Hernandez v. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, (2012) Dismissal.
The IBP found respondent guilty of violating Canons
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez
(complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla
(respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his
alleged negligence in the handling of her case.
Facts:
Complainant was a respondent of an ejectment case with the
RTC. RTC ordered the Deed of Sale of complainants cancelled and
to pay the complainant of the said case, Duigan, attorney’s fees
and damages. Complainants chose Padilla to represent them for
their Appeal with the CA. He filed a Memorandum on Appeal
instead of an Appellants’ Brief, which was requested by the CA.
Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, which was granted
by the CA. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored
the Resolution, he acted with “deceit, unfaithfulness amounting
to malpractice of law.” Complainant and her husband failed to
file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the
adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked
respondent “several times” about the status of the appeal, but
“despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response,” to the
damage and prejudice of the spouses. Respondent claimed it was
the husband and not the complainant who transacted with him
and that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly
believed it was the pleading required. He further advised the
husband to settle the case and after not hearing from him again,
assumed that the husband heeded his advice. When he received
the CA’s Order to comment on the Motion to Dismiss, he
instructed his staff to contact the husband but to no avail and
was thus surprised when he was informed by the husband of the
5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended suspension for 3-6 months.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canons 5, 17 and
18 of the Code.
Ruling:
The Courts adopt the factual findings of the board of governors
of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees with its Decision to
reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the
six-month suspension the Board originally imposed. A perusal of
the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed
that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants
therein, including complainant and her husband. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship
and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Once a
lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve
the client with competence and diligence (Canon 18).
Respondent’s claim that the reason for his failure to file the
proper pleading was that he “did not have enough time to
acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case”
does not excuse his negligence to file a proper pleading and
comment on the Motion to Dismiss as well as failure to update
his clients regarding status of the case. Rule 18.02 of the Code
provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation, Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. and Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall
keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may
have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s duty to know
the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions.
CANON 5 - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS.
Spouses Aranda vs Atty. Emmanuel Elayda
In 2006, Atty. Emmanuel Elayda was hired by Spouses Virgilio
and Angelina Aranda to be their counsel in a civil case. However,
to their surprise in July 2006, an adverse judgment was issued
against them, thus they lost possession of their car. Apparently,
their counsel never appeared in court for them. Atty. Elayda
failed to inform the spouses of the date of hearing as well as the
order of judgment. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was
interposed by the lawyer as well.
In his defense, Atty. Elayda said that it was the spouses who
never went to court; that the spouses neglected to check on their
case in court; that one time when their case was scheduled, he
even notified the court stenographer to notify him if the spouses
are in court so that he could be there for them as he was in
another court branch for another case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Elayda should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. It was established that Atty. Elayda was remiss and
negligent in handling the Aranda case. Although it is true that the
client and their counsel must equally share the burden of
communication, it is the primary duty of the counsel to inform
the client of the status of their case in court and the orders which
have been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his
clients to make an inquiry about the developments in their case.
Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for
them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively
monitor the progress of the case. Also, his excuse that he did not
appear in court because the spouses failed to appear in court is
not tenable. His attendance at the hearing should not be made to
depend on the whether the spouses Aranda will come or not.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended a 6 month
suspension. This was adopted by the court.
ULEP v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Bar Matter No. 550, June 17, 1993
FACTS: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio
Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward
specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a
complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s
advertisements which contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on
DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-
2041 8:30am – 6:00pm 7 th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE DON PARKINSON An attorney in Guam is giving
FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce.
Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of
Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment
in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. 7 th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
nr. US Embassy Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article
entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star
wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of
specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff
of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields,
can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medicolegal problems, labor, litigation and
family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in
view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John
Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services
that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice
of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its
advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law
however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is
composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under
Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by
Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The
standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret
marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law
which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are
allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and
the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also
enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement: 1.
Advertisement in a reputable law list 2. Use of ordinary simple
professional card 3. Listing in a phone directory but without
designation as to his specialization
GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO 611 SCRA 508 (2010)
FACTS: The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a
complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment
against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana
P.Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality,
in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner caught
wind through her daughter that her husband was having an
affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child
with her; and the same information was confirmed when one of
her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons mall
with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in tow.
After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and
effort given yielded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her
legal husband had been married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on
June 1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty.
Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence, and has since failed
to render much needed financial support. In their defense, they
postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they
committed the supposed immorality, so as such, they were not
guilty of a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01.
SSUE: Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions
constitute a violation of Canon 1, Rule1.01 and thus a good
enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being
supposedly committed when they were not lawyers.
HELD: Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a
privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances
show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of
lawyers, be they academic or moral. In the present case, the
Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their
blatant violation of Canon 1,Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Furthermore, the contention of respondent that they were not
yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford them
exemption from sanctions; good moral character was already
required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. As a
lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty.
Garrido and Valencia were shouldered with the expectation that
they would set a good example in promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and
distorted it to cater to their own personal needs and selfish
motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession.
Such actions by themselves, without even including the fact of
Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the
detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that
Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages
to two other women including the petitioner, are clear
indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the
proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such,
their disbarment is affirmed.
 REYNALDO RAMIREZ vs. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-
MARGALLO
A.C. No. 10537
February 3, 2015
FACTS: Complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) engaged Atty.
Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of
Title entitled “Spouses Roque v. Ramirez.” The case was initiated
before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him as per a
referral from a friend of Ramirez’s sister. He alleged that Atty.
Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she
be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of
attorney’s fees. It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay
Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court appearance. On October 19,
2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse
to Ramirez. Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment.
She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of Appeals. The
Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of
Appeals sometime in 2008.14 On December 5, 2008, the Court of
Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief. Ramirez
notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one
prepared. On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo
to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Margallo informed
him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary
for the brief. On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the
status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no word
from the Court of Appeals. On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo
informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. She told him
that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to
establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis
of his claim. She also informed him that they could no longer
appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals
had been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an
Appeal had already lapsed. Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals.
There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April
13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for
filing beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner’s Contention: Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had
violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s Contention: By way of defense, Atty. Margallo
argued that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for
travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that
she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they
only had a 50% chance of winning the case. She denied ever
having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee
worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the controversy.
Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the
Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had begged her to do
so. She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for
document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he
finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had
been busy. Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the
unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing
her client’s number because her 8-year-old daughter played with
her phone and accidentally erased all her contacts.
IBP Findings and Recommendation: The Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The
Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of
reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution. It found that
respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon
18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Consequently, the Board of Governors
recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Margallo should be held
administratively liable?
RULING: Yes, Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty.
Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the case
of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She
made it appear that the case was dismissed on the merits
when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time.
She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client. Canon 17
and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly provide: CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES
FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM. CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to client’s request for information.
DE LEON v. CASTELO
A.C. No. 8620,
January 12, 2011
FACTS: On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the
purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City then
registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a public callejon and on
a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline. De Leon,
having joined the civil case as a voluntary intervenor two years
later, now accuses the respondent, the counsel of record of the
defendants, with the serious administrative offenses of
dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or
suspension as an attorney. The respondent’s error was allegedly
committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu of various pleadings that is, answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint;
and answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim
and cross-claim despite said spouses being already deceased at
the time of filing.
Defendant’s Defense: In his defense, he averred that he was
engaged to represent the Lim family by William and Leonardo
Lim, the children of Spouses Hio and Dolores Chu. That by virtue
of a deed of absolute sale executed in their favor by their parents,
William and Leonardo had assumed that the TCTs were already
transferred to their names. He prepared the initial pleading
based on his honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were then still living. Had he known that they were already
deceased; he would have most welcomed the information and
would have moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as
defendants for that reason.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility or Lawyer’s Oath.
HELD: No. The Court found that the respondent, as attorney,
did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his
pleadings. The records indicated that the respondent did not
misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still
living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the
answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and
cross-claim, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that
the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased.
Even if any of the respondent’s pleadings might have created any
impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still
living, the Court still cannot hold the respondent guilty of any
dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent was acting in
the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed
the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006.
As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion
any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made
clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were
no longer the actual owners of the affected properties due to the
transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action,
and that the actual owners needed to be substituted in lieu of
said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the
pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not
disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were no longer living. His joining in the action as a voluntary
intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons
interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of
such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, bear
out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William
Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly
insist that the respondent committed any dishonesty or
falsification in relation to him or to any other party.
Peter Bejarsco v PP
GR No 159781
This case concerns the dire consequences of a litigants
failure to periodically follow up with his counsel on the
developments of his appeal.
The petitioner was convicted on February 16, 2001,
for grave threats and grave oral defamation in the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) in Sibonga, Cebu. On July 31, 2001, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Argao, Cebu affirmed the
convictions. In due course, the petitioner, then represented by
the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), sought the reconsideration of
the RTC decision, claiming that he had not filed his appeal
memorandum because of the MTCs failure to give him free
copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. He argued that
the RTCs decision should be set aside and the criminal cases
against him should be dismissed due to the prematurity and the
serious errors of facts and law. However, the RTC denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration on September 24, 2001.
On October 12, 2001, the petitioner, this time represented by
Atty. Luzmindo B. Besario (Atty. Besario), a private practitioner,
filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a motion for extension of time
to file his petition for review (C.A.-G.R. CR No. UDK-181). The CA
granted his motion. Instead of filing his petition for review
within the period granted, however, Atty. Besario sought another
extension, but still failed in the end to file the petition for review.
Thus, on March 13, 2002, the CA dismissed his appeal. After the
dismissal became final and executory, entry of judgment was
made on April 4, 2002.
Thereafter, on March 31, 2003, the MTC issued a warrant
of arrest against the petitioner, who surrendered himself on May
22, 2003.
On July 16, 2003, the petitioner filed in the CA his petition for
review through another attorney, alleging that Atty. Besario had
recklessly abandoned him and had disappeared without leaving
a trace.
In its resolution dated August 14, 2003, the CA denied
admission to the petition for review and ordered it expunged
from the records; and reiterated its March 13, 2002resolution of
dismissal.[1]
Aggrieved, the petitioner is now before the Court to plead
his cause. He submits that Atty. Besarios reckless abandonment
of his case effectively deprived him of his day in court and of his
right to due process; and that said former counsels actuation
constituted reckless and gross negligence that should not be
binding against him.
The petition is denied due course.
That Atty. Besario was negligent in handling the petitioners case
was clear. Indeed, his abject failure to file the petition for review
in the CA despite his two motions for extension for that purpose
warranted no other conclusion but that he was negligent.
Nonetheless, we find no justification to reverse the CAs
disposition of the appeal. The petitioner was bound by Atty.
Besarios negligence.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsels
acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural
technique.[2] The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once
retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary
or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of
the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission
by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in
the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client
himself.[3] A recognized exception to the rule is when the
reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of
due process of law. For the exception to apply, however,
the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the clients
own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the
duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself
up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client
should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against
him.
Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of
his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely
in the hands of his lawyer. It is the clients duty to be in contact
with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the
progress and developments of his case;[4] hence, to merely rely
on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being
taken care of is not enough.
Here, the petitioner took nearly 16 months from the
issuance of the entry of judgment by the CA, and almost 22
months from when the RTC affirmed the convictions before he
actually filed his petition for review in the CA. He ought to have
been sooner alerted about his dire situation by the fact that an
unreasonably long time had lapsed since the RTC had handed
down its dismissal of his appeal without Atty. Besario having
updated him on the developments, including showing to him a
copy of the expected petition for review. Also, he could have
himself verified at the CA whether or not the petition for review
had been filed, especially upon realizing that Atty. Besario had
started making himself scarce to him. In short, the petitioners
failure to know or to find out the real status of his appeal
rendered him undeserving of any sympathy from the Court vis--
vis the negligence of his former counsel.
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process,
but is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by the law.[5] The right is unavoidably
forfeited by the litigant who does not comply with the manner
thus prescribed. So it is with the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the resolution promulgated
on August 14, 2003 in C.A. G.R. CR No. UDK-181 for failure of the
petitioner to show a reversible error committed by the Court of
Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 1900, June 13, 2012 ]
RODRIGO A. MOLINA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CEFERINO R.
MAGAT, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is the undated Resolution[1] of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding
Atty. Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical conduct
and recommending that he be reprimanded.
The Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint for disbarment[2] filed by
Rodrigo A. Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the
Court on May 5, 1978. The complaint alleged, among others, that
complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority and Breach of the Peace and Resisting Arrest against
one Pascual de Leon (de Leon) before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the counsel of record for accused
de Leon in both cases was Atty. Magat; that a case for slight
physical injuries was filed against him (Molina)by de Leon as a
counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the private prosecutor;
that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion to quash the
information on Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority
on the sole ground of double jeopardy claiming that a similar
case for slight physical injuries was filed in court by a certain
Pat. Molina (Molina); that based on the record, no case of
slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against de Leon;
that Atty. Magat was very much aware of such fact as he was the
counsel and private prosecutor on record of de Leon from the
very start of the case way back on May 24, 1974; that Atty.
Magat's act of filing the Motion to Quash was a malicious act
done in bad faith to mislead the court, thus, a betrayal of the
confidence of the court of which he is an officer; and that Atty.
Magat likewise committed willful disobedience of the court order
when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2) occasions
despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice of law.
In his Answer,[3] Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the filing of
the motion to quash was concerned, he was really under the
impression that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2) charges was
indeed filed and that the said motion was opposed by the other
party and was denied by the court. He admitted his appearances
in court while under suspension. He explained that his
appearance in the December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the
court that the accused was sick and to prevent the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the accused. In the January 9, 1978
hearing, he appeared because the accused had no money and
pleaded that his testimony be finished. Atty. Magat begged for
the indulgence of the court and conveyed his repentance and
apology and promised that the same would not happen again.
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[4] Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records
of the case to the IBP for proper disposition.
In his Report and Recommendation[5] dated March 20, 2009, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found merit in the complaint
and recommended that Atty. Magat be reprimanded and fined
P50,000.00. It stated that:
This Commission finds it hard to believe that respondent would
have mistakenly been under the impression that a case for
physical injuries was filed against his client when there was no
such case filed. Respondent was either negligently reckless or he
had mischievous intentions to deceive the trial court. In any case,
he committed a transgression for which he should be punished.
However, the graver sin of respondent is, and this he admits, that
he appeared as counsel before a trial court on at least two (2)
occasions notwithstanding the fact that he had been suspended
by the Supreme Court from the practice of law. Despite
professing his contrition in his Answer, this Commission is not
convinced. Otherwise, respondent should have had, at the onset
of the proceedings, admitted to his misdeeds and put his fate
squarely with the disciplinary body. Yet, he proceeded to fight
the charges against him.
Moreover, if respondent was indeed moved by altruistic
intentions when he made those appearances before the trial
court despite having been suspended, he could have so informed
the Presiding Judge of his plight and explained why the party he
was representing could not attend. Yet, what he proceeded to do
was to enter his appearance as counsel. Indeed, it is beyond
doubt he trifled with the suspension order handed by the
Supreme Court.
If there is one thing going for respondent, it is that the passage of
time with which this case remains pending makes it difficult to
impose a penalty of suspension on him. Under normal
circumstances, this Commission would not have thought twice of
suspending respondent. However, the acts committed by
respondent occurred over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would
not be fair to now impose a suspension on respondent, more so
considering that he is, in all likelihood, in the twilight of his
career.
On the other hand, there is still a need to discipline respondent if
only to set an example to other lawyers that suspension orders of
the Supreme Court cannot simply be ignored. Thus, it is the
recommendation of the undersigned that respondent be meted a
fine of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and that he be
heavily reprimanded for his actions, the passage of time
notwithstanding.[6]
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed its
Resolution[7] adopting the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not with
respect to the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show
that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty
to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[8]
Atty. Magat's act clearly falls short of the standards set by the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01,
which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that
there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat to
mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the
criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat
should not make any false and untruthful statements in his
pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight
physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do
was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case
was filed.
Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court
on two occasions despite having been suspended from the
practice of law by the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from office as an attorney for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so. It
provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. [Underlining supplied]
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic intentions
when he appeared before the trial court despite having been
suspended, he could have informed the Presiding Judge of his
plight and explained why the party he was representing could
not attend. On the contrary, Atty. Magat kept his silence and
proceeded to represent his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is hereby
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months with a WARNING that the commission of the same or
similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 Alberto Fernandez vs Atty. Benjamin Grecia
2 SCAD 438 – Legal Ethics – Gross Misconduct
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia
was filed on August 20, 1991 by Doctors Alberto Fernandez,
Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke’s
Medical Center (hereafter “St. Luke’s” for brevity) where they are
accredited medical practitioners. The respondent is charged with
dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of
some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in
a damage suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors
and St. Luke’s.
In 1990, Linda Aves was admitted to St. Lukes Hospital. Among
the doctors who treated her was Dr. Alberto Fernandez. She was
treated well hence she was sent home but then the next day she
died together with her unborn child. Damaso Aves, husband,
then filed a damage suit against the hospital and he impleaded
the attending doctors which included Fernandez. Aves hired
Atty. Benjamin Grecia to represent him.
Grecia requested St. Luke to surrender before the court the
medical records of Linda Aves. St. Luke complied and the medical
records were delivered to the Clerk of Court. In the morning of
July 16, 1991, Grecia went to the office of the clerk of court to
borrow the said medical records. While Grecia was examining
the said medical records, he tore in front of the Clerk and one
office staff two pages from the medical records and then handed
it back to the Clerk. The Clerk was stunned as she watched Grecia
walk away. She then reported the incident to the judge. The
judge immediately took action and the torn pages were
eventually recovered as it turned out that Grecia handed the torn
pages to someone else.
Grecia was then administratively charged by Dr. Fernandez.
Apparently, Grecia has been disbarred before. However, he was
able to get to the good side of the Supreme Court hence he was
reinstated to the profession.
ISSUE: Whether or not Grecia should be disbarred again.
HELD: Yes. Grecia violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a lawyer, he should not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. A lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar. A lawyer is an officer
of the courts; he is “like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the ends of justice”. Considering that this is his
second offense, an incorrigible practitioner of “dirty tricks,” like
Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of “an instrument
to advance the ends of justice.” By descending to the level of a
common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced
the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to
continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He
has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad,
the Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney
Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda
Aves’ medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he
violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
 Jocelyn De Leon v Atty. Padrena
Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct.
Respondent Pedreña, a Public Attorney, was charged for sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court held that the records show that
the respondent rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand;
tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her
hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his
finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which
he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and
undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They
constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard,
immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he
was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal
service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant was
then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as a public officer
to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he
thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in
desperate need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was
meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No.
9401, October 22, 2013.
DE LEON vs PEDREÑA708 SCRA 13
Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney of Parañaque City.
Jocelyn De Leon is a single mother of two minor children. Atty.
Pedreña is the counsel of Jocelyn De Leon on the case for support
for the two minor children. Records show, as established by the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, on January 30,2006 after asking
about the status of the casualty. Pedreña told Jocelyn De Leon
then to ride with him and he would just drop Jocelyn by
thejeepney station, she refused to ride with himbut Atty. Pedreña
persistently told her to get in the car, and so she acceded to his
request so as not to offend him. Inside the car Atty. Pedreña
rubbed the Jocelyn’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his
finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly
placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her
private part. Jocelyn thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car’s
door and told him categorically that she was getting off the car.
Instead he accelerated a bit more but sensing her insistence to
get off, he stopped the car, and allowed her to get off. Jocelyn de
Leon then filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) a
complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law
against Atty.Tyrone Pedreña.
Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent Pedreña, a Public
Attorney, was charged for sexual harassment. The Supreme
Court held that the records show that the respondent rubbed the
complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger
into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly
placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her
private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed
them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but
repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted
misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he
was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal
service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant was
then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as a public officer
to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he
thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in
desperate need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was
meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C.
No. 9401, October 22, 2013.
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., complainant versus Atty. Leo J. Palma,
respondent.
Adm. Case No. 2474 September 15, 2004
Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his
oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.
Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz
Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to
handle his cases. He hired respondent as his personal counsel.
Consequently, respondent’s relationship with complainant
became intimate. On June 22, without the knowledge of
complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa, the
complainant’s daughter in Hongkong. Complainant came to know
that, a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent
requested from his (complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to
and from Australia, with stop-over in Hongkong; b) respondent
misrepresented himself as bachelor in the Hongkong
authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and c)
respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has
three children. Complainant filed for the declaration of nullity
of the marriage between respondent and Lisa. The
complainant contented that with the moral ascendancy of the
respondent over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that
there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a
second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and
beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the
requirements of the Philippine law that he should first obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H.
Palma and that the “advice” of Maria Luisa’s parents should first
be obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of age,
respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in
Hongkong in June 22, 1992 by falsely representing himself
before the Hongkong authorities that he is a “bachelor.”
The respondent contented that “….. and that it is contrary to the
natural course of things for an immoral man to marry the woman
he sincerely loves.”
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of respondent to Ma. Luisa is
void ab initio.
Held: To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this
case.
Respondent admits that he married Luisa in Hongkong
representing himself as a bachelor; however, he claimed that the
marriage certificate stated a condition no different from the term
“spinster” with respect to Luisa. There is no question that
respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully well
that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous
marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa
while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima.
The Certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City
shows that he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at the
Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the
Certificate of Marriage from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages in
Hongkong proves respondent’s subsequent marriage with Lisa
on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of
respondent’s second marriage was confirmed. In particular, he
made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved
Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged with
immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen
regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man
and woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity. How could respondent perform these obligations to
Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really
loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk
away.
Furthermore, (not stated in the case) under Article 35 paragraph
3 of the Family Code, “a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license is void ab initio except those covered by the preceding
chapter”. Though the marriage was solemnized in Hongkong, the
intrinsic validity of the marriage is governed by the national law
of the contracting parties. In the case at bar, since both of the
parties are Filipino citizens, the validity of their marriage shall be
governed by the Philippine law. Under the Philippine law,
absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage shall
make the marriage void ab initio. Their marriage was contracted
without the valid marriage license, thus, the marriage of
respondent and Ma. Luisa is void ab initio.
The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. This is founded on the lawyers primordial duty to
society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of
Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first
in the enumeration. They knew then that more than anybody
else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most
obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:[37]
Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him,
of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them underfoot
and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office
and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of
the body politic.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer,
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
 CASE DIGEST : Estrada Vs Escritor
A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No.
00-1021-P) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD
S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.
FACTS : Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a
man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to
twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to
Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she
entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her
husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the
religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of
living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned,
there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good
standing in the congregation.
ISSUE : Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct."
HELD : The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or
accommodationist - are anchored on a different reading of the
"wall of separation." Separationist - This approach erects an
absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and
state. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct
or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular
programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers.
the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the
Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly
towards a more secular society Accommodationist - Benevolent
neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role
in the public life of the United States as shown by many
traditional government practices which An accommodationist
holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes
constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom.
On the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it
is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist
interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First
Amendment. Second, the accommodationist position best
achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the
accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to
protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable
effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and
indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the
accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical
way to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths
in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects
may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-
reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in
preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary In applying the test, the first inquiry is
whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been
burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping
her employment and abandoning her religious belief and
practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her
employment and keeping her religious practice and family
on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of
religion The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in
her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her
religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment
for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and
defined, much less only after an administrative case for
immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the
compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should
be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is
the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in
the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity
to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in
opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes
within the scope of free exercise protection.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-
RTJ) ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, vs.JUDGE MA. CECILIA I.
AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City,
Respondent.
FACTS: The complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc.No. 06-7993,
the respondent committed Gross ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection,
Conduct Unbecoming of a judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period
and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1. The respondent
appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s
objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal
counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he
engaged as legal adviser.2. The respondent conducted informal meetings
(which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order2 dated May
11,2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a
hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily
dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she
wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she
would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.3. The modified rehabilitation
plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated
to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and
effectively usurped and pre- empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of
functions.4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal
meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that she had favored
Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).5. The respondent had secret meetings and
communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge and
presence ofSCP and its creditors.6. The respondent appointed Gerardo
Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and, at the same time,
as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development f the
rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the
cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations
against SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion tocreate a management
committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a
subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the
allegation that there was a need for the creation of management committee),
the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the order
until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s
counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused
to recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and snide
remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by
the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She
approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the
Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme
Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of
the Rules (the court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the
power to amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the
matter in EPCIB’s favour and made comments and rulings in the proceedings
that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed
special interest and personal involvement in the case. The
complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April
14, 2008 where he alleged that the respondent committed an act
of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal
details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding compatible
partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl,
allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a
brassiere. In arriving at its recommendation the 1. OCA found that the
respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the
complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. The OCA also found that 2. the
charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were
not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the
charge of failure to observe the elementary period.
Lastly, 3. the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority
and gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the
subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct
unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared
JusticeGonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting
seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of
propriety set forth by the Code.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING: We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison
and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the
amount as indicated below. We sustain JusticeGonzales-Sison’s finding of
gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the
creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary
hearing. The absence of hearing was a matter of basic due process that no
magistrate should be forgetful or careless about. Even granting that the
respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at
best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial
remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous
order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such
as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23Errors committed by
him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected
through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead
through judicial remedies.24In the present case, aside from being
speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the
complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The
complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s
predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence
would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot
overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and
impartially. We thus conclude that due to the
Complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the
allegations of bias and partiality must fail. In the present case, nothing in the
records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the
complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad
faith cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith
intervened when none was actually proven.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One
Thousand Pesos (P21, 000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby
ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain
from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely.