NIFATAN vs.

CIR

GR No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284

FACTS:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in
response to representations that the Court shall direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, it was
reaffirmed by the Court en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:

No.

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect.

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization
of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.

The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof,
and so violates the Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must
be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of
the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of
the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation
equitably.

Therefore, the petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194

SCRA 317)
Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing
cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive
department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive
additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13,
Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or
employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as
affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of
Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from
that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is
constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.

RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for
self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise provided
by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section
7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase
is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a
cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and
the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the
government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino
nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical
agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that
the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify
plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is
exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of managerial,
operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate
officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the
business.

SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE

Posted by kaye lee on 11:13 PM

156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the
appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and
functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation
of the CoA.

2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;

3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;

4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of
such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987
Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Sarmiento v. Mison
156 SCRA 548

FACTS:
In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then
President Corazon Aquino. Petitioners questioned the appointment of Mison as it appears that Mison’s
appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento
insists that under the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmationd of COA. Sarmiento
also seeks to enjoin Guillermo Carague, then Secretary of the Department of Budget from disbursing
salary payments for Mison.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed the confirmation given by the Commission
on Appointments

HELD:
The 1987 Constitution framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation
by COA. There are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These groups are: 1) heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution; 2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; 3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and 4) officers
lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group
are the only public officers appointed by the president which requires the confirmation of COA. The
position of Mison does not belong to the first group, hence, his appointment need not be confirmed by the
COA.
IBP VS ZAMORA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal
directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of
the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct
and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by
Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
IBP v. Zamora
9/18/2014

0 Comments

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Fundamental Principles and State Policies. Article II, Section 3. Civilian
Supremacy.

IBP v. ZAMORA
338 SCRA 81

FACTS:
The President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression. On Januray 17, 2000, the IBP filed the instant petition to declare the
deployment of Philippines Marines unconstitutional thus null and void alleging that no emergency
situation would justify the employment of soldiers for law enforcement work and that the same is in
derogation of Article II Section 3 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint visibility patrols violate the Constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military

HELD:
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
enforcement and that it does not contravene Section 3, Article II of the Constitution. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the LOI itself which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of
the Marines’ authority. The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution and not with the military. What is in here is mutual support and cooperation between the military
and the civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby
dismissed.
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only)
[consti1]
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

En Banc

Doctrine: citizenship

Date: July 30, 1991

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
 Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district
of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.
 Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
 The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

 WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
  The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
 As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the
then Spanish colonial administration.
 The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He
was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province
of Samar.
 As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got
married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
 The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
 Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
 The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up
in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an
application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
 On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
 Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9
years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned.
 After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
 Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work
here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in
the hardware business of his family in Manila.
 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the
mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born
Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.
 The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

 SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

 SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

 The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted
the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have
to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born
 Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
 To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when
he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old.
 He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
 In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
 In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
 The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
 Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
 SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of
his citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct
action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to
respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has
already been laid to rest
Bernardino Marcelino vs
Fernando Cruz, Jr.
121 SCRA 51 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Period to Resolve a Case from Date of
Submission – Promulgation vs Rendition of Judgment – Constitutional Period to Decide not
Mandatory
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the
same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within which to
submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them
30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision, his
decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions
was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the court can no longer
promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month period (90 day period) within
which lower courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last
day of filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period
begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz
made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of rendition is the date of
filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the case
within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day from
September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not
serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “upon the effectivity of this
constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved
from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for
the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal
when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory, its merely directive. Extensions
can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as mandatory will only be
detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to
resolve cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as an
excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.
Legaspi vs Minister of Finance
Amnesty Does not Need Concurrence from Congress if the President Acts Pursuant to His
Power to Legislate
In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty
and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes” unconstitutional.
He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution
‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and
the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this
case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is
already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi
averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid
because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the
Batasan Pambansa.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not
enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution
which provides that –
‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa,
grant amnesty.’
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his
power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power
to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts
as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan.
Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.”
Montejo vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 415)
Montejo vs. COMELEC
242 SCRA 415
March 16, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates
the principle of equality of representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is
composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval,
San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141
Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria,
Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised
therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province.
(The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new
province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined
above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the
province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of
the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution
where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of
Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the
major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after
the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative
districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance
states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.”

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases,
is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the
correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of
one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,
section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to
adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)

Notes:

Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd district.
It is likewise denied.
Case Digest: Vera vs Avelino
Facts of the Case:

The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a
report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified
acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan
and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.

During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the
report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been
included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of
the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.

Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the
resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise
their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

Issues of the Case:

Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not
votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and
Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against
their elections.

Held:

The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding
that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to
determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the
Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical
review of the courts

The case is therefore dismissed

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25,
2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to
apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in
the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the
JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after
May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President
or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President
or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section
16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive
that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if
only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

TANADA v. ANGARA
October 26, 2012 § Leave a comment

272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts :

This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)

Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as

Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of

tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities

for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.

These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a

“free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine

economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for

granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,

justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is

bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our

own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not

a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it

is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations

(UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.”

What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,

beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said

agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the

political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO

remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of

international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the

people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
Self Executing Statutes

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching
bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel
has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
 management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go
to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies
or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the
laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player,
and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of
MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not
only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding
rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the
Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to
GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):
 Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
 Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-
executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice
to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is
not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph,
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It
also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has
become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel
when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between
a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the
MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and
thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
 1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.