UNIT -I

Salient Features of Indian Constitution

A Written Constitution:
For a federal State, the Constitution must necessarily be a written constitution that defines the relation
between the Central Government and the Regional Governments; demarcates the sphere of each, and is
paramount to the constitutions of Regional Governments.

Lengthy Document:
The Constitution of India has the distinction of being the most lengthy and detailed constitutional
document, the world has produced so far. The original Constitution contained as many as 395 Articles and
8 schedules.

Democratic Republic:
The Preamble to the Constitution declares that India is a Sovereign Democratic Republic. It has been
argued that the word “Democratic” used before the word “Republic” is redundant. But it is not so, for
democracy does not involve the existence of a republican form of government.

It may be obtainable under a hereditary monarchy as well, as in the case of Britain. The President of India
is indirectly elected by the representatives of the people for a period of five years. The Council of
Ministers, which aids and advises the President, is constituted from the party or parties commanding a
majority in the Parliament.

A Federal Polity with a Unitary Bias:

In accordance with the federal set-up there has been a division of powers between the Centre and the
States. There are three lists: The Union List, State List and Concurrent List and the residuary powers have
been given to the centre.

Legislation on the subjects mentioned in the Central List is the responsibility of the Centre, whereas
legislation for the subjects mentioned in the State List is the responsibility of States.
Both the Centre and the States can enact on the subjects mentioned in the Concurrent List, but when the
laws passed by the Centre and the State are at variance with each other, Central law will get precedence
over the State law and latter will be repugnant to that extent.

India also has a Supreme Court which is the guardian of our Constitution and decides all disputes which
might arise between the Centre and the States. The residuary power to make laws on subjects that are not
mentioned in any of the lists, like the cyber laws, rest completely with the centre.

But there are also certain peculiar features of our federal system which have made the critics to say that
India is over-centralised or that India is quasi-federal. Few have even said that India is unitary in spirit but
federal in structure. Unlike other federations, the Union has a right to change the boundaries of the States,
divide them or completely end up their existence in the existing territorial form.
The heads of the States i.e. the Governors are appointed by the President and are his agents in the States.
They are responsible to him for their acts of omission and commission. The governor can reserve any bill
passed in the state, legislative for the assent of the Union that may delay it or lead to a complete veto by
the President.
Articles 33 and 34 authorize the parliament to protect persons in service of the union or state with respect
to any action taken by them during martial law to maintain or restore order that further strengthens the
union’s control over states.

The Centre can, at any time, declare emergency in the States and with that declaration, can take over the
administration of that State in its control. Moreover, the country’s financial set-up and structure is such
that the States are financially dependent on the Centre.

Single Citizenship:
In a federation there is usually dual citizenship. A citizen belongs to the State in which he is born and also
enjoys the citizenship rights of the federation.

This is based on the principle that the states in a federation are of course units, but do not, at the same
time, give up their individual identity. But in India there is only one citizenship. Citizens belong to the
Indian Union and not to any state.

More Flexible than Rigid:

Another distinctive feature of the Indian Constitution is that it seeks to impart flexibility to a written
federal constitution. The amendment of only a few of the provisions of the Constitution requires
ratification by the State Legislatures and even then ratification by only 1/2 of them would suffice (while
the American Constitution requires ratification by 3/4th of the States).

The rest of the Constitution may be amended by a special majority of the Union Parliament. On the other
hand, the Parliament has been given the power to alter or modify many of the provisions of the
Constitution by a simple majority as is required for general legislation. The flexibility of our Constitution
is illustrated by the fact that since its working, it has been amended 100 times (till July 2015).

Balance between Judicial Supremacy and Parliamentary Sovereignty:

An independent Judiciary with the power of judicial review is a prominent feature of our Constitution.
The harmonization which our Constitution has effected between Parliamentary Sovereignty and a written
Constitution with a provision for Judicial Review is an important achievement of the framers of our
Constitution.
The Indian Constitution adopts the via media between the American system of Judicial Supremacy and
the English principle of Parliamentary Supremacy, by endowing the Judiciary with the power to declare a
law as unconstitutional if it is beyond the competence of the Legislature as per the distribution of powers
provided by the Constitution or if, it is in contravention to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Further, the major portion of the Constitution is liable to be amended by the Union Parliament by a
special majority, if in any case the Judiciary proves to be too obstructive. The balance between
Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review was however seriously disturbed, and a drift towards the
former was made by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976.

Universal Adult Franchise:

The introduction of adult suffrage without qualifications of any kind was the boldest step taken by the
Constitution-makers and it was an act of faith they had placed in the common man. Article 326 of the
Constitution provides that the election to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of
every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage.

Every person who is a citizen of India and who is not otherwise disqualified is entitled to be registered as
a voter in any such election. Adult suffrage is an acceptance of the fullest implication of democracy.

Secular State:
A multi-religious nation like India has to be a secular state. The word “Secular” was missing in our
Constitution till the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution was passed. Secularism in India does not mean
an irreligious or an anti-religious state.

It only means: (i) there is no official religion for India and the Parliament has no right of imposing a
particular religion as an official religion, (ii) It also means that all citizens, irrespective of their religious
beliefs, are to be considered and treated as equal and (iii) no discrimination is to be shown by the State
against any person on account of his/her religion either for participation in political affairs or entry into
government service or admission into educational institutions.

The Provision of Fundamental Rights:

This has been derived from the US Bill of Rights. The fundamental rights consist of the Right to Equality,
the Right to Freedom, the Right against Exploitation, the Right to Freedom of Religion, Cultural and
Educational Rights, and finally, the most important right, the Right to Constitutional Remedies that makes
the enjoyment of other rights real and enforceable.

The rights are negative obligations of the State to not to encroach upon individual liberty and the courts
are the guardians of these rights. One of the salient features of Fundamental Rights is that during
emergencies, these can be suspended.
Yet another restriction on Fundamental Rights, as provided in the Indian Constitution, is that none of
these rights are absolute. Each and every right has got certain restrictions and limitations. Each and every
citizen of India is supposed to accept those limitations for enjoyment of these rights.

Directive Principles for a Welfare State:

These are well-prepared guidelines available to the government that can become fundamental for the
governance of the country. The objective of the Constitution-makers was to draft a Constitution with
social and economic justice accompanied by equality that underlie a welfare state model. Derived from
the Irish constitution.

The basic aim of a Welfare State was clearly foreshadowed in the Preamble to the Constitution, and
virtually in the Part IV of the constitution containing the Directive Principles of State Policy.
The essence of justice is the attainment of happiness and good for all, as distinguished from the happiness
and good of individuals or even for the majority of them. Justice in this sense cannot be secured unless
there is a society of equals in status and opportunity.

Equality of status and opportunity are not available unless all sections of the people are equally in a
position and circumstances to benefit from the social order that prevails. The Constitution of India not
only prohibits discrimination on grounds of birth, sex, religion, caste and creed, but also adequately
provides for the promotion of the interests of the Backward Classes and areas.

It seeks to remove all inequalities created by inequalities in the possession of wealth and opportunity,
race, gender, caste and religion by providing just and humane conditions of work, maternity relief, leisure
and cultural opportunity to every individual, prevention of exploitation in labour and industry, free
education for all and the like.

Incorporation of Fundamental Duties:

It was with the passing of Forty-Second Constitutional Amendment Act that a Chapter on Fundamental
Duties was incorporated in the Constitution with the addition of a new Article (A.51 A under Part IV A ).
The Article provides that every citizen of India has specific Fundamental Duties, that (s) he ought to
perform. The concept was inspired from the constitution of USSR.

After the 42nd Amendment act we had 10 Fundamental Duties. But currently the number of fundamental
duties of an Indian citizen stands at 11 after the 86th Amendment Act 2002, where by it was stated to
provide basic primary education to every child between the ages of 6 – 14.

Emergency Provisions:
Derived from the Weimar Constitution of Germany, Article 352, 356 and 360 of the Constitution provide
the provisions for emergency. According to these provisions when the Head of the State is dissatisfied
with the administration of the country or a part thereof, in accordance with the normal procedure laid
down in the Constitution, (s)he can declare emergency and take the administration of the country or a part
thereof, in his/her own hands.

Protection of Minorities:
The Constitution has provided for a system of reservation of seats for cultural minorities, in all spheres of
life. This is, however, a temporary provision and it has been mentioned in the Constitution that as soon as
it is felt that these minorities have come at par with other sections of society, this reservation will cease to
exist.

During the pre-independence era, in India, there was a system of reservation of seats for religious
minorities. The system proved to be very dangerous and ultimately resulted in the partition of the country.
This system has however been completely abandoned and now there is no reservation for religious
minorities.
Preamble to the Constitution of India

The original text of the Preamble, before the 42nd Amendment) of the Constitution
The preamble to the Constitution of India is a brief introductory statement that sets out the guiding
purpose and principles of the document.The hopes and aspiration of the people as well as the ideals before
our nation are described in the preamble in clear cut words. It may be considered as the soul of
Constitution. The preamble can be referred to as the preface which highlights the essence of the entire
Constitution. It was adopted on 26 November 1949 by the Constituent Assembly.

It is based on the Objectives Resolution which was drafted and moved in the Constituent Assembly by
Jawaharlal Nehru on 13 December 1946.[1] The preamble-page, along with other pages of the original
Constitution of India, was designed and decorated solely by renowned painter Beohar Rammanohar Sinha
of Jabalpur who was at Shantiniketan with acharya Nandalal Bose at that time. Nandalal Bose endorsed
Beohar Rammanohar Sinha's artwork without any alteration whatsoever. As such, the page bears Beohar
Rammanohar Sinha's short signature Ram in Devanagari lower-right corner.

That the preamble is not an integral part of the Indian constitution was declared by the Supreme Court of
India in BeruBari case therefore it is not enforceable in a court of law. However, Supreme Court of India
has, in the Kesavananda case, overruled earlier decisions and recognised that the preamble may be used
to interpret ambiguous areas of the constitution where differing interpretations present themselves. In the
1995 case of Union Government Vs LIC of India also, the Supreme Court has once again held that
Preamble is the integral part of the Constitution.

As originally enacted the preamble described the state as a "sovereign democratic republic". In 1976 the
Forty-second Amendment changed this to read "sovereign socialist secular democratic republic".[2]

These are the opening words of the preamble to the Indian Constitution

“ WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its
citizens:
JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity;
and to promote among them all
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY
ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION. ”
The Preamble reflects the philosophy as well as fundamental values of Indian Constitution. It clarifies
four important aspects
1. It mentions that the Constitution derives its Authority from the people of India
2. It declares India to be Sovereign, Socialist, secular, Democratic and Republican country.
3. It clarifies the objectives of the Constitution are Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.
4. It states the date of Adoption i.e., 26 November 1949
The enacting words, "We, the people of India ...in our constituent assembly ...do here by adopt, enact and
give to ourselves this constitution", signify the democratic principle that power is ultimately rested in the
hands of the people. It also emphasises that the constitution is made by and for the Indian people and not
given to them by any outside power (such as the British Parliament). The phrase "we the people"
emphasises the concept of popular sovereignty as laid down by J. J. Rousseau: All the power emanates
from the people and the political system will be accountable and responsible to the people.

Sovereign
The word sovereign means supreme or independence. India is internally and externally sovereign -
externally free from the control of any foreign power and internally, it has a free government which is
directly elected by the people and makes laws that govern the people. She allies in peace and war. The
Popular sovereignty is also one of the basic structure of constitution of India. Hence, Citizens of India
also enjoy sovereign power to elect their representatives in elections held for parliament, state legislature
and local bodies as well. People have supreme right to make decisions on internal as well as external
matters. No external power can dictate the government of India. India’s membership of the
commonwealth or of the United Nations does not impose any external limit on her sovereignty. The
Commonwealth is a free association of sovereign Nations. It is no longer British Commonwealth. India
does not accept the British Queen as the head of state. The sovereignty empowers India to either acquire a
foreign territory or cede a part of its territory in favour of a foreign state.[3]

Socialist
The term socialist here means democratic socialism i.e. achievement of socialistic goals through
democratic,evolutionary and non-violent means. A mixed economy in which both Public sector and
Private sector run together as two wheels of economic development.

Secular
Secular means the relationship between the government and the people which is determined according to
constitution and law. By the 42nd Amendment, the term "Secular" was also incorporated in the Preamble.
Secularism is the basic structure of the Indian constitution. The Government respects all religions. It does
not uplift or degrade any particular religion. There is no such thing as a state religion for India. In S.R.
Bommai vs UOI (1994) The SC of India held "A state which does not recognise any religion as the state
religion, it treats all religions equally". Positively, Indian secularism guarantees equal freedom to all
religion. it stands for the right to freedom of religion for all citizens. Explaining the meaning of
secularism as adopted by India, AlexandrOwics has written, "Secularism is a part of the basic of the
Indian Constitution and it means equal freedom and respect for all religions."[3]

Democratic
The first part of the preamble “We, the people of India” and, its last part “give to ourselves this
Constitution” clearly indicate the democratic spirit involved even in the Constitution. India is a
democracy. The people of India elect their governments at all levels (Union, State and local) by a system
of universal adult franchise; popularly known as "one man one vote". Every citizen of India, who is 18 [4]
years of age and above and not otherwise debarred by law, is entitled to vote. Every citizen enjoys this
right without any discrimination on the basis of caste, creed, colour, sex, Religious intolerance or
education. The word 'democratic' not only refer to political but also to social & economic democracy.[3]

Republic
As opposed to a monarchy, in which the head of state is appointed on hereditary basis for a lifetime or
until he abdicates from the throne, a democratic republic is an entity in which the head of state is elected,
directly or indirectly, for a fixed tenure. The President of India is elected by an electoral college for a term
of five years. The post of the President of India is not hereditary. Every citizen of India is eligible to
become the President of the country. The leader of the state is elected by the people.[5]

Justice
The term 'justice' in the preamble refers to three varying aspects - Political, Social and Economic which
are secured through different provisions of Fundamental Rights & Directive Principles of State Policy.[5]

Liberty
The ideal of Liberty refers to the freedom on the activities of Indian nationals. This is found to be an
important tool in ensuring democratic framework. All the citizens are secured with liberty of thought,
expression, belief, faith & worship through the Fundamental Rights which are justiciable in nature.
However, liberty does not mean freedom to do anything, and it must be exercised within the constitutional
limits.

Equality
This envisages that no section of the society enjoys special privileges and individuals are provided with
adequate opportunities without any discrimination. Again, there are three dimensions of Equality -
Political, Economic & Civic.[5]

Fraternity
This refers to a feeling of brotherhood & a sense of belonging with the country among its people. It
embraces psychological as well as territorial dimensions of National Integration. It leaves no room for
regionalism, communalism, casteism etc. which hinders the Unity of the State.

Amendablity
It has been clarified by the Supreme Court of India that being a part of Constitution, the Preamble can be
subjected to Constitutional Amendments exercised under article 368, however, the basic structure cannot
be altered.
 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

ARTICLE 14- EQUALITY BEFORE LAW

Article 14 declares that ‘the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection
of law within the territory of India.’. thus article 14 uses the two expressions “equality before law” and
“equal protection of law”. The phrase “equality before law” find a place in almost in written constitution
that guarantees fundamental right both these expression .both this expression aim at establishing what is
called “equality of status” While both the expression are kind of identical but they don’t give similar
meaning.

EQUALITY BEFORE LAW

Its origin is from America. And somehow its negative concept. It aims at implying the absence of any
special privilege by reason of birth, sex, religion etc in favor of individuals and the equal subject of all
the classes to the ordinary law

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW

Its origin is from British. And somehow it is a positive concept. it aims at equality of treatment in equal
circumstances. It means whether someone is P.M. or President he should be deal with same law as normal
being deals with

RULE OF LAW
The guarantee of equality before the law is an aspect of what Dicey calls the Rule OF Law in England. It
means that no man is above the law and that every person whatever be his rank or condition is subject to
the jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
Rule of law require that no person shall be subjected to harsh, uncivilized or discriminatory treatment
even when the object is the securing of the paramount exigencies of law and order.

Professor Dicey gave three meanings of the Rule Of Law

1. Absence of arbitrary power or supremacy of the law
It means the absolute supremacy of law as opposed to the arbitrary power of the Government. In
other words-a man may be punished for a breach of law, but he cant be punish for anything else.
2. Equality before law
It means subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of land administrated by ordinary law courts.
This means that no one is above law all are equal in eyes of law
3. Absence of individual liberty
There are various constitution that provide individual liberty but not provide method It means that the
source of the right of individuals is not the written constitution. U.K. don’t have provision for
individual liberty.

Rule of Law in India

1. Supremacy of Law:
The First meaning of the Rule of Law is that 'no man is punishable or can lawfully be made to suffer in
body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the
ordinary courts of the land. It implies that a man may be punished for a breach of law but cannot be
punished for anything else. No man can be punished except for a breach of law. An alleged offence is
required to be proved before the ordinary courts in accordance with the ordinary procedure.

2. Equality before Law:-

The Second meaning of the Rule of Law is that no man is above law. Every man whatever be his rank or
condition is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary
tribunals. Everybody under Article 14 is equal before law and have equal protection.

3. Individual Liberty
Lot of individual liberty is mention like fundamental right in Article 21- protection of life and personal
liberty, article 19- Right to freedom etc. and courts are their to protect individual liberty.

The first and second aspect apply to Indian system but the third aspect of the diceys rule of law does not
apply to Indian system as the source of right of individuals is the constitution of India. The constitution is
the supreme law of the land and all laws passed by the legislature must be consistent with provisions of
the constitution

The rule of law impose a duty upon state to take special measure to prevent and punish brutality by police
methodology. The rule of law embodied in article 14 is the basic feature of the Indian constitution and
hence it can’t be destroyed even by an amendment of the constitution under article 368 of the constitution.

Exception To Rule OF Law

The above rule of equality is however not an absolute rule and there are number exception to it
 ‘Equality of Law’ does not mean the power of the private citizens are the same as the power of the
public officials. Thus a police officer has the power to arrest you while no other private person has
this power. This is not violation of rule of law. But rule of law does require that these powers should
be clearly defined by law and that abuse of authority by public officers must be punished by ordinary
courts.

 The rule of law does not prevent certain class of persons being subject to special rules. Thus
members of armed forces are controlled by military rules. Similarly medical practitioners are
controlled by medical council of India

 Certain members of society are governed by special rules in their profession i.e. lawyers, doctors,
nurses, members of armed forces and police. Such classes of people are treated differently from
ordinary citizens.

Article 14 Permits Classification But Prohibits Class Legislation

The equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be general in
character. It does not mean that the same laws should apply to all persons. It does not attainment or
circumstances in the same position. The varying needs of different classes of persons often requires
separate treatment. From the very nature of society there should be different laws in different places and
the legitimate controls the policy and enacts laws in the best interest of the safety and security of the state.
In fact identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. So a reasonable
classification is only not permitted but is necessary if society is to progress.

Thus what Article 14 forbids is class-legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification. The
classification however must not be “arbitrary ,artificial or evasive” but must be based on some real and
substantial bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
Article 14 applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. But where equals and
unequals are treated differently, Article 14 does not apply. Class legislation is that which makes an
improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected
from a large number of persons all of whom stand in the same relation to the privilege granted that
between whom and the persons not so favored no reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be
found justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such privilege.

Test of Reasonable Classification

While Article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects,
and transactions by the legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. But classification must not
be “arbitrary ,artificial or evasive”. It must always rest upon some real upon some real and substantial
distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
Classification to be reasonable must fulfil the following two conditions

 Firstly the classification must be founded on the intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
thing that are grouped together from others left out of the group
 Secondly the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the act.

The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the act are two distinct things.
What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the act
which makes the classification. It is only when there is no reasonable basis for a classification that
legislation making such classification may be declared discriminatory. Thus the legislature may fix the
age at which persons shall be deemed competent to contract between themselves but no one will claim
that competency. No contract can be made to depend upon the stature or colour of the hair. Such a
classification will be arbitrary.

The true meaning and scope of Article 14 have been explained in a number of cases by the Supreme
Court. In view of this the propositions laid down in Dalmia case still hold good governing a valid
classification and are as follows.
1. A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if on account of some special
circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be
treated as a class by itself
2. There is always presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the burden is upon him
who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of constitutional principles.
3. The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the fact of the statue, there is
no classification and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other
individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class
4. It must be assumed that Legislature correctly understand and appreciates the need of its own people
that its law are directed to problem made manifest by experience and that its discrimination are based
on adequate grounds
5. In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration maters of
common knowledge, matters of report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts
which can be conceived existing at the time of the legislation.
6. Thus the legislation is free to recognize degrees of harm and may confine its restriction to those cases
where the need is deemed to be the clearest.
7. While good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be
presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the
notice of the court on which the classification may reasonable be regarded as based, the presumption
of constitutionality cannot be carried to extent always that there must be some undisclosed and
unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporation to be hostile or discriminating
legislation
8. The classification may be made on different bases e.g. geographical or according to object or
occupation or the like.
9. The classification made by the legislature need not be scientifically perfect or logically complete.
Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required.
10. Equality before the law does not require mathematical equality of all persons in all circumstances.
Equal treatment does not mean identical treatment. Similarly not identity of treatment is enough.
11. There can be discrimination both in the substantive as well as the procedural law. Article 14 applies
to both.
If the classification satisfies the test laid down in the above propositions, the law will be declared
constitutional. The question whether a classification is reasonable and proper and not must however, be
judged more on commonsense than on legal subtitles.

Article 15- PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION

Article 15 of the Constitution provides that no citizen shall be subjected to discrimination in matters of
rights, privileges and immunities pertaining to him. This Article lays down:

(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place
of birth or any of them,
(2) No citizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be
subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to:
a. Access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, or
b. The use of wells, tanks, bathing Ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or
partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and
children.
(4) Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The guarantee under Article 15 is available to citizens only and not to every person whether citizen or
non-citizen as applicable under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Article 15 directs that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, and place of birth or any of them. Any law discriminating on one or more on these
grounds would be void. The word, “only” has been purposely used In the Article.

Discrimination based on one or more of these grounds and also on other grounds or grounds will not be
affected by Article 15 (1). It means that if one or more of the specified grounds is combined with a
ground not mentioned In Article 15 (1); the laws will be outside the prohibition contained in Article 15
(1). Article 15 (1) prohibits discrimination on the ground of birth and not that of residence. A State can,
therefore, grant concessions to its residents in matters of fees in an educational institution.

In D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1955 S.C. 334, a rule of medical colleges provided that all
students who are bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat, no capitation fee should be charged but for non-
resident students, capitation fee should be retained.

The validity of this rule was challenged on the ground that it contravened Articles 14 and 15 (1) of the
Constitution. It was held that the rule was not open to attack as infringing Article 15 (1). The ground for
exemption from payment of capitation fee is bona fide residence in the State.
Residence and place of birth are two distinct conceptions with different connotations both in law and fact.
Article 15 (1) prohibits discrimination on the ground of place of birth but not on the ground of residence.

Similarly, the requirement of a test in the regional languages for State employment does not contravene
Article 15, as a test in the regional language for State employment does not contravene Article 15, as the
test is compulsory for all persons seeking employment. It has been held so in P. Raghunandha Rao v.
State of Orissa AIR 1955 Orissa 1131.

In Air India v. Nargesh Mishra, AIR 1981 S.C. 1829, the Supreme Court struck down Regulations 46 and
47 of the Air India and Indian Airlines. Regulation 46 provided that an air-hostess shall retire from the
service of the corporation upon attaining the age of 35 years or on marriage, if it takes place within 4
years or on first pregnancy whichever is earlier.

Under Regulation 47, Managing Director had discretion to extend the age of retirement by one year at the
time up to the age of 45 years, if the air-hostess is found medically fit. The court held that termination of
service on the basis of pregnancy is unfair and clearly violates Article 14. The power of managing
director for the extension of age of retirement is also unconstitutional.

Article 15 (2) applies to States as well as private actions while Article 15(1) refers to the obligation of the
States only.

Clauses (3) and (4) of Article 15 embodies exception to the general rule enunciated above. They empower
the State to make special provisions for women and children and for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
In M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 S.C. 649, the government reserved seats in the Medical and
Engineering colleges in the State as follows:

Backward classes 28%; more backward classes 22%; Scheduled Castes and Tribes 18%. The court held
that the sub-classification made by the order between backward classes, was not justified under Article 15
(4). Caste is not the sole criteria for determining backwardness. Reservation up to 68% is a fraud on the
Constitution. Article 15 (4) only enables the State to make special provision and not exclusive provision
for the backward classes.

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nivedita Jain, AIR 1981 S.C. 2045, the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of an executive order of the Government of Madhya Pradesh completely relaxing the condition of
qualifying marks for the candidates of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Pre-Medical Tests.

The court observed that in the absence of any law to the contrary, it is open to the government to impose
such conditions which would make the reservation effective for the advancement of candidates of such
classes.

The court held that the executive order completely relaxing the minimum qualifying marks was not
volatile of the Regulation and Article 15 (4) of the Constitution.

In Mandal Commission case, the Supreme Court by a majority of 6-3 has held that the sub-classification
of backward classes into more backward castes and backward castes for the purposes of Article 16(4) can
be made. But as a result of sub-classification the reservation cannot exceed more than 50%. The
distinction should be on the basis of degrees of social backwardness.

Article 16. Equality of Opportunity in matters of public Employment. :-

(1) There shall be quality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or
appointment to any office under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent place of birth, residence or any
of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the
State.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class
or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of , or any local or other
authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or
Union territory prior to such employment or appointment.
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of
appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State,
is not adequately represented in the service under the State.
(4-A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in
matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the services
under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of
the State, are not adequately represented in the service under the State.
 (4-B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year
which are reserved for being filled up in (4) or Clause (4-A) as a separate class of vacancies to be
filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together
with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling fifty per
cent reservation on total number of vacancies of that year.
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an
office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of
the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a
particular denomination.
Art. 16(1) is a facet of Art. 14. Arts. 14 and 16(1) are closely inter-connected. Art. 16(1) takes its
roots from Art. 14. An important point of distinction between Arts. 14 and 16 is that while Art. 14
applies to all persons, citizens as well as non-citizens, Art. 16 applies only to citizens and not to non
citizens. The goal of Articles 14 and 16 is limited to equality among comparables, a necessary
implication of which is permissibility of reasonable classification, having nexus with the object to be
achieved.
Art. 16 deals with a very limited subject, viz., public employment. The Scope of Art. 15(1) is much
wider as it covers the entire range of state activities. The ambit of Art. 16(2) is restrictive in scope
than that of Art. 15(1) because Art. 16(2) is confined to employment or office under the state,
meaning services under the Central and State Governments and their instrumentalities, Art. 15 being
more general in nature covers many varied situations of discrimination. Further, the prohibited
grounds of discrimination under Art. 16(2) are somewhat wider than those under Art. 15(2) because
At. 16(2) prohibits discrimination on the additional grounds or descent and residence apart from
religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth.
In Clause (1) the general rule is laid down hat there shall be equal opportunity for citizens in matters
relating to ‘employment’ or ‘appointment to any office’ under the State. What is guaranteed is the
equality of opportunity.
Clause (2) lays down specific grounds on the basis of which citizens are not to be discriminated
against each other in respect of any appointment or office under the State. The scope of clause (1) of
Article 16 is wider than the scope of clause (2), because discrimination on grounds other than those
mentioned in clause (2) of the Article 16 has to be weighed and judged in the light of the general
principles laid down in clause (1).
Under Clause (3) Parliament is competent to regulate the extent to which it would be permissible for
a State to depart from the law laid down in clause (2). It is Parliament alone which can prescribe
such conditions, and that too in regard to State and not the Union appointments.

Explaining the nature of Art. 16(4), the Supreme Court has stated that it is “an enabling provision”
conferring a discretionary power on the state for making any provision or reservation of
appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the state,
is not adequately represented in the service of the state. Art. 16(4) neither imposes any constitutional
duty nor confers any Fundamental Right on any one for claiming reservation.

The equality of opportunity guaranteed by Art. 16(1) is to each individual citizen of the country
while Art. 16(4) contemplates special provision being made in favour of the socially disadvantaged
classes. Both must be balanced against each other. Neither should be allowed to eclipse the other.
Accordingly, the rule of 50% reservation in a year should be taken as a unit and not the entire
strength of the cadre, service or the unit as the case may be.

In Devadasan case the Supreme Court was required to adjudge the validity of the carry forward rule.
The carry forward rule envisaged that in a year, 17½ per cent posts were to be reserved for
Scheduled Castes/Tribes; if all the reserved posts were not filled in a year for want of suitable
candidates from those classes, then the shortfall was to be carried forward to the next year and added
to the reserved quota for that year, and this could be done for the next two years. The result of the
rule was that in a year out of 45 vacancies in the cadre of section officers, 29 went to the reserved
quota and only 16 posts were left for others. This meant reservation upto 65% in the third year, and
while candidates with low marks from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were appointed,
candidates with higher marks from other classes were not taken.

Basing itself on the Balaji principle, the Supreme Court declared that more than 50 per cent
reservation of posts in a single year would be unconstitutional as it per se destroys Art. 16(1). The
Court emphasized that in the name of advancement of backward communities, the Fundamental
Rights of other communities should not be completely annihilated. The Court held that as Article
16(4) was a proviso or an exception to Art. 16(1), it should not be interpreted so as to nullify or
destroy the main provision, as otherwise it would in effect render the guarantee of equality of
opportunity in the matter of public employment under Art. 16(1) wholly illusory and meaningless.
The overriding effect of Cl. (4) of Art. 16 on Cls. (1) and (2) could only extend to the making of a
reasonable number of reservations of appointments and posts in certain circumstances. A ‘reasonable
number’ is one which strikes a reasonable balance between the claims of the backward classes and
those of other citizens.

The Court emphasized that each year of recruitment has to be considered by itself and the reservation
for backward communities should not be so excessive as to create a monopoly or to disturb unduly
the legitimate claims of other communities.

In State of Kerala V. N.M. Thomas, the Supreme Court held that it was permissible to give
preferential treatment to Scheduled Castes/Tribes under Art. 16(1) outside Art. 16(4). In this case in
a dissenting opinion, Subba Rao, J., had express the opinion that Art. 16(4) was not an exception to
Art. 16(1), but was a legislative device by which the framers of the Constitution had sought to
preserve a power untrammeled by the other provisions of the Article. It was a facet of Art. 16(1) as
“it fosters and furthers the idea of equality of opportunity with special reference to under privileged
and deprived classes of citizens.

The majority accepted this view of Subba Rao, J. Accordingly, the Court observed: Art. 16(4) is not
in the nature of an exception of Art. 16(1). It is a facet of Art. 16(1) which fosters and furthers the
idea of equality of opportunity with special reference to an under privileged and deprived class of
citizens. Thus, Art. 16(1) being a facet of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Art. 14 permits
reasonable classification just as Art. 14 does. The majority ruled that Art. 16(4) is not an exception to
 Art. 16(1). Art. 16(1) itself permits reasonable classification for attaining equality of opportunity
assured by it.

Thomas marks the beginning of a new judicial thinking on Art. 16 and leads to greater concessions
to SC, ST and other backward persons. If the Supreme Court had stuck to the view propagated in
earlier cases that Art. 16(4) was an exception to Art. 16(1), then no reservation for any other class,
such as army personnel, freedom fighters, physically handicapped, could have been made in
services.

The fact situated in Thomas was that the Kerala Government made rules to say that promotion from
the cadre of lower division clerks to the higher cadre of upper division clerks depended on passing a
test within two years. For SCs and STs, exemption could be granted for a longer period. These
classes were given two extras years to pass the test. This exemption was challenged as
discriminatory under Art. 16(1) on the ground that Art. 16 permitted only reservation in favour of
backward classes but it was not a case of reservation of posts for SCs and STs under Article 16(4)
and that these persons were not entitled to any favoured treatment in promotion outside Art. 16(4).

By majority, the Supreme Court rejected the argument. It ruled that Art. 16(1) being a facet of Art.
14, would permit reasonable classification and, thus, envisaged equality between the members of the
same class of employees but not equality between members of a separate, independent class.
Classification on the basis of backwardness did not fall within Art. 16(2) and was legitimate for the
purposes of Art. 16(1). Giving preference to an under-represented backward community was valid
and would not contravene Arts. 14, 16(1) and 16(2). Art. 16(4) removes any doubt in this respect.
The classification of employees belonging to SC and ST for allowing them an extended period of
two years for passing the special tests for promotion is a just and reasonable classification having
rational nexus to the object of providing equal opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to public office.

The majority adopted a very liberal attitude in Thomas as regards SCs and STs and backward
classes. The result of the pronouncement is to enable the state to give the backward classes a
preferential treatment in many different ways other than reservation of posts as envisaged in Art.
16(4). Preferential treatment for one is discriminatory treatment for another and, therefore, it is
necessary to draw a balance between the interests of the backward classes and the other classes. The
Supreme court has shown consciousness of this danger and, therefore, has laid down a few criteria
which a classification must fulfill, viz.:
i. The basis of the classification has to be backwardness.
ii. The preferential treatment accorded to backward classes has to be reasonable and must have
a rational nexus to the object in view, namely, adequate representation of the under-
represented backward classes;
iii. the overall consideration of administrative efficiency should be kept in view in giving
preferential treatment to the backward classes.

It is obvious that in Thomas, the Court has taken a more flexible view of Art. 16(1) than had been taken
by it is earlier cases. It is now clearly established that Art. 16(4) does not cover the entire field covered by
Arts. 16(1) and (2) and some of the matters relating to employment in respect of which equality of
opportunity is guaranteed by Arts. 16(1) and (2) do not fall within Art. 16(4).
In Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) V. Union of India, the Supreme Court again went
into the question of reservation in public services vis-à-vis Art. 16. The Court upheld reservation of posts
at various levels and making of various concessions in favour of the members of the SC and ST.

The Court reiterated the Thomas proposition that under Art. 16(1) itself, the state may classify, “based
upon substantial differentia, groups or classes” for recruitment to public services and “this process does
not necessarily spell violation of Article 14 to 16”Art. 1692) expressly forbids discrimination on the basis
of ‘caste’. SC and ST are not castes within the ordinary meaning of caste. These are backward human
groups. There is a great divide between these persons and the rest of the community.

Thus, reservation in selection posts in railways for SC and St was held valid. The quantum of reservation
(17½%) in railway services for SC and ST was held not excessive and the field of eligibility was not too
unreasonable. The carry forward rule for three years was held not bad. Under the Carry forward rule, the
quota for SC and ST could go up to a maximum of 66% of posts. This was upheld with the remark that
figures on paper were not so important as the facts and circumstances in real life which showed that the
quota was never fully filled. But this fixation was subject to the rider that, as a fact, in any particular year,
there would not be a substantial increase over 50% in induction of reserved candidates. Here the Court
took the actual facts, rather than the paper rules, into consideration.

In Indra Sawhney, the Supreme Court has taken cognizance of many complex but very momentous
questions having a bearing on the future welfare and stability of the Indian Society. The Supreme Court
has delivered a very thoughtful, creative and exhaustive opinion dealing with various aspects of the
reservation problem. Basically reservation in government services, is anti-meritocracy, because when a
candidate is appointed to a reserved post it inevitably excludes a more meritorious candidate. But
reservation is now a fact of life and it will be the ruling norm for years to come. The society may find it
very difficulty to shed the reservation rule in the near future. But the Court’s opinion has checked the
system of reservation from running riot and has also mitigated some of its evils.

Three positive aspects of the Supreme Court’s opinion may be highlighted.

One, the over-all reservation in a year is now limited to a maximum of 50%. Two, amongst the classes
granted reservation, those who have been benefited from reservation and have thus improved their social
status (called the ‘creamy layer’ by the Court), should not be allowed to benefit from reservation over and
over again. This means that the benefit of reservation should not be misappropriated by the upper crust
but that the benefit of reservation should be allowed to filter down to the lowliest so that they may benefit
from reservation to improve the position.

Three, an element of merit has now been introduced into the scheme of reservation. This has been done in
several ways, e.g.:
a. promotions are to be merit-based and are to be excluded from the reservation rule
b. certain posts are to be excluded from the reservation rule and recruitment to such posts is to be
merit based;
 c. minimum standards have to be laid down for recruitment to the reserved posts. IN facts, the
Courts has insisted that some minimum standards must be laid down even though the same may
be lower than the standards laid down for the non-reserved posts.

In his opinion in Indra Sawhney, Jeevan Reddy,J., has emphasized upon the member of a backward
class reaching an “advanced social level or status”, he would no longer belong to the backward class
and would have to be weeded out. The Court has opined that exclusion of creamy layer, i.e., socially
advanced members, will make the class a truly backward class and would more appropriately serve
the purpose and object of Art. 16(4). Jeevan Reddy, J., has stated that there are sections among the
backward classes who are highly advanced socially and educationally, and they constitute the forward
section of the community. These advanced sections do not belong to the true backward class. “After
excluding them alone, would be the class be a compact class. In fact, such exclusion benefits the truly
backward.”

Accordingly to Jeevan Reddy, J., the exclusion of the creamy layer must be on the basis of social
advancement and not on the basis of economic interest alone. It is difficult to draw a line where a
person belonging to the backward class ceases to be so and becomes part of the ‘creamy layer’.

In Ashoka Kumar Thakur V. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court has assessed the validity of
unrealistically high levels of income or holdings of other conditions prescribed by the Legislatures of
UP and Bihar as criteria to identify the creamy layer. For example, while the Supreme Court in the
Mandal case has categorically said that the Chiildren of IAS or IPS, etc. without anything more could
not avail the benefit of reservation, in the scheme drawn in UP and Bihar, a few more conditions were
added for falling in the creamy layer, such as, he/she should be getting a salary or Rs. 10,000/- p.m. or
more; the wife or husband to be a graduate and owing a house in an urban area. OR, if a professional
doctor, surgeon, lawyer, architect, etc., he should be having an income not less than Rs. 10 lakh, his/
her spouse is a graduate and having family property worth Rs. 20 Lakhs. Similar conditions were
added in case of others, such as, traders, artisans, etc.
The Supreme Court has quashed these conditions as discriminatory. The Court has ruled that these
conditions laid down by the two States have no ‘nexus’ with the object sought to be achieved. The
criterion laid down by the two States to identify the creamylayer are violative of Art. 16(4), wholly
arbitrary, violative or Art. 14, and against the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the Mandal
case, where the Court has expressed the view that a member of the All India Service without anything
more ought to be regarded as belonging to the “creamy layer”

Article 19 Right to Freedom

Clause (a) to (g) of Art. 19(1) guarantee to the citizens of India six freedoms, viz., of ‘speech and
expression’, ‘peaceable assembly’ ‘association’, ‘free movement’, ‘residence’, and ‘practising any
profession and carrying on any business’.

These various freedoms are necessary not only to promote certain basic rights of the citizens but also
certain democratic values in, and the oneness and unity of, the country. Art. 19 guarantees some of the
basic, values in, and the oneness and unity of, the country. Art. 19 guarantees some of the basic, valued
and natural rights inherent in a person.
These rights are not exhaustive of all the rights of a free man who has far more and wider rights. The
freedoms enumerated in Article 19(1) are those great and basic rights which are recognized as the natural
inherent in the status of a citizen. According to Supreme court, it is possible that a right does not find
express mention in any clause of Art. 19(1) and yet it may be covered by some clause therein. This gives
an additional dimension to Art. 19(1) in the sense that even though a right may not be explicit, it may yet
be implicit in the various clauses of Art.19.

The principle on which the power of the State to impose restriction is based is that all individual rights of
a person are held subject to such reasonable limitations and regulations as may be necessary or expedient
for the protection of the general welfare. In the words of Das, J., “social interest in individual liberty may
well have to be subordinated to other greater social interests. Indeed, there has to be a balance between
individual rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) and the exigencies of the State which is the custodian of
the interests of the general public, public order, decency or morality and of other public interests which
may compendiously be described as social welfare.”

A law restricting the exercise of any of the seven freedoms guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 19 to be
constitutionally valid, must satisfy two conditions, namely:-
1. The restriction must be for the particular purpose mentioned in the clause permitting the imposition of
the restriction on that particular right, and permitting the imposition of the restriction.
2. The restriction must be a reasonable restriction. It may be emphasized that the requirement that a
restriction should be reasonable is of great constitutional significance, for it acts as a limitation on the
power of the legislature, and consequently, widens the scope of judicial review of laws restraining the
exercise of freedoms guaranteed by Article 19.

Freedom of speech is essential for the proper functioning of the democratic process. The freedom of
speech and expression is regarded as the first condition of liberty. It occupies a preferred position in the
hierarchy of liberties giving succour and protection to all other liberties.
The test of reasonableness has to be applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard
or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The meaning would vary
according to which of the six rights guaranteed under clause (1) is being restricted by the impugned law.
Some of the principles which the Supreme Court has affirmed in ascertaining the reasonableness of
restrictions on the exercise of the rights secured under this article.

(1) Reasonableness demands proper balancing:- The phrase ‘reasonable restrictions’ connotes that the
limitation imposed upon a person in the enjoyment of a right should not be arbitrary or of an
excessive nature. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades any of the six freedoms cannot
be said to contain the quality of reasonableness, and unless it strikes a proper balance between the
freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1) and social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Article
19, it must be held to be wanting in reasonableness.
(2) Reasonableness both substantive and procedural:- In determining the reasonableness of a statute, the
court would see both to the nature of the restriction and procedure prescribed by the statute for
enforcing the restriction on the individual freedom. Principles of natural justice are an element in
 considering the reasonableness of a restriction where Article 19 is applicable. Absence of provision
for review makes the provisions unreasonable.
(3) Reasonableness and objective concept:- The reasonableness of a restriction has to be determined in an
objective manner and from the standpoint of the interests of the general public and not from the point
of view of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract considerations.
(4) Reasonableness of restriction and not of law:- The court is called upon to ascertain the reasonableness
of the restriction and not of the law which permits the restriction. A law may be reasonable, but the
restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable.
(5) Reasonableness includes total prohibition:- The word ‘restriction’ also includes cases of prohibition
and the State can establish that a law, though purporting to deprive a person of his fundamental right,
under certain circumstances amounts to a reasonable restriction only.
(6) Reasonableness and American ‘Due Process’:- The Constitution framers deliberately avoided the use
of the expression ‘due process’ with its comprehensiveness, flexibility and attendant vagueness, in
favour of the somewhat more definite word, ‘reasonable’, and caution has, therefore, to be exercised
before the literal application of American decisions. Our Constitution provides reasonably precise
general guidance in this matter.
(7) Reasonableness and Directive Principles of State Policy:- That the restrictions are imposed in
carrying out the Directive Principles of State Policy is a point in favour of the reasonableness of the
restrictions.
(8) Reasonableness of Taxes:- Prima facie a tax is not a restriction on any of the freedoms guaranteed
under Article 19. Mere excessiveness of a tax is not a ground for challenging it as a restriction on one
of the freedom in Article 19(1).

Art. 19(1)(a) guarantees to all citizens the right to ‘freedom of speech and expression’. Under Article
19(2), reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the exercise of this right for certain purposes. Any
limitation on the exercise of the right under Art. 19(1)(a) not falling within the four corners of Art. 19(2)
cannot be valid.

The freedom of speech under Art. 19(1)(a) includes the right to express one’s views and opinions at any
issue through any medium, e.g., by words of mouth, writing, printing, picture, film, movie, etc. It thus
includes the freedom of communication and the right to propagate or publish opinion. But this right is
subject to reasonable restrictions being imposed under Art. 19(2).

Unlike Art. 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, the provision in the U.S. Constitution has two notable
features, viz.,
(1) Freedom of Press is specifically mentioned therein;
(2) No restrictions are mentioned on the freedom of speech unlike Art. 19(2) which spells out the
restrictions on Art. 19(1).

The Courts in the U.S.A. have to spell out the restrictions on this right from case to case.
The ‘freedom of speech and expression’ includes the right to acquire information and disseminate the
same. It includes the right to communicate it through any available media whether print or electronic or
audio-visual. This freedom includes the freedom to communicate or circulate one’s opinion without
interference to as large a population in the country, as well as abroad, as is possible to reach.
Freedom of the press is implied from the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a).
There is no specific provision ensuring freedom of the press as such. The freedom of the press is regarded
as a “species of which freedom of expression is a genus. Thus being only a right flowing from the
freedom of speech, the freedom of the press in Indian stands on no higher footing than the freedom of
speech of a citizen, and the press enjoys no privilege as such distinct from freedom of the citizen.

The prime purpose of the free press guarantee is regarded as creating a fourth institution outside the
government as an additional check on the three official branches- executive, legislative and the judiciary.
It is the primary function of the press to provide comprehensive and objective information on all aspects
of the country’s social, economic and political life. The press serves as a powerful antidote to any abuse
of power by government officials and as a means for keeping the elected officials responsible to the
people whom they were elected to serve.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the freedom of the press is not so much for the benefit of the
press as for he benefit of the general community because the community has a right to be supplied with
information and the government owes a duty to educate the people within the limits of its resources.
Imposition of pre-censorship on publication is, therefore, unless justified under clause (2), violative of
freedom of speech and expr3ession. In Brij Bhushan V. State of Delhi, an order issued under East Punjab
Safety Act, directing the editor and publisher of a newspaper “to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before
publication ,till further orders, all communal matters and news and views about Pakistan, including
photographs and cartoons”, was struck down by the Supreme Court observing, there can be little doubt
that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an
essential part of the freedom of speech and expression declared by Art. 19(1)(a).

Das C.J. said in Virendra V. State of Punjab, that “It is certainly a serious encroachment on the valuable
and cherished right to freedom of speech if a newspaper is prevented from publishing its own view or
views of its correspondents”.

Freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom of propagation of ideas and is ensured by the
freedom of circulation. In Romesh Thappar V. State of Madras, the notification banning the entry into or
circulation, sale, or distribution in the State of Madras or any part of it of the newspaper entitled
‘Crossroads’ published at Bombay was held invalid because, “without liberty of circulation, the
publication would be of little value”.

The right of freedom of speech is infringed not only by a direct ban on the circulation of a publication, but
also by an action of the government which would adversely affect the circulation of the paper. In Sakal
Papers (p) ltd. V. Union of India, a government order which fixed the number of pages and size which a
newspaper could publish at a price was challenged by the petitioners on the ground that it infringed the
liberty of the press implicit in the terms of Art. 19(1)(a). The order affected the liberty of the press
because its adoption would mean, the petitioners explained, either the reduction in the existing number of
pages or raising of the price. In either case, there would be reduction in the volume or circulation of the
paper and therefore a direct violation of the liberty of the press. On behalf of the State, the law was
justified as a reasonable restriction on the business activity of a newspaper in the interests of the general
public.

The Court agreed that newspapers have two aspects-dissemination of news and views and commercial.
The two aspects are different, the former falls under Art. 19(1)(a) read with Art. 19(2), and the latter falls
under Art. 19(1)(g) and can be regulated under Art. 19(6). However, the state cannot seek to place
restriction on business by directly immediately curtailing any other freedom of the citizen guaranteed by
the constitution and which is not susceptible of abridgement on the same grounds as are set out in Art.
19(6). “Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken away with the object of placing
restrictions on the business activities of a citizen.

The Court accepted the plea of the petitioners that the order affected the circulation and so restrained the
dissemination of news and views which a newspaper had the freedom to do. The order was struck down
and held to be inoperative. Therefore, referring the press as a business and justifying the impugned
restriction under Art. 19(6) as a proper restriction on the right to carry on the business of publishing a
newspaper “would be wholly irrelevant for considering whether the impugned Act infringes or does not
infringes the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a).” This means the freedom of speech cannot be
restricted for the purpose of regulating the commercial aspects of the activities of the newspapers.

Bennett Coleman & Co. V. Union of India, is a case of great significance in the area of freedom of speech
and expression. India faces a shortage of indigenous newsprint. Because of the shortage of foreign
exchange, quantity of newsprint imported was not adequate to meet all requirements. Some restrictions,
therefore, become necessary on the consumption of newsprint. Accordingly, s system of newsprint quota
for newspapers was evolved. The actual consumption of newsprint by newspaper during 1970-71 & 1971-
72, whichever was less, was taken as the base. For dailies with a circulation up to 1,00,000 copies, 10%
increase in the basic entitlement was to be granted, but for newspapers with a larger circulation, the
increase was to be only 3%. Newspapers with less than 10 pages daily could raise the number of pages by
20% subject to the ceiling of 10. A few more restrictions were imposed on the user of newsprint. This
newsprint policy was challenged in the Supreme Court.

By a majority, the Supreme Court declared the policy unconstitutional. While the Government could
evolve a policy of allotting newsprint on a fair and equitable basis, keeping in view the interests of small,
medium and big newspapers, the Government could not, in the grab of regulating distribution of
newsprint, control the growth the circulation of newspapers. In effect, here the newsprint policy became
the newspaper control policy. While newsprint quota could be fixed on a reasonable basis, post-quota
restrictions could not be imposed. The newspapers should be left free to determine their pages, circulation
and new editions within their fixed quota. The policy of limiting all papers whether small or large, to 10
pages was held to be discriminatory as it treated unequal as equals. The restrictions imposed cut at the
very root of the guaranteed freedom. In the words of the Court, “Freedom of the press is both qualitative
and quantitative. Freedom lies both in circulation and in content.”

The Supreme Court in concluded in Tata Press Case that “commercial speech” cannot be denied the
protection of Art. 19(1)(a) merely because the same is issued by business man. “Commercial Speech” is a
part of freedom of speech guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a). The public at large has a right to receive the
“commercial speech”. The protection of Art. 19(1)(a) is available both to the speaker as well as the
recipient of the speech.

The Supreme Court accepted as valid the printing of yellow pages by the Tata Press. Printing of a
directory of telephone subscribers is to be done exclusively by the Telephone Department as a part of its
service to the telephone subscribers. But yellow pages only contain commercial advertisements and Art.
19(1)(a) guarantee freedom to publish the same.

In LIC V. Manubhai D. Shah, the Supreme Court stated a liberal interpretation should be given to the
right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Rt. 19(1)(a) . The Court has characterized this
right as a “basic human right”. This right includes “the right to propagate one’s views through the print
media or through any other communication channel, e.g. the radio and television”. Thus, every citizen
“has the right to air his or her views through the print and/or the electronic media subject, of course, to
permissible restrictions imposed under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.

In this case the Supreme court has taken cognizance of two situations. One, the respondent circulated a
research article suggesting that the LIC was charging unduly high premiums from those who took out life
insurance policies. The LIC published a counter reply to this paper in a daily newspaper and also in its
own in-house magazine. The respondent then prepared a rejoinder and got it printed in the same daily
newspaper. He also wanted the LIC to print his rejoinder in their magazine, but the LIC refused to do so.
The Supreme Court was called upon to decide the question whether the LIC was right in refusing to
publish the rejoinder the responded in magazine. Answering in the negative the court pointed out that the
attitude of the LIC was both “unfair and unreasonable”-unfair because fairness demanded that both view
points were placed before the readers and unreasonable because there was no justification for refusing
publication. By refusing to print and publish the rejoinder the LIC had violated the respondent’s
Fundamental Right.

Every free citizen has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public. Freedom of
speech and expression is subject only to the restrictions imposable under Art. 19(2). Efforts by intolerant
authorities to curb or suffocate this freedom must be firmly replied, more so when public authorities
betray autocratic, tendencies.

LIC is a ‘state’ within the meaning of Art. 12. The LIC Act enacted by Parliament requires LIC to
function in the best interest of the community. The community is, therefore, entitled to know whether or
not, this requirement of the statute is being satisfied in the functioning of the LIC.

The right of a citizen to exhibit films on the Doordarshan subject to the terms and conditions to be
imposed by the latter has been recognized. On further consideration in Secretary, Ministry I&B V. Cricket
Association of Bengal, the Court has held that air waves or frequencies are public property, their use must
be controlled and regulated by a public authority in the interest of public and to prevent the invasion of
their rights. As the electronic media involves the use of the air wages, this factor creates an inbuilt
restriction on its use as in the case of any other public property. This limitation in the nature of public
property involved in the electronic media is in addition to the grounds of restriction on the right of
freedom of speech and expression under Art. 19(2). Accordingly, while an individual has a right under
Art. 19(1)(a) to have an access to telecasting, this right is subject to the limitation on account of use of
public property, i.e. the air waves involved in the exercise of the right can be controlled and regulated by
the public authority even on grounds not strictly covered under Art. 19(2). The Court also asked the
Central Government to take immediate steps to establish an independent autonomous public authority
representative of all sections and interests of the society to control and regulate the use of air waves. The
provision for the Prasar Bharti seems to be taking care of this issue.

Virendra V. State of Punjab.

The general principle is that it is unreasonable to leave absolute and arbitrary discretion to an
administrative officer to regulate the freedom of speech and expression. The discretion to be valid must
be exercisable for purposes specified in Art. 19(2), and subject to legislative policy and procedural
safeguards. Like, banning of publication in any newspaper of any matter relating to a particular subject or
class of subjects would be obnoxious to the right of free speech.

The significant judicial pronouncement in the area is Virendra V. State of Punjab. This is an important
decision of the Supreme court illustrating the Scope of Permissible restriction on the right of freedom of
speech and expression. Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act empowered the State Government to:

i. Prohibit the Printing or Publication of any article, report news item, letter or any other material
relating to or connected with “Save Hindi Agitation”;
ii. The imposition of ban against the entry and circulation of the said papers published from New
Delhi in the State of Punjab and
iii. Authorizing the State Government of its delegate to impose Pre-censorship, for a maximum
period of two months in any issue of a newspaper.

These provisions were challenged on the ground of giving arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion to the
government to curtail freedom of speech ‘on its subjective satisfaction’. The Supreme Court pointed out
that there existed in Punjab serious tension amongst the various communities and in such a situation,
conferment of wide powers to be exercised in the subjective satisfaction of the government could not be
regarded as an unreasonable restriction. The State Government being in possession of all material facts,
was the best authority to take anticipatory action for prevention of threatened breach of peace. Therefore,
determination of necessity be left to the judgment and discretion of the government. To make the exercise
of those powers justiciable would defeat the very purpose of the Act.
The first provision relating to ban on publication of news, etc. was upheld in the time of tension brought
about or aided by the ‘Save Hindi Agitation’, taking into consideration the safeguard provided therein, as
being a reasonable restriction and procedurally reasonable were:

a. The positive requirement of the existence of the satisfaction of the authority as to the necessity for the
making of order for the specific purposes mentioned in the Act.
b. The discretion was given in the first instance to the State Government and not to every subordinate
officer to determine the necessity of passing the order.
c. The order could remain in force only for two months from the making thereof.
d. The aggrieved party was given the right to make representation to the State government which could,
on consideration thereof, modify, confirm or rescind the order.
The second provision of the Act mentioned above, namely the power to impose a ban against the entry
and the circulation of the paper, was not sustained as a reasonable restriction on the freedom of speech
because there was no time-limit for the operation of an order made against a paper and also because there
was no provision made for any representative being made to the State Government.

Further the court held that a law conferring discretion on the executive could not be invalid if it laid down
the policy so that discretion was exercised to effectuate the policy. The law in question satisfied this test
for it laid down the purpose for which the power could be exercised. Further there were two safeguards
subject to which the government was to exercise its power, viz., an order could remain in force only for
two months, and the aggrieved person could make a representation to the government against the order,
and so Act as a whole was valid of the order, nor did it provide for any representation to the government
against the order.

Ex Post Facto Legislation

The clause (1) of Article 20 protects individuals against ex post facto legislation, which means
no individual can be convicted for actions that were committed before the enactment of the law.

In other words, when a legislature declares an act to be an offence or provides a penalty for an
offence, it can’t make the law retroactive so as to prejudicially affect the individuals who have
committed such acts prior to the enactment of that law.

Immunity from Double Punishment

The Constitution of India prohibits double punishment for the same offence. That is reflected in
the clause (2) of Article 20, which safeguards an individual from facing multiple punishments or
successive criminal proceedings for the same crime. According to this clause, no person shall be
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.

If someone has been put on trial and punished in a previous proceeding of an offence, he can’t be
prosecuted and punished for the same proceedings of an offence again in subsequent proceeding.
If any law provides for the double punishment, it will be considered void.

Although Article 20 disapproves of the doctrine of ‘Double Jeopardy’, it does not give immunity
from proceedings before a court of law or tribunal. Hence, a public servant who has been
punished for an offence in a court of law may yet be subjected to departmental proceedings for
the same offence.

It is to be noted that Article 20 provides protection against double punishment only when the
accused has been ‘prosecuted’ and ‘punished’ once. Also, the Article does not prevent
subsequent trial and conviction for another offence even if the two offences have some common
aspects.
Immunity from Self-Incrimination

The immunity from self-incrimination is conferred in the Article 20(3) of the constitution which
states that the accused can never be compelled to be a witness against himself. In short, no
individual can be forced to accuse himself.

The scope of this immunity has, prima facie, been widened by the Supreme Court by interpreting
the word ‘witness’ as inclusive of both oral and documentary evidence. Hence, no person can be
compelled to furnish any kind of evidence, which is reasonably likely to support a prosecution
against him. This ‘Right to Silence’ is not called upon in case any object or document is searched
and seized from the possession of the accused. For the same reason, the clause does not bar the
medical examination of the accused or the obtaining of thumb-impression or specimen signature
from him.

This immunity is only limited to criminal proceedings.

The Article 20 (3) can be rightfully used as an anchor only by those accused of an offence and
against whom an FIR has been lodged, which in normal course would result in prosecution.

Article 21. Protection of Personal Life and Liberty:-

No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by
law.

Article 21, though couched in negative language, confers on every person the fundamental right to life
and personal liberty. The two rights have been given paramount position by our Courts. The right to life
which is the most fundamental of all is also the most difficult to define. Certainly it cannot be confined to
a guarantee against the taking away of life; it must have a wider application. With reference to a
corresponding provision in the 5th and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which says that no
person shall be deprived of his “life, liberty or property without due process of law”.

The word ‘due’ in this clause is interpreted to mean ‘just’, ‘proper’ or ‘reasonable’, according to the
judicial view. Due process has two aspects. Substantive due process envisages that the substantive
provisions of a law should be reasonable and not arbitrary. Procedural due process envisages a reasonable
procedure, i.e., the person affected should have fair right of hearing which includes four elements; (i)
notice, (ii) opportunity to be heard, (iii) an impartial tribunal and (iv) an orderly procedure.

The term ‘life’ as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence by which life is
enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or
the putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul
communicates with the outer world.
For some time the Court held that the view that right of life in Art. 21 does not include right to livelihood.
After some controversy on the issue the Court has clearly held that right to livelihood is included in the
right of life “because no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood.
The Court has also observed that life ‘includes all that give meaning to a man’s life including his
tradition, culture and heritage and protection of that heritage in its full measure’. Again, the Court has
held that right to life includes the right to ‘a reasonable accommodation to live in’ and right to shelter,
includes the necessary infrastructure to live with human dignity. The offence of rape has also been held to
be a violation of the right of life under Art. 21. Right to self-preservation has also been recognized under
the Article. Art. 21 has also been invoked for the upliftment of and dignified life for the prostitutes.

More importantly, in Unni Krishanan V. State of A.P. the Court has recognized a fundamental right to
education in the right to life under Art.21. Taking help from Art. 41 and 45 it has held that ‘every
child/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years.
Thereafter his right to education is subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the
State. But this right does not include the right to participate in the student union activities and to contest
union elections.

In Art. 21, in contrast to with the American Constitution, the word ‘liberty’ is qualified by the word
‘personal’, leading to an inference that the scope of liberty under our Constitution is narrower than in the
U.S. Constitution. Seemingly that was the impression drawn by some of the judges in A.K. Gopalan V.
State of Madras. Though that case was concerned about the constitutionality of preventive detention of
the petitioner which in any case was an infringement of the ‘personal liberty’ even in the narrowest sense
of the term and therefore it may be said that the scope of ‘personal liberty’ was not an issue in that case,
yet some of the learned judges looking at the difference in the expression in U.S. and Indian Constitutions
and relying upon the meaning given to ‘personal liberty’ by some English jurists concluded that ‘personal
liberty’ was confined to freedom from detention or physical restraints. “But there was no definite
pronouncement made on this point since the question before the Court was not so much the interpretation
of the words ‘personal liberty’ as the inter-relation between Art. 19 and 21.

For the First time the meaning and scope of ‘personal liberty’ came up pointedly for consideration in
Kharak Singh V. State of U.P. In that case validity of certain police regulations which, without any
statutory basis, authorized the police to keep under surveillance persons whose names were recorded in
the ‘history-sheet’ maintained by the police in respect of persons who are or are likely to become habitual
criminals. Surveillance as defined in the impugned regulation included secret picketing of the house,
domiciliary visits at night, periodical inquiries about the person, an eye on his movements, etc. The
petitioner alleged that this regulation violated his fundamental right to movement in Article 19(1)(d) and
‘personal liberty’ in Art. 21. For determining the claim of the petitioner the Court, apart from defining the
scope of Art. 19(1)(d) had to define the scope of ‘personal liberty’ in Art. 21.

The Court rejected that ‘personal liberty’ was confined to “freedom from physical restraint or freedom
from confinement within the bounds of a prison” and held that “personal liberty” is used in the article as a
compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the ‘personal
liberty’ of man other than those dealt with in several clauses of Art.19(1). In other words, while Article
19(1) deals with particular species or attributes of that freedom, ‘personal liberty’ in Art. 21 takes in and
comprises the residue. He concluded that “an unauthorized intrusion into a person’s home and the
disturbance caused to him thereby” violated ‘personal liberty’ enshrined in Art. 21 and therefore the
regulation was invalid insofar as it authorized domiciliary visits but the rest of it did not violate either
Article 1(91)(d) or Art. 21. He also held that “the right to privacy is not a guaranteed right under our
Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movement of an individual which is merely a
manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a fundamental right.
Subba Rao, J. held that right to privacy “is an essential ingredient of personal liberty” and that the right to
personal liberty is “a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person,
whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by
calculated measures”.
In Satwant Singh Sawhney V. A.P.O., New Delhi, it was held that right to travel abroad is included
within the expression ‘personal liberty’ and, therefore, no person can be deprived of his right to travel
except according to the procedure established by law. Since a passport is essential for the enjoyment of
that right, denial of a passport amounts to deprivation of personal liberty. In the absence of any procedure
prescribed by the law of land sustaining the refusal of a passport to a person, its refusal amounts to an
unauthorized deprivation of personal liberty guaranteed by Art. 21. This decision was accepted by
Parliament and the infirmity was set right by the enactment of the Passport Act.

In A.K. Gopalan V. State of Madras, it was held that the expression ‘procedure established by law’ means
procedure enacted by a law made by the State. The Supreme Court, by a majority, rejected that the
argument that the ‘law’ in Art. 21 is used in the sense of jus and lex, and that it means the principles of
natural justice on the analogy of ‘due process of law’ as interpreted by American Supreme Court.

In Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India, the passport authorities impounded the passport of Maneka Gandhi
under S. 10(3) of the Passport Act which provides authorizes if it deems it necessary to do so in the
interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India. Maneka challenged the order on the ground of violation
of her fundamental right under Art. 21. One of the major grounds of challenge was that the order
impounding the passport was null and void as it had been made without affording her an opportunity of
being heard in her defence.

Bhagwati, J. in Maneka Gandhi case, established that the requirement of reasonableness of procedure in
Art. 21 through Art. 14, some of the judges in that case and in some other subsequent cases have read it in
Art. 21 itself and particularly in the word ‘law’ leading to the conversion of ‘procedure established by
law’ into ‘due process of law’ in the American sense which the Constitution-makers had intended to avoid
by replacing the latter expression by the former. Thus in Maneka Gandhi, it was said that the procedure in
Art. 21 “has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary”. The ‘law’ in Art. 21 “is
reasonable law, not any enacted piece”.

The Court reiterated the proposition that Arts. 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive. A nexus has been
established between these Articles. This means that a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person
of ‘personal liberty’ has to meet the requirements of Art. 19. Also, the procedure established by law in
Art. 21 must answer the requirement of Art. 14 as well. According to K. Iyer. J., no Article in the
Constitution pertaining to a Fundamental Right is an island in itself. Just as a man is not dissectible into
separate limbs, cardinal rights in an organic constitution have a synthesis.

Court held that as the right to travel abroad falls under Art. 21, natural justice must be applied while
exercising the power of impounding a passport under the Passport Act. Although the Passport Act does
not expressly provide for the requirement of hearing before a passport is impounded, yet the same has to
be implied therein.

Again in Sunil Batra V. Delhi Administration, it was held that “true our Constitution has no ‘due process’
clause but the consequence is same” and added that Art. 21 is the counterpart of the procedural due
process in the U.S.

The Supreme Court has made a novel use of Art. 21 viz., to ensure that the female workers are nor
sexually harassed by their male co-workers at their work. In Vishaka V. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme
Court has declared sexual harassment of a working woman at her place of work as amounting to violation
of rights of gender equality and right to life and liberty which is a clear violation of Art. 14, 15 and 21 of
the constitution.

In Mithu V. State of Punjab, a constitutional bench, for the first time and unanimously invalidated a
substantive law - Section 303 of the IPC – which provided for the mandatory death sentence for murder
committed by a life convict.

After posing the question of reasonableness of Section 303 under Art. 21 the Court concluded that “it is
difficult to hold that the prescription of the mandatory sentence of death answers the test of
reasonableness” and added that “a provision of law which deprives the Court of the use of its wise and
beneficent discretion in a matter of life and death, without regard to the circumstances in which the
offence was committed and, therefore, without regard to the gravity of the offence, cannot but be regarded
as harsh, unjust and unfair”. Relying exclusively on Art. 21 it was concurred that “so final, so irrevocable
and so irresuscitable is the sentence of death that no law which provides for it without involvement of the
judicial mind can be said to be fair, just and reasonable. Thus not merely procedure but a substantive law
was invalidated under Art. 21.

In Mr. X V. Hospital Z, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide a very crucial questioning the
modern social context, viz., can a doctor disclose to the would be wife of a person that he is HIV
positive? Does it infringe the right to privacy of the person concerned?
The Court has answered both of these question in the negative. The Court has argued that the lady
proposing to marry such a person is also entitled to all the human rights which are available to any human
being.

The ‘right of life’ guaranteed by Art. 21 “would positively include the right to be told that a person with
whom she was proposed to be married, was the victim of a deadly disease, which was sexually
communicable”. Moreover when two Fundamental Rights clash, viz., that of the person concerned (right
to Privacy) and that of the would be wife (to live a healthy life also guaranteed by Art. 21) “the Right
which would advance the public morality or public interest would alone be enforced through the process
of Court.

It has been noted that the impression of exclusiveness among different fundamental rights, particularly
between Art. 19 and 21, which Gopalan had left has been removed by Maneka Gandhi. It has also been
noted that by establishing a relationship among Art. 14, 19 and 21, particularly between Art. 14 and 21, a
requirement of reasonableness of law providing for deprivation of life or liberty has been created. The
creation of requirement of reasonableness is different thing, but otherwise no controversy apparently ever
existed about the relationship between Art. 14 and 21.

It is only in respect of relationship between Art. 19 and 21 that the controversy has exited. The test is
whether the law penalizes an activity protected by Art. 19. if it does, its validity shall have to be tested
under Art. 19 though it may also be tested under Art. 21 if the reasonableness of procedure for penal
sanctions is also questioned.

There are many more heads concerning the expansion of Art. 21 in different directions such as:

(i) Right of Prisoners:-

In Sunil Batra V. Delhi Administration, the solitary confinement of a prisoner, who was awarded the
capital sentence for having committed the offence of murder under the Prisons Act, was held bad as it
was imposed not as a consequence of violation of the prison discipline but on the ground that the prisoner
was one under sentence of death. Court pointed out that ground that the conviction of a person for a
crime did not reduce him to a non-person vulnerable to major punishment imposed by jail authorities
without observance of procedural safeguards.

(ii) Right of Inmates of Protective Homes:-

Appropriate directions have been given by the courts to the inmates of protective and remand homes for
woman and children for providing suitable human conditions in the homes and for providing appropriate
machinery for effective safeguard of their interests.

(iii) Right to Legal Aid:-

Right to free legal aid at the cost of the State to an accused who cannot afford legal services for reasons
of poverty, indigence or incommunicado situation is part of fair, just and reasonable procedure under Art.
21.

(iv) Right to Speedy Trial:-

In Hussainara Khatoon V. Home Secretary, Bihar, it was held that a procedure which keeps such large
numbers of people behind bars without trial so long cannot possibly be regarded reasonable, just or fair
so as to be in conformity with the requirement of Art. 21. Bhagwati, J. observed that although the right to
speedy trial is not specifically mentioned as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and
content of Art. 21. The court re-emphasized the expeditious review for withdrawal of cases against
undertrial for more than two years. The court reiterated that the investigation must be completed within a
time-bound programme in respect of undertrials and gave specific orders to be followed for quick
disposal of cases of undertrials. It was held that continuance of such detention of undertrials held by
periods more than the maximum term imposable on them on conviction, is clearly illegal and in violation
of that fundamental right under Art. 21.

(v) Right against Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

(vi) Right of Release and Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour:- Art. 21 read with the Directive
Principles of State Policy and the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act obliges the State to identify
release and suitably rehabilitate the bonded labourers. The bonded labourers also have the right to live
with human dignity enshrined in Art. 21.

(vii) Right of Compensation:- Right to claim monetary compensation for the violation of the right in
Art. 21 has also been recognized in several cases.

(viii) Right to Know:- The courts have also recognized the right to know in Art. 21 as a necessary
ingredient of particularly democracy.

Article 21A – Right to Education ( by the 86th Amendment 2002)

Article 22 SAFE GUARD AGAINST ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION.

1. No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of
the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal
practitioner of his choice.
2. Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate
within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from
the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody
beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.
3. Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply —
a. to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or
b. to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
4. No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period
than three months unless—
a. an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be
appointed nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the
maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause
(7); or
b. such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament
under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
5. When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive
detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the
grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a
representation against the order.
6. Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause
to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.
7. Parliament may by law prescribe—
a. the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be
detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive
 detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the
provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);
b. the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained
under any law providing for preventive detention; and
c. the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under ***[sub-clause (a) of
clause (4)].

ARTICLE 23-24 Right Against Exploitation

The right against exploitation is one of the most vital fundamental rights given by the Indian Constitution.
These rights aim at protecting citizens from being subjugated to environmental, domestic and work
hazards. Articles 23 and 24 of the Indian Constitution safeguard women and children and others against
exploitation of various forms.

Article Against Human Trafficking And Forced Labor

The first provision in the Article that mentions the Right against exploitation, states the ‘eradication of
human trafficking and forced labor (beggar)’. Article 23 declares slave trade, prostitution and human
trafficking a punishable offence. There is, however, an exception here in the form of employment without
payment for compulsory services for public purposes. Compulsory military conscription is covered by
this provision

Article Against Child Labor

Article 24 of the Indian Constitution prohibits abolition of employment of children below the age of 14
years in dangerous jobs like factories and mines. Child labour is considered gross violation of the spirit
and provisions of the constitution. The parliament has also passed the Child Labor act of 1986, by
providing penalties for employers and relief and rehabilitation amenities for those affected.

Although Articles 23 and 24 lay down definite provisions against trafficking and child labor, the weaker
sections of the society are still faced by such grave problems. Punishable by law, these acts are now
legitimately bound by legal actions of the Parliament in the form of Bonded Labor Abolition Act of 1976
and the Child Labor Act of 1986, along with the ground rules and provisions stated in the Right against
Exploitation act.

ARTICLE 25-28 FREEDOM OF RELIGION

i. The preamble to the Constitution which contains the ideals and aspirations or the objects which the
Constitution makers intended to be realised clearly proclaims that the people of India have solemnly
resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC. The expression " Socialist Secular" was inserted in the preamble by the Constitution
(42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. The object of inserting this expression was to spell out expressly the
high ideas of socialism and secularism and the integrity of the Nation. In short, the object of the
Government, in making this amendment was to make explicit what was already provided in the
Constitution.
 Even before the word 'secular' was inserted in the preamble in 1976, in 1973 the Supreme Court
observed that secularism was a basic feature of the Constitution. So far as secularism is concerned,
Articles 25 to 30 provide for the same. In Kesavanada V State of Kerala (AIR 1973 S.C. 1461) and in
Indira V Rajnarain (AIR 1975 S.C. 2299) the Supreme Court has observed that by secularism it is
meant that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the ground of religion only and that
the State shall have no religion of its own and all persons shall be equally entitled to the freedom of
conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. To spell out the above
ideas which in fact existed prior to 1976, the preamble to the Constitution was amended in 1976.

ii. In the background of the proclamation in the preamble to the Constitution that India is a secular
country i.e. India shall have no religion of its own and all persons shall be entitled to the freedom of
conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion, the recent activities
targeted against Christians in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Orissa will have to be
examined.

iii. The right to freedom of religion is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25 of the
Constitution of India. Article 25 reads as follows:-
1. Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are
equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate
religion.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from
making any law-
a. regulating or restricting any economic financial political or other secular activity which
may be associated with religious practice;
b. Providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
3. Explanation I. The wearing and carrying of Kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the
profession of the Sikh religion.
4. Explanation II. In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as
including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference
to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.

This Article guarantees that every person in India shall have the freedom of conscience and shall have the
right to profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to the restrictions that may be imposed by the
State on the following grounds, namely:-
1. public order, morality and health;
2. other provisions of the Constitution;
3. regulation of non-religious activity associated with religious practice;
4. social welfare and reform;
5. throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes of Hindus.

The freedom of religion conferred by this Article is not confined to citizens of India alone but extends to
all persons including aliens and individuals exercising their rights either in their individual capacity or on
 behalf of some church or institution. Freedom of conscience connotes a person's right to entertain beliefs
and doctrines concerning matters, which are regarded by him to be conducive to his spiritual well being.

A person has freedom to believe in the religious tenets of any sect or community. The right is not only to
entertain such religious beliefs as may be approved by his judgement or conscience but also to exhibit his
sentiments in overt acts as are enjoined by his religion. According to this Article, he may 'profess, practise
and propagate his religion'.

To profess a religion means the right to declare freely and openly one's faith. Modes of worship
considered by a religion to be its integral and essential part are also secured. He may propagate freely his
religious views for the edification of others. Thus, freedom of conscience would be meaningless unless it
is supplemented by the freedom of unhampered expression of spiritual conviction in word and action.

The right to propagate one's religion means the right to communicate the person's beliefs to another
person or to expose the tenets of that faith, but would not include the right to convert another person to
the former's faith, because the latter is equally entitled to freedom of conscience.

Of course, the latter person is free to adopt another religion in the free exercise of his conscience. Thus,
Article 25(1) guarantees to every person not only the right to entertain such religious beliefs as may
appeal to his conscience, but also the right to exhibit his belief in his conduct by such outward acts as may
appear to him proper in order to spread his ideas for the benefit of others. Therefore, every person is
guaranteed the freedom to practise his religion- or to spread it if he so wishes - if that freedom is not
abused to commit crimes or indulge in anti social activities.

iv. Any attempt to impose a ban on all religious conversions would interfere with one's right to propagate
one's religion under Article 25(1), apart from infringing the right to freedom of speech guaranteed
under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that there is no fundamental
right to convert another person to one's religion as such a right would infringe on the right to freedom
of conscience guaranteed to all citizens of the country alike.

In this context, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the Acts passed by the Madhya Pradesh
and Orissa Govts., which prohibited forcible conversion from one religion to another in a manner
reprehensible to the conscience of the community and which made conversions by force, fraudulence
or allurement an offence. Please see Rev Stainislaus vs State of M.P. (A.I.R. 1997 SC 908)

v. The resultant position is that Article 25(1) of the Constitution does not guarantee the right to convert
but only the right freely to profess, practise and propagate one's religion. Forcible conversion which is
likely to give rise to an apprehension of breech of public order and which is reprehensible to the
conscience of the community is not permissible under this Article.

It is absolutely impossible to forcibly convert any person against his will. No Christian missionary
has ever been accused of resorting to physical threats while propagating the religion. The said Article
unequivocally states that people have the freedom to freely profess and practise, the religion of their
choice. This means that if a person propagates his faith to another person and the person to whom the
 faith is propagated is convinced and wants to profess or practise it, he has the right to do so. If this is
not allowed then the right to propagate religion guaranteed by the Constitution will be meaningless.

vi. The question whether the right to propagate one's religion should be incorporated in Article 25 (draft
Article 19) was the subject matter of discussion in the Constituent Assembly on 3.12.1948 and
6.12.1948. Although some members expressed the view that the right to propagate should not be
included in Article 25 (1), the majority of the members felt otherwise. The following are the views
expressed by certain members:-

Shri. T.T. Krishnamachari

The right to propagate one's religion is not given to any particular community or to people who follow
any particular religion. It is perfectly open to Hindus and Arya Samajis to carry on their suddhi
propaganda as it is open to the Christians, the Muslims, the Jains etc., so long as they do it subject to
public order, morality and the other conditions that have to be observed in any civilized Government. So,
it is not a question of taking away anybody's rights.

It is question of conferring these rights on all citizens and seeing that these rights are exercised in a
manner which will not upset the economy of the country, which will not create disorder and which will
not create undue conflicts in the minds of the people. ---------- Sir, I know as a person who has studied for
about fourteen years in Christian institutions, that no attempt has been made to convert me from my own
faith and to practise Christianity.---------------- The fact that many people in this country have embraced
Christianity is due partly to the status that it gave to them. Why should we forget that particular fact.

Cultural & Educational Rights – Article 29 and 30

Right To Constitutional Remedies - Article 32

Article 32 of the Indian constitution provides for constitutional remedies against the violation or
transgression of fundamental rights. The fundamental rights are of highest importance to the individuals.
They are basic conditions for the fullest development of personality.
Article 32 which was referred to “as the very soul of the constitution” by Dr. Ambedkar, provides for
constitutional remedies. Clause 2 of Article 32 provides that, “The Supreme Court shall have the power to
issue directions or order or writs including the writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, Quo warranto and criterion, whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by” fundamental rights. The citizens are given the right to move—the Supreme Court in
case of transgression of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court thus is constituted into a protector and
guarantor fundamental rights. The right to constitutional remedy is itself a fundamental right.

Besides the Supreme Court, the High Courts also have been given a role in the protection of fundamental
rights. Under Art. 226 of the constitution, High Courts also can issue writs for the enforcement of
fundamental rights.
But the jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in the matter of issue of writs are slightly
different. The Supreme Court can issue writs only in case of infringement of a fundmental right in part III
of the constitution. The High Courts on the other can issue writs against infringement of fundamental
rights, as well as against contravention of ordinary law of redress grievances arising therefrom. Thus the
area of High Courts, with respect to the power to issue writs is wider than that of the Supreme Court.
However, competence of the High Courts to issue writs is limited within its territorial jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court’s area of competence is co-terminus with the territory of India as a whole.

In case of transgression of fundamental rights the Supreme Court or the High Courts may issue five kinds
of writs. These are writs of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Criterion, and Quo warranto.
 Habeas Corpus—Habeas Corpus is a latin term which literally means—you may have the body.
No person may be detained illegally. Whenever a person is detained, he must be produced before
a court. This writ is a powerful safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention.
 Mandamus—meaning ‘command’, mandamus calls upon public servants to perform some
duties. Thus mandamus is issued against dereliction of duty.
 Prohibition—as the very term prohibition—suggests, this writ is issued by the Supreme Court or
the High Courts, to prohibit inferior courts under them to overstep their jurisdiction. This is a
preventive step.
 Certiorari—it enables a superior court to compel the inferior courts to submit records of
proceedings to the higher court.
 Quo Warranto—literally means by what right. This writ is issued to determine the legality of a
person’s claim to public office. The purpose of this writ is to prevent usurpation of a public office
by an undesirable or, unqualified person.

Limitations
Like fundamental rights themselves, the right to constitutional remedies under Article 32 are not without
limits. The constitution visualizes there situations when fundamental rights may be denied hut
constitutional remedies will not be available i.e. Article 32 will not be applicable.
 Article 33 empower the Parliament to modify application of fundamental rights to armed forces
and the Police to ensure proper discharge of their duties.
 Secondly, under Article 34, during the operation of Martial law in any area, the Parliament may
indemnify any person in the service of the central or a state government for acts for the
maintenance or restoration of law and order.
 Thirdly, during emergency proclaimed under Art 352 of the constitution, the fundamental rights
guaranteed to the citizens, will remain suspended. Article 358 authorize the Parliament to restrict
fundamental rights guaranteed by Art 19 during the pendency of an emergency under Article 352.

Article 359 empower the President to suspend the right to move the courts for the restoration of
fundamental rights. In other words, Article 359 empowers the President to suspend Art 32 of the
constitution. Such an order however is to be submitted to the Parliament, and the Parliament has the right
to disapprove the Presidential order.
Right to Information
Elonnai Hickok summarises the Right to Information Act, 2005, how it works, how to file an RTI request,
the information that an individual can request under the Act, the possible responses and the challenges to
the citizen and the government. She concludes by saying that there are many structural changes that both
citizens and governmental officers can make to improve the system.

Introduction
The Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI) was created in 2005 and marked an important time in Indian
legislative history. The Right to Information enables citizens to hold the government accountable and
ensure that it is a transparent body. Questions that can be asked by the citizen to the government range
from anything that may concern to some meeting notes to why a teacher is not present in a public school,
etc. In the current RTI system there are many challenges that are inhibiting the government’s efficient
delivery of the RTI as a service to the people. This has changed the concept of how the citizens view the
RTI, as the government feels harassed and the citizens feel as though their rights are being unjustly
denied. Additionally, individuals have turned the RTI into a redressal mechanism rather than a way to
ensure transparency and learn/understand how their government is functioning. The use of the RTI as a
redressal mechanism has created a relationship of animosity between the government and citizens. The
below note outlines the ecosystem of the RTI and notes specific challenges that both citizens and the
government face.[1]

The RTI Ecosystem

RTI work flow
 An individual files an RTI with the central/ state public information officer (PIO) or a specific PIO.
PIOs are often not trained, and rarely apply for the position, but are instead designated.
 Within five days the information is to be forwarded to the correct PIO.
 The PIO must open a file and dispose of the request within 30 days.
 If the PIO fails to reply to the applicant by either approving or denying a request, the PIO is liable to
pay a fine of Rs. 250 for each day of delay.
 If information is electronically uploaded, it is stored in any format the officer chooses (jpeg, pdf,
html, etc).
 Except for land records and staff records, files are retained for a maximum of one year.
 If the PIO does not dispose of the request, there is scope for an appeal within 30-45 days to the
appellate authority.
 There is scope for a second appeal to the information commissioner if the authority does not respond
within 90 days or the answer is found to be unsatisfactory.
 The final decision of the information commissioner is binding.

Filing an RTI request

Though there is no specific format an individual must follow when submitting an RTI, when filing a
request, individuals must include:
 His /her name and address.
 The name and address of the public information officer (PIO).
 The particulars of information/documents required (limited to 150 words and one subject matter).
 The time period of the information required.
 Proof of payment.
 Signature.
 Proof if the individual is a BPL holder.[2]

Information that an individual can request under the RTI Act

 Inspection of work, documents, and records
 Taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records.
 Taking certified samples of material.
 Obtaining of information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, and video cassettes, or in any other
electronic mode, or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer, or in any other
device.
 Obtaining the status of an RTI request or complaint.

Note: If an individual is requesting third party information, the PIO must inform the third party and
provide the individual the opportunity to state a reason for not disclosing the information.

Accepted format of requested materials and records

 Material requested can be in any format including: records, documents, memos, emails, opinions,
advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, and
data material held in any electronic form.
 Records requested can include: any document, manuscript and file, any microfilm, microfiche and
facsimile copy of a document, and reproduction of image or images embodied in such microfilm
(whether enlarged or not), and any other material produced by a computer or any other device.

Possible Responses to an RTI request

An information officer can respond to an RTI in the following ways:
 Transfer request to appropriate PIO within five days and notify the applicant about the transfer.
 Provide the requested information within 30 days.
 Reject the request information within 30 days stating the reasons for rejection, the period within
which an appeal against such rejection may be preferred, and the details of the appellate authority.
 Not respond to the applicant. If no response is received within 30 days the officer is liable for a
penalty of Rs. 250 per day.

Appeal/Complaint Process
 First appeal can be filed after 30 days or if the information given was unsatisfactory. The appeal must
include: name and address of the appellant, name and address of the PIO involved, brief facts leading
to appeal, relief sought, grounds for appeal, and copies of the application or documents involved,
including copies of the reply, if received from the PIO.
 Second appeal must contain: name and address of the applicant, and name and address of the PIO
involved, particulars of the Order including the number if any against which the appeal is preferred,
brief facts leading to the appeal, if appeal/complaint is preferred against deemed refusal then the
particulars of the application, including number and date and name, address of the PIO to whom the
application was originally made, relief sought, grounds for the relief, verification by the applicant,
 any other information which the commission may deem necessary for deciding during the appeal, self
attested copies of the application or documents involved, copies of the documents relied upon by the
appellant and referred to in the appeal, and an index of the documents referred to in the appeal.
 A complaint must include: name and address of the complainant, name and address of the state PIO
against whom the complaint is being made, facts leading to the complaint, particulars of the
application [number, date, name and address of the PIO (three copies)], relief sought, grounds and
proof for relief, verification of the complainant (three copies), index of documents referred to in the
complaint, and any other necessary information.[3]

Challenges to the Citizen

Knowing the correct Public Information Officer

Knowing which public information officer to mail in the RTI request is the first difficulty that an
individual faces. As noted above in 2008 there were a total of 73,256 recorded public information
commissioners in the State of Karnataka. New public information commissioners are created every day,
because the RTI extends not only to any department of the government, but to any sub-contracted
company, organization, school, or NGO that is receiving government funding and doing work on behalf
of the government directly or indirectly. Lists of PIOs can be found on department bulletin boards and
websites, but there is no clear method for an individual to know what information each PIO is the
custodian over. Thus, they are left to determine on their own, and rely on the PIO to forward their
application to the correct individual.

Filing in the correct format

Though it is stated in the law what language an RTI request will be accepted in, and what information
should be included – individuals are often unaware of the guidelines and unaware of how to correctly fill
out an RTI request. An incorrectly formatted request is one of the major reasons for rejection of a request
by the PIO.

Language
In the State of Karnataka, RTIs can be filed only in two languages: Kannada and English. By law, RTI
responses are given only in the language that the department works in on a daily basis, and in English.
The information that is supplied through the request is given in its original language. For example, if you
ask for a document that is originally in Marathi, the document will be photo copied and sent to you. No
translation of documents takes place, because it is not the job function of the officer to translate
documents.

Appeals
If an individual is denied information, or does not receive a reply within 30 days, they have the option of
seeking an appeal through an appellate authority. In 2008 Karnataka had 5416 Appellate Authorities.
Currently, because of the backlog in appeal cases and the slow functioning of the system, an individual
might have to wait for upto one year for his/her appeal to be heard. Often at this point the information is
no longer relevant or needed.
Privacy
In some cases individuals are denied a request for information based on the grounds that it would invade
the privacy of the public officer. This is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case. Finding the right
balance between the right to information and privacy is important, as protecting an individual’s privacy is
crucial, but privacy should not be used as a reason for the government to be less transparent to the citizen
and be used as a way to deny a citizen the information that they are entitled to.[4]

Challenges in the RTI System for the Government

 Too many RTI requests and no system to record duplicates: As the figure shows above, in 2008,
the Karnataka Government received 42208 RTI requests. Currently, it is not possible to know how
many of these requests were duplicates since departments handling RTIs do not make it a practice to
upload and organize filed RTI requests in a format easily accessible to citizens. Thus, there is no
present system in place to track, upload, and store past RTI's in a meaningful way.
 Additional overhead in recording, organizing, accessing, and storing data: In the current system
every time an RTI request is received by the government, they open a new file for that request.
Though in some ways this system of storage simplifies the process of finding past RTIs, it adds an
additional overhead cost as photocopies must be made, new files created, and correctly added to the
organized system. Each state follows its own method of recording, organizing, accessing, and storing
data – thus, currently it is not possible to easily access the information from another state or combine
information from two separate states.
 Lack of compliance with section 4(d) pro-active disclosure: Under section 4 (d), the government is
required to pro-actively disclose a pre-determined data to the public via websites and other useful
modes. Currently there is very little compliance with section 4(d) from governmental departments.
There are many factors that contribute to the low rate of compliance that exist including lack of
resources and lack of proper enforcement. If governmental departments were to comply with section
4(d) then the load of RTI requests and the time each request must take to answer could be lightened
considerably as the government could respond by pointing citizens to the already disclosed
information.

Conclusion
Though the Right to Information is an important right, the above entry looks at some of the
weaknesses and challenges in the system. There are many structural changes that both citizens and
governmental officers can make to improve the system such as pro-actively disclosing information,
ensuring that an RTI is filed correctly, and creating a system for organizing previously asked questions.
Alongside of these structural changes it is also critical that a positive culture of transparency and
accountability is fostered throughout society, thus encouraging citizens to actively engage with the
government and exercise their right to information.
List of Landmark cases on Right to Information decided by the
Supreme Court of India
1. People’s Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) And Another, Petitioner V. Union Of
India And Another, With Lok Satta And Others, V. Union Of India, 2003(001)
SCW 2353 SC
2. Union Of India V. Association For Democratic Reforms And Another, With
People's Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) And Another, V. Union Of India And
Another, 2002(005) SCC 0361SC
3. Union Of India And Others, V. Motion Picture Association And Others, 1999(006)
SCC 0150 SC
4. Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. And Others V. Union Of India And Others, 1997(004) SCC
0306SC
5. Tata Press Ltd., V. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited And Others, 1995(005)
SCC 0139 SC
6. Secretary, Ministry Of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. Of India, And Others, V.
Cricket Association Of Bengal And Others, 1995(002) SCC 0161 SC
7. Life Insurance Corporation Of India, V. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah, 1992 (003) SCC
0637 SC
8. Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd., V. Proprietors Of Indian Express Newspapers,
Bombay Pvt. Ltd. And Others, 1988 (004) SCC 0592 SC
9. Sheela Barse, V. State Of Maharashtra, 1987 (004) SCC 0373 SC
10. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd., And Others, V. Union Of India
And Others, 1985 (001) SCC 0641 SC
11. S.P. Gupta vs. Union of India , MANU/SC/0080/1981, AIR 1982 SC 149 ,
1981Supp(1)SCC87.
12. The State Of U. P., V. Raj Narain And Others, 1975 (004) SCC 0428 SC