1.THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR vs.
PANGANDAPUN BENITO
[G.R. No. L-28113. March 28, 1969]
FACTS:
Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanaodel Sur, while Pangandapun
Benito is the mayor of the municipality of Balabagan. Balabagan was formerly a part of the
municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of
the then President Carlos P. Garcia. Mayor Balindong filed an action for prohibition to nullify
Executive Order 386 and to restrain the municipal officials of Balabagan from performing the
functions of their respective offices. He argues that Section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio
Charter Act] is a "statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio [and]
implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, as held in the prior case of
Pelaez vs. Auditor General. On the other hand, the officials of the municipality of Balabagan
argue that the rule announced in Pelaez is not applicable because unlike the municipalities
involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation,having
been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional. Its officers
have been either elected or appointed. The municipality itself has discharged its corporate
functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as
a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be
inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Balabagan is a de facto municipal corporation.
RULING:
While it is true that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State
in a proceeding for quo warrantoor other direct proceeding, the rule disallowing collateral
attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation.If it is
neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a complete nullity, the rule is that its existence
may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights
or interests are affected thereby. The municipality of Balabagan was organized before the
promulgation of Pelaez vs. Auditor General. Can the statute creating Balabagan lend color of
validity to an attempted organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute is
subsequently declared unconstitutional? Supreme Court held that the color of authority may
be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time by the
courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found
in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or
constitution of the state.
In the case at bar, what is important is that there must be some other valid law giving
corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a
time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto
corporation, because, aside from the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no
other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. An unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Therefore, Executive
Order 386 created no office. This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the
municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the
existence of Executive Order 386 is an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.
Therefore, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the municipal officials of the
Municipality of Malabang were permanently restrained from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices.
2. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR.
[G.R. No. 103702. December 6, 1994]
FACTS:
On August 20, 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued Executive Order No. 353 creating
the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, pursuant to the Sections 68 and 2630 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Subsequently, the municipal district of San Andres was later
officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality. On June 5, 1989,
the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warrantowith the Regional Trial Court
against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres, which sought the declaration of nullity
of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the local officials of the Municipality of San
Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing their duties and functions. It was
argued that EO 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the
legislature. On December 2, 1991, the lower court finally dismissed the petition for lack of
cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding that whatever
defects were present in the creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to
executive orders were cured by the enactment of RA 7160, otherwise known as Local
Government Code of 1991. This prompted the Municipality of San Narciso to file a petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Andres is a de facto municipal corporation.
RULING:
When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to
the State in a proceeding for quo warrantoor any other credit proceeding. It must be brought
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and commenced by the Solicitor General
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on August
20, 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on June 5, 1989, that the
municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In
the meantime, the Municipality of San Andres began and continued to exercise the powers
and authority of a duly created local government unit. A quo warrantoproceeding assailing the
lawful authority of a political subdivision must, with greatest imperativeness, be timely raised.
Public interest demands it. Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for
being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the
Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status closely approximating that of a
de facto municipal corporation. Created in 1959, by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the
Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when Pelaez v.
Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it did not. On the
contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres, such as the following:
1. After more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the
Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality.
2. Section 31 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
constituted Municipality of San Andres as covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court.
3. Under the Ordinance adopted on October 15, 1986, apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, which was appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San
Andres has been considered to be as part of the Third District of the province of Quezon.
Finally, equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code which states that
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.The power to
create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. And Congress did just that when it
incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, in essence, are retrospective. They
are aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws. All
considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon
must now be conceded.
3. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL [G.R. No. 116702. December 28, 1995]
FACTS:
The case revolves around the controversy on territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Alicia, Bohol. During the proceedings, after presentation of evidence by the Municipality of
Candijay, the latter asked the trial court to bar the Municipality of Alicia from presenting its
evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. It was adjudged by the lower court
that Barangay Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay.
Therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory. The Regional Trial Court of Bohol
permanently enjoined defendant Municipality of Alicia to respect plaintiff's control, possession
and political supervision of Barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its
possession and ownership over the same barrio. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It ruled that the trial court committed an error in
declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Candijay
because the lower court rejected the boundary line being claimed by the Municipality of Alicia
based on certain exhibits. If allowed, the Municipality of Candijay will not only engulf the
entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of many other barrios. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of
territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. CA also found,
after an examination of the respective survey plans both plans are inadequate insofar as
identifying the monuments of the boundary lines. It decided the case based on the rule on
equiponderance of evidence. Hence, the Municipality of Candijay now files a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Alicia has a juridical personality to claim its territory.
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds that the issues of fact in this case had been adequately passed
upon by the Court of Appeals with the application of the equiponderance doctrine which
states: “When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence
which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.” The
determination of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent Court involves the
appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless
shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing. As to the issue
on the personality of the Municipality of Alicia, it is noteworthy that the Municipality of
Candijay commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of respondent
municipality on January 19, 1984 or some thirty five years after respondent municipality first
came into existence in 1949. The Municipality of Candijay contended that Executive Order
No. 265 issued by President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating the Municipality of
Alicia is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers, and was therefore declared
unconstitutional in Pelaez vs. Auditor General. However, the factual milieu of the Municipality
of Alicia is strikingly similar to that of the Municipality of San Andres in the case of
Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez. The latter case, in appreciating the de jure status of
the municipality, considered the peculiar circumstances supporting its juridical existence.
In the case at bar, respondent Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order
No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had
been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated.
And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and
acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33
above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court.
Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, it is one of twenty
municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol. Inasmuch as respondent municipality of
Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from
the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, which states that municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
4.THE MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR. [G.R. No. 105746.
December 2, 1996]
FACTS:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by President ElpidioQuirino through Executive
Order No. 258, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. EO 258
stated that the mother Municipality of Jimenez shall have its present territory, minus the
portion thereof included in the Municipality of Sinacaban. Based on the technical description
stated in the EO, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios
Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto. In response, the Municipality of
Jimenez, while conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted
jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This
agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No.
77, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the
Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. The suit was filed against Sinacaban and other
government agencies. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the Pelaezruling, the power
to create municipalities is essentially legislative. Consequently, Sinacaban, which was
created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial
claim against Jimenez, of which it remains part. Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined
from assuming control and supervision over the disputed barrios. RTC, however, maintained
the status quo, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban shall continue to exist and operate as a
regular municipality, for the following reasons: “Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it
had completely organized itself even prior to the Pelaezcase and exercised corporate powers
for forty years (40) before its existence was questioned; that Jimenez did nothave the legal
standing to question the existence of Sinacaban, the same being reserved to the State as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General in a quo warrantoproceeding; that Jimenez
was estopped from questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by entering into an
agreement with it concerning their common boundary; and that any question as to the legal
existence of Sinacaban had been rendered moot by Sec. 442(d) LGC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legal juridical entity, duly created in accordance
with law;
2. Whether the decision of the Provincial Board regarding the boundaries had acquired
finality.
RULING:
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal
corporations is essentially a legislative matter. Therefore, the President was without power to
create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, the Supreme Court had
since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly
recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
This was the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez, Sr. Here, the same factors are
present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in
the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly as shown in
the following circumstances:
1. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years (16) when Pelaez v. Auditor General
was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never
been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was
questionedand only because it had laid claim to a certain area.
2. The State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's
corporate existence.
a. Under Administrative Order No. 33 and Section 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban has a municipal circuit court.
b. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an
agreement with it regarding their common boundary which was embodied in Resolution No.
77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
c. Indeed, Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental.
3. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., Sec.
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in
the creation of Sinacaban.
Second, the Supreme Court held that the Provincial Board did not have the authority to
approve the agreement declaring certain barrios part of one or the other municipality because
the effect would be to amend the technical description stated in E.O. No. 258. Any alteration
of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying
into effect of that law but is rather considered an amendment. Since Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory
of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the territorial claim of
Sinacaban.
5.SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [G.R. No. 161414.
January 17, 2005]
FACTS:
This case involves the municipality of Andong, Lanaodel Sur, which is a town that is not
supposed to exist yet but is insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Andong was
created through Executive Order No. 107 issued by Pres. Macapagal in 1965, which was
declared void in the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965).Sultan Camid alleges that
Andong “has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials
appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents.” He however
concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of
the elective local government positions in Andong. He also alleges that the town has its own
high school, Bureau of Posts, DECS Office, among others. According to him, public officials
of Andong have been serving their constituents in their own little ways and means despite
absence of public funds. To bolster his claims, he presented to the Court a DENR-CENRO
Certification of the total land area of the Municipality of Andong. He also submitted a
Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning Andong’s
population (14,059). He also lists several government agencies and private groups that have
allegedly recognized Andong. Camid assails the DILG certification of 18 municipalities
certified as “existing” per DILG records. These 18, were among the 33 municipalities whose
creation was voided by the Court in the Pelaezcase. He imputes grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the DILG for not classifying Andong as a regular existing municipality and in not
including it in its records and official database. Camid also argues that EO 107 remains valid
because of the decision of court in Municipality of San Narciso vs. Hon. Mendez, where the
court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a de facto
municipal corporation. He insists that inspite of insurmountable obstacles, Andong lives on.
Hence, its existence should be given judicial affirmation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality whose creation by executive fiat, which was previously voided
by the Court, may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or implementing statute.
RULING:
The Court said that the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and
mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual questions. Also, the
Pelaezcase and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create
municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in
actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government
Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive
order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres,
Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by the Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local
Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects these municipalities had labored
under. Andong is not similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation. This
is because there are eminent differences between Andong and the other municipalities. The
most prominent is that, the EO which created Andong was expressly annulled by the Court in
1965. The court said that if it would affirm Andong’sde facto status by reason of its alleged
continued existence despite its nullification, it would in effect condone defiance of a valid
order of the Court. Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the
parties aggrieved. Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code (LGC), as it requires that, for the municipality created by EO to receive
recognition, they must “have their respective set of elective officials holding office at the time
of the effectivity of the LGC. Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. The
national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of
the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections in the void municipality. Andong
is not listed as among the municipalities of Lanaodel Sur in the Ordinance apportioning the
seats of Congress in the 1987 Constitution. Finally, Andong has not been reestablished
through statute. In contrast, the 18 municipalities in the DILG certification, were recognized as
such because subsequent to the ruling in the Pelaezcase, legislation was enacted to
reconstitute these municipalities. Section 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm or
reconstitute the judicially-dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been
previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. On the other hand, the
municipalities judicially-dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang,
remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the
eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG.
 On July 18, 1960, the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte passed Resolution No. 62
suspending the implementation of Executive Order 368. The Board also created a committee
to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in the barrios and sitios affected by Executive Order 368
and to finally settle the boundary dispute.
Settlement of Boundary Dispute
the municipality of Sogod filed Civil Case No. R-1706 for certiorari and prohibition with the
6. THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD vs. ROSALMEDIALDEA; September 24, Court of First Instance to enjoin the provincial board and provincial governor from taking
1991NATURE cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between the two municipalities and to
enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercising territorial jurisdiction over the barrios of
Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Pangi, Taa Casao, Sta. Cruz, Tuburan and Laogawan all allegedly belonging to the
Facts: municipality of Sogod

On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of On August 31, 1973, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction over the
Bontoc, formerly a barrio of the municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be subject matter of the case
composed of the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa,
G.R. No. 38205
Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios
On December 7, 1970, the municipality of Sogod filed Civil Case No. R-1707 with the Court of
A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the
First Instance of Southern Leyte for recovery of taxes with receivership against the
municipality of Sogod with the latter claiming that the former exercised jurisdiction not only
municipality of Bontoc. The complaint alleged that the municipality of Bontoc, without any
over the barrios above-mentioned but also over other ten (10) barrios allegedly belonging to
legal basis, exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios enumerated in Republic Act No.
Sogod.
522 but also over ten (10) barrios belonging to the complainant municipality of Sogod
On June 17, 1952, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing the
, the trial court issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. R-1707 on the ground that the right
holding of a plebiscite among the barrios of Pangi, Taa part of Sta. Cruz, Tuburan, Laogawan
to collect taxes would ultimately depend on Civil Case No. R-1706, which was already
and their corresponding sitios. The purpose of the plebiscite is to determine whether the
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that the issue as to boundary dispute have not yet been
people in these barrios would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc.
decided in a plebiscite for that purpose
more votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those in favor of Bontoc
Issue:
, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to the President of
the Philippines and/or to the Congress of the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be amended whether or not the trial court gravely erred in dismissing the two cases for lack of jurisdiction.
so as to include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc, the following barrios claimed
by Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not included in said law, namely: Baugo, Ruling: NO
Himakilo, Esperanza, Hibagwan, Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the
On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines, promulgated parties nor can it be acquired or diminished by any act of the parties.
Executive Order No. 368, which approved the recommendation of the provincial board of
Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and sitios which shall compose the municipalities of It is a settled rule that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
Bontoc and Sogod. commencement of action

However, on July 14, 1960, the President of the Philippines, thru then Executive Secretary At the time the civil actions were filed with the trial court by petitioner municipality in 1970, the
Castillo sent a telegram to the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte to SUSPEND applicable laws necessary for the determination of the question of whether the trial court has
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 368. the authority to decide on the municipal boundary dispute are the following: 1) Republic Act
No. 522, creating the municipality of Bontoc; 2) Republic Act No. 3590, the Revised Barrio
Charter, revising Republic Act No. 2370; and 3) Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of
Code of 1917. Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable
settlement was reached.
Republic Act No. 522 defines the jurisdiction of the municipality of Bontoc. It clearly
enumerates the barrios which shag compose the municipality of Bontoc. This means that all The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary
the other barrios in Southern Leyte which are not included in the law creating the municipality dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no
of Bontoc are deemed to remain under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sogod jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas PambansaBlg. 129. that Section 118 of
Republic Act No. 3590 on June 22, 1963, known as the Revised Barrio Charter, barrios may the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties
be created and their boundaries altered only by Act of Congress or by the corresponding already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In fact, both agreed to
provincial board upon petition of the majority of the voters in the area affected and the elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118
recommendation of the municipality in which the proposed barrios are situated. Thus, the governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule
provincial board was empowered under the Id law to determine and alter boundaries of 4 of the Rules of Court.
municipalities and barrios
ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
Further, the law then vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities on WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary
the provincial board pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

It is clear from the aforestated legal provision that the authority to hear and resolve municipal HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.
boundary disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not to the trial courts. The decisions
of the boards are then appealable to the Executive Secretary. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE
FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR
Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter of delay to the then Secretary of MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY
Interior (now Executive Secretary) for action instead of bringing it to the trial court. Although URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR.
existing laws then vested on the provincial board the power to determine or even alter
municipal boundaries, the Secretary of Interior or the Executive Department for that matter,
was not precluded during that time from taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of “Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. — Boundary
the boundary dispute disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably. To this end:
We find that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the cases for want of jurisdiction and “(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality
in allowing the provincial board to continue with the pending investigation and proceedings on shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniangpanlungsod or sangguniangbayan
the boundary dispute. concerned.
“(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall
The 1987 Constitution now mandates that no province, city, municipality or barangay may be be referred for settlement to the sangguniangpanlalawigan concerned.
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in “(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Hence, any “(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a
alteration or modification of the boundaries of the municipalities shall only be by a law to be highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly
enacted by Congress subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
the barrios affected (Section 134, Local Government Code). Thus, under present laws, the “(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days
function of the provincial board to fix the municipal boundaries are now strictly limited to the from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect.
factual determination of the boundary lines between municipalities, to be specified by natural Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall
boundaries or by metes and bounds in accordance with the laws creating said municipalities. decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.”
7. MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA VS MADRONA G.R. No. 141375. April 30, 2003.],
Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute
between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on
the other — or between two or more highly urbanized cities — shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved. There is no
question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of
Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not
a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality
seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent
component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city.
Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.
SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. — Under Section 451 of the LGC, a
city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent
component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a
highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas PambansaBlg. 643, which calls for
a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct
BatasangPambansa. There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an
allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its
Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG.129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO
ADJUDICATE ALL CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD
FROM THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT BAR. —
As previously stated, “jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the
parties.” It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties
or by estoppel. It should not be confused with venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC
finds no application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then
be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since there
is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of
boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same
province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to
Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those
expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the
exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also
exclusive.
8. BARANGAY SANGALANG VS BRGY.MAGUIHAN
More credence should be given to the survey of lands conducted by the LMB, than
that of the tax assessors.
Facts:
This is a territorial dispute involving claims of jurisdiction between the two Barangays, namely
Sangalang and Maguihan (both in Batangas) over a parcel of land. Sangalang claims that the
said lot is within their territorial jurisdiction while Maguihan claims that it is within their
territorial boundary.
The dispute was then referred to the Sangguniang Bayan for resolution. The hearing
committee, in its report found that the disputed lot is within the jurisdiction of Sangalang. This
was affirmed by the Sangguniang Bayan (SB). The decision was appealed by Maguihan to
RTC (Sec. 119 LGC) which overturned the decision of the SB, and declared the disputed land
to belong to Maguihan.
Sec. 119 LGC: Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any
party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the
appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area
prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
Aggrieved, Sangalang filed a notice of appeal to the CA. CA dismissed the appeal citing that
the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. The proper remedy was Rule 42 (Petition for
Review) because the decision of RTC was in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It
further said, that even if it could have filed an appeal under Rule 41, it would still be
dismissed because the submitted appellants brief failed to contain a subject index and page
references to the records requirement in its Statement of Facts and Case and Argument.
Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issues:
(1) WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case by applying the rigid
technical procedure over substantial justice.
(2) WON RTC has jurisdiction of the appeal made by Maguihan considering there was no
payment of docket fee.
(2) WON the RTC erred in ruling that the disputed lot belonged to the jurisdiction of
Maguihan.
Ruling:
Let’s tackle the substantive issue first.
Third Issue: Disputes of the Barangay over a certain lot.
What it basically involved is adjudication as to which barangay the lots in dispute belong.
Petitioner submitted the following Documents:
1. Copy of a certification from the Office of the Provincial Assessor stating that the disputed
lots are all within the territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Sangalang.
2. Copies of Tax Declaration Nos. 038-00315, 038-00316 and 038-00317, and
3. Old Map of Barangay Sangalang.
Respondent’s Documents:
1. Certified copy of the cadastral map of the Lemery Cadastre, which was approved on March
17, 1983 by the Director of Lands, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
2. Certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources dated September 9, 1997.
Art. 17 of the IRR of LGC proscribes the documents to be submitted for the settlement of
boundary disputes.
Art. 17: Documents attached to petition - The petition shall be accompanied by:
1. Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute creating the LGU or any other document
showing proof of creation of the LGU;
2. Provincial, city, municipal, or barangay map, as the case may be, duly certified by the LMB.
3. Technical description of the boundaries of the LGUs concerned;
4. Written certification of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor, as the case may be, as to
territorial jurisdiction over the disputed area according to records in custody;
5. Written declarations or sworn statements of the people residing in the disputed area; and
6. Such other documents or information as may be required by the sanggunian hearing the
dispute.
The RTC observed that neither of the parties satisfied the requirement that all the
enumerated documents must be attached to the petition. Hence, like the RTC, this Court is
left with no other option but to select which between the documents presented by the parties
carries greater weight in proving its claim.
The documents presented by petitioner were sourced from the tax assessors office, whereas
the documents presented by respondent were sourced from the land management bureau.
The answer is very apparent and needs little discussion.
To this Court’s mind, the presence of the cadastral map, which was approved by the Director
of Lands, should be given more weight than the documents sourced by petitioner from the
assessors office. Said map was approved on March 17, 1986, which was approximately 10
years before the controversy in hand developed. Hence, the same should be controlling in the
absence of proof that such document is invalid or inaccurate. As a matter of fact,
notwithstanding the hearing committees recommendation to rule in favor of petitioner, the
committee itself stated in its report that the cadastral map submitted by respondent was
authentic.
It is undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal government agency tasked
with the survey of lands, and thus, more weight should be given to the documents relating to
its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the ordinary course of business. Between
a geodetic engineer (has sufficient expertise) and a tax assessor (mainly concerned with
assessment of taxes), the conclusion is inevitable that it is the formers certification as to the
location of properties in dispute that is controlling, absent any finding of abuse of discretion.
As correctly observed by respondent and the RTC, the duty of provincial and municipal
assessors is primarily the assessment of taxes and not the survey of lands.
Lastly, petitioner alludes to a petition/resolution allegedly of persons residing in the properties
in dispute to the effect they are under the jurisdiction of petitioner. On this note, this Court
agrees with the observation of the RTC that the determination as to whether the properties in
dispute are within a certain jurisdiction is not a decision to be made by the populace, to wit:
x x x In simple language, the population follows the territory and not vice versa. It is the
determination of the ambit and sphere of the land area as culled in the approved barangay
map that determines the jurisdiction of the barangay and not the decision of the populace. To
allow the latter will open endless litigation concerning disputes of jurisdiction.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: (pwede na di basahon)
The court said that it is bewildered by the petitioner to tailor-fit the rules to their own
convenience (kung asa ang pabor sa ilaha, mao to ilaha gusto I apply). As to the first issue, it
questioned the rigid application of law, however in the second issue, they questioned why the
rules was not strictly applied.
Docket Fees: Yambao v. Court of Appeals declared:
Considering the importance and purpose of the remedy of appeal, an essential part of our
judicial system, courts are well-advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from constraints of technicalities. In line
with this policy, we have held that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate docket
fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal.
The court further said that the petitoners only raised this issue in their Motion for
Reconsideration, and respondent had explained that his failure to do so was because of
ignorance. The failure to pay docket fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of an
appeal, it being discretionary on the part of the appellate court to give it due course or not.
This Court will then not interfere with matters addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC in
the absence of proof that the exercise of such discretion was tainted with bias or prejudice, or
made without due circumspection of the attendant circumstances of the case.
Issue on Appeal to CA: CA was correct, but should have not dismissed the case.
After an examination of relevant laws pertinent to herein petition, this Court finds that the CA
was correct in holding that petitioner had availed itself of the wrong remedy.
As correctly observed by the CA, under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the
jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of boundary disputes between and among local
government units is to be lodged before the proper Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, if it involves two or more barangays in the
same city or municipality. Under Section 118(e) of the same Code, if there is a failure of
amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned and
shall decide the same within (60) days from the date of the certification referred to.[24]
Section 119 of the Local Government Code also provides that the decision of
the sanggunian concerned may be appealed to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area in
dispute, within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, it is clear that when the case was appealed to the RTC, the latter took
cognizance of the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, not its original
jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from the RTC Decision must conform to the provisions
of the Rules of Court dealing with said matter.
Based on Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner availed itself of the wrong remedy, but
the CA should have not so easily dismissed the petition, because of the emerging trend
towards liberal construction of the Rules.
In a case, the court has said: Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even
the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put
an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has
allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice and equity. This was further explained by SC in the case of Aguam vs. CA.
9. CALANZA V. PICOP
Facts:
Petitioners Leonora P. Calanza, et. al., filed with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development
Service, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XI, of Davao
City, applications for small-scale mining permits for the purpose of extracting gold. They
stated that the area where they will conduct mining operations was in the Municipality of
Boston, Davao Oriental. Their application was approved by the governor of Davao Oriental,
Rosalind Y. Lopez.
Since the mining areas applied for by petitioners were within the respondent Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines’ (PICOP) logging concession area under Timber License
Agreements (TLAs), petitioners negotiated with PICOP for their entry into the mining site at
Barangay Catihan, Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental.
PICOP, through its officer Roberto A. Dormendo, refused petitioners’ entry into the mining
area on the ground that petitioners’ mining permits are defective since they were issued by
the governor of Davao Oriental when in fact the mining area is situated in Barangay
Pagtilaan, Municipality of Lingig, Surigao del Sur.
Because of such refusal, petitioners filed a Complaint against PICOP and its officers before
the RTC of Banganga, Davao Oriental, praying that PICOP or its agent be enjoined from
preventing and prohibiting them from entering into the mining site.
PICOP countered that the RTC of Davao Oriental has no jurisdiction over the complaint of
petitioners since the disputed area is situated in the Province of Surigao del Sur.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. The RTC opined that Barangay Pagtilaan (as
claimed by PICOP) or Catihan (as claimed by petitioners) is within the territory of the
Province of Davao Oriental.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and dismissed the complaint of
respondents.
The Court of Appeals stated that the RTC erred in passing upon the issue of the boundary
dispute between the provinces of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur since the resolution of
the boundary dispute primarily resides with the sangguniang panlalawigans of the two
provinces and the RTC has only appellate jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Issue: WON RTC has original jurisdiction over the case? NO.
There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a Local
Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two or more LGUs. In settling boundary disputes,
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. – Boundary
disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably. To this end:
xxx
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall
be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
xxx
Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any
party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute x x x.
Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing The Local Government Code
of 1991 outlines the procedures governing boundary disputes, which succinctly includes the
filing of the proper petition, and in case of failure to amicably settle, a formal trial will be
conducted and a decision will be rendered thereafter. An aggrieved party can appeal the
decision of the sanggunian to the appropriate RTC.
The records of the case reveal that the instant case was initiated by petitioners against
respondents predicated on the latter’s refusal to allow the former entry into the disputed
mining areas. This is not a case where the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur jointly rendered a decision resolving the boundary dispute of the two
provinces and the same decision was elevated to the RTC. Clearly, the RTC cannot exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no petition that was filed and decided by
the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC
assume original jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since the Local Government Code
allocates such power to the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del
Sur. Since the RTC has no original jurisdiction on the boundary dispute between Davao
Oriental and Surigao del Sur, its decision is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect.
----------------------------------------
Article 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. – The following procedures shall
govern the settlement of boundary disputes:
(a) Filing of petition - The sanggunian concerned may initiate action by filing a petition, in the
form of a resolution, with the sanggunian having jurisdiction over the dispute.
(b) Contents of petition - The petition shall state the grounds, reasons or justifications
therefore.
(c) Documents attached to petition - The petition shall be accompanied by:
1. Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute creating the LGU or any other document
showing proof of creation of the LGU;
2. Provincial, city, municipal, or barangay map, as the case may be, duly certified by the LMB.
3. Technical description of the boundaries of the LGUs concerned;
4. Written certification of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor, as the case may be, as to
territorial jurisdiction over the disputed area according to records in custody;
5. Written declarations or sworn statements of the people residing in the disputed area; and
6. Such other documents or information as may be required by the sanggunian hearing the
dispute.
(d) Answer of adverse party - Upon receipt by the sanggunian concerned of the petition
together with the required documents, the LGU or LGUs complained against shall be
furnished copies thereof and shall be given fifteen (15) working days within which to file their
answers.
(e) Hearing - Within five (5) working days after receipt of the answer of the adverse party, the
sanggunianshall hear the case and allow the parties concerned to present their respective
evidences.
(f) Joint hearing - When two or more sanggunians jointly hear a case, they may sit en banc or
designate their respective representatives. Where representatives are designated, there shall
be an equal number of representatives from each sanggunian. They shall elect from among
themselves a presiding officer and a secretary. In case of disagreement, selection shall be by
drawing lot.
(g) Failure to settle - In the event the sanggunian fails to amicably settle the dispute within
sixty (60) days from the date such dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to
the effect and copies thereof shall be furnished the parties concerned.
(h) Decision - Within sixty (60) days from the date the certification was issued, the dispute
shall be formally tried and decided by the sanggunian concerned. Copies of the decision
shall, within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation thereof, be furnished the parties
concerned, DILG, local assessor, COMELEC, NSO, and other NGAs concerned.
(i) Appeal - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may
elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the dispute by filing therewith the appropriate pleading, stating among others,
the nature of the dispute, the decision of the sanggunian concerned and the reasons for
appealing therefrom. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case within one (1) year from
the filing thereof. Decisions on boundary disputes promulgated jointly by two (2) or more
sangguniang panlalawigans shall be heard by the Regional Trial Court of the province which
first took cognizance of the dispute.