record shows the petitioner's counsel was
furnished with copy of the decision on June 16, 1961.3 No appeal was taken from the decision of the
Director of Patents within the reglementary period from June 16, 1961.

On December 14, 1961, however, herein petitioner-appellant filed with the Patent Office a petition to
set aside the aforementioned judgment of June 14, 1961, invoking section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, alleging fraud and/or negligence committed by her former counsel, Atty. Bienvenido Medel, in
that the latter failed to file a memorandum before the case was submitted for decision; that she had
been fraudulently kept in total ignorance of the proceedings in the case; that her counsel had not
informed her of the decision thus preventing her from resorting to all the legal remedies available to
her; that she came to known of the decision only about the latter part of October, 1961, through her
friend, Mr. Domingo Adevoso; that she had evidence to disprove the claim of opposer The American
Food Manufacturing Company that it had been using the same trademark even before 1958; and that
she had evidence to show that the bechin that the opposer sold prior to 1958 were not of the "Lion"
brand but of the "Lion-Tiger" brand, another trademark of opposer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Director of Patents erred in denying the petition to set aside judgment and
resolving that there was no fraud perpetrated against petitioner-appellant, as contemplated under
section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: NO.

Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or order entered against a party
through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence may be set aside upon proper petition to
that effect. Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court
has held that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for
annulling a judgment.7 Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a
litigation which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his
side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the
trial, such as the use of forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.

The acts complained of by petitioner-appellant, even if assumed to be true and fraudulent, were all
committed by her own counsel, and not by the successful party or opponent in the case. Hence,
petitioner-appellant had not shown extrinsic fraud that would warrant the setting aside of the
decision.
 CASE 213
G.R. No. L-8222. June 25, 1956
GREGORIO TARCA and RODOLFO TARCA CASTRO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs.
ANGELES CASON VDA. DE CARRETERO, Defendant-Appellee.

FACTS: Plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action seeking to annul the
judgment rendered in a registration case (G.L.R.O. Record No. 54794) which was jointly heard with
another case concerning recovery of two of the lots that were the subject of registration (Civil Case No.
8853), on the ground that said judgment was obtained through fraud. Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss which, as amended, disputed the sufficiency of the complaint on three grounds; (a) that the
court had no jurisdiction of the person of Defendant; (b) that the cause of action was barred by a prior
judgment; and (c) that the complaint states no cause of action.
After Plaintiffs had filed their objection to said motion and Defendant had replied, the court found the
motion to dismiss well taken on the ground that the alleged fraud on which the cause of action
of Plaintiffs is predicated, even if committed, is not extrinsic or collateral to the issues involved in the
former case, but intrinsic or one which should have been raised therein because it was part and parcel
of the defense that the Plaintiffs had set up to protect their interest. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the case.
The facts which, according to the complaint, constitute the alleged fraud on which Plaintiffs base their
cause of action to annul the judgment rendered in the former case, are: (1) the concealment
by Defendant of the true traces of an old sugar mill and of the house of their predecessors-in-interest
by indicating some big stones within the perimeter of lot No. 8 is the ocular inspection conducted by
the court, because the truth is that said traces are on the western side of lot 8, located in another
property belonging to Defendant; (2) the refusal of the trial judge to conduct an ocular inspection of
the other side of Cabatuan creek to see for himself the location of the true traces of said sugar mill and
house without any justifiable reason; (3) the mysterious disappearance of the record of the
proceedings concerning the ocular inspection made by the trial judge as above adverted to.
But it appears on the very face of the complaint that those facts, which allegedly constitute the fraud
on which the action of Plaintiffs is predicated, are matters which have transpired in the course of the
ocular inspection made by the trial judge in the former case and which said trial judge had already
considered and passed upon in his decision. It even appears that when the ocular inspection was
made, both parties were present with their counsel, and the objection of Plaintiffs to the indication of
the traces or remains of the old sugar mill and house determinative of Defendant’s possession has
been duly noted by the trial judge only that the same was not given due consideration by him. And it
likewise appears that these matters have also been taken up by Plaintiffs in connection with their
appeal to the Court of Appeals but that said court did not decide them in their favor but instead
affirmed the findings of the trial court. It is therefore evident that the alleged fraud now advanced
by Plaintiffs predicated on those facts is not extrinsic or collateral but intrinsic in the sense that they
have not only been raised but were the subject of adjudication by both the former court and the Court
of Appeals and as such it cannot be considered as sufficient basis for annulling the judgment rendered
in the former case.
ISSUE: Whether or not fraud indicated by complainant are sufficient to annul judgment rendered in
the former case.
HELD: “Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to the litigations. Were not
these the rule there would be no end to litigation, perjury being of such common occurrence in trials.
In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing
imaginary falsehood to his adversary’s proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination
however erroneous of matters brought within the court’s jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another
proceeding. It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponent’s perjured evidence.” (Almeda
vs. Cruz, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1179, 1180.)
It is true, as Plaintiffs claim, that when the former case was appealed to the Court of Appeals they
discovered that the record of the proceedings concerning the ocular inspection made by the trial court
has “mysteriously” disappeared and for that reason the Court of Appeals could not act properly on the
issues raised concerning said ocular inspection, but why did not Plaintiffs take the necessary steps in
order that the record of said ocular inspection may be located or reconstituted as required by law? It
is preposterous to contend that such disappearance is the result of a conspiracy between the trial
judge and the Defendant. In any event, it was the concern of Plaintiffs to have the matters investigated
in due time, and this they failed to do. But this circumstance alone cannot certainly be the basis of
annulment of a judgment duly rendered and affirmed by the appellate court and which has become
final long ago.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellants.
 CASE 214
G.R. No. 70443 September 15, 1986
BRAULIO CONDE, RUFINA CONDE, GERARDO CONDE, CONCHITA C. LUNDANG, and
ALFREDO VENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXVI, Third Judicial Region, Capas,
Tarlac, and MARCELO GUTIERREZ, respondents.

FACTS: On January 16, 1984, the petitioners filed an action to annul the judgment of the Court of
Appeals dated September 23, 1981, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
ordered the petitioners and/or their successors-in-interest to deliver immediately the ownership and
possession of the property in question to the then plaintiff-appellant Marcelo Gutierrez. In their
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, the petitioners alleged that through
fraud, Gutierrez was able to make it appear that he was the son of Esteban Gutierrez and Fermina
Ramos and as a necessary consequence of such filiation, was the absolute owner by succession of the
property in question.

On February 27, 1984, the trial court dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the ground that it had
no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Upon the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction
before the appellate court. The said court in turn, dismissed the petition and a subsequent motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and that only the Supreme Court is empowered to review the
judgment of said appellate court. Hence, the petitioners elevated the case before this Court.

On the merits of the petition, the appellate court ruled that the fraud relied upon by the petitioners is
only intrinsic and thus, even on the assumption that it has jurisdiction to decide the case, still the
same has no merit. It dismissed the petition. The petitioners elevated this decision to us.

On June 5, 1985, we resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition. Notwithstanding
proof that a copy of the petition was served on the respondents' counsel on June 24, 1985, no
comment has been filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fraud mentioned is intrinsic in nature.

HELD: Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule 'where it is
one of the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contests, or from presenting all
of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to
the manner by which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other
words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.

The resort to fraud in introducing fabricated evidence is definitely an intrinsic fraud, hence false
testimony being a matter of evidence is definitely intrinsic and not extrinsic. Fraud consisting in
acting fictitious cause of false testimony is intrinsic (sic) (Francisco v. David, 38 CG 714). Intrinsic
fraud takes the form of acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged
instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a
fair and just determination of the case (Libudan v. Palma, [S1, 45 SCRA 17]). Intrinsic fraud is not
sufficient to attack a judgment (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971).

Petitioners stand that extrinsic fraud was employed by the respondents, is bereft of any factual basis,
hence, even on the assumption that this court has jurisdiction to decide this issue, still the petitioners
cause of action must fail.

A careful review of the present petition and of the records of the appellate court on this case shows
that even on the assumption that all the facts alleged in the petition are true, the petition should be
dismissed for lack of merit because the fraud allegedly perpetrated by the private respondent in AC-
G.R. SP No. 03301 is only intrinsic in nature and not extrinsic. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or
collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting an of his case to the
court. (Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233, 239; citing Amuran v.
Aquino, 38 Phil. 29). In the case at bar, the fraud was in the nature of documents allegedly
manufactured by Marcelo Gutierrez to make it appear that he was the rightful heir of the disputed
property, Hence, the Intermediate Appellate Court is correct in finding the fraud to be intrinsic in
nature.
 CASE 215
G.R. No. 79244 December 10, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MATEO AYLLON SR.,
(Deceased) ERLINDA S. AYLLON petitioner- appellant,
vs.
PRIMA A. SEVILLA, PILAR A. SALAZAR, MERCED A. PABELLO MARCOS AYLLON
ANGELES A. SALAMEDA and and VICENTE AYLLON AYLLON ANGELES A.
SALAMEDA and VICENTE AYLLON respondents-appellees.

FACTS: A petition for probate of a holographic last will and testament of Mateo Ayllon Sr. was filed
on 7 November 1977 by the petitioner with the Court of First Instance (Now Regional Trial Court),
Branch VI, of Guiuan Eastern Samar. The case was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 459. In said
will, the testator made disposition of specific properties to the petitioner, as his surviving spouse with
whom he had no children, and to the respondents, as his sons and daughters by a first marriage. The
respondents opposed the probate, and so hearings were held until the case was submitted for decision
at about the end of 1981. .

While the case was awaiting the court's decision, the Petitioner, without the aid of a lawyer, entered
into a verbal amicable settlement with the respondents. Relying on the verbal settlement and
believing that she will be given one-half (1/2) of the house and lot situated at Concepcion Street,
Guiuan Easter Samar, in return for her abandoning the rest of the properties willed to her, petitioner
wrote her lawyer a letter requesting the latter to file a motion to dismiss the case. Petitioner's lawyer
complied with her request. On 14 March 1984, the case was dismissed. However, the respondents
apparently did not comply with their verbal agreement with the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed
an affidavit with the court on 22 March 1984, asking for the withdrawal of her motion to dismiss and
for revival of the case.

On 7 September 1984, the trial court reconsidered the order of dismissal, and revived the case. But, on
10 September 1985, the court issued an order recalling the order of 7 September 1984, thereby
reviving the order of dismissal of 14 March 1984, on the grounds that (1) the case was amicably
settled, and (2) the petitioner failed to present three (3) witnesses who could Identify the handwriting
of the testator in the disputed holographic will, as provided under Article 811 of the Civil Code.

The petitioner files a motion for reconsideration of order of the trial court dismissing the case but it
was denied. Upon petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court required the petitioner
to file a Record on Appeal within Sixty (60) days from notice. The counsel of the petitioner received
the notice on 11 February 1987, so that the last day to file the record on appeal was on 12 April 1987.
But, instead of preparing and eventually filing the Record on Appeal, the petitioner's counsel filed an
Appeal Brief dated 28 February 1987, but actually filed through the mails on 17 March 1987. Hence, in
a Resolution dated 29 May 1987, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on account of failure of
counsel of the petitioner to filed a record on appeal, which is required in appeals in special
proceedings, under Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 29 (b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 29 May 1987.
It was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, with the petitioner praying that her case be
revived, and that she be allowed to submit a record on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sixty-day period within which a party may file an appeal already lapsed.

HELD: YES.

Petitioner's counsel failed to file a record on appeal despite due notice and the period of sixty (60)
days given to him to file said record on appeal. Instead of filing the record on appeal, as required,
what the petitioner's counsel did was to file an Appeal Brief. And even after petitioner's counsel
received a copy of the respondents' Motion for the Dismissal of the Appeal for failure of the petitioner
to file a record on appeal, nothing was done by petitioner's counsel to correct or amend the erroneous
procedure he had taken. Thus, it is clear that the failure of the petitioner, through counsel, to file the
record on appeal was not inadvertent. In other words, petitioner's counsel ignored compliance with
the requirement of filing a record on appeal, as provided for by the Rules. Hence, there is no
reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals, in dismissing petitioner's appeal.
 CASE 216
G.R. No. L-56171 January 31, 1983
NIDA GABA, RODOLFO GABA, NATY A. UY and MARIANO TAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City,
NILO CABANG, Deputy Sheriff, and PEDRO F. MARTINEZ. respondents.

FACTS: Pedro F. Martinez sued Nida Gaba, Naty A. Uy and Lilian C. Gabriel and their respective
husbands for the recovery of the sums of P20,000 and P3,000 plus damages.

Nida Gaba and the Uy spouses answered the complaint through lawyer Tirso L. Manguiat. Although
duly served with the summons, the Gabriel spouses did not answer the complaint. They pleaded the
defense that they borrowed from Martinez only one amount of P10,000 and not P20,000 and that all
the interests due were deducted in advance.

The trial court set the case for pre-trial and an order was sent to the parties’ counsels through mail. At
the pre-trial on July 16, where only plaintiff Martinez and his counsel appeared, Gaba and the Uy
spouses were declared in default for their non-appearance. Lilian C. Gabriel was declared in default
for her failure to answer the complaint. The clerk of court was commissioned to hear the evidence.

A copy of the decision was received on August 22, 1980 by registered mail by Manguiat's clerk,
Alfredo Chico. On September 8, 1980, Martinez filed a motion for execution with notice to Manguiat
by registered mail. On that same date, September 8, Manguiat filed an urgent motion to set aside the
order of default with the advertence that the clerk of court should submit the motion for the
immediate consideration by the trial court and, alternatively, that it be set for hearing with notice to
the parties.

Defendant Manny Tan, husband of Naty A. Uy, verified that motion. He alleged that defendants'
failure to appear in court was due to fraud or excusable neglect since no notice of the trial was sent to
them and their counsel. A copy of that motion was furnished Martinez's counsel by registered mail.
The trial court in its order of November 12, 1980 denied the motion for lack of merit.

Several months later, or on February 11, 1981, the Gaba, Uy and Gabriel spouses filed the herein
petition for certiorari through another lawyer, Camilo R. Flores. Attached to the petition was the
affidavit of Manguiat, a resident of 2401 Singalong Street, Manila (no longer holding office at the City
Court Compound). The Gabriel spouses, who are abroad, were later dropped as petitioners. Manguiat
alleged that Alfredo Chico, who received copies of the notice of pre-trial and decision, had ceased to
be his clerk in December, 1979, that his other clerk was Chona M. Seminiano and that Chico did not
turn over to him the said papers. Manguiat did not attach any affidavit of Chona.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was unduly inflated by
the trial court.

HELD: Manguiat's claim that he was deceived by his alleged former clerk (Chico) cannot be taken
seriously in the light of the incontestable fact that although his other clerk, Chona Seminiano received
on August 1, 1980 a copy of the order of default, yet it was only on September 8, or thirty-eight days
later, when Manguiat filed a motion to set it aside, He was not conscientious in attending to his
clients' interests.

As to petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was unduly inflated by the trial court, it
should be observed that petitioners Mariano Tan and Nida Gaba -in a letter to respondent deputy
sheriff dated January 6, 1981 asked for a period of fifteen days within which to satisfy the judgment
(p. 95, Rollo). They did not contest the validity of the judgment and the levy.

Since the said judgment had long become final and executory when the petitioners filed on February
11, 1981 their petition for certiorari and as there is no clear showing that they were deprived of due
process or that the said judgment was procured by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud, it can no
longer be set aside. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction and did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in rendering and enforcing that judgment.

With reference to the alleged irregularities in the execution of the judgment, particularly with respect
to Rodolfo Gaba the same should be first raised in the trial court. The record does not show that the
lower court's attention was called to the alleged improper implementation of the writ of execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with cost,-against the petitioners. The writ of preliminary
injunction is cancelled.
 CASE 217
G.R. No. L-39373 September 30, 1974
FELIXBERTO W. FERRER, as administrator of the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
SPOUSES ESTEBAN F. FERRER, SR. and MIGUELA WENCESLAO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
YANG SEPENG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: This case was certified to this Court as involving a pure question of law by resolution of
August 2, 1974 of the Court of Appeals

In the action below for recovery of a sum of money, trial on the merits was set for November 8, 1967.
At the hearing, plaintiff-appellee and counsel appeared while only counsel for defendant-appellant
was present. The trial proceeded and plaintiff introduced his documentary evidence supporting his
claim against defendant, all of which were admitted without objection by defendant's counsel. After
plaintiff rested his case, defendant's counsel moved for postponement on the ground that defendant
was not present in court. The trial court denied the motion and declared the case submitted for
decision. On the same day, it rendered judgment against defendant.

Three weeks thereafter on December 2, 1967, defendant filed a motion for new trial allegedly on the
ground of "accident, mistake or excusable neglect" in that defendant "early in the morning of said
November 8, 1967 ... had stomach trouble and consequently I was not able to go to the court for said
trial" as per defendant's affidavit annexed to the motion. The trial court denied the motion on the
following grounds:

“1. That the alleged stomach "trouble" does not constitute excusable negligence since it is merely one
which could not physically prevent him from appearing in court;

2. That the motion for new trial did not allege any statement of fact constituting the valid defense
which the defendant may prove if given the chance to introduce evidence;

3. Finally, because it is not in dispute that appellant is indebted to the late Esteban Ferrer, Sr. in the
amount of P20,750.00 as set forth in Exhibit A which appellant signed and did not deny as shown by
the fact that appellant in his Answer did not deny the same under oath thereby giving rise to the
presumption that he is deemed to have admitted it (Section 3, Rule 8, Rules of Court).”

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial.

HELD: NO.

We find it necessary to tarry on this point of division in the appellate court. Defendant-appellant's
averment of "stomach trouble belatedly presented after three weeks, without any specific statement of
its nature and gravity was patently inadequate to show to the trial court's satisfaction the existence of
"accident, mistake or excusable neglect" which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against by
reason of which his substantial rights have been materially affected, as required by the Rules of Court.

But even if it were to be conceded that defendant-appellant did in fact suffer from serious stomach
trouble which physically prevented him from appearing and giving his testimony at the scheduled
trial, his failure to submit in addition an affidavit of merits showing the valid defense which he may
prove as against plaintiffs case in case a new trial is granted is fatal to his cause.

The reason is fundamental and elementary. The rule requires that motions for new trial founded on
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e.
affidavits showing the facts (not mere conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action
or defense which the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve
no purpose and would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint is after all
groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective.

The decisive undisputed fact is that no affidavit of merits to support his motion for new trial as
required by Rule 37, section 2 was submitted by defendant-appellant. Such failure is fatal to his cause
and is decisive on the question of law presented by his sole assignment of error.
 CASE 218
G.R. No. L-45885 April 28, 1983
JULIAN MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BULACAN, BRANCH III, and SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and CORAZON
MACAPAGAL, respondents.

FACTS: This is a direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari of an order of the respondent
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, dismissing the petitioner's complaint in
Civil Case No. 339-V-76 and of the subsequent order denying a motion for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal.

In May 1975, the petitioner Julian Mendoza and private respondents, spouses Renato Macapagal and
Corazon Macapagal, entered into a written contract, entitled "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapatayo Ng
Tirahang Bahay" whereby for and in consideration of the sum of P320,000.00, the petitioner
undertook to construct a residential house for the private respondents under the terms and conditions
therein provided for. The construction of the house was attended by some misunderstandings
between the parties, with the petitioner claiming that he is entitled to certain amounts which the
private respondents refused to pay, and the latter in turn alleging that the petitioner should pay them
damages for having abandoned the job.

Sometime in March 1976, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
against the private respondents and the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Before any
trial was conducted, however, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the same does not state a cause of action. The petitioner filed an opposition to the said
motion to dismiss. The Judge granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

Realizing, perhaps, the weakness of their position in sustaining the order of the respondent Judge in
dismissing the complaint, the private respondents, in their memorandum, resorted to additional
grounds for upholding such dismissal. They now contend that this petition for certiorari may not be
entertained because it is being utilized as a substitute for appeal, and that it was filed out of time.
Neither of these contentions of the private respondents find support in applicable rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant proceeding is a petition for certiorari and whether or not is was
filed out of time.

HELD: NO.

The instant proceeding is not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It is an
appeal by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. It is illogical,
therefore, to claim that the petitioner is resorting to this proceeding as a substitute for appeal, it being
an appeal in itself.

The contention that the petition was filed out of time is predicated on the claim that the motion for
reconsideration was defective for being pro-forma and for failing to comply with the requirements of
the Rules of Court regarding such a motion. We fail to see how the motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner may be considered pro-forma, the same having called the attention of the trial court to
a point which the latter totally ignored in the order dismissing the complaint. The requirement which
the petitioner supposedly failed to observe in filing his motion for reconsideration was the failure to
attach an affidavit of merit to the same. Private respondents argue that a motion for reconsideration is
equivalent to a motion for new trial and, under Section 2 of Rule 37, when the motion for new trial is
filed, affidavits of merits should be attached to the motion. Once again, private respondents
misinterpreted the rules. While it is true that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion
for new trial if based on a ground for new trial (2 Moran, 1970 Edition, p. 222), the so-called "motion
for reconsideration" which is not called as such in Rule 37 is the term commonly used to refer to a
motion for new trial under subdivision (c) of Section I of Rule 37. An affidavit of merit is required in a
motion for new trial pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 37 if the motion for new trial is based on any of the
causes mentioned in subdivision (a) of Section I of Rule 37, to wit, fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. No similar requirement is imposed for a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration under subdivision (c) of the same section.

The timeliness of the filing of this petition may not be validly questioned. The order dismissing the
complaint was received by the petitioner on January 25, 1977. The motion for reconsideration was
received on February 1, 1977. The order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the
petitioner on March 21, 1977. Within fifteen days thereafter or on April 4, 1977, the instant petition
was filed before this Court.
 CASE 219
205 SCRA 537 JANUARY 27, 1992
VILLANUEVA VS CA
(CANNOT FIND SA NET UNG FULL CASE)

CASE 220
G.R. No. L-57204 March 14, 1988
FORTUNATO BORRE, ARTURO SANTOS, ALEJANDRO MANALANG, JOSE
MANALANG, VIRGINIA SANTOS, VIRGILIO GALLARDO, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ,
GLORIA DE LA FUENTE, DIONISIO CASTANEDA, SR., YOLY ANG ESPINA, JACINTO
MOLINA, BENIGNO MONDERO, SALUD VIRAY, DEMETRIO CHICA, CRISANTA
BRILLANTES, MILAGROS GALLARDO, FERNANDO ABES, MODESTA GABEON,
AMPARO GARA, RAMON GARA, RAMESES TAMOAN, FELIMON DORADO,
FLORENTINA PERALTA, ADELAIDA ABAYGAR, MARINO ABAYGAR, FIDEL
CAYANAN, ABDON SARMIENTO, ROSARIO SISON, LAURA LUMABI, and RUPERTO
TORREFIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE ARTEMON D. LUNA, and
THE MANOTOK SERVICES, INCORPORATED, respondents.

FACTS: On August 29, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent Manotok
Services, Inc. to recover rentals paid by them alleging that the land leased to them by the company
was actually public land, forming part of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and did not
belong to the company.

On motion of the respondent company, the trial court dismissed the complaint on November 11, 1980
on the ground that the company's ownership of the property was recognized by the State with the
passage of Pres. Dec. No. 1670.

On December 13, 1980, petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that respondent company's
titles covered lots which were portions of the Estero de Sunog-Apo and Estero de Maypajo and
therefore should not have been included in those titles because these portions are public property
which cannot be appropriated and titled by private persons like the respondent company. The trial
court denied the motion in its order dated December 22, 1980 which was received by petitioners on
January 12, 1981.

A second motion for reconsideration was filed on January 14, 1981 on the ground that a subsequent
survey showed that the lots occupied by petitioners are not covered by respondent company's titles,
and hence, are neither covered by Pres. Dec. No. 1670. In its order dated January 20, 1981, the trial
court denied the second motion. Petitioners received the court order on January 30, 1981.

The next day, January 31, 1981, the last day for perfecting their appeal from the dismissal of their
complaint, petitioners filed by registered mail a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to
file the record on appeal. However, they did not file their appeal bond until February 2, 1981 for which
reason the court dismissed their appeal, the thirty-day period for perfecting appeal having expired.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari but their petition was dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the late filing of the appeal bond of the petitioners was due to "excusable
negligence".

HELD: NO.

This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a question on the timeliness of filing the appeal
bond, a requirement for perfecting an appeal which had been dispensed with by Section 18 of the
Interim Rules of Court. Although this new procedural rule may be given retroactive effect, the extent
of its retroactive application is, however, limited to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
its approval and does not extend to actions which had already become final and executor.

Before the Interim Rules of Court took effect, the 1964 Rules of Court required the filing with the trial
court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and
a record on appeal. In the case at bar, although the notice of appeal and the motion for extension of
time to file the record on appeal were filed within the reglementary period, the appeal bond was filed
two days late, or after the period for perfecting an appeal had lapsed. Inasmuch as the appeal was not
perfected on time, the decision of the trial court became final and executory on January 31, 1981. The
trial judge committed no error in dismissing the appeal. This is clearly set forth in Section 13, Rule 41
of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 13.Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal. — Where the notice
of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein
provided, the appeal shall be dismissed.

There is, therefore, no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. This Court has
repeatedly held that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional. As Justice J.B.L. Reyes has pointed out, "The right to appeal is
not a natural right nor part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law

Unless there is a showing of excusable negligence justifying the failure to file the appeal bond on time,
the period within which to perfect an appeal cannot be extended to accommodate the appellant.
Petitioners' mistake in believing that the Office of the Clerk of Court would be closed on Saturdays
does not constitute "excusable negligence" which would justify a liberal application of the pertinent
rules on the perfection of an appeal. Petitioners' counsel, a practitioner in the Metro Manila area,
should have known or exerted effort to inquire about office hours in courts on Saturdays instead of
assuming that Saturdays are not working days. No abuse of discretion, much less a grave one at that,
as alleged, was committed by respondent Judge in dismissing petitioners' appeal.
 CASE 221
G.R. No. 174536 OCTOBER 29, 2008
ROBERTO Y. PONCIANO, JR., Petitioner
VS.
LAGUNA LAKEDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CASE 222
G.R. No. 168985 JULY 23, 2008
ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST INC., a.k.a. ARTS 21 CORPORATION, and TADAHIKO
HASHIMOTO
VS.
ERLINDA B. ALABANZA, for and in behalf of her deceased husband, JONES B.
ALABANZA,

FACTS: On September 27, 2002, respondent Alabanza filed a complaint against petitioners Arts 21
and Hashimoto for and in behalf of her husband for non-payment of salaries, separation pay and 13th
month pay.

Respondent’s husband was the Vice-President, Manager and Director of Arts 21 and had been
with the company from 1975 to 1997. He was compelled by the owner, Hashimoto, to file his
involuntary resignation on October 17, 1997 on the ground that Arts 21 allegedly suffered losses.
Respondent’s husband demanded payment of his money claims upon resignation but was told that
rank and file employees will be paid first and thus waited for his turn. Respondent’s husband made
several demands but Arts 21 just kept on assuring him that he will be paid his money claims.
Respondent’s husband died on August 5, 2002 with his claims still unpaid.

Petitioners invoke Art. 291 of the Labor Code and contend that respondent’s husband
voluntarily resigned in October, 1997, thus the cause of action has already prescribed since the case
was filed in 2002 only, beyond the three-year-period within which money claims should be filed.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay respondent over P4M.
Petitioners filed an appeal along with a motion to reduce bond, attaching receipts for cash bond
amounting to P290K and appeal fee for P170.00. The motion was denied and petitioners were given
10 days within which to file the required bond. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which
the NLRC denied ordering the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection thereof due to non-
compliance with the bond requirement. The resolution became final and executory and a writ of
execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter upon motion by respondent. Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction. The petition was dismissed.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the cause of action of respondent has already prescribed.

2. Whether or not the posting of the complete amount of the bond in an appeal from the decision of
the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC is an indispensable requirement for the perfection of the appeal
despite the filing of a motion to reduce the amount of the appeal bond.

HELD:

1. NO.

Based on the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter, it was petitioner Arts 21 which was responsible for
the delay in the institution of the complaint. When petitioner’s husband filed his resignation he
immediately asked for the payment of his money claims. However, the management of Arts 21
promised him that he would be paid immediately after the claim of the rank-and-file employees had
been paid. Jones relied on this representation.

Promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without
consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon, as in fact it was relied upon,
and if a refusal to enforce it would virtually sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other
injustice. The principle of promissory estoppel is a recognized exception to the three-year prescriptive
period enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor Code.

In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing
the following elements: (1) a promise was reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; (2)
such promise did, in fact, induce such action or forbearance; and (3) the party suffered detriment as a
result. All the requisites are present in this case. The Court, therefore, finds ample justification not to
follow the prescriptive period imposed under Art. 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will be
committed if respondent’s claims will be brushed aside on a mere technicality, especially when it was
petitioner’s own action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the required
period.

2. YES.

Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in case of a judgment of the Labor Arbiter involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer to the NLRC may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission, in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving

monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be
complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the
decision of the Labor Arbiter final and 28xecutor. This requirement is intended to assure the workers
that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favour upon the
dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to
delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees’ just and lawful claims.

The failure of petitioners to comply with the requirement of posting a bond equivalent in
amount to the monetary award is fatal to their appeal. Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC mandates, among others, that no motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on
meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award. The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny their motion to reduce the amount of
the appeal bond. The finding of the NLRC that petitioners did not present sufficient justification for
the reduction thereof is generally conclusive upon the Court absent a showing that the denial was
tainted with bad faith.

Furthermore, appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Parties who
seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.
 CASE 223
G.R. No. L-43252 September 30, 1976
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CORAZON JEREMIAS (REMIAS) and GERINIMO PERECHO, defendants. CAPITAL
INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC., movant-appellant.

CASE 224
G.R. No. 98334 May 8, 1992
MANUEL D. MEDIDA, Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Cebu, CITY SAVINGS BANK
(formerly Cebu City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.) and TEOTIMO
ABELLANA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ANDRES DOLINO and PASCUALA DOLINO

FACTS: Private respondents, Spouses Dolino, alarmed of losing their right of redemption over the
subject parcel of land from Juan Gandiocho, purchaser of the aforesaid lot at a foreclosure sale of the
previous mortgage in favor of Cebu City Development Bank, went to Teotimo Abellana, President of
the City Savings Bank (formerly known as Cebu City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.), to obtain a
loan of P30, 000. Prior thereto, their son Teofredo filed a similar loan application and the subject lot
was offered as security. Subsequently they executed a promissory note in favor of CSB.

The loan became due and demandable without the spouses Dolino paying the same, petitioner
association caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The land was sold at a public auction
to CSB being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued which was also
registered. No redemption was being effected by Sps. Dolino, their title to the property was cancelled
and a new title was issued in favor of CSB.

Sps. Dolino then filed a case to annul the sale at public auction and for the cancellation of certificate of
sale issued pursuant thereto, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was in violation of Act
3135, as amended. The trial court sustained the validity of the loan and the real estate mortgage, but
annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure on the ground that it failed to comply with the notice
requirement of Act 3135.

Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Sps. Dolino interposed a partial appeal to the CA,
assailing the validity of the mortgage executed between them and City Savings Bank, among others.
The CA ruled in favor of private respondents declaring the said mortgage as void or the reason that
the mortgagor spouses, at the time when the said mortgage was executed, were no longer the owners
of the lot, having supposedly lost the same when the lot was sold to a purchaser in the foreclosure sale
under the prior mortgage. This holding cannot be sustained.

Preliminarily, the issue of ownership of the mortgaged property was never alleged in the complaint
nor was the same raised during the trial, hence that issue should not have been taken cognizance of by
the Court of Appeals. An issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor ventilated during the
trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
basic rule of fair play, justice and due process

ISSUE: Whether or not a mortgage, whose property has been extra judicially foreclosed and sold at a
corresponding foreclosure sale, may validly execute a mortgage contract over the same property in
favor of a third party during the period of redemption.

HELD: It is undisputed that the real estate mortgage in favor of petitioner bank was executed by
respondent spouses during the period of redemption. During the said period it cannot be said that the
mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property since the rule up to now is the right of a
purchaser of a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired
without the right being exercised. The title to the land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in the
mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption period and the conveyance of the
master deed.

The mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property during the redemption period and has
the free disposal of his property, there would be compliance with Article. 2085 of the Civil Code for
the constitution of another mortgage on the property. To hold otherwise would create an inequitable
situation wherein the mortgagor would be deprived of the opportunity, which may be his last
recourse, to raise funds to timely redeem his property through another mortgage.

CASE 225
G.R. No. 102128 November 6, 1992
ABUNDIA ESPINA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEMETRIA VILAS VDA. DE PINILI, ALFONSO ARTUS and
AGUSTINA DELA RIARTE, respondents.

FACTS: This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City which dismissed petitioner's action for reconveyance
against private respondents.

The property in dispute is a 744-square meter lot which is a portion of Lot 2723 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre, situated at Taclobo, Dumaguete City, registered on 27 October 1922 in the name of Rufina
Lazaga under Original Certificate of Title No. 66-A. On 16 February 1939, Geronimo Pinili, deceased
husband of private respondent Demetria Vilas Vda. de Pinili, acquired one-half (1/2) of said Lot 2723,
which contained a total area of 2,402 square meters, as evidenced by TCT No. T-5448 issued in his
name, 2 while the other half was purchased by a certain Alfonso Artus. The 744-square meter lot in
dispute is part of the portion now owned by private respondents.

Petitioner now seeks the reconveyance of the disputed lot as she alleges that the property is owned by
her mother, Maria Lazaga, who had it declared in her name in 1915 for taxation purposes, and that
she and her mother have been in the peaceful and public possession and enjoyment thereof. She
asserts that by means of deceit and fraud, the disputed property was included and made part of Lot
2723 and subsequently registered in the name of Rufina Lazaga under OCT No. 66-A. Petitioner
claims that she discovered the fraud only sometime in 1985 when private respondents required her
tenants to pay rentals to them.

Private respondents in turn maintain that they are the owners of the land in dispute, which is
registered in their names under TCT No. T-1365, and that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Maria
Lazaga, does not even appear to be a survey claimant in Lot 2723 in the 1918 cadastral proceedings.

The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and held that the land in dispute was
subject of a cadastral proceeding but Maria Lazaga did not file an answer to claim any interest in the
land as required by Act No. 2259, Sec. 9 and the tax declaration presented by petitioner covers a
different land.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in considering an issue which was not raised in the briefs of the
parties.

HELD: A careful study of the petition reveals that it raises factual issues which this Court could have
dismissed outright under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But We brushed aside technicalities and gave
due course to the petition if only to be satisfied that respondent Court of Appeals did not, contrary to
the petition, misapprehend the facts.

As regards petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals considered ground other than those
touched upon in the decision of the trial court, it is settled that the appellate court may uphold the
judgment of a lower court on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court. 7 In fact, even if
issues are not formally and specifically raised on appeal, they may nevertheless be considered as long
as they are closely related to the error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the
question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent. 8 The Court of Appeals, in the case
before Us, can hardly be said to have treated issues not brought before the court a quo. What the
appellate court merely did was to make a strict scrutiny of the evidence on record, and that its ruling
that petitioner's Exh. "F" pertains to a different land does not mean it violated the principle that an
issue which has not been raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Simply put, all that respondent Court of Appeals did was to take into account a ground or issue closely
related to or intimately interwoven with the error properly assigned.