VENEFRIDA A. DE RIVERA, ET AL vs. FORTUNATO F.

HALILI

This appeal was originally addressed to the Court of Appeals. For the reason, however, that the case "is one in which
the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue and the evidence involved is largely the same as the evidence
submitted in an appealed civil, case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, within the meaning of
Section 17, paragraphs (3) and (5) of Republic Act No. 296, the Judiciary Act of 1948, "We allowed the endorsement
of the same to Us the appellate court above-mentioned.

The relevant circumstances which precipitated the filing of this suit, borne by the records and established by the trial
court, are as follows:

1. On September 27, 1951, Federico Suntay the registered owner of the fishponds in question situated in the
municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, leased said fishponds to Virgilio I. Ramos. Maximo Santiago and Graciano
Queyquep for a period of four years beginning October 1, 1951 up to October 1, 1955.

2. On September 29, 1951, Federico Suntay signed a promissory note in favor of the aforesaid lessees, as follows: .

Value Received: P30,000.00.

For value received I hereby promise to pay Virgilio I. Ramos, Maximo Santiago and Graciano Queyquep, or order
payable in Quezon City within 3 years from the herein stated date at 10% a year. In case of my failure to pay within
the said period of 3 years, the said amount of P30,000.00 shall be consolidated and considered as additional sum to
the consideration with the corresponding extension of period of the contract of lease entered into between Virgilio I.
Ramos, Maximo Santiago and Graciano Queyquep and Federico Suntay, Docket No. 217, Book X, Page 4, Series of
1951 acknowledged before the Notary, Apolonio Amancio on the 27th day of September 1951 at the city of Manila.

September 29, 1951.

(Sgd.) FEDERICO SUNTAY"

3. On October 1, 1951, Ramos, Santiago and Queyquep executed an "Assignment of Lease." whereby for and in
consideration of the sum of P32,000.00 Philippine Currency paid to them by the assignee, Fortunato P. Halili, they
sold, conveyed assigned and transferred unto the said Fortunato P. Halili. all their rights and interest to the contract
of lease executed by Federico Suntay in their favor for the term of four years, beginning October 1, 1951. This
assignment of lease according to Suntay, was made by Ramos, Santiago and Queyquep without his knowledge and
consent;

4. On September 28, 1955, Suntay leased the fishponds in question to the herein plaintiffs for a period of two years
beginning October 2, 1955 and ending October 2, 1957 for the sum of P32,000.00;

5. On October 4, 1955, as defendant was then in possession of the fishponds in question, and as he refused to
relinquish the possession thereof, plaintiffs instituted an action for unlawful detainer against said defendant in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Hagonoy, Bulacan, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 96 of the said court;

6. On October 5, 1955, Suntay filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City against the herein
defendant Halili together with Virgilio I. Ramos, Maximo G. Santiago and Graciano Queyquep (which was docketed
as Civil Case Q-1564) wherein he prayed for judgment:
(A) Declaring the lease evidenced by Annex A and the assignment thereof as evidenced by Annex B, and plaintiff's
promissory note, to be null and void for lack of, or for failure, of consideration, or

(B) Declaring the said lease and the said promissory note to be null and void under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code, in
relation to the provisions of the Revised Election Code and

II

In either event, sentencing defendant Halili to pay plaintiff the sum of P64,000.00 for the use and occupation of
Plaintiff's fishpond which he has held from October 1, 1951 to October 1, 1955.

The plaintiff further prays for his costs of suit and for such other relief as in the premises he may be entitled to.

7. On January 1, 1956, the Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy, Bulacan rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 96,
ordering:

1. The defendant and all persons claiming under him, to vacate the fishponds in question and to surrender
possession thereof to plaintiffs;

2. The defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P2,200.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the fishponds from October 2, 1955 until defendant finally vacates the same, and

3. To pay the costs of the suit. The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby dismissed.

8. On May 23, 1957 the Court of First Instance of Rizal Quezon City Branch, rendered a decision in Civil Case Q-
1564 the dispositive portion of which declares:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of plaintiff Federico Suntay, by declaring the
promissory notes as well as the contract lease, null and void, as they were executed in violation Art. 1409 of the new
Civil Code and Section 48 of the Revised Election Code, and insofar as the claim of damages both plaintiff and
defendant in their respective pleadings are concerned, the court dismisses the same for both are in pari de
licto, without special pronouncement as to costs.

9. The parties in Civil Case Q-1564, not satisfied with the decision above rendered, filed their respective notices of
intention to appeal and eventually elevated the ruling to the Supreme Court.1

10. On appeal of the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court to the Court of First Instance of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
the same was reversed and the complaint dismissed. The CFI rule that the Justice of the Peace could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the case and that, consequently, it, the CFI, could likewise acquire no appellate jurisdiction
to review the same In support of the ruling, the CFI said:

After a careful study of the evidence of record, it is our sense that plaintiffs' right to the possession of the fishponds in
dispute depends upon the declaration of nullity of the various documents under which defendant bases his right
possession. The basic issue involves not mere the question of possession which "naturally flows as consequence of
the leasehold right" but also "the validity of the source of the right of possession." In order to determine the validity of
the leasehold rights of the defendant, this court perforce has to make a judicial pronouncement or finding as to the
validity or nullity of the deed of assignment executed in his (defendant) favor well as the promissory note - the issue
involved and/or squarely presented in Civil Case No. Q-1564 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City above-
adverted to. It is our considered opinion that the Quezon City Court (now the Supreme Court where the case is on
appeal) is the proper court that could legally pass upon and determine the validity of the documents upon which the
defendant bases his right to possess the fishpond in dispute and not this court or the court of origin for that matter.
Until said case is finally decided in favor of Suntay, the defendant cannot be dispossessed of the property in litigation
by means of this action. Unless the contract of lease, assignment of lease and promissory note have been finally
declared void by the Supreme Court said documents are presumed valid. Undoubtedly, the justice of the peace court
of Hagonoy had no power to declare said documents upon which defendants bases his right to void. ....

Plaintiffs-appellants take exception to the aforequoted ruling of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, assigning
thereto the following errors:

First: That the trial court erred in finding that the issue involved in this case is not merely the question of possession
but also the validity of the contract of lease the promissory note and the assignment of lease;

Second: That the trial court finally erred in refusing to take cognizance of this case in exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.

Third: That the trial court finally erred in not declaring the plaintiffs entitled to the possession of the property in
question, together with the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the same.

We cannot subscribe to the stand taken by the herein plaintiffs-appellants.

When the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court dated January 5, 1956 was elevated for review to the Court of
First Instance, the latter court could have acted on the same only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, however, calls for and demands a previous, legitimate jurisdiction by the court of
origin. Unfortunately, this requirement for the proper dispensation of the Court of First Instance's appellate jurisdiction
was wanting in the case at bar. It is the Court's considered view that the Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy, Bulacan
had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 96.

The disagreement of the parties in Civil Case No. 96 of the Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy, Bulacan extended far
beyond the issues generally involved in unlawful detainer suits. The litigants therein did not raise merely the question
of who among them was entitled to the possession of the fishpond of Federico Suntay. For all judicial purposes, they
likewise prayed of the court to rule on their respective rights under the various contractual documents — their
respective deeds of lease, the deed assignment and the promissory note — upon which they predicate their claims to
the possession of the said fishpond. In other words, they gave the court no alternative but to rule on the validity or
nullity of the above documents. Clearly, the case was converted into the determination of the nature of the
proceedings from a mere detainer suit to one that is "incapable of pecuniary estimation" and thus beyond the
legitimate authority of the Justice of the Peace Court to rule on. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, is amended, civil
actions "incapable of pecuniary estimation" can only be addressed to the origins jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance (Section 44 Par. A).

Considering that, as the Court of First Instance of Bulacan expressed it, "plaintiffs' right to the possession of the
fishpond in dispute depends upon the declaration of nullity of the various documents under which defendant bases
his right of possession," then truly, only the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (now the Court of Appeals) could
have legally decided that question for two reasons: First of all, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan did and could
not try the case, even if it wanted to, because then it would have done violence to Section 11 of Rule 40 of the Rules
of Court which says —
SEC. 11. Lack of Jurisdiction. — A case tried by an inferior court without jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be
dismissed on appeal by the Court of First Instance. But instead of dismissing the case, the Court of First Instance in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may try the case on the merits if the parties therein file their pleadings and go
to the trial without any objection to such jurisdiction.

Pursuant to the above rule, therefore, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan could have tried the case on the merits
only had the parties therein filed their pleadings and gone "to the trial without any objection to such jurisdiction." That
was however, a condition which could have not been met for the reason that a party thereto has precisely "objected
to such jurisdiction.".

Secondly, the nullity of the various instruments under which the defendant (herein appellant) bases his right of
possession was the sole and very bone of contention in Civil Case No. Q-1564 of the Quezon City Court of First
Instance (now Court of Appeals). If the Court of First Instance of Bulacan were to make its own findings on that issue,
and, thereafter the Supreme Court laid down a contrary ruling, then the proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan would only have been rendered naught since, naturally, the Court of Appeals' decision must prevail.

One other observation may be pertinent. There is no privity of contract between the appellants and the defendant-
appellee. The unlawful case was filed by the herein appellants ostensibly as an assertion of their right under the
contract of lease with Federico Suntay dated September 28, 1955. If, indeed, appellants trace their right to the
possession of the fishpond to that lease contract, then We hold that the course of action taken by them was
inadequate and essentially erroneous. Under the premises, We believe that they should have claimed their right
under the said contract against the lessor, Federico Suntay, and not against the incumbent possessors who
themselves had some colorable right to the disputed realty.

Under Article 1654 of the Civil Code, the lessor is obliged:

1. To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended;

2. To make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it
has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;

3. To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract.

Under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code appellant's failure to take possession of the leased fishpond pond
on account of the presence of persons unwilling to vacate the premises because of some previous act or transaction
of the lessor, is a breach of the obligations of the lessor "to deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such
a condition as to render it fit for the use intended" as well as of his obligation "to maintain the lessee in the peaceful
and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract." Consequently, appellants should have
instituted an action against the lessor, Federico Suntay, based upon the latter's failure to comply with his obligations
under the aforecited Article 1654 of the Civil Code.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in full, with costs against the
appellants in all instances.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
Footnotes

1On September 29, 1961 under G.R. No. L-12810 the Supreme Court decided that it did not have appellate
jurisdiction over the case and remanded the appeal to the Court of Appeals.

HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I, (IN SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS OF MELECIO BUENO)vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA,
ZAMBALES,

For review are the resolutions promulgated on October 28, 20031 and February 10, 2004,2 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) respectively “dismissed” the petitioners’ petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and
denied their motion for reconsideration.

At issue is the correct remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the
special civil action for certiorari brought by the defendant in an ejectment suit to assail the refusal of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) to give due course to the latter’s notice of appeal vis-à-vis the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Antecedents

The late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in Poblacion, Iba,
Zambales. On October 18, 1999, he brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba,
Province of Zambales,3claiming that in 1983, the Municipality of Iba had constructed the public market on a
substantial portion of his land without his consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba to vacate
the property had remained unheeded.

After due proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno.4 Thence, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but
the MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the
RTC in Iba, Zambales to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case was assigned to Branch 69 which
ultimately granted the petition for certiorari.5redarclaw

The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon his death, moved for the reconsideration of the judgment
granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration.6redarclaw

Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

As earlier mentioned, the CA “dismissed” the petitioners’ petition for review on October 28, 2003 for not being the
proper mode of appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction.7redarclaw

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was ultimately denied by the CA.8redarclaw

Issue
Although admitting that their petition for review under Rule 42 was inappropriate, the petitioners maintain that they
substantially complied with the requirements of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, and pray that the Court exercise
its equity jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court would not serve the demands of
substantial justice.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm.

An appeal brings up for review any error of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of the suit
and over the persons of the parties, or any error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to
nothing more than an error of judgment.9 It was, therefore, very crucial for the petitioners and their counsel to have
been cognizant of the different modes to appeal the adverse decision of the RTC in the special civil action
for certiorari brought by the Municipality of Iba. Such modes of appeal were well delineated in the Rules of Court, and
have been expressly stated in Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court since July 1, 1997,10 to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 2. Modes of appeal.—

(a) Ordinary appeal.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall
be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari.—In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (n)

Pursuant to this rule, in conjunction with Section 311 and Section 412 of Rule 41, the petitioners should have filed a
notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within the
same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. The filing of the notice of appeal within the period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary
appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely filing of the notice of
appeal. It is upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case.13 On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate
court docket fee within the reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the
non-compliance with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1,14(c), Rule
50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements was the only way by which they could have
perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.
In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition
for review before the CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties.

The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly
treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under
Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a
superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the
discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary
appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion
whether to due course to the petition for review or not.17redarclaw

The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs from that taken under
Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to immediately undertake the
transmittal of the records by verifying the correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the transmittal to
the CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal.18 This requirement of transmittal of the
records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed necessary.

As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners’ resort to the petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong. Hence, the
CA did not err in denying due course to the petition for review.

Yet, the petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for review, albeit the wrong mode, was a substantial
compliance with the proper mode of appeal.

The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have always looked at appeal as not a matter
of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners should have faithfully
complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed,
any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked only in cases of some excusable
formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases like now where a liberal application would directly
subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the petitioners did not give any good reason or cause that could warrant the relaxation of the rules in their
favor. Their bare plea for substantial justice was not enough ground to suspend the rules. Acceding to their plea
would conceal their shortcomings in procedure, and thereby belittle the lofty objectives of instituting rules of
procedure. We cannot allow that to happen, for doing so would sacrifice the smooth administration of justice
guaranteed to every litigant. We have allowed exceptions only for the most persuasive of reasons, like relieving the
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 28, 2003 and
February 10, 2004 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 78706; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT, INC. vs. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS CORPORATION; MACONDRAY AND COMPANY,
INC.; and LUIS P. LORENZO JR.,

The special civil action for certiorari and appeal are two different remedies that are mutually exclusive; they are not
alternative or successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 28, 2002 Decision and
the November 5, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 54861. The challenged Decision
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, private respondents Lapanday and Lorenzo, Jr.s Motion
for Reconsideration dated 10 February 2000 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Resolution dated 10 January 2000 is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE, thereby dismissing the Petition for Certiorari dated 10 September 1999.

The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts

The pertinent facts are undisputed. On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc. (Madrigal) filed a
Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 49. Subsequently, on
February 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against Respondents Lapanday Holdings Corporation
(Lapanday), Macondray and Company, Inc. (Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of Manila, Branch
36.

In the latter action, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture agreement with Lapanday for the
primary purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc.; (2) that it
had done so on the strength of the representations of Lorenzo, in his capacity either as chairman of the board or as
president of Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray; (3) that Macondray had thereafter been appointed -- allegedly
upon the insistence of Lapanday -- as broker, for the purpose of securing charter hire contracts from Del Monte; (4)
that pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Madrigal had purchased a vessel by obtaining a P10,000,000 bank
loan; and (5) that contrary to their representations and guarantees and despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had
allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte charter hire contracts.

On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court (RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner insolvent. On March 30, 1998 and
April 6, 1998, Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective Motions to Dismiss the case
pending before the RTC Branch 36.

On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of
action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the Insolvency Law, the trial court opined that upon the filing by Madrigal of a
Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the latter lost the right to institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that
the exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed assignee.

On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was later denied on July 26,
1999. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the
December 16, 1998 and the July 26, 1999 Orders of the trial court. On September 29, 1999, the CA issued a
Resolution requiring petitioner to explain why its Petition should not be dismissed outright, on the ground that the
questioned Orders should have been elevated by ordinary appeal.

On January 10, 2000, the appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant case was purely legal, the
Petition could be treated as one for review as an exception to the general rule that certiorari was not proper when
appeal was available. Respondents Lapanday and Lorenzo challenged this ruling through a Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 10, 2000. The CA heard the Motion for Reconsideration in oral arguments on April
7, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On February 28, 2002, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision granting Respondents Lapanday and
Lorenzos Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing Madrigals Petition for Certiorari. The CA opined that an order
granting a motion to dismiss was final and thus the proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari.

Furthermore, even if the Petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, according to the CA. The appellate court held that the issues raised by petitioner involved pure questions
of law that should be brought to the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.

Hence, this Petition.

The Issues

In its Statement of Issues, petitioner contends:

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed egregious error by ruling that the order of the lower court which granted
private respondents Motions to Dismiss are not proper subjects of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

A. Section 5, Rule 16 does not apply in the present case since the grounds for dismissal [were] petitioners purported
lack of capacity to sue and its failure to state a cause of action against private respondents, and not any of the three
(3) grounds provided under said provision, namely, res judicata, extinction of the claim, and Statute of Frauds.

B. Section 1 of Rule 41, which is the applicable provision in petitioners case, expressly proscribes the taking of an
appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration or one which dismisses an action without prejudice,
instead, the proper remedy is a special civil action under Rule 65.

C. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was correctly resorted to by petitioner from the dismissal order of the lower
court, which had clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

II

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.
A. Section 2, Rule 50 nor Section 2(c) and Section 2(c), Rule 41 find no application in the present case, since said
rule contemplates of a case where an appeal is the proper remedy, and not where the appropriate remedy is a
petition for certiorari where questions of facts and laws may be reviewed by the court a quo.

B. The court a quo erroneously concluded that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition based on
the wrong premise that an appeal from the lower courts dismissal order is the proper remedy by applying Section 2,
Rule 50 and Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

First Issue:

Remedy Against Dismissal of Complaint

The resolution of this case hinges on the proper remedy: an appeal or a petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that it
correctly questioned the trial courts Order through its Petition for Certiorari. Respondents insist that an ordinary
appeal was the proper remedy. We agree with respondents.

Appeal

Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of
appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:

Section 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be
done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au
contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as
regards the merits of the latter.

Petition for Certiorari

A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65, which reads:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to
keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when
the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.

As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:

When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction
being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of
justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of
reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the
case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it
has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not
one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over
a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over
the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is
an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or
order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a
petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-
judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).

As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are
appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorarimay be directed against an interlocutory
order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and
served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.

On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order,
or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from
the denial of the motion.

As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing
of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this
motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order.

Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy

if Appeal Is Available

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal
(including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive.[52] Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence or
error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.[53] One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be
no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[54] Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

Second Issue:

CA Jurisdiction

Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, in its Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.
The issue raised there was the trial courts alleged error in dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
Petitioner argues that it could still institute the Complaint, even if it had filed a Petition for Insolvency earlier.[55] As
petitioner was challenging the trial courts interpretation of the law -- posing a question of law -- the issue involved an
error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate
jurisdiction is not necessarily equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.[56]

The instant case falls squarely with Barangay Blue Ridge A of QC v. Court of Appeals.[57] In that case, the trial court
granted the Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. After the Motion for Reconsideration
was denied, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The appellate court denied the Petition on the ground
that the proper remedy was appeal. Holding that an error of judgment should be reviewed through an ordinary
appeal, this Court upheld the CA.

The Dismissal -- a Final Order

An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order.[58] It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are
terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the
order.[59]

Petitioner avers that Section 5 of Rule 16[60] bars the filing of an appeal when the dismissal is based on lack of
cause of action. It adds that Section 5 limits the remedy of appeal only to dismissals grounded on prior judgments or
on the statute of limitations, or to claims that have been extinguished or are unenforceable. We find this interpretation
absurd.

The provision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute res judicata. However, such dismissals are still
subject to a timely appeal. For those based on other grounds, the complaint can be refiled. Section 5, therefore,
confirms that an appeal is the remedy for the dismissal of an action.

Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41,[61] petitioner further claims that it was prohibited from filing an appeal.
Section 1(a) of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration,
because the remedy is to appeal the main decision as petitioner could have done. In fact, under Section 9, Rule 37,
the remedy against an order denying a motion for reconsideration is to appeal the judgment or final order. Section
1(h) does not apply, because the trial courts Order did not dismiss the action without prejudice.[62]

Exception to the Rule

Not Established by Petitioner

We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted certiorari despite the availability of appeal.[63] Where
the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate -- either in point of
promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of justice could result -- a writ of certiorari may still
be issued.[64]Petitioner cites some of these exceptions to justify the remedy it has undertaken with the appellate
court,[65] but these are not applicable to the present factual milieu.

Even assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous, its error did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should not have dismissed the Complaint or should have at least allowed the
substitution of the assignee in petitioners stead.[66] These alleged errors of judgment, however, do not constitute a
despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise of power. On the contrary, petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-
day period within which to file an appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the
lapsed remedy of appeal.
As previously stressed, appeal -- not certiorari -- was the correct remedy to elevate the RTCs Order granting the
Motion to Dismiss. The appeal, which would have involved a pure question of law, should have been filed with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 2 (c) of Rule 41 and Section 2 of Rule 50,[67] Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the challenged Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO BIHAG, NAMELY: ALEJANDRA BIHAG, NICOMEDES B. BIHAG, VERONICA B. ACOSTA,
SUSANA B. MINOZA, PAULINO B. BIHAG, DANILO B. BIHAG, TIMOTEO B. BIHAG JR., EDILBERTO B. BIHAG,
JOSEPHINE B. MINOZA, and MA. FEB. ARDITA,* Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF NICASIO BATHAN, NAMELY: PRIMITIV AB. BATHAN and DUMININA B. GAMALIER,** Respondents,

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The doctrine of finality of judgment dictates that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments or orders must become
final at some point in time.1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 26, 20073 and
January 14, 20084 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03019.

Factual Antecedents

On April 23, 1992, petitioners heirs of Francisco Bihag (Francisco), namely: Teofilo T. Bihag, Jorge T. Bihag, Leona
B. Velasquez, Vivencia B. Suson and Timoteo T. Bihag,5 represented by his heirs Nicomedes Bihag, Alejandra
Bihag, Veronica B. Acosta, Susana Miñoza, Paulino Bihag, Danilo Bihag, Edilberto Bihag, Timoteo Bihag, Jr.,
Josephine B. Miñoza, and Ma. Fe Bihag, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint6 for
Quieting of Title, Damages, and Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case
No. MAN-1311, against respondents spouses Nicasio7 and Primitiva (Primitiva) Bathan and their daughter, Duminina
Bathan Gamalier. Petitioners alleged that sometime in the 1960’s, respondent Primitiva approached her brother,
Francisco, to borrow money.8 But since he did not have money at that time, she instead asked him to mortgage his
unregistered land in Casili, Mandaue City, to the Rural Bank of Mandaue City so that she could get a loan.9 She
promised that she would pay the obligation to the bank and that she would return to him the documents, which were
submitted to the bank in support of the loan application.10 Francisco agreed on the condition that respondent
Primitiva would pay the real property tax of the subject land while it was mortgaged.11 When Francisco died on
December 13, 1976, petitioners found out that the mortgage had long been cancelled.12 They confronted
respondents to return the documents but to no avail.13 Petitioners later discovered that respondents took possession
of the land and were hauling materials and limestones from it to the prejudice of petitioners.14 Thus, petitioners
prayed that a TRO be issued against the latter to enjoin them from entering the land and from hauling materials
therefrom.15

On the same day, the RTC issued a TRO16 against respondents for a period of 20 days, pending the resolution of
petitioners’ application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Respondents, in their Answer,17 denied the material allegations of the Complaint and interposed the defenses of
lack of cause of action and laches. They claimed that respondent spouses already owned the land when it was
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Mandaue City in the 1960’s.18 They alleged that in 1956, Francisco borrowed money
from Primitiva using the tax declarations of the land as collateral;19 that he failed to pay the loan;20 and thus, in
1959, he verbally sold the land to respondent spouses.21 Respondents insisted that petitioners knew about the
sale,22 as evidenced by the Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs with Deed of Sale,23 which was signed by some of
the petitioners in 1984.

In response, petitioners countered that the signatures of those who signed the Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs with
Deed of Sale were obtained through fraud as they barely know how to read and were in their twilight years when they
signed the document.24

On June 2, 1992, the RTC issued an Order25 granting petitioners’ application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

Thereafter, trial ensued.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On March 20, 2006, the RTC issued a Decision26 in favor of respondents. It gave credence to their version that
Francisco sold the land to respondent Primitiva in 1959.27 In addition, the RTC ruled that petitioners are estopped
from claiming ownership over the said land by reason of laches, pointing out that respondents have been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years and that Francisco, during his lifetime, never disputed their public and
peaceful possession of the land.28 Thus, the RTC decreed:

Foregoing considered, the Court decides in favor of the [respondents].

1. the dismissal of the case;

2. Plaintiffs to surrender possession and ownership of the property under consideration to Nicasio Bathan and
Primitiva Bihag-Bathan;

3. Plaintiffs to pay moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00); Attorney’s fees of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as well as litigation expenses in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00).

SO ORDERED.29

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its August 11, 2006 Order.30

Unfazed, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2, 2006.31

On January 5, 2007, the RTC issued an Order32 denying the Notice of Appeal. The RTC declared that:
A reading of the Notice of Appeal will show that [petitioners] received a copy of the Decision on April 20, 2006 but
filed the Motion for Reconsideration on April 28, 2006 after the lapse of eight (8) days. Furthermore, [petitioners]
received a copy of the Order denying their motion on September 22, 2006 but filed the Notice of Appeal on October
2, 2006 after the lapse of ten (10) days. Thus, the Notice of Appeal was filed after the lapse of [the] fifteen (15) days
reglementary period or to be exact after the lapse of eighteen (18) days.

xxxx

[Based] on the case cited above, [petitioners] only [have] (7) seven days from the date of receipt of the Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration to file the Notice of Appeal.

Considering that the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 15th day from receipt of the Order denying Motion for
Reconsideration which is beyond the reglementary period to file the Notice of Appeal, the same is DENIED due
course.

Notify counsels.

SO ORDERED.33

Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,34 which petitioners did not oppose.

On April 24, 2007, the RTC issued an Order35 granting the Motion and on May 2, 2007, it issued a Writ of
Execution.36

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On October 10, 2007, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction37 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

On October 26, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution38 dismissing the Petition for being insufficient in form and
substance. It found that the Petition failed to indicate the material dates as required under Section 3,39 Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court; that no prior motion for reconsideration was taken; that one of the petitioners, Jorge T. Bihag, failed to
sign the verification and certification of non- forum shopping; that the verification appended to the Petition was a
photocopy; that affiants failed to indicate the date of issue of their Community Tax Certificate; and that petitioners
failed to submit the certified true copy of the RTC’s April 24, 2007 Order, granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration40 attaching a copy of the RTC’s August 24, 2007 Order and
explaining that no motion for reconsideration was filed since they never received a copy of the RTC’s January 5,
2007 Order, denying their Notice of Appeal.

Respondents opposed the Motion, contending that petitioners received a copy of the RTC’s January 5, 2007 Order
as evidenced by the Certification issued by the assistant postmaster, attesting that petitioners, through their counsel’s
receiving clerk, received a copy of the Order on January 22, 2007.41

On January 14, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution42 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners for
lack of merit.

Issue
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with Application for Preliminary Injunction with the sole issue of
"whether x x x the disapproval of the Notice of Appeal undertaken by petitioners from the judgment of the [RTC] was
in accordance with law."43

Acting on petitioners’ application for Preliminary Injunction, this Court, in its April 2, 2008 Resolution,44 issued a TRO
enjoining respondents from implementing the May 2, 2007 Writ of Execution issued by the RTC in Civil Case No.
MAN-1311.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners’ sole contention is that the RTC’s denial of their Notice of Appeal contravenes the ruling in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals,45 which grants an aggrieved party a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the denial of a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration within which to file the notice of appeal.46

Petitioners claim that their Notice of Appeal was timely filed on October 2, 2006 or within 10 days after they received
the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration on September 22, 2006.47

Respondents’ Arguments

Instead of responding to petitioners’ contention, respondents put in issue petitioners’ failure to move for a
reconsideration of the denial of their Notice of Appeal.48 Respondents assert that the absence of a motion for
reconsideration justifies the CA’s denial of the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners.49

Anent petitioners’ alleged non-receipt of the January 5, 2007 Order, respondents insist that this is belied by the
Certification issued by the assistant postmaster certifying that on January 22, 2007, the receiving clerk of the office of
petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the January 5, 2007 Order.50 Respondents further contend that even if
petitioners did not receive a copy of the said Order, they should have at least opposed the Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution filed by respondents or moved for a reconsideration of the RTC’s April 24, 2007 Order granting
respondents’ Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.51 Failing to do so, petitioners lost the right to question
the RTC’s Orders.52 Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

Our Ruling

The Petition must fail.

An aggrieved party is allowed a fresh

period of 15 days counted from receipt
of the order denying a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration
within which to file the notice of appeal
in the RTC.

In Neypes, the Supreme Court, in order to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, declared that an aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC.53
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we agree with petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was timely filed as they
had a fresh 15-day period from the time they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration within
which to file their Notice of Appeal.

The January 5, 2007 Order has attained finality.1âwphi1

But while we agree with petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was erroneously denied by the RTC, we are
nevertheless constrained to deny the instant Petition as the January 5, 2007 Order, denying petitioners’ Notice of
Appeal, has attained finality. It is a settled rule that a decision or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved
party fails to appeal or move for a reconsideration within 15 days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order
disposing of the action or proceeding.54 Once it becomes final and executory, the decision or order may no longer be
amended or modified, not even by an appellate court.55

In this case, petitioners, through their counsel, received a copy of the assailed January 5, 2007 Order, under Registry
Receipt No. E-0280, on January 22, 2007, as evidenced by the Certification of the assistant postmaster. As such,
petitioners should have filed their motion for reconsideration within 15 days, or on or before February 6, 2007, but
they did not. Instead, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 10, 2007. At this time,
the RTC’s January 5, 2007 Order denying the Notice to Appeal had long become final and executory. Petitioners’
mere denial of the receipt of the assailed Order cannot prevail over the Certification issued by the assistant
postmaster as we have consistently declared that "[t]he best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a
certification from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to how,
when and to whom the delivery and receipt was made."56

Considering that the January 5, 2007 Order has attained finality, it may no longer be modified, altered, or disturbed,
even if the modification seeks to correct an erroneous conclusion by the court that rendered it.57

In view of the foregoing, we find no error on the part of the CA in denying the Petition for Certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 26, 2007 and January 14, 2008 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03019 are hereby AFFIRMED.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on April 2, 2008 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. BELIO ICAO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

This Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
dated 27 September 2010 and the Resolution dated 11 March 2011 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113095.1In the assailed
Decision and Resolution, the CA upheld the Order of the National Labor and Relations Commission (NLRC) First
Division dismissing petitioner s appeal for allegedly failing to post an appeal bond as required by the Labor Code.
Petitioner had instead filed a motion to release the cash bond it posted in another NLRC case which had been
decided with finality in its favor with a view to applying the bond to the appealed case before the NLRC First Division.
Hence, the Court is now asked to rule whether petitioner had complied with the appeal bond requirement. If it had, its
appeal before the NLRC First Division should be reinstated.

The Facts

We quote the CA s narration of facts as follows:

The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages filed by private respondent Belio C.
Icao [Icao] against petitioners Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (LCMC) and its Chief Executive Officer [CEO]
Felipe U. Yap [Yap] before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

Private respondent essentially alleged in his complaint that he was an employee of petitioner LCMC assigned as a
lead miner in its underground mine in Paco, Mankayan, Benguet. On January 4, 2008, private respondent reported
for the 1st shift of work (11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) and was assigned at 248-8M2, 750 Level of the mining area. At their
workplace, private respondent did some barring down, installed five (5) rock bolt support, and drilled eight (8) blast
holes for the mid-shift blast. They then had their meal break. When they went back to their workplace, they again
barred down loose rocks and drilled eight (8) more blast holes for the last round of blast. While waiting for the time to
ignite their round, one of his co-workers shouted to prepare the explosives for blasting, prompting private respondent
to run to the adjacent panels and warn the other miners. Thereafter, he decided to take a bath and proceeded at [sic]
the bathing station where four (4) of his co-workers were also present. Before he could join them, he heard a voice at
his back and saw Security Guard (SG) Larry Bulwayan instructing his companion SG Dale Papsa-ao to frisk him. As
private respondent was removing his boots, SG Bulwayan forcibly pulled his skullguard from his head causing it to
fall down [sic] to the ground including its harness and his detergent soap which was inserted in the skullguard
harness. A few minutes later, private respondent saw SG Bulwayan [pick] up a wrapped object at the bathing station
and gave it to his companion. SGs Bulwayan and Papsa-ao invited the private respondent to go with them at the
investigation office to answer questions regarding the wrapped object. He was then charged with "highgrading" or the
act of concealing, possessing or unauthorized extraction of highgrade material/ore without proper authority. Private
respondent vehemently denied the charge. Consequently, he was dismissed from his work.

Private respondent claimed that his dismissal from work was without just or authorized cause since petitioners failed
to prove by ample and sufficient evidence that he stole gold bearing highgrade ores from the company premises. If
private respondent was really placing a wrapped object inside his boots, he should have been sitting or bending
down to insert the same, instead of just standing on a muckpile as alleged by petitioners. Moreover, it is beyond
imagination that a person, knowing fully well that he was being chased for allegedly placing wrapped ore inside his
boots, will transfer it to his skullguard. The tendency in such situation is to throw the object away. As such, private
respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable for illegal dismissal, to reinstate him to his former position without
loss of seniority rights and benefits, and to pay his full backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.

For their defense, petitioners averred that SG Bulwayan saw private respondent standing on a muckpile and inserting
a wrapped object inside his right rubber boot. SG Bulwayan immediately ran towards private respondent, but the
latter ran away to escape. He tried to chase private respondent but failed to capture him. Thereafter, while SG
Bulwayan was on his way to see his co-guard SG Papsa-ao, he saw private respondent moving out of a stope. He
then shouted at SG Papsa-ao to intercept him. When private respondent was apprehended, SG Bulwayan ordered
him to remove his skullguard for inspection and saw a wrapped object placed inside the helmet. SG Bulwayan
grabbed it, but the harness of the skullguard was also detached causing the object to fall on the ground. Immediately,
SG Bulwayan recovered and inspected the same which turned out to be pieces of stone ores. Private respondent
and the stone ores were later turned over to the Mankayan Philippine National Police where he was given a written
notice of the charge against him. On January 9, 2008, a hearing was held where private respondent, together with
the officers of his union as well as the apprehending guards appeared. On February 4, 2008, private respondent
received a copy of the resolution of the company informing him of his dismissal from employment due to breach of
trust and confidence and the act of highgrading.2

THE LABOR ARBITER’S RULING THAT

PETITIONER LCMC IS LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

On 30 September 2008, the labor arbiter rendered a Decision holding petitioner and its CEO liable for illegal
dismissal and ordering them to pay respondent Icao P345,879.45, representing his full backwages and separation
pay.3 The alleged highgrading attributed by LCMC’s security guards was found to have been fabricated;
consequently, there was no just cause for the dismissal of respondent. The labor arbiter concluded that the claim of
the security guards that Icao had inserted ores in his boots while in a standing position was not in accord with normal
human physiological functioning.4

The labor arbiter also noted that it was inconsistent with normal human behavior for a man, who knew that he was
being chased for allegedly placing wrapped ore inside his boots, to then transfer the ore to his skullguard, where it
could be found once he was apprehended.5 To further support the improbability of the allegation of highgrading, the
labor arbiter noted that throughout the 21 years of service of Icao to LCMC, he had never been accused of or
penalized for highgrading or any other infraction involving moral turpitude–until this alleged incident.6

THE NLRC ORDER DISMISSING THE APPEAL

OF PETITIONER LCMC FOR FAILURE TO POST THE APPEAL BOND

On 8 December 2008, petitioner and its CEO filed an Appearance with Memorandum of Appeal7 before the NLRC.
Instead of posting the required appeal bond in the form of a cash bond or a surety bond in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award of P345,879.45 adjudged in favor of Icao, they filed a Consolidated Motion For Release Of Cash
Bond And To Apply Bond Subject For Release As Payment For Appeal Bond (Consolidated Motion).8 They
requested therein that the NLRC release the cash bond of P401,610.84, which they had posted in the separate case
Dangiw Siggaao v. LCMC,9 and apply that same cash bond to their present appeal bond liability. They reasoned that
since this Court had already decided Dangiw Siggaao in their favor, and that the ruling therein had become final and
executory, the cash bond posted therein could now be released.10 They also cited financial difficulty as a reason for
resorting to this course of action and prayed that, in the interest of justice, the motion be granted.

In its Order dated 27 February 2009, the NLRC First Division dismissed the appeal of petitioner and the latter’s CEO
for non-perfection.11 It found that they had failed to post the required appeal bond equivalent to the monetary award
of P345,879.45. It explained that their Consolidated Motion for the release of the cash bond in another case (Dangiw
Siggaao), for the purpose of applying the same bond to the appealed case before it, could not be considered as
compliance with the requirement to post the required appeal bond. Consequently, it declared the labor arbiter’s
Decision to be final and executory. The pertinent portions of the assailed Order are quoted below:

The rules are clear. Appeals from decision involving a monetary award maybe [sic] perfected only upon posting of a
cash or surety-bond within the ten (10) day reglementary period for filing an appeal. Failure to file and post the
required appeal bond within the said period results in the appeal not being perfected and the appealed judgment
becomes final and executory. Thus, the Commission loses authority to entertain or act on the appeal much less
reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter (Gaudia vs. NLRC, 318 SCRA 439).

In this case, respondents failed to post the required appeal bond equivalent to the monetary award of P345,879.45.
The Consolidated Motion for Release of Cash Bond (posted as appeal bond in another case) with prayer to apply the
bond to be released as appeal bond may not be considered as compliance with the jurisdictional requirement, as the
application or posting is subject to the condition that the cash bond would be released. Besides, even if the motion for
release is approved, the ten (10) day period has long expired, rendering the statutory right to appeal forever lost.

WHEREFORE, respondents’ appeal is hereby DISMISSED for non-perfection and the questioned decision is
declared as having become final and executory. Let the Motion for Release of Cash bond be forwarded to the Third
Division, this Commission, for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner and its CEO filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They emphasized therein that they had tried to comply in
good faith with the requisite appeal bond by trying to produce a cash bond anew and also to procure a new surety
bond. However, after canvassing several bonding companies, the costs have proved to be prohibitive.13 Hence, they
resorted to using the cash bond they posted in Dangiw Siggaao because the bond was now free, unencumbered and
could rightfully be withdrawn and used by them.14 Their motion was denied in a Resolution dated 27 November
2009. Hence, they filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA.

THE CA RULING AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE NLRC

On 27 September 2010, the CA issued its assailed Decision15 affirming the Order of the NLRC First Division, which
had dismissed the appeal of petitioner and the latter’s CEO. According to the CA, they failed to comply with the
requirements of law and consequently lost the right to appeal.16

The CA explained that under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal from the labor arbiter’s Decision must be filed
within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, the posting of
a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. In
the instant case, the CA found that petitioner and its CEO did not pay the appeal fees and the required appeal bond
equivalent to P345,879.45. Instead, it filed a Consolidated Motion praying that the cash bond it had previously posted
in another labor case be released and applied to the present one. According to the CA, this arrangement is not
allowed under the rules of procedure of the NLRC.17

Furthermore, the CA said that since the payment of appeal fees and the posting of an appeal bond are indispensable
jurisdictional requirements, noncompliance with them resulted in petitioner’s failure to perfect its appeal.
Consequently, the labor arbiter’s Decision became final and executory and, hence, binding upon the appellate
court.18

Nevertheless, the CA ruled that the CEO of petitioner LCMC should be dropped as a party to this case.19No specific
act was alleged in private respondent’s pleadings to show that he had a hand in Icao’s illegal dismissal; much less,
that he acted in bad faith. In fact, the labor arbiter did not cite any factual or legal basis in its Decision that would
render the CEO liable to respondent. The rule is that in the absence of bad faith, an officer of a corporation cannot be
made personally liable for corporate liabilities.
THE ISSUE

The sole issue before the Court is whether or not petitioner complied with the appeal bond requirement under the
Labor Code and the NLRC Rules by filing a Consolidated Motion to release the cash bond it posted in another case,
which had been decided with finality in its favor, with a view to applying the same cash bond to the present case.

OUR RULING

The Petition is meritorious. The Court finds that petitioner substantially complied with the appeal bond requirement.

Before discussing its ruling, however, the Court finds it necessary to emphasize the well-entrenched doctrine that an
appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of only in the manner provided by
law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the
rules; otherwise, the privilege is lost.20

In appeals from any decision or order of the labor arbiter, the posting of an appeal bond is required under Article 223
of the Labor Code, which reads:

Article 223. APPEAL.–Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to
the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

xxx

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphasis and underlining supplied)

The 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure (NLRC Rules) incorporates this requirement in Rule VI, Section 6, which
provides:

SECTION 6. Bond.–In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form of cash
deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.
(Emphases and underlining supplied)

In Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. NLRC,21 the Court explained the mandatory nature of this requirement
as follows:

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer, is clearly limned in the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting
of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash
or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected.
(Emphases supplied)

We now turn to the main question of whether petitioner’s Consolidated Motion to release the cash bond it posted in a
previous case, for application to the present case, constitutes compliance with the appeal bond requirement. While it
is true that the procedure undertaken by petitioner is not provided under the Labor Code or in the NLRC Rules, we
answer the question in the affirmative. We reiterate our pronouncement in Araneta v. Rodas,22 where the Court said
that when the law does not clearly provide a rule or norm for the tribunal to follow in deciding a question submitted,
but leaves to the tribunal the discretion to determine the case in one way or another, the judge must decide the
question in conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of the circumstances of the case. Applying this
doctrine, we rule that petitioner substantially complied with the mandatory requirement of posting an appeal bond for
the reasons explained below.

First, there is no question that the appeal was filed within the 10-day reglementary period.23 Except for the alleged
failure to post an appeal bond, the appeal to the NLRC was therefore in order.

Second, it is also undisputed that petitioner has an unencumbered amount of money in the form of cash in the
custody of the NLRC. To reiterate, petitioner had posted a cash bond of P401,610.84 in the separate case Dangiw
Siggaao, which was earlier decided in its favor. As claimed by petitioner and confirmed by the Judgment Division of
the Judicial Records Office of this Court, the Decision of the Court in Dangiw Siggaao had become final and
executory as of 28 April 2008, or more than seven months before petitioner had to file its appeal in the present case.
This fact is shown by the Entry of Judgment on file with the aforementioned office. Hence, the cash bond in that case
ought to have been released to petitioner then.

Under the Rule VI, Section 6 of the 2005 NLRC Rules, "[a] cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective from the
date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or the award satisfied." Hence, it is
clear that a bond is encumbered and bound to a case only for as long as 1) the case has not been finally decided,
resolved or terminated; or 2) the award has not been satisfied. Therefore, once the appeal is finally decided and no
award needs to be satisfied, the bond is automatically released. Since the money is now unencumbered, the
employer who posted it should now have unrestricted access to the cash which he may now use as he pleases–as
appeal bond in another case, for instance. This is what petitioner simply did. Third, the cash bond in the amount
of P401,610.84 posted in Dangiw Siggaao is more than enough to cover the appeal bond in the amount
of P345,879.45 required in the present case.

Fourth, this ruling remains faithful to the spirit behind the appeal bond requirement which is to ensure that workers
will receive the money awarded in their favor when the employer’s appeal eventually fails.24There was no showing at
all of any attempt on the part of petitioner to evade the posting of the appeal bond. On the contrary, petitioner’s move
showed a willingness to comply with the requirement. Hence, the welfare of Icao is adequately protected.

Moreover, this Court has liberally applied the NLRC Rules and the Labor Code provisions on the posting of an appeal
bond in exceptional cases. In Your Bus Lines v. NLRC,25 the Court excused the appellant’s failure to post a bond,
because it relied on the notice of the decision. While the notice enumerated all the other requirements for perfecting
an appeal, it did not include a bond in the list. In Blancaflor v. NLRC,26the failure of the appellant therein to post a
bond was partly caused by the labor arbiter’s failure to state the exact amount of monetary award due, which would
have been the basis of the amount of the bond to be posted. In Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association v.
NLRC27 petitioner-appellant was an association of Negritos performing trash-sorting services in the American naval
base in Subic Bay. The plea of the association that its appeal be given due course despite its non-posting of a bond,
on account of

its insolvency and poverty, was granted by this Court. In UERM-Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC28 we allowed the
appellant-employer to post a property bond in lieu of a cash or surety bond. The assailed judgment involved more
than P17 million; thus, its execution could adversely affect the economic survival of the employer, which was a
medical center.

If n the above-cited cases, the Court found exceptional circumstances that warranted an extraordinary exercise of its
power to exempt a party from the rules on appeal bond, there is all the more reason in the present case to find that
petitioner substantially complied with the requirement. We emphasize that in this case we are not even exempting
petitioner from the rule, as in fact we are enforcing compliance with the posting of an appeal bond. We are simply
liberally applying the rules on what constitutes compliance with the requirement, given the special circumstances
surrounding the case as explained above.

Having complied with the appeal bond requirement, petitioner s appeal before the NLRC must therefore be
reinstated.

Finally, a word of caution. Lest litigants be misled into thinking that they may now wantonly disregard the rules on
appeal bond in labor cases, we reiterate the mandatory nature of the requirement. The Court will liberally apply the
rules only in very highly exceptional cases such as this, in keeping with the dictates of justice, reason and equity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Rule 45 Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
27 September 2010 and its Resolution dated March 2011 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113095, which dismisse4 petitioner s
Rule 65 Petition, are hereby REVERSED. Finally, the National Labor Relations Commission Resolutions dated 27
February 2009 and 27 November 2009 are SET ASIDE and the appeal of petitioner before it is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164255 September 7, 2011

SPOUSES ELBE LEBIN and ERLINDA LEBIN, Petitioners,

vs.
VILMA S. MIRASOL, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO, BRANCH XXVII, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.

The Case

In Special Proceedings No. 1307 involving the settlement of the estate of the late L.J. Hodges, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 27, in Iloilo City, issued an order dated May 3, 1995 (ruling that a property of the estate sold to
the petitioners be divided in two equal portions between the petitioners and the respondent).1 On March 2, 1998, the
RTC affirmed the order dated May 3, 1995.2 The petitioners filed a notice of appeal and, later on, a record on appeal,
but the respondents moved to dismiss their appeal on June 15, 2000 on the ground of tardiness of the record on
appeal. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002. On March 13, 2002, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the dismissal,3 but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2004.4Thus, on
June 23, 2004, the petitioners directly appealed to the Court, assailing the orders of February 1, 2002 and May 21,
2004.
Antecedents

In January 1985, the petitioners relayed their offer to the administrator of the Estate of L.J. Hodges to purchase for
₱22,560.00 Lot 18, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 18), an asset of the Estate situated on D.B. Ledesma Interior, Jaro, Iloilo City.
They made a deposit of ₱4,512.00, the equivalent of 20% of the offer.5 On August 1, 1985, the administrator sought
judicial approval of the offer,6 stating to the RTC that petitioner Erlinda Lebin was the actual occupant of Lot 18.7 The
RTC commissioned one Atty. Tabares to conduct an ocular inspection of Lot 18 to ascertain if Erlinda Lebin was
really the occupant. In his report, Atty. Tabares confirmed that Erlinda Lebin was the only occupant of Lot
18.8Accordingly, on August 28, 1985, the RTC granted the administrator’s motion for approval of the offer.9

In the meanwhile, respondent Vilma S. Mirasol (Mirasol) also offered to purchase the lot containing an area of 188
square meters where her house stood. The lot was initially identified as Lot No. 4, Block 7 of 971 (Lot 4), but a later
survey revealed that her house was actually standing on Lot 18, not Lot 4.10 Learning on November 11, 1985 of the
approval of the petitioners’ offer to purchase Lot 18, therefore, Mirasol filed on December 6, 1985 a petition for relief
from the order dated August 28, 1985.11

On December 17, 1987, pending resolution of the petition for relief, the petitioners paid the last installment for Lot 18,
and moved for the execution of the deed of sale.12 Apparently, the motion was not acted upon by the RTC.

At last, on May 3, 1995, the RTC resolved the petition for relief, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Court, under the auspices of equity and justice tempered with humanitarian reasons, hereby
declare each of the offeror-claimants after complying with their respective obligation with the estate, should there be
any, to be the owner where their respective houses stand, and therefore, DIRECTS and ENJOINS for the following
matters to be undertaken:

For the Administrator of the L.J. Hodges Estate:

1) To assist both offeror-claimants in effecting a Relocation Survey Plan and cause the equal partition of the subject
lot herein between the said offeror-claimant;

2) To execute the corresponding deed of sale over the aforecited subject lot in favor of the herein offeror-claimants ---
Erlinda Lebin and Vilma S. Mirasol purposely to expedite the issuance of respective title; and ---

3) To exact payment from either or both offeror-claimants should there be any deficiency, and/or to refund payment
should there be any excess payment from either or both offeror-claimants.

SO ORDERED.13

On May 23, 1995, the petitioners moved for reconsideration and/or new trial.14 On March 2, 1998, the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the petitioners.15 Thus, on March 27, 1998, the petitioners filed a
notice of appeal in the RTC.16 Allegedly, on May 5, 1998, they also filed a record on appeal.17 On January 25, 1999,
they presented an ex parte motion to approve the record on appeal.18 On June 15, 2000, Mirasol filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, insisting that the record on appeal had been filed late.19 The RTC granted the motion to dismiss
the appeal on February 1, 2002.20 The petitioners moved for reconsideration on March 13, 2002,21 but the RTC
denied their motion for reconsideration on May 21, 2004.22
Hence, the petitioners appealed via petition for review on certiorari filed on June 23, 2004, to seek the review and
reversal of the orders of the RTC dated February 1, 2002 and May 21, 2004.

Issues

1. Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for their failure to timely file a record on appeal;
and

2. Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in adjudging that Lot 18 be sold to both the petitioners and
Mirasol in equal portions.

Ruling

The petition for review lacks merit.

RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal

for their failure to timely file a record on appeal

Among the innovations introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 12923 is the elimination of the record on appeal in most
cases, retaining the record on appeal only for appeals in special proceedings and in other cases in which the Rules
of Court allows multiple appeals. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 has incorporated this innovation, to wit:

Section 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight
(48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all
the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. (emphasis supplied)

In early 1990, the Supreme Court issued its resolution in Murillo v. Consul24 to clarify and fortify a judicial policy
against misdirected or erroneous appeals, stating:

At present then, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, there
is no way by which judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court except by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 as amended. The proposition is clearly stated in the Interim Rules: "Appeals to the Supreme Court shall be
taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, it is not possible to take an appeal by certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Appeals to that Court
from the Regional Trial Courts are perfected in two (2) ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. They are:
a) by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; and

b) by petition for review - where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of the judgment, and as
already stated, shall point out the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by merely filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from
notice of the judgment, except in special proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the
period of appeal is 30 days and a record on appeal is necessary.

There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in civil cases to the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. The present procedures for appealing to either court – and, it may be added, the process of ventilation of
the appeal – are distinct from each other. To repeat, appeals to this court cannot now be made by petition for review
or by notice of appeals (and, in certain instances, by record on appeal), but only by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. As was stressed by this Court as early as 1980, in Buenbrazo v. Marave, 101 SCRA 848, all "the
members of the bench and bar" are charged with knowledge, not only that "since the enactment of Republic Act No.
8031 in 1969," the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance in a case exclusively cognizable by the inferior
court xxx cannot be made in an ordinary appeal or by record on appeal," but also that appeal by record on appeal to
the Supreme Court under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court was abolished by Republic Act No. 5440 which, as already
stated, took effect on September 9, 1968. Similarly, in Santos, Jr., v. C.A., 152 SCRA 378, this Court declared that
"Republic Act No. 5440 had long superseded Rule 41 and Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court on direct
appeals from the court of first instance to the Supreme Court in civil and criminal cases, x x and that "direct appeals
to this Court from the trial court on questions of law had to be through the filing of a petition for review on certiorari,
wherein this Court could either give due course to the proposed appeal or deny it outright to prevent the clogging of
its docket with unmeritorious and dilatory appeals."

In fine, if an appeal is essayed to either court by the wrong procedure, the only course of action open is to dismiss
the appeal. In other words, if an appeal is attempted from a judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal,
that appeal can and should never go to this Court, regardless of any statement in the notice that the court of choice is
the Supreme Court; and more than once has this Court admonished a Trial Judge and/or his Clerk of Court, as well
as the attorney taking the appeal, for causing the records to be sent up to this Court in such a case. Again, if an
appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the
appellant raises naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. And finally, it may
be stressed once more, it is only through petitions for review on certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court may properly be invoked.

There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to the other, much less
for tolerating continued ignorance of the law on appeals. It thus behooves every attorney seeking review and reversal
of a judgment or order promulgated against his client, to determine clearly the errors he believes may be ascribed to
the judgment or order, whether of fact or of law; then to ascertain which court properly has appellate jurisdiction; and
finally, to observe scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with keen awareness that any error or
imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client's cause.25 (emphasis supplied)
An offshoot of Murillo v. Consul is the inclusion in the 1997 revision of the rules of civil procedure, effective July 1,
1997, of a provision that forthrightly delineated the modes of appealing an adverse judgment or final order. The
provision is Section 2 of Rule 41, viz:

Section 2. Modes of appeal.—

(a) Ordinary appeal.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall
be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari.— In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (n) (emphasis supplied)

The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but merely
statutory, and the implication of its statutory character is that the party who intends to appeal must always comply
with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else the right of appeal may be lost or squandered.

As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final order in special proceedings is appealed by record on
appeal. A judgment or final order determining and terminating a particular part is usually appealable, because it
completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless otherwise declared by the Rules of Court.26 The
ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice of appeal is the multi-part nature of nearly
all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally determined and terminated independently of the
other parts. An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the original records to the
appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In
contrast, the record on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case because the original
records remain with the trial court even as it affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide the
appealed matter.

Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court underscores the multi-part nature of special proceedings by enumerating
the particular judgments and final orders already subject of appeal by any interested party despite other parts of the
proceedings being still untried or unresolved, to wit:

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such
person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented
on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of
a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no
appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing,
unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

The petitioners’ appeal comes under item (e) of Section 1, supra, due to the final order of May 3, 1995 issued in the
settlement of the estate of L.J. Hodges being "a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing." In order to elevate a part of the records sufficient for appellate review without the RTC being deprived of
the original records, the remedy was to file a record on appeal to be approved by the RTC.

The elimination of the record on appeal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 made feasible the shortening of the period
of appeal from the original 30 days to only 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order. Section 3,27 Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, retains the original 30 days as the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal to take
into consideration the need for the trial court to approve the record on appeal. Within that 30-day period a party
aggrieved by a judgment or final order issued in special proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal and a record on appeal
upon the adverse party within the period;28 in addition, the appealing party shall pay within the period for taking an
appeal to the clerk of the court that rendered the appealed judgment or final order the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees.29 A violation of these requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by
record on appeal,30 or the non-payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees to the
clerk of the trial court31 may be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.

Did the petitioners comply with the requirements for perfecting their appeal?

The petitioners received the assailed May 3, 1995 order of the RTC on May 15, 1995. They filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial on May 24, 1995. On March 23, 1998, they were served with the order dated March
2, 1998 (denying their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial). Although they filed a notice of appeal on March
27, 1998, they submitted the record on appeal only on May 5, 1998. Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal 43
days from March 23, 1998, the date they received the denial of their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. They
should have filed the record on appeal within 30 days from their notice of the judgment. Their appeal was not
perfected, therefore, because their filing of the record on appeal happened beyond the end of their period for the
perfection of their appeal.

The petitioners’ filing of the motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the order of May 3, 1995 interrupted the running of
the period of 30 days; hence, their period to appeal started to run from May 15, 1995, the date they received the
order of May 3, 1995. They filed their motion for reconsideration on May 24, 1995. By then, nine days out of their 30-
day period to appeal already elapsed. They received a copy of the order dated March 2, 1998 on March 23, 1998.
Thus, the period to appeal resumed from March 23, 1998 and ended 21 days later, or on April 13, 1998. Yet, they
filed their record on appeal only on May 5, 1998, or 22 days beyond the end of their reglementary period. Although,
by that time, the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure had meanwhile taken effect (July 1, 1997), their period of appeal
remained 30 days. It is stressed that under the 1997 revisions, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
interrupted the running of the period of appeal, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
viz:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension
of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) (emphasis supplied)

Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court empowers the RTC as the trial court, motu proprio or on motion, to dismiss
the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.32 For that reason, the RTC rightly granted Mirasol’s motion to dismiss the record on appeal.

Nonetheless, the petitioners propose to be excused from the requirement of filing a record on appeal, arguing that
"(t)o require a (r)ecord on (a)ppeal here is to reproduce the more than eighteen (18) volumes of records here which is
quite impossible to do" and that "most of these records, (sic) have nothing to do with the present controversy."33Also,
they state that their counsel was "of the honest belief and impression" that "the same was not really necessary
because the nature of the controversy xxx is civil and not an intestate one."34

The petitioners’ submissions are frail and facetious.

In order to come up with the record on appeal, the petitioners were not expected to reproduce over 18 volumes of the
records, for their record on appeal would have included only the records of the trial court which the appellate court
would be asked to pass upon.35 Section 6, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which meanwhile became
applicable to them, specified what the record on appeal should contain, thusly:

Section 6. Record on appeal; form and contents thereof. - The full names of all the parties to the proceedings shall be
stated in the caption of the record on appeal and it shall include the judgment or final order from which the appeal is
taken and, in chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions, motions and all interlocutory orders as are
related to the appealed judgment or final order for the proper understanding of the issue involved, together with such
data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. If an issue of fact is to be raised on appeal, the record on
appeal shall include by reference all the evidence, testimonial and documentary, taken upon the issue involved. The
reference shall specify the documentary evidence by the exhibit numbers or letters by which it was identified when
admitted or offered at the hearing, and the testimonial evidence by the names of the corresponding witnesses. If the
whole testimonial and documentary evidence in the case is to be included, a statement to that effect will be sufficient
without mentioning the names of the witnesses or the numbers or letters of exhibits. Every record on appeal
exceeding twenty (20) pages must contain a subject index. (6a)

The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, and should be exercised only in the manner prescribed by
law.36The statutory nature of the right to appeal requires the one who avails himself of it to strictly comply with the
statutes or rules that are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge
of judicial business. In the absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their relaxation, like when the
loftier demands of substantial justice and equity require the relaxation,37 or when there are other special and
meritorious circumstances and issues,38 such statutes or rules should remain inviolable.39
In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period laid down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional,
because the failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court causes the judgment or
final order to become final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment or
final order.40 The failure of the petitioners and their counsel to file their record on appeal on time rendered the orders
of the RTC final and unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court lost the jurisdiction to review the challenged orders,
and the petitioners were precluded from assailing the orders.

II

RTC committed no reversible error in allocating

Lot 18 in equal portions to both petitioners and respondent

The non-perfection of the appeal by the petitioners notwithstanding, the Court declares that the RTC did not err in
allocating the parcel of land equally to the parties if only to serve and enforce a standing policy in the settlement of
the large estate of the late L.J. Hodges to prefer actual occupants in the disposition of estate assets. The policy was
entirely within the power of the RTC to adopt and enforce as the probate court.

As stated in the administrator’s motion for approval of the offer, the approval of the offer to purchase would be
conditioned upon whether the petitioners were the only actual occupants. The condition was designed to avoid the
dislocation of actual occupants, and was the reason why the RTC dispatched Atty. Tabares to determine who
actually occupied the property before approving the motion. It turned out that the report of Atty. Tabares about the
petitioners being the only occupants was mistaken, because the house of Mirasol, who had meanwhile also offered
to purchase the portion where her house stood, happened to be within the same lot subject of the petitioners’ offer to
purchase. The confusion arose from the misdescription of Mirasol’s portion as Lot 4, instead of Lot 18.411âwphi1

Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize the sale, mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the
estate.1avvphi1 The approval of the sale in question, and the modification of the disposition of property of the Estate
of L.J. Hodges were made pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 89, to wit:

Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons; Disposal of proceeds. - When
it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees,
legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or administrator and on
written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the executor
or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses
of administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such
sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions. [emphasis
supplied]

Without doubt, the disposal of estate property required judicial approval before it could be executed.42 Implicit in the
requirement for judicial approval was that the probate court could rescind or nullify the disposition of a property under
administration that was effected without its authority.43 This power included the authority to nullify or modify its
approval of the sale of the property of the estate to conform to the law or to the standing policies set and fixed for the
purpose, where the invalidation or modification derived from the falsity of the factual basis of the disposition, or from
any other factual mistake, or from the concealment of a material fact by a party. Consequently, the probate court’s
modification of its approval of the petitioners’ offer to purchase was well within the power of the RTC to nullify or
modify after it was found to be contrary to the condition for the approval. Thereby, the RTC’s ruling, being sound and
judicious, constituted neither abuse of discretion nor excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review, and AFFIRM the final orders dated May 3, 1995 and March 2, 1998.

The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the August 29,
2007 Decision2 (CA Decision) and July 7, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 96111.
The CA Decision reversed the May 29, 2006 Decision4 of Branch 68, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City and
reinstated the January 19, 2004 Decision5 of Branch 69, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City. The MeTC
ordered petitioners to: (a) vacate the lot owned by respondent-spouses; and (b) pay the monthly back rentals from
the month of default until the leased premises are vacated.6chanrobleslaw

The Facts

Respondent Mena Ravanes (Mena), married to Roberto Ravanes (Roberto) (collectively, the respondent-spouses), is
the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57414 located in Caniogan, Pasig
City.7 On about thirty-five (35) square meters of the property stands the two-storey residential house of
petitioners.8 Petitioners' father, Gamaliel Albano, purchased the house in 1986 from a certain Mary Ong
Dee.9 Petitioners leased the property from Mena with the agreement that they will vacate it, regardless of their rental
payments, when the latter and her family would need to use it.10chanrobleslaw

In March 2000, respondent-spouses informed petitioners that their daughter, Rowena, is getting married and would
need the property to build her house.11 However, petitioners refused to vacate the property. Thus, respondent-
spouses filed a complaint in the Office of the Barangay Captain of Caniogan against petitioners.12 Having failed to
reach an amicable settlement, however, the Barangay issued a certificate to Hie action on June 22,
2000.13chanrobleslaw

On September 14, 2000, respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment14 against petitioners in the MeTC of
Pasig City. Respondent-spouses cited Section 5 (c) of Batas Pambama Blg. 877 (BP 877)15 as a ground for
ejectment:

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Section 5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. - Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:

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xxx

(c) Legitimate need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for the use of any immediate
member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or immediate member not being the owner of any other
available residential unit within the same city or municipality: Provided, however, That the lease for a definite period
has expired: Provided, further, Thai the lessor has given the lessee formal notice three (3) months in advance of the
lessor's intention to repossess the properly: and Provided, finally. That the owner/lessor is prohibited from leasing the
residential unit or allowing its use by a third party for at least one year.

xxx

Respondent-spouses stated that their daughter needs the property to build her conjugal home.16 They pleaded that
they do not own any other available residential units within Pasig City or anywhere else. They also stated that the
lease between them and petitioners had already lapsed as of December 31, 1999. Respondent-spouses claimed
they notified petitioners of their intent to repossess the property at least three (3) months in advance. They prayed for
the MeTC to order petitioners to vacate the property and remove the improvements in it. They also sought payment
of petitioners' rent for July 2000 and attorney's fees.17chanrobleslaw

In their Answer dated October 4, 2000,18 petitioners countered that respondent-spouses and their predecessors-in-
interest assured them that they can stay in the property for as long as they are paying the agreed monthly
rentals.19 Petitioners claimed that their harmonious relationship with respondent-spouses changed in February 2000
when the latter suddenly refused to accept the rental payments for January to June 2000.20 They belied the claim
that respondent-spouses do not own other lots in Pasig City, asserting that respondent-spouses have other suitable
residential houses and apartment units in Pasig City as evidenced by photocopies of land titles attached to their
Answer.21 Consequently, petitioners argued that the Complaint should be dismissed because respondent-spouses
do not need the property for their personal use.22chanrobleslaw

Further, petitioners alleged respondent-spouses handed them the notice to vacate only on June 15, 2000. The notice
demanded petitioners to vacate the premises on or before July 13, 2000. Thus, they were given only a 28-day notice,
which was short of the 3-month notice requirement under BP 877.23chanrobleslaw

By way of counterclaim, petitioners prayed that respondent-spouses be ordered to pay moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.24 Petitioners also asked that, in the event the MeTC ruled in favor of respondent-
spouses, they be ordered to reimburse petitioners the amount the latter incurred for the repair of their
house.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

In their Position Paper dated December 26, 2000,26 respondent-spouses admitted ownership of several properties in
Pasig City, but insisted that these properties were not available for their daughter because they were on
lease.27 Respondent-spouses explained that they chose to eject petitioners rather than their other lessees because
petitioners are delinquent in their rental payments.28 Respondent-spouses also alleged that they complied with the
3-month notice requirement because they waited for 91 days—from June 15, the date when petitioners received the
notice to vacate, until September 14, 2000—to file the case for ejectment.29chanrobleslaw

In their Position Paper dated January 2, 2001,30 petitioners reiterated that respondent-spouses have no legal ground
to eject them on the basis of an alleged legitimate need for personal use of the property because respondent-
spouses own other available lots in Pasig City, and because the 3-month notice requirement was not complied with.

Both parties raised the issue of whether petitioners can be legally ejected from the property under Section 5 (c) of BP
877.
The Ruling of the MeTC

In its Decision dated January 19, 2004,31 the MeTC found for respondent-spouses. The dispositive portion of its
Decision reads:

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants | who
are hereby ordered to vacate immediately the leased premises located at No. 19-A, A. Flores St., Caniogan, Pasig
City, and to pay plaintiffs the monthly [back rentals] of PHP2,131.00 from the month of default until the premises are
vacated. Attorney's fees are additionally awarded in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of PHP 10,000.00 the same
being deemed just and equitable under the circumstances. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.32

The MeTC held that the lease between respondent-spouses and petitioners is one in which no period of lease has
actually been fixed. Thus, under Article 1687 of the New Civil Code, the lease is deemed to be on a month to month
basis since rentals were paid monthly. Accordingly, the lease expires every end of the month which gives
respondent-spouses a ground for judicial ejectment.33 The MeTC declared as void and against public policy the
interpretation of petitioners of their contract that they were assured of a lifetime lease for as long as they are paying
monthly rent. It also explained that respondent-spouses' ownership of other properties is immaterial because as
owners of the property, respondent-spouses have the right to repossess it after the monthly expiration of the lease
between the parties.34chanrobleslaw

The MeTC also denied petitioners' counterclaim on the ground that they do not have the right to be paid the value of
their house's improvements since they built it at their own risk. Petitioners, however, may remove the improvements if
respondent-spouses refuse to reimburse one-half of its total value.35chanrobleslaw

The Ruling of the RTC

On appeal before the RTC of Pasig City, petitioners took issue with the MeTC's judgment that respondent-spouses
can eject petitioners on the ground of expiration of the lease contract. They contended that the issue about the
expiration of the lease was neither invoked by the respondent-spouses in their Complaint nor raised as an issue in
the pleadings. Thus, the MeTC should not have departed from the sole issue defined by the parties during the
preliminary conference in the MeTC. Petitioners claimed they were denied due process because they were not given
the opportunity to meet the issue regarding the alleged expiration of lease.36chanrobleslaw
The RTC agreed with petitioner. In its Decision dated May 29, 2006,37 the RTC vacated the decision of the MeTC
and ordered the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC opined that the issue in the case is
whether respondent-spouses had satisfied the requisites for ejectment under Section 5 (c) of BP 877. It then
answered the question in the negative, thus:

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Accordingly, the assailed decision is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE on the ground of denial of due
process, and this Court is now tasked to look into the issue of whether or not the plaintiffs have met the following
requirements of Section 5, par (c) of the Rental Law as amended:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya). A legitimate need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for the
use of any immediate member of his family;
b). The need to repossess is for residential [purpose|;
c). Such owner or immediate family member does not own any other available residential unit within the city or
municipality;
d). The lease agreement should be for a definite period;
e). The period of lease has expired;
f). The lessor has given the lessee a formal notice three (3) months in advance of the lessor's intention to repossess
the property.

The assailed decision is unequivocal. It stated that "Clearly, this is a lease for which no period of lease has actually
been fixed x x x." On this score alone, this case necessarily has to fail for the lease covered under this provision of
the Rental Law should be one with a definite period, and the lease at bar as held by the lower court is not one with a
definite period. But aside from this the defendants also were able to show that the plaintiffs own other available
residential units in I'asig City, although the lower court alleged that it is of no moment. Similarly, the defendants were
also able to show that the three (3) months requirement notice was not complied with. The assailed decision kept
silent on this requirement but the very letter of demand dated June 9, 2000 of the plaintiffs required the defendants to
vacate the premises on or before July 13, 2000 or just about a month and three (3) days from the date of the
letter.38 (Emphasis in the original.)

The Ruling of the CA

Respondent-spouses appealed to the CA, reiterating that they have complied with Section 5 (c) of BP
877.39chanrobleslaw

In its Decision dated August 29, 2007, the CA set aside the Decision of the RTC and reinstated the Decision of the
MeTC.40 The CA ruled that, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the lease between respondent-spouses and
petitioners is one with a period. Citing Dula v. Maravilla and Rivera v. Florendo,42 the CA explained that a lease
agreement without a fixed period is deemed to be from month to month if the rentals are paid monthly. Thus, there is
a definite period to speak of, and as such, respondent-spouses can eject petitioners from the property on the ground
of expiration of their lease under Section 5 (f) of BP 877. The CA thus stated:

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In the instant case, it is undisputed that the rental on the lot was paid monthly. And based on the previous rulings of
the Court, it is clearly one with a definite period, which expires every month, upon proper notice to the respondents
[herein petitioners]. Thus, when petitioners [herein respondent-spouses] sent a letter of demand dated June 9, 2000
for respondents to vacate the leased premises on July 13, 2000, the lease contract is deemed to have expired as of
the end of that month. Upon the expiration of said period, the contract of lease would expire, giving rise to the
lessor's right to file an action for ejectment against respondent.

Based on the foregoing, a legal ground for ejectment would still exist against respondents which is the expiration of
the lease, under paragraph (f) of Section 5.43 (Emphasis supplied.)

The CA also held that petitioners failed to present concrete evidence that respondent-spouses have other available
properties in Pasig City. Further, the CA found that the respondent-spouses substantially met the 3-month notice
requirement since as early as March 2000, respondent-spouses notified petitioners to vacate the property because
their daughter needs it. The CA stressed that petitioners participated in a barangay hearing regarding the
matter.44chanrobleslaw

On September 19, 2007, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay the Execution of Judgment dated
August 29, 2OO7.45 They manifested that respondent Roberto entered into a lease contract with petitioner
Alexander Albano (Alexander) on September 10, 2007,46 which meant that petitioners are now in lawful occupation
of the property. The execution of the CA's Decision is no longer necessary because the judgment was mooted by a
supervening event. Petitioners averred that with the renewal of the expired lease contract, the ground for judicial
ejectment relied upon by the CA no longer exists.47chanrobleslaw

Further, petitioners claimed that the Contract of Lease operates as a novation of the previous month-to-month lease
between petitioners and respondent-spouses, and which renders inutile the allegations that were passed upon in the
trial courts below.48chanrobleslaw

Mena filed a Comment49 to petitioners' manifestation and motion. Mena assailed the validity of the lease contract
between her husband, Roberto, and Alexander. She claimed that Roberto has no personality to unilaterally enter into
a lease contract with Alexander because the property is her paraphernal property.50 She further questioned the
wisdom of the lease because the monthly rental price of P2,131.00 is the same rent existing in
1986.51chanrobleslaw

In its Resolution dated February 20, 2008,52 the CA denied petitioners' manifestation and motion. The CA held that
its Decision dated August 29, 2007 attained finality on September 19, 2007.53 It found that the lease contract did not
operate as a novation of its Decision because it was entered into without the express consent of
Mena.54chanrobleslaw

On March 7, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated February 20, 2008.55 They
contended that the Contract of Lease between Roberto and Alexander is valid and binding upon Mena considering
the conjugal nature of the property.56 The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution57 dated July 7,
2008. Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioners allege that the CA erred in reversing the RTC's Decision. They aver that under BP 877, the lessor should
prove that he or his immediate family member is not the owner of any other available residential unit within the same
city or municipality.58 They also reiterate that the execution of the lease contract between Roberto and Alexander on
September 10, 2007 is a supervening event that justifies the stay of execution of the CA Decision,59 and that Mena
cannot assert the paraphernal nature of the property for the first time in her Comment before the
CA.60chanrobleslaw

In their Comment,61 respondent-spouses argue that the CA Decision became final and executory on September 20,
2007 because petitioners neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor filed an appeal before us.62 Accordingly,
respondent-spouses plead that petitioners' right to file this petition before us had already lapsed.

The Issues

The issues before us are:

Whether the CA Decision is already final and executory;

Whether the execution of the lease contract is a supervening event that will justify the stay of execution of the CA
Decision; and

Whether the respondent-spouses complied with Section 5 (c) of BP 877.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

The CA Decision is already

Final and Executory

The facts and material dates are undisputed. On September 4, 2007, petitioners received notice of the CA Decision.
On September 19, 2007, they filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay the Execution of Judgment, which the CA
denied in its February 20, 2008 Resolution. The petitioners received a copy of this Resolution on February 22, 2008.

Thereafter, on March 7, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 20, 2008 Resolution of
the CA. The CA also denied this motion in its July 7, 2008 Resolution, a copy of which was received by the
petitioners on July 14, 2008.
Subsequently, petitioners filed before us a Motion for Additional Period to File Petition for Review,63which we
granted. They prayed that they be given additional 30 days within which to file their petition or from July 29, 2008 to
August 28, 2008. Petitioners filed the petition for review on August 28, 2008.

The above narration of material dates gives a semblance that the present petition was seasonably filed. However, the
records show that petitioners should have reckoned the 15-day period to appeal from the receipt of the denial of the
Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment, and not from their receipt of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration. Having failed to do so, petitioners' right to appeal by certiorari lapsed as early as March 9, 2008
when the assailed CA Decision became final and executory.

Petitioners' Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment is, in actuality, a motion for reconsideration of
the CA Decision. The said manifestation and motion so alleged:

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10. In light of the foregoing, respondents are constrained to bring the matter of supervening event to the attention of
this Honorable Court and likewise in the manner of a motion for reconsideration, by way of modification of the
DECISION, if the same maybe deemed proper and allowed and favorably considered, for the Honorable Court to so
hold that the execution of the judgment dated August 29, 2007 no longer necessary, as there appears NO MORE
VALID GROUND TO EJECT respondents from the leased premises or otherwise so hold that respondents arc at the
present time in lawful occupation of leased premises;64 (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, contrary to the allegation of respondent-spouses and the finding of the CA, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA Decision, albeit in the guise of a "Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of
Judgment." In fact, the relief prayed for by petitioners in this manifestation and motion is the same relief obtained
once a motion for reconsideration is filed on time. Rule 52, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that generally, a
motion for reconsideration filed on time stays the execution of the judgment sought to be reconsidered. It thus baffles
us why petitioners captioned their motion as a "Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Execution of Judgment" when
the effect sought is one and the same —to stay the execution of judgment. This carelessness only brought confusion
to respondent-spouses and the CA.

Since the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment is a motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision, petitioners' receipt of the resolution denying it triggers the running of the 15-day period within which to file
an appeal.65 Petitioners received a copy of the February 20, 2008 Resolution on February 22, 2008. Thus, counting
15 days from receipt, petitioners had only until March 8, 200866 to file a petition for review.

On March 7, 2008, however, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 20, 2008 Resolution
instead. This motion for reconsideration partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. In Tagaytay
City v. Sps. De Los Reyes,67 we ruled that a motion for reconsideration, even if it was not designated as a second
motion for reconsideration, is a disguised second motion for reconsideration if it is merely a reiteration of the
movant's earlier arguments.68 Here, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is just that—a mere rehash of the
arguments raised in their earlier Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment, which we found previously
to be their (first) motion for reconsideration.
The filing of a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under Rule 52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended69 and the prevailing 1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the CA
(IRCA).70chanrobleslaw

Being a prohibited pleading, a second motion for reconsideration does not have any legal effect and does not toll the
running of the period to appeal.71chanrobleslaw

In Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,72 we explained why the period to appeal should
not be reckoned from the denial of a second motion for reconsideration:

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To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order denying the second
motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or
resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments
shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall the
running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only
illogical but also unjust to the winning party.

The same principle is likewise applicable by analogy in the determination of the correct period to appeal. Reckoning
the period from the denial of the second motion for reconsideration will result in the same absurd situation where the
courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying a prohibited pleading in the first place.73 (Emphasis
supplied.)

An appeal is not a matter of right, but is one of sound judicial discretion. It may only be availed of in the manner
provided by the law and the rules.74 A party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy
within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do so as the decision, as to him, becomes final and
binding.75chanrobleslaw

Considering that petitioners reckoned the period to appeal on the date of notice of the denial of the second motion for
reconsideration on July 7, 2008, instead of the date of notice of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration on
February 22, 2008, the present petition filed only on August 28, 2008 is evidently filed out of time. The petition, being
173 days late, renders (lie CA Decision final and executory. Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to pass upon the
petition.

Our ruling in Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank76 is illustrative:

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In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of petitioner Alfredo in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 by
virtue of a Resolution dated 6 September 2005. Petitioner Alfredo's Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of his
petition was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 16 February 2006. Petitioner Alfredo thus had 15
days from receipt of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals within which to Hie a petition for
review. The reckoning date from which the 15-day period to appeal shall be computed is the date of receipt by
petitioner Alfredo of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, and not of its 11 April 2006
Resolution denying petitioner Alfredo's second motion for reconsideration, since the second paragraph of Sec. 5,
Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall not be allowed. And
since a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of the
period to file an appeal by certiorari. Petitioner Alfredo made a critical mistake in waiting for the Court of Appeals to
resolve his second motion for reconsideration before pursuing an appeal.

Another elementary rule of procedure is that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. For this reason, petitioner Alfredo's failure to file this petition within 15 days from
receipt of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his first Motion for Reconsideration,
rendered the same final and executory, and deprived us of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal thereof.77 (Emphasis
supplied.)

While there are instances when we relax the application of procedural rules, the present petition is not one of them.
Liberal application of the rules is an exception rather than the rule. In this case, petitioners failed to address the issue
of finality of the CA Decision when it was raised in respondent Mena's Comment to the Manifestation and Motion to
Stay Execution in the CA. Upon the denial of the manifestation and motion due to finality of the CA Decision,
petitioners again ignored the issue of finality in their Motion for Reconsideration. Up until respondent-spouses'
Comment before us, which again alleged the finality of the CA Decision, petitioners continued to be mum on the
issue. Petitioners' silence as to the timeliness of their appeal is suspect. Thus, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances and effort on the part of petitioners to justify the liberal application of the rules, we are constrained to
deny the petition.

Nevertheless, even discounting the above procedural defect, we still find the present petition unmeritorious.

The Execution of the Lease Contract

is not a Supervening Event

The assailed CA Decision was promulgated on August 29, 2007, and petitioners received notice of it on September
4, 2007.78 The CA Decision ordered petitioners to vacate the property on the ground of respondent-spouses'
legitimate need of the premises and expiration of the lease. On September 10, 2007, petitioners entered into a 10-
year lease contract with Roberto involving the property.79chanrobleslaw

Consequently, petitioners allege that the execution of the lease contract lent legitimacy to their occupation of the
property, such that the CA Decision is now mooted and should no longer be enforced because to do so would be
inequitable. Petitioners insist that the lease contract constitutes a supervening event justifying the stay of the CA
Decision.80chanrobleslaw

Petitioners' contentions are untenable. A supervening event refers to facts which transpire after judgment has
become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at
that time.81 Here, the lease contract was executed after the CA Decision was promulgated but before it attained
finality. In fact, petitioners executed the lease contract just six days after they received the adverse ruling of the CA.
To our mind, instead of a supervening event, the execution of the lease contract partakes of the nature of a
compromise. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or
put an end to one already commenced.82 It is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for the purpose of
preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree
on, and which each party prefers over the hope of gaining but balanced by the danger of losing.83 In the case before
us, petitioners claim that they executed the lease contract before notice of the CA Decision as an "amicable
settlement of the issues with reference to occupancy of the subject property."84 Thus, petitioners' intention to end the
litigation by virtue of a compromise is evident.

A compromise may be entered into at any stage of the case—pending trial, on appeal and even after finality of
judgment.85 Hence, petitioners may enter into a compromise with the respondent-spouses, even after the CA
Decision was rendered. However, the validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and
the principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into.86Unfortunately for petitioners, the compromise that they
effected is wanting of one of the essential requisites87 of a valid and binding compromise—consent of all the parties
in the case. We have consistently ruled that a compromise agreement cannot bind a party who did not voluntarily
take part in the settlement itself and gave specific individual consent.88chanrobleslaw

It is undisputed that only Roberto entered into a lease contract with petitioners. Men a. did not sign it, but on the
contrary, denounces its execution as being done in evident bad faith and without authority from her as the sole owner
of the property. Considering that Mena did not participate in the execution of the lease contract, the compromise is
not binding on her.

In addition, the compromise is also not valid even between petitioners and Roberto because the records show that
the land in question is indeed a paraphernal property of Mena. Petitioners themselves admitted in their
Answer89 and Position Paper90 before the MeTC that only Mena is the registered owner of the property. Estoppel
therefore lies against them. Petitioners cannot now argue before us that the property is a conjugal property of the
respondent-spouses, such that only Roberto's consent is necessary for the effectivity of the lease. Without an
authorization showing that Roberto is acting on behalf of Mena, he has no right and power to enter into a lease
contract involving Mena's exclusive property.

Besides, even assuming that the property is conjugally owned by respondent-spouses, this does not bestow upon
Roberto the power to enter into a lease contract without the consent of his wife. We have explained in Roxas v. Court
of Appeals,91 that consent of the wife is required for lease of a conjugal realty for a period of more than one year,
such lease being considered a conveyance and encumbrance under the provisions of the Civil
Code.92chanrobleslaw

Respondent-Spouses Complied
with Section 5 (c) of BP 877

The controversy revolves on whether respondent-spouses' satisfied the requisites of Section 5 (c) of BP 877 as a
ground for judicial ejectment. To recapitulate, the requisites are:

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(1) the owner's/lessor's legitimate need to repossess the leased property for his own personal use or for the use of
any of his immediate family;

(2) the owner/lessor does not own any other available residential unit within the same city or municipality;

(3) the lease for a definite period has expired;

(4) there was formal notice at least three (3) months prior to the intended date to repossess the property; and

(5) the owner must not lease or allow the use of the property to a third party for at least one year.93 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The second, third and fourth requisites are the ones contested in this case. The RTC found that respondent-spouses
have other residential units within Pasig City. It also adjudged that the verbal lease between the parties does not
have a period and the 3-month notice requirement was not complied with.

We disagree with the RTC and affirm the CA.

First, while it is admitted by respondent-spouses that they have other residential units in Pasig City, they were not
available because they were occupied by tenants who pay their rentals promptly.94 The keyword in the second
requisite of Section 5 (c) is the word "available." The right of respondent-spouses to eject petitioners cannot be
negated by the fact alone that the former have other residential units in Pasig City. The said properties must be
"available." Our ruling in Roxas v. Intermediate Appellate Court95is enlightening, thus:

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It is important to stress that even assuming any of petitioners own other residential units, what the law requires is that
the same is an available residential unit, for the use of such owner/lessor or the immediate member of his
family. Thus even if an owner/lessor owns another residential unit, if the same is not available as for example the
same is occupied or it is not suitable for dwelling purposes, it is no obstacle to the ejectment of a tenant on the
ground that the premises is needed for use of the owner or immediate member of his family.96 (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent-spouses did not choose to eject petitioners arbitrarily and unreasonably. They asserted that among their
tenants, petitioners are delinquent in their rental payments. We cannot fault respondent-spouses in choosing their
other tenants, who are in good standing, over petitioners.

Second, the lease between respondent-spouses and petitioners, although merely verbal, is deemed to be one with a
definite period which expires at the end of each month. The lease is on a month-to-month basis because the rentals
are paid monthly. In this regard, we cite our ruling in Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank,97 to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The question now is, has the verbal contract of lease between petitioners and the Bank expired in order to call for the
ejectment of the latter from the premises in question? The Court rules in the affirmative.
It is admitted that no specific period for the duration of the lease was agreed upon between the parties. Nonetheless,
payment of the stipulated rents were made on a monthly basis and, as such, the period of lease is considered to be
from month to month in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Moreover, a lease from month-to-month is
considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the
lessor.98 (Citations omitted, Emphasis supplied.)

Third, respondent-spouses complied with the requirement of 3-month prior notice. Petitioners do not dispute that they
were verbally informed of respondent-spouses' need of the property as early as March 2000. In
fact, barangay conciliation meetings were held regarding the matter. Petitioners, however, insist that the reckoning
period for the 3-month notice should be counted from their receipt on June 15, 2000 of the letter to vacate.
Consequently, they argue that they were given only 28 days from June 15 to July 13, 2000 to vacate the property.

We reject petitioners' contention.

The "formal notice" requirement under BP 877 does not refer to a written notice only. In the case of Garcia v. Court of
Appeals,99 we reckoned compliance with the 3-month notice requirement from his verbal demand to vacate, viz:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [E]ven assuming arguendo that the appellate court's premise is correct, petitioner did give notice on his own
behalf. The trial court found that soon after the sale of (he properly to petitioner, or on October 10, 1979, the latter
wrote to private respondent that he vacate the premises. After this and other subsequent demands were ignored, he
again made a demand on August 7, 1982 informing private respondent that he wished to build his house on the
property. After this last demand was again ignored, he brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman who, on
September 19, 1982, sent a summons to private respondent, who, not only ignored it but in addition, refused to
accept it when served upon him. Petitioner finally filed an ejectment suit before the MTC on December 7, 1982, or
four months after his verbal demand on August 7, 1982. Thus, even disregarding the previous demands soon after
the sale, petitioner had complied with the requirement of three-month notice.100 (Emphasis supplied.)

All told, the present petition is without merit both on technical and substantive grounds.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2007
and July 7, 2008, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MUOZ VS. PEOPLE

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

By way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Merliza A. Muoz (petitioner) assails
the November 19, 2003 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) sustaining her conviction for violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22); and the March 10, 2004 CA Resolution[2] denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as stated by the trial courts.

Petitioner is the wife of Ludolfo P. Muoz Jr. (Ludolfo), owner and operator of L.P. Munoz Construction
(Muoz Construction). On August 3, 2000, Ludolfo took a loan ofP500,000.00, at 5% interest,
from Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation (Sunwest). Ludolfo issued to Sunwest a Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) check, postdated September 3, 2000, for P500,000.00.[3]

On September 3, 2000, Ludolfo sought an extension of his loan by replacing the DBP check with Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) Check No. 0000057285 forP500,000.00, drawn by
petitioner[4] and postdated December 3, 2000. Sunwest accepted the replacement check.[5]

On February 5, 2001 Sunwest deposited the RCBC check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), Legaspi City,[6] which presented it to the drawee bank RCBC, but the latter dishonored the check for
insufficiency of funds.[7] Thus, on February 8, 2001, Sunwest sent by registered mail a letter addressed to Ludolfo,
informing him of the dishonor of the RCBC check and demanding that he make good the check or pay the amount
thereof within five days from receipt of said notice.[8] The letter was received on the same day by Eden Barnedo at
the postal address L.P. Muoz, Jr. [sic] Construction, Fernando Avenue, Doa Maria Subd., Daraga, Albay.[9]

On March 14, 2001, Sunwest sent by registered mail another letter, this time addressed to petitioner, informing her of
the dishonor of the RCBC check and demanding that she pay the said check within five days from receipt of the
letter.[10] The letter was received on March 20, 2001 by Eden Barnedo at the postal address, Fernando
Avenue, DoaMaria Subd., Daraga, Albay.[11]
In her March 20, 2001 reply to Sunwest, petitioner explained that Sunwest and Muoz Construction had mutual claims
against each other: Muoz Construction had a claim againstSunwest for P10,000,000.00, including a 15% advance
payment, for two river control projects, while Sunwest had a claim against Muoz Construction for P500,000.00. Given
that the claim of Muoz Construction was bigger than that of Sunwest, petitioner treated the first claim as having
automatically offset, covered or paid the second claim as represented by the amount of the RCBC check. This
explains why petitioner did not give emphasis anymore to the RCBC check, the amount of which she considered as
having been already settled. Petitioner reminded Sunwest that it was made aware of the offsetting of the amount of
the RCBC check as early as February 15, 2001.[12]

Upon a criminal complaint[13] filed by Elizaldy S. Co, Sunwest president, an Information[14] was filed by the City
Prosecutor before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Legaspi City, charging petitioner with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner entered a plea of Not Guilty.[15]

After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision dated August 19, 2003,[16] finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and sentencing her to pay a fine ofP200,000.00; to pay Sunwest P500,000.00,
representing the amount of RCBC Check No. 0000057285, plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum
computed from April 23, 2001, the date of the filing of the information, until fully paid; and to pay the costs. [17]

On appeal by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Legaspi City, in a Decision dated October 16, 2003, affirmed
the MTCC Decision in toto.[18]

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA but the latter dismissed it outright in the November 19,
2003 Resolution assailed herein, citing the following grounds:

(a) Failure to attach or incorporate an Affidavit of Service as required under Section 13, Rule 13 in relation to Section
3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; and

(b) Failure to furnish copy of the petition and its annexes to the Office of the Solicitor General which is the counsel of
the People of the Philippines.[19]

With the denial by the CA of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner is now before the Court raising the following
issues:
Whether or not the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by
herein petitioner purely on technical grounds.

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the criminal
complaint was filed by an unauthorized representative of the private complainant corporation.

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution
failed to prove the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank on the part of the
petitioner.

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred when it held the petitioner civilly liable notwithstanding the absence of
authority of Elizaldy S. Co to file the instant case for and in behalf of the private complainant corporation.[20]

The Court finds no merit in the Petition.

Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or death, an appeal is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion. It may be availed of only in the manner provided by law and the rules.[21]

Rule 42 prescribes the following requirements for the filing with the CA of a petition for review from a decision of the
RTC:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said Court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the
amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before
the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days
only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, therefore, the timeliness of a petition depends not only on its seasonable filing but also on the prompt service
of copy thereof on the adverse party and the RTC. Thus, the petition must be accompanied by proof of service as
prescribed under Rule 13, viz:
Section 13. Proof of service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of
facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately
upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.

Failure to serve copy of the petition on the adverse party or to show proof of service thereof is a fatal defect,[22] for
which the petition can be dismissed under Section 3, Rule 42, thus:

Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof.

In the present case, petitioner failed to serve copy of her petition on the Solicitor General as counsel of the adverse
party, the People of the Philippines.[23] Hence, the CA did not commit any reversible error in dismissing her
petition.[24]

Petitioner did not even show substantial compliance with the requirement of service of pleading.[25] Although
she served copy of her Petition for Review on Assistant City Prosecutor Catalino C. Serrano, the latter was no longer
counsel of the adverse party when the case was brought to the CA, nor was he specifically deputized or designated
by the Solicitor General to represent him or receive notices for him.[26] Hence, service on the Assistant City
Prosecutor did not amount to service on the Solicitor General.[27]

However, petitioner argues that, rather than dismiss her petition, the CA should have advised her to correct the
deficiency or taken the initiative of furnishing the Solicitor General with a copy of the petition and requiring the latter
to comment on it.[28] Furthermore, petitioner appeals for liberality in the treatment of her appeal, so that it may be
decided on the merits rather than on technicality.[29]

It is true that oftentimes the Court applied the rules with flexibility in order that the merits of a case will be fully
adjudicated upon, not-withstanding its technical imperfections.[30] But what impels the Court to do so is neither a
party's empty invocations of liberality nor its mechanical correction of the imperfections.[31] Rather, only a clear
showing of prima facie merit of the petition will persuade the Court to take the extraordinary effort of setting aside its
rules to give way to the imperfect petition.[32] After all, the rationale for liberality is to bring to light the merits of the
petition, unobstructed by mere deficiencies in its form, such that if the petition has not an iota of merit in it, then there
is nothing for the Court to bring to light at all.

In the present case, while upon motion for reconsideration, petitioner supplied what were lacking in her petition for
review filed with the CA,[33] she utterly failed to convince the Court that the substantial grounds cited
therein far transcend its technical deficiencies as would justify the resolution of her petition on its merits rather than
form.

A cursory assessment of the arguments of petitioner is necessary.

First, petitioner insists that the criminal case filed against her, as well as the civil case that was deemed instituted
with it, should have been dismissed for lack of authority ofElizaldy Co to file the same on behalf of Sunwest, the
payee of the RCBC check.[34]

The issue of whether a corporate officer may bring suit on behalf of his corporation for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not
novel. In Tam Wing Tak v. Makasiar,[35] the Court affirmed the dismissal of a criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 for lack of authority of the private complainant, thus:

Second, it is not disputed in the instant case that Concord, a domestic corporation, was the payee of the bum check,
not petitioner. Therefore, it is Concord, as payee of the bounced check, which is the injured party. Since petitioner
was neither a payee nor a holder of the bad check, he had neither the personality to sue nor a cause of action
against Vic Ang Siong. Under Section 36 of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23, it is clear that where
a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. Note that petitioner
failed to show any proof that he was authorized or deputized or granted specific powers by Concord's board of
director to sue Victor And Siong for and on behalf of the firm. Clearly, petitioner as a minority stockholder and
member of the board of directors had no such power or authority to sue on Concord's behalf. x x x[36] (Emphasis
supplied)

We applied the same rule just recently to Ilusorio v. Ilusorio,[37] which involved a criminal complaint for robbery and
qualified trespass.

However, it bears emphasis that in both cases, the deficiency in the complaint was challenged by the accused at the
preliminary investigation stage, or before he entered a plea upon arraignment. On the contrary, in the present case,
petitioner questioned the authority of Elizaldy Co after arraignment and completion of the prosecution's presentation
of evidence. Thus, she is barred from raising such objection under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to
quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on
the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

The deficiency in the complaint/information arising from the lack of authority of Elizaldy Co was not jurisdictional. It
did not detract from the unquestioned authority of the Assistant City Prosecutor to file the Information, nor impair the
jurisdiction of the MTCC to act on the same.[38]

Second, petitioner harps on the purported lack of notice to her of the dishonor of the RCBC check. This contention
flies in the face of documentary evidence consisting of the March 20, 2001 letter of petitioner to Sunwest where she
expressly acknowledged receiving the March 14, 2001 notice of dishonor of the RCBC check.[39]

In fine, for deficiency in form and for lack of showing that her appeal to the CA was meritorious, the petition for review
of petitioner was correctly dismissed by the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC., BALIWAG NAVIGATION, INC., FIM LIMITED OF THE MARDEN GROUP (HK), and
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Did the respondent Court act correctly when it set aside its own Resolution dismissing a petition for review
on certiorari which, according to the petitioners, had been filed out of time by the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue? Should the technical rules on reglementary periods for appeal be applied stringently as to deprive
the Government of appeal from an adverse ruling on its cause of action involving a substantial tax refund?
These questions are addressed by the Court in resolving the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65, seeking to annul the following Resolutions issued by the respondent Court of Appeals,[1] in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
29994 entitled "Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Magsaysay Lines, Inc., et al.", to wit:

1) Resolution[2] dated February 3, 1993 which ruled that:

As prayed for, petitioner is hereby granted an extension of thirty (30) days from January 7, 1993 or until February 6,
1993 within which to file the petition for review on certiorari in the above entitled case with a WARNING that no
further extension shall be entertained.

2) Resolution[3] dated July 27, 1993 which reads as follows:

Before Us is a motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the petitioner (respondent Commissioner herein) from
Our resolution dated May 3, 1993 dismissing the petition for review for failure to file the petition within the extension
granted.

After a careful study of the grounds relied upon by the petitioner in support of the motion vis-a-vis the opposition, We
find cogent reason to grant the same, hence, Our resolution dated May 3, 1993 is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE in
the interest of substantial justice.

Accordingly, private respondents are hereby directed to file its (sic) comment on the petition for review within ten (10)
days from notice hereof.

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioners filed on April 10, 1989 an Appeal and Petition for Refund before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), followed
by a Supplemental Petition for Review on July 14, 1989, praying for the reversal of VAT Ruling Nos. 395-88, 568-88
and 007-89 and the refund of P15,120,000.00, representing erroneously paid 10% value-added tax on the sale
through public bidding of five (5) vessels by the NDC to the group of investors composed of Magsaysay Lines, Inc.,
Baliwag Navigation and FIM Limited. The case was docketed as CTA No. 4354 and captioned Magsaysay Lines,
Inc., et al. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

On April 27, 1992, the CTA rendered a decision ordering respondent Commissioner to refund in favor of petitioners
Magsaysay Lines, Inc., Baliwag Navigation, Inc., and FIM Limited of the Marden Group (HK) for and in behalf of the
National Development Corporation the VAT paid amounting to P15,120,000.00 under Confirmation of Receipt No. B
16374703 dated March 16, 1989.

Respondent Commissioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CTA in a resolution dated December 9,
1992, copy of which was received by respondent Commissioner on January 6, 1993.

Immediately upon receipt of said resolution, respondent Commissioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed on the same day, January 6, 1993, a motion before respondent appellate court praying for an extension
of thirty (30) days from January 7, 1993 or until February 6, 1993 within which to file the petition for review on
certiorari.[4]

However, on February 5, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General filed on behalf of respondent Commissioner
a second motion requesting another extension of thirty (30) days from February 6, 1993 or until March 8, 1993, within
which to file a petition for review. As shown by the stamped proof of receipt on the face of the motion, it was received
by the respondent appellate court on February 5, 1993.[5]

Only after it had filed the second motion did the OSG receive, on February 11, 1993, the first assailed resolution
issued by respondent appellate court, dated February 3, 1993, which granted respondent commissioners first motion
for extension with a warning that no further extensions shall be entertained.

Thus, in its Manifestation and Motion dated February 16, 1993, respondent Commissioner thru the OSG prayed that
the second motion for extension dated February 5, 1993 be granted in view of the following considerations:

Considering that said resolution was received by the OSG after the requested period of the first motion for extension
had lapsed, the OSG is now left with no recourse but to seek the kind indulgence of this Honorable Court to grant
petitioners second motion for extension.

On March 8, 1993, or within the period prayed for by respondent Commissioner in its second motion for extension,
the petition for review (dated March 5, 1993) was filed through registered mail.

In its Resolution[6] of May 3, 1993, respondent appellate court dismissed the petition for review on the ground that

Considering Our resolution dated February 3, 1993 WARNING petitioner that no further extension shall be
entertained, the motion for extension of time dated February 5, 1993 is hereby DENIED, hence, the petition for
review filed on March 8, 1993 is hereby DENIED ADMISSION.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

However, respondent Commissioners motion for reconsideration of the above ruling was granted by the appellate
court in its Resolution dated July 27, 1993 the second of the herein assailed Resolutions which set aside the said
dismissal and directed the private respondents (petitioners herein) to comment on the reinstated petition.

The Issue

Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition alleging this reversible error:[7]

The questioned resolutions of the Respondent Court of Appeals x x x are erroneous as a matter of law, having been
rendered without jurisdiction and contrary to the applicable rules and doctrines firmly established x x x in a long line
of decisions.

The Courts Ruling

The thrust of the instant petition is that, since the mere filing by respondent Commissioner of the first motion for
extension of time, and the pendency thereof, did not suspend the tolling of the reglementary period to appeal; and
since that period elapsed on January 7, 1993 without any such appeal having been filed, and without respondent
Commissioners first motion for extension having been granted by the appellate Court prior to the expiration of said
reglementary period, therefore the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated April 27, 1992, had become final,
conclusive and unappealable, and thus, the appellate court had been divested of all authority and jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case or to act on the appeal.[8]
Petitioners position is devoid of merit, and must perforce fail. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the petition for
review pending before the respondent Court had been filed in accordance with this Courts Circular No. 1-91, dated
February 27, 1991, which prescribed the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies. Paragraph 4 of said Circular provides:

4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the ruling, award, order,
decision, or judgment or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity. One (1)
motion for reconsideration of said ruling, award, order, decision, or judgment may be allowed. If the motion is denied,
the movant may appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckoned from notice of the resolution of denial.
(italics supplied)

Pursuant to the aforequoted Circular, where an aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse
decision of the CTA, he has only the balance of the reglementary period within which to appeal, reckoned from
receipt of notice of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration. There was no violation of said rule in the
instant case. Here, the respondent Commissioner received on January 6, 1993 the CTA resolution denying
reconsideration, and had only one (1) day left within which to perfect his appeal. On the very day he received said
resolution, he filed the (first) motion for extension for thirty days.

While Circular No. 1-91 is silent as to whether a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals may be permitted, nevertheless, this Court in Liboro vs. Court of Appeals[9] (promulgated on January 29,
1993, or at about the very time the present controversy was taking shape in the respondent Court) already ruled that
such motion is allowed and should be granted.

Previously, we had held in Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court[10] (which was promulgated in 1986, prior to the issuance of Circular No. 1-91) that:

The Court rules, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
under Section 22 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) and Section 22(b) of the Interim
Rules, may properly be filed with and granted by the Intermediate Appellate Court (now renamed Court of Appeals).

xxx xxx xxx

3) APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.

The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for review in accordance with Section 22 of BP No. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the
Interim Rules. The reason for extending the period for the filing of a record on appeal is also applicable to the filing of
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for
reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only (the) remaining period within
which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension
of time to file such petition for review. (Italics are part of original text.)

xxx xxx xxx

6) PERIOD OF EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW.

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only fifteen days for filing a petition for
review may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.

The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period
of appeal.

xxx xxx xxx (Italics in the original text.)

Thus, in Liboro, citing Lacsamana, we said that:

From these rules [i.e., the rules on appeals set forth in Lacsamana], it is clear that the prohibition against granting an
extension of time applies only in a case where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of appeal. The reason is
that only the filing of the notice of appeal is required to perfect an appeal and nothing more. However, it is different in
a petition for review where the pleading is required to be verified. A petition for review, unlike an ordinary appeal,
requires careful preparation and operose research in order to put up a persuasive and formidable position. In other
words, the drafting of a petition for review entails more time and effort than merely filing a notice of appeal. Hence, in
Lacsamana, a motion for extension of time was granted to enable a party to file a petition for review from a final
decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Sec. 22 of B.P. 129 and par. 22 (b) of
the Interim Rules.

Since Circular No. 1-91 now provides that an appeal from the Court of Tax Appeals or other quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals is by a petition for review, and no longer by mere notice of appeal, x x x a corresponding
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review should likewise be granted. There is indeed no reason why a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review pursuant to Circular No. 1-91 may not be filed, if a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review pursuant to Sec. 22 of B.P. 129, and par. 22(b) of the Interim Rules, may
be granted.

But the extension nonetheless should be limited only to fifteen (15) days, save in exceptionally meritorious cases
where the Court of Appeals may grant a longer period, as similarly provided in Lacsamana. Generally, then, a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days may be granted unless there are compelling reasons which may warrant the
allowance of a longer period. Thus, ubi eadem ratio, ibi eadem legis dispositio. (boldtype ours)

Parenthetically, we should mention that this Courts Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (also known as Revised Circular
No. 1-91) and titled Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgments or Final Orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies,[11] which took effect on February 15, 1995, has a similar provision on
motions for extension to file petitions for review.

In brief, then, we deem the resort to the filing of the first motion for extension dated January 6, 1993 as proper, and
consider the said motion as having been validly and timely filed, pursuant to the then prevailing rules of
procedure. The first motion (for 30 days or up to February 6, 1993) having been granted on February 3, 1993, or well
within the period of extension asked for, it is unarguable that such grant was no less valid and effective. Therefore,
petitioner had until February 6, 1993 to file the subject petition for review.

With respect to respondent Commissioners second motion for extension filed on February 5, 1993, the OSG
reasoned that, aside from the fact that the grant of the first extension was received only after the lapse of the period
of extension asked for, the OSG had experienced delays in finishing and submitting the petition caused by the
prolonged daily brownouts which disrupt(ed) office work. We take cognizance of the fact that the intermittent power
failures occurring almost daily (and often, several times a day, with durations ranging from a few minutes to several
hours) throughout 1993 took a heavy toll on productivity and efficiency at all levels and in all sectors of our
society. We therefore hold that considering the difficult working conditions associated with the serious energy
situation prevailing in our country at that time, substantial work delays were inevitable. Hence, the second motion for
extension was justified, and the grant thereof would have been proper under the circumstances.

This is not to say that technical and procedural rules for appeal, including reglementary periods therefor, need not be
observed at all or may be disregarded at will, since appeal may be availed of only in the manner provided for by
law.[12] While generally speaking, a review on appeal is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and may
be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor,[13] still, it must be remembered that appeal
is an essential part of our judicial system, and thus, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious.[14] Laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not
in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction, but in light of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford
justice to all. In this instance, we have no doubt that substantial justice would be better served by allowing the
appeal.[15] Moreover, dismissal of an appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon, since the policy of our
courts is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits.[16]

In this case, aside from the aforementioned considerations, we are not unmindful of the immediate loss of revenue in
the sum of P15,120,000.00 plus interest of at least P734,534.89 (per the computations of respondent Commissioner)
which the Government would surely suffer if the dismissal of the subject petition for review by the respondent Court
were to be upheld on technicality. And because taxes constitute the lifeblood of the government, through which its
agencies continue to operate and with which the State effects its functions for the welfare of its constituents,[17] tax
exemptions (and, we might add, refunds in the nature of exemptions) must be strictly construed against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the state.[18] Hence, technical rules barring a full hearing on the merits should be relaxed,
again in the interest of justice to all.

We therefore hold that it would be ill-advised to allow petitioners to prevail on mere technicality and compel a refund
of the not-insubstantial amount of P15 million without affording the government reasonable opportunity to contest the
assailed CTA ruling. In any event, the subject petition for review had actually been filed on March 8, 1993, the last
day of the period prayed for in the second motion for extension, so there is no further delay to speak of. And we
cannot conceive of any additional undue prejudice which may befall the petitioners in the event the appeal is heard
on the merits, for if their cause is valid and truly meritorious, petitioners will prevail in the end anyway.

As for the period of extension granted, although the rules provide for fifteen days, we reiterate that, in meritorious
cases the Court of Appeals may grant a longer period.[19] In a few highly exceptional instances, this Court has
allowed the relaxing of the rules on the application of the reglementary period of appeal,[20] particularly in the case
of Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[21] where this Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite
the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice, inasmuch as the Republic stood to lose hundreds of
hectares of land already titled in its name and devoted for educational purposes.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED, no grave abuse of discretion
having been committed by respondent Court, and the assailed Resolutions are AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN, petitioners, vs. SPS. HENRY and LIWANAG ANDRES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal are two resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 7450-UDK. The first, dated March 17,
1999,[1] dismissed petitioners appeal for their failure to pay docket and other lawful fees, while the second, dated
August 9, 1999,[2] denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

As gleaned from the records, the following are the antecedent facts:

The original case involved a complaint for accion publiciana with a claim for damages, entitled Sps. Henry Andres
and Natividad Liwanag-Andres vs. Noli Alfonso and Erlinda Fundialan, docketed as Civil Case No. 1182, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal. It was decided against herein petitioners in favor of the spouses
Andres, now the respondents herein.

On July 15, 1997, a copy of the decision[3] was served upon petitioners.

On July 17, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, without the assistance of counsel and without payment of the
docket and other lawful fees.

On July 21, 1997, the RTC granted the notice of appeal.

On August 25, 1997, respondents herein, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss petitioners appeal, citing Section
1(c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On October 9, 1997, the trial court dismissed the motion and directed petitioners to pay the proper fees to cure the
technical defect, stating thus:

The Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated August 25, 1997, filed by the plaintiffs, through counsel is hereby DENIED.

Defendants are directed to pay the corresponding docket fees and other required fees, within five (5) days from
receipt of this Order, considering that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997, must at
least in the meantime, be construed liberally.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On the same date, petitioners paid the subject fees, as evidenced by official receipts[5] issued by the RTC of San
Mateo to petitioner Erlinda Fundialan. The receipts, all dated October 9, 1997, showed payments for appeal and legal
research fees in Civil Case No. 1182, in compliance with the trial courts order of even date, the details of which are
as follows:

PARTICULARS O.R. No. AMOUNT

--------------------- ---------------- -----------------

Appeal fee 7403333 P 48.00

Appeal fee 7402555 352.00

Legal Research 1880282 20.00

-----------------

TOTAL P 420.00

==========

Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Upon a review of the records, which included the proofs of
payment of the docket and appeal fees, the appellate court nevertheless resolved to dismiss the appeal in this wise:

For failure of defendants-appellants to pay the required docket fees, as reported by the Judicial Records Division
(JRD) on February 24, 1999, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED (Section 1 (c), Rule 50 in relation to Section 4, Rule
41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

SO ORDERED.[6]

On April 12, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution, which the Court of
Appeals denied on August 9, 1999. Thus:

THROUGH a motion for reconsideration, defendants-appellants claim having paid the docketing fees on October 9,
1997, beyond the period for perfecting an appeal.

Any subsequent compliance with the formal requirements for filing an appeal as prescribed by the Rules will
not per se warrant reconsideration of Our Resolution.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners submit that the sole issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in its strict
construction of the provisions of Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, however, we
find two main issues for our resolution: (1) whether or not the payment of docket and other lawful fees within the
period for perfecting an appeal is mandatory; and (2) whether or not petitioners have shown sufficient reason for the
relaxation of what otherwise should be a stringent application of the rule on the payment of appellate docket and
other lawful fees.

As ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the appellate court cites Section 1 (c), Rule 50, in relation to Section 4,
Rule 41, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 (c), Rule 50 provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxx
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4
of Rule 41;

xxx

Section 4, Rule 41 in turn provides:

SECTION 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall
pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record or the record on appeal. (Underscoring supplied.)

Petitioners argue for liberal construction of the Rules,[8] stating that its delay[9] in the payment of the fees, was a
trivial technical oversight which was nonetheless cured by the order of the court a quo directing it to make the
payment.[10] By such payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the technical deficiency was
cured.[11] Petitioners also cites Section 13, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[12] and argues that in the
case at bar, although the notice of appeal had been seasonably filed, there was the unintentional and excusable non-
payment of the required fees.[13] In fact, albeit belatedly, petitioners did pay the required fees on the very day the
trial court ordered its payment. According to petitioners, substantial justice should not be sacrificed over
technicalities.[14]

On the other hand, respondents aver that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, perfection of an appeal requires
the payment of the docket and other lawful fees. Since the same were not seasonably paid, such failure to pay was a
fatal defect which an order from the trial court cannot cure.[15]

At the outset, it should be stressed that failure to pay the appellate docket and lawful fees is a serious matter
affecting the courts jurisdiction. Time and again, we have consistently held that the payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final
and executory.[16]

Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege; thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with provisions set by
law.[17] The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear. The payment of appellate docket fee is not a
mere technicality of law or procedure but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.[18]

However, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such requirement, this Court has also held that the strict
application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under
exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice.[19] Hence, we resolve the second issue. Has
petitioners presented any sufficient or satisfactory reason for the relaxation of the rules?

We note that at the time petitioners filed said notice of appeal on July 17, 1997, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
had then very recently taken effect on July 1, 1997.

In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Mangubat, 312 SCRA 463, 466-467 (1999),[20] where
the notice of appeal was likewise filed only 14 days after the effectivity of the new rules, this Court has stated:

We find the delay excusable. In the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort the court held that failure to
attach to the Answer a written explanation why alternative mode of service of pleading is availed of, thirty nine (39)
days after the effectivity of the new rules, may be excused as the counsel may not have been fully aware of the new
requirements. This Court further ordered that strictest compliance with the said mandatory requirement is to be
enforced one month from the promulgation of the said decision on August 5, 1998. The intent of the Court is clear to
afford litigants full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the
recency of the changes introduced by the new rules. x x x We also note that the Solicitor General observed the
procedure for perfecting an appeal under the old rule wherein only the notice of appeal is filed with the trial court and
the docket fees were later paid to the appellate court after notice from the latter court that payment of docket fees are
due. x x x . (Underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, as averred by petitioners in the present case, at the time of the filing of the notice of appeal, the changes
introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure were yet novel, and even judges and lawyers needed time to
familiarize themselves with the rules intricacies. The trial court acknowledged this fact when it resolved to grant the
appeal, and favorably considered a liberal application of the rules in the meantime.

Also material is the fact that petitioners were not assisted by counsel when they filed their notice of appeal. Indeed, it
appears that on August 20, 1997,[21] petitioners former counsel made formal the withdrawal of appearance from this
case. In the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort, 293 SCRA 661 (1998), this Court even assumed
that counsel therein may not have been fully aware yet of the new requirements, and deemed failure to observe them
excusable. In this case, where petitioners themselves filed the notice of appeal, without assistance of counsel, there
is more reason to relax the application of the new rules.

Respondents reliance on the case of Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals[22] is not well taken. In Lazaro, the case in the trial
court was decided months after the new rules had already taken effect. The litigants had the assistance of counsel
and payment of fees was made belatedly after six months from the expiration of the appeal period. This delay was
not sufficiently explained. Thus, this Court saw no compelling reason therein to deviate from the strict application of
the rules. Moreover, the case of Lazaro also admits that the rules may be relaxed in exceptionally meritorious cases.

We also note that petitioners were not informed by the trial court that the docket fees were already due at that
time. This failure of the trial court might have stemmed from the recency of the rules. Hence, fairness bids us not to
take this circumstance against petitioners.

While it is true, as pointed out by respondents, that the same docket fees were only paid on October 9, 1997, or more
than two months after the period to appeal has lapsed, this matter was sufficiently explained by petitioners. The
records bear out the fact that the notice of appeal was granted on July 21, 1997. It was only on August 25, 1997 that
respondents motion to dismiss was filed. Hence, following the course of judicial proceedings, including setting the
motion for hearing, filing of an opposition thereto, with a resetting of a hearing also thrown in, the said motion was
only resolved on October 9, 1997. Petitioners demonstrated their willingness to pay the docket fees, as shown by
their immediate compliance with the order of the trial court, on the very day the motion was resolved. Late payment of
docket fees may be admitted when the party showed willingness to abide by the rules, by immediately paying the
required fees.[23]

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolutions in CA-G.R. CV No. 7450-UDK are SET ASIDE. The appeal is hereby
REINSTATED and the case REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MARTINEZ, COMMISSION and
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin
Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and
petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value
added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).[1]

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly
working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an
indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took over the management of the
business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although
the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business
operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.[2]

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25,
1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.[3]

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred
(1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a volunteer and not as
an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year;
and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.[4]

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to
the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.[5] Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,[6] hence the present petition
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.[7]

Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to
reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still
follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this
Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442
(The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No.
21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and,
ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its
promulgation.[8] Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor
and Employment for program and policy coordination only.[9] Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also
granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D.
No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then
been provided for.

Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the
NLRC.[10] The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that
the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such
decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review
thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize
the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that
the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial
rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.[11]

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party
is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,[12] and then
seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,[13] for which said Rule has now fixed the
reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the
decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held
that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if
filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.[14]

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines
and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.[15]

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to
wit:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and
all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals
must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.

It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court,[16] the following
amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to
conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.

2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that
the original exclusionary clause therein now provides except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (Italics supplied)

3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of
Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier
explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought
to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally
or specifically referred to therein except, among others, those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x
x x. This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions
of the NLRC.[17] Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought
to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are
cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is
illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in
the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an
oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine,
Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme
Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have
reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.[18]

In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech[19] from which we
reproduce the following excerpts:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at
the same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover
not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of
subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its
burden of review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the
expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill
No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of
appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the
Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)

xxx

Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically
reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate
tribunal.

In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the
Supreme Court:

x x x Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases
which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme
Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of
the Constitution and the guarantor of the peoples basic rights and additional task expressly vested on it now to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases
some five years ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate
courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.

In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice
and Human Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.

xxx

Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said
sponsor and the following proceedings transpired:[20]

Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, add the phrase
THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED. So that it becomes clear, Mr.
President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our
Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also
deleted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.

Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Italics supplied)

xxx

Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and
being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed.[21]; Record of the Senate, Vol. V, No. 63, pp.
180-181.21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having
theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on
February 20, 1995,[22] inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were
eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle
for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we
have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are
both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the
concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;[23] whereas to indulge in the assumption that
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC
to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the
proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be
advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:

On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the
advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and
conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.

Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal
appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions.[24]

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we
add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not
being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or
ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action
on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule
65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order,
this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al.[25] should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but
also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often
has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that
this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts
or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise
of our primary jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all
pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition
consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.