In Re: Disciplinary Action Against Atty.

Wenceslao Laureta and Contempt

Preoceedings Against Eva Maravilla Illustre GR No 68635 12 March 1987
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A.
Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language
claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap
failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty
Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no
reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated
as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May
1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of
exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of
the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s Complaint

Issue:

Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of
grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.

Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the
same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme
Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks
and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of
government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can
interfere with the performance of the duties of the other

DEMETRIA V ALBA
G.R. No. 71977 | February 27, 1987 | J. Fernan

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree
of 1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest
common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44
infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to
undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed
for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and
held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its
performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become
moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant
thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

Issue:

1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional

2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

Held:

1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any
program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers,
but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes
the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as
void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is
superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy;
they are only the administrators of the public will.

Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

COCOFED VS REPUBLIC
Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012

Facts:

In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment
Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued
COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of
coconut producers having the largest membership.

When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:

PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the
CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing
the price of edible oil.

PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid
coconut seed farm.

In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut and palm oil industry.

Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755
authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit
the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has
attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized
to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of
the government.

Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special
and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to
coconut farmers in their private capacities.

Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2%
of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding
Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for
PCA’s buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB
shares.

The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later
reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % – 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and
delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in
the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the
agreements.

Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or
was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to
acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large
block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.

Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be construed by
any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid

No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should
revert back to the general fund.

Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only, and if the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall
be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced
exactions with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore, the subsequent
reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private
capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional.

Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which the coco
levy fund was created.

Issue 2:

W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities

No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They
cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the money
is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character.

Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of
stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may
promulgate is unconstitutional.

It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and second, it
allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of
absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined
“coconut farmers”, which negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by
P.D. No. 755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers’ shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private capacities,
but to the Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any property purchased by
means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to
burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.

BOCEA VS. TEVES CASE DIGEST

Facts:

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which
took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The
law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution
and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials
and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance
with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform
other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to
Congress.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner contended
that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of
officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board
the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets;
that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately
executory.

Issue:

Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

Held:

R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment
without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC
official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still
followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. BOCEA vs. Teves,
G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589

CASE DIGEST: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), REPRESENTED

BY ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO,PETITIONER,V. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III,
RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen
meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course
conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. The property
consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila.

His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus,
the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder.

When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no
corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations
submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in
relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification
of public documents. Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was granted. Nonetheless, on
December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and
recommended his being charged with estafa through falsification of public document. Tobias appealed
to the DOJ and then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing
the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul
M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's motion for reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK challenged the
adverse resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the
innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminary investigation; and that the
CA disregarded such lapse.
ISSUE:

Did the CA err in dismissing METROBANK's petition?

HELD: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters
over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government

The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is no definitive
standard by which probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the
existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the
examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding
should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the
duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the
validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of
dispatching its competent and experienced representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and
condition, and of investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not
diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had
offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise
greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public
interest. Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part.

DENIED
DIMAPORO V MITRA
FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the
COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by
the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the
Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress.
He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not
applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened,
are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these
constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a
ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman
holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not
equivalent to holding another office or employment.

ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE
ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY
PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not
because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our
Constitution, we have this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987
constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their
principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut
short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them
from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that
should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with
the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle
with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being
held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment
and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing
save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the
forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself
as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application
to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment … All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such
constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the
Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression
in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative
enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not
suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor
of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of
Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim
Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question
the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the
interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and
conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by
the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during
which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond
the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations
will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be
shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and
Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section
66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no
longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials
continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.
On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section
16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before
it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
“Accountability of Public Officers:”

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those
members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso
facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough
to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of
society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into
the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired
results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions
does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the
provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby
enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly
deserving members of Congress – is achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.
In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its
previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is
the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been
shown in this case.

Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso
facto resigned from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only
copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

NO.

In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials.
Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there
was no violation of the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an
obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge
Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a
valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government
will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election.
This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to
wield influence in the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non
partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown
a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
Pundaodaya –versus- Comelec & Noble,

G.R.179313, Sept.17, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residency
qualification. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Noble
averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
In a resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled and disqualified Noble from running as
mayor. Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. In the meantime, he garnered the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent
Motion to Annul Proclamation. The COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and
declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position. Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for
certiorari

Issue:

Should “residence” and “domicile” be construed as referring to “dwelling”? Did Noble effectively change
his domicile?

Held:

The Court found that Noble failed to convince that he successfully effected a change of domicile. To
establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared
and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. In Japzon v. Commission on
Elections, it was held that the term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a
resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers,
they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the
questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They
are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence
of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents
of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist
this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Limbona vs. Mangelin (170 SCRA 786)

.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous
Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman Datu
invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues on the
recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII hopefully
resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the
Commission.
Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all Assemblymen that there shall be no session
in November as “our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over
any pending business in batasang pampook … .”
In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore
was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative.

Issue:

Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

Held:

Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner
indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper
proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is
within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are
nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised
with grave abuse.
the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with
legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises “general
supervision” over them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free
to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation,” since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec.
15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects
and limits of “autonomy.” On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in
the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that
the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of
the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they
were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government
commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that “[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the
second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services

Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

Vilando v. HRET, Limkaichong & Nograles

G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 : August 23, 2011

RENALD F. VILANDO, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN

SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.She won over the other contender, Olivia
Paras.OnMay 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on
the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8062 issued onMay 18, 2007.OnJuly 23, 2007, she assumed office as
Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed
before the Commission on Elections(COMELEC)which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando(Vilando),as taxpayer; and Jacinto
Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo
Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET.These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they
both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent.Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong
was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed.They alleged that she
was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who
acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.Also, they
invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily
included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.She averred that the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the
status ofres judicata.Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed
through a collateral attack.

OnMarch 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as
Member of the House of Representatives.

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its
Resolution datedMay 17, 2010. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the case is already moot and academic;

2) Whether Limkaichong is a natural born-citizen

HELD:

POLITICAL LAW: question on citizenship

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however,
may be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on
the merits.This position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and
academic, if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. The question on Limkaichongs citizenship is
likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding
that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.

Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the
citizenship of Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning,
is devoid of merit.

In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen.To
prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs
father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the
father.In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity.

The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.As held inLimkaichong v. Comelec,thus:

As early as the case ofQueto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judgemotu propioand not in
the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization
(who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to
procedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were
tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise,but that is beside the point in this case. The
jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in
accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the
naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other
words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each
particular case.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute,
that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an
election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

POLITICAL LAW: jurisdiction of the HRET

Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET,having the
plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications,can pass upon the efficacy of
the certificate of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging
ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the
authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its
Members.This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET.Rule 14 thereof
restates this duty, thus:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. The power
granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature.Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise
of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the
same.

Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to
delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong.To
rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already
stated, is not permissible.The HRET properly resolved the issue with the following ratiocination:

xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father Julio Ong Sy, is the respondent in the present
case.The Tribunal may not dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization of the father if only to
pursue the end of declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office.

Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because its jurisdiction
is limited to the qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the
Congress.

Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization proceedings for a
determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of respondent. A petition forquo warrantois not a
means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo warranto proceeding will not only be a
clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant violation
of due process on the part of the persons who will be affected or who are not parties in this case.

The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September
21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance(CFI)Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and
declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.

POLITICAL LAW: citizenship provision in the 1935 constitution

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.The governing law
is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:

Article IV

Section 1.The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx

(3)Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4)Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
xxx

Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it
follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate
of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having
been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached
majority age.The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen:

Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution)It matters not whether the father acquired
citizenship by birth or by naturalization.Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father
under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for
candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support inparagraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution.

Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a
natural born citizen of thePhilippines, having been born to a mother who was a natural-born Filipina at
the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenship informally when she reached
majority age.Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished
voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros
Oriental in 2004.These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship.The case ofIn re:Florencio
Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite
choice.We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship afterJanuary 17, 1973during which
time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of thePhilippinesall those who elect citizenship in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution.The 1987 Constitution provisions, i.e.,Section 1(3), Article [IV]
and Section 2, Article [IV]were enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so
elected, was not conferred natural-born status.It was the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to treat equally those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority either before or after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution.Thus, those who would elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the
1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos.The following
are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the
latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law
of February 5, 1959, must likewise fail.

As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of
the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her
Philippine citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible
evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.

POLITICAL LAW: application for alien certificate of registration

Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration(ACR)is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of
Philippine citizenship.It is well to quote the ruling of the HRET on this matter, to wit:

An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a Filipino
citizen.It is obtained only when applied for.It is in a form prescribed by the agency and contains a
declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and physical details that
identify the applicant.It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to
foreign citizenship.It certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting
and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or
other special law.It is only evidence of registration.

Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like
other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not a
public document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained therein.On its face,
it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration.Therefore, there is no
presumption of alienage of the declarant.This is especially so where the declarant has in fact been a
natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her status as such.

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong's mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original
citizenship.Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship.In a string of decisions, this Court has
consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an
act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case.

Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.

Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference.The only
instance where this Court may intervene in the exercise ofits so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon
a determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy
for such abuse. In this case, there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or improvidence.The HRET
acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto petition.

In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which resolved the issue of
citizenship in favor of Limkaichong

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary
of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before
the elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as
Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a
component city of theProvince of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the
ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the
transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta.
Monica, PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan.
He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a
petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
Issue:

Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held:

YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that
Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the
Constitution.

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld
in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome
Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation
on this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to
conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."

Rogelio Bagabuyo vs Commission on Elections

573 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Local Government – Reapportionment

Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite

Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino
Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371)
hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and
he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the
upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite
which he averred was required by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section
5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not
bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into
two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its
population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of
the city’s population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services
only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.

Aquino III v. Comelec [April 7, 2010]

Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment.”

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among
four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province?

Held:
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the
Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. –

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito
Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In
his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284
Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the
petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won
against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted
with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2
June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack
of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the
sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only
under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent
of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short
of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of
choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the
elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident
and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election.
His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be
a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the
filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a
resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in
Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is
hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner
must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year
residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second
district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional
candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of
representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and
the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent
with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned
decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed
again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the
petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency
requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for
less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in
Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of
canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the
erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or
a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute
winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents
in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his
residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot be better.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)

FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38
additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.

On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats
for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.

ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.

HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to
promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them.

It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have “additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes.”

Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

Note:

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise “twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list.” We thus translate this legal provision
into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

———————————- x .20 = No. of party-list

.80 representatives

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided
by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections,
the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

208

——– x .20 = 52

.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question,
however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and
under all circumstances? Our short answer is “No.”

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties,
the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their
petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.
RULING:

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha facts
attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the
Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the
criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of
the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the
pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist
the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine
compliance by the party lists

Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010

FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list organization,
manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
They submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
obtain the number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was
amended: the nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn;
Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were
retained.

Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on
the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of nominees and the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved the amendment of the list of
nominees with the new order as follows:

1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva

2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales

3. Armi Jane Borje

The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales
took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.

Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official
second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari assailing Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its
nominees.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;

3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act; and

4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of polls.

RULING:

The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s case is not an election protest nor an action
for quo warranto. Election protest is a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based
on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who obtained the higher number of
votes entitling them to hold the office. On the other hand, a special civil action for quo warranto
questions the ineligibility of the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari against the
COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus are based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different. Forum
shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively to obtain a favorable judgment.
The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued Resolution No.
7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of
Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and
enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shal be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall
not be considered resigned.

The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite meaning, there is no
room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of
nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to the
COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an organization can substitute another person in
place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee fies; (2)
when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it
provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as statutory ground for
substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to
implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant
or modify it. An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and
the IRR, the law prevails.

The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was
declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its
nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections
694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party-List System

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-
lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the
two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in

“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have
a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated
that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political
system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of
the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the
1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is
also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in
the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
G.R. No. 193643 January 29, 2013

ANTONIO D. DAYAO vs. COMELEC

Facts:

LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG and
energy sector. It sought to register as a party-list organization for the May 10, 2010 elections and was
approved by the COMELEC. Petitioners filed a complaint and petition before the COMELEC for the
cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a party -list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not
represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not
marginalized or underrepresented citizens. In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be members of the
marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society. It also averred that the ground cited by the
petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just
trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for registration. The COMELEC dismissed the
complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the
exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is actually a belated
opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved with finality. Petitioners’
motions for reconsideration were denied.

Issues:

1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for registration bars the action of complainants.

2) Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System Act (RA 7941) require that incorporators,
officers and members of a party-list must be marginalized or underrepresented citizens.

Ruling of the Court:

There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation. However, in light of
COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought to be dismissed. 1) An
opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint for
cancellation. Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of
party-list accreditation, viz: Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu
propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious

purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization
 (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered. For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory
power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions:
(1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the
enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists. 2) In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC, the Court explained that the "laws, rules or regulations relating to elections"
referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, which declares the underlying
policy for the law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens become members of
the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with
this policy must be disqualified. The party-list system of representation was crafted for the
marginalized and underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact,
there is

BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national
papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider
its decision to use the Veteransformula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
the Veteransformula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the
same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDEthe Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-
60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation
of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%
party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats
that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any
party from dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissiveceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional
seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to
each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of
the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to
determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the
computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I
vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my
interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major
political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs,
hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political
parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major
political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear
expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would
figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven
major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of
the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties
(including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58%
each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more
than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members
as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties,
or only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing
of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution
sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the
interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties
who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political
parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the
marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That
opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the
party-list system.

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote
required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared
constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the
people’s broadest representation in Congress,the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.

Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that
in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula.
But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it
mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system can never exceed 100%.

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement.
The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief
Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that
a minimum vote requirement is needed --

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low,
from participating in the elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives
in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an
outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not
really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn,
they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system;
and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment
as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-
list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the
inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it
prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list
seats in Congress.But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of
implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling
completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending
condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the
legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions
remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative
enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It
filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral
grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and
quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public
policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule
65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection
is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the
convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution
of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus
subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but
they are both subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1
violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to
the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and
ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately
but together.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA) VS. MATHAY G.R.

NO. L-25554, OCTOBER 4, 1966

Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given
being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134,
would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of
the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before
the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and
theHouse of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation
between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
“expiration of thefull term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the
singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for
the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the
singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,”
underscores that in theapplication of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that
the terms of office of all members of the Legislaturethat enacted the measure must have expired before
the increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative
until December 30, 1969, when thefull term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it
will have expired.

BENJAMIN LIGOT VS ISMAEL MATHAY

56 SCRA 823 – Political Law – Salaries of Representatives – Retirement

Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines
for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 “fixing the
salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was enacted
into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act
expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.”

Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act
No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of
any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last
three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of employees based on the
highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.” The House
of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so
issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.

The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him
during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.
Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act
4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would
be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what
he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of
Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the
simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the
Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary as provided
by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them
prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by
the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision
in the similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme would
contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative
authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”

MARTINEZ V MORFE (1972) CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is the scope to be accorded the constitutional
immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of
the peace.
Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegate of the present
Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above
constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any
member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor."

Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for falsification of a public document and for violation
of the Revised Election Code.

The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not
cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical
inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it
would be unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not senators should be immune from the criminal charges.

HELD:

No. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution, the immunity from arrest does not
cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused
levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. Breach of the
peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.

It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach
thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost
freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.

When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.
There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an
unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a
strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of

Representatives

Held:

Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said
provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in
the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive
of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7,
first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The
petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to
appoint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

RULING:

The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they
are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of
other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the
condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the
Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is
no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by
limiting his choice.

HOMOBONO ADAZA VS FERNANDO PACANA, JR.

September 3, 2011

135 SCRA 431 – Political Law – Congress – Singularity of Office/Position

Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under
the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed
his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27,
1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost.
Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has
discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25,
1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to
exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law,
and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a
local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an
elected member of Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original
position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet . . .”

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding
of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he
became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to
assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs
afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section
13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence
from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code.

PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN, JR. G.R. NO. L-51122, MARCH 25, 1982

Facts:

After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one
group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the
election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on
Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before anyadministrative body,”
and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero.
Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in
the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case
without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining
the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in
the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after thecontested election of
directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled
hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his
intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners.
Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal
interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect
appearance as counsel before an administrativebody. In the opinion of the Court, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The
intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity.

CASE DIGEST: DANTE V. LIBAN, ET AL. V. RICHARD J. GORDON

FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a Supreme Court decision which ruled
that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a
Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and
the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to
incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to the second part
of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private
corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of
locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the
case. ADVERTISEMENT: Work from home! Be an online English tutor. Earn at least PHP100/hour.
ISSUE:

Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute?

HELD: In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of standing. As
such, the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional. On the
substantive issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the Constitution
wants to prevent Congress from creating. First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization
dedicated to assist victims of war and administer relief to those who have been devastated by
calamities, among others. It is entirely devoted to public service. It is not covered by the prohibition
since the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain.
Secondly, the PNRC was created in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as
embodied in the Geneva Convention. The creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty
obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like
government instrumentalities and GOCC. The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian
law, as opposed to local law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the
Court to have declared certain portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand
of Justice Carpio that there is no mandate for the Government to create a National Society to this effect.
He also raises the fact that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a private corporation organized for public
needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC is neither private or governmental, hence it was
within the power of Congress to create.

It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise judicial restraint when it
comes to issues of constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of the case.

SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.

G.R. NO. 134577, NOV. 18, 1998

o While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby
elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

o Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President
and House Speaker

o Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
o Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation,
modification and waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared
the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement
of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the
“majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
“minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus,
also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this
case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader

o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half
of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean
that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by
any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in
the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than
the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a
group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between
two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously
be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all
the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out
by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified
by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or
are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority
groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and
House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker,
it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of
its proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may
not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is
of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.
 Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation,
modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence
and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers
as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that
it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a
wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation,
a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the
petition would easily fail.

AVELINO VS. CUENCO

Facts:

1. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate
President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from
delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate
charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the
session of the Senate and walked out with his followers.

2. Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:

1. The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.

2. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to

preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
 3. The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.

3. Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because the
Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the
latter abandoned the session.

4. Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68),
and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

5. The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare
him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that
the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum –
the majority required of the 24-member Senate.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.

2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.

3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines
Senate and oust respondent.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will be against
the doctrine of separation of powers.

1. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.

2. The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. If, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the
majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

2. Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.

1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required by the
Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate, because, firstly, the
minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least
fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view
 of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute
a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.

2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute
a quorum, “the House: does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the
House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority
of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

3. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.

1. The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the
Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority.

2. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the
benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein
involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a
doubt.

Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground as it involved a
political question. The Supreme Court should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding
officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them.