Rights theories

Moral rights are conceived as "trump cards against utilitarian

arguments."

 If it is true that A has a right to X, then it would be wrong to

deprive A of X or to prevent A from Xing on purely utilitarian
grounds.
 There are other, more specific uses of rights claims, but this is
a basic conception of "having moral rights."

Various senses of "having (a)

right(s)"
1. "Nanci has rights" just means "there are (morally) right
and wrong ways of treating Nanci." In this sense, even
utilitarians can admit that individuals "have rights," but
"having rights" in this sense just means counting for
something from the moral point of view.
2. "Nanci has a right to X" means "Nanci has no obligation
not to X." To have a right to X in this sense just means
that one's Xing would be morally permissible. Such rights
are often called "liberties" or "privileges." An example of
"having a right" in this sense might be having the right to
run for office or having the right to sell your car."
3. "Nanci has a right to X" means "No one may interfere
with Nanci's Xing." Such rights are often called "negative
rights" or "rights to non-interference." An example might
be the right to free speech.
4. "Nanci has a right to X" means "Someone has a duty to
provide Nanci with X." Such rights are often called "claim
rights." An example might be the right to a public
education.
niversalizability and the Golden Rule

Variations on the familiar "Golden Rule" are found in most

world religions:
 Christian version: "Treat others as you would like them to treat
you" (Luke 6:31, New English Bible).
 Hindu version: "Let not any man do unto antoher any act that he
wisheth not done to himself by others, knowing it to be painful to
himself" (Mahabharata, Shanti Parva, cclx.21).
 Confucian version: "Do not do to others what you would not
want them to do to you" (Analects, Book xii, #2).
 Buddhist version: "Hurt not others with that which pains yourself"
(Udanavarga, v. 18).
 Jewish version: "What is hateful to yourself do not do to your
fellow man. That is the whole of the Torah" (Babylonian Talmud,
Shabbath 31a).
 Muslim version: "No man is a true believer unless he desires for
his brother that which he desires for himself" (Hadith, Muslim,
imam 71-72).

Collected by C. Harris, M. Pritchard, and M. Rabins, in Engineering Ethics:

Concepts and Cases, second edition (Wadsworth, 2000), p. 86.

One explanation for the universal acknowledgement of such a

standard would be that it provides a common sense expression
of the requirement of universalizability:

Universalizability: "whatever is right (or wrong) in one situation

is right (or wrong) in any relevantly similar situation" (Harris et
al., p. 37).

Universalizability as described above is a basic logical feature

of all moral discourse. That is, in making a distinctively moral
judgment, you commit yourself to its universalizability. If in
making a judgment you refuse to recognize its
universalizability, then you are actually refusing to make a
moral judgment.