FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997]

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS
OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration case by
oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does ownership of land
formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered
property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north
by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as
boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's
registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally
accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision [1] and (2) two subsequent resolutions[2] of the
Intermediate Appellate Court[3] (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-84,[4] the
application over which was filed by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now
deceased, before the Court of First Instance [5] (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application
was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.

Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application
with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property formed part
of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1988, gave due course
to his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of
Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.

The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the decision
of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The
then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.

On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm
his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an
area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto
Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the
Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay
River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on
Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.

On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto
stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same
being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of
Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as that advanced
by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry
become the sole oppositor.

On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of Lands and the Director
of Forestry.

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro
thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always
been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession
of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the
Office of the President; and that he had already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.

During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint
for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully
claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-
175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby
deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to
vacate the property.

The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity
of the parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case
and was jointly tried by the court a quo.

During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and was
substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.

Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein private respondents.

On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being
a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.

The decision's dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;

(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land in question; and

(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2873 and as applicant in Land
Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances."[6]

The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assigned the following
errors:
"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private respondents].

2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.

3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and is controversy in favor of applicants-appellants
[private respondents].

4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private respondents] are entitled to eject the
oppositor-appellee [petitioners]."[7]

On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for
registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner
1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:

"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their respective briefs is whether or
not the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the
action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of the
Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is
foreshore land.

xxx

It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately adjoining the land sought
to be registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on
the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland
flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the
property of applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and
emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land
adding thereto the land now sought to be registered.

This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is immediately attached to
appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the
Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion this case might have caused the lower
court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the action
of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing
appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the
patrimonial property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule x x x .

xxx

It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies between these two rivers and it is precisely
appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the
flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths.

It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the deposit thereat for in the natural
course of things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add
anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves and the wind. It is then more logical to
believe that the two rivers flowing towards the bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus
causing appellants' [private respondents'] land to accumulate therein.
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to accept this theory and stated that
the subject land arose only when x x x Pascual planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees thereat to serve as a boundary or
strainer. But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the land mass came into
being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were
the few trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would have stopped at the place where the said
trees were planted. But this is not so because the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were
planted.

On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants' [private respondents'] clearly show that the land that accumulated
beyond the so-called boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing
innumerable trees x x x. The existence of vegetation on the land could only confirm that the soil thereat came from
inland rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals?
On the other hand, the two rivers would be bringing soil on their downward flow which they brought along from the
eroded mountains, the lands along their path, and dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private
respondents'] land.

In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is true that the subject land is
found at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an
accretion from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the Bureau of Lands found
out, as shown in the following report of the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:

'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11, 1960, it was found out that the said
land is x x x sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers x x x These two rivers bring down considerable amount of soil and
sediments during floods every year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private property of the applicant
[private respondents]. About four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are planted palapat trees
thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land x x x
subject of this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by accretion. And having been formed by accretion, the
said land may be considered the private property of the riparian owner who is the applicant herein [private
respondents'] x x x .

In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be withdrawn, except for the portion
recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May 2, 1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. x x
x'

Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of Lands withdrew his opposition
dated March 25, 1960, and limited 'the same to the northern portion of the land applied for, compromising a strip 50
meters wide along the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part of the foreshore' x x x. [8]

Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the reversion to private
respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The
Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same decision. Both motions were opposed
by private respondents on January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its decision, to read, viz:

"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion included in their fishpond permit
covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said portion is
not within the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern portion of the land subject of the
registration proceedings and which area is more particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards
corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181. x x x[9]
 On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry,
an extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the decision dated November
29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled,
"The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals."[10] We, however, denied the same in a minute resolution
dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was
yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
decision dated November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the decision
dated November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in
L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)
of Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978
was filed by petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners' request for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred in
appreciating the facts of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law relating to
accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the
accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and sand
sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual
in 1948.
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, private respondents vigorously
argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of private respondents'
own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river.[11] Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium
is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; [12] the owner of such estate is called the riparian
owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. [13] The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of
the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be
seen[14] but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.[15]
Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is
misplaced.
First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila
Bay. Private respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the
two rivers whose torrential action, private respondents insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In
fact, one of the private respondents, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay
used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan
trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise. [16]
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) private respondents' own
tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Private respondents' own land
lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed
land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of
either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both
of the eastern and western boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern portion
thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which
is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private respondents' own tract of land adjoins the Manila
Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of
water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held that:

"Appellant next contends that x x x Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A
bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:

'Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm
of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.' 7 C.J. 1013-1014."[17]

The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be
the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the northern side. As
such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts of the
case. As the trial court correctly observed:

"A perusal of the survey plan x x x of the land subject matter of these cases shows that on the eastern side, the property
is bounded by Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the
northern side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion
because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little
bit meandering and there is no portion where the two rivers meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which
is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion [caused by the action of the two
rivers].

Applicant Pascual x x x has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has applied for registration is
the result of the settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered
as an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where the accretion must
have been caused by action of the bay."[18]

The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing observation is that the disputed
land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain. The respondent
appellate court, however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two
rivers because private respondents' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and
that the current of the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay which
accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the
light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either the eastern or western
portion of private respondents' land where a river each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners' land
which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic and
consonance with natural experience in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat
and bakawan trees on the northern boundary of their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more
reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting opinion when he stated
that:

"As appellants' (titled) land x x x acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to meet, and considering the wide
expanse of the boundary between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters x x x it is believed
rather farfetched for the land in question to have been formed through 'sediments of sand and salt [sic] . . . deposited
at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments
of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths,' why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at
the northern portion of appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these
two rivers? That being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not caused by the
current of the two rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.

The conclusion x x x is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the contrary, shows that the disputed
land was formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original applicant,
testified on cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore and it was only in 1948 that he noticed
that the land was beginning to get higher after he had planted trees thereon in 1948. x x x

x x x it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide could reach as far as the dike of
appellants' fishpond within their titled property, which dike now separates this titled property from the land in
question. Even in 1948 when appellants had already planted palapatand bakawan trees in the land involved, inasmuch
as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still reach the dike. This must be so because in x x x the
survey plan of the titled property approved in 1918, said titled land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So
Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in
question began to rise or to get higher in elevation.

The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and at the same time a kind of block
to the strained sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very waves that brought them to the former shore
at the end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore
leading to the formation of the land in question."[19]

In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and the
regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern
boundary of private respondents' own tract of land.

The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the
disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain.

At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano [20] that Manila Bay is
considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion is to be applied in multifarious
situations, we have ruled differently insofar as accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are
concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose,[21] Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[22] Republic v. Alagad[23], and Meneses v. Court of Appeals,[24] we categorically ruled that Laguna
de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which
is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility,
or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be
the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed
land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the
foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public
uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses,
it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted
in due form by a competent authority."[25] Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have
the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer
necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast
guard services.[26] Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has
already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to
be the property of private respondents as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.
The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in CA G.R. No. 59044-R
dated November 29, 1978 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution dated November 21,
1980 and March 28, 1982, respectively, promulgated by the Intermediate Appellate Court are likewise
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan,
is hereby ORDERED REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.