Joel Greenblatt the little book that beats the market talks at Google

[MUSIC PLAYING]
SPEAKER: Joel Greenblatt, our guest for today, is the co-founder, managing principal,
and co-CIO of Gotham Asset Management. We could not be more thrilled and more
grateful than to have him accept our invitation and be here. Thank you so much, Joel-- over
to you.[APPLAUSE]

主持人：欢迎我们今天演讲的嘉宾乔尔·格林布拉 ，他是高谭资产管理公司的共同创始人，
基金经理，以及联合首席信息官，我们非常感谢他接受我们的邀请，来到这里为我们分享他
的投资理念。谢谢您，乔尔。（掌声）

JOEL GREENBLATT: Thanks so much. Thanks for coming out today. I really appreciate it very
much. I've never been here before, so I'm looking forward to my tour right after, so thank
you. So even Warren Buffett says the vast majority of people should index, and I agree with
him. So are there any questions, or do I have any time? [LAUGHTER]

乔尔·格林布拉：谢谢大家！谢谢你们今天能来。我从来没有在谷歌公司演讲过，所以我很
期待今天的演讲，谢谢。 人们说即便是沃伦巴菲特也认为绝大多数人应该做索引的工作（谷
歌搜索引擎的主要功能是索引） ，我同意他所说的。你们（这些供职于互联网索引器公司的
精英们对我这个金融业者贸然提到贵行业的主要业务）有什么疑问吗？我可以继续我的演讲
吗？（笑声）

Then again-- well, I have time, so then again, Warren Buffett doesn't index and neither do I.
So I thought I'd tell you why, and then maybe you'll have some more information to decide
for yourself what makes sense for you. And in a sense, it shouldn't be that hard. Actually, I
had a friend who's an orthopedic surgeon and is in charge of a group of orthopedic
surgeons. And he asked me to speak to them at a dinner, about the stock market. And I said,
OK, these are smart, educated guys. They can understand this stuff. And I spoke for about 35
minutes, explaining how the stock market worked and everything else. And then I started
getting questions along the lines of, oil went down $2 yesterday-- What should I do? Or a
market was up 2% yesterday-- what do I do about that? So my interpretation of those
questions was I had just crashed and burned.

好的，那么我继续，沃伦巴菲特不做索引，我也不做。因此我认为我有必要告诉你们为什么，
然后你们或许会得到一些可供你们参考的信息，我相信下面我演讲的内容对你们而言，不会
是过于艰涩难懂的。我的一个朋友是一名整形外科医生，同时也是一名主任医师。他某次邀
请我去他们的晚宴上做一个关于股票市场的演讲。我很愉快地答应了，因为他们有很好的教
育背景，也有很好的理解力。我整整讲了 35 分钟，我向他们解释股票市场的工作原理和其
他所有的相关理论。然后在提问环节我收到了一系列如下问题——昨天原油价格下跌了 2%。
我该怎么办？昨天某个市场上涨了 2%，我又该怎么办？在那一晚，我完全无法很好地解释
他们的这些问题，这使我感到非常挫败。

So last year, I was lucky enough to be asked to teach a ninth-grade class, a bunch of
kids, mostly from Harlem. And I had just sort of crashed and burned with the orthopedic
surgeons, and I didn't want to do that with the kids. And so I started to try to think of, what
could I do to explain the stock market a little bit better? And so I walked into class the first
day,and I handed out a bunch of three-by-five cards. And I brought in this jar of jellybeans
right here, and I asked--the students passed around the jar of jellybeans.I asked them to
count the rows, do whatever they wanted to do, and write down their best guess for how
many jellybeans were in the jar.I collected the three-by-five cards, then I went around the
room, one by one, to each one of the kids in the room. And I said, listen, you can keep your
guess or you can change your guess. That's up to you. And I went, one by one, around the
room and asked people how many, and wrote down the various guesses. So it turned out,
the average of the guesses for the three-by-five cards was 1,771 jellybeans. There are 1,776
jellybeans in the jar, so that was pretty good. The guess when I went around the room, that
was 850 jellybeans.

在去年，我有幸被邀请给九年级生讲课，他们是一群孩子，大部分来自 Harlem。我在
整形科医生们的晚宴上一败涂地，因此我并不想（像上次一样）对孩子们讲一些过于艰涩的
理论，我思考着应该如何更好地向他们解释股票市场。所以当我第一次走进教室的时候，我
分发了一些卡片，并在这里放了一罐我带来的雷根糖，我请学生们传阅这罐糖，并要求他们
清点数目，用任何他们想要的方式写出对雷根糖数目的猜测，我收集了他们写下的卡片，然
后在教室走了一圈，我告诉孩子们，你们可以坚持你们的猜测，也可以改变你们的猜测，之
后我又依次询问了教室里每个孩子的答案，并把他们的答案写了下来。他们猜测的雷根糖数
目的平均值是 1771 个，而那个罐子里有 1776 个，这说明他们猜得相当准确，然而当我在
教室里巡视的时候，有人给出的数目是 850 个。

And I explained to them that the stock market's actually second-guessed, because everyone
knows what they just read in the paper or what the guy next to them said, what they saw in
the news, and are influenced by everything around them. And that was the second guess,
and that's the stock market. The cold, calculating guess, when they were counting rows and
trying to figure out what was going on, that actually was the better guess--that's not the
stock market. But that's where I see our opportunity.

我向他们解释这就是说股票市场往往会被二次猜测，因为每个人都相信他们刚在报纸上读到
的内容，相信他们身边的人透露给他们信息，相信他们在新闻中获得的消息，并被他们周围
的信息影响。这是一种二次猜测，而股票市场就是如此，用那种冷静的基于计算的猜测去猜
测正在发生的事情，这样固然会产生更加精确的猜测，然而这并不是股票市场，但我们从中
看到了机遇。

Once a year in my class at Columbia, at least for the last five, six years, somebody raises their
hand and asks a question that goes something like this--hey, Joel, congratulations.You've
been doing this for 35 years, and you've had a nice record. But now there are more
computers, there's more data, there's more ability to crunch numbers. And isn't the party
over for us? Isn't it just more hedge funds? It's just a lot more competition. Isn't the party
over for us? So my students are generally second-year MBAs-- I'd say average age, 27 or so.
So I just answer it this way. I tell them, let's go back to when you learned how to read.
Let's take a look at the most followed market in the world. That would be the United States.
Let's take a look at the most followed stocks within the most followed market in the world.
Those would be the S&P; 500 stocks.

在过去的五六年当中，每年我都会在哥伦比亚大学的课上遇到一些同学，他们会询问类似这
样的问题：乔尔, 你在行业里已经有 35 年的经验了，并一直保持良好的记录，然而现在我
们有更多的计算机，更多的数据，更强大的数学计算能力，我们是否已经失去了优势？我认
为这仅仅意味着更加激烈的竞争。我们真的失去优势了吗？我的学生大部分是 MBA 二年
级生，平均年龄在 27 左右，因此我这样回答他们，我让他们回想他们刚学习读写的时候，
我让他们把目光投向世界上最受欢迎的市场，也就是美国。我让他们反思一下在美国最受欢
迎的股票，也就是标普 500 股票。

Let's take a look at what's happened since you learned how to read. So I tell them, from
1997--when they were 9 or 10--to 2000, the S&P; 500 doubled. From 2000 to 2002, it
halved. From 2002 to 2007, it doubled. From 2007 to 2009, it halved. And from 2009 to
today, it's roughly tripled, which is my way of telling them that people are still crazy. That was
just the last 17 years. And I'm way understating the case, because the S&P; 500 is an average
of 500 stocks. If you lift up the covers and look underneath what's going on, there's huge
dispersion of those 500 stocks between those, at any particular time, that are in favor and
those that are out of favor. And so there's a wild ride going on underneath the covers. If you
look under the covers, there's a wild ride of those 500 stocks at any particular time. And that
doubling and halving, doubling and halving with the average of 500 stocks is really
smoothing the ride. So there should be an opportunity.

自从他们开始学习阅读至今的这段时间，那里发生了什么事？我告诉他们，从 1997 年（也

就是他们 9-10 岁的时候）
， 到 2000 年，标普 500 股票翻番了，然而从 2000 到 2002 年，
标普 500 股票缩水了一半，从 2002 到 2007 翻番，从 2007 到 2009 缩水一半，从 2009 至
今，它几乎增至原来的三倍，我以这种方式告诉他们人们仍然非常疯狂，这还仅仅是过去十
七年的现象（未来也许更甚） 。我仍然在试图理解这种状况，因为标普 500 股票是 500 支股
票的平均值，如果剥开现象，深入观察，会发现 500 支股票之间存在巨大的离差。在一些
特定的时间，有一些很受欢迎，有一些无人问津。所以在平静的表象之下这些股票有很巨大
的起伏波动，如果你们看到本质，就会发现在每个特定的时间点，这 500 支股票非常剧烈
地此消彼长，而他们各自的持续翻番和缩水使得这种此消彼长更加平稳。因此机遇是存在的。

And if you understand what stocks are--and I guarantee my students, first day of class--
I make a guarantee every year. And they walk in, and I guarantee them this-- if they do good
valuation work of a company, I guarantee them the market will agree with them.
I just never tell them when. It could be a couple weeks. It could be two or three years.
But if they do good valuation work, the market will agree with them. Stocks are not pieces of
paper that bounce up and down, and you put complicated ratios on, like Sharpe ratios or
Sortino ratios. Stocks are ownership shares of businesses that you are valuing and, if so
inclined, tried to buy at a discount. So if you believe what Ben Graham said, that this
horizontal line is fair value,and this wavy line around that horizontal line are stock prices, and
you have a disciplined process to buy, perhaps, more than your fair share when they're
below the line, and, if so inclined, sell or short more than your fair share when they're above
the line, the market is throwing us pitches all of the time. The reason people don't
outperform the market--there are behavioral problem.There are agency problems. But it's
not because we're not getting those opportunities.

如果你们理解股票的定义，我常常在第一堂课上向学生们保证：如果他们很好地评估了一家
公司的价值，我向他们保证市场会认同他们的评估，但我无法告诉他们什么时候，有可能是
几周，有可能是 2-3 年，但如果他们可以做出正确的评估，市场会认同。股票并不是上下
跳动的纸张，你无法套用复杂的比率，例如夏普比率或索提诺比率。股票是你们所评估的商
业所有权份额，如果它上升，那么就需要试图减价购买。如果你们认同 本杰明格雷厄姆所
说的，这条水平线是公平价值，这条在水平线周围的波浪线是股票价格，你有一种有原则的
购买流程——在价格低于公平价值时以高于公平价值的价格购买，在他们上涨，或稀缺，或
价格超过公平价值的时候卖出, 市场无时无刻都在向我们投球，人们无法跑赢大市是基于购
买行为上的问题，投资代理人中存在的问题，而并非由于缺乏机遇。

I will show you briefly--let me tell you how we value stocks. It's not very tough, and I think
most of you will understand it. And I think the best example that seems to resonate with
most people is thinking about buying a house. And to keep the numbers simple, let's
say that someone is asking $1 million for the house. They want to sell, and your job is to
figure out whether that's a good deal or not. So there's certain questions you would ask.
One of the first questions I'd ask is, well, how much rent could I get for that thing, OK?
So in other words, if I rented out that million-dollar house, how much rent would I collect?
If I were going to collect $70,000, $80,000, $90,000 a year--7%, 8%, 9% yield on that house--
that's one way I might go about valuing it. And what's the next question you would ask?
I'm pretty sure I know what it would be. What are the other houses on the block going for,
on the block next door and the town next door? How does this compare? How relatively
cheap is this, relative to all my current choices?

在这里我简单向你们展示一下我们如何为股票估价，我相信你们每个人都能够理解。一个很
多人认同的最好的例子是购买房屋，简单来说，卖方出价 100 万美金，你们的工作是评估
这是不是一个理想的交易。你们一定会问几个问题，譬如说我想问，购买后我可以从中获得
多少租金，也就是说，如果我出租这栋售价 100 万的房子，我可以回收多少的租金。如果
我可以获得 7-9 万的年租金，那么这栋房子就产出了 7%-9%的利润，这也许是一种评估它的
方式。你们接下来会问什么问题？我很确信你们会这样问。这个街区上其他的房子怎么样？
隔壁街区以及旁边的镇景气如何？这个街区的景气与之相比如何？相对我目前的选择而言，
这栋房子便宜了多少？

So that's what we do. We look at, how relatively cheap is this business, relative to other
similar businesses, relative to a whole universe of choices that I have? We do that. We also
go back in history, look at how this company or this house has traditionally been valued,
versus other ones in the neighborhood or versus other communities. And how is it being
valued now? So measures of absolute and relative value--absolutely cheap on a rental basis,
relatively cheap on all different kinds of measures. that make sense to you--now, you
wouldn't use any of these measures all by themselves. If you just used relative cheapness-- if
some of you remember the internet bubble, and you bought the cheapest internet stock,
that wasn't cheap. It was just cheap relative to all the other crazy-priced stocks at the time.
But we use our measures of absolute and relative value as checks and balances against each
other to try to zero in on fair value.

这就是我们所做的，我们考虑眼前的生意与同类生意相比是否相对较便宜，相对于我们的所
有选择而言是否较便宜。我们也会回顾历史，观察这家公司或这栋房产一直以来得到的评估，
并与相邻街区/社区的房屋所一直以来得到的评估做对比，并观察它目前得到了怎样的评估。
你们估算了绝对价值与相对价值，发现房屋在有租金回报的基础上显然是便宜的，在其他各
种计算方法中也显示出了相对便宜的价格。你不太可能孤立地使用这些计算方法，如果你利
用相对的低价，（如果你们还记得互联网泡沫的话），你们以购买了最低价的互联网股票，而
实际上它们并不便宜，只是相对于当时其他的超高价股票而言比较低价。我们利用我们对于
绝对价值和相对价值的估算作为一种两者间的相互制衡，目的是瞄准公允价值。

So when you do this--I just want to show you a simple chart. This is actually a study we did
of our valuation methodology, very similar to the way I just said we value a house.
This is how we-- we looked at the 2,000 largest companies in the US over a 20-year period.
This was 1992 to 2012, and we ranked them on a daily basis from 1 to 2,000, based on their
discount to our assessment of value, using these metrics. The x-axis here-- you probably
can't see it--is just a valuation percentile. All this means is if you were in the bottom
left-hand corner, and you were in the first percentile, you're the 20 companies at any
particular time, out of those 2,000, that measure cheapest, according to our measures of
absolute and relative value. Go to the 99th percentile--you would be the 20 companies that
measure most expensive out of those 2,000.

当你们这么做的时候，我想给你们展示一张图表：这是一项关于我们的估算方法的研究，和
我刚刚谈到的房屋购买非常相似。我们研究了过去 20 年（1992-2002）美国的 2000 个规模
最大的公司，我们按照我们对他们价值的评估，使用我们的评估方法，一天为他们排名一次，
从第 1 名排至第 2000 名。这里的 X 轴是计价百分位，如果你处于左下角，也就是第一百分
位，（这意味着）根据我们对绝对价值和相对价值的计算，在任何时间点你都处于 2000 家
公司中最低价的 20 家。如果你处于第 99 百分位，那意味着你处于 2000 家公司中最高价的
二十家。

The y-axis is the year forward return on average during those 20 years. What this chart
simply says is, on average, stocks that fell in our first percentile, the cheapest 20, averaged a
one-year forward return during those 20 years of 38%. Stocks that ranked in our second
percentile averaged a one-year forward return of about 37%. And then we drop down to this
best-fit line, which we always say we don't mind missing when we're making extra money.
And then as we measure something more expensive, the year forward return drops. And if
you were sitting in my class at Columbia and I said, hey, does anyone see a long-short
strategy you might pursue if you could predict ahead of time which stocks would do best,
second best, third best, in order, and you did not say, I guess I'd buy these guys up here in
the upper left-hand corner and short these guys in the bottom right-hand corner--
if you didn't say that, I'd probably throw you out of class, because it's very straightforward.
Y 轴是 20 年的平均年回报，这张图表显示，平均来看，位于第一百分位的股票，也就是最
低价的 20 家，二十年当中年回报的平均值是 38%。位于第二百分位的股票的年回报平均值
是 37%。之后我们来看看这条离散度最小的线，在这里我们并不介意错失赚取额外收入的机
会。当我们估算那些比较高价的公司，（我们发现）他们的年回报下降了。如果你们是我在
哥伦比亚大学的学生，如果你们可以提前预知哪一只股票第一名，第二名，第三名，以此类
推，你们是否意识到你们可以追求多空策略，你们也许会购入这里的这些位于左上角的股票，
卖出右下角的这些，如果你们不这么认为，我也许会把你们赶出教室，因为答案是非常直观
的。

That's what you should do. And by the way, that's what we do. The important thing to
understand is that stocks are ownership shares of businesses, OK? Now, by the way, that
beautiful chart I showed you with the 90% fit--why doesn't everyone do this? Well,
unfortunately, it doesn't look like that when you're living through that. That's an average
over 20 years. If I showed you a snippet of three or four years, the fit would be nice. It might
be 0.55, 0.6, something like that. But it's not going to be very cooperative, right? If what we
did worked every day, and every month, and every year, everyone would do it. It would stop
working--but it doesn't, unfortunately.

这就是你们应该给出的策略，这也是我们一直以来的策略。你们需要明白一件非常重要的事，
股票是商业所有权份额。我向你们展示的这张图表，有着 90% 的相似系数，那么为什么大
家不这么做呢？不幸的是，当你身处其中的时候，事实看起来往往并非如此。这是 20 年的
平均值，如果我给你们看一小段 3-4 年的情况，相似系数仍会很高，也许会到达 0.55 或 0.6，
但是这对我们的帮助并不是很大。如果我们每天，每个月，每年进行这样的评估，别人也会
这么做，这种方式也就不再奏效了。

But the reason that we stick to what we're doing even when it's not working is that chart,
meaning the way we value companies, our measures of absolute and relative value, are
approximately how the market values them over time. If we were, for instance, momentum
investors--OK, and I will tell you that for those of you who know that means, momentum has
been studied across the globe over the last 30, 40 years in the US. It's worked pretty much
everywhere--not all the time, but on average it's worked very well over 30,40 years, and not
just in this country.But here's the problem. What if it didn't work over the next two or three
years?

但我们坚持这样做的原因是基于上面提到的图表所揭示出的规律。上面的图表意味着我们估
价公司的方法，以及我们对于绝对价值和相对价值的估算与市场评估公司价值的方法十分近
似。如果我们是惯性投资者（momentuminvestor）
，我告诉你们动量交易已经在过去 3-40
年在世界范围内被研究，它几乎在美国的任何地区都适用， 而且在过去 30 年表现非常出色，
不仅仅在美国，也在世界各地运行良好。但是这里有一个问题，如果动量交易在未来 2-3
年不再奏效该怎么办?

It could be that we just have to be patient. It works over time, and it's cyclical. And so it's out
of favor, and we just have to stick to our guns because it's something that's worked.
Or it could be, if it didn't work in the next two or three years, that the explanation is, hey,
it's not so hard to figure out. A stock used to be down here, and now it's up here-- it's got
good momentum. And with all the data, and the ability to crunch numbers, and computers,
and studies that have come out, it's a crowded trade. It's degraded. It's not as good as it
used to be. And if that's what happened over the next two, three years, I would know the
answer to that question. I didn't know which one it was. Should I just be patient, or has the
trade degraded?

也许我们仅仅是需要耐心，因为它一直奏效，呈现周期性，因此当它失去优势的时候我们需
要坚持相信它。但另一种可能的情况是，如果它在未来 2-3 年不再奏效，那么就说明了一
点：动量交易并不是非常难以被大多数人发现的。一支股票在这里缩水，现在它又增值，有
了更好的动量（momentum）, 根据所有的数据，数学计算能力计算的结果，计算机分析的
觉果，以及研究结果，这是一个非常饱和的贸易，并被降级了。动量交易已经并不如以前那
样奏效了。如果这就是今后 2-3 年即将发生的事，我的答案是：我不知道应该选择继续等
待，还是降级（degrade）这种交易。

But if you view stocks as ownership shares of businesses that you value and try to buy at a
discount, and that doesn't work for a couple of years, I'm not going to change what I'm
doing. I'm not going to buy the bottom right-hand corner, buy all the money-losers and the
companies that don't earn anything or are trading it 100 times, free cash flow. I'm not going
to buy those, even if it works in one particular year, and then sell the ones that are cheap,
relative to everything, get me high rents, and everything else. I'm not going to change my
strategy, and I believe that stocks will eventually—not right now, but eventually people get it
right. And I may have to be patient. That's really what I have to do.

如果你们将股票看作商业所有权份额，评估它并试图以低价买入，那在几年中并不会奏效，
我不会改变我一贯的做法转而去买那些右下角的股票，也就是那些亏损的公司，即便这种方
法在某一年奏效我也不会买这些股票，同时我也不会卖出那些相对低价的股票，我不会改变
我的策略，我相人们最终（也许不是现在）会明白股票的本质，我只需要更多的耐心。

What that chart tells me is I'm on the right track, meaning that's sort of our true north, and
we just have to be patient to get there. The reason that these simple metrics don't get
arbitraged away is-- the example I usually use for arbitrage is, oh, you see gold in New York
at $1,200, and it's selling at London simultaneously at $1,201. Well, an arbitrageur sitting on
a trading desk someplace will see that and buy up gold in New York at $1,200 and push the
price up a little bit. He'll simultaneously sell gold in London at $1,201, push the price down.
And they'll converge somewhere in the middle, and it'll happen so fast on a trading desk
that you don't really even get to see that. But what if I told you, you could buy gold in New
York. today at $1,200, and sometime in the next two, three years. You're going to make
money, but you could lose 20% of your money while you're waiting? There's no guy sitting on
a desk anywhere that really can do that.

这个图表告诉我的是我处在正确的轨道上。这些简单的测算方法没有实现套利的原因是——
我经常这样举例解释套利，你在纽约看到 1200 美金的金子，但它们在伦敦同时售价 1200
美金。一个套利者会在纽约以 1200 美金买入金子，提高一点价格，同时在伦敦以 1201 美
金卖出，并压低价格，这些价格会在某个中间点交汇，这会非常快速地发生在交易中，你甚
至不会察觉。如果我告诉你，你今天在纽约以 1200 美金买入金子，在 2-3 年后你会赚钱，
但你在等待的时间里会损失 20%的钱，任何交易者都不会这么做。

And frankly, time horizons are getting shorter. It used to be, when I was younger, I used to
get quarterly statements, and most people would throw them in the garbage. Now you can
check your stock price 30 times a minute on the internet. Maybe some of you do. And time
horizons are shrinking, and we're just playing time arbitrage. We're being patient, buying
cheap, good businesses,and waiting for the market to recognize the value we see.
But it takes some work to value companies. And let's say you don't want to do that. You have
a day job. I guess everyone here has a day job, so you don't want to do that. So one thing
you could do is try to find someone good to do it for you, right? I'm showing you there's this
opportunity. Maybe someone can do it for you. And what you should probably look for
when you're looking for that person is someone who has a good investment process that
makes sense to you.

诚然，投资回报期正渐渐缩短，在我年轻时，它通常有季度报表，但人们并不重视。而现在
你可以在网上以每分钟 30 次频率监看你的股价。投资回报期缩短了，现在我们仅操作时间
套利。我们耐心等待，购入低价的优秀的商业股票，等待市场的股价与我们趋同。评估公司
是复杂的，假设你们并不想这么辛苦，或者你们时间很有限，你可以找到一个合适的人为你
做评估工作。当你在寻找这样的人时，你需要他有着很好的投资流程。

The problem is, for most active managers, if you think of their challenge--when they're
picking an individual stock, they must think that they have a variant hypothesis as to why
that stock is priced differently than the way it should be. And I can tell you, I've been doing
this over 35 years, and it's very rare. Almost never have I bottom-ticked a stock, bought
it at the absolute bottom. So 99.9-plus percent of the time, a stock is down after I've bought
it. And there are really only two reasons why--one is I was wrong. The other is I just need
more time for my thesis to play out, OK?

对于很多的执行经理来说，当他们挑选了某一个股票作为投资，他们一定对于这个股票价格
与它应有的价格之间的差异有着不同的解释。我对这项工作有超过 35 年的经验，在我的职
业生涯中，这种股价与应有价格产生差异的情况非常罕见，我几乎从来没有以超低价格买入
过股票。在绝大多数情况下，股价在我买入后才下降，这种现象背后只有两种原因：1.我判
断错误，2.我需要等待更长的时间。

Now, as an outside allocator, you don't really know what the thesis for the individual stock
was. Even the manager himself sometimes doesn't know. When things are going against you,
there are all kinds of agency problems. You've got people to answer to.
You have behavioral issues, just naturally—you start to doubt yourself. It's very unclear
sometimes, even to them, what their biases are and what they're doing. They did studies that
you guys are familiar with, probably, of why the home team always wins in sports, or at least
wins more than it should. And the original thesis was generally, oh, they're used to the court.
They slept in their own bed. The fans, they jazz them up, whatever it might be. And when
they controlled for all these variables, the answer turned out to be that the refs don't like to
get booed, OK?

作为一个外部的分配者（allocator），你并不知道某一个特定股票中的原理，即便股票经理
有时也不知道。当事情不如预期时，那往往意味着投资代理人中间存在许多问题——例如你
是经过某人授意，或存在购买行为上的缺陷，你开始怀疑自己判断的正确性，然而即便是那
些股票经理也会对自己的思维偏差和购买行为存在一定的盲点，因此如果你的判断不同于投
资代理人，那绝不意味着你是错误的，也不意味着他是正确的。这里有一些你们耳熟能详的
研究，例如为什么主场球队总是能赢，最初的解释是主场球队更熟悉场地，球迷对士气的影
响，等等因素，当研究者试图控制这些变量时，发现主场球队更容易获胜的原因是裁判不希
望收到来自球迷的嘘声。

So they don't think that they're being biased. I'm sure in 99.9% of cases, they don't, but they
don't like to get booed. And so they're being influenced by--and so there's the same
problem with an active manager. He's got agency behavioral issues that he's not sure of.
So the allocator doesn't really understand the thesis behind each pick. It's not clear that the
manager is totally unbiased when he has a variant thesis that's going against him. And so
since you don't know the thesis as an allocator, most people--all they have are the returns,
and that's what they used.

当然，裁判并不认为他们的行为和判断有偏差，但研究证明了他们在大多数情况下不喜欢收
到嘘声，这种心理因素影响了他们的裁判行为，股票经理们也是如此，他们可能有着偏差的
购买行为，而且他们对自己的偏差购买行为存在一定的盲点。那些分配者并不懂支持股票选
择的一系列理论，当有很多相反的理论指向股票经理人是否意味股票经理人的行为存在偏差，
这一点也是不得而知的，既然你们作为购买者并不知道股票选择背后的理论，大多数人就只
能局限于根据你们的回报来制定投资策略。

So in an interesting study that came out the day after Thanksgiving--so it was interesting to
me, probably not interesting to the guys who did the study. Morningstar put out a study of
their star system. And their star system is based on past returns, letting you know who's done
the best over the last one, three, and five years. Of course, my interpretation of their study
was that our star system doesn't work. We can't discern. The last one, three, five years of
returns has not much to do with the next one, three, five. But that's what everyone uses.I
wrote a book.I hold it up here. It's called "The Big Secret," and I always say it's still a big
secret because no one read it.[LAUGHTER] And in that book, I talked about a few
studies.Number one, it talked about the best-performing manager.I wrote it in 2011, so it
talked about the decade 2000 to 2010-- looked at the best-performing mutual fund, a study
of the best-performing mutual fund for that decade. That fund was up 18% per year, 100%
long in the US equities.The market was flat during those 10 years, so 18% up a year is pretty
good. Unfortunately, the average investor in that fund, on a dollar-weighted basis, managed
to lose 11% a year because every time the market went up, people piled in. When the market
went down, they piled out. When the fund outperformed, they piled in. When the fund
underperformed, they piled out. And they took an 18% annual gain and turned it into an 11%
annual dollar-weighted loss--why?

在一项有趣的研究中，晨星公司针对他们的基金评级系统做了一项研究，基金评级系统
是基于过去 3-5 年的回报对投资进行评级，我对这个研究的理解是，晨星公司的评级系统
并不能很好的运行。因为我们无法从这个评级系统中看出任何有指导意义的信息。过去 1-5
年的回报与未来 1-5 年的回报没有任何关系，然而很多人还是依赖于这种评级系统。我写
了一本书, Big Secret, 我总是称它为超级秘密，因为很少有人读过这本书。(笑声)在书中，
我讨论了几个研究，有一篇是关于当今最优秀的基金经理人，这篇文章写于 2011 年，因此
它主要是关于 2000-2010 这十年里表现最优秀的共同基金，这个基金每年增长 18%，在美国
股票的持有率是 100%，在过去十年一直市场平稳。不幸的是，以美金计算，这项基金的投
资人平均每年损失了 11%，因为当市场景气好时，人们涌入，景气差时又退出，当基金收益
超预期时，他们涌入市场，当收益低于预期时又退出。他们本来拥有 18%的年收益，却最后
变成了 11%的年亏损。这是什么原因呢？

Well, to beat the market, if you're beating by 18 points, you're doing something different
than the market. You're going to zig and zag differently. You can't do the same as the
market. You have to do something different. You're going to zig and zag differently.
Institutional managers are no different. Here are the stats on the-- if you just took a look at
the top institutional managers for that decade, the ones who--2000 to 2010-- the
top-quartile managers, the ones who ended up with the best 10-year record, here are the
stats on them. 97% of those who ended up with the best 10-year record, top quartile, spent
at least 3 of the 10 years in the bottom half of performance--not shocking, but everyone,
right? To beat the market, you have to do something different. You're going to zig and zag
differently. 79% of those who ended up with the best 10-year record spent at least 3 of the
10 years in the bottom quartile performance. And here's the stunner-- 47%, roughly half of
those who-- they ended up with the best record, but they spent at least 3 of those 10 years
in the bottom decile, the bottom 10% of performers. So you know no one stayed with them,
but they ended up with the best record.

如果你想打败市场，你需要有 18%的年收益，你需要与市场不同，你需要以不同的曲线增长，
机构经理也是如此。我有一些很有说服力的数据：过去十年(2000-2010)，97%的最优秀的机
构经理人至少有 3-5 年是处于排名倒数的。79%的最优秀的机构经理有 3-10 年排名倒数。
47%的机构经理有 3-10 年的表现是处于倒数 10%。如果你想打败市场，你需要与市场不同，
你需要以不同的曲线增长。79%的最优秀的机构经理有 3-10 年排名处于倒数的百分位，更
惊人的是，47%的机构经理（几乎是 50%）有 3-10 年的表现是处于倒数 10%。没有人看好他
们，但他们最终取得了最优秀的投资记录

So it's very hard to pick an allocator, because you don't know the thesis, so you're using past
returns. But when you do that, all you're doing is chasing your tail, going in and out at all the
wrong times, So it's very hard. What a good allocator-- usually an institutional allocator, and
there are a few of them--should be looking at process, and do you stay with your process.
But of course, there's agency problems on the side of those people allocating, because even
if you're on a really good investment board, and you're an allocator, and you're head of US
equities, or you're head of alternatives or bonds, or whatever it might be, you have a
benchmark. And if you haven't beaten your benchmark for the last three years, I'm not
saying at the good places, they throw you out. But I am saying they don't throw you a
parade, OK? So it's very, very hard on that. So one thing you could do is do it yourself.

当你正在选择一个好的资源分配者的时候，你往往不知道他投资背后的理论，你局限于
关注回报，因此你会一直犯同样的错误，一个真正优秀的分配者（allocator）会关注过程，
当然，在分配者的那一边也会有很多代理人层面的问题，因为不论你是在最好的投资委员会
担任资源分配者，还是说你是美国股票的领导者，无论你是谁，你都受制于一个基准。如果
你在三年内没有打破这个基准，哪怕你在很普通的投资机构任职，你仍然会被开除。所以你
唯一能做的就是自己作投资决定。

And I wrote this other book that you have, "The Little Book That Beats the Market." And
I just did a simple formula that sort of was like the jellybeans, counting the rows, going
across, and just picking the cheap companies to buy, very simple. And I wasn't running
outside money at that time that I wrote the book in 2005--just wrote up the very first study
we did of doing something cheap and good. Businesses just made it pretty easy for you to
buy a handful of those. And I kept getting phone calls-- hey, could you just do this for us?
And so what I did was I set up a website that listed the top stocks. It's still going around,
MagicFormulaInvesting.com. And people said, yeah, that's fine. But could you still do this for
us? So I set up something called formula investing. And I gave people two choices. I said,
well--I sort of viewed it as a benevolent brokerage firm. I said, listen, we'll let you do this
yourself. But you have to choose from this top list of 30 or 50 stocks, and you have to choose
at least 20 of them, OK? Stay out of trouble, and you're supposed to invest every quarter,
update your portfolio, and just mechanically do this. You don't have to buy everything, but
you have to buy at least 20.

我还写了这样一本书 The Little Book That Beats the Market. 在这里我做了一个非常简

单的投资方程式，就像猜测雷根糖数目的那个小实验一样，我买最低价的公司股票，那是
2005 年，我还没有花光我的钱，那时我使用非常简单的策略，只买低价而优秀的公司股票，
我不断接到电话，人们说，你可以用这种方式为我们投资股票吗？因此我成立了一个网站，
里面列出了最优秀的股票，MagicFormulaInvesting.com. 人们继续给予我好评，要求我继续
帮他们购买股票，因此我建立了一种方程式投资。我把这当作一种慈善性质的股票经纪人业
务，我提供给咨询者两个选择，我告诉他们你们要自己作独立的投资决定，但前提是你们必
须从这个排名前 30-50 名的股票中选择 20 个来投资。你们每个季度都要投资，更新你们的
投资组合，不需要买太多，但至少要买 20 个。

And then the person who was running this for me said, you know what? How about you
just add a check box which said, just do this for me, just automatically buy it. So just as an
afterthought, I said fine. We'll do that too. So we ran this for a couple of years，and let me tell
you the results. The people who chose their own stocks from the pre-approved list of the
top stocks, they did pretty well. For the two years, they were up 59%, roughly. Unfortunately,
the S&P; was up 62% during those two years. The automatic, just do it for me-- that was up
84%. So the automatic had beaten the--in other words, just buying the list had beaten the
market by 22 points. But by giving people any discretion, even though the list was
pre-approved, just by picking and choosing the ones that they didn't like-- but they had
to buy at least 20-- they had managed to take a 22% out-performance in a couple of years,
which is pretty good, and turn it into a 3% under-performance. So do-it-yourself-- I wrote a
piece for Morningstar called "Adding Your Two Cents May Cost You a Lot." And so I just
wanted to caveat that.

人们给我的反馈是，为什么你不做一个编程代码，自动地帮你作重复这些投资呢？我答应了
他们，同时做了这个编程。这种程序化的购买持续了几年，现在我来告诉你们结果。那些从
我拟定好的优秀股票名单中购买股票的人，他们都取得了不错的收益，在过去两年，他们买
的股票上涨了 59%。不幸的是，标普的股票在过去两年上涨了 62%。 我们的这种通过程序
化的购买方式买进的股票上涨了 84%，也就是说，我们这种按照股票排名购买的投资方法，
以 22% 跑赢了市场。尽管这份名单是很客观的，人们仍然非常保守地选择股票，购买一些
他们不怎么看好的股票，即便是在这样的情况下，（按照这样的股票排名购买）也使他们以
22% 跑赢市场，而仅仅以 3%跑输市场。因此你们一定要（像这样）自己决定如何投资。我
给晨星公司写了一篇文章，Adding Your Two Cents May Cost You a Lot. 我想给这篇文章中
的理论增加一些限定和前提。

So another way-- let's see, I'll do this fast. I wrote a book [INAUDIBLE] mentioned, called
"You Can Be a Stock Market Genius." World's worst title of all time, but in it, it said sort of
what Warren Buffett calls, why don't we look for one-foot hurdles, OK? And I opened the
book with a story about my in-laws, who used to spend--they had a house in Connecticut,
and they used to spend the weekends going to yard sales and country auctions looking for
bargains, OK? Paintings or sculptures-- they were art collectors. And I described what they
were actually doing. And they were not going to these yard sales and country auctions
looking for--seeing a painting that was discarded, saying,this guy's the next Picasso.That's
not what they were doing. What they were looking for are pieces of art or sculpture
that they know the artist. Some of his similar work had just gone for auction for a lot more
than they could buy it for, right? They could buy it for 30 or 40 cents on the dollar for what it
just went to auction for. That's a lot different question. And so what "You Can Be a Stock
Market Genius" was, was showing you these areas that are ignored. These are the country
auctions and the yard sales of the investment world. And these were--I talked about
different areas, spin-offs, bankruptcies, small-cap stocks, companies going through
recapitalizations, anything weird, complicated situations.

在这里我会尽量简短地说明。我写了一本书 You Can Be a Stock Market Genius. 在里面我提

到了一个类似沃伦巴菲特“单脚跨栏”的概念，我举了我妻子的家人的例子，他们在康涅狄格
州拥有一处房产，一家人常常在周末去跳蚤市场或者拍卖会买一些便宜的东西，例如油画或
者雕塑，因为他们是艺术品收藏者。然而他们并不是去市场中寻找那些名不见经传的画家的
艺术品等待其成为下一个毕加索，他们仅仅购买那些他们熟知的画家的作品，他的类似作品
已经以他们无法承受的高价被拍卖出售。他们一般以 30-40 美分，或者 1 美金（如果在拍
卖会的话）买入，这和买他们的成名作相比是截然不同的。这就是我在这本书中传达的，有
一些投资市场是被忽略的，就像这些跳蚤市场和拍卖会一样，例如分拆，破产重组，小股盘，
正经历资产重组的公司，等等类似的非主流，不寻常的投资选项。
So that's another way, but you guys have a full-time job. That is a full-time job, let me tell
you--that's a full-time job. So right now we run mutual funds. I can just tell you some of the
struggles that we have with investors. We do follow that chart, choose from the 2,000 largest
companies, and we've had a nice record. But there are years like 2015 where there's a
benchmarking issue, meaning the S&P; 500 in 2015 was up roughly 1.3%. The equally
weighted Russell 2000 was down 10. The equally weighted Russell 1000 was down 4. So if
you're picking from roughly the 2,000 largest stocks, an even performance would be down 6
or 7, not up 1.3. So there's a benchmarking issue, but to beat the market, you have to do
something different. You're going to zig and zag. Everyone knows that. We're now working
on something-- we've had something open a couple of years where we sort of say, OK, we'll
start with the benchmark, and then we'll value-add. And we'll make some compromises so
that we don't--it's called Index Plus--and so that we don't vary too much from the index.
So you can stay with us, and the thesis was basically--the best strategy for you, which is
how I'll end before I take questions,is not only one that makes sense, but one you can stick
with, OK? So you have to understand what you're doing, number one. If you give it to
someone else, you have to understand what they're doing. And you have to be able to stick
with it, so you have to understand it well enough to stick with it. So that's, I guess, before I
take questions what I will leave you at. And maybe [INAUDIBLE]—

这是另外一种投资方式。但鉴于你们来自各行各业，时间精力十分有限，因此现在比较流行
投资共同基金。我可以给你们看看我们和投资人之间的一些争论，我们遵循上面给你们看过
的图表，永远从排名前 2000 名的公司中选择，所以一直保持良好的记录。但也有一些时候，
例如说 2015 年，投资会遭遇一些基准上的问题，例如说标普在 2015 年只有 1.3% 的增长。
等权重的罗素 2000 下降了 10%，等权重的罗素 1000 下降了 4%. 因此如果你从前 2000 名的
公司中选择购买，平均下来可能会下降 6-7%。而不是上升 1.3%。因此这里存在一个基准的
问题。但你们每个人都明白的一个道理是，想要跑赢市场就要使用不同于市场的增长方式。
这里我们有一种几年前向广大投资者公开的投资方法，我们从基准开始，增加附加价值，然
后我们做出一些投资上的妥协，也就是股指（Index Plus）, 这保证我们不会偏离股指太远。
这个理论非常简单， 对你们来说最好的策略并不是最严谨科学的策略，而是让你们能够一
直坚持使用的策略。首要的一点是，如果你要把股票交给他人运作，你要明白他们是怎么做
的，你要理解的很透彻，这样你才能坚持这样的策略。我就讲到这，接下来换你们提问。

SPEAKER: Yeah, thank you so much.That was great. So let me set up the chairs. So thanks
again. In reading your magic formula book, "The Little Book That Still Beats the Market,"
I noticed that you mentioned that there were questions about whether one should short
stocks, the most expensive ones, through the same metrics. And you had, I guess, not
explicitly said that that's the way you'd want to go. And correct me if I'm mistaken.
And then you started the formula investing funds as well, which you alluded to in your talk.
However, what has happened to them? Are they still continuing, and what's your vision for
that going forward?

主持人：谢谢您的演讲，非常有启发性。我在阅读您的 The Little Book That Still Beats the

Market 时，注意到您提到了针对是否应该以同样的标准卖出那些最贵股票这个问题的争论，
您认为当中存在很多待解决的问题，我认为您刚刚非常隐晦的表示，这正是您接下来要着手
解决的，如果我有理解上的错误，请您指正。您刚才提到了方程式投资，我想请问的是，您
的方程式投资现在还在正常运行吗，您对它将来的运行状况有什么预测？

JOEL GREENBLATT: Sure, we opened long-only funds, called formula investing. And we just
merge them with our long-short funds. So we have long-short funds that run 100% net long.
But when we looked at their performance, we did better in up markets with the 100%
long, long-short funds. We had a long-short overlay in up markets and down markets.
Pretty much, we never did better the other way. And so we just merged our simple 100% long
into the 100% long that also did long-short. So it was just a matter of trying to put our best
foot forward and managing the things. We actually-- we had just been rated the
number-one fund, had gotten five stars from Morningstar for our formula investing fund,
and we closed it. And we merged it with our long-short funds. It wasn't really a business
decision. It was really a decision that we want to put our best foot forward. And so that's why
we did that.

乔尔·格林布拉: 我们开设了多头基金（Long-only funds）

，我们称之为方程式投资（formula
investing）
。我们将其与多空基金合并，这样我们有了以 100% 好仓运行（ run 100% net long）
的多空基金。然而当我们观察它们的表现时，发现它们在高端市场（up-market）表现得很
好，我们在高端和低端市场都有多空基金管理外包（long-short overlay）, 其他的方法都没
有达到这么好的效果，我们把 100%好仓单一基金和 100%好仓的包含多空基金的基金合并，
这就是用最适合我们的方式前进。就在不久前我们被列为排名第一的基金，我们的方程式投
资在晨星公司得到了五星的评级，之后我们关闭了基金，把它和我们的多空基金合并，这并
不是一个商业上的决策，我们仅仅是想更好的前进，这就是我们这么做的原因。

SPEAKER: So when you talk of long-short, how do you decide between 1/70/70 distribution
or 1/40/40 distribution. When you're saying you're net 100% long, how do you come at what
the ratios should be?

主持人：那么当您谈到多空时，您如何从 1/70/70 分布 （1/70/70 distribution）和 1/40/40

分布（1/40/40 distribution）中抉择？当您谈到您持有的是 100% 好仓（100% net long）,您
是如何得知比率的？

JOEL GREENBLATT: Sure, so what [INAUDIBLE] is mentioning is that-- well, what he means is,
let's say you give us $1. We'll go buy $1 of our favorite stocks. Then we'll go out and buy
$0.70 more of our favorite stocks, but this time we'll pair them with $0.70 of our
least-favorite stocks. We'll short them, so we'll be 70 long and 70 short, and so another
bucket to add return. And why isn't that 40/40? We picked ratios for most of our funds that
we thought made sense, given how much volatility you added by the amount of leverage
you're adding and the amount that you're shorting. There's not a big magic to it. Something
that worked well at $1 long with 70/70 or 40/40--they both work well. In our large-cap
universe, we give people choices.

乔尔·格林布拉: 假设你给我 1 美金，我们为你买进一美金的我们看好的股票，接着再买 0.7

美金的我们看好的股票，但这一次我们把它和 0.7 美金的我们所不看好的股票放一起，我们
把这些股票卖出，这样我们买进 70，卖出 70，有了另一个增加收益的可能。为什么不是 40/40
（买进 40 卖空 40） 呢？因为我们给每一只基金制定了合适的比率，无论你们通过增加杠
杆或卖出股票提高了多少波动率，这当中并没有什么超出常理的规律，适用于 1 美金的定律
在长期的 70/70 或 40/40 同样是适用的。在我们的大资本市场中，我们会给予人们不同的
选项。

SPEAKER: Mm-hmm-- so Joel, there are a bunch of questions around the same theme. I
guess we can sort of package them into one. People are curious to know, what do you think
of the market's valuation today? Where do you see value areas today?

主持人：Joel , 针对这个主题有很多的问题需要探讨，我认为把它们归纳为一点：您如何看
待今天的市场价值，您认为今天市场的价值领域在哪里？

JOEL GREENBLATT: Well, the benefit of having--we have a big research team, and we have a
lot of history on--if you want to think of the S&P; 500, those 500 companies. So we actually
go back 25 years and look at each individual company every day for the last 25 years and
aggregate them in the weights of the S&P; 500. So what that allows us to do is go look at
today--where's the valuation of the S&P; 500 today, contextualized, versus the last 25 years?
And so what I can tell you is, we're in the 17th--it's not a prediction. I'm just giving you some
facts.The way we value companies, we're in the 17th percentile towards expensive over the
last 25 years.That means the market's been cheaper 83% of the time, more expensive 17% of
the time. When it's been here in the past, year-forward returns haven't been negative.
During that 25 years, the market's been up about 10% a year. So right now from these
valuation levels, what's happened in the past--over the next year, up 3% to 5% on average;
over the next two, up 8 to 10, so like I said, not a prediction. But if you want to know what
has happened to stock prices from similar valuation levels over the last 25 years, that's what's
happened--3% to 5% positive return on average over the next year, and 8 to 10 over the next
two.

乔尔·格林布拉: 我们有一个很大的研究团队，我们有很长时间的观察研究的积累，例如我们
对标普 500 中 500 家公司进行长达 25 年的追踪研究，并汇总到标普 500 的权重中。这给我
们今天的投资提供了参考，结合过去 25 年的追踪，标普 500 今天的估价区间在哪里呢？我
要告诉你们一个事实，在过去 25 年在公司价值方面我们前进了 17 百分位，这意味着市场
相对于那时降价了 83%，涨价了 17%。如果放在过去，年收益并不会呈现负数 在过去的 25
年中，这个市场每年增长 10%。 根据过去的评估，在未来一年市场会平均上涨 3-5%，未来
两年 8-10%，这是必然会发生的。根据这个过去 25 年的评估看股票价格，在未来一年会有
3-5% 的正回报（positive return）, 而接下来的两年会有 8-10%的回报。

SPEAKER: So there's one question around what you were doing in the first 10 years of
investing, when I think you averaged 40% to 50% annual gains after fees. Correct me if I'm
wrong. What was the strategy that you and Rob Goldstein were following in those days, and
what parts of that are actionable for the individual investor, compared to the Index Plus
strategy?
主持人：关于您投资中的第一个十年中谈到了您平均达到了 40%-50% 的年税后利得（annual
gain after fee）我有一个问题。在那十年当中，您和 Rob Goldstein 采取的策略是什么，与
Index Plus 策略相比，那样的策略中有没有什么是适合一般投资者借鉴的呢？

JOEL GREENBLATT: Sure, so stock investing is figuring out what a business is worth and
paying less, and so that hasn't changed. What makes a company worth something and what
makes it cheap relative to that is pretty straightforward. That's sort of Ben Graham-- figure
out what it's worth, pay a lot less, leave a large margin of safety between those two. Warren
Buffett added a little twist that made him one of the richest people in the world. He simply
said, if you can buy a good business cheap, even better.If you read through Buffett's letters,
it's very clear what he's looking for--first thing he's looking for, anyway, is businesses that
are in high returns, we call it, on tangible capital. And that just means every business needs
working capital. Every business needs fixed assets. How well does it convert its working
capital and fixed assets into earnings?

乔尔·格林布拉: 股票投资的宗旨是要寻找优质又低价的股票，决定一家公司股票优质与否的
因素非常直观，正如本杰明格雷厄姆所说，找出最值得购入的股票，以低价买入，为了确保
你的投资安全这两者之间（股票优秀的程度和买入的价格）的差异要足够大，二沃伦巴菲的
在这基础上稍作变动成为了世界首富，这个变动就是，用最低价买最好的股票。如果你们读
了巴菲特的著作你们就会很清楚他要什么：第一，高回报的公司，我们称之为有形资本
（tangible capital），所有的公司都需要营运资金，和固定资产，他们是如何把营运资金和固
定资产变为收入的呢？

So the example I used in "The Little Book," which I really wrote to explain these kind of
concepts to my kids-- I said, imagine you're building a store, and you have to buy the land,
build the store, set up the display, stock it with inventory. And all that cost you $400,000.
And every year, the store spins out $200,000 in profits. That's a 50% return on tangible capital.
Maybe I should open more stores--not so many places I can reinvest my money at those
rates. Then I compared it to another store. Remember, I wrote this for my kids. And I called
that store Just Broccoli. It's a store that just sells broccoli, and it's not a very good idea.
Unfortunately, you still have to buy the land, build the store, set up the display, stock it with
inventory. That's still going to cost you roughly $400,000. But because it's kind of a stupid
idea just to sell broccoli in your store, maybe it only earns $10,000 a year. That's a 2 and 1/2%
return on tangible capital.

我在 The Little Book 中举了一个例子，我对孩子们也是用这个例子。我说，想象你在建一

间商店，你需要买一块土地，建造它，布置橱窗，准备库存，一共花费 40 万美金，这间店
每年衍生出 20 万美金的盈利，对有型资本有 50%的收益。也许我应该再开一家商店，毕竟
并没有很多地方可以让我的投资得到这样的回报率。接着我拿我的商店和其他商店比较，假
设那家商店是卖花椰菜的，很不幸，我同样要重复上面的购买土地，建造，布置橱窗，准备
库存，一共花费 40 万，也许只卖花椰菜是很不明智的，这种不明智导致我一年只赚 1 万，
上面两者分别给有型资本带来 200% 和 0.5% 的收益。

And all I simply say is, I'd much prefer to own the business that can reinvest its money--
all things being equal, much prefer to own the business that can reinvest its money at high
rates of return than much lower rates of return. And so that's sort of the Buffett twist
that we incorporate in the companies that we invest in, by being very tough on the way
companies earn and spend their money. So we tend to get a group of companies
that are not only cheap, but also deploy capital well. And that's really what we're looking for.
So we've always done that. "The Little Book" was more of a way to systematize that.
But in "You Can Be a Stock Market Genius," which--what did we do in the first 10 years?
I wrote a book about it. It was "You Can Be a Stock Market Genius." It was looking for
off-the-beaten-path, more complicated things that other people weren't looking
at. Something strange or different was going on. I showed people nooks and crannies
in the market, where they could look for those. The issue there-- and there is no issue.
It's a great business. But our portfolios were 6 or 8 names, were 80% of our portfolio.
We returned half our outside capital after five years.

基于上面的这个非常直观的例子，我想说的是我更倾向于那些可以再投资的生意，在其他同
等条件下，我倾向于再投资回报率高的生意。这就是巴菲特的扭转。我们通过对公司回报和
支出的严格管控与我们投资的公司进行合作，然后从中我们找到一些股票价格便宜，又非常
善于运用资本的公司，这就是我们（投资的时候）要找的公司。The Little Book 是把这些体
系化的一个过程，你问我们过去十年做了什么投资，我们这十年写下了这本书——You Can
Be a Stock Market Genius，我们在寻找不为人知的投资，那些人们并不留意的复杂的一面。
有一些奇怪的事正在发生，我给人们展示了市场中的偏僻角落，我让让他们从中寻找问题，
结果发现那些偏僻角落几乎没有什么问题，是非常优秀的投资选择。我们的投资组合中只有
6-8 家公司，占据了我们组合的 80%. 我们在五年内回收了外部资产的一半。

SPEAKER: Five years.

JOEL GREENBLATT: We returned all our outside capital after 10 years--
SPEAKER: 10 Years.
JOEL GREENBLATT: Between '85 and '94--we were lucky enough to have enough money to
keep our staff and continue to run our money thereafter. Warren Buffett said a fat wallet's
the enemy of high investment returns. And so when you have a very concentrated portfolio,
and you're looking off the beaten path, where there are smaller situations and things that are
more obscure, you're very liquidity-constrained. That's why we kept returning money, but
that's not why we're doing what we're doing now.

主持人：5 年
乔尔·格林布拉: 10 年后我们回收了全部的外部资产。
主持人：10 年？
乔尔·格林布拉: 1984 年到 1995 年。正因为这样，我们有足够的钱可以留住我们员工，并继
续运作我们的资金。巴菲特曾说一个塞满钞票的钱包是高回报投资的敌人。因此你的投资组
合需要很集中很精简，你要寻找市场中很不寻常的投资机会，你也必须有非常紧的流动性约
束。这就是我们不断获得收益的原因所在。然而上述这些并不是我们采取现阶段措施的原因。

If you're going to run other people's money, this is what I'll tell you with a portfolio that
has 6 or 8 names that are 80% of your portfolio. Every two to three years, usually within two,
Rob and I--my partner, Rob Goldstein, and I would wake up, and we'd find out we just lost
20% or 30% of our net worth. And that happened like clockwork every two or three years--
just always happened. It has to happen with a concentrated portfolio, either because we
were wrong on one or two of our picks, or market-- they were out of favor for some period
of time. And maybe it bothered us, maybe it didn't if we just had to be patient. But I would
say for outside, when I was talking about people going in and out of funds and losing their
turn, that is not conducive for other people, especially if they're not doing the work.
It was OK for us, and I think it was good for us because we knew what we owned. And so as
long as the facts hadn't changed, and as long as we believed in our thesis, we could take
that.I wouldn't say it was easy, but we could take that. Now, our bad days, we have hundreds
of stocks on the long side and hundreds of stocks on the short side. We're trying to be right
on average. We're buying cheap, good companies. We're shorting companies that are
either destroying capital, or losing money, or whatever it is. And over time, that pays off.
But our bad days, with hundreds of stocks on the side, are 20 or 30 basis points of
under-performance, not 20%, 30% of our net worth.

如果在座的各位将要为他人管理投资，这就是我通过我们这种 6-8 家公司占据投资组合 80%

的投资策略所要给你们的一些建议。每隔 2-3 年（通常是每隔两年，）我和我的搭档 Rob
Goldstein 会突然惊觉我们已经损失了 20-30%的资本净值。那就像一个周期一样，每隔 2-3
年就会发生。这一定与我们集中精简的投资组合有关，有可能是我们有一两个投资选项不当，
也有可能是市场的原因使它们不再受欢迎。 我们有可能非常焦虑，但也有可能是我们只是
需要耐心。对外我总是说，当我谈到人们涌入或退出市场,有一些人失势的时候，我并不是
说这些会发生在所有人身上，特别是当我提到的那些人之所以失利是由于他们在投资上有不
当行为的时候。投资上的起起伏伏对我们来说是非常正常的，因为我们清楚我们作了什么样
的投资选择，以及那些选择的结果。因此只要基本定理不变，只要我们还认可这些定理，那
么我们就可以忍受短期的亏损，虽然这并不容易，但我们可以忍受。在我们最艰难的时期，
我们买进数百只股票，卖出数百只股票，我们希望平均来说，我们作了正确的投资决定。我
们买入低价且优质公司的股票，我们卖出那些正在糟蹋它们自己的资产或者正在亏损的公司
股票。经过一段时间，我们的努力获得了预期的回报。然而在我们非常艰难的时期，我们以
20%-30%基点跑输市场，那对于我们的净资产来说就不仅仅的 20%，而是高达 30%。

And so I think for most people, it's a smoother ride. And one of the great lessons that young
investors-- and a lot of you guys are still very young-- can learn are the compound interest
tables. If you can make mid-teen returns-- wouldn't make 40% or 50% annualized returns,
but in mid-teens returns, if you know compound interest tables, you can do very well with a
smoother ride over a long period of time.

因此我认为对大部分人而言，你们的投资上的波动是相对平稳的，不会像我们的投资起伏这
么巨大。 对于你们这些年轻投资者来说，最好的一课是复利表（compound interest table）
告诉你们的。如果你们达不到 40% -50%的年收益，而可以获得 15-16% 的收益，在这种情况
下如果你们懂得复利表的话，你们可以使你们的投资波动长期内变得很平稳。

One of the best examples-- and when I taught those ninth-graders, I actually put on the
outside of their notebooks-- I handed them notebooks. And I on the outside, I had a
compound interest table. And it had the example of starting investing $2,000 a year when
you're 19, in your IRA, until you're 26-- so seven years of putting away $2,000--and never
putting another nickel in again,or starting when you're 26 and putting in $2,000 a year for 40
years, until you're 65. So the people who put in $2,000 a year from age 19 to 26
and never put in another nickel ended up with more money if you earn 10% a year on that
money. They ended up with more money with those seven payments than the people who
start at 26 and put in 40 payments, till they were 65. You end up with more money, the 19 to
26--just a very important lesson to learn about starting early. I know all of you are over 19,
so I'm sorry I didn't tell you this. [LAUGHTER] But these kids weren't, and so compound
interest tables are important. So you're young-- if you stay with a very methodical
investment strategy that makes sense over time, you can all still do very, very well.

这里有一个最好的例子，也是我给九年级生举的例子，我发给他们一些笔记本，在笔记本外
面我写了一个复利表，举个例子，当他们 19 岁的时候每年往他们的个人退休账户（IRA）投
资 2000 美金，到他们 26 岁的时候，也就是他们连续 7 年每年投资 2000 美金的时候停止投
资，另一种方案是从 26 岁时开始以每年 2000 美金的投资持续 40 年，等他们 65 岁的时候，
那些仅仅在 19-26 岁投资的人，如果他们每年能从他们的投资中赚取 10%，届时他们拥有的
钱多于那些从 26 岁到 65 岁连续投资 40 年的人。这告诉我们提早开始的重要性。我知道在
座的大部分都超过 19 岁了，所以我很遗憾告诉你们这一点。
但那些孩子们还非常小，所以复利表对他们来说很重要。你们都很年轻，如果你们坚持有条
不紊的投资策略，你们都会有非常优秀的表现。

SPEAKER: So, Joel, thanks. You've talked about the size effect, right? Going into hidden
places and obscure areas as well-- you also talked about the temperamental edge that you
can bring to the process of investing. And then there is something to say about the analytical
and the informational edge. And there used to be a lot of investing in net nets payback.
And do you think some of these edges have become less relevant, versus more relevant,
over time, with information becoming almost universally accessible?

主持人：Joel, 谢谢你。您谈到了规模效应，您也谈到要寻找市场中不为人知的角落，您同
时谈到您的投资所参考的边缘气质（temperamental edge ） ，也谈了投资分析边缘（analytical
edge）和信息边缘（informational edge）. 目前对于净回报有很多的分析，随着越来越多
的人知道这样的信息，您上述所提到的这些是否已经不再具有参考性了呢，您对这个问题是
怎么看的？

JOEL GREENBLATT: Well, information--people have information on the S&P; 500 stocks.
There's still a lot of group-think going on. What I tell my students is, some of these smaller
cap--you know what happens if you're very good at doing things, like you read "You Can Be
a Stock Market Genius" and buy some of these things in these obscure places. And what I
would call it is taking unfair bets, not because you're so smart, but because you found it in a
place that other people aren't looking. What happens to people who get good at that is they
get a lot of money, and then they can't do that anymore because they have too much
money. So it opens a whole new area for young people to keep coming into that. So
certainly, some of the smaller situations will always be there. Things may be a little more
efficient,

乔尔·格林布拉: 人们了解关于标普 500 的信息，但直到现在仍然有很多群体思维的现象

（Group-think）我常常和我的学生说，当你们面对尤其是一些小股盘时，如果你们非常擅
长投资，你们很清楚市场正在发生什么，例如如果你们读了 You Can Be a Stock Market
Genius ， 购买无人知晓的优秀股票，在我看来这是一种不公平竞争，这并不是因为你比别
人聪明多少，而是你关注了别人没有留意到的。那些非常擅长这样做的人，他们变得非常富
有，我觉得这是年轻投资者很值得借鉴的。所以说，类似这样的不为人知的好的投资机会总
是有的，它们会使你们的投资更加有效率。

But there have been plenty studies that--one of the big chapters I wrote was on spin-offs,
which are companies that are sort of separated from--and those still work very well.
But it sort of misses--they've studied, if you bought all of the spin-offs, how would you do?
And they continue to outperform. That's not really the question. The question is, is this an
area ripe for mispriced securities?

这里也有一些关于拆分的研究（Spin-off），在我的书里也有一个非常重要的章节是关于拆分，
那是一些分离出来的公司，但（这并不妨碍）它们始终运行得非常好。这里我们有一些偏题
了。我想说的是，如果你买了所有的拆分公司，你会怎么做？这些拆分公司一直有超出预期
的表现，但这显然不是不是我们要探讨的。我们关注的是，这对于定价错误的证券来说，那
是一个时机条件成熟的领域吗？

If the average spin-off did average, that wouldn't mean anything to me. You're looking for
the opportunity where people are discarding things or are just not interested in things
for reasons that don't have to do with the investment merits. They may be too small. It may
not be the company that the people who owned the original stock invested in. Usually, you
discard companies that are out of favor at that time. So even though on average, they've
continued to outperform pretty much as well as when I wrote the book-- so that's not
discouraging. But even if they did average, they still are ripe for mispricing, really what I'm
looking for. So you're looking in these areas that are ripe for mispricing. You don't have to
run a statistical model to decide whether, on average, they do well or they don't. If you know
what you're looking for, you're looking for opportunities to find things that are mispriced.
And I don't think those will go away. But as I said, there are higher and better uses for most
people's time. So I had a ball doing that. I have a ball doing what I'm doing. If you don't want
to do it, fine with me.

如果一般的拆分（average spin-off）真的表现平平，那对我来说没有任何意义。你们要从
人们抛弃的或者不感兴趣的地方寻找机会。由于一些与投资优势无关的因素，这些机会显得
很微不足道，这些显然也不是那些拥有企业原始股票的投资者会感兴趣的机会。通常情况下，
你会抛弃那些不受市场青睐的公司，然而这些公司持续地有着超出预期的表现（outperform）,
即使是在我写这本书的时候也是这样，所以并不令人失望。即便是那些拆分真的表现一般，
它们对于错误定价（mispricing）来说仍然是成熟的时机，那就是我真正在寻找的。因此你
们要寻找的是这些对于错误定价来说成熟的时机，你们没有必要做一个数据模型去判断它们
平均表现的好坏，如果你们很清楚自己要什么，你们应该努力寻找那些被错误定价的证券，
我不认为这些机会会消失。但正如我所说的，每个人的时间都有他们认为的更好的利用方式，
我自己很享受这种投资方式，如果你们并不喜欢这么做，我也尊重你们的选择。

SPEAKER: In one of your recent interviews, I think you mentioned Apple, one of the big
companies. And you think group think and mispricings can happen even in big companies.
So maybe Apple or some other company--I was wondering if you could take our audience
through an example of, what are the metrics one should be looking at if they were looking at
a company?

主持人：在您最近的一个采访中，您提到了最大公司之一的苹果公司，您认为群体思维和错
误定价也有可能发生在大公司中，例如苹果公司或其他大公司，我想请问您，当我们在评估
这些大公司时应该采取什么样的衡量标准，您能为我们举例说明吗？

JOEL GREENBLATT: Well, I'll pick Apple as just big, big picture. You guys have heard of that?
[LAUGHTER] So at least I'm old enough to have had a BlackBerry. And it used to have 50% of
the market. Now it doesn't really exist. It wasn't that long ago. And the vast majority of
Apple's profits come from their phone. So that's the negative story on Apple-- it's a
hardware company. It's going to crash and burn like all of them do, OK? On the other hand,
some people might say, oh, it has an ecosystem of products that play off one another.
They interact with one another. It has a brand. I always say, hey, Coca-Cola doesn't make
sugar water, and they have kept their brand pretty well.

乔尔·格林布拉: 我把苹果公司比作一个生产超大屏幕的公司，我不知道你们是否听说过这个
比喻？（笑声）至少我的年龄足够老以至于我仍然在使用黑莓手机，黑莓的市场份额曾高达
50%，但现在它几乎已经不存在了，这就是近几年发生的一个现象。苹果的大部分利润来源
于他们的手机，所以说这是他们的一个劣势——苹果是一家硬件公司，它有可能像其他的硬
件公司一样彻底倒闭，另一方面，也许很多人会说，苹果公司有环保的产品，每一个环节都
被高效利用，它有非常好的品牌形象，等等诸如此类的辩护，我总这样反驳他们，可口可乐
公司并不主要生产含糖饮料，但他们一样有很好的品牌形象。

People tend to like Apple as a brand. And so the question is, which is it? Is Apple a hardware
company, or is it an ecosystem of products with a great brand name? I'd say the answer is
probably gray, somewhere in between. It's not either one. It's probably somewhere in
between those two. But if you took a look at the market, I can look at where the S&P; is
trading. I can look where Apple's trading. And a few months ago-- it's still very cheap,
but a few months ago, it was trading at less than half of the valuation of the S&P.; So at a
price, my answer is, if it's somewhere in between, I'd say it's probably better than average.
And I'm getting it at half price. I don't know if that's right, but I have a large margin of safety.
I own hundreds of-- what I say is, what we do now is, I don't know the answer to your
question. It's gray. I don't know the answer. I don't know if it's closer to a hardware company.
I don't know if it's a ecosystem with a brand attached, and so it's much, much better.

人们倾向于声称他们推崇苹果这个品牌，问题是，苹果到底是这两者中的哪一个：是一家硬
件公司，还是一个有着环保产品的形象非常好的品牌？我很难回它究竟是哪一个，它可能介
于两者之间。然而，如果你观察市场，例如我会观察标普进行交易的市场，我可以看苹果公
司交易的市场，我发现在几个月前，苹果公司的股票是非常便宜的，但在几个月前，它是以
低于标普估价一半的价格进行交易，因此，我的回答是，如果苹果公司是介于硬件公司和品
牌之间，它表现或许还不错，我会以半价买它的股票，由于我不知道我的判断是否准确，因
此我会制定一个确保投资安全的保证金（Margin）。我想说的是，我不知道准确怎么回答你，
因为这个答案会很模糊。我无法准确回答你是因为我不清楚苹果究竟更接近一家硬件公司，
还是更接近于一个环保品牌。

But interest rates are 2%. It's got a 10% free cash flow yields, earns high returns on capital.
It's got a great niche. What I would say is, I don't know if Apple's going to work, but I don't
own just Apple. I own a bucket of Apples. I own a bucket of companies with metrics
like that-- trading really cheap, with deploys capital well, with nice potential prospects.
And so I don't know if Apple's going to work. I know my bucket of Apples is going to work.
That was the chart I showed you. And so we own the bucket of Apples. But if you ask my bet
on Apple, I think it's cheap, relative to other choices right now.

它的利率达 2%，产出 10%的自由现金流，资本有很高的回报，也有很好的利基市场，我想

说的是，我不知道苹果是否会持续经营下去，但我不仅仅持有苹果的股票，我也有很多类似
苹果的股票，他们都符合下述衡量标准：股票非常低价，资本运用得宜，有很好的未来前景，
虽然说我不知道苹果未来是否会很好地经营下去，但我相信我投资这些类似公司的方式未来
会很好地持续下去，就像我一开始展示的图表所阐述的那样，如果你们非要要求我把赌注押
在苹果公司上，我可以肯定地告诉你们的是，他们公司的股价相对于目前的很多选择来说是
比较便宜的。

SPEAKER: Fantastic, I just have a couple of questions, Joel, quickly. You mentioned index fund
in the beginning of your talk. With all the money flowing into passive funds, ETFs, and index
funds, what would be your contrarian moves during a period like that? Are there things
investors should be cautious about, for example?

主持人： 您的分析太精彩了，我还有几个问题要占用您很短的时间，您在今天演讲的开始
提到了指数基金，您提到有很多资金流入了被动式管理基金（Passive funds），交易型开放
式指数证券投资基金（ETF）和指数基金，再这样的情况下，您在这段时期会有怎样的逆向
操作？有哪些地方是投资者需要保持谨慎的？

JOEL GREENBLATT: Well, I told you where I thought the market in general-- it's a market cap
weighted index, S&P; 500 was expensive, but still expecting positive returns going forward.
It's a world of alternatives. So the question is, how should I invest my money?
The move to passive can, with all the ETFs and everything else, can cause dislocations in the
short term, because people are not discerning. Remember, I said stocks are not pieces of
paper that bounce around, that you put Sharpe ratios and Sortinos on. They're ownership
shares of businesses, and businesses--there's a dispersion in their fundamentals, how one is
doing,versus another.When you just take an ETF and don't discern between the differences
in the fundamentals, that can cause dislocations in the short term. That just makes me smile
more because those dislocations mean, hey, I can find bargains because people stopped
thinking.

乔尔·格林布拉: 市场从总体来看是一个资本权重指数（cap weighed index）

，当中标普 500
是非常高价的，但仍可期待很好的收益。这是一个充满替代选项的投资世界，所以我们面临
的问题是，我们希望用什么样的方式投资？资金流向被动式管理基金在短期内可能会导致错
位（dislocation），这是因为人们缺乏很好的判断力，要记住我所说的一点——股票不是一
张下波动的纸，你们无法套用夏普指数或索提诺指数，股票是企业所有权份额，诚然，不同
的投资选项在基本面上有所差异，当你仅仅选择了交易型开放式指数证券投资基金（ETF） ，
而没有仔细研判其他投资与之的差异时，就会造成短时间的错位（dislocation），这些投资
上的错位往往让我感到高兴，应为我又找到了捡便宜的机会，这一切只因为人们在投资之前
没有好好地思考和判断。

But I don't think they're at such an extent, other than in the short term. I think you're
familiar-- when the market falls, and everyone gets depressed all at once, they say
correlations go to 1. That just means everyone throws the baby out with the bathwater. They
make no discernment. But that really just happens for the first month, maybe two at the most.
And then there starts to be discernment. That's actually the best opportunity time for us,
when people start discerning again. And you just had everything move together, which it
shouldn't. They all have different prospects. And so the same with ETFs, if there's flows
into them or the indexes-- that could cause short-term dislocations over a month or two,
but those get corrected over time. Like I said, the market eventually gets it right. There's a lot
of-- just think of the jellybeans. You really get it.

但我并不认为他们这些投资者愚蠢到了没有判断力的程度，虽然说短期内有可能比较缺
乏判断力。你也许很熟悉这样的情况，当市场不景气时，人们普遍非常低落，人们称之为相
关性为 1 的情况. 在我看来他们这种行为是为了打老鼠而砸坏了玉瓶，因为他们没有判断力。
但这种缺乏判断力的情形仅仅会持续一个月，最多两个月，然后投资者们就恢复了判断力，
当人们恢复判断力（这段时间）对我们来说是很好的机会，你会发现很多原本不该合并的东
西合并了，它们各自有着不同的前景，对交易型开放式指数证券投资基金（ETF）来说也是
如此，当有资金流入它，或者流入指数基金，这个过程中会产生一个为期 1-2 个月的错位，
然后渐渐恢复正常，就像我一贯认为的那样，市场会做出最正确的判断，想想我给你们举的
雷根糖的例子你们就会很清楚了。

It's the jellybean effect of when everyone hears what everyone else is thinking. That happens
most of the time. That's what the stock market is. Your job is to be cold and calculating and
unemotional. Unfortunately, people are human. It's good news for us, but people-- the stats
are against you. That's why I think the indexers get it right for the wrong reasons. They
mostly are saying the market's efficient and have other explanations of why you can't beat it.
I think the market often gives you opportunities, but it's very difficult to take advantage of
them for behavioral and agency problems. And those are much more powerful than you
would think by just saying, oh, behavioral and agency problems. The people are people, and
it's been happening forever.

雷根糖效应就是说每个人都知道其他人在想什么，受到影响，这就是股票市场。你们的
工作是保持冷静，做精确的计算工作，但这种冷静客观的态度是违背人性的，你们可以说你
们拥有这种品质，但绝大部分人并非如此，过往的数据已经充分证明了这一点。这就是为什
么我认为索引器往往能从一个错误的假设推导出一个正确的结论，他们往往会告诉你市场是
很高效的，对于你为什么被市场打败给出各种不同的解释。但是我认为市场永远都在提供机
会，但由于代理人和购买行为上的一些偏差，抓住这些机会加以利用是很难的。那些比你们
更强势的投资人是不会真正理解你们所面临的代理人和购买行为上的这些偏差。这一点就是
人性，这是永远不会改变的。

I don't think it's getting better. I think time horizons are shortening. There's so much-- all
that data, all that-- look, when I started my first firm in 1985, I used to write quarterly letters.
And they read something like this--we were up 3% last quarter, thanks a lot. That's what it
sort of said. Now we have $10 and $20 billion endowments that need to get our results
weekly. I don't know what they do with them. [LAUGHTER] But we now have to do that, and
most of them do a good job with it. But that's just the way of the world. So if you keep
measuring things in shorter periods, and you can measure them, and there's more data,
it doesn't make it better. It makes you more susceptible to emotional influence. So that
world's getting better. The last man standing is patience. We call it time arbitrage. Other
people call it time arbitrage-- just being patient. That's in really short supply, and it's not
getting better. Things are moving to faster and less patience. So that's really the secret. So
now you don't have to even read the big secret [INAUDIBLE].

我一点也不认为情况有任何好转。投资期限正在不断地缩短，这里有太多数据可以佐证这一
点了，当我在 1985 年开办我的第一家公司时，我会写一些季度信（quarterly letters），里面
提供类似“上个季度我们上涨了 3% ”这类的内容。现在我们每周有 1-2 亿的留本资金
（endowments）要求我们每周汇总收益结果，我也不知到他们打算拿那么多钱做什么（笑
声）。但重点是我们现在要为他们提供这样的周汇报服务，而且他们大部分都运行得不错。
这就是目前世界运行的方式，如果你以短期来衡量，你会得到更多的数据来支持这个观点，
但这于事无补。这些情况使得你对那些非理性的因素带来的影响更加警惕，世界在往良性的
方向发展，最后留下来的人一定是最有耐心的人，我们称之为时间套利。当今事物的周期变
得越来越短，人们变得越来越没有耐心，这就是最大的秘密，知道了这一点我想你们也就没
必要花时间读我写的 Big Secret 了。

SPEAKER: I think one fantastic gift you've given to the value investing community is the Value
Investors Club. I'm sure most people here have already visited the website. If you have not,
please check it out. It's an amazing resource. Joel, if you could maybe just say a word about
the Value Investors Club, what's your vision with it going forward? And how does it compare
or contrast it with other investing platforms that are emerging these days?

主持人：我认为您对于价值投资领域(Value investment community)做出的一项杰出贡献是

您的价值投资者俱乐部网站（Value Investor Club），我相信在座很多人已经登陆过您们的网
站，如果你们还没有的话，我非常鼓励你们去看看，因为那里有非常优秀的资源。 请您用
一句话形容一下您对价值投资者俱乐部网站（Value Investor Club）前景的看法？贵网站与
目前其他投资平台的相同点和不同点是什么？
JOEL GREENBLATT: Sure, well, it originally started in 1999. And the whole big thing with the
internet back then was getting millions of eyeballs to look. And I viewed it more as a, wow, I
always wanted to be in an investment club. And I thought, hey, I could form an investment
club where you can meet any time, at your convenience, wherever you are, were, and share
ideas and back and forth about it. And I'm always grading papers at Columbia for my
students. And at the time, there were Yahoo message boards where 99.9% of the stuff was
not worth reading. So I sort of said, hey, why don't we-- along with my partner John Petry,
I said, why don't we vet the people who can join the Value Investors Club? And if you would
have gotten-- maybe two or three people in the class each year would get an A-plus.
And if you could write up an investment thesis that I would have given an A-plus to in my
class, you can join the club, and it's free. The only thing that you have to do is share your
best ideas. You have to share a couple of your best ideas during the course of the year, and
that entitles you to see everybody else's good ideas. And so it's just merit based. And still
only 1 out of 20 applicants get in, so I think it's a little harder than Harvard. I don't know.
[LAUGHTER]

乔尔·格林布拉: 好的。我们的网站成立于 1999 年，在当时使用互联网作为平台的一个巨大

优势是你会得到很多的关注，我把它定义为一个投资人俱乐部，在这里大家可以选取适合自
己的时间，不受地域局限地交流投资信息，针对不同的观点进行辩论。那时候我经常给我在
哥伦比亚大学的学生打分数，在那时的雅虎信息版上有 99%的咨询都是没什么营养的，于是
我和我的伙伴 John Petry 建议说，为什么我们不挑选一下有哪些人可以加入我们的价值投资
者俱乐部（Value Investor Club）呢？如果每年你班上有 2-3 个学生得到 A ＋，如果我的学
生能写出一篇投资理论并得到 A ＋的分数，我就让他免费加入我们的价值投资者俱乐部，
他们要做的事就是在那里分享他们的好点子，他们每个学期在网站上分享几个好的投资理论，
这样也使他们有资格从他人那里获得一些不错的点子，因此我们这个俱乐部是一个以监管机
构评审为基本的平台。每 20 个申请者中只有一个能获准进入，比哈佛大学的录取率还要低
（笑声）。

But it's been going now for 16 years. We do have a-- I think it's a 45- or 90-day delay
that if you're not a member, but to get the live stuff, you have to be a member. So learn how
to value a business and apply, if you like. There are instructions on the website.
It's called the Value Investors Club. But as a learning tool, I always refer people there
because these are very smart investors. They beat each other up. There's a Q&A; after they
post something, and say, what about this? What about that? A great rating out of 10 is 5,
because everyone's mean and very--they're value investors. They're very tough and stingy.
And so they don't--so if you look at the ratings and see anything a 5 or above,
that's good, these guys. And you can look at that. It's just a learning exercise, right?
It's teach a man to fish. That's really how to be good at investing.
It's not anything else. You've got to understand what you're doing.
It's a great way to learn. So I think for the next generation,
it's a nice way to teach them to look at what smart investors are doing now--
doesn't mean I agree with everything on the site. And this is a good point.
I'm probably wrong more than I'm right about passing on things. But Warren Buffett calls it
no called strikes on Wall Street. You could let 100 pitches go by, and you should've swung at
30 of them. But if you only pick one, and you make sure that's a good one, that's really the
way that we go about investing.

我们迄今为止已经维持了 16 年。只有我们的会员才能获得实时的投资信息，非会员会
得到滞后 45 天-90 天的投资信息。如果你们感兴趣的话可以做一些企业评估方面的研究，
并申请加入我们的网站，网站上有具体的说明。这个网站对我来说一个得力的研究工具，我
常常援引价值投资者俱乐部的成员的论述，因为他们是非常聪明的投资者。他们之间竞争激
烈，试图把对方踢出局，每当他们在网上贴出一个理论， 下面会有一连串的 Q&A 问答，
如果满分是 10 分，那在我们的网站上 5 分就是非常高的分数，因为我们的每个成员都是非
常严苛的价值投资人。所以你们如果在上面发现了高于 5 分的评价，那真的是非常有借鉴意
义的，也是一种学习和训练，是授人以渔，教人们如何完成一个好的投资，仅此而已，这也
是你们的一个学习机会，让你们得知优秀的投资人现在正在做什么样的决策，当然不是说我
认同网站上所有的言论，连我在过去的经验中错误的决策也比正确的决策多，巴菲特称之为
华尔街上的无预警罢工（no called strike）. 你可以选择 100 个推介(Pitch), 通过你们的判断
否定掉其中的 30 个，但如果你只选择 1 项投资，那么一定要确保它是好的，这是我们投资
时需要遵守的原则。

I just have to--my partner Rob Goldstein and I are very tough on each other. So we both
have to like it. We both have to argue our points. And if we both like it, we think it's pretty
good. So we're really, really picking our pitches. It doesn't mean we don't miss a lot of good
ones. It doesn't matter if we miss them. It just matters the one we pick are good. And that's
sort of the way to think about "You Can Be a Stock Market Genius" type of investing.

我和我的伙伴 Rob Goldstein 对彼此都很严苛，所以我们做的投资需要我们俩都论证通过才

可以，但我们都很喜欢这种严苛对待投资的态度，所以我们的推介（pitch）都是严格挑选
的，这并不意味着我们没有错失好的投资的时候，但是我们看重的并不是我们错过了哪些投
资，我们看重的是我们推介的投资都是好的投资，这就是我们对 You Can Be a Stock Market
Genius 式投资的看法。

What we're doing now in our long-short portfolios is more being right on average. I showed
you that chart where we're pretty good at valuing businesses. So we buy a group of
businesses where we have a bucket of Apples. And we're short a bucket of high-priced
companies. We're going to be short some things that lose money, or the Teslas and
Amazons of the world, who are selling at 100 times free cash flow. And people get confused,
because I call that the tyranny of the anecdote. It's we will short some wrong ones. We won't
short much of them, but we'll short some, and we'll be wrong. And you'll know their names
because those were the winners. But if you're short hundreds, take my word.

现在我们多空组合中的决策平均来看是正确的，我们按照上述图表的方式评估公司，然
后购买了一系列类似苹果公司这样大公司的股票，我们从中卖出了一些高价股票，也将要卖
出一些亏损公司的股票，或是一些诸如亚马逊（Amazon）和特斯拉（Teslas）这样以 100
倍现金流（100 times free cash flow）出售的公司。人们感到很困惑，因为这就是我所说的
道听途说导致的暴政。我们会卖出一些我们认为错误的股票，不会很多，但我们要卖出它们。
然后我们会发现我们犯了错误，你们一定都听过这些企业的名字，因为他们现在都是赢家，
但如果你们要卖出上百家公司的股票，你们要把我的建议听进去。

It's not a good idea to eat through cash, or lose money, or sell at 100 times free cash flow.
And usually, if you're generating lots of cash,and you can buy that cheap, and they're
deploying their capital well, that's a good thing to do. And so we're just trying to be right on
average. Two different ways to do it, doesn't make one better than the other-- there are
different ways to make money. I love them both, would do both again. They're just both
full-time jobs.

不管是吃现金（eat through cash），亏损，还是以 100 倍现金流出售，这些都是很不明智的，

通常，如果投资者能赚进大量现金，以低价购买公司股票，这说明他们有效利用了资本，是
非常值得鼓励的。因此我们追求的是平均水平的正确性，两种不同的赚钱方式没有优劣之分，
对于不同的赚钱的方式我都很欣赏，而且这两种方式我都会持续使用下去，它们对我而言都
是一种工作而已。

SPEAKER: Great-- and, Joel, our final question goes maybe one step ahead into valuation.
In your books you've spoken about different kinds of multiples that are used to value
companies. You've spoken about enterprise value to free cash flow, for example EV to
EBITDA is one of those multiples. And lots of such multiples, you say, have been proven
effective for long-term investing, as you're buying a bucket or a basket. However, the
question is, due to the lack of a single source of accurate benchmark markets-- because
there are one-off charges and things you have to clean up for-- there are many sites on the
web claiming a wide range of numbers, some good, some not so much. Have you thought of
having a standardized, maybe open-source, implementation to benchmark these metrics
over the long term, in the same spirit of magic formula investing, for example?

主持人：太好了。这是我们的最后一个问题，这个问题会更进一步针对您对于公司的评估。
在您的书中您谈到了各种评估公司的方法。您提到了企业价值/现金流（enterprise value to
free cash flow）,例如企业价值倍数，您提到还有很多类似的方法被证明在长期投资中有效，
所以您会购买一系列这样的投资（buy a bucket or a basket）.但这里的问题是，由于我们缺
乏一个单一的准确的基准市场（有一些一次性收费（one-off charges）和一些你需要清空的），
导致现在有很多网站开出了大量的投资推介，有一些很好，有一些较差，品质参差不齐。您
是否考虑设立一个标准化的，资源公开的工具去从长远角度来为这些不同的衡量标准做一个
标杆，类似您的方程式投资的（这种标准化的标杆） ，您能举个例子吗？

JOEL GREENBLATT: OK, I think I'm a nice guy, but not that nice. [LAUGHTER] So we have a
team of analysts. We go through every balance sheet, income statement, cash flow
statement in the companies we look at. What's that deferred tax asset, or pension liability, or
off balance sheet plant in Taiwan? How should we handle that? How efficient are they at
using and spending money? We do all that work. When I wrote "The Little Book," I called that
the Not Trying Very Hard method. It worked incredibly well using rough metrics-- the type
you're talking about, Rough metrics--and it worked incredibly well. My partner Rob and I
looked at each other and said, this not only worked well. It worked much better with those,
not trying very hard, than we even thought. Can we improve on that? We actually know how
to value businesses. Can we just go do that? And we put together a research team, and we
do that. It would be really nice if I shared that with everyone, but it's a lot of work. And the
other way works incredibly well.
SPEAKER: You're a nice guy.
[LAUGHTER]
JOEL GREENBLATT: I am a nice guy,
and so we're trying to treat our clients really well.
[LAUGHTER]
SPEAKER: On that happy note, thank you so much, Joel.
It's been a pleasure.
JOEL GREENBLATT: Thank you very much.
Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]

乔尔·格林布拉: 我觉得我是个好人，但可能没有你想的那么好。（笑声）我们有分析团队，
我们浏览公司的的资产负债表，损益表，现金流量表。那么台湾的延递所得税资产，退休金
负债，或是帐外工厂又是什么情况呢？我们又该如何着手呢？他们在支出和资金使用方面是
否高效呢？我们会做全部的分析工作。我写 The Little Book 这本书的时候，我把它称为不费
力的方法，通过使用严格的衡量标准，这个方法出乎意料的好用。这就是你刚才谈到的严格
的衡量标准，我的伙伴 Rob 和我都觉得这个方法不仅是好而已，而是使用起来毫不费力地，
且远远优于我们所原本设想的。我们可以在此基础上提高吗？既然我们擅长评估企业，那么
我们可以继续下去，只做我们擅长的吗？诚然我们可以召集一个研究团队，研究你提到的那
种标杆，和所有人分享我们的成果，但是我们需要为此做很多的工作。而且明显另一种方法
也可以做得很好。
主持人：您是个很好的人。
乔尔·格林布拉: 我是，所以我一直致力于给我们的客户最好的服务。（笑声）
主持人：非常感谢您，我们非常享受您带来的演讲。
乔尔·格林布拉: 谢谢大家！