01.
Republic of the Philippines land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the
issue of the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction
of municipal trial courts in land registration cases.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas 2 in
LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329,
granting respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporation’s (Corporation) application for original
registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of
law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision
before filing this Petition for Review.
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point
Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for
original registration of title over a parcel of land with
an assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a
total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property,
more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D,
San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less
10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte,
San Juan, Batangas. 3
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the
case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.4 On 7
August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the
initial hearing on 4 November 1997.5
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the
application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the
records were still with the RTC.6
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted
motuproprio the records of the case to the MTC of San
Juan, because the assessed value of the property was
allegedly less than ₱100,000.7
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General
Default8 and commenced with the reception of
evidence.9Among the documents presented by
respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations,10 a Deed of Absolute Sale in its
favor,11 and a Certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is
within the alienable and disposable zone.12 Thereafter,
it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.13
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,14 the CA
ruled that since the former had actively participated in
the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to
raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is
thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the lower court on appeal.15 The CA further found that
respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the
latter’s registrable title over the subject property after
having proven open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject
before the outbreak of World War II.16
Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic
filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the
following arguments in support of its appeal:
I.
THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL
II.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
OF LAND TITLE.17
The Court’s Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the
case to the court a quo for further proceedings in order
to determine if the property in question forms part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
I
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional
question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.18 Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or
the law.19 It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by
the acquiescence of the court.20 Consequently,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if
raised for the first time on appeal.21
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be
estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if
he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which
he questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s
jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him"22 is based on
the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of
that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.23 InTijam, the party-litigant actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court
and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter,
and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits
from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question
the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique
facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa
v. People,24 we cautioned that Tijam must be
construed as an exception to the general rule and
applied only in the most exceptional cases whose
factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the
exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
registration when the records were still with the
RTC.25 At that point, petitioner could not have
questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC,
simply because the case was not yet with that court.
When the records were transferred to the MTC,
petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested
affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner
immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its
Brief.26 Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by
laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.
Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it."27 In this case,
petitioner Republic has not displayed such
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to
conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its
right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction
over the case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts,
petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a)
the period for setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the application, because the
RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond
the 90-day period provided under the Property
Registration Decree.28
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The
court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of
the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-
five days nor later than ninety days from the date of
the order. x xx.
In this case, the application for original registration
was filed on 17 July 1997.29 On 18 July 1997, or a day
after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately
issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on
22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the
Order.30 While the date set by the RTC was beyond the
90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic
v. Manna Properties, Inc.,31 petitioner Republic therein
contended that there was failure to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for original registration,
because there were 125 days between the Order
setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial
hearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time between
the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial
hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was
not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:
x xx [A] party to an action has no control over the
Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land
court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the
business of such official in the performance of his
duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the
exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on
matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an
applicant for an act or omission over which the
applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
especially if the applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.32
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize
respondent Corporation by dismissing its application
for registration on account of events beyond its
control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7
August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November
1997,33 within the 90-day period provided by law,
petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect
was still not cured, as the second Order was issued
more than five days from the filing of the application,
again contrary to the prescribed period under the
Property Registration Decree.34
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date
and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the
filing of the application for registration, as provided in
the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the
court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day
period was merely directory, and failure to issue the
Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with
the five-day period is mandatory would make
jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon
the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law.35 It
cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the
court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the
statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume
that the law deliberately meant the provision "to
become meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter."36 However, the records of this case do not
show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the
RTC immediately set the case for initial hearing a day
after the filing of the application for
registration,37 except that it had to issue a second
Order because the initial hearing had been set beyond
the 90-day period provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended38 that since the selling
price of the property based on the Deed of Sale
annexed to respondent’s application for original
registration was ₱160,000,39 the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,40 the MTC’s
delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land
registration cases is limited to lands, the value of
which should not exceed ₱100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral
and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land
Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear
and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots where the value of which
does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the
affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decision in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691)
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral
and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or
opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value
of which does not exceed ₱100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance,
because petitioner opposed respondent Corporation’s
application for registration on 8 January 1998.41
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second
instance, because the value of the lot in this case does
not exceed ₱100,000.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the value of the
land should not be determined with reference to its
selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in
three ways: first, by the affidavit of the
claimant; second, by agreement of the respective
claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from
the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property.42
In this case, the value of the property cannot be
determined using the first method, because the
records are bereft of any affidavit executed by
respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise,
valuation cannot be done through the second method,
because this method finds application only where there
are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint
submission as to the value of the property. Here, only
respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation
claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be
ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax
Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation
together with its application for registration. From the
records, we find that the assessed value of the
property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total
assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire
property.43 Based on these Tax Declarations, it is
evident that the total value of the land in question
does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the MTC may
exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof
that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC’s exercise
of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower
court erred in granting respondent Corporation’s
application for original registration in the absence of
sufficient proof that the property in question was
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.44 The applicant for
land registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership by establishing
through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought
to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government.45 We held in Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the land sought to be registered.46 The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the
DENR Secretary has approved the land classification
and released the land in question as alienable and
disposable.47
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO48 Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.49
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO
certification in support of its application.50 Clearly, this
falls short of the requirements for original
registration.1âwphi1
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for
reception of further evidence to prove that the
property in question forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. If respondent
Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a
certified true copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for
original registration should be granted. If it fails to
present sufficient proof that the land in question is
alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the
government, the application should be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan,
Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the
property sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
JOSE PORTUGAL
ARTURO D. BRION
PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
and Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K.
Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In
the course of her search for properties to satisfy the
judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that
Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister
Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a
parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters,
situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas,
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot
13713. She was able to secure an Order6 dated 4
March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr.
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving
the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club,
Inc. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings,
including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla K. Mortilla, et al."
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to
residential, commercial, and recreational uses. She
was also able to get from the Office of the City
Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification7 stating that Lot
13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was
in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla;
and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-
A itself.8 Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City
issued a Certification9 attesting that Lot 13713 in the
name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not
covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or
patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award or patent under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on
execution Lot 13713, and the public auction sale of the
same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in
May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale,
petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the
Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned
by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation
(Summit Realty). She immediately went to the Makati
City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice
President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense
did not show her any document to prove ownership of
Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened her
that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family,
was too powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle
with.
The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May
2002, and petitioner bought Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso
share in Lot 13713.
On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following
documents, on her acquisition of Raquel’s 1/3 pro-
indiviso share in Lot 13713, recorded in the Primary
Entry Book and Registration Book of the Register of
Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act No. 334410:
(a) Notice of Levy;11 (b) Certificate of Sale;12 (c)
Affidavit of Publication;13 and (d) Writ of Execution.14
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City
Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration No. 00942-
A,15 indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of
Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other
10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for
her 5,000-square-meter share in Lot 13713, she was
shocked to find out that, without giving her notice, her
Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713
was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with
the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot
1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
12964216 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A,17 both in
the name of Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac). The
reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three entries,
reflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit
Realty, to wit:
ENTRY NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY: In favor of LEONARDO YAGIN: For
purposes more particularly stipulated in the
contract ratified before Atty. Ernesto M.
Vergara of Lipa City as per Doc. No. 639; Page
No. 29; Book No. LXXVI; Series of 1976.
Date of instrument – 2-6-1976
Date of inscription – 6-26-2002 at 11:20 a.m.
ENTRY NO. 185833: SALE IN FAVOR OF
SUMMIT POINT REALTY & DEVELOPMENT
CORP: –
ENTRY NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE: – Of the
parcel of land described in this cert. of title is
hereby sold and cancelled TCT No. 134609(SN-
6672938) Vol. 671-A, having been issued by
virtue of the aforesaid instrument ratified
before Perfecto L. Dimayuga, Notary Public for
Makati City as per Doc. No. 148; Page 31,
Book No. LXVII, Series of 2002.
Date of instrument: July 22, 2002
Date of inscription: July 25, 2002 at 2:30
P.M.18
On 25 July 2002, at 2:30 p.m., TCT No. 129642 in the
name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T-134609
in the name of Summit Realty was issued in its place.
The foregoing incidents prompted petitioner to file a
Complaint Affidavit19 before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon charging several public officers
and private individuals as follows:
32. I respectfully charge that on or about the months
of June 2002 and July 2002 and onwards in Lipa City,
Atty. Antonio M. [Escutin], the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City[;] Aquilina A. Mistas, the Local Assessment
Operations Officer III of the City Assessor’s Office of
Lipa City[;] Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, Office of
the City Assessor of Lipa City, who are public officers
and acting in concert and conspiring with Lauro S.
Leviste II and Benedicto L. Orense, Executive Vice-
President and Vice-President, respectively[,] of
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation x
xx while in the discharge of their administrative
functions did then and there unlawfully, through
evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence and
with manifest partiality towards Summit caused me
injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 by cancelling my
TD #00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa
City and instead issuing in the name of Francisco
Catigbac TC #00949-A when aforesaid personalities
well knew that TCT No. 129642 was already cancelled
and therefore not legally entitled to a new tax
declaration thereby manifestly favoring Summit Point
Realty and Development Corporation who now appears
to be the successor-in-interest of Francisco Catigbac,
all to my damage and prejudice.20 (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit gave rise to
simultaneous administrative and preliminary (criminal)
investigations, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and
OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, respectively.
Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in the
circumstances surrounding the alleged sale of Lot 1-B
to Summit Realty and in the documents evidencing the
same.
The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Summit Realty executed on 22 July 2002 by Leonardo
Yagin (Yagin), as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, appeared
to be a "one-way street." It did not express the desire
of Summit Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot 1-B or
indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the
Deed. No representative of Summit Realty signed the
left margin of each and every page of said Deed. It
also did not appear from the Deed that a
representative of Summit Realty presented himself
before the Notary Public who notarized the said
document. The Tax Identification Numbers of Yagin, as
vendor, and Summit Realty, as vendee, were not
stated in the Deed.
Petitioner also averred that, being a corporation,
Summit Realty could only act through its Board of
Directors. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Lot 1-B was presented for recording before the
Register of Deeds, it was not accompanied by a
Secretary’s Certificate attesting to the existence of a
Board Resolution which authorized said purchase by
Summit Realty. There was no entry regarding such a
Secretary’s Certificate and/or Board Resolution,
whether on TCT No. 129642 or TCT No. T-134609. A
Secretary’s Certificate eventually surfaced, but it was
executed only on 30 July 2002, five days after TCT No.
T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was already
issued.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was presented before and
recorded by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on 25
July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., at exactly the same date and
time TCT No. T-134609 was issued to Summit Realty.
Petitioner theorizes that for this to happen, TCT No. T-
134609 was already prepared and ready even before
the presentation for recording of the Deed of Absolute
Sale before the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried.
The agency Catigbac supposedly executed in favor of
Yagin was extinguished by Catigbac’s death. Thus,
petitioner argued, Yagin no longer had authority to
execute on 22 July 2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Lot 1-B in favor of Summit Realty, making the said
Deed null and void ab initio.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware
of Catigbac’s death, having acknowledged the same in
LRC Case No. 00-0376, the Petition for Issuance of
New Owner’s Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost
One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lipa City. During the ex parte
presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000,
Orense testified on behalf of Summit Realty that
Catigbac’s property used to form part of a bigger
parcel of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring
132,975 square meters, covered by TCT No. 181 in the
name of Catigbac; after Catigbac’s death, Lot 1 was
informally subdivided into several parts among his
heirs and/or successors-in-interest, some of whom
again transferred their shares to other persons;
Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts of
Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a
consolidated area of 105,648 square meters, and
identified as Lot 1-B after survey; despite the
subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No.
181 covering the same was never cancelled; and the
owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact
of such loss was annotated at the back of the original
copy of TCT No. 181 with the Registry of Deeds.
Subsequently, in an Order21 dated 3 January 2001, the
RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and
directed the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of
TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac, under the same
terms and condition as in its original form.
Petitioner further cast doubt on the acts undertaken by
Summit Realty in connection with Catigbac’s property,
purportedly without legal personality and capacity. The
Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976
granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac,
yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case
No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation at all in
said case. Likewise, it was not Yagin, but Orense, who,
through a letter22dated 27 June 2001, requested the
cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the
issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence,
it was Orense’s request which resulted in the issuance
of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, later
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the
name of Summit Realty.
Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the
cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of
Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-
134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the
former cancelled title which was used as basis for
canceling petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A.
Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in
the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.
Piecing everything together, petitioner recounted in
her Complaint Affidavit the alleged scheme perpetrated
against her and the involvement therein of each of the
conspirators:
28. Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation
went into action right after I paid Orense a visit
sometime May 2002. Summit resurrected from the
grave. (sic) Francisco Catigbac whom they knew to be
long dead to face possible litigation. This is the height
of malice and bad faith on the part of Summit through
its LauroLeviste II, the Executive Vice President and
Benedicto Orense, the Vice President. I had only in my
favor a tax declaration to show my interest and
ownership over the 5, 000 sq.m. of the subject parcel
of land. Evidently, Leviste and Orense came to the
desperate conclusion that they needed a TCT which is
a far better title than any tax declaration.
Both then methodically commenced their evil and
illegal scheme by causing on June 26, 2002 at 11:20
a.m. the inscription with the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City of a purported Special Power of Attorney in favor
of Leonardo Yagin (Annex "I"). Next, the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Annex "J") was made the following
month in order to make it appear that
Yagin unilaterally sold to Summit the subject parcel of
land purportedly belonging to Francisco Catigbac.
Since the latter was already dead and realizing that
the agency was already extinguished, Annex "J" was
not signed or executed by Leviste or Orense. This fact
however did not deter the two from securing a BIR
clearance on July 25, 2002. Also, on this same day,
July 25, 2002, Annex "J" was presented to Atty.
[Escutin] at 2:30 p.m. simultaneously, at exactly the
same time of 2:30 p.m. TCT No. T-134609 in Summit’s
name was issued by Atty. [Escutin] WITHOUT benefit
of the submission of the necessary documentation
such as the Board Resolution, DAR Clearance, Revenue
Tax Receipts for documentary stamps, real property
tax clearance, proof of payment of transfer tax, tax
declaration, articles of incorporation, SEC certification,
license to sell and/or certificate of registration by
HLURB, etc. Without the total and lightning speed
cooperation of Atty. [Escutin] to close his eyes to the
total absence of said vital documents, the desperately
needed TCT to erase my interest and ownership would
not have come into existence. Atty. [Escutin] had
indeed acted in concert and in conspiracy with Leviste
and Orense in producing Annex "H" and Annex "K".
29. Thereafter, Leviste and Orense utilized the
already cancelled TCT No. 129642 in the name of
Francisco Catigbac to be the basis in seeking the
cancellation of TD #00942A in my name (Annex "F").
The Tax Mapping Division of the Office of City Assessor
of Lipa City opined that my 5,000 sq.m. was (sic) part
and parcel of the 105,648 sq.m. covered by TCT No.
129642. A photocopy of the Certification from said
division is hereto marked and attached as Annex "P",
hereof. AquilinaMistas, the Local Assessment
Operations Officer III of the Office of the City Assessor
of Lipa City then conveniently caused the
disappearance of my Notice of Levy and other
supporting documents which she had personally
received from me on March 13, 2002. For her part of
the conspiracy likewise, Marietta Linatoc, Records
Clerk, forthwith cancelled by TD#00942-A and in lieu
thereof she issued TD #00949-A in the name of
Francisco Catigbac. I dare say so because Mistas and
Linatoc were presented a cancelled TCT as basis for
obliterating my 5,000 sq.m. The fact of cancellation is
clearly stated on the posterior side of TCT No. 129642.
Both can read. But the two nevertheless proceeded
with dispatch in canceling my TD, though they had
ample time and opportunity to reject the request of
Summit who is not even the registered owner
appearing on TCT No. 129642. Francisco Catigbac
could not have been in front of Mistas and Linatoc
because he was already six feet below the ground.
Mistas and Linatoc could have demanded presentation
of the document authorizing Summit in requesting for
the cancellation of my TD. Also, they could have
demanded from Summit any document transferring my
interest and ownership in favor of a third party. Or, at
least, they could have annotated in Tax Declaration
No. 00949-A the fact that I bought my 5,000 sq.m.
from a public auction sale duly conducted by the court
sheriff. Alternatively, Linatoc and Mistas should have
advised Summit to the effect that since they already
appear to be the owners of the subject parcel of land,
the new tax declaration should bear their name
instead. Mistas and Linatoc indeed conspired with
Summit in the illegal and unwarranted cancellation of
my TD and in covering up the behind-the-scenes
activities of Summit by making it appear that it was
Francisco Catigbac who caused the cancellation. Even
Leonardo Yagin, the alleged attorney-in-fact did not
appear before Mistas and Linatoc. Yagin could not have
appeared because he is rumored to be long dead. The
aforementioned acts of the two benefitted (sic)
Summit through their manifest partiality, evident bad
faith and/or gross inexcusable negligence. Perhaps,
there is some truth to the rumor that Yagin is dead
because he does not even have a TIN in the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale. If indeed Yagin is
already dead or inexistent[,] the allged payment of the
purchase price of P5,282,400.00 on July 25, 2002 is a
mere product of the fertile imagination of Orense and
Leviste.1avvphi1.zw+ To dispute this assertion[,] the
live body of Leonardo Yagin must be presented by
Orense and Leviste.23
After filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner
attempted to have the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square meter pro-
indiviso share in Lot 13713 registered with the Register
of Deeds of Lipa City. She also sought the annotation
of her Affidavit of Adverse Claim on the said 5,000
square meters on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit Realty.
Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on
the finding of Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana),
refused to have the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance registered, since:
The Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance is a Mode
of Transfers (sic) ownership in favor of the Plaintiff,
[Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it happen (sic)
that the presented Tax Declaration [No.] 00942-A is
already transfer (sic) in the name of the said [Dinah]
C. Castillo, therefore[,] the registration of Sheriff (sic)
Final Sale is no longer necessary.24
Escutin likewise denied petitioner’s request to have her
Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated on TCT No. T-
134609 on the following grounds:
1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not
adverse to the registered owner. The
registered owner is Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-134609 of the
Registry of Deeds for Lipa City.
2. The records of the Registry reveals that the
source of the rights or interest of the adverse
claimant is by virtue of a Levy on Execution by
the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 30, San Pablo City, in Civil Case No.
SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel
Buenaventura. The registered owner, Summit
Point Realty and Development Corporation nor
its predecessor-in-interest are not the
judgment debtor or a party in the said case.
Simply stated, there is no privity of contract
between them (Consulta No. 1044 and 1119).
If ever, her adverse claim is against Raquel
Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds
no title over the property.25
Escutin did mention, however, that petitioner may
elevate enconsulta to the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) the denial of her request for registration of the
Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and
annotation of her adverse claim on TCT No. T-134609.
This petitioner did on 3 July 2003.
While her Consulta was pending before the LRA,
petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit26 and a Second Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit27 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, bringing to its attention the aforementioned
developments. In her Second Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit, petitioner prayed that Sta. Ana be included
as a co-respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-
C-03-0728-F, averring that the latter’s actuation
deprived petitioner of a factual basis for securing a
new title in her favor over her 5,000 square meter pro-
indiviso share in Lot 13713, because the public auction
sale of the said property to her could never become
final without the registration of the Sheriff’s Deed.
The persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-
L-C-03-0728-F filed their respective Counter-Affidavits.
Respondent Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit
that TCT No. T-134609 reflected the same date and
time of entry of the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Yagin (as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact) and Summit
Realty, i.e., 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., in accordance
with Section 5628 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
He emphasized that his duty as Register of Deeds to
register the Deed of Absolute Sale presented before
him was purely ministerial. If the document was legal
and in due form, and there was nothing mutilated or
irregular on its face, the Register of Deeds had no
authority to inquire into its intrinsic validity based upon
proofs aliunde. It was not true that he allowed the
registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale
notwithstanding the absence of the required
documents supporting the application for registration
thereof. On the contrary, all the required documents
such as the DAR Clearance, Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) Certificate Authorizing Registration
(CAR), Real Property Tax, Transfer Tax, Secretary’s
Certificate and Articles of Incorporation of Summit
Realty were submitted. While it was true that the
Secretary’s Certificate did not accompany the Deed of
Absolute Sale upon the presentation of the latter for
registration, Section 117 of the Property Registration
Decree gives the party seeking registration five days to
comply with the rest of the requirements; and only if
the party should still fail to submit the same would it
result in the denial of the registration. The License to
Sell and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Registration of Summit Realty are only required when
a subdivision project is presented for registration. The
use of TINs in certain documents is a BIR requirement.
The BIR itself did not require from Yagin as vendor his
TIN in the Deed of Absolute Sale, and issued the CAR
even in the absence thereof. The Register of Deeds,
therefore, was only bound by the CAR. As to the
Certification earlier issued by the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-
owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by
any certificate of title, Escutin explained that the
Register of Deeds was not technically equipped to
determine whether a cadastral lot number was within a
titled property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring
or participating in the cancellation of petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A for, as Register of Deeds, he
was not concerned with the issuance (or cancellation)
of tax declarations.
Respondent Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for
Administration of the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa
City, disputed petitioner’s allegations that she
personally received from petitioner copies of the Notice
of Levy and other supporting documents, and that she
caused the disappearance thereof. Although she
admitted that said documents were shown to her by
petitioner, she referred petitioner to the Receiving
Clerk, Lynie Reyes, who accordingly received the
same. Mistas maintained that she was not the
custodian of records of the Office and she should not
be held responsible for the missing documents. She
opined that petitioner’s documents could have been
among those misplaced or destroyed when the Office
of the City Assessor was flooded with water leaking
from the toilet of the Office of the City Mayor. As
Assistant City Assessor for Administration, Mistas
identified her main function to be the control and
management of all phases of administrative matters
and support. She had no hand in the cancellation of
petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and the
issuance of Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A for
such function pertained to another division over which
she did not exercise authority. Thus, it was also not
within her function or authority to demand the
presentation of certain documents to support the
cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-
A or to cause the annotation of petitioner’s interest on
Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A.
Respondent Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment
Operation Officer II of the Office of the City Assessor,
Lipa City, she was in charge of safekeeping and
updating the North District Records. With respect to
the transfer of a tax declaration from one name to
another, her duty was limited only to the act of
preparing the new tax declaration and assigning it a
number, in lieu of the cancelled tax declaration. It was
a purely ministerial duty. She had no authority to
demand the presentation of any document or question
the validity of the transfer. Neither was it within her
jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner’s interest
should have been annotated on Catigbac’s Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A. Examining the documents
presented in support of the transfer of the tax
declaration to another’s name was a function belonging
to other divisions of the Office of the City Assessors.
The flow of work, the same as in any other ordinary
transaction, mandated her to cancel petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A, and to prepare and release
Catigbac’s Tax Declaration No. 00949-A after the
transfer had been reviewed and approved by other
divisions of the Office. It was also not true that TCT
No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was already
cancelled when it was presented before the Office of
the City Assessors; the photocopy of said certificate of
title with the Office bore no mark of cancellation.
Leviste and Orense, the private individuals charged
with the respondent public officers, admitted that they
were corporate officers of Summit Realty. They related
that Summit Realty bought a parcel of land measuring
105,648 square meters, later identified as Lot 1-B,
previously included in TCT No. 181, then specifically
covered by TCT No. 129642, both in the name of
Catigbac. As a result of such purchase, ownership of
Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Summit
Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in
good faith that said property was indeed owned by
Catigbac on the basis of the latter’s certificate of title
over the same. Catigbac’s right as registered owner of
Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was superior
to petitioner’s, which was based on a mere tax
declaration. Leviste and Orense rebutted petitioner’s
assertion that the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Yagin, as Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, and Summit
Realty was a "one-way street." The Deed was actually
signed on the left margin by both Yagin and the
representative of Summit Realty. The inadvertent
failure of the representative of Summit Realty to sign
the last page of the Deed and of both parties to
indicate their TINs therein did not invalidate the sale,
especially since the Deed was signed by witnesses
attesting to its due execution. Questions as regards
the scope of Catigbac’s Special Power of Attorney in
favor of Yagin and the effectivity of the same after
Catigbac’s death can only be raised in an action
directly attacking the title of Summit Realty over Lot 1-
B, and not in an administrative case and/or preliminary
investigation before the Ombudsman, which
constituted a collateral attack against said title. Leviste
and Orense further explained that since the owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and was judicially
ordered replaced only on 3 January 2001,
entries/inscriptions were necessarily made thereon
after said date. As to Orense’s failure to show
petitioner any document proving ownership of Lot 1-B
by Summit Realty when the latter paid him a visit, it
was not due to the lack of such documents, but
because of petitioner’s failure to establish her right to
peruse the same. Orense also denied ever threatening
petitioner during their meeting. Finally, according to
Leviste and Orense, petitioner’s allegations were based
on mere conjectures and unsupported by evidence.
That particular acts were done or not done by certain
public officials was already beyond the control of
Leviste and Orense, and just because they benefited
from these acts did not mean that they had a hand in
the commission or omission of said public officials.
After more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F
and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F were finally submitted for
resolution.
In a Joint Resolution29 dated 28 April 2004, the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon gave more
credence to respondent Escutin’s defenses, as opposed
to petitioner’s charges against him:
Going to the charges against respondent Escutin, he
convincingly explained that he allowed the registration
of the allegedly defective Deed of Sale because he, as
Register of Deeds, has no power to look into the
intrinsic validity [of] the contract presented to him for
registration, owing to the ministerial character of his
function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said
respondent, all the documents required for the
registration of the Deed of Sale were submitted by the
applicant.
We likewise find said respondent’s explanation
satisfactory that Section 56 of P.D. 1529 mandates
that the TCT bear the date of registration of the
instrument on which the said TCT’s issuance was
based. It is for this reason that TCT 134609 bears the
same date and time as the registration of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, which deed served as basis for its
issuance.
As to his denial to register [herein petitioner’s]
Affidavit of Adverse Claim and Sheriff’s Certificate of
Final Sale, through the issuance by the Registry of
Deeds Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana, of the 29 June
2003 Order denying registration thereof, such matter
had been raised by herein [petitioner] in a letter-
consulta to the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) on 03 July 2003. As the criminal and
administrative charges respecting this issue is
premised, in part, on a matter still pending with the
LRA, we find it premature to make a finding on the
same.
It is for the same reason that we deny the motion
contained in the Second Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit praying for the inclusion, as additional
respondent, of Juanita H. Sta. Ana, who is impleaded
solely on the basis of having signed, by authority of
Escutin, the 29 July 2003 Order of denial of
[petitioner’s] application for registration.
Finally, respondent Escutin was able to successfully
demonstrate, through Consulta 2103 dated 25 July
1994, wherein the denial of registration by the
Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City was
upheld by the LRA Administrator, that the (sic) it was
practice in the different Registries that Examiners are
given authority by the Register to sign letters of
denial.30
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
declared in the same Joint Resolution that there was
no basis to hold respondents Mistas and Linatoc
administratively or criminally liable:
In this respect, this Office notes that while [herein
petitioner] alleges that AquilinaMistas caused the
disappearance of the Notice of Levy and other
supporting documents received from [petitioner] on 13
March 2003 when she applied for the issuance of a Tax
Declaration in her favor, she did not present her
receiving copy thereof showing that it was Mistas who
received said documents from her. Neither did she
show that Mistas is the employee responsible for
record safekeeping.
Next, we find, as convincingly answered, the allegation
that respondent Marietta Linatoc cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A and issued Tax Declaration
00949-Q (sic) on the basis of a cancelled Transfer
Certificate of Title upon the behest of Summit [Realty],
which was not the registered owner of the property.
Respondent Linatoc, meeting squarely [petitioner’s]
allegation, admits having physically cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A and having prepared a new
declaration covering the same property in Catigbac’s
[name], as mandated by the flow of work in the City
Assessor’s Office. However, she denies having the
authority or discretion to evaluate the correctness and
sufficiency of the documents supporting the application
for the issuance of the Tax Declaration, arguing that
her official function is limited to the physical
preparation of a new tax declaration, the assignment
of a new tax declaration number and the cancellation
of the old tax declaration, after the application had
passed the other divisions of the City Assessor’s Office.
Verily, [petitioner] failed to establish that respondent
Mistas and Linatoc, are the ones officially designated to
receive applications for issuance of Tax Declaration,
evaluate the sufficiency of the documents supporting
such applications, and on the basis of the foregoing
recommend or order the cancellation of an existing Tax
Declaration and direct the annotation of any fact
affecting the property and direct the issuance of a new
tax declaration covering the same property.
In fact, there is even a discrepancy as to the official
designation of said respondents. While [petitioner]
impleads Mistas, in her capacity as Local Assessment
Officer, and Linatoc, in her capacity as Records Clerk,
Mistas, in her counter-affidavit, alleges a different
designation, i.e., Assistant City Assessor for
Administration, while Linatoc claims to be the Local
Assessment Operation Officer II of the City Assessor’s
Office.
With the scope of work of said respondents not having
been neatly defined by [petitioner], this Office cannot
make a definitive determination of their liability for
Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, which charges both relate to the
performance or discharge of Mistas’ and Linatoc’s
official duties.31
Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon find any probable cause to criminally charge
private individuals Leviste and Orense for the following
reasons:
Anent private respondents, with the alleged conspiracy
to unlawfully cause the transfer of the title of [herein
petitioner’s] property to Summit sufficiently explained
by respondent Register of Deeds, such allegation
against private respondents loses a legal leg to stand
on.1avvphi.zw+
Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not able to sufficiently
outline the official functions of respondents Mistas and
Linatoc to pin down their specific accountabilities, the
imputation that private respondent (sic) conspired with
said public respondents respecting the cancellation of
Tax Declaration No. 00942-A is likewise stripped of any
factual and legal bases.32
As to whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully
deprived of her 5,000 square meter property, which
issue comprised the very premise of OMB-L-A-03-
0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ruled that such matter
was not within its jurisdiction and should be raised in a
civil action before the courts of justice.
In the end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed:
WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that : (1) the administrative case
against public respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN,
AQUILINA A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be
DISMISSED, for lack of substantial evidence; and (2)
the criminal case against the same respondents
including private respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and
BENEDICTO L. ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for lack of
probable cause.33
In a Joint Order34 dated 20 June 2005, the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in its
Joint Order, took notice of the Resolution dated 17
December 2002 of the LRA in Consulta No. 3483,
which involved circumstances similar to those in
petitioner’s case. The LRA distinguished between two
systems of land registration: one is the Torrens system
for registered lands under the Property Registration
Decree, and the other is the system of registration for
unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now Section
113 of the Property Registration Decree). These
systems are separate and distinct from each other. For
documents involving registered lands, the same should
be recorded under the Property Registration Decree.
The registration, therefore, of an instrument under the
wrong system produces no legal effect. Since it
appeared that in Consulta No. 3483, the registration of
the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan, the Certificate of Sale and
the Affidavit of Consolidation was made under Act No.
3344, it did not produce any legal effect on the
disputed property, because the said property was
already titled when the aforementioned documents
were executed and presented for registration, and
their registration should have been made under the
Property Registration Decree.
Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, in the same Joint Order, took into account
petitioner’s withdrawal of her appeal enconsulta before
the LRA of the denial by the Register of Deeds of her
request for registration of the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which
prompted the LRA Administrator to declare the
consulta moot and academic. For want of a categorical
declaration on the registerability of petitioner’s
documents from the LRA, the competent authority to
rule on the said matter, there could be no basis for a
finding that respondent public officers could be held
administratively or criminally liable for the acts
imputed to them.
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals
by filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court challenging the 28 April 2004 Joint
Resolution and 20 June 2005 Joint Order of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.35 The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90533.1avvphi1
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision36 on 18
October 2005, also finding no reason to
administratively or criminally charge respondents.
Essentially, the appellate court adjudged that
petitioner can not impute corrupt motives to
respondents’ acts:
Without evidence showing that respondents received
any gift, money or other pay-off or that they were
induced by offers of such, the Court cannot impute any
taint of direct corruption in the questioned acts of
respondents. Thus, any indication of intent to violate
the laws or of flagrant disregard of established rule
may be negated by respondents’ honest belief that
their acts were sanctioned under the provisions of
existing law and regulations. Such is the situation in
the case at bar. Respondent Register of Deeds acted in
the honest belief that the agency recognized by the
court in LRC Case No. 00-0376 between the registered
owner Francisco Catigbac and Leonardo Yagin
subsisted with respect to the conveyance or sale of Lot
1 to Summit as the vendee, and that the Special Power
of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale presented as
evidence during said proceedings are valid and
binding. Hence, respondent Escutin was justified in
believing that there is no legal infirmity or defect in
registering the documents and proceeding with the
transfer of title of Lot 1 in the name of the new owner
Summit. On the other hand, respondent Linatoc could
not be held administratively liable for effecting the
cancellation in the course of ordinary flow of work in
the City Assessor’s Office after the documents have
undergone the necessary evaluation and verification by
her superiors.37
The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent policy
of the Supreme Court not to interfere with the exercise
by the Ombudsman of his investigatory power. If the
Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the
case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings,
unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. The
appellate court pronounced that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in dismissing
petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit against respondents.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
challenged Joint Resolution dated April 28, 2004 and
Joint Order dated June 20, 2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0573-
F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F are hereby AFFIRMED.38
In its Resolution dated 11 January 2006, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for failing to present new matter which the appellate
court had not already considered in its earlier Decision.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari, with the following
assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX
DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION
OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION ACT (sic);
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS COULD NOT
BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR UNDULY
FAVORING SUMMIT TO THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE
OF PETITIONER.39
The Petition at bar is without merit.
As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section 109 of
the Property, Registration Decree which provides:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate
certificate. – In case of loss or theft of an owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall
be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to
the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a
duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced by a person applying for the entry of a new
certificate to him or for the registration of any new
instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss
or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or
other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other
person in interest, the court may, after notice and due
hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate
certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the
fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate
certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like
faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall
thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this
decree.
Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-
0376, only ordered the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 181 in lieu of the lost one.
However, respondents did not only issue a new
owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also cancelled
petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued in
its place Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of
Catigbac. Respondents did not even annotate
petitioner’s existing right over 5,000 square meters of
Lot 1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her
Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Petitioner maintains that
a new owner’s duplicate of title is not a mode of
acquiring ownership, nor is it a mode of losing one.
Under Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree,
the new duplicate of title was issued only to replace
the old; it cannot cancel existing titles.
Petitioner’s position on this issue rests on extremely
tenuous arguments and befuddled reasoning.
Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title
is different from a certificate of title. Title is generally
defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing
that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of
ownership of property, real or personal.40 Title,
therefore, may be defined briefly as that which
constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or
which is the foundation of ownership of
property.41 Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a
mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the
land itself.42 Under the Torrens system, a certificate of
title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which
constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or
a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the
original registration.
Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from
the issuance of the new owner’s duplicate of TCT No.
181, but from its purchase of the same from Yagin, the
attorney-in-fact of Catigbac, the registered owner of
the said property. Summit Realty merely sought the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in
the name of Catigbac so that it could accordingly
register thereon the sale in its favor of a substantial
portion of Lot 1 covered by said certificate, later
identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s title to Lot 1-B passed
on by sale to Summit Realty, giving the latter the right
to seek the separation of the said portion from the rest
of Lot 1 and the issuance of a certificate of title
specifically covering the same. This resulted in the
issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac,
covering Lot 1-B, which was subsequently cancelled
and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of
Summit Realty.
Petitioner’s reliance on Section 109 of the Property
Registration Decree is totally misplaced. It provides for
the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to
the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration.
The cancellation of petitioner’s Tax Declaration No.
00942-A was not because of the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that
Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000 square meters
petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT
No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the
name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an
absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the
property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole
world.43 All persons must take notice, and no one can
plead ignorance of the registration.44 Therefore, upon
presentation of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the City
Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by
Catigbac and issue in his name a tax declaration for
the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered
by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac,
accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same
property or portion thereof in the name of another
person, not supported by any certificate of title, such
that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the
City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax
from different persons on one and the same property.
As between Catigbac’s title, covered by a certificate of
title, and petitioner’s title, evidenced only by a tax
declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is,
in the absence of any other certificate of title to the
same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to
Catigbac’s ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac’s certificate
of title is binding upon the whole world, including
respondent public officers and even petitioner herself.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that tax
declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be
used to prove title to or ownership of a real property
inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the
same.45 Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000
square meter property from Raquel, her judgment
debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a
tax declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the
Court of Appeals aptly observed that, "[c]uriously, as
to how and when petitioner’s alleged predecessor-in-
interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-
owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot
13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far
remained utterly silent."46
Petitioner’s allegations of defects or irregularities in the
sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty by Yagin, as
Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, are beyond the jurisdiction
of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to
consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty
had already acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-
134609, in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes
conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership
of the said property and, thus, cannot be collaterally
attacked in the administrative and preliminary
investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree categorically provides that a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
For this same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to
grant petitioner’s prayer in the instant Petition for the
cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of
Summit Realty.
Which now brings the Court to the second issue raised
by petitioner on the administrative liability of
respondents.
Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it
establishes that petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit before
the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon gave rise to
two charges: (1) OMB-L-A-03-0573-F involved the
administrative charge for Gross Misconduct against
respondent public officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-0728-
F concerned the criminal charge for violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act47 against respondent public officers and private
individuals Leviste and Orense. The Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, dismissed both charges. In the Petition at
bar, petitioner only assails the dismissal of the
administrative charge for grave misconduct against
respondent public officers. Since petitioner did not
raise as an issue herein the dismissal by the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, of the criminal charge against
respondent public officers for violation of Section 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the same
became final and executory.48
In Domingo v. Quimson,49 the Court adopted the well-
written report and recommendation of its Clerk of
Court on the administrative matter then pending and
involving the charge of gross or serious misconduct:
"Under Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, 'misconduct' is a ground for disciplinary
action. And under MC No. 8, S. 1970, issued by the
Civil Service Commission on July 28, 1970, which sets
the 'Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in
Administrative Cases and other Matters Relative
Thereto,' the administrative offense of 'grave
misconduct' carries with it the maximum penalty of
dismissal from the service (Sec. IV-C[3], MC No. 8, S.
1970). But the term 'misconduct' as an administrative
offense has a well defined meaning. It was defined in
Amosco vs. Judge Magno, Adm. Mat. No. 439-MJ, Res.
September 30, 1976, as referring 'to a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer.' It is a misconduct 'such as affects
the performance of his duties as an officer and not
such only as effects his character as a private
individual.' In the recent case of Oao vs. Pabato, etc.,
Adm. Mat. No. 782-MJ, Res. July 29, 1977, the Court
defined 'serious misconduct' as follows:
‘Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is
erroneous, this would be merely an error of judgment
and not serious misconduct. The term `serious
misconduct’ is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action more particularly, unlawful
behavior of gross negligence by the magistrate. It
implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must
be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt or inspired by intention to
violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules. We have previously ruled that
negligence and ignorance on the part of a judge are
inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which
cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation.
This is not so in the case at bar.’" (Italics supplied.)
To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there must
be reliable evidence showing that the acts complained
of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate
the law, or were a persistent disregard of well-known
legal rules. Both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon and the Court of Appeals found that there
was no sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s
charge of grave misconduct against respondents. For
this Court to reverse the rulings of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of
Appeals, it must necessarily review the evidence
presented by the parties and decide on a question of
fact. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.50
Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. In order to resolve this issue, the Court would
necessarily have to look into the probative value of the
evidence presented in the proceedings below. It is not
the function of the Court to reexamine or reevaluate
the evidence all over again. This Court is not a trier of
facts, its jurisdiction in these cases being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower courts or administrative bodies
performing quasi-judicial functions. It should be
emphasized that findings made by an administrative
body, which has acquired expertise, are accorded not
only respect but even finality by the Court. In
administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence
required is only substantial.51
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion,
the Court shall not disturb findings of fact. The Court
cannot weigh once more the evidence submitted, not
only before the Ombudsman, but also before the Court
of Appeals. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770,
findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive, as
long as they are supported by substantial
evidence.52 Substantial evidence is the amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.53
The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the
Court of Appeals that respondents did not commit
gross misconduct. Evident from the 28 April 2004 Joint
Resolution of the former and the 18 October 2005
Decision of the latter is that they arrived at such
findings only after a meticulous consideration of the
evidence submitted by the parties.
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official
functions and to convincingly explain that they had
only acted in accordance therewith in their dealings
with petitioner and/or her documents. Respondents
also enjoy in their favor the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their official duty. The burden of
proving otherwise by substantial evidence falls on
petitioner, who failed to discharge the same.

From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to 47Section 3(e) of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
identify correctly the positions held by respondents Practices Act reads:
Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor.
How then could she even assert that a particular action (e) Causing any undue injury to any
was within or without their jurisdiction to perform? party, including the Government, or
While it may be true that petitioner should have at giving any private party any
least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942- unwarranted benefits, advantage or
A was being cancelled, she was not able to establish preference in the discharge of his
that such would be the responsibility of respondents official, administrative or judicial
Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present functions through manifest partiality,
statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
insistence that respondents should have done or not negligence. This provision shall apply
done a particular act. A perfect example was her to officers and employees of offices or
assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc should government corporations charged with
have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. the grant of licenses or permits or
00949-A in the name of Catigbac. However, she failed other concessions.
to cite any law or rule which authorizes or recognizes
the annotation of an adverse interest on a tax
declaration. Finally, absent any reliable evidence, 02. Republic of the Philippines
petitioner’s charge that respondents conspired with
Supreme Court
one another and with corporate officers of Summit
Manila
Realty is nothing more than speculation, surmise, or
conjecture. Just because the acts of respondents were
EN BANC
consistently favorable to Summit Realty does not mean
that there was a concerted effort to cause petitioner
prejudice. Respondents’ actions were only consistent
THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No.
with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-
167707
B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
by certificates of title.
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
dated 18 October 2005 and Resolution dated 11 LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-
January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP SANTIAGO,
No. 90533 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
the petitioner Dinah C. Castillo. ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRI
A-MARTINEZ,
SO ORDERED. RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO
MORALES,
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice DIRECTOR
OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
WE CONCUR: DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-
NAZARIO,
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO,
Associate Justice JR.,
Chairperson PHILIPPINE
TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- ANTONIO EDUARDO
Petitioners, LEONARDO-
MARTINEZ B. NACHURA
DE CASTRO, and
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BRION, JJ.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA - versus -

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in theirbehalf
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
and Promulgated:
were reached in consultation before the case was
inbehalf of allthosesimilarlysituated,
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Respondents. O
Division.
ctober 8, 2008

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO x----------------------------------

Associate Justice ----------------x
Chairperson, Third Division
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R.
CERTIFICATION No. 173775
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, THE LANDOWNERS OF
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby BORACAY SIMILARLY
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
were reached in consultation before the case was ANNEX “A” OF THIS PETITION,
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Petitioners,
Division.

- versus -
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
 as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
THE SECRETARY OF THE administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, implement Proclamation No. 1801.
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801
AKLAN,
Respondents. and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing

x---------------------------------- an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title

----------------x
or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
DECISION claimants

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the

right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to

secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first

is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review

on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals

(CA) affirming that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for

declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor

Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for

titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a

petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of

Proclamation No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved

forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay,

Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm

crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine

tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003

inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped island’s

three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,[6] which identified several lots as being

occupied or claimed by named persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President

Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other

islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,

Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., LibertadTalapian, Mila Y. respondents-claimants declared the land they were

Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for occupying for tax purposes.[12]

declaratory relief with the RTCinKalibo, Aklan.

The parties also agreed that the principal issue

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation

that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to

raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to

occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, forego with the trial and to submit the case for

or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in resolution upon submission of their respective

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession memoranda.[13]

and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or

earlier since time immemorial. They declared their The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain

lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly

them.[10] Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by

Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the

Respondents-claimants posited that name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were

Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before

did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15] The titles were issued

man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, on

it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section August 7, 1933.[16]

48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise

known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to RTC and CA Dispositions

have the lots registered in their names through judicial

confirmation of imperfect titles. On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision

in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:

The Republic, through the Office of the

WHEREFORE, in view of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for foregoing, the Court declares that
declaratory relief. The OSGcountered Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the legal obstacle to the petitioners and
those similarly situated to acquire title
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
to their lands in Boracay, in accordance
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for with the applicable laws and in the
manner prescribed therein; and to
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional
Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Technical Director of Lands as the
Code,[11] as amended. approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.[17]
The OSG maintained that respondents-

claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right
No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It
confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and
ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801
PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been
nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private

ownership of lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and
87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for
the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of
and that only those forested areas in public lands were
parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of
declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]
land were planted with coconut trees and other natural
growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its
more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
motion was denied.[23] The Republic then appealed to
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
the CA.
 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court possession in the concept of owner for the required

affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows: period entitled them to judicial confirmation of

imperfect title.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that
appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
court.[24]
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an

unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a)

of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed

The CA held that respondents-claimants could
portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest
only the executive department, not the courts, which
reserve.
has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain

into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it
for a positive government act in order to release the
was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present petition
lots for disposition.
under Rule 45.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the

G.R. No. 173775
consolidation of the two petitions as they principally

involve the same issues on the land classification

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R.
of Boracay Island.[33]
No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island

Issues
into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest

land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-

G.R. No. 167707
eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land

(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-
any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied
for forest land protection purposes.
lands in Boracay Island.[34]

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr.

Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and other

landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an

G.R. No. 173775
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and

nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues,
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior
namely:
vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have

been in continued possession of their respective lots in I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED
Boracay since time immemorial. They have also POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY,
building internationally renowned first class resorts on SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE
LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE
their lots.[31] FILING OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19,
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY
THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS
AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST
AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral
II.
nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF
 PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR
OCCUPIED PORTIONS But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and
OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT
APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL public domain.
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF
THEIR AREAS AS public domain into agricultural, forest or
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER S
timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided
EC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN
TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM? commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber

or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION may be provided by law,[41] giving the government
1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO great leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE classification with one addition: national parks.[43] Of
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION these, only agricultural lands may be
1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
22, 2006, Boracay Island had neverbeen expressly
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY and administratively classified under any of these
MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE
SURVEY PLANSFOR PURPOSES OF THE the public domain.
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied) The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of

the public domain belong to the State, that the State is

In capsule, the main issue is whether private the source of any asserted right to ownership of land
claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and charged with the conservation of such
and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently
right to secure titles over their occupied portions in adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if Constitutions.[46]
any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA

No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
to secure title under other pertinent laws. within private ownership are presumed to belong to

the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been

acquired from the government, either by purchase or

Our Ruling by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable

public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain determine if lands of the public domain will be

disposed of for private ownership. The government, as

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary

executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of power as the persona in law to determine who shall be

imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under

relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or what terms they may be granted such privilege, not

superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;[37] (b) excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their

Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of

Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by ownership.[49]

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed

to determine their rights to apply for judicial Our present land law traces its roots to the

confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of

executive acts. the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and

possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish

Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced

in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and

the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that “all

 x xx In other words, that the
lands that were not acquired from the Government, phrase “agricultural land” as used in
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spainwhich
domain.”[51] are not timber or mineral lands. x
xx[65] (Emphasis Ours)

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration
the Land Registration Act. The act established a
of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
system of registration by which recorded title becomes

absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura
known as the Torrens system.[66]
Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and

the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the
information as the method of legalizing possession of
Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which
the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the
were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of
homestead system and made provisions for judicial
the Maura Law, an informacionposesoria or possessory
and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and
information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry
for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands
possession which must be actual, public, and
of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open,
adverse,[56] from the date of its
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
inscription.[57] However, possessory information title
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of
years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for
the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
lands would revert to the State.[58]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926

In sum, private ownership of land under the
was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known
Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
as the second Public Land Act. This new, more
concessions which took various forms,
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the
estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title
same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
by purchase; and (5) informacionposesoria or
possession and occupation enconceptodueñosince time
possessory information title.[59]
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]

The first law governing the disposition of

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA
public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
amended, remains as the existing general law
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions,
governing the classification and disposition of lands of
to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the
lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant
the State.[71]
(freehold system) and by lease (leasehold

system).[62] It also provided the definition by

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the
exclusion of “agricultural public lands.”[63] Interpreting
requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
the meaning of “agricultural lands” under the Philippine
occupation of lands of the public domain since time
Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular
immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this
Government:[64]
provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.

1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year

prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD secure a certification from the government that the

No. 1073,[73] which now provides for possession and land claimed to have been possessed for the required

occupation of the land applied for since June 12, number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

1945, or earlier.[74]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation,

The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, executive order, administrative action, report, statute,

1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence or certification was presented to the Court. The

in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to

all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private

registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six claimants were subject of a government proclamation

(6) months from the effectivity of the decree that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such

on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot

all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section accept the submission that lands occupied by private

194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended claimants were already open to disposition before

by Act No. 3344. 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification

cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended

and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the

Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,

various laws relative to registration of property.[78] It agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that

governs registration of lands under the Torrenssystem Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to

as well as unregistered lands, including chattel the old cases Ankron v. Government of the

mortgages.[79] Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The

Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases were

A positive act declaring land as alienable decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of

and disposable is required. In keeping with the 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these

presumption of State ownership, the Court has time old cases that “in the absence of evidence to the

and again emphasized that there must be a positive contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural

act of the government, such as an official lands until the contrary is shown.”[90]

proclamation,[80]declassifying inalienable public land

into disposable land for agricultural or other Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De

purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the

alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or

have been “officially delimited and classified.”[82] portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be

stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.

The burden of proof in overcoming the 926 merely provided the manner through which land

presumption of State ownership of the lands of the registration courts would classify lands of the public

public domain is on the person applying for registration domain. Whether the land would be classified as

(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof

subject of the application is alienable or presented in each case.

disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption,

incontrovertible evidence must be established that the Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time

land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or when the President of the Philippines had no power to

disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act classify lands of the public domain into mineral,

declaring land of the public domain as alienable and timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were

disposable. To prove that the land subject of an free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable

application for registration is alienable, the applicant cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,

must establish the existence of a positive act of the depending upon the preponderance of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an evidence.[91] This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the

executive order; an administrative action; investigation Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and

reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a SoterraneaRafolsVda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in

legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x xx Petitioners furthermore
insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed
open to private ownership, citing the
cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of
the Philippine Islands.
x xxx
Petitioner’s reliance
upon Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government is
misplaced. These cases were decided
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission
on October 7, 1926, under which there
was no legal provision vesting in the
Chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify lands
of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the
courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending
upon the preponderance of the
evidence.[93]
To aid the courts in resolving land registration
cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus
evolved the dictum in Ankron that “the courts have a
right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown.”[94]
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption
in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all
lands of the public domain had been automatically
reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural
lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants,
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except
those already classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these
lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the
long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under
Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners,
such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits
of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained
unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine,
continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in
the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that
the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses,
the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land
despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry (supra), the
Attorney-General admitted in effect
that whether the particular land in
question belongs to one class or
another is a question of fact. The
mere fact that a tract of land has trees
upon it or has mineral within it is not of
itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the
extent and present or future value of
the forestry and of the
minerals. While, as we have just
said, many definitions have been
given for “agriculture,” “forestry,” and
“mineral” lands, and that in each case
it is a question of fact, we think it is
safe to say that in order to be forestry
or mineral land the proof must show
that it is more valuable for the forestry
or the mineral which it contains than it
is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7,
Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to
show that there exists some trees upon
the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or
mineral today, and, by reason of the
exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason
of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be
differently classified tomorrow. Each
case must be decided upon the
proof in that particular
case, having regard for its present
or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter
of public knowledge that a majority of
the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have
a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each
case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown. Whatever
the land involved in a particular
land registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value
for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by
the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not
 sufficient for the courts to decide
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or Krivenko, however, is not controlling here
mineral land. It may perchance belong because it involved a totally different issue. The
to one or the other of said classes of
land. The Government, in the first pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots
instance, under the provisions of Act
were included in the general classification of
No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide
for itself what portions of public land agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could
shall be considered forestry land,
unless private interests have acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
intervened before such reservation is
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
made. In the latter case, whether the
land is agricultural, forestry, or Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which
mineral, is a question of proof. Until
private interests have intervened, the included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
Government, by virtue of the terms of
unclassified lands of the public domain are
said Act (No. 1148), may decide for
itself what portions of the “public automatically deemed agricultural.
domain” shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry,supra)[95] (Emphasis ours) Notably, the definition of “agricultural public

lands” mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
determine the classification of lands from the facts of
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have
each case, except those that have already became
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since
private lands.[96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919
they were decided when the Executive did not have
and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the
the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber,
Executive Department, through the President,
or mineral.
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify

public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or Private claimants’ continued possession
forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
authority, whether express or implied, to determine that the land is alienable. Private claimants also
the classification of lands of the public domain.[97] contend that their continued possession of portions

of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the
Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, [98] did island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply
not present a justiciable case for determination by the for a title in their name.
land registration court of the property’s land
A similar argument was squarely rejected by
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for
the Court in Collado v. Court of
the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of
occupants are now claiming were agricultural
now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary
lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No.
of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial

confirmation having been filed by private claimants or “Act No. 926,

their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no the first Public Land
Act, was passed in
longer authorized to determine the property’s land pursuance of the
provisions of the
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank
Philippine Bill of 1902.
on Act No. 926. The law governed the
disposition of lands of
the public domain. It
prescribed rules and
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No.
regulations for the
167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of homesteading, selling
and leasing of portions
Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. of the public domain of
the Philippine Islands,
141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
and prescribed the
classify lands of the public domain was already in terms and conditions to
enable persons to
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular perfect their titles to
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular public lands in
the Islands. It also
Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the provided for the
“issuance of patents to
Philippine Islands.[103] certain native settlers
upon public lands,” for
 the establishment of
town sites and sale of island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
lots therein, for the its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
completion of imperfect
titles, and for the developments. As a premier tourist destination for
cancellation or
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
in the Islands.” In
short, the Public Land
Act operated on the
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay
assumption that title to
public lands in the have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
Philippine Islands
remained in the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of
government; and that
its forest cover; or that the implementation of
the government’s title
to public land sprung Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism
from the Treaty of Paris
and other subsequent industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
treaties between Spain
and the United States.
The term “public land” Forests, in the context of both the Public Land
referred to all lands of
the public domain Act and the Constitution[112] classifying lands of the
whose title still public domain into “agricultural, forest or timber,
remained in the
government and are mineral lands, and national parks,” do not necessarily
thrown open to private
appropriation and refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
settlement, and covered by dense growths of trees and
excluded the
patrimonial property of underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of
the government and
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly
the friar lands.”
instructive:
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners
to argue that under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act A forested area classified as
No. 926, mere possession by forest land of the public domain does
private individuals of lands creates not lose such classification simply
the legal presumption that the because loggers or settlers may have
lands are alienable and stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels
disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours) of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops bykaingin cultivators
or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not
Except for lands already covered by
have to be on mountains or in out of
existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa
of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. palms, and other trees growing in
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The
public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not
the National Mapping and Resource Information have to be descriptive of what the
Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as “forest” is
unclassified land of the public domain. released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do
categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain not apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a

public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain There is a big difference between “forest” as
which has not been the subject of the present system defined in a dictionary and “forest or timber land” as a
of classification for the determination of which lands classification of lands of the public domain as
are needed for forest purpose and which are appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the
facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, Court is tasked to determine the legal status
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
The Court notes that the classification of replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem commercial establishments, it has not been
to be out of touch with the present realities in the
automatically converted from public forest to alienable Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and

agricultural land. peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and

marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to

Private claimants cannot rely on ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and

Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial private sectors in the development of the areas’

confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation tourism potential with due regard for ecological

did not convert Boracay into an agricultural balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the

land. However, private claimants argue that proclamation is aimed at administering the islands

Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not

Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of address the areas’ alienability.[119]

imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay,

among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801

claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64)

susceptible of private ownership. other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines,

such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3- Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag

82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and

agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in

Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a

land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to “private few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist

lands”[117] and “areas declared as alienable and zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of

disposable”[118] does not by itself classify the entire Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned

island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes would likewise be declared wide open for private

reference not only to private lands and areas but also disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly

to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides: beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

No trees in forested private

lands may be cut without prior It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006
authority from the PTA. All forested which positively declared part of Boracay as
areas in public lands are declared
forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied) alienable and opened the same to private

ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both 141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the

private and public lands merely recognizes that the recommendation of the proper department head, who

island can be classified by the Executive department has the authority to classify the lands of the public

pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, domain into alienable or disposable, timber and

Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of mineral lands.[121]

Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President
island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the

Subsistence farming, in areas authority granted to her to classify lands of the public
declared as alienable and disposable by
domain, presumably subject to existing vested
the Bureau of Forest Development.
rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive

prerogative of the Executive Department, through the

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
deemed the positive act needed to
so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable
unclassified until released and rendered open to
land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
disposition.[123]
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he

would have identified the specific limits of each, as

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This
400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise

provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801
the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved
also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
for right of way and which shall form part of the area

reserved for forest land protection purposes. In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there and SoterraneaRafols v. Republic,[124] the Court stated

was nothing invalid or irregular, much less that unclassified lands are public forests.

unconstitutional, about the classification

of Boracay Island made by the President through

While it is true that the land
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to classification map does not
make such classification, subject to existing vested categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that
rights. they were unclassified lands leads
to the same result. In the absence
of the classification as mineral or
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private rendered open to
disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064

violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL
Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion
applies only to a “reclassification” of land. If the land
of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim
had never been previously classified, as in the case of
that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a)
the Department of Justice[126] on this point:
of RA No. 6657, thus:

Indeed, the key word to the

SEC. 4. Scope. – The
correct application of the prohibition in
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
Section 4(a) is the word
of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
“reclassification.” Where there has
tenurial arrangement and commodity
been no previous classification of public
produced, all public and private
forest [referring, we repeat, to the
agricultural lands as provided in
mass of the public domain which has
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
not been the subject of the present
Order No. 229, including other lands of
system of classification for purposes of
the public domain suitable for
determining which are needed for
agriculture.
forest purposes and which are not] into
permanent forest or forest reserves or
More specifically, the following
some other forest uses under the
lands are covered by the
Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
“reclassification of forest lands” to
Program:
speak of within the meaning of Section
4(a).
(a) All alienable and
disposable lands of
Thus, obviously, the prohibition
the public domain
in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
devoted to or
reclassification of forest lands to
suitable for
agricultural lands without a prior law
agriculture. No rec
delimiting the limits of the public
lassification of
domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
forest or mineral
those lands of the public domain,
lands to
denominated as “public forest” under
agricultural lands
the Revised Forestry Code, which have
shall be
not been previously determined, or
undertaken after
classified, as needed for forest
the approval of
purposes in accordance with the
this Act until
provisions of the Revised Forestry
Congress, taking
Code.[127]
into account
ecological,
developmental and
equity Private claimants are not entitled to apply
considerations,
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
shall have
determined by CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights
law, the specific
limits of the public over the occupied lands under the said
domain. law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation

of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,

That Boracay Island was classified as a public namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from possession and occupation of the subject land by
later converting it into agricultural himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial
land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally

land as alienable and disposable land of the public rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

domain.[128]

The continued possession and considerable

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act investment of private claimants do not automatically

No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give

portions of Boracay Islandinto an agricultural them a right to apply for a title to the land they are

land. The island remained an unclassified land of the presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally

public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is bound to decide cases based on the evidence

considered State property. presented and the laws applicable. As the law and

jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their

of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued

Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail possession and considerable investment in the island.

because of the absence of the second element of

alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a One Last Note

government grant under our present Public Land Act

presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is The Court is aware that millions of pesos have

already alienable and disposable. This is clear from been invested for the development of Boracay Island,

the wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is not making it a by-word in the local and international

alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a

matter how long, cannot confer ownership or number of years, thousands of people have called the

possessory rights.[130] island their home. While the Court commiserates with

private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it

confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. should prevail. Ito angbatas at itoangdapatumiral.

1064, with respect to those lands which were classified

as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove All is not lost, however, for private

the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for

notorious possession of their lands in Boracay judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section

since June 12, 1945. 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote

their automatic ouster from the residential,

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion commercial, and other areas they possess now

in the petition for declaratory relief that private classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the

claimants complied with the requisite period of loss of their substantial investments on their occupied

possession. alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily

mean lack of right to possess.

The tax declarations in the name of private

claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of For one thing, those with lawful possession

possession. We note that the earliest of the tax may claim good faith as builders of

declarations in the name of private claimants were improvements. They can take steps to preserve or

issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax protect their possession. For another, they may look

declarations are not sufficient to convince this into other modes of applying for original registration of

Court that the period of possession and occupation title, such as by homestead[131] or sales

commenced on June 12, 1945. patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by law.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested More realistically, Congress may enact a law to

right in Boracay, having been in possession of the entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
island for a long time. They have invested millions of occupied lots or to exempt them from certain

pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They requirements under the present land laws. There is

say their continued possession and investments give one such bill[133] now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will 2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No.

become a law is for Congress to decide. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the

government has taken the step necessary to open up

the island to private ownership. This gesture may not

be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the

RUBEN T. REYES
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve
Associate Justice
as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by

trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect

its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy

balance between progress and ecology. Ecological

conservation is as important as economic progress.

WE CONCUR:

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our

nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are

REYNATO S. PUNO
not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and Chief Justice

activists. These are needs that become more urgent

as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and

difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice LEONARDO A.

QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. SANTIAGO
Munoz:[134] Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
The view this Court takes of
the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed
with respect to forest lands. Many have
written much, and many more have ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA.
spoken, and quite often, about the ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
pressing need for forest preservation, AssociateJustice
conservation, protection, development AssociateJustice
and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a
vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge (Onofficialleave)
by now that absence of the necessary RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA
green cover on our lands produces a CARPIO MORALES
number of adverse or ill effects of Associate
serious proportions. Without the trees, Justice Associate
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes Justice
which they supply are emptied of their
contents. The fish disappear. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile ADOLFO S.
topsoil is washed away; geological AZCUNA DANTE O.
erosion results. With erosion come the TINGA
dreaded floods that wreak havoc and Associate
destruction to property – crops, Justice Associate
livestock, houses, and highways – not Justice
to mention precious human
lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in
a lumberman’s decalogue.[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO

J. VELASCO, JR.
follows: Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No.

167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals

(No part)
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J.
71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNAT
O S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* On official leave per Special Order No. 520
dated September 19, 2008.
** No part. Justice Nachura participated in the present
case as Solicitor General.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), pp. 37-43. CA-G.R. CV
No. 71118, promulgated on December 9,
2004. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican,
with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Ramon
M. Bato, Jr., concurring.
[2] Id. at 47-54; Annex “C.” Spl. Civil Case No.
5403. Penned by Judge Niovady M. Marin, RTC,
Kalibo, Branch 5.
[3] Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), pp. 101-114. Annex “F.”
Classifying Boracay Island Situated in the Municipality
of Malay, Province of Aklan Into Forestland (Protection
Purposes) and Into Agricultural Land (Alienable and
Disposable) Pursuant to Presidential Decreee No. 705
(Revised Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines).
Issued on May 22, 2006.
[4] As of the year
2000. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru6/boracay.htm.
[5] Manoc-Manoc, Balabag, and
Yapak. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru6/boracay.htm.
[6] Under Survey Plan No. NR-06-000001.
[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 49.
[8] Id. at 21-23; Annex “B.” Declaring Certain Islands,
Coves, and Peninsulas in the Philippines as Tourist
Zones and Marine Reserves Under the Administration
and Control of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
[9] Id. at 24-27. Rules and Regulations Governing
Activities at Boracay Island Tourist Zone.
[10] Records, pp. 13-32; Annexes “A” to “A-18.”
[11] Issued on May 19, 1975.
[12] Records, p. 148.
[13] Id.
[14] RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 2.
[15] Records, p. 148.
[16] Id. at 177, 178.
[17] Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 54.
[18] Id. at 51.
[19] Id.; PTA Circular No. 3-82, Rule VIII, Sec. 1(3)
states:
No trees in forested private lands may
be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands
are declared forest reserves.
[20] Sec. 87. If all the lands included in the
proclamation of the President are not registered under
the Land Registration Act, the Solicitor-General, if
requested to do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall proceed in accordance with
the provisions of section fifty-three of this Act.
[21] Sec. 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of
Lands, whenever in the opinion of the President the
public interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in
the proper Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, a petition
against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of
any land who shall not have voluntarily come in under
the provisions of this chapter or of the Land
Registration Act, stating in substance that the title of
such holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant is open
to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land
which has not been brought into court as aforesaid are
open to question; or that it is advisable that the title to
such land be settled and adjudicated, and praying that
the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or
the right to occupancy thereof be settled and
adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this
section shall be in accordance with the laws on
adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 51.
[23] Id. at 211-121.
[24] Id. at 42.
[25] Id. at 45-46.
[26] Supra note 3.
[27] Owner of Waling-Waling Beach Resort and
Chairman of the Board of Boracay Foundation, Inc.
[28] Owner of Willy’s Beach Resort.
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 20; Annex “A.”
[30] Petitioners in G.R. No. 173775 claim that they are
also petitioners in the declaratory case filed in
November 1997 before the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan,
docketed as Sp. Civil Case No. 5403 and now before
this Court as G.R. No. 167707.
[31] Rollo (G.R No. 173775), pp. 4-5.
[32] Id. at 4.
[33] Id. at 143.
[34] Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 26.
[35] Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), pp. 280-281.
[36] An Act Temporarily to Provide for the
Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the
Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes. Issued
on July 1, 1902.
[37] An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to
Lands of the Public Domain. Approved on December 1,
1936.
[38] See note 8.
[39] See note 3.
[40] CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
[41] CONSTITUTION (1973), Art. XIV, Sec. 10.
[42] Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution
Writers, 1995 ed., p. 830.
[43] CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XII, Sec. 3.
[44] Id.
[45] Zarate v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 131501, July
14, 2004, 434 SCRA 322; Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 356 Phil. 606, 624 (1998).
[46] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152.
[47] Zarate v. Director of Lands, supra; Collado v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002, 390
SCRA 343; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339.
[48] Republic v. Estonilo, G.R. No. 157306, November
25, 2005, 476 SCRA 265; Zarate v. Director of
Lands, supra.
[49] De los Reyes v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-47331, June
21, 1983, 122 SCRA 652, citing Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No.L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA
381.
[50] Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority, supra.
[51] Id., citing separate opinion of then Justice Reynato
S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6,
2000, 347 SCRA 128, andChavez v. Public Estates
Authority, supra note 46.
[52] Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
[53] Effective February 13, 1894.
[54] De Aldecoa v.The Insular Government, 13 Phil. 159
(1909).
[55] A valid title based upon adverse possession or a
valid title based upon prescription. Noblejas, A.H. and
Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds,
1986 ed., p. 39, citing Cruz v. De Leon, 21 Phil. 199
(1912).
[56] Ten (10) years, according to Archbishop
of Manila v. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593 (1915).
[57] Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration
of Land Titles and Deeds, supra at 8.
[58] Id. at 9; Director of Forest Administration
Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 36827, 56622
70076, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 121, 137.
[59] Id. at 5-11.
[60] See note 36.
[61] Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-
32266, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598, 601.
[62] Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration
of Land Titles and Deeds, supra note 55, at 347.
[63] The provisions relevant to the definition are:
Sec. 13. That the Government of the
Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of
this Act and except as herein provided, shall
classify according to its agricultural character
and productiveness, and shall immediately
make rules and regulations for the lease,
sale, or other disposition of the public lands
other than timber or mineral lands, but such
rules and regulations shall not go into effect
or have the force of law until they have
received the approval of the President, and
when approved by the President they shall be
submitted by him to Congress at the
beginning of the next ensuing session thereof
and unless disapproved or amended by
Congress at said session they shall at the
close of such period have the force and effect
of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided,
That a single homestead entry shall not
exceed sixteen hectares in extent.
Sec. 14. That the Government of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered to enact rules and regulations
and to prescribe terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their title to public
lands in said Islands, who, prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, had fulfilled all or some of the
conditions required by the Spanish laws and
royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the
acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to
secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine
Commission is authorized to issue patents,
without compensation, to any native of said
Islands, conveying title to any tract of land
not more than sixteen hectares in extent,
which were public lands and had been
actually occupied by such native or his
ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of
August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
Sec. 15. That the Government of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
empowered, on such terms as it may
prescribe, by general legislation, to provide
for the granting or sale and conveyance to
actual occupants and settlers and other
citizens of said Islands such parts and
portions of the public domain, other than
timber and mineral lands, of the United
States in said Islands as it may deem wise,
not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one
person and for the sale and conveyance of
not more than one thousand and twenty-four
hectares to any corporation or association of
persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of
such lands, whether the purchase price be
paid at once or in partial payments, shall be
conditioned upon actual and continued
occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of
the premises sold for a period of not less
than five years, during which time the
purchaser or grantee can not alienate or
encumber said land or the title thereto; but
such restriction shall not apply to transfers of
rights and title of inheritance under the laws
for the distribution of the estates of
decedents.
[64] 10 Phil. 175 (1908).
[65] Id. at 182.
[66] Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
[67] Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration
of Land Titles and Deeds, supra note 55.
[68] Sec. 54, par. 6.
[69] Sec. 45(b); Public Estates Authority v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112172, November 20, 2000, 345
v. SCRA 96; Director of Lands v. Buyco, G.R. No.
& 91189, November 27, 1992, 216 SCRA 78.
[70] Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, see
separate opinion of Justice Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 51,
and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 46.
[71] Sec. 2.
[72] An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty-
Eight of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred
Forty-One, Otherwise Known as
the Public Land Act. Approved on June 22, 1957.
[73] Extending the Period of Filing Applications for
Administrative Legislation (Free Patent) and Judicial
Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to
Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain
Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) Years
Commencing January 1, 1977. Approved on January
25, 1977.
[74] Republic v. Doldol, G.R. No. 132963, September
10, 1998, 295 SCRA 359.
[75] Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of
Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as
Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings (Issued –
February 16, 1976).
[76] Director of Forest Administration v.
Fernandez, supra note 58, citing Director of Lands v.
Rivas, G.R. No. L-61539, February 14, 1986, 141
SCRA 329.
[77] Lands which were not recorded under the Maura
Law and were not yet covered by Torrens titles.
[78] Presidential Decree No. 1529, Preamble; Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47.
[79] Peña, N. and Peña, Jr., N., Registration of Land
Titles and Deeds, 1988 ed., p. 9.
[80] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
48227, August 21, 1991, 201 SCRA 1; Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, October
26, 1989, 178 SCRA 708.
[81] Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
SoterraneaRafolsVda. De Palanca v. Republic, G.R. No.
151312, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 209; Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47,
citing Director of Lands v. Aquino, G.R. No.
31688, December 17, 1990, 192 SCRA 296.
[82] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 46.
[83] Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003;
405 SCRA 291; Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra note 47, citing Director of Lands
v. Aquino, supra.
[84] Republic v. Lao, supra; Pagkatipunan v. Court of
Appeals, 429 Phil. 377, 389-390 (2002).
[85] Republic of the Philippines v. Muñoz, G.R. No.
151910, October 15, 2007.
[86] Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
SoterraneaRafolsVda. De Palanca v.
Republic, supra; Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 54472-77, September 28, 1989,
178 SCRA 37.
[87] Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, January 24,
2006, 479 SCRA 585.
[88] 40 Phil. 10 (1919).
[89] Supra note 54.
[90] Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, supra at 16.
[91] Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
SoterraneaRafolsVda. De Palanca v. Republic, supra
note 81.
[92] Id. at 76.
[93] Id. at 219-223.
[94] Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, supra note 88, at 16.
[95] Id. at 15-16.
[96] Act No. 2874, Sec. 8; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 155450, August 6, 2008; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127245, January 30, 2001.
96-a Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.L-
37995, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 351, 357.
[97] Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
SoterraneaRafolsVda. De Palanca v. Republic, supra
note 81.
[98] The records do not show the manner in which title
was issued to the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol.
[99] Records, p. 179.
[100] 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
[101] Supra note 64. Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64753, April 26, 1989, 172
[102] Supra note 54. SCRA 795.
[103] Supra note 88. [122] Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, G.R. No.
[104] Art. XIII, Sec. 1. 73974, May 31, 1995, 244 SCRA 537; Director of
[105] Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, supra Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47.
note 100, at 468-469. [123] Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
[106] Act No. 926, Sec. 54, par. 6 states: Court, supra note 47, citing Yngson v. Secretary of
SEC. 54. The following described Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-
persons or their legal successors in right, 36847, July 20, 1983, 123 SCRA 441; Republic v.
occupying lands in the Philippines, or Court of Appeals, G.R. No.L-45202, September 11,
claiming to own any such land or interest 1980, 99 SCRA 742.
therein but whose titles to such land have not [124] Supra note 81.

been perfected may apply to the Court of [125] Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and

Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for SoterraneaRafolsVda.De Palanca v. Republic, id.at
confirmation of their claims and the issuance 222-223.
of a certificate of title therefor to wit – [126] Reconsideration of DOJ Opinion No. 169, s. 1993,

x xxx on the DOJ affirmative stand on whether the

(6) All persons who by themselves or prohibition against the reclassification of forest lands
their predecessors in interest have been in applies to “unclassified public forest.”
the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious [127] Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 139.

possession and occupation of agricultural [128] Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, G.R. No.
public lands, as defined by said Act of 158449, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 188; Republic v.
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and Lao, supra note 83.
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership [129] Public Land Act, Sec. 48(b).

except as against the Government, for a [130] Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, supra

period of ten years next preceding the taking note 69.

effect of this act, except when prevented by [131] Commonwealth Act No. 141, Chapter IV.

war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively [132] Id., Chapter V.

presumed to have performed all the [133] House Bill No. 1109. Declaring Certain Parcels of

conditions essential to a Government grant the Public Domain Within Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan
and to have received the same, and shall be as Agricultural Land Open to Disposition.
entitled to a certificate of title to such land [134] G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
under the provisions of this chapter. 1183, cited in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
[107] Supra note 47. v. Dumyung, G.R. Nos. L-31666-68, April 30, 1979, 89
107-a G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA SCRA 532.
128. [135] Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, id.at 1214.
[108] Collado v. Court of Appeals, id.at 356.
[109] Records, p. 101; Annex “A.”
[110] Id. at 106; Exhibit “1-a.”
[111] Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 5.
[112] CONSTITUTION (1987), Art.XII, Sec.
3; CONSTITUTION (1973), Art.XIV, Sec. 10, as
amended; and CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec.
1.
[113] Republic v. Naguiat, supra note 87.
[114] G.R. No.L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA

69.
[115] Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, id.at

75.
[116] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
56948, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 476, 482-483.
[117] Sec. 3 provides:

Establishment of or low-density human

settlements in private lands, or subdivisions,
if any, subject to prior approval by the
Ministry of Human Settlements, PTA and local
building officials; Provided, that no structures
shall be constructed within 30 meters from
the shorelines.
[118] Sec. 5 states:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared

as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development.
[119] Pars.3-4.
[120] SEC. 6. The President, upon recommendation of

the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the

Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources), shall from time to time classify
lands of the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
And may at any time and in a like manner transfer
such lands from one class to another, for the purposes
of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources),
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act.
[121] Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra note 47; Manalo v. Intermediate