Social Justice Society v.

Atienza

Facts: City of Manila enacted an ordinance that reclassified the Pandacan area from
an Industrial Area into a Commercial Area. Incidentally, the ordinance called
businesses operating in the Pandacan area to cease from operating after 6 months.
Subsequently, affected oil companies entered into an MOU with the City, which was
eventually ratified by the SP of Manila. Thus, petitioners assail the ratification of the
MOU noting that the original ordinance should be upheld.

Ruling: However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the

right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power
clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail. Thus, the
original ordinance was upheld over the contentions of the oil companies.

Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD

Facts: Petitioners assails the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme of RA

9257 (Senior Citizen’s Act) on the ground that it amounts to taking without due
process of law and taking of property without just compensation.

Ruling: The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power
of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Accordingly, it has been
described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does to all the great public needs. For this reason, when the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare. Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While
Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property,
various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of
contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to
property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of
public good.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. v. PBM Co.

Facts: Petitioner organization organized a demonstration to protest against the

action of Pasig police officers. Upon learning of such demonstration, respondent
company sought to prohibit certain employees (those belonging to 1st shift) from
attending the demonstration. Despite this plea, petitioner failed to accede to
respondent’s plea which prompted the later to charge some first shift employees for
violating RA 875.

Ruling: While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and
of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. The primacy of
human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained.

Balacult v. CFI

Facts: Petitoners assailed an ordinance passed by the SP of Butuan penalizing movie

theaters selling tickets more than a price ceiling fixed by the same ordinance.

Ruling: To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the
interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the
means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is
equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. The enacted ordinance amounts to interference of property rights without
a lawful subject. Thus invalid

Lozano v. Martinez

Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of BP 22 on the ground that it

violates the non-imprisonment of debt and non-impairment clauses of the
constitution.

Ruling: Police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies
of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even
override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we
held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to
the police power of the state. Since BP 22 was enacted by the state in the exercise of
police power, the Court ruled I favor of its validity notwithstanding the alleged
constitutional transgressions

Del Rosario v. Bengzon

Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the Generics Act and its pertinent
IRR, this petition is primarily directed against the penal clause of the said law. The
petitioners noted that the law violates the equal protection clause of the constitution.
Ruling: In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed
to override the power of the State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to
secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community.
This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and
property rights are held subject to its fair exercise. Thus, the Court sustained the
validity of the Generics Act of 1988.

Tablarin v. Judge Gutierrez

Facts: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the National Medical Admissions

Test on the ground that it violates the freedom of education.

Ruling: The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is
also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Thus, the Court
affirmed the validity of NMAT.

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor

Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of a city ordinance which required

guests to fill up a prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times.
Petitioners argued that such measure amounts to the violation of the right to privacy.

Ruling: he mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not
cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To
hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power
which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs." It would be,
to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it
could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote
public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.

Cruz v. Paras

Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of an ordinance promulgated by the

SB of Bocaue prohibiting the operation of nightclubs. The challenge is anchored on
the claim that the ordinance violates the due process clause of the Constitution.

Ruling: An ordinance is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the

Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against
public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation
of common right. It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the
general powersand purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or
policy of the State. The Court justified the invalidity of the ordinance as it was aimed
to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, contrary to the facts under a case where an
ordinance was enacted so as to regulate the operations of night clubs.

Velasco v. Villegas

Facts: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance,which prohibits

barbershops from offering massages to adjacent rooms. In consonance to this
challenge, petitioners argue that it violates the due process clause of the constitution.

Ruling: The attack against the validity cannot succeed it is a police power measure.
This, ordinance was deemed to be constitutional.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties

Facts: Upon learning of PAGCOR’s intent to operate a casino within the City of
Cagayan de Oro, petitioners enacted an ordinance, which sought to prohibit the
operation of casinos within Cagayan de Oro. Respondents’ challenge the resolution
on the ground of its unconstitutionality.

Ruling: While Local Government units are empowered by the General Welfare
Clause to enact ordinances aimed to promote public welfare, it shall be subject to the
conditions as established by jurisprudence, namely: 1) It must not contravene the
constitution or any statute; 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) It must not be
partial or discriminatory; 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) It must be
general and consistent with public policy; 6) It must not be unreasonable.

Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local

councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The ordinance is declared invalid as it
runs aground to the statutes pass allowing PAGCOR to operate casinos.

Tano v. Socrates

Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted an ordinance that sought

to prohibit the shipment of some fishes and penalize those who violated the
ordinance. Petitioners were then apprehended for violating the ordinance and were
charged before the CFI. Thus, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the
ordinance on the ground that it violates the due process clause. Respondents
countered by alleging that they are vested with the authority to promulgate
ordinances by virtue of the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code.
Ruling: The general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to
give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community.
Thus, the Court ruled that the validity of the ordinance noting that it is within the
purview of the general welfare clause.

City of Manila v. Judge Laguio

Facts: The City of Manila enacted an ordinance that sought to prohibit persons and
corporations from operating motels and other establishment, which tends to illicit
immoral activities. Private respondents argued against the constitutionality of the
ordinance on the ground that it violates the due process clause.

Ruling: What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that

government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of
nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use
prohibitable. The Court ruled against the validity of the ordinance as it was an
improper exercise of police power being as it amounted to taking without just
compensation. Nonetheless, the ordinance also fails the test in analyzing the validity
of LGU ordinances, to wit: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

Ortigas and Co. v. Feati Bank and Trust Co.,

Facts: Private individuals initially acquired the subject lots of the case. Subsequently,
defendants acquired the same lots and intend to construct a banking complex.
Plaintiff opposed this plan on the ground that the conditions for the sale provided
that the purchased lots should only be used for residential purposes. On the other
hand, defendants invoked the municipality’s zoning resolution that classified the area
as industrial/commercial. Finally, plaintiff argued that the resolution is invalid as it
would impair the conditions in the sale of the lots

Ruling: It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is

constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with
the legitimate exercise of police power. Having been expressly granted the power to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of
Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly,
justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. Thus, the state, in
order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds
of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity
of the state and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. The motives behind the passage of the questioned
resolution being reasonable, and it being a " legitimate response to a felt public
need," not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the
Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. The validity
of the ordinance is sustained.

Presley v. Bel-Air Village

Facts: The case started when respondent village filed an action for specific
performance and damages against plaintiff on the ground that she violated the Deed
of Restriction imposed on her lot by building a pan de sal store. The lower Courts
ruled against plaintiff, which prompted to appeal before the SC. Petitioner argues
that the building of the store is justified as the lot is classified as a commercial area.
Respondent village also challenged the Court’s previous ruling in Sangalang v. IAC
noting that the SC misinterpreted the zoning ordinance classifying the village as a
highly commercial area.

Ruling: Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner.
However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions
are annotated on the torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the
legitimate exercise of police power. Above all, it [contract stipulations] cannot be
raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety,
peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights,
whenever necessary.

Bautista v. Juinio

Facts: In lieu of the oil crisis in 1974, respondents implemented Letter of Instruction
869, which sought to prohibit heavy and extra heavy vehicles from using roads
during 12-5 AM. Pursuant to this, respondents were empowered to impose penalties
upon violators of the said LOI. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the LOI
on the ground that it violates the due process clause.

Ruling: The Court noted that the LOI was pursuant to a lawful subject. In the
interplay between such a fundamental right [due process] and police power,
especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's
property, the latter is accorded much leeway. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized
as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
'to all the great public needs. Thus the Court upheld the validity of the LOI and the
measure adopted by the respondents.
JIL v. Municipality of Pasig

Facts: Respondents sought to open an access road to a market in Pasig. Thus, they
expropriated the lots that was bought by petitioners. Petitioners on the other hand
opposed the expropriation noting that the was no necessity to expropriate the lots
and that the original owners were not informed of the expropriation

Ruling: The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain by a local government unit must be complied with:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local

chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power
of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article

III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and
definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection
thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable
efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with
the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint. In the
present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made
a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access
road. Thus, the Court ruled against the validity of the expropriation.

Republic v. Castellvi

Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondent seeking
to expropriate the land belonging to the later. One of the pertinent issues raised was
the amount of compensation to be awarded. Petitioner argued that the compensation
should be computed based on the land’s market value during its ‘taking’, which
occurred when petitioner leased respondent’s land. Respondent on the other hand
argued that taking should be considered to have occurred only when the
expropriation proceedings were initiated.

Ruling: The elements of taking are as follows: a) Expropriator must enter private
property; b) Entrance in private property must be for more than a momentary period;
c) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; d)
Property must be devoted to public use; e) Utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Upon careful perusal of the facts, the Court ruled that
taking did not happen when the petitioner leased respondent’s land. The "taking" of
the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be
paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for
eminent domain was filed.

People v. Fajardo

Facts: Respondents were prosecuted for violating a local ordinance by constructing a

building that destroys the view of the public plaza without the necessary permit from
the mayor. Incidental to their appeal, respondents assailed the constitutionality of the
ordinance.

Ruling: The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to

permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property
without just compensation. Thus, the Court ruled against the validity of the
ordiance.

National Power Corporation v. Sps. Gutierrez

Facts: Petitioner sought to expropriate the land of respondent for the construction of
a transmission lines. The lower court ruled compensation to be awarded is 10/square
meter. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed before CA. In turn the CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling. Thus, petitioner appealed the matter before the Court noting that they should
only pay a simple easement fee and not the market value of the lot as the respondents
retained full ownership and were not totally deprive of the use of the land.

Ruling: Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon
the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. The easement
of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an
indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. Thus, spouses were
entitled to just compensation and not merely simple easement fees.

PPI v. COMELEC

Facts: COMELEC promulgated a resolution, which required various publishers of

newspapers to provide free print space for COMELEC’s use. Petitioner challenged
the validity of the ordinance noting that it amounts to taking of property without just
compensation. Respondent argues that the measure may be justified under the guise
of police power.

Ruling: To compel petitioners to donate COMELEC-space amounts to taking of

private personal property. Eminent domain is exercised if the threshold requisites are
present, to wit: a) necessity for the taking; b) legal authority to effect the taking. In
the present case, COMELEC failed to demonstrate the necessity in acquiring such
print space, more so the same failed to provide for its basis to exercise eminent
domain. Thus, resolution was void.

City of Mandaluyog v. Francisco

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC seeking to expropriate the land
belonging to the respondents. Respondents sought for the dismissal of the case noting
that their lots were exempted from expropriation by virtue of RA 7279. On the other
hand, petitioner argued that the modern exercise of eminent domain calls for a less
restricted exercise of power by virtue of more liberal jurisprudences interpreting the
power in favor of the general welfare.

Ruling: While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A.
No. 7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 introduced a limitation
on the size of the land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. Small-
property owners are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property
whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square
meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2)
that they do not own real property other than the same. In the present case, while the
lot of the heirs of Francisco was noted to be more than 300 sq. meters, each heir as
co-owners were only entitled to 69 sq. meters. Thus, their lot was considered to be
exempt from expropriation.

Sumulong v. Guerrero

Facts: NHA filed a petition to expropriate the lot of petitioner at a price of 1.oo per
square. Consequently, respondent judge issued a writ of possession in favor of NHA.
Because of this, petitioners assailed the issuance of the writ on the ground that they
are deprived of property without due process of law. Petitioners also noted that the
term social housing does not fall under the purview of ‘public use’.

Ruling: It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially

employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Specifically,
urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is
recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public
use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The issuance of a writ
of possession rests on the satisfaction of the following requisite: (1) There must be a
Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional
determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must
be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive)
discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement. Once these are complied the issuance of
a writ is ministerial function of the expropriation court.
Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes

Facts: The Philippine Tourist Authority sought to expropriate the land belonging to
petitioners for the promotion of tourism by creating, among others, golf course and
other recreational activities. Petitioner challenge the act on the ground that the
‘promotion of tourism’ does not fall under the purview of public use.

Ruling: As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. Ostensibly the Court also noted that the non-impairment
clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent
domain. Thus, the Court ruled in favor of the expropriation.

Province of Camarines Sur v. CA

Facts: Petitioner sought to expropriate the land belonging to respondent in order to

establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional crops and as housing project
for provincial government employees. Private respondents opposed the act on the
ground that the reason behind the expropriation does not fall within the purview of
public use. The OSG, when asked by the CA to comment on the expropriation,
noted that the expropriation of the agricultural land needs the approval of the
Secretary of DAR as it would entail the conversion of an agricultural land to a non-
agricultural one.

Ruling: Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience
or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. Requiring
approval of the DAR Secretary prior to the expropriation of agricultural land would
give his the unbridled authority to ascertain whether it is for public purpose or use.
Thus, expropriation is valid.

Jimenez v. PEZA

Facts: Respondent sought to expropriate the irrigated Riceland owned by petitioners.

Ruling: Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends
either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to take the land and
the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of
dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it finally disposes of the case. The
second phase concerns the determination of just compensation to be ascertained by
three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this order finally disposes
of the second stage. To both orders the remedy therefrom is an appeal.
Reyes v. NHA
Facts: NHA filed a complaint to expropriate the land of petitioners to resettle
squatters from Metro Manila. Petitioners assailed the expropriation on the ground
that its award to a real estate developer is beyond the purview of the term public use.

Ruling: The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate
developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold
to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from
the stated public purpose of their taking.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by
the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in
the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion
to the former owner.

MCWD v. J King and Sons

Facts: MCWD instituted an action to expropriate the lot belonging to respondents.

Respondents argued that the expropriation is invalid as the petitioner lack the
capacity and authority to expropriate their land.

Ruling: For petitioner to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements
should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the
expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was
subjected to review by the LWUA. In the present case, it was noted that MCWD
was with authority to expropriate the land.

RA 8974, a statute which prescribes the guidelines by which the National

Government and GOCC expropriates land requires the deposit of 100% of the total
zonal value of the property to be expropriated prior to the issuance of a writ of
possession. Appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is
within the province of the legislature to fix the standard. R.A. No. 8974 does not take
away from the courts the power to judicially determine the amount of just
compensation. The law merely sets the minimum price of the property as the
provisional value. Thus, the amount of just compensation must still be determined by
the courts according to the standards set forth in Section 5 of R.A. No. 8974.
Expropriation is valid

NHA v. Heirs of Guivilondo

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation against respondent. Initially,

respondent accented to the act. Because of this, the Court ordered for the fixing of
the just compensation. After trial, respondent was not satisfied with the
compensation award which prompted the same to question the expropriation of their
land.
Ruling: The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either
an order of expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of
the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount
of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable. An order of
condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the
plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the
first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate
and its public use can no longer be questioned.

Vda de Ouano v. Republic

Facts: Petitioner sought to reacquire their lots which were expropriated by

respondent on the ground that the purpose behind the expropriation has ceased.

Ruling: If the genuine public necessity the very reason or condition as it were
allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or
disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the governments retention of the
expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes
the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates
from the declared purpose to benefit another private person.

De Knecht v. Bautista

Ruling: The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or

reason. The condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Where the legislature
has delegated a power of eminent do-main, the question of the necessity for taking a
particular fine for the intended improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee
power subject however to review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross
abuse of discretion.

Republic v De Knecht

Facts: In lieu of the SC’s ruling in De Knecht v. Bautista, BP 390 was enacted which
sought to expropriate the lands subject in the above mentioned case.

Ruling: Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the
Government in thereafter (over two years later in this case) making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting
the corresponding legislation as it did in this case.

Eslaban v. De Onorio
Facts: Petitioner sought to expropriate the land of respondent for the creation of an
irrigation canal. Initially, petitioner as the agent of the National Irrigation Authority
paid a Right-of-Way fee to respondent. Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner asking for additional compensation.

Ruling: it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or that sum
of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. Thus,
the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

Republic v. IAC

Ruling: The determination of just compensation for a condemned property is basically a

judicial function. As the court is not bound by the commissioners' report, it may make such
order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the
exercise of its right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property
expropriated. For that matter, this Court may even substitute its own estimate of the value as
gathered from the record. 11 Hence, although the determination of just compensation appears
to be a factual matter which is ordinarily outside the ambit of its jurisdiction, this Court may
disturb the lower court's factual finding on appeal when there is clear error or grave abuse of
discretion.

Republic v. Gingoyon

Facts: Petitioner sought to expropriate NAIA 3 in lieu of the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO.

Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent

Ruling:
to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation,
unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant
standard for initial compensation, the market value of the
property as stated in the tax declaration or the current
relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements
and/or structures using the replacement cost method. The
right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property,
and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are
considered as real property.