Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
1 of 14
Independent scrutiny is provided by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser,
supported by his Counter-Terrorism Core Interest Group.
Further details of these technologies and the key challenges identified in the
above mentioned document are available from the OSCT internet pages on
the Home Office website.
Explosives
2 of 14
Information Communication Technology
3 of 14
Fit with the Science and Innovation Strategy
The programme is managed and directed in line with the CONTEST S&I
strategy 2007 and the Home Office S&I strategy 2008.
The OSCT led CBRN S&T programme has been running for 5 years and
there are well established governance and procedures to manage it. These
include a cross Government CBRN S&T Delivery board to set and prioritise
research requirements and an independent and external CBRN S&T Advisory
board to quality assure the research.
The following details the CBRN research themes within the CBRN S&T
programme. The figures in the tables below refer to the current contracted
commitments for research based on cross-Government prioritisation for the
OSCT CBRN S&T programme. Subject to decisions on funding available for
2010 onwards spending in this year may be increased up to the maximum of
£11m. The actual figures for each area are likely to fluctuate during the year
as some research projects conclude and new contracts are let. In addition, to
research, the programme also funds specialist support staff to provide
scientific advice across the programme, and project management of the
various external suppliers contracted to carry out research work.
Laboratory Analysis
Research on the efficacy of conventional forensic recovery techniques
(fingerprints and DNA) on CBR contaminated evidence. Development of
methods for safe handling of contaminated evidence Research into methods
for rapid identification of CBR agents in food and water.
4 of 14
CBRN Protection
Reducing the physiological burden for first responders wearing Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) and increasing operational time. Development of
standards for assessing the performance of PPE.
Detection
Development of technology and systems to identify a release, the extent and
level of concentration of materials in a large area for both fixed point and hand
held applications. Development of technology and systems to detect
concealed materials or devices. Development of methodologies for routinely
monitoring the background level of toxic materials and interferents in the
environment.
Medical Countermeasures
Identification of prophylaxis and treatments to counter effects of exposure to
C, B, and R material. This includes determination of the efficacy of early/pre-
symptomatic diagnosis, antidotes, therapies and antibiotics.
5 of 14
09/10 Research 09/10 Cost
Conducted externally ≈ 800 (£k)
Models
Validation of dispersion models for movement of CBR material in the urban
environment, transport networks, and other public areas. Linkage of
dispersion models to decision models.
Working closely with the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism RN
Mitigation project team to develop enhanced capabilities to provide future
technical options to mitigate risks and enhance operational effectiveness.
6 of 14
3. Social and Behavioural Science Programme
In addition to managing its own research programme, the OSCT social and
behavioural science research team (SBRT) is part of a larger cross
government group of researchers and analysts working on the PREVENT
agenda. SBRT has a coordinating role in this endeavour, ensuring appropriate
prioritisation and avoidance of duplication of research projects. Together with
other Government departments and agencies, the SBRT is increasingly
working with, and contributing to, the Pursue, Protect and Prepare policy and
research programmes for the CONTEST II strategy.
7 of 14
Brief outline of the approach
The radicalisation process is imperfectly understood, multifactorial and
research subjects may be difficult to study. Our understanding of
radicalisation has improved considerably in recent years although much more
needs to be done to understand the relative importance of political, economic,
social and psychological factors and how they interact in individual cases.
8 of 14
- secondary (targeted communications, usually delivered locally, to
specific audience segments) designed to change attitudes and shape
behaviour;
- tertiary (targeted at particularly vulnerable groups and individuals,
probably by specialist practitioners) designed to change behaviour.
9 of 14
• Management of a portfolio of 17 projects across a range of innovation
providers across academia and industry. The projects are aimed at
improving the state of the art in explosives and weapons detection
technology, and are jointly funded by four government departments.
• Investigating less-lethal weaponry options for deployment in terrorist
situations.
Explosives Forensics
Research to enhance existing methods and develop new forensic techniques
to maintain the operational capability of the Forensic Explosives Laboratory.
Maritime Protection
The development of less lethal interception systems for small and medium
vessels and the research into the protection of vessels in port and installations
with a maritime boundary.
10 of 14
09/10 Research 09/10 Cost
Conducted internally Supported by additional
internal HO research/science
Conducted externally* < 100 (£k)
11 of 14
8. ERA Security & Intelligence Analysis Team (SIAT)
The Security and Intelligence Analysis Team provides analytical support to
OSCT; its activities contribute to the evidence base underpinning the Home
Office’s work to “Protect the public from terrorism”. In addition to work
supporting each of the four Ps, the team also undertakes analysis aimed at
strengthening the evidence base generally and supporting CONTEST.
Prevent
During 2008/2009, we developed and promulgated cutting-edge techniques
for the analysis of covert social networks, and analysed two specific networks
in detail, producing suggestive early results on both structural features of
covert networks and mechanisms of recruitment into such networks. During
2009/2010 and beyond, we plan to develop these approaches further, and to
build up a library of real-world covert networks drawn from a variety of
sources, which can be used as a dataset in its own right in order to investigate
the effects of network structures and behaviour on radicalisation and de-
radicalisation.
Protect
During 2008/2009, we supported policy development and PSA target
development for the Crowded Places strand of the Protect agenda, and were
able to help develop a much more strongly evidence-based target. During
2009/2010, we intend to continue this work with a focus on the trajectory
towards the target and on the development of the policy beyond the current
PSA period. We will also work closely with colleagues in TRANSEC to
develop a strong evidence base for the Transport strand of this agenda, and
to ensure that our analytical approaches within the different strands are
consistent.
One key gap in the Protect evidence base concerns the extent to which
Protect (and to some extent Pursue) measures deter terrorists, rather than
simply displacing their activities to softer targets. During 2009/10, we will
initiate a programme of research to fill this gap (jointly with TRANSEC); the
first stages will use a war-gaming approach.
12 of 14
09/10 Research 09/10 Cost
Conducted internally
Prepare
During 2008/2009, we have had relatively little involvement in the construction
of the social science evidence base for Prepare; during 2009/10, we will seek
to establish the key evidence gaps in this area, and develop a programme of
work to begin to fill them, as we have done for the other Ps.
Pursue
During 2008/2009, we initiated a programme of work to establish the detailed
evidence base for links between terrorist finance and organised fraud; in
2009/2010, we plan to continue this work, and to extend it to other areas of
organised crime.
13 of 14
establish a definition of “a terrorist incident” which is accepted by the relevant
stakeholders. This can then be used to establish a baseline dataset for more
detailed analysis of numbers and types of terrorist incidents over time.
Finally, the rationale for CT activity depends strongly upon the cost that the
fear of terrorism imposes upon all of us; at present there is no good estimate
of the magnitude of these costs for the UK, and we will initiate work to
estimate them during 2009/2010.
In addition to our work to plug specific gaps, we will also continue the detailed
mapping and summarising of the evidence base which we began in
2008/2009, in order to contribute to a shared understanding of the evidence
base and its weaknesses among the many CONTEST stakeholders.
о
Physical/natural sciences, social sciences, statistics, engineering, economics and
operational research.
14 of 14