LAHOM vs.

SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial
court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin
Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in
which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use
their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution
of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption
previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law
on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998,
wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed.
In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke
the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the
right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force,
could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of
the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to
in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be
for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of
the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a
right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying
him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.

GUICO, ET AL. vs. BAUTISTA, ET. AL.,

G.R. No. L-14921, December 31, 1960

FACTS:
Mariano G. Bautista and Gertrudes Garcia died intestate. The former’s properties had already
been extrajudicially partitioned among his heirs. Gertrudes Garcia left as her legitimate heirs plaintiffs
(their grandchildren) and defendants (their children). Gertrudes Garcia, during her lifetime, made
several deeds of donation of some of her properties in favor of all the defendants, but did not provide
that the properties donated would not be subject to collation, so that the donees are legally bound to
bring into the mass of the estate by way of collation the value of the properties received by them in
order that the net hereditary estate may be divided equally among the heirs. Gertrudes left outstanding
obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G.A. Machineries, Inc. Plaintiffs filed an
action for liquidation and partition of the estate. Defendants moved to dismiss the action alleging that it
is prematurely filed because it is admitted in the complaint that the deceased left certain debts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for partition and liquidation may be maintained, notwithstanding
that there are pending obligations of the estate.

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court is inclined to hold at the lower court that until all the debts of the estate
in question are paid, appellants' action for partition and liquidation is premature. The law allows the
partition of the estate of a deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action
for petition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the
purpose of the settlement of said estate if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all
of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians (sec. 1, Rule 74). The situation is
different where the deceased left pending obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be first paid
or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they
reach an amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably
be submitted to administration for the payment of such debts.
Appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the purpose of paying off its debts
be accomplished right in this partition. Obviously, an ordinary action for partition cannot be converted
into a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, without compliance with the
procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the rules of Court, especially the provisions on publication and
notice to creditors.

PEREZ vs. ARANETA

G.R. No. L-18872, July 15, 1966

FACTS:
Sometime in 1948, Angela S. Tuason died leaving a will. In conformity with this provision ofsaid
will, the present trusteeship proceedings was instituted and certain properties of the estate of the
deceased were turned over in 1950 to J. Antonio Araneta, as trustee for the benefit of Benigno, Angela
and Antonio, all surnamed Perez y Tuason, the grandchildren of the decedent. Portions of said
properties constituting the trust were sold. Thus, the judicial guardian and father of said minors filed a
motion in the trusteeship proceedings alleging that said proceeds of the sale represent profits or income
of the trusteeship to which said minors are entitled and praying that the trustee be accordingly
instructed to deliver said sum to the movant.
Perez’s contention: The proceeds of the sale is a profit or income as it was included as profit in
the statements of profits and losses attached to the corresponding income tax returns.
Trustor: Angela Tuason
Trustee: Antonio Araneta
Beneficiary: Benigno, Angela, Antonio (grandchildren of decedent)
Judicial guardian of the grandchildren: Antonio Perez

ISSUE:
Whether or not the aforesaid sum of P98,828.88 is a profit or income which should be turned
over to the guardian of said minors according to the provisions of the will.

RULING:
NO. To begin with, the issue as to whether or not the minors are entitled to the delivery of said
sum of P98,828.88 is a matter dependent exclusively upon the conditions upon which the trust had been
established, as provided in the above quoted paragraph of the will of the decedent, which in turn
depends upon the latter's intent, as set forth in said paragraph. Upon the other hand, the question
whether the sum in question is a profit or not within the purview of our internal revenue law depends
upon the provisions of the latter, regardless of the will of the decedent. Secondly, the proceeds of the
sale of portions of the real estate held in trust, merely take is a matter dependent exclusively upon the
conditions upon which the trust had been established, as provided in the above quoted paragraph of the
will of the decedent, which in turn depends upon the latter's intent, as set forth in said paragraph. Upon
the other hand, the question whether the sum in question is a profit or not within the purview of our
internal revenue law depends upon the provisions of the latter, regardless of the will of the decedent.
Secondly, the proceeds of the sale of portions of the real estate held in trust, merely take the place of
the property sold. What is more, the provision of the will of the decedent explicitly authorizing the
trustee to sell the property held in trust and to acquire, with the proceeds of the sale, other property
leaves no room for doubt about the intent of the testatrix to keep, as part of the trust, said proceeds of
the sale, and not to turn the same over to the beneficiary as net rentals. Thirdly, pursuant to the general
law on trust, "a provision in the instrument to the effect that the beneficiary shall be entitled to the
'income and profits of' of the trust estate is not ordinarily sufficient to indicate an intention that he
should be entitled to receive gains arising from the sale of trust property ..." The corpus of the estate, no
matter what changes of form it undergoes, should be regarded as the same property. That the trust
property is srcinally money, later becomes bonds, and still later real estate, ought not to affect the
status of the property as the capital fund. Hence, it is well settled that profits realized in the sale of trust
properties are part of the capital held in trust to which the beneficiaries are not entitled as income.
Money or other property received by the trustee as the proceeds of a sale or exchange of the principal
of trust property is principal. Where it is provided by the terms of the trust that the 'income and profits'
of the trust estate shall be paid to the life beneficiary, it is a question of interpretation whether the life
beneficiary is to receive more than he would receive if it were provided that the 'income' should be paid
to him. Ordinarily the inference is that he is not to receive more, and if trust property is sold at a profit,
the profit is principal.

YU vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-20874, May 25, 1966
FACTS:
In the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Joselito Yu, represented by his guardian ad litem
Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his name changed to Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in his petition
that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese citizen who has been a resident of Manilafor more than
three years prior to the filing of the petition. As grounds for the change of name he alleges that as far as
he can remember has been using the name "Ricardo Sy," that he grew up under the care and custody of
Juan Sy Barrera, his guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled in school under the said name and that he was
baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real name also stated."Without a hearing being had, the court motu propio
dismissed the petition on the ground thatRule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by
aliens.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien may petition the court for change of name

RULING:
Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of
name.2Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino
citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the
petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or
some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause
for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and
affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one
of them.