ELS: Consti 2 Batch 6 Case Digests (1-7) Twenty19 1

1. Province of Tayabas v. Perez

Facts:

Among the various property owners against whom the plaintiff fled its complaint for
expropriation in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, were Florentino San Gil, who died in the
course of the trial and was substituted by Josefa R. Oppus, Jose Cabrera, Josefa Villareal de
Meric, Hilarion Castor, Rafaela Martinez, Enrica Malubag and Bernardino Maaño. After it had
been proven that the plaintiff had a perfect right to the expropriation sought by it, the lower court
rendered judgment granting it said expropriation and ordering it to pay to the above-named
defendants, by way of indemnity, which includes the expenses incurred in the transfer and
reconstruction of the expropriated houses in another place by the owners.

Issue:

Whether or not the above-named defendants, in addition to recovering the price of their
respective houses, are entitled to the additional compensation granted them in said judgment, for
the transfer and reconstruction of said houses in other places.

Held:

Supreme Court modifed the judgement, by eliminating that part granting the appellees
the right to collect from the appellant the expenses for the transfer and reconstruction of their
respective houses, and it is affrmed in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever
it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.

It is unjust to compel the appellant to defray the expenses incurred in the transfer and
reconstruction of the expropriated houses in another place by the owners thereof, who, strictly
speaking, already cease to be so from the time they are paid the price thereof. To do so would
mean double compensation, or in other words, it would be equivalent to giving the appellees, for
their expropriated houses, more than the money value thereof. The appellees have no right to
collect at the same time the just prices of their houses and the cost of their transfer and
reconstruction in another place. At most, they are entitled to either one or the other, and nothing
more.

2. Tuason v. Land Tenure Administration

Facts:

On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate jointly
owned by J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor et al was
authorized to be expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was directed
by the executive secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property. Appellee
thereupon fled a prohibition with a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from
instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the said act was unconstitutional and
a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A.

Issue:
Whether the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? YES
Held:
The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is
unconstitutional as amended by RA 3454 is reversed i.e. the expropriation is constitutional
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Rationale (as was stated in each:

There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is
limitless. There is to be just compensation. This means the equivalent for the value of the
property at its taking. The market value of the land taken is just compensation to which the
owner of the condemned property is entitled.

There is nothing to prevent Congress in view of the public funds at its disposal to follow a
system of priorities, especially when a serious social or economic problem is at hand. In the bill’s
Explanatory Note, Congress claims that given the problem of Quezon City’s growing population,
expropriating the land will help solve the overpopulation and “implement the land-for-the-
landless program of the present Administration.” Singling out Tatalon Estate doesn’t stigmatize
the effort of the statute as denial of equal protection.

On the occasion of expropriation, whatever contractual rights might be possessed by

vendors and vendees could be asserted and accorded the appropriate constitutional protection.
The statute of concern can stand the test of validity. If it were otherwise, then the judiciary may
lend itself susceptible to the charge that in its appraisal of governmental measures with social
and economic implications, its decisions are characterized by the narrow, unyielding insistence
on the primacy of property rights, contrary to what the Constitution ordains.

3. Manotok v. NHA

Facts:

Two petitions assailing the constitutionality of PD 1669 and 1670 (expropriation of

Tambunting Estate and property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog). In 1977, President issued LOI
No. 555 – nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program (SIR) and LOI No. 557 – slum
improvement as a national housing policy. Governor of Metro Manila issued EO No. 6-77 –
Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) which includes the aforementioned
properties as they were identifed as blighted communities.

In 1978, a fre razed the Tambunting Estate. Government made an announcement that
property would be acquired for the victims through the NHA. Negotiations did not materialize. As
per PD 1810: all areas identifed by MM LGUs and approved by the Ministry of Human
Settlements to were included in the ZIP, includes the two properties. Subsequently, the two
properties were expropriated. The NHA immediately take possession and awarded not more than
17m and 8m to the properties respectively.

ISSUE;
WON direct expropriation of the lots in question violated constitutional rights of the owners of the
lots?

HELD:
YES. Power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the
Constitution pertaining to such power only serve to limit its exercise to protect the individual
against whose proper the power is enforced. As such, the following must be complied with: the
taking must be for public use, there must be payment of just compensation and that due process
must be observed.
In the case herein, the Pds promoted uniquely unfair procedures. No opportunity for
owners to plead or contest, no interest for balance of payments, no payment was made before
taking and resolutions by NHA which were out of reach of judicial review. There was also no
reason given in the PDs for the valid expropriation of the lots for housing projects. They were
valuable commercial lots. Benefciaries of the housing project would have just rented out or sold
their lots to wealthy merchants. Public use and social justice ends would not be served. PD 1669
allows NHA to use part of the Tambunting Estate for commercial use to defray development costs
of the housing program. Private property cannot be expropriated for private purposes.
In just compensation, the value of the property should be fxed at the time of taking.
Fixing a maximum amount deprives owners of the opportunity to present higher value. PDs were
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issued in 1980 but cut off was set in 1978, when they were determined to be part of the housing
program. The owners must be informed with formal notice, not mere public announcements.

4. RAMAS V. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS

Facts:

Respondent Geronimo B. Ramos is the tenant of herein petitioner Mateo de Ramas on a 2-

1/2 hectare land at Muzon Naic, Cavite, under a verbal share tenancy contract at 70-30. On June
22, 1960, or one month before the beginning of the agricultural year 1960-1961, Ramos informed
petitioner of his desire to change their contract from that of share tenancy to leasehold tenancy.
Petitioner refused to grant the request insisting on the former 70-30 sharing basis, so on May 23,
1961 Ramos fled a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations praying that he be allowed to
change their tenancy contract from share to leasehold, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended. Petitioner opposed the petition as groundless
and violating their gentleman's agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 is unconstitutional in that it impairs the
obligation of contracts.

Held:

Supreme Court ruled that the disputed Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 is
constitutional and valid. The judgment appealed from was affrmed.

The general rule has been stated that a police regulation, obviously intended as such, and
not operating unreasonably beyond the occasions of its enactment, is not rendered invalid by the
fact that it may affect incidentally the exercise of some right guaranteed by the Constitution. The
constitutional prohibition against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not
restrict the power of the state to protect the public health, the Public morals, or the public safety.
One or more of these factors may be involved in the execution of such contracts. Rights and
privileges arising from contracts are subject to regulations for the protection of the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety, in the same sense and to the same extent as is all
property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations. Not all police legislation which has
the effect of impairing a contract is obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment.

Obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such
power is exercised, as in this case, to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted
are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are not arbitrary or oppressive.

The right granted to the tenant to change the contract from share tenancy to that of
leasehold tenancy can not be considered unreasonable or oppressive, because by the landlord's
giving up of 5% of the harvest (the change from share to leasehold tenancy reduces the landlord's
share from 30% to 25%), the tenant becomes, more responsible, more competent, and fnancially
prepared to comply with his obligations under the lease, to the ultimate beneft of the landlord,
with the consequent improvement of a lot of a big segment of the population and thereby giving
full meaning to the social justice directive contained in the Constitution.

5. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers

Facts:
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the
Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a
close shop agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the
membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said factory one must be a
member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that
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as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of
the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union.
It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which
notifed ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from
the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement
because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affliation of their members in any such labor organization, is
unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member
may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the
factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-
membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to
join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and
employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to
join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a
contractual right.

6. Martinez v. People
Facts:
Teoflo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial
Court, petitioner fled a motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper. However, this was denied by the
trial court and prompted petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders.

Later on, petitioner also fled with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper
attaching thereto affdavits by himself and two disinterested persons of his eligibility to avail this
privilege. The appellate court subsequently issued a resolution denying the motion and directing
the petitioner to pay the proper docketing fees within fve (5) days from notice. Thereafter,
Petitioner fled a motion for reconsideration but this was also denied by the appellate court.
Petitioner then fled a manifestation through his counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees
required "under protest" and that the money was advanced by his counsel. The transmittal was
evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the motion to litigate as pauper.

In the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that
petitioner failed to pay the required docket fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his
compliance with the required docket fee. In the second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the latest motion on the ground that it was short of 150.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to appeal as pauper litigant?

RULING:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The
Court held that a motion to litigate as indigent can be made even before the appellate courts,
either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions. It
maintained that the interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with the Bill of Rights,
which decrees that "free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary
requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as pauper. The affdavits executed by
himself and two other disinterested persons were enough to convince the court that petitioner is
qualifed to litigate as indigent.
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The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of
Appeals which is further ordered to allow the petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him
the docket fees he paid.

7. City of San Pablo v. Judge Reyes and Meralco

Facts:
This was a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review on a pure question of law
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 29 in Civil Case No. SP-
4459(96), entitled Manila Electric Company vs. City of San Pablo, Laguna, City Treasurer of San
Pablo Laguna, and the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, Laguna. The RTC declared the
imposition of franchise tax under Section 2.09 Article D of Ordinance No. 56 otherwise known as
the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo as ineffective and void insofar as the respondent
MERALCO is concerned for being violative of Act No. 3648, Republic Act No. 2340 and PD 551.
The RTC also granted MERALCOS claim for refund of franchise taxes paid under protest.

Issue:
Whether or not the RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FRANCHISE TAX IN QUESTION CONSTITUTES AN IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT

Held:
Yes. Private respondent's invocation of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is
unavailing. The LGC was enacted in pursuance of the constitutional policy to ensure autonomy to
local governments and to enable them to attain fullest development as self-reliant communities.
There is further basis for the conclusion that the non-impairment of contract clause cannot be
invoked to uphold Meralco's exemption from the local tax. Escudero Electric Co. was originally
given the legislative franchise under Act 3648 to operate an electric light and power system in
the City of San Pablo and nearby municipalities. The term of the franchise under Act No. 3648 is a
period of ffty years from the Act's approval in 1929. The said law provided that the franchise is
granted upon the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, or repeal by the Congress of the
United States. Under the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
the National Assembly when the public interest so requires. With or without the reservation
clause, franchises are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power;
they are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which like police power cannot be
contracted away.