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2007 SCMR 97 (Pakistan Tobacco Board v Tahir Raza)

What is writ of Quo Warranto—Nature of Court’s jurisdiction—Powers of

Court

1. Such writ is to inquire from a person, the authority of law under which he
purports to hold public office and it is primarily inquisitorial and not adversarial
for the reason that a relator need not be a person aggrieved but also that while
a person is holding a public office without any legal warrant, he is taxing public
exchequer besides causing injury to others who may be entitled to that office---
High Court, keeping in view the nature of such proceedings, can undertake such
an inquiry as it may deem necessary in the facts and circumstances of a
particular case including examination of the entire relevant record---Such
exercise can be done suo motu, even if attention of High Court is not drawn by
the parties concerned.

2. Petitioner was working in Pakistan Tobacco Board, as Secretary in BS-19, and

after his retirement and on recommendation of Chairman Pakistan Tobacco
Board, petitioner was re-employed on contract basis. Re-employment was
permissible under R.20 of Pakistan Tobacco Board (Service) Rules, 1985, only in
public interest. Merely because the petitioner was described as hardworking
and efficient officer, did not authorize the Federal Government to bypass the
rules. Mere notification of Federal Government was not sufficient to answer
the writ of quo warranto, as such issuance of notification was not enough---
Petitioner had to demonstrate that his appointment was in accordance with
law and the rules.

3. As regards the third ground, there is nothing on the record to show that
there is any dearth of efficient and competent doctors in Pakistan, or if
there is any, it can be removed effectively by retaining the services of Dr.
Saeed Ahmad in the Medical Department. Surely, like everybody else in the
world. Dr. Saeed Ahmad is also not indispensable.

2011 SCMR 848 (NWFP Public Services Commission v

Muhammad Arif)
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Writ of Certiorari brought under Clause 1 (a) (ii)1 of Article 199---

aggrieved person—legal right is the basis of invoking jurisdiction of the
Court

We may mention here that no vested legal right whatsoever was available to
the respondents for the invocation of the provisions as envisaged in Article 199
of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It is well settled by now that
"the right which is the foundation of an application under Article 199 is a
personal and individual right. The legal right may be a statutory right or a right
recognized by the law. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a
person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to perform
relating to the right. There must not only be a right but a justiciable right in
existence, to give jurisdiction to the High Court in the matter. Unless whatever
right, personal or otherwise, on which the application is based is established,
no order can issue under Art. 199.

2014 SCMR 122 (Dr Imran Khattak v Ms Sofia Waqqar

Khattak)

Whether High Court in a writ in nature of mandamus or certiorari or

under paragraph (c ) of Clause (1) of Art 199 (PIL cases) has powers to
move on information merely or application filed by an aggrieved person is
a sine qua non for exercise of constitutional powers

A careful perusal of the Article reproduced above would show that a High Court
would exercise its extraordinary discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction where
it is satisfied that, subject to the Constitution, no other adequate remedy is
provided by law. It would exercise such jurisdiction under Article 199(1)(a)(i),
(ii) and (c) on the application of an aggrieved person while under 199(1)(b)(i) &
(ii) on the application of any person whether aggrieved or not, and not on an
information or on its own knowledge. The case of "High Court Bar Association
and others v. Government of Balochistan through Secretary, Home and Tribal
Affairs Department and six others" (supra), inasmuch as it upholds exercise of
Suo Motu jurisdiction is per incuriam for having been rendered in derogation of
the express words used in Article 199 of the Constitution, therefore, has no
force altogether. The case of "Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others v.

Declaring that any act done or proceedings taken by a person performing functions ..
in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province ..has been done or taken
without lawful authority and is of no legal effect
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Muhammad Habib Wahab-al-Khairi and others" (supra), when read carefully

does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents.
The case of "Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and others" (supra), too,
does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents as
in that case Sindh High Court had not passed the order impugned before this
Court, in exercise of its Suo Motu jurisdiction. The case of "Mst. Zubaida A.
Sattar and others v. Karachi Building Control Authority and others" (supra),
would not advance the case of the respondents as in that case this Court opted
to decide the question as to whether the High Court can register a
constitutional petition Suo Motu under Article 199 of the Constitution in an
appropriate case. The case of "Ardeshir Cowasiee and 10 others v. Karachi
Building Control Authority (KMC), Karachi and 4 others" (supra), too, would not
give any strength to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents
as in that case the High Court did not pass the order impugned before this
Court in exercise of its Suo Motu jurisdiction. A reference was also made to the
case of "Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty" (1996 AIR SC
922) by arguing that for exercise of Suo Motu jurisdiction, it is not necessary
that the person who is the victim of violation of his fundamental right should
personally approach the Court as the Court can itself take cognizance of the
matter and proceed Suo Motu or on a petition of any public spirited individual,
but this would not support the case canvassed at the bar by the learned
counsel for the respondents as Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not
provide anywhere that any writ, order or direction shall be issued on the
application of an aggrieved person. The case of "Benazir Bhutto v. Federation
of Pakistan" (PLD 1988 SC 416) was also cited but that has no perceptible
relevance to the case in hand as the jurisdiction in that case was exercised by
this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution which too does not provide
anywhere that this Court will exercise its jurisdiction on the application of any
aggrieved or any person. We, therefore, are of the view that a High Court
cannot exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.

PLD 2009 SC 644 (Federation v Mian Nawaz Sharif)

Only a person aggrieved is competent to file a writ petition of either

mandamus or certiorari before High Court

As the writ petitions filed before the Lahore High Court, eventually leading
to the judgments under review, were for the issuance of either writ of
Certiorari or Mandamus, they could have been maintained only by an
aggrieved person within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution. As
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held above, neither Noor Elahi nor Syed Khurram Ali Shah fulfilled that
condition. The writ petitions filed by these two persons were, therefore,
not maintainable. Consequently, the petitions filed in this Court against
the judgments of the Lahore High Court in the said writ petitions,
culminating into the judgments under review, were also not maintainable.

PLD 2007 SC 62 (Hafiz Hamdullah v Saifullah Khan)

Who is aggrieved person under Clause 1 (a) of Art 199—Scope of writ

of quo warranto—whether any person can file writ of quo warranto?

1. With regard to the first objection it may be noted that under Article
199(1)(a) of the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked
by an aggrieved person which denotes a person who has suffered a legal
grievance, against whom a decision has been pronounced which has
wrongfully deprived him or wrongfully refused him something which he
was legally entitled to. It is also the requirement that the person invoking
the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution has to
establish that any of his legal or fundamental right guaranteed under the
Constitution has been violated resulting in legal loss.

2. A writ of the quo warranto is in the nature of laying an information before a

Court, against a person who claimed and usurped an office, franchise or
liberty, requesting for holding an enquiry to enable him to show the
authority under which he supported his claim of right to the office,
franchise or liberty. Its object is to determine the legality of the holder of a
statutory or constitutional office and decide whether he was holding such
office in accordance with law or was unauthorizedly occupying a public
office. Where a person prays for a writ of quo warranto the Court would be
under an obligation to enquire whether the incumbent is holding the office
under the orders of a competent authority and also to examine whether he
would be legally qualified to hold the office or to remain in the office.

3. For issuance of a writ of quo warranto the person invoking the jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is not required to
fulfill the stringent conditions required for brining himself within the
meaning of an aggrieved person. Any person can move the High Court to
challenge the usurpation or unauthorized occupation of a public office by
the incumbent of that office and he is not required to establish his locus
standi to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the
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Constitution in a manner as generally required by the said Article. This

Court in the case of M.U.A. Khan v. Rana Muhammad Sultan and another
(PLD 1974 SC 228) categorically pronounced that a Civil Petition for
issuance of a writ of quo warranto can be moved by a person who may not
even be an aggrieved party. The pronouncement to the above effect was
reiterated and followed by this Court in the cases of (i) Al Jahad Trust
through Raees-ul-Mujahidin Habibul Wahabul Khairi v. Federation of
Pakistan and others (PLD 1996 SC 324), (ii) Malik Asad Ali and others v.
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law, Justice and Parliamentary
Affairs Islamabad and others (PLD 1998 SC 161); and (iii) Captain retired
Muhammad Naseem Ejazi v. Province of Punjab (2000 SCMR 1720) It is,
thus, to be observed that this Court has consistently held that a writ of quo
warranto can be instituted by a person though he may not come within the
meaning of word aggrieved person.

PLD 2010 SC 676 (PIA v Tanir ur Rehman)

Writ jurisdiction—laches—reasonable time—90 days—after 90 days

of cause of action, writ would be hit by laches

Petitioner had to approach the court within a reasonable time---Although

no definition of the expression "reasonable time" was available :» any
instrument of law, however the courts had interpreted it to be ninety
days---(followed in PLD 2017 K 140 and 2012 CLC 1729 (Lah))

------------------------------------

PLD 1991 Lahore 420 (Syed Ali Raza Asad v Ghulam

Ishaq Khan) (DB)

Effect of Laches on the writ of quo warranto

Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Quo warranto---Laches----Laches would

not generally apply in cases of quo warranto but then the Court can also
not ignore the application of this principle if the attendant circumstances
are such which militate against the bona fide's of the petitioner. Laches
would not generally apply in cases of quo warranto but then the Court can
also not ignore the application of this principle if the attendant
circumstances are such which militate against the bona fides of the
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petitioner. In the present case the election of respondent to the office of

the President of Pakistan was held on 12th December, 1988 and in
pursuance of that election, respondent took oath of his office on 13th of
Dccember, 1988 and is performing his functions as President of Pakistan
since then. The attempt of the petitioner at such a belated stage to call in
question the validity of the said election and as a consequence the validity
of the acts of the President, was bound to create confusion and chaos
which in national affairs must be avoided as far as possible, especially when
no ground exists for holding that the election of the President held on 12th
of Decerneber, 1988 suffered from any legal infirmity. The circumstances
which float manifestly on the surface warranted an explanation from the
petitioner about the delay in filing the petition. Nothing at all has been
urged to explain the inordinate delay of 2-1/2 years from the date of the
questioned election of the President and more than one year even from 20-
3-1990, in filing the petition. This was yet another valid basis for refusing to
entertain this petition.

PLD 2010 Lahore 605 (Attaullah Khan v Federation)

PIL—Aggrieved Person—Locus Standi--scope

It is settled on good authority that in matters pertaining to public interest

litigation (also known as "PIL") the rule of "standing" or "locus standi" or
"aggrieved person" has received a liberal interpretation over the years and
any person/citizen having "sufficient interest" (in the context of larger
public interest) can maintain a petition and pass as an "aggrieved person"
under Article, 199 of the Constitution, subject to' satisfying other
requirements of the said Article. Any citizen or person (part of the public)
has "sufficient Interest" and is, therefore, an aggrieved person under Article
199 of the Constitution, if public property is being acquired, held, used, or
disposed of by public functionaries in violation of the law. Public
functionaries as trustees of the people, cannot have any personal interest
in any public property, therefore if there is any abuse of trust or violation of
law, it qualifies any member of the general public as an "aggrieved person"
with the right to' invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, subject
to fulfilling other requirements of Article 199.

(To the same effect, see PLD 2014 Balochistan 1 (Muhammad Alam v
P & D department (who is aggrieved person when issue at stake is
matter of utilization of public resources)
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PLD 2013 Lahore 343 (Sardar Muhammad v Federation)

Scope of inquiry in quo warranto

It is well-settled that the entire process of recruitment leading to

appointment to a "public office" can be judicially reviewed under
Article 199(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution. The process has to pass the test of
law, which includes the settled principles of due process, openness,
fairness, participation and transparency. Appointment to a "public office" is
a public trust reposed by the people of Pakistan in the Competent
Authority. It is a key institutional decision and marks the future progress,
growth and development of the public institution, which is to be manned
by the prospective incumbent to the said public office. This trusteeship in
the hands of the Competent Authority (the Executive) cannot be discharged
in whimsical, temperamental, partial and preferential manner. The
recruitment process must be above board, devoid of even the slightest taint
of favourtisim. The Court is under an obligation to judicially review the
integrity of the selection process to a public office.

PLD 2012 Balochistan 31 (Chamber of Commerce v DG

QDA)

Locus Standi—PIL---Right to Life—utilization of public resources

The learned counsel for the respondents have objected to the

maintainability of the petitions on the ground that QDA is empowered
under the Quetta Development Authority Ordinance, 1978 ("the QDA
Ordinance") to decide and determine the manner in which its land can be
used and the petitioners are not aggrieved persons. It would therefore be
appropriate to decide the said legal objections first. These petitions can be
categorized as public interest litigation and thus do not envisage the strict
concept of the aggrieved person or locus standi. "Where there are
violations of Fundamental Rights of a class or a group of persons who
belong to the category ... then the traditional rule of locus standi can be
dispensed with, and the procedure available in public interest litigation can
be made use of (Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1988
Supreme Court 416 at page 491). The Supreme Court also came to the
rescue of a group of petitioners who had challenged the construction of a
high voltage grid station in a residential area (Shehla Zia v. WAPDA 1994
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Supreme Court 693). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the right to life
and the right to lead a life of dignity, respectively guaranteed in the
Constitution under Articles 9 and 14, was not limited to, "mean nor can it
be restricted only to the vegetative or animal life or mere existence from
conception to death. Life includes all such amenities or facilities which a
person in a free country is entitled to enjoy with dignity, legally and
constitutionally" (at page 712). In General Secretary Salt Miners Labour
Union (CBA) Khewra, Jhelum v The Director, Industries and Mineral
Development, Punjab, 1994 SCMR 2061, the Supreme Court stated that,
"The right to have unpolluted water is the right of every person wherever
he lives" (at page 2070). In the case of Sindh Institute of Urology and
Transplantation v. Nestle Milkpak Limited, 2005 CLC 424, the Sindh High
Court held, that:
"It is well-settled that natural resources like air, sea, waters, and
forests are like Public Trust. The said resources being a gift of
nature, they should be made freely available to everyone
irrespective of status. "Doctrine of Public trust" as developed
during the days of ancient Roman Empire, enjoins upon the
Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the
general public rather than to permit their use for private
ownership or commercial purposes. Even under Islamic law
certain water resources are to be protected from misuse and
over exploitation" (at page 440).
Consequently, there is no substance in the objections taken with regard to
the maintainability of the petitions and we hold that the same are
maintainable.

2016 CLD 1011 (Feryal Gohar v EPA Punjab)

PIL—Locus Standi—requirements

In Nayyar Khan Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of

Defence, Rawalpindi Cantt. and others 2015 CLC 978-Lahore, which reads:

"To satisfy the requirements of an "aggrieved person" in public

interest litigation under Article 199 of the Constitution, the
petitioner needs to disclose a personal interest in the
performance of legal duty owed to him winch if not performed
would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage
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or curtailment of a privilege in liberty or franchise.'

2015 CLC 978 (Nayyar Khan v Secretary MoD)

PIL—Utilization of public funds--Aggrieved Person—requirements

Learned counsel for the respondent No.5 have objected to the locus standi
of the petitioner on the ground that he is not an aggrieved person. Article
199 or the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution)
requires that a petition be instituted by an aggrieved person. The basic
objection here is that this is litigation in public interest where the petitioner
has to meet the criteria for instituting his case in public interest. To satisfy
the requirements of an "aggrieved person" in public interest litigation
under Article 199 of the Constitution, the petitioner needs to disclose a
personal interest in the performance of legal duty owed to him which if not
performed would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage
or curtailment of a privilege in liberty or franchise. Reliance is placed on
1999 SCMR 2883 (supra). It has also been stated that to establish locus
standi in the context of public interest litigation, the petitioner would have
to show that he belongs to class of affected persons who are unable to
access the Court for the protection of their rights. Reliance is placed on
2012 SCMR 455 (supra). In this case, the petitioner claims that he is an
aggrieved because he is. resident of Cantt. and he has sufficient interest in
the matter, hence he falls within the definition of an aggrieved person.
Sufficient interest as per the judgment cited at 1999 SCMR 2883 (supra)
means any legal interest which can include civic, environment, cultural
interests and it is the gravity of the issue which should be taken into
consideration, such that the more serious the issue at stake the less
significance will be attached to arguments based on the applicant's alleged
lack of standing

2016 YLR 2163 (Muhammad Akhtar v AJK Government)

Court to exercise extreme caution while entertaining PIL matters

"Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care
and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that
behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested
interest and/or, publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an
effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the
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citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not
be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal
of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or
founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to
see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court
is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political
motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its
process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested
interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by
force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a
desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy
bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold