Green Notes 2014
Legal Ethics
A SURVEY OF THE 2010 - 2013 CASES IN
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
FE A. YLAYA vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT
Adm. Case No. 6475/ January 30, 2013
FACTS: The respondent briefly represented the
two in the expropriation case as intervenors for
being the new registered owners of the
property. The complainant alleged that the
respondent convinced them to sign a
"preparatory deed of sale" for the {sale of the
property, but he left blank the space for the
name of the buyer and for the amount of
consideration. The respondent further alleged
that the deed would be used in the sale to the
City Government when the RTC issues the order
to transfer the titles. The respondent then
fraudulently - without their knowledge and
consent, and contrary to their understanding -
converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a
Deed of Absolute Sale, selling the subject
property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So for
P200, 000.00.
The complainant denied that she and
Laurentino were paid the P200,000.00 purchase
price or that they would sell the property "for
such a measly sum" when they stood to get at
least P6,000,000.00 as just compensation. The
respondent denied the allegations and filed a
motion to resolve or decide the case. The
complainant filed an ex parte motion to
withdraw the verified complaint and to dismiss
the case. The complainant also claimed that the
respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale
even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother’s
sister) are his uncle and his aunt, respectively.
According to THE IBP, the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon I, Rule
1.01 Canon and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice)
and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the IBP violated the respondent’s
right to due process; and
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2. Whether the evidence presented supports
a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon
1, Rule l. and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section
3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
HELD:
1. The respondent claims that the IBP violated
his right.to due process because he was not
given the "amplest opportunity to defend
himself, to cross examine the witness
complainant, to object to the admissibility of
documents or present controverting
evidence" when the IBP rendered its
conclusion without requiring the
complainant to adduce evidence in a formal
hearing and despite the absence of
corroborative proof. He insists that these
defects rendered the complainant’s
allegations as hearsay, and the IBP’s report,
recommendation or resolution null and void.
Although the respondent failed to have a
face-to-face confrontation with the
Complainant when she failed to appear at
the required mandatory conference, the
records reveal that the respondent fully
participated during the entire proceedings
and submitted numerous pleadings,
including evidence, before the IBP. He was
even - allowed to file a motion for
reconsideration supported by his submitted
evidence. ,
2. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states: A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is
liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for
representing conflicting interests without
the written consent of all concerned,
particularly the complainant; under Canon
16 for being remiss in his obligation to hold
in trust his client’s properties; and under
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal
matter entrusted to him.
According to IBP, respondent violated
Canon 16. The respondent admits to losing
certificates of land titles that were entrusted to
his care by Reynold. According to the
respondent, the complainant "maliciously
retained" the TCTs over the properties sold by
Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed them
 Green Notes 2014
from his office. Reynold confirms that the TCTs
were taken by the complainant from the
respondent’s law office. The respondent is
reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to
"hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession."
Also, likewise, respondent is liable for
violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a
legal matter entrusted to him.
Despite the respondent’s admission
that he represented the complainant and her
(ate husband and that he purportedly filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene in their behalf,
the records show that he never filed such a
motion for the spouses Ylaya. The complainant
herself states that she and her late husband
were forced to file the Motion for Leave to
Intervene on their own behalf. The records of
the case, which include the Motion for Leave to
Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya, support
this conclusion.
SPOUSES ARCING AND CRESING BAUTISTA,
EDAY jRAGADIO and FRANCING GALGALAN vs.
ATTY. ARTURO CEFRA
Adm. Case No. 5530/ January 28, 4OI3
FACTS: The complainants engaged the services
of Atty. Cefra to represent them in |i|
proceedings. According to the complainants,
they lost in Civil Case No. U-6504 because of
Atty. Cefra’s negligence in performing his duties
as their dounsel. First, Atty. Cefra’s only
presented testimonial evidence and
disregarded two (2) orders of the RTC directing
him to submit a formal offer of documentary
exhibits. Second, Atty. Cefra belatedly
submitted the formal offer of documentary
exhibits after the complainants had been
declared to have waived their right to make a
submission. Third, Atty. Cefra did not fil6 a
motion or appeal and neither did he file any
other remedial pleading to contest the RTC’s
decision rendered against them.
The IBP Board of Governors found Atty.
Cefra negligent in handling the complainants’
case and unanimously approved his suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months. Atty.
Cefra filed a motion for reconsideration. On
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January 14, 2012, in Resolution No. XX-2012-24,
the IBP Board of Governors partially granted
Atty. Cefra’s motion considering that the failure
was not material to the case arid that
complainants were not prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Cefra has been guilty of
negligence in handling the complainants’ case
Ruling
HELD: The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence." It further
states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
In addition, a lawyer has the corresponding
duty to "keep the client informed of the status
of his case.
Under the circumstances, the IBP Board
of Governors’ recommended penalty of simple
reprimand is not commensurate with the
gravity of Atty. Cefra’s infractions. As the
complainants incurred pecuniary damage by
reason of Atty. Cefra’s negligence, a suspension
of one (1) year from the practice of law is in
order Except for the recommended penalty, the
Supreme Court agreed with the IBP Board of
Governors that Atty. Cefra has been guilty of
negligence in handling the complainants ‘case.
His actuations in the present administrative
case also reveal his' lack of diligence in
performing his duties as an officer of the Court.
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or free.
Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his
title cannot afford to practice the profession in
a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyer’s lethargy from
the perspective of the Canons is both
unprofessional and unethical. Atty. Cefra failed
to live up to these standards. Interestingly, he
did not deny the complainants’ allegations and
impliedly admitted his actions in the
proceedings in Civil Case No. U-6504.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Supreme Court find Atty. Arturo Cefra guilty of
negligence, in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
 Green Notes 2014
one (1) year and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
MARIANO T. ONG vs. EVA G. BASIYA-SARATAN,
CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 32
A.M. No. P-12-3090/January 7, 2013 PERLA
FACTS: Complainant is one of the
defendants/judgment obligee in the Decision
dated June 21, 1999 rendered in the
aforementioned case, in the amount of
P800,000.00 representing damages and
attorney’s fees. To implement the judgment,
the RTC issued the Order: dated April 24,2006
granting the issuance of the writ of execution.
Since the judgment has remained unsatisfied,
complainant moved for the issuance of an Alias
|Writ of Execution, which was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated September 26, 2008,
with a further directive to the Sheriff of the RTC
of Valenzuela City, Branch 72 to proceed against
plaintiffs attachment bond issued by Prudential
Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
On November 26, 2010 or after the
lapse of more than two (2) years with no action
on the part of respondent, the RTC again
directed the issuance of in Alias Writ of
Execution and its implementation by Sheriff
Romero L. Rivera (Sheriff Rivera).
Notwithstanding, respondent did not issue any,
prompting complainant to file a "Very Urgent
Motion to Be Furnished Certified True Copy of
Alias Writ of Execution," which the RTC granted
in its Order dated January 14,2011.
On February 7, 2011, complainant filed
a Manifestation and Motion, followed by a
subsequent urgent motion dated April 27, 2011,
seeking to compel respondent to comply with
the court's directive. He also averred that on
February 1, 20 Hi, he received an unsigned and
uncertified copy of the Alias Amended Writ of
Execution dated June 7, 2007, addressed to
"The Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo or any of his
Lawful Deputies1' and not to Sheriff Rivera, the
deputized sheriff.
On August 15, 2011, the RTC issued an
Amended Order enjoining respondent to issue a
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Legal Ethics
Prepared by: Atty. Erickson H. Balmes
certified true copy of the Amended Writ of
Execution to complainant and to Sheriff Rivera.
But up to the filing of the instant administrative
complaint] no action has been taken by
respondent.
ISSUE: 1) Whether respondent should be
imposed the penalty as recommended by the
OCA for her repeated failure to issue the
corresponding alias writs of execution despite
directives from the RTC.
HELD: Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins court
personnel to perform their official duties
properly and with diligence at all times. As an
officer of the court, respondent was duty-
bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in
the performance of her officially designated
duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants
the imposition of administrative sanctions. In
this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to
issue the alias writs of execution to implement
the judgment in Civil Case No. 18978 despite
orders from the RTC. Moreover, she failed to
file the required comment in disregard of the
duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey
the orders and processes of the Court without
delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in
clearing her name, constituting an implied
admission of the charges.
Consequently, the Court finds her guilty
of refusal to perform official duty classified as a
grave offense under Section 52(A) (18) of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, punishable with suspension
of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
for the first offense and by dismissal for the
second offense. Thus, she was found guilty of
refusal to perform official duty and accordingly,
suspends her from office for six (6) months and
one (1) day without pay effective immediately
upon receipt of this resolution. She is sternly
warned once again that a commission of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
 Green Notes 2014
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF AMA LAND, INC.
AGAINST HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON.
SESINANDO E. VILLON and HON. RICARDO R.
ROSARIO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS.
A.M. OCA 1PI No. 12-202-CA-J/ January 15,
2013 PERLA-BERNABE
FACTS: The controversy started in the mid-
1990s when AMA LAND commenced the
construction of a 37-floor
commercial/residential building located at
Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) corner
Fordham Street, Wack Wack Village,
Mandaluyong City. After securing the required
licenses and permits, AMAL1 notified WWRAI,
the owner of Fordham Street, of its intention to
use the said street as an access road and staging
area of the project. Not having received any
response, AMALI proceeded to temporarily
enclose the job site and set up a field office
along Fordham Street. However, WWRAI fenced
off the said street, which prompted AMALI to
file before the RTC-Pasig a petition to enforce
an easement of right of way pursuant to Article
649 in relation to Article 656 of the Civil Code.
AMALI also prayed for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to enjoin WWRAI from
demolishing and removing its temporary field
office, fencing off Fordham Street, and
preventing its access to the construction site.
In its Answer, WWRAI averred that
AMALI's project violated applicable zoning
ordinances; the licenses and permits secured
therefor were irregular and unlawful; the
project is a nuisance; and EDSA should instead
be utilized as the staging area of the project.
Apart from praying for the dismissal of the
complaint, WWRAI interposed a counterclaim
for actual and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and costs of suit, and prayed for a TRO and
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for
AMALI to immediately cease and desist with its
project construction. After hearing AMALI’s
application for injunctive relief, the RTC-Pasig,
in its Order dated July 24, 1997, granted
AMALI's prayer and directed WWRAI to allow
the use of Fordham Street as a temporary
easement of right of way. Apparently, WWRAI's
application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction in its counterclaim was not heard.
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On June 10, 2011, the CA granted
WWRAI's application for TRO and subsequently,
its application for writ of preliminary injunction
pending resolution of the petition. Op the other
hand, AMALI, in its Comment, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for laps, of merit and
on the ground of forum shopping. On June 14,
2012, the CA rendered a Decision granting
WWRAI’s petition and directing the RTC-Pasig
to issue the injunctive writ in favor of WWRAI
pending determination of the petition for the
declaration of permanent easement of right of
way filed by AMALI.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is jurisdiction on
the part of the respondent CA Justices to act on
WWRAI's petition assailing the denial of its
application for injunctive relief to stop AMALI
from proceeding with its project construction,
claiming this issue as irrelevant to the principal
action to enforce an easement of right of way
pending before the RTC Pasig.
HELD: A perusal of the records of the case as
well as the parties’ respective allegations
disclosed that the acts complained of relate to
the validity of the proceedings before the
respondent CA Justices and the propriety of
their orders in GA-G.R. SP No. 118994: which
were done in the exercise of their judicial
functions. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
holding that errors, if any, committed by a
judge in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings, but should instead
be assailed through available judicial remedies.
Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not
complement, supplement or substitute judicial
remedies and, thus, cannot tie pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies
accorded to parties aggrieved by their
erroneous orders or judgments.
In this case, AMALI had already filed a
petition for review on certiorari challenging the
questioned order of the respondent CA Justices,
which is still pending final action by the Court.
Consequently, a decision on the validity of the
proceedings and propriety of the orders of the
respondent CA Justices in this administrative
proceeding would be premature. Besides, even
if the subject decision or portions thereof turn
out to be erroneous, administrative liability will
only attach upon proof that the actions of the
 Green Notes 2014
respondent Justices were motivated by bad
faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by
fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently
shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as
well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of
the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice must be clearly shown before he can
be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice
cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here,
other than AMALI's bare and self-serving claim
that respondent CA Justices "conspired with
WWRAl's counsel in knowingly and in bad faith
rendering an unjust judgment and in
committing x x x other misconduct," no act
clearly indicative of bias and partiality was
alleged except for the claim that respondent CA
Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence.
Thus, the presumption that the respondent
judge has regularly performed his duties shall
prevail.
Finally, resort to administrative
disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of
the judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse
of court processes that serves to disrupt rather
than promote the orderly administration of
justice and further clog the courts' dockets,
Those who seek relief from the courts must not
be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse
court processes in their efforts to vindicate their
rights. Thus the court dismisses the
administrative complaint.
GEOFFREY BECKETT vs. JUDGE OLEGARIO R.
SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Cebu City
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326/ January 30, 2013
VELASCO
FACTS: Geoffrey Beckett (Beckett or
Complainant), an Australian national, was
previously married to Eltesa Densing Beckett
(Eltesa), a Filipina. Out on the marriage was
born on June 29, 2001, Geoffrey Beckett, Jr.
(Geoffrey, Jr.).In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against
Beckett for violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
7610, otherwise known ^s the Violence against
Women and Children Act, followed by a suit for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB -32254. Both
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cases ended in the sala of Judge Olegario
Sarmiento, Jr. (respondent or Judge Sarmiento).
For his part, Beckett commenced criminal
charges against Eltesa, one of which was for
adultery.
The couple’s initial legal battle ended
when Judge Sarmiento, on September 25, 2006
in Civil Case No. CEB-32254, rendered judgment
based on a compromise agreement in which
Eltesa and Beckett agreed and undertook,
among others, to cause the dismissal of all
pending civil and criminal cases each may have
filed against the other. They categorically
agreed too that Beckett shall have full and
permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five
(5) years old, subject to the visitorial rights of
Eltesa. In the 2010 visit, Beckett consented to
have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after
the holidays, provided she return the child on
January 9. 2011. January 9 came and went but
Geoffrey, Jr. remained with Eltfesa, prompting
Beckett to file a petition against Eltesa for
violation of RA 7610.
Beckett further relates that, [during the
March 1, 2011 conference on the application
for habeas corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9)
years old, displayed inside the courtroom
hysterical conduct, shouting and crying, not
wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though,
he, the father, was a total stranger. Despite
Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued
an Order, dated March 1, 2011, directing inter
alia the following: (1) Eltesa to return Geoffrey,
Jr. to Beckett; and (2) Beckett to bring the child
in the pre-trial conference set for March 15,
2001. For some reason, the turnover of
Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett did not materialize.
Beckett also alleged that while waiting
for the March |15, 2011 pre-trial conference to
start, he saw one Helen Sy, purportedly a close
friend of Eltesa, enter Judge Sarmiento’s
chambers. Then, during the conference itself,
Eltesa moved f6r reconsideration of the court’s
March 1,2011 Order, praying that it be set aside
insofar as it directed her to return the custody
of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett. To this partial
motion, Beckett requested, and was granted, a
period of five (5) days to file his
comment/opposition. Additionally, Beckett
sought the immediate implementation of the
said March 1, 2011 Order. But instead of
 Green Notes 2014
enforcing said order and/or waiting for
Beckett’s comment, Judge Sarmiento, in open
court, issued another order giving Eltesa
provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. and at the
same time directing the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) to] conduct
a social case study on the child.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge
Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.
HELD: Gross ignorance of the law on the part of
a judge presupposes an appalling lack of
familiarity with simple rules of law or
procedures and well-established jurisprudence
which tends to erode the public trust in the
competence and fairness of the court which’ he
personifies. Not to know the law as basic,
almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or
acting in disregard of established rule of law as
if he were not aware of the same constitutes
gross ignorance whence no one is excused,
especially an RTC judge. Respondent judge, in
granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr.
in favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard
the res judicata rule. The more appropriate
description of the legal situation engendered by
the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the
persistent plea of the child not to be returned
to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited
fidelity to jurisprudential command to accord
primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor
child.
Now to another point. In disputes
concerning post-separation custody over a
minor, the well-settled rule is that no child
under seven (7) years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if
already over 7 years of age, the child’s choice as
to which of his parents he prefers to be under
custody shall be respected, unless the parent
chosen proves to be unfit. ln the light of the
foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held
guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant
against him for the reason that absent a finding
of strong reasons to rule otherwise, the
preference of a child over 7 years of age as to
whom he desired to live with shall be
respected.
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RE: COMPLAINT OF LEONARDO A. VELASCO
AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICES FRANCISCO H.
VILLARUZ, JR., ALEX L. QUIROZ, AND SAMUEL
R. MARTIRES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J/ January 15, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE
FACTS: On December 10, 2008, the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan, rendered a
Decision convicting accused Pacifico C. Velasco.
Accused Velasco sought its reconsideration,
which the Sandiganbayan denied in its March
13, 2009 Resolution. He, then, elevated the case
before the Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 187277, which
was denied in a minute resolution.
Subsequently, accused Velasco filed a motion
for leave to file and to admit a second motion
for reconsideration of the Court’s June 3, 2009
Resolution, which the Court merely noted
without action in its January 1, 2010 Resolution.
The Court’s Resolution became final and
executory.
In the hearing for the execution of
accused Velasco’s sentence before the
Sandiganbayan, his counsel manifested that he
was confined at the San Juan De Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and was due for surgery.
Nonetheless, a warrant of arrest was issued, but
as agreed by the parties, accused Velasco shall
remain in the hospital until further order by the
Sandiganbayan. Accused Velasco filed an Urgent
Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest, invoking
humanitarian consideration, having allegedly
just undergone a rigid and serious surgical
operation. However, the Sandiganbayan
Justices, on instead issued an Order of Arrest.
The Sandiganbayan Justices set aside their
earlier order recalling the warrant of arrest and
issued anew an Order of Arrest for failure of
accused Velasco to attend the heading of even
date. Subsequently, or on November 15, 2010,
accused Velasco filed a Motion to Defer
Promulgation of Sentence, to Suspend
Proceedings and/or Recall Warrant' of Arrest
claiming, once again, that , he had just
undergone a major operation necessitating
hospitalization and post-operation treatment.
Hence, the instant administrative complaint for
grave misconduct and violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct f asserts that, the conviction of
accused Velasco having attained finality on
 Green Notes 2014
September 25, 2009, the Sandiganbayan
Justices should have merely performed the
ministerial duty of executing his final sentence
of conviction and not entertained his potions or
pleadings that forestalled its execution. In doing
so, they have shown evident partiality, bias and
impropriety in favor of accused Velasco.
However, the Sandiganbayan Justices
claimed that the repeated resetting of the
hearings for the execution of judgment against
accused Velasco was mainly due to medical
reasons and the pendency of incidents before
the Court. Vehemently denying that their
questioned orders were issued to unduly favor
accused Velascp, they insisted that these were
prompted by circumstances which were not at
their instance land that the instant complaint
consists of unfounded allegations and
suspicions of partiality They also argued that
since accused Velasco had already been
committed to the national penitentiary on May
10, 2012, this case is now moot and academic
and therefore; should be dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent Sandiganbayan
Justices may be held administratively; liable for
their actions which unduly delayed the
execution of the final sentence of conviction of
accused Velasco.
HELD: Misconduct means intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of
law or a standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance
of the official functions of a public officer. In
this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan
Justices respecting the execution of the final
judgment against accused Velasco were shown
to be in respectful deference to the Court’s
action on the various petitions filed by the
former, who apparently exhausted what
he]perceived were valid available remedies
under the law.
However, the becoming modesty that
the Sandiganbayan Justices have exhibited in
this case cannot detract from the fact that the
judgment of conviction of accused Velasco
should have been immediately executed,
absent any restraining order from the Court, in
violation of the Court’s directive.
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The Court finds no grave misconduct or
violation of a specific provision of the Code of
Judicial Conduct to have been committed by the
Sandiganbayan Justices. However the Supreme
Court STERNLY WARNED the Sandiganbayan
that repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
KAREEN P. MAGTAGNOB vs. JUDGE GENIE D.
GAPAS-AGBADA
OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3631-RTJ January 16, 2013
PEREZ
FACTS: Complainant contends that her
appointment was not renewed because
respondent judge refused to sign the
requirements for the change of her
employment status from temporary to
permanent despite her two-year service. Thus,
her temporally appointment ended last 16
October 2010.
Complainant states that many of her
officemates have) questioned the "satisfactory"
rating given to her by respondent judge
considering that Isidro Guerrero (Mr. Guerrero),
their non-performing utility clerk, received a
higher rating despite respondent judge’s
knowledge of his misdeeds. Complainant
alleges that respondent judge has retained her
position as executive judge of RTC, Virac,
Catanduanes because she has successfully
maligned the character of the other judge in the
station, Judge Lelu P. Contreras (Judge
Contreras).
Finally, complainant prays that she be
reinstated to her former position because she
believes that her separation from employment
was unjust and without valid grounds. She
further prays that respondent judge be relieved
as executive judge of RTC, Virac, Catanduanes
to put an end to her abusive acts towards lowly
employees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Judge Genie G.
Gapas-Agnada (respondent) is guilty
ofoppression, conduct unbecoming of a judge
and abuse of authority.
HELD: Complainant was appointed; Court
Stenographer III Sat RTC, Branch 42, Virac,
 Green Notes 2014
Catanduanes on 16 October 2008. Her
appointment was under temporary status in
view of her lack of two years relevant
experience which was required for the position.
Her temporary appointment was renewed for
one year on 16 October 2009 upon
recommendation of Judge Agbada, the
presiding judge of her court.
After another year, however,
complainant was no longer recommended by
her judge for permanent position (change of
status from temporary to permanent). Thus, her
temporary appointment expired on 16 October
2010.
In her resolve to discredit her judge,
complainant made a shotgun imputation of
offenses allegedly committed by the former.
She, however, failed to show any proof that she
was entitled to be given a permanent position.
Other than her allegation that she was given
two "very satisfactory" and one "satisfactory"
rating, there was no evidence presented that
she has met the prescribed qualification
standard for the position. "Such standard is a
mix of the formal education, experience,
training, civil service eligibility, physical health
and attitude that the job requires." Respondent
judge, who is the immediate supervisor of
complainant, is in the best position to observe
the fitness, propriety and efficiency off the
employee for the position. It should be
impressed upon complainant that her
appointment in the Judiciary is not a Vested
right. It is not an entitlement that she can claim
simply for the (reason that she had been |n the
service for almost two years.
The subsequent filing of complaint
against Atty. Borja manifests complainant’s
propensity to file complaints whenever she
does not get what she wants. Such attitude
should not be tolerated. Otherwise, judges will
be placed in hostage situations by employees
who will threaten to file complaints whenever
they do not get their way with their judges.
There being no proof that respondent
judge abused her position, the case against her
should be dismissed. Respondent judge should,
however, be reminded to be circumspect in her
actuations so as not to give the impression that
she is guilty of favoritism.
Page 8 of 43
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EMILIA O. DHALIWAL vs.
ATTY. ABELARDO B. DUMAGUING
A.C. No. 9390/ August 1, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE
FACTS: In her sworn statement, complainant
alleged that she engaged the services of
respondent in connection with the purchase of
a parcel of land from Fil-Estate Development,
Inc. (Fil-Estate). On June 13, 2000, upon the
instruction of respondent, complainant's
daughter and son-in-law withdrewP342,000.00
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
handed the cash over to respondent. They then
proceeded to BPI Family Bank Malcolm Square
Branch where respondent purchased two
manager's checks both payable to the order of
Fil-Estate Inc. When asked why the manager's
checks were not [purchased at PNB, respondent
explained that he has friends at the BPI Family
Bank and that is where he maintains an
account. These manager's checks were
subsequently consigned with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) after
complainant’s request to suspend payments to
Fil-Estate had been granted. On September 22,
2000, respondent, on behalf of complainant,
filed with the HLURB a complaint for delivery of
title and damages against Fil-Estate. A week
after or on September 29, 2000, he withdrew
the two manager's checks that were previously
consigned. On March 3, 2003, complainant
informed the HLURB through a letter that
respondent was no longer representing her. On
March 11, 2003, the HLURB promulgated its
Decision, adverse to complainant, finding the
case for delivery of title and damages
premature as there was no evidence of full
payment of the purchase price}. Thereafter,
complainant made demands upon respondent
to return and account to her the amounts
previously consigned with the HLURB.
Respondent did not comply. Thus, complainant
prays that respondent be disbarred.
In his answer, respondent admitted
substantially all of the allegations in the
complaint. In defense, he claims that the
amount of P311,819.94 was consigned to the
HLURB to cover the full payment of the balance
of the purchase price of the lot with Fil-Estate.
Fil-Estate, however, did not accept the same as
it wanted complainant to also pay interests and
 Green Notes 2014
surcharges totalling more than & 800,000.00.
Because the amount was formally consigned
with the HLURB, he allegedly filed a motion to
verify if the judgment iii the case was already
satisfied.
He claimed that his motion has not yet
been acted upon; hence, he did not deem it
proper as yet to return the consigned amount.
Following the submission by
complainant of her verified position paper and
the failure of respondent to submit his, despite
having been given ample opportunity to do so,
the Commission on Bar Discipline, submitted its
Report and Recommendation finding
complainant to have sufficiently established
that respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. It also found
respondent to have submitted a false and
fabricated piece of documentary evidence, as
the January 2004 Motion attached to his
answer as Annex A did not bear any proof of
service upon the opposing party and proof of
filing with the HLURB. The Commission
recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. On September 19, 2007, the Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-93,
adopting with modification the Commission's
Report and Recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Abelardo B.
Dumaguing is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and be
hereby suspended from the practice of law.
HELD: Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as payment for the
balance of the purchase price of a parcel of land
as in the present case, but not used for the
purpose, should be immediately returned. "A
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client! Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. Respondent's
proffered excuse of having to await the HLURB
action on his alleged motion— the filing of
which he miserably failed to prove-- as a
Page 9 of 43
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condition to the return of the sum of P311
,891.94 to complainant compounds his liability
and even bolstered his attitude to use dishonest
means if only to evade his obligation. It
underlines his failure to meet the high moral
standards required of members of the legal
profession.
GRACE M. ANACTA vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO D. RESURRECCION
A.C. No. 9074/August 14, 2012 DEL CASTILLO
FACTS: Complainant engaged the services of
respondent to file on her behalf a petition for
annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for which she paid
respondent P 42,000.00. In December 2004,
respondent presented to the complainant a
supposed copy of a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage. From then on, complainant did not
hear from respondent or receive any notice
from the trial court relative to the said petition.
To her surprise and dismay, she discovered that
no petition for annulment docketed as Civil
Case No. 04-25141 was ever filed before the
said court. Thus, complainant terminated the
services of respondent "for loss of trust and
confidence" and requested the OCC-RTC to
refuse tiny belated attempt on the part of
respondent to file a petition for annulment of
marriage on her behalf.
On July 30, 2007, complainant, through
her new counsel, wrote a letter to the
respondent demanding for an explanation as to
how respondent intended to indemnify the
complainant for damages she had suffered due
to respondent’s deceitful acts. Respondent has
not replied thereto. Hence, complainant filed
before the IBP a verified complaint praying that
respondent be disbarred.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Eduardo D.
Resurreccion (respondent) is guilty of gross
misconduct, deceit and malpractice.
HELD: One of the qualifications required of a
candidate for admission to the bar is the
possession of good moral character, and, when
one who has already been admitted to the bar
clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does
not follow such moral principles as should
 Green Notes 2014
govern the conduct of an upright person, and
that, in his dealings with his clients and with the
courts. The disregards the rule of professional
ethics required to be observed by every
attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian
of the interests of society, as well as of the
preservation of the ideal standard of
professional conduct, to make use of its powers
to deprive him of his professional attributes
which he so unworthily abused.
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, respondent may either be
disbarred or suspended for committing
deceitful and dishonest acts. Thus:
“SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.”
Complainant asks that respondent be
disbarred. However, the Supreme Court find
that suspension from the practice of law is
sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme
penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar.
While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will
also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will
suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this
case, we find suspension to be sufficient
sanction against respondent. Suspension, we
may add, is not primarily intended; as
punishment, but as a means to protect the
public and the legal profession.
Page 10 of 43
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In this case, it is also clear that
respondent violated his lawyer’s oath and code
of conduct when he withheld the amount of P
42,000.00 despite his failure to render the
necessary legal services and after complainant
demanded its] return. He must therefore be
directed to return the same.
Finally, we emphasize that "the object
of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to
punish the individual attorney himself, as to
safeguard the administration of justice' by
proceeding the court and the public from the
misconduct on officers of the court, and to
remove from the profession of law persons
whose disregard for their oath of office has
proved them unfit to continue discharging the
trust respect in them as members of the bar."
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO
A.C. No. 6116/ August 1, 2012 |
PERLAS-BERNABE
FACTS: Complainant narrated that respondent
undertook to give him 20% commission* later
reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter
would receive in representing Spouses Amble
and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he
referred, in an action for partition of the estate
of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986
before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan).
However, respondent failed to pay him the
agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of
attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total
estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was
informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997
that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after
respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's
fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the
payment of1 his commission which respondent
ignored.
Complainant further alleged that
respondent has not lived up to the high moral
standards required of his profession for having
abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with
whom he has two children, and cohabited with
Mae Flor Galido, with whom he has four
children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business without
 Green Notes 2014
the required authorization from the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained
that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25%
contingent fee basis, and advanced all the
expenses. He disputed the August 11,1995
letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps.
Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission
which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He,
thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
and for the corresponding sanction against
complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B.
Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.
The Court resolved to refer this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation dated October 10, 2008, the
Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended
that respondent be suspended for one (1) year
from the active practice of law, for violation of
the Lawyer's Oath.
ISSUE: Whether ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is
GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
same Code and be SUSPENDED from the active
practice of law.
HELD: The practice of law is considered a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. As
such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and
must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients,
in accordance with the values and norms
embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be
disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of
the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity.
In this case, clearly, respondent has
violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Page 11 of 43
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Furthermore, respondent did not deny
the accusation that he abandoned his legal
family to cohabit with his mistress with whom
he begot four children notwithstanding that his
moral character as well as his moral fitness to
be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been
assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the
marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by
our laws.
However, the Supreme Court finds the
charge of engaging in illegal money lending pot
to have been sufficiently established. A
"business" requires some form of investment a
sufficient number of customers to whom its
output can be sold at profit on a consistent
basis. The lending of money to a single person
without showing that such service is made
available to other persons on a consistent basis
cannot be construed as in the case that
respondent is engaged in the business of
lending.
Nonetheless, while the Supreme Court
rule that respondent should be sanctioned for
his actions, It is minded that the power to
disbar should be exercised with great caution
and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and as
member of the bar, or the misconduct borders
on the criminal, or committed under scandalous
circumstance which do not obtain here.
Considering the circumstances of the case, the
Supreme Court deems it appropriate that
respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year as
recommended.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION,
INC., represented by GABRIEL H. ABAD vs.
ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK
FACTS: Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma
Foundation (Hocorma Foundation) filed a
complaint for disbarment against respondent
Atty. Richard Funk. It alleged that Atty. Funk
used to work as a corporate secretary, counsel,
chief executive officer, and trustee of the
 Green Notes 2014
foundation form 1983 to 1985. He also served
as its counsel in several criminal and civil cases.
Hocorma Foundation further alleged
that on November 26, 2006 Atty. Funk filed an
action for quieting of tile and damages against
Hocorma Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat
Institute (Mabalacat Institute). Atty. Funk did
so, according to the foundation, using the
information that he acquired while serving as its
counsel in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attomey-
client relationship.
In his answer, Atty. Funk averred that
Don Teodoro |V. Santos (Santos) organized
Mabalacat Institute in 1950 and Hocorma
Foundation in 1979] Santos hired him in January
1982 to assist Santos and the organizations he
established, including the Mabalacat Institute,
in its legal problems. Subsequently, according to
Atty. Funk, J when Santos got involve4 in
various litigations, he sold or donated
substantial portions of his real and personal
properties to the Hocorma Foundation. Santos
hired Atty. Funk for this purpose. The latter
emphasized that, in all these, the attorney-
client relationship was always between I Santos
and him. He was more of Santos’ personal
lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation.
Atty. Funk claimed that before Santos
left for America in August 1983 for prejudicial
treatment, he entered into a retainer
agreement with him. They agreed that Atty.
Funk would be paid for his legal services out of
the properties that he donated or sold to the
Hocorma Foundation. The foundation approved
that compensation agreement on December 13,
1983. But it reneged and would not pay Atty.
Funk's legal fees.
Atty. Funk also claimed that Santos
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
his favor on August 13, 1983. The SPA
authorized him to advise Hocorma Foundation
and follow up with it Santos' sale or donation of
a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat
Institute, covered by TCT 19989-R. Atty. Funk
was to collect all expenses for the property
transfer from Hocorma Foundation out of funds
that Santos provided. It was Santos' intention
since 1950 to give the land to Mabalacat
Institute free of rent and expenses. The SPA
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Legal Ethics
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also authorized Atty. Funk to register the 5-
hectare land in the name of Mabalacat institute
so a new title could be issued to it, separate
from the properties of Hocorma Foundation.
Atty. Funk claims that in 1985 when
Hocorma Foundation refused to pay his
attorney's fees, he severed his professional
relationship with it. On November 9, 1989, four
years later, he filed a complaint against the
foundation for collection of his attorney's fees.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals (CA), and
the Supreme Court decided the claim in his
favor.
After hearing, the Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the
aggravating circumstance of a pattern of
misconduct consisting of four court
appearances against his former client, the
Hocorma Foundation. The CBD recommended
Atty. Funk's suspension from the practice of law
for one year and the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the CBD's report and
recommendation. Atty. Funk moved for
reconsideration but the IBP Board of Governors
denied it.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Funk betrayed the trust
and confidence of a former client in violation of
the CPR when he filed several actions against
such client on behalf of a new one.
HELD: An attorney owes his client undivided
allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary
nature of their relationship, sound public policy
dictates that he be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging
inconsistent duties. An attorney may not,
without being guilty of professional misconduct,
act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former
client. This rule is so absolute that good faith
and honest intention on the erring lawyer's part
does not make it inoperative.
The reason for this is that a lawyer
acquires knowledge of his former client's
doings, whether documented or not, that he
would ordinarily not have acquired were it not
for the trust and confidence that his client
placed on him in the light of their relationship.
 Green Notes 2014
It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to
identify and erase such entrusted knowledge
with faultless precision or lock the same into an
iron box when suing the former client on behalf
of | new one.
Here, the evidence shows that Hocorma
Foundation availed itself of the legal services of
Atty. Funk in connection with, among others,
the transfer off one of the properties subject of
the several suits that the lawyer subsequently
filed against the foundation. Indeed, Atty. punk
collected attorney's fees from the foundation
for such services] Thus, he had an obligation pot
to use any knowledge he acquired during that
relationship, including the fact that the property
under litigation existed at all, when he sued the
foundation.
Thus the Supreme Court finds it fitting
to adopt the CBD's recommendation as well as
the IBP Board of Governor's resolution
respecting the case.
JUDGE ARMANDO S. ADLAWAN, Presiding
Judge, 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis
Occidental vs. ESTRELLA P. CAPILITAN, Court
Stenographer, 6th Municipal Circuit]' Trial
Court, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos,
Misamis Occidental
A.M. No. P-12-3080/August 29, 2012 PERALTA
FACTS: Judge Adlawan stated that respondent
Estrella Capilitan was appointed Court
Stenographer on February -4, 2008 on account
of his recommendation. Respondent was
previously married to a Muslim under Muslim
laws and the relationship bore two (2) children.
She is now single-handedly raising her kids after
being separated from her husband.
Hence, he and the rest of his staff were
surprised when respondent announced to them
that she was four (4) months pregnant by a
married man. As respondent narrated, in
February 2010, she met her former high school
classmate who represented himself as
separated from his wife. She claimed to have
given in to temptation. Later on, respondent
alleged that the man became elusive when she
told him about her pregnancy. Complainant
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BAR OPERATIONS 2014
Legal Ethics
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judge noted that respondent was apologetic
and acknowledged her mistake.
Complainant averred that while he
understands the present condition of
respondent, he, however felt duty-bound to
report the matter to the court. Being pregnant
outside of marriage, respondent had breached
the ethical standards in the Judiciary, thus, is
administratively liable.
The Court referred this case to
Executive Judge Elenija M. Arabejo, Regional
Trial Court, Tangub City, for investigation,
report and recommendation. During the
investigation, respondent refused to further
explain and give more information regarding
her circumstances. She, however, admitted and
confirmed anew the truth of the statements
which complainant made regarding her
condition. With respondent's admission of the
fact that she was impregnated by a man
married to another woman, the Investigating
Judge concluded that respondent indeed
engaged in extra-marital affairs and committed
immoral conduct that is unbecoming of a court
employee. Thus, the Investigating Judge
recommended that the penalty of suspension
for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day be
imposed upon respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent being a court
employee, is guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
HELD: Immorality has been defined to include
not only sexual matters but also "conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless
conduct showing moral indifferent to opinions
of respectable members of the community, and
an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare.
In the instant case, respondent has
been informed or the charge against her and
afforded the opportunity to respond thereto. In
all instances, respondent admitted the
allegation that she is pregnant by a man
married to another woman. Indeed, while she
initially claimed that the man who impregnated
her represented to be separated from his wife,
the fact remains that the man is still married.
 Green Notes 2014
Thus, there is no doubt that respondent
engaged in sexual relations with a married man
which not only violate the moral standards
expected of employees of the Judiciary but is
also a desecration of the sanctity of the
institution of marriage.
Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable
by suspension of six ( 6) months and one (1) day
to one ( 1) year for the first offense. Considering
that this is respondent's first offense, we deem
it proper to impose the penalty of suspension in
its minimum period to respondent.
MANOLITO C. VILLORDON vs. MARILYN C.
AVILA, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City
A.M. P-10-2809/ August 10, 2012 PER CURIAM
FACTS: Complainant met respondent. Soon
after, they started living together as husband
and wife. Respondent was later appointed as
Court Interpreter, the position vacated by
complainant’s father. Complainant and
respondent parted ways in 2008, and both
subsequently found other partners. After their
break-up, respondent filed an administrative
case against complainant before the BJMP.
On 29 January 2009, at about 6 o’clock
in the evening, complainant and his partner,
Maribel Caballero (Caballero), met Respondent
at the parking area of the Minganilla Sports
Complex. The three had an altercation. As a
result, respondent filed a case against
complainant for violation of Republic Act No.
9262 (RA 9262), or the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Children Act. Meanwhile, Caballero
filed a complaint for physical injuries against
respondent before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor.
Judge Andrino examined respondent’s
PDS. He found that respondent did not indicate
that she has three daughters and failed to
disclose that there was a physical injuries
complaint filed against her. In her comment,
respondent said that complainant has an axe to
grind against her because they had an illicit
affair, which she broke off when she entered
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government service. As to the information she
omitted from her PDS, respondent admitted
having left but the names of her three children.
She argued, however, that she did so because
they were never her dependents and were in
the custody of her parents. She also claimed
that she has never claimed tax exemptions for
her children. Respondent also denied that she
falsified her civil status, as she is in fact single.
She claimed that the omission of her children’s
names did not: mean that she was not
acknowledging them or that she was concealing
their existence from family and friends, and
neither did it jeopardize the interest or violate
any right of complainant.
Respondent pointed out that she has
complied with the requirements of her
employment, she possesses all the necessary
qualifications, and she has performed her duties
in accordance with the mandate of her position.
She prayed that the charges against her be
dismissed. In a manifestation received by the
Court on 14 March 2011, respondent further
argued that, when she filled out her PDS, the
birth certificates of her children were not
available so she needed a co-worker’s advice to
leave the items blank. She reiterated that when
she applied as court interpreter, she was
qualified for the position. She insisted that all
the information in her PDS are true and only the
names of her three children were omitted.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of
dishonesty and falsification of official
documents.
HELD: Dishonesty has been defined as
"intentionally making a false statement on any
material fact." Dishonesty evinces "a disposition
to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.
The Court has already ruled in the past
that willful concealment of facts in the PDS
constitutes mental dishonesty amounting to
misconduct. Likewise, making a false statement
in one’s PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. The
omission of the names of her children in her
PDS is an act of dishonesty, which merits the
 Green Notes 2014
imposition of penalties provided for under the
law. Further, even as respondent knowingly
provided incomplete information in her PDS,
she signed the undertaking attesting that the
same was true, correct and complete. Civil
service rules mandate the accomplishment of
the PDS as a requirement for employment in
the government. Hence, making false
statements in one’s PDS is ultimately connected
with one’s employment in the government. The
employee making false statements in his or her
PDS becomes liable for falsification.
Moreover, for respondent to be meted
the penalty of dismissal, her dishonesty need
not be committed in the performance of official
duty. The rationale for the rule is that if a
government officer or employee is dishonest or
is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct,
even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right
to continue in office. The Government cannot
tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if
he performs his duties correctly and well,
because by reason of his government position,
he is given more and ample opportunity to
commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow
men, even against offices and entities of the
government other than the office where he is
employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys
and possesses a certain influence and power
which renders the victims of his grave
misconduct; oppression and dishonesty less
disposed and prepared to resist and to
counteract his evil acts and actuations.
By her acts of dishonesty and
falsification of an official document, respondent
has failed to measure up to the high and
exacting standards set for judicial employees
and must, therefore, be dismissed from the
service.
MEMORANDA OF JUDGE ELIZA B. YU ISSUED
TO LEGAL RESEARCHER MARIEJOY P. LAGMAN
AND TO COURT STENOGRAPHER SOLEDAD J,
BASSIG, ALL OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY
A.M. No. P-12-3033/ August 15, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
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FACTS: The OCA required Judge Yu to submit
certified photocopies of the documents
pertinent to her complaints against
respondents Lagman and Bassig in order for the
OCA to take appropriate action on the matter.
In response, Judge Yu submitted the
required documents and in a letter dated
October 26, 2010, charged respondent Lagman
with grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation
of judicial functions, and dishonesty. Judge Yu
likewise charged respondent Bassig with
misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial
functions, and gross insubordination.
With regard to the mistakes made in
the preparation of the Minutes of the Hearing
for Civil Case No. SCC-10-55, respondent
Lagman denied having submitted the case for
decision. She maintained that, as reflected in
the Minutes, she had merely stated that the
complainant appeared while the defendant
neither appeared nor filed his answer.
Respondent Lagman also contended that she
should not be Warned if complainant, who
arrived on time, signed the Minutes without
waiting for the arrival of Judge Yu. She further
explained that she simply allowed the
complainant to sign the Minutes of the Hearing
after the latter requested and manifested that
she would come back after her other
appointments. Unfortunately, the complainant
did not come back. Respondent Lagman
asserted that all her acts were within the
bounds of the law, and that she neither
committed any corrupt acts nor intended to
defy any rules.
Respondent Lagman, in a letter-
explanation dated June 24, 2010, clarified that
there was actually no discrepancy in the total
number of pending criminal and civil cases since
the results of the physical inventory conducted
on February 8, 2010of which were for the year-
end December 31, 2009, were the same results
that were submitted to the Supreme Court on
February 16, 2010. She further explained that
the inventory did not include the newly-raffled
cases as they were supposed to be included in
the report for the month of January 2010,
which at that time, had not yet been
completed. Respondent Lagman stated that all
the statistics indicated in the reports were
actual and legitimate numbers, and that if ever
 Green Notes 2014
there was indeed a discrepancy, the Court
Management Office would have called) her
attention regarding the errors.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents Lagman and
Bassig are liable for simple neglect of duty.
HELD: Simple neglect of duty is defined as the
failure to give attention to a task or the
disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference. Here, respondent Lagman showed
carelessness or indifference in the performance
of her duties. As Officer-in-Charge, she was
remiss in her duties to give due care and
attention/to established procedure in the
calendar of cases. Respondent Lagman should
have properly informed Judge Yu of the
inadvertent omission in the list of calendared |
cases for hearing. She should have sought the
necessary permission from Judge Yu before
calling the case as she was still under her direct
supervision.
Respondent Lagman also did not follow
established procedure when she allowed one of
the parties to sign the Minutes of the Hearing
without waiting for the arrival of Judge Yu. It
must be remembered that the Minutes of the
Hearing is a very important document which
gives a brief summary of the events that took
place at the session or hearing of a case. With
regard to the alleged discrepancies in the
number of pending cases in the inventory and
monthly reports, the Supreme Court agree with
the OCA that respondent Lagman had clearly
explained and clarified the reports and
inventory that she had submitted to the Court
Management Office of the Supreme Court.
With regard to respondent Bassig, we
also find her Iiable for simple neglect of duty for
her failure to follow the established procedure
in the conduct of hearings. As alleged by Judge
Yu, respondent Bassig made it appear that a
hearing was conducted for Civil Case No. B-03-
08 on July 16, 2010 when in fact, no hearing
was actually conducted on the said date.
Moreover, respondent Bassig also committed
mistakes in the pates specified in the subpoena
issued by the court in Criminal Case Nos. 04-178
& 179 CFM. She also failed to pay particular
attention to the details of a draft Order dated
August 13, 2010 that she prepared, stating that
the summons in the Sheriff’s Return was not
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served. On the contrary, the summons was
actually duly served.
In the instant case, respondent Bassig
could have rectified the inadvertent mistakes in
the drafting of the subpoena, order,: and
Minutes of the Hearing had she given more
effort and attention in reviewing the drafts and
not putting the blame Ion other court
personnel. She should have gone over the
drafts and made sure that the papers were
correct and in order. Thus, it is clear that
respondent Bassig was remiss in her duties as
the Officer-in-Charge. She failed to supervise
her subordinates well and to efficiently conduct
the proper administration of justice.
From the foregoing, we hold that the
mistakes or errors in the contents of the orders,
subpoena, and Minutes of the Hearing
committed by respondents Lagman and Bassig
could be attributed to their lack of attention or
focus on the task at hand. These could have
easily been avoided had they exercised greater
care and diligence in the performance of their
duties. We find respondents Lagman and Bassig
liable for simple neglect OT duty.
ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES
represented ATTTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES vs.
LEODEL N. ROXAS, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 66, MAKATI CITY
A.M. No. P-12-3029/August 15, 2012
FACTS: Respondent served a copy of the Writ of
Execution upon NEC at Block 15, Lot 9, Tulip
Street, Camella Homes I, Putatan, Muntinlupa
City, which was received by Mr. Narciso E.
Catalon (Catalon). On even date, respondent
levied upon the personal properties, consisting
of office equipment, found inside the NEC
office. An auction sale was set on July 19, 2006
at 10:30 a.m. at the Main Entrance of the Hall of
Justice of Makati City. However, Catalon filed on
July 17, 2006 an Affidavit of Third Party Claim,
asserting ownership over the levied
properties.Respondent personally furnished
complainant, through Atty. Lugares, on July; 18,
2006 a copy of the Notice of Third Party Claim,
together with a copy of Catalon’s Affidavit of
Third Party Claim. Since FGU failed to post an
indemnity bond in favor of third party claimant
 Green Notes 2014
Catalon, respondent did not proceed with the
scheduled auction sale on July 19, 2006.
The Sheriff’s Report dated August 7,
2006, prepared by respondent, declared the
levy upon the personal properties in the NEC
office lifted, cancelled] and without effect; and
stated that the same personal properties were
released to Catalon and the original copy of the
Writ of Execution and all pertinent papers were
temporarily returned to the RTC unsatisfied.
Since then, there appears to have been no
further development in the execution of the
RTC Decision dated January 16, 2006 in Civil
Case No. 01- 1002. Thus, complainant filed the
instant Complaint-Affidavit dated April 29, 2008
against respondent,] alleging, among other
things, that the Sheriff is remiss in the
performance of his duties arid does not have
the slightest intention to neglect his duty as
executing sheriff in the implementation of the
Writ.
ISSUE: Whether Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV of
the Regional Trial Court, is guilty of simple
neglect of duty.
HELD: Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:
“Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. —
The writ of execution shall be returnable
to the court issuing it immediately after
the judgment has been satisfied in part or
in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied
in full within thirty (30) days after his
receipt of the writ, the officer shall report
to the court and state the reason
therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect
during the period within which the
judgment may be enforced by motion.
The officer shall make a report to the
court every (30) days on the proceedings
taken thereon until the judgment is
satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires.
The returns or periodic reports shall set
forth the whole of the proceedings taken,
and shall be filed with the court and
copies thereof promptly furnished the
parties.”
Herein respondent had undeniably
failed to file periodic reports on the Writ of
Execution dated July 10, 2006. Respondent
received a copy of said Writ also on July 10,
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2006 and he filed a Sheriff’s Report on August 7,
2006. According to his Report, respondent had
to lift and cancel the levy on the office
equipment found inside the NEC office given
Catalon’s third party claim over said properties
and the failure of FGU to post an indemnity
bond in Catalon’s favor, thus, the Writ of
Execution dated July 10, 2006 was returned to
the RTC unsatisfied. The Sheriff’s Report dated
August 7, 2006 was the first and last filed by
respondent in connection with the Writ of
Execution dated July 10, 2006, until the instant
administrative complaint dated April 29, 2008
was filed against him. For almost two years,
respondent was completely remiss in filing the
mandated periodic reports on the Writ of
Execution dated July 10, 2006.; Consequently,
for the same period of time, FG, the prevailing
party in Civil Case No. 01-1002, was left
unaware of any steps taken by respondent to
satisfy the Decision dated January 16, 2006.
Ultimately, it is apparent that respondent did
not file any periodic report because he had
nothing to state therein as he failed to take any
further action to satisfy the Decision dated
January 16, 2006 and implement the Writ of
Execution dated July 10, 2006.
It is almost trite to say that execution is
the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of
law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be
nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing
party. Therefore, sheriffs ought to know that
they have a sworn responsibility to serve writ of
execution with utmost dispatch. When writs are
placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty
to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute them in accordance
with their mandate. Unless restrained by a
court order, they should see to it that the
execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
Accordingly, they must comply with their
mandated ministerial duty as speedily as
possible. As agents of the law, high standards
are expected of sheriffs.
Evidently, respondent displayed
conduct short of the stringent standards
required of court employees. Respondent’s long
delay in the execution of the final judgment in
favor of FGU and failure to submit the required
periodic reports constitute simple neglect of
duty, defined as the failure of an employee to
give one’s attention to a task expected of him
 Green Notes 2014
and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference. Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19
classifies simple neglect of duty as a less grave
offense, punishable by suspension without pay
for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months, for the first offense. This being
respondent’s first offense, the penalty
recommended by the OCA of one (1) month and
one (1) day is appropriate.
JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA vs. ATTY. MANUEL
"LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY.EDWIN M.
ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M. ALMARIO, ATTY.
MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN,
and JOHN DOES
A.C. No. 9259/ August 23, 2012 DEL CASTILLO
FACTS: On May 5, 2011, William Strong
(Strong), an American, was arrested and
detained by the operatives of the Bureau of
Immigration. Strong sought the assistance of
Philip G. Apostol (Apostol), a friend and
neighbor, to secure the Services of a lawyer.
Atty. Manuel initially declined because his law
office only handles cases of its retained clients
and those known to him or any of the associate
lawyers. However, he was eventually prevailed
upon by Apostol who would consider it as a
special favor if Atty. Manuel would handle
Strong’s case.
During the course of their meeting,
Strong casually mentioned that he has a
property in Boracay and that he suspected his
neighbors as the persons who caused his arrest.
According to Strong, his live-in partner Rodica
filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, for recovery of
possession and damages.
Upon inquiry with the Bureau of
Immigration, it was discovered that Strong’s
arrest was made pursuant to an Interpol Red
Notice; and that Strong is wanted in Brazil for
Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, Setting Up a Gang
and Other Related Crimes. Specifically, Strong is
being indicted for his alleged involvement in "an
international gang involved in shares fraud
which led to the creation of hundreds of
millions of dollars in illegal securities." Strong
denied any participation in the alleged crime.
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Strong then pleaded with Atty. Manuel to
expedite his deportation to any country except
Brazil and reiterated his willingness to pay the
success fee of US$100,000.00.
On May 25, 2011, the Bureau of
Immigration, rendered its Judgment granting
the motion of Strong to voluntarily leave the
country. On May 31, 2011, Strong left the
Philippines. Subsequently, or on June 6, 2011,
Rodica filed with the RTC a motion effectively
withdrawing her complaint.
Rodica alleged that after the
deportation of Strong and the withdrawal of the
RTC case, she heard nothing from the Lazaro
Law Office. She also claimed that contrary to
her expectations, there was no "simultaneous
over-all settlement of per grievances x x [with]
the defendants [in the RTC] case. Thinking that
she was deceived, Rodica filed the instant
administrative case. Otherwise stated, Rodica
claimed that she is a client of the Lazaro Law
Office and that she was deceived into causing
the withdrawal of the RTC case. Further* she
claimed that the Lazaro Law Office collected
exorbitant fees from her.
ISSUE: Whether the allegations in Rodica’s
Complaint merit the disbarment or suspension
of respondents.
HELD: Preponderance of evidence means that
the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than
that of the other. It means evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the
presumption of innocence of the lawyer
continues and the complaint against him must
be dismissed.
Rodica’s assertions that Atty. Tan
orchestrated Strong’s arrest and that Atty.
Manuel proposed the withdrawal of the RTC
case to facilitate the deportation of Strong, are
mere allegations without proof and belied by
the records of the case!. "The basic rule is that
mere allegation is not evidence, and is not
equivalent to proof." Aside from her bare
assertions, Rodica failed to present even an iota
of evidence to prove her allegations. In fact, the
records belie her claims. The documents issued
 Green Notes 2014
by the Bureau of Immigration showed that
Strong was the subject of the Interpol Red
Notice for being a fugitive from justice wanted
for crimes allegedly committed in Brazil. His
Warrant of arrest was issued sometime in
February 2008. Significantly, even before Strong
was arrested and eventually deported, Atty. Tan
had already obtained a favorable judgment for
his clients.
The Supreme Court cannot lend
credence to Rodica’s allegation that she was
deceived by Atty. Manuel, Atty. Espejo, Atty.
Almario and Atty. Michelle, another senior
associate at the Lazaro Law Office, into
believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case
was part of a settlement package to settle her
differences with her legal adversaries. We
accord more credence to the explanation of the
respondents, particularly Atty. Espejo, that in
the course of rendering legal services to Strong,
he had become close to Rodica so much so that
he accommodated Rodica’s request to cause
the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the
sale of the Boracay property to Apostoi It is well
to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a
friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an
officer of the court. Hence, he is expected to
maintain a high standard of honesty and fair
dealings and must conduct himself beyond
reproach at all times. He must likewise ensure
that he acts within the bounds of reason and
common sense, always aware that he is an
instrument of truth and justice. As shown by his
actuations. Atty. Espejo fell short of what is
expected of him. Under the circumstances, Atty.
Espejo should have exercised prudence by first
diligently studying the soundness of Rodica’s
pleas and the repercussions of his acts.
Thus, premises considered the instant
Complaint for disbarment against respondents
Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin
M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M. Almario, Atty.
Michelle B. Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C. Tan is
dismissed. Atty) Edwin M. Espejo is warned to
be more circumspect and prudent in’ his
actuations.
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MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA vs. ATTY. BEDE S.
TABALINGCOS
A.C. No. 6622/July 10, 2012 PER CURIAM
FACTS: Complainant averred that on February
2002, he was employed by respondent as a
financial consultant to assist the latter on
technical and financial matters in the latter’s
numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation
filed with different courts. Complainant claimed
that they had a verbal agreement whereby he
would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay
Order issued by the court in the cases they
would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%)
of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that,
from February to December 2002, respondent
was able to rake in millions of pesos from the
corporate rehabilitation cases they were
working on together. Complainant also claimed
that he was entitled to the amount of P 900,000
for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a
result of his work with respondent, and a total
of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their
clients. Complainant appended to his Complaint
several annexes supporting the computation of
the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent
engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in
violation of Section 27 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Allegedly
respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as
fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases. Complainant supported his allegations by
attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of •
Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, letter-proposals
to clients signed by respondent on various dates
and proofs of payment made to the latter by
their clients.
On the third charge of gross immorality,
complainant accused respondent of committing
two counts of bigamy: for having married two
other women while his first marriage was
subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated
13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General-National Statistics Office
(NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos,
herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice:
first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano,
which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the
 Green Notes 2014
second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia in the City of Manila; and the
third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
(respondent) is guilty of unlawful solicitation of
cases, violation of the Code or Professional
Responsibility for non-payment of fees to
complainant, and gross immorality for marrying
two other women while respondent’s first
marriage was subsisting.
HELD: The first charge of complainant against
respondent for the non-payment of the
former’s share in the fees, if proven to be true
is based on an agreement that is violation of
Rule 9,02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the
Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for
legal services rendered with a person not
licensed to practice law. Based on the
allegations, respondent had agreed to share
with complainant the legal fees paid by clients
that complainant solicited for the respondent.
Complainant, however, failed to proffer
convincing evidence to prove the existence of
that agreement.
A lawyer is not prohibited from
engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business
is of such a nature or is conducted in such a
manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s
duties as a member of the bar. This
inconsistency arises when the business is one
that can readily lend itself to the procurement
of professional employment for the lawyer; or
that can be used as a cloak for indirect
solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a
nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be
regarded as the practice of law.
It is clear from the documentary
evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi &
Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a
financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to
procure professional employment; specifically
for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or
with procedure such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this
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case, prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the complainant —
do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the
Bar. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant. For the court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.
According to the respondent, after the
discovery of the second and the third
marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the
Marriage Contracts. The Supreme Court
perused the attached Petitions for Annulment
and found that his allegations therein treated
the second and the third marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements, rather than as special
contracts contemplated under the then Civil
Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke
any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on
marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family
Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage
contracts as ordinary agreements indicates
either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of
marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on
what course of action to take to annul a
marriage under the old Civil Code provision.
What has been clearly established here is the
fact that respondent entered into marriage
twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack
of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His acts of committing
bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Thus, the Supreme court adopt the
recommendation of the IBP to disbar
respondent and order that his name be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR. vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA
A.C. No. 7360/ July 24, 2012 PER CURIAM
FACTS: Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of
appearing as private counsel in a case where he
 Green Notes 2014
previously appeared as public prosecutor,
hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Catalan also
Alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty.
Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have
the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed
manifest bias in the accused’s favor, Atty.
Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of
the Esperon case by arguing against the position
of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial
Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty.
Catalan’s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from
handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered
judgment convicting the accused on .16
November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty.
Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the
accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending
finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action; Atty.
Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio.
In a case for frustrated murder where Atty.
Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros.
Toribio reviewed the findings of the
investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical
injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa,
Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public
prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her
P30.000 to reconsider her findings and uphold
the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action,
Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting
Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006.
Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against
Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an
affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a
homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s fatner-in-
law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still
remained in detention for more than two years.
Atty. Silvosa demanded PI 5,000 from Lanticse
for the dismissal of the case and for the release
of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment
operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television
program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the
actual entrapment operation. The footage was
offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed
by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s
defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa.
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In his defense, on the first cause of
action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18
October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November
2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail. Atty.
Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for
the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty.
Silvosa also denies any relationship between
himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty.
Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as
"self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty.
Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue
persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty.
Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation^ he
asserts that "conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since
the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to aj
crime.’" He further claims that "it is not the
lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but
his capacity as a public officer, the charge
against respondent for which he was convicted
falling under the category of crimes against
public officers.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Silvosa is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
under Rule 6.03.
HELD: Atty. Catalan relies on Rule; 6.03 which
states that "A Sawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter, in
which he had intervened while in said service."
Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2,01
which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject,
except for valid reasons the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14
which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse
his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funal’s finding
that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post
Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides
that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
 Green Notes 2014
interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his
involvement in the same case on two occasions
can only be described as desperate. He claims
his participation, as public prosecutor was only
to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial
conference. He likewise claims his subsequent
participation, as collaborating counsel was
limited only to the reinstatement of the original
bail.
The Supreme Court on the other hand,
disagrees with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the
findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
in a disbarment proceeding.Atty. Silvosa’s
representation of conflicting interests and his
failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at
least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s
final conviction of the crime of direct bribery
clearly falls under one of the grounds for
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty.
Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are
constrained to impose a penalty more severe
than suspension because we find that Atty.
Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting
standards of moral and decency required of a
member of the Bar. His excuse that his
conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer,
but as a public officer, is unacceptable and
betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his
character. The practice of law is a privilege, and
Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to
exercise this privilege.
ISAAC C. BASILIO, PERALTA PEDROZO and JUN
BASILIO vs. ATTY. VIRGIL R.CASTRO
A.C. No. 6910/July 11, 2012 SERENO
FACTS: Complainants filed before the Court is a
Petition praying for the suspension or
cancellation of the license of Atty. Castro. They
allege that they were plaintiffs in Civil Case Nos.
1427 and 1428 before MTC Bambang, as well as
in Civil Case No. 883 before RTC Br. 37. They
likewise averred that they; paid Atty. Casiro the
amounts of P40.000 as acceptance fee and
P20,000 as filing fee, which he supposedly
charged them despite the actual filing fee
totaling only PI ,000. Finally, they contended
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that he failed to prosecute the cases before
MTC Bambang, resulting in their dismissal.
However, Atty. Castro clarified that he was
preceded two other lawyers, who acted as
petitioners’ counsel in all three civil cases. Upon
entering his appearance in these cases, he
exerted all efforts to protect the interests of his
clients. Further, he asserted that petitioners
ordered him to abandon the appeal he filed on
their behalf before RTC Br. 30 on the ground
that they were unable to file the supersedes
bond required of them by MTC Bambang to
Stay the execution of its 10 February 2005
Decision. He maintained that in lieu of pursuing
the appeal, they had ordered him to
concentrate on Civil Case No. 883, in which he
supposedly performed all his duties as their
counsel. Moreover, he pointed out the
correction that petitioners were defendants -
and not plaintiffs - in Civil Case Nos. 1427 and
1428, and that he did not repeatedly postpone
the hearings in the' three cases, contrary to
what they alleged. Finally, he maintained that
he used the money he received from them to
pay for his legal fees and for the filing fees for
the appeal.
The Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In
the proceedings before the Investigating
Commissioner, no actual hearing took place,
since Atty. Castro was absent for the first
setting due to a serious ailment, the
Investigating Commissioner was unavailable
during the second, and petitioners were unable
to attend the third. Instead, the parties were
only able to file their Pre-trial Briefs.
Upon the termination of the mandatory
conference, the IBP Commissioner directed the
parties to submit their respective position
papers. However, neither complainants nor
respondent complied. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Castro
be suspended for six months. The former ruled
that there was insufficient evidence to show
that the latter reneged on his obligation to
serve his clients in Civil Case No. 883.
Nonetheless, he should be held administratively
liable! for failing to file the requisite appellants’
memorandum before RTC Br. 30. The
Investigating Commissioner dismissed Atty.
Castro’s defense that the failure of petitioners
 Green Notes 2014
to file the supersedes bond and their instruction
to abandon the appeal were the reasons why
he did not file the memorandum.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Castro should be held
administratively liable for his failure to file the
mandatory appellants’ memorandum before
RTC Br. 30.
HELD: An attorney is bound to protect his
client’s interest to the best of his ability and
with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for
his client certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part. The respondent has
indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty
owed by him to his client as well as to the Court
not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy
administration of justice.
All told, the Supreme Court rule and so
hold that on account of respondent’s failure to
protect the interest of complainant, respondent
indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent
is reminded that the practice of law is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and
morally. The Supreme Court has been exacting
in its expectations for the members of the Bar
to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence of the public.
If it were true in this case that
petitioners directed Atty. Castro to abandon
their appeal, the prudent action should have
been for him to file a motion to withdraw
appeal before RTC Br. 30. In this regard, his
failure to file the appellants' brief' could indeed
be construed as negligence on his part.
However, it appears that the conduct of
Atty. Castro was; not so grave as to warrant the
recommended three-month suspension. In fact,
he still fulfilled his duty as counsel of petitioners
by attending the pre-trial conference held on 6
February 2006 in Civil Case No 883, even after
they had already filed the: instant Petition
against him. Thus, the Court bowers the period
of suspension to two months.
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FILOMENA B. CONSOLACION vs. LYDIA S.
GAMBITO, Court Stenographer, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan, Pangasinan
JUDGE EMMA S. INES- PARAJAS vs.
LYDIA S. GAMBITO, Court Stenographer,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Binalonan,
Pangasinan
A.M. No. P-06-2186 & A.M. No. P-12-3026/July
3, 2012 PER CURIAM
FACTS: Complainant Filomena B. Cofisolacion
charged respondent Ms. Lydia S. Gambito, a
court stenographer at the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Binalonan-Laoac, Pangasinan, with
"misrepresentation and unlawful acts."
Complainant alleged that sometime in
November 2002, respondent came to her house
and convinced her to buy her (respondent’s)
"claimed tricycle. As she wanted to help
respondent and the latter’s son, she agreed-to
buy the said tricycle after respondent promised
her that she [respondent] would present to her
[complainant] the documents evidencing her
ownership of the tricycle. Respondent allegedly
assured her that the said tricycle was not
encumbered. She handed to respondent the
amount of 65,000.00 after they executed a
"Deed of Sale of a Motorized Tricycle," and
respondent thereafter delivered and
transferred "her possession of the tricycle."
Allegedly, respondent also promised her to
deliver the "Original Certificate of Registration"
of the tricycle" on or before January 31, 2003."
Respondent, however, failed to make good her
promise and, despite demands, she failed to
deliver the said document. Complainant further
claimed that her repeated efforts to meet with
respondent at the latter’s place of work was in
vain, as respondent was always not around
every time she would go there.
Complainant claimed that on July 14,
2005, "a Branch Manager of the PR Bank" in
Urdaneta City, together with "a couple of
policemen," came to her house and "took
possession and control of the tricycle [she]
bought1 from [respondent] "on the claimed
ground that the said bank already owned it via
foreclosure of the "Chattel Mortgage"
supposedly executed by [respondent] over the
tricycle." She insisted that respondent never
informed her "about her [respondent’s]
mortgage transaction with said PR Bank." In
 Green Notes 2014
fact, she claimed that the respondent told her
at the beginning that the tricycle had been
mortgaged, she would not have bought it
despite respondent’s "financial plea."
Respondent alleged that when her son
applied for work abroad, she borrowed money
for her son’s placement fee from relatives and
friends, include complainant to whom she
[would] gave the tricycle as a "security,"
assuring her "that her money be returned after
two months" following the arrival of her son
abroad, "or deliver to her the certificate of
registration also within that period." However,
the recruitment agency failed to send her son
abroad, and they were unable to get back the
money they paid to the said agency, as its
manager could no longer be found and the
person who recruited her son had already died.
She also informed the Court that there was "an
on-going conciliation with [complainant]," and if
the latter would be amenable, she would pay
her "installment term until [her] obligation will
be fully paid. 1: She likewise admitted the
existence of a civil case for sum of money
against her. She explained that the money she
borrowed from the plaintiff was used by her
son who applied for work abroad, but he was a
victim of illegal recruitment. She claimed that
they could no longer get back the money from
the recruiter because the latter is already dead.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Gambito is
administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and if so,
whether or not her offense warrants the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
HELD: The Court stresses that the conduct of
every court personnel must be beyond reproach
and free from suspicion that may cause to sully
the image of the Judiciary. They must totally
avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed
or misdemeanour not only in the performance
of their official duties but also in conducting
themselves outside or beyond the duties and
functions of their office. Court personnel are
enjoined to [conduct themselves toward
maintaining the prestige and integrity of the
Judiciary for the very image of the latter is
necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both
official and otherwise. Gambito’s
misrepresentation regarding the ownership and
actual status of the tricycle which she sold to
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Filomena B. Consolacion (Consolacion) for
P65,000.00 unquestionably undermined the
people’s faith in the Judiciary. Gambito, a long
time court stenographer, took advantage of her
being a court employee and her friendship with
Consolacion when she induced the latter to buy
the tricycle and promised her that she would
give her the documents proving ownership of
the tricycle with the assurance that it was not
encumbered.
Another point against Gambito was her
transaction with Billamanca She admitted in her
letter-comment, dated June 14, 2005, that she
facilitated two (12) cases (ejectment case and
petition for the issuance of lost title) for the
amount of P 15,000.00, which was supposed to
be used for publication, filing fee and sheriff’s
fee. She explained that the cases were not filed
in court because Billamanca failed to give her
the full amount of P15,000.00. The amount
given was only P 7,000.00, delivered in
installments. Gambito’s unauthorized
transactions with Villamanca and Erum
constitute conduct grossly prejudicial to the
interest of the service. Under the Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules, dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service are
grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the
service.
Thus, the Supreme Court decided that
Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographers hereby
found guilty of three (3) counts of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
and is hereby dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-
employment in any government office,
including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
MA. IRISSA G. MUSNGI, Court Legal researcher
II, Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region III,
Branch 36, Gapan City,Nueva Ecija
A.M. No. P-l 1-3024/July 17, 2012 PER CURIAM
FACTS: Judge Cielitolindo A. Luyun (Judge
Luyun) assumed office as Presiding Judge of tHe
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region III,
 Green Notes 2014
Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija. Upoh
assumption of office, he conducted an
inventory of pending cases and evidence
submitted to the trial court. During the
inventory, he found a handwritten receipt for
P45,000. The amount, which was missing, was
part of the evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 8674,
9096, 9151 and 9152. The recipient of the
amount was Ma. Irissa G. Musngi (Musngi),
Court Legal Researcher II of the RTC.
The evidence shows the amount of Php
45,000.00 was part of the evidence seized by
the enforcers in Criminal Cases [sic] Nos 8674,
9151, 9096, and 9152 which are [sic] part of the
accountabilities of Ms. Gutierrez as the then
evidence custodian of this court and which she
turned over to Ms. Musngi on July 19, 2005, in
view of the former’s transfer to another court.
The same amount was in turn turned over by
Ms. Musngi to Ms. Pangilinan for safekeeping
only in the Office of the Clerk of Court upon
verbal instruction of the then
Executive/Presding [sic] Judge Arturo m. [sic]
Bernardo. Since there is no account with which;
to credit the amount of Php 45,000.00, Ms.
Pangilinan issued an acknowledgment receipt
instead of the customary official receipt. Later
or on February 6, 2006, Ms. Musngi withdrew
the said amount from Ms. Pangilinan. By her
own admission, Ms. Musngi spent the money
for; the alleged repair of the previous court’s
courtroom, chamber room, an [sic] restroom.;
However, Ms. Musngi failed to submit receipts
in support thereof. Inquiries made with court
employees disclosed that the sala of Branch 36,
RTC was housed at the old City Hall and all I
repairs made therein were shouldered by the
city government. The old City Hall had;
undergone renovation to be used as a hospital
and we cannot confirm as to whether or not the
previous sala had actually undertaken any
repairs.
In a report dated 28 November 2011,
the OCA found Musngi liable for grave
misconduct and serious dishonesty, and
recommended that Judge Luyun’s 8 August
2011 report be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that Musngi be
dismissed from the service.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ma. Irissa G.
Musngi is guilty of dishonesty and grave
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misconduct.
HELD: Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and
lack of fairness and straightforwardness."
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a
transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. To warrant dismissal from the service,
the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment.
The misconduct must also have a direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of
the public officer’s official duties amounting
either to administration or willful, intentional
neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the
office.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the
factual finding of Judge Luyun and the OCA that
Musngi stole the P45,000. Musngi failed to
present any evidence to prove that, indeed, she
spent the P45,000 for the repair of the ceiling
and toilet of the trial court. She did not present
any receipt for the materials used or for the
services engaged for the alleged repairs. She
also did not present any affidavit from Judge
Bernardo or from other court employees to
vouch for the truthfulness of the alleged
repairs. Even assuming that Musngi indeed
spent the P45.000 for court repairs, she would
still be liable because she is not authorized to
appropriate or spend monetary evidence for
whatever purpose.
Musngi’s excuse that she spent the
P45,000 for the repair of the ceiling and toilet of
the trial court is unconvincing. In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Pacheco, the Court
found unconvincing the unsubstantiated
explanation that money was spent for alleged
court renovations. Musngi’s acts of stealing the
P45.000 and saying that she used the amount
for the alleged repair of the ceiling and toilet of
the trial court constitute grave misconduct and
dishonesty.
 Green Notes 2014
Thus, the Court finds respondent Ma.
Irissa G. Musngi, guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct. Respondent Ma. Irissa G. Musngi is
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in
any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
LUNALINDA M. PERADILLA, Clerk of Court II,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, El Nido-
Linapacan, Palawan
A.M. No. P-09-2647/ July 17, 2012 PER CURIAM
FACTS: Presiding Judge Ma. Theresa P.
Mangcucang-Navarro of the MCTC of El Nido-
Linapacan, Palawan, requested then Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez (now Supreme
Court Justice) that a financial audit be
conducted on the books of account of the said
court. The request was made after Judge
Mangcucang-Navarro discovered that Clerk of
Court Lunalinda M. Peradilla (Peradiila) had
been remiss in remitting the Judiciary
Development Funds and the Fiduciary Funds.
The Financial Audit Team found that the bulk of
Peradilla’s accountability was due to her non-
remittance of the judiciary funds, especially the
collections for Fiduciary Fund. The Financial
Audit Team also uncovered a total of P235,000
representing un-receipted and unreported
collections. It was also found that Peradilla
intentionally made erroneous reports regarding
some of the collections. Further, the team
uncovered her Peradilla practice of erroneously
reporting her collections. This practice enriched
her in the amount of P20,187.50.
The Court Administrator adopted the
findings of the Financial Audit Team in its
Memorandum dated 14 May 2009. In a
Resolution dated 1 July 2009, the Court
docketed the report by the Financial Audit
Team as an administrative complaint against
Peradilla. In her one-page letter dated 19 April
2010, Peradilla did not refute the findings of the
Financial Audit Team. In fact, Peradilla
requested that the monetary equivalent of her
earned vacation and sick leave for her 16 years
of service in the Judiciary be used to restitute
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the shortages she incurred. Peradilla-also
admitted misappropriating the court funds.
Peradilla alleged that she only intended to
"borrow" the funds but unfortunately, she
failed to replace the "borrowed" funds.
ISSUE: Whether Peradilla is guilty of dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty, and grave misconduct by
misappropriating the court funds.
HELD: Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution
declares that a public office is a public trust, and
all public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. The demand for moral
uprightness is more pronounced for the
members and personnel of the judiciary who
are involved in the dispensation of justice. The
conduct of court members and personnel must
not only be characterized with propriety and
decorum but must also be above suspicion, for
any act of impropriety can seriously erode or
diminish the people’s confidence in the
judiciary. As front liners in the administration of
justice, they should live up to the strictest
standards of honesty and integrity in the public
service.
Clerks of Court act as custodians of the
court’s funds, revenues, records, property and
premises and are thus, liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment of such
funds and property.
As custodian of court funds and
revenues, Peradilla is mandated to immediately
deposit the court funds or collections in the
Land Bank of the Philippines; she is not
supposed to keep the funds in her custody.
Peradilla admitted that she failed to remit court
funds which she used for her family’s expenses.
In her letter dated 19 April 2010, Peradilla
requested that the monetary value of her
earned leave credits be used to restitute the
shortage of P62,847.55 for Judiciary Fund;
P213,263.00 for Special Allowance for Judiciary;
P13.20 for General Fund; and PI 8,500.00 for
Mediation Fund.
Although Peradilla inadvertently
omitted the shortage of P309,000.00 for
Fiduciary Fund, she never denied or refuted
 Green Notes 2014
such finding by the Financial Audit Team.
Peradilla also failed to issue official receipts and
did not report some of the collections in the
Monthly Reports of Collections and Deposits.
Furthermore, the Financial Audit Team found
that Peradilla made erroneous entries in her
collections by reporting lesser amounts than
the actual amounts collected as indicated in the
official receipts.
In this case, Peradilla is guilty of
dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and grave
misconduct for her: (1) non-remittance of
collections of judiciary funds; (2) non-issuance
of official receipts and non-reporting in the
Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposit^
of some of the collections; and (3) erroneous
reporting in the Monthly Reports and
Collections and Deposits of some of the
collections.
LAMBAYONG TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES
COOPERATIVE, represented in this act by its
Manager, GUDELIO S. V ALEROSO vs.
CARLOS P. DIAZ, in his capacity as Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Tacurong City
A.M. No. P-06-2246/ July 11, 2012 MENDOZA
FACTS: Complainant alleged that Sheriff Diaz
committed irregularities in the implementation
of the writs of execution. Sheriff Diaz was said
to have delayed the execution of the writs and
it was only after they had inquired from the
court that he actually executed them by
garnishing the salary checks of Lucito and
Constantinopla. Complainant further alleged
that Sheriff Diaz failed to render an accounting
on the garnished amounts and that out of the PI
6,695.17 worth of cash and checks, only
P8,347.93 was remitted to the Cooperative.
In response, Sheriff Diaz denied the
allegations and stated that when he received
the three writs on February 19, 2004, he
immediately prepared the Sheriff’s Notice and
instructed Atty. Marilou S. Timbol (Atty.
Timbol), the Cooperative’s counsel, to pay the
amount of PI,500.00 to defray the necessary
expenses in the implementation of the writs. He
explained that it was only on March 19, 2004,
when all the writs were personally served on
the judgment debtors because they were not in
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their offices or in their respective houses every
time he attempted to serve them the notices.
Sheriff Diaz further alleged that when
the judgment debtors failed to comply with the
notice, he served the Notice of Garnishment
regarding the salaries of the judgment debtors
and their co-makers on their employer, the
Department of Education (DepEd); that DepEd,
however, did not withhold their salaries but
only furnished him with machine copies of their
pay checks for the month of May 2004; that he
went to the complainant and told him about
DepEd’s refusal to withhold the salaries of the
judgment debtors and their co-makers; and that
the complainant advised him to collect only
from the judgment debtors and exempt the co-
makers from liability.
Sheriff Diaz also denied that he
appropriated the cash and checks he garnished.
Regarding Tacot, he claimed that he turned
over to complainant the following: LBP Check in
the amount of PI 4,016.50, DBP Check in the
amount of. P4.847.06 and cash amounting to
PI36.96 or a total amount of PI9,000.56. Then,
he remitted the whole amount to the
Cooperative through its treasurer, Melinda
Agcambot (Agcambot), but the latter handed
back to him the PI36.96 cash for merienda and
tricycle fare. Thus, only PI 8,863.56 was credited
to the account of Tacot. Sheriff Diaz further
claimed that by January 26, 2007, he then
remitted the total amount of P58,276.45 to the
Cooperative and submitted the Sheriffs Final
Report and the Notice of Lifting of
Levy/Attachment to the MTCC stating therein
that the judgment against Tacot had been fully
satisfied.
On March 18, 2011, the Investigating
Judge found the charges for dereliction of duty,
inefficiency and dishonesty unsubstantiated.
He, however, found Diaz liable for grave abuse
of discretion and recommended that the
appropriate penalty be meted against him for
accepting the amount of PI,500.00 for his
expenses in the execution of the writs in
violation of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court.
On March 14, 2012, the OCA, in its
Memorandum, adopted the recommendation
of the Investigating Judge, dismissing the
 Green Notes 2014
charges for dereliction of duty, inefficiency and
dishonesty. It, however, found Sheriff Diaz
guilty of simple misconduct and recommended
that he be fined an amount equivalent to his
three (3) months salary.
ISSUE: Whether Sheriff Diaz is guilty of
dereliction of duty, inefficiency and dishonesty
and grave abuse of discretion
HELD: Sheriffs are reminded that they are not
allowed to receive any voluntary payment from
parties in the course of the performance of
their duties. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just
unilaterally demand sums of money from a
party-litigant without observing the proper
procedural steps. Even assuming that such
payments were indeed given and received in
good faith, such fact alone would not dispel the
suspicion that such payments were made for
fees than noble purposes.
Sheriff Diaz’s act of receiving P 1,500.00
from Atty. Timbol, and P136.96 Agcambot, for
the expenses to be incurred in the execution of
the writs, without first making an estimate and
securing prior approval from the MTCC, as well
as his failure to reader accounting after its
execution, are clear violations of the rule. Even
if conceding that the sum demanded by Sheriff
Diaz is reasonable, this does not justify his
deviation from the procedure laid down by the
rule. Neither the acquiescence nor consent of
the complainant, before or after the
implementation of the writ will absolve him
from liability. The mere act of receiving the
money without the prior approval of the court
and without him issuing a receipt therefor has
been considered as a misconduct in office.
Thus, the respondent Sheriff Carlos P.
Diaz had only been charge of simple misconduct
considering that the sheriff has been previously
suspended for one (1) month and one (1) day
for Simple Neglect with the penalty of fine
equivalent to three (3) months salary is in
order. Sheriff Diaz, in fact, also has been
dismissed from the service for grave
misconduct.
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RHEA AIRENE P. KATAGUE, RODOLFO E.
KATAGUE, RONA SALVACION K. DELA vs. JERRY
A. LEDESMA, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 48, Bacolod City
A.M. No. P-12-3067/ July 4, 2012 SERENO
FACTS: Complainants alleged that on 17
December 2009, Presiding Judge Gorgonio J.
Ybanez of RTC Branch 48 issued a Writ of
Execution directed to the Provincial Sheriff of
Negros Occidental ordering the latter to cause
plaintiff therein, Eustaquio dela Torre (Dela
Torre), to vacate the subject premises in
connection with the Civil Case. Subsequently,
respondent, employed as Sheriff IV of the said
court, personally served a Notice to Vacate
upon Dela Torre on 22 December 2009. The
Writ of Execution was implemented after the
five (5)-day grace period, and Dela Torre
peacefully vacated the premises. However,
pieces of equipment and other lumber products
were left behind, as their removal would take
approximately two (2) days to accomplish.
Complainants claimed that contrary to the
assurance of respondent that he would return
the following day to remove the said effects, he
failed to do so.
Complainants further alleged that
respondent again committed himself to the
accomplishment of the task on 09 January 2010;
again, he failed to do so. On 08 January 2016, a
Third-Party Intervention (Intervention) in the
Civil Case was filed by Riza L. Schlosser
(Schlosser), who asserted a purported fifty-one
percent (51%) share in the properties left
behind by Dela Torre. Schlosser was the
petitioner in a related liquidation proceeding
entitled "Riza L. Schlosser v. Eustaquio Dela
Torre," pending before the Regional Trial Court.
On 29 January 2010, a Motion was filed
by complainants to enforce the Writ of
Execution in the Civil Case. Consequently, the
trial court issued an Order directing the
enforcement of the writ, but still to no avail.
Complainants alleged that respondent’s
explanation, that police assistance was needed
to facilitate the enforcement, was baseless.
Subsequently, complainants yet again moved to
have the writ implemented. Despite repeated
requests, however, respondent allegedly still
did not act upon the motion. Eventually, as
 Green Notes 2014
stated earlier, the aggrieved complainants filed
their respective Verified Complaints.
Accordingly, the trial court directed
respondent to seek assistance from the Bacolod
City Police Office to maintain the peace during
the implementation of the writ. On 11 March
2010, respondent wrote a letter to Police
Superintendent Celestino Guara (Guara) and
sought Guara’s assistance as instructed. Instead
of acting upon it, Guara coursed it through
Police Chief Inspector Noel E. Polines, who in
turn indorsed it to the Legal Department of the
PNP Regional Office at Iloilo City for review and
to the Regional Director for final approval. The
letter was not acted upon by the regional office
despite respondent’s follow-ups.
The OCA found respondent liable for
simple neglect of duty. It ruled that he had
failed to submit periodic reports as required by
the Rules of Court, which prompted several
follow- ups by complainants
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of
simple neglect of duty.
HELD: In the instant case, respondent was able
to sufficiently explain the circumstances
surrounding the delay in the implementation of
the writ. He was justified in not pushing through
with his plan of removing the subject effects,
considering that the latter were in custodia
legis, and that the Intervention of Schlosser was
yet to be heard at that time. He complied with
the instruction to seek police assistance and
was not remiss in his responsibility to follow up
his request. Indeed, the delay in the
implementation of the writ was caused by
circumstances beyond his control. However, the
Court faults respondent for not submitting his
periodic reports on the progress of his
implementation of the writ. Obviously, such
reports could have properly apprised
complainants of the reasons behind the
seeming delay in the execution of the writ and
prevented them from speculating too much.
These could have also appeased complainants
and shown the efforts that respondent had
undertaken in order to subvert any delay.
Although he submitted his Sheriffs Return upon
completion, it was clearly not the periodic
report required of him as outlined in the Rules.
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In fine, respondent is guilty of simple
neglect of duty, defined as "the failure of an;
employee to give one’s attention to a task
expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a
duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference." As officers of the court, sheriffs
are charged with the knowledge of what proper
action to take in case there are questions on the
writ needing to be clarified; they are charged as
well with the knowledge of what they are
bound to comply with. Sheriffs are expected to
know the rules of procedure pertaining to their
functions as officers of the court, relative to the
implementation of writs of execution, and
should at all times show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of their
duties. Any act deviating from the procedure
laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct
that warrants disciplinary action. Thus, the
Supreme Court affirms the OCA’s findings on
the respondent.
JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN vs.
NICOMEDES DELA CRUZ, Process Server,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan
A.M. No. P-06-2241/ July 10, 2012
DEL CASTILLO
FACTS: In her Complaint, Judge Dalmacio-
Joaquin alleged that Dela Cruz submitted
belated and false returns of service of notice. In
particular, she claimed that Dela Cruz received
the Order dated November 25, 2005 relative to
Criminal Case No. 5744-96 on December 9,
2005 but served the same to the parties only on
March 23, 2006. She also alleged that Dela Cruz
submitted false returns relative to Criminal Case
Nos. 04-0488 and 04-0489, No. 04-0483 and No.
05-0213. According to Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin,
Dela Cruz stated in his return of seryice in
Criminal Case Nos. 04-0488 and 04-0489 that
the accused therein was no longer residing at
her given address. However, during pre-trial,
this was denied by the accused herself who
declared in open court that she has not
transferred residence. Anent Criminal Case No.
04- 0483, Dela Cruz likewise indicated in his
return of service that therein accused is no
longer residing at his given address and that the
houses thereat have already been demolished.
However, during the scheduled pre-trial, the
 Green Notes 2014
complainant manifested that the accused who
is her neighbor still resides at his given address
and that his house is still standing thereon.
Finally, as regards Criminal Case No. 05-0213,
two of the accused therein manifested during
their scheduled arraignment that they are still
residing at their given address contrary to the
report of Dela Cruz. Hence, the trial court motu
propio lifted their warrants of arrest.
Dela Cruz denied the allegation and
claimed that the same was served to the parties
concerned three days before the scheduled
hearing. Anent the returns relative to Criminal
Case Nos. 04-0488 and 04-0489, No. 04-0483
and No. 05-0213, Dela Cruz vehemently denied
submitting false returns. He averred that it was
not his intention to submit incorrect or
misleading returns. He also claimed that Judge
Dalmacio-Joaquin only wanted to harass him as
this is not the first administrative complaint she
filed against him.
The OCA, on the other hand, agreed
with the Investigating Judge that Dela Cruz
indeed submitted false returns which amounts
to dishonesty, a grave offense punishable with
the extreme penalty of dismissal from service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of
the government. Considering however that on
June 10, 2008, Dela Cruz had already resigned
from the service "which the Court accepted
without prejudice to the continuation of his
administrative cases," the OCA recommended
that Dela Cruz’s benefits, except accrued leave
credits, be forfeited, with prejudice to re-
employment in any government
instrumentality.
ISSUE: Whether Dela Cruz is guilty of dishonesty
amounting to grave offense.
HELD: "All employees in the judiciary should be
examples of responsibility, competence and
efficiency." As Process Server, Dela Cruz ought
to be aware of the importance to serve the
court processes with dispatch. "It is through the
process server that defendants learn of the
action brought against them by the
complainant. More important, it is also through
the service of summons by the process server
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that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the
defendant.
It is therefore important that
summonses, other writs and court processes be
served expeditiously." In this instance, the
Supreme Court finds Dela Cruz guilty of simple
neglect of duty for the delay in the service of
the subject Order.
However, the court does not agree with
the OCA that the above infractions amount to
dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as the
'disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray. Thus, the Supreme
Court agrees with the observation of the
Investigating Judge that Dela Cruz did not
deliberately or intentionally make such
erroneous entries. As Dela Cruz explained, he
merely relied on the persons whom he
interviewed when he went to the given
addresses. It was never alleged, much less
established, that Dela Cruz was impelled by
some evil design or corrupt motives to commit
said errors or to favor any party or litigant.
Hence, the court finds him guilty only of
negligence in the performance of his tasks, and
not of dishonesty. Much as we empathize with
Dela Cruz considering his heavy workload, the
same however is an unacceptable excuse for
him not to exercise prudence and care in
verifying the information relayed to him.
In sum, the Supreme Court finds Dela
Cruz guilty not of dishonesty but only of simple
neglect of duty which is defined as "the failure
of an employee to give proper attention to a
required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference." Considering his 24
years of service in the judiciary and his health
condition, as well as the fact that no prejudice
was caused to the party-1 litigants in the above-
mentioned cases as they were all able to attend
the scheduled hearings, the court deem it
proper to impose upon Dela Cruz the penalty of
suspension of three months. However, in view
of Dela Cruz's resignation on June 10, 2008,
forfeiture of his salaries for three months
should instead be imposed in lieu of
suspension, to be deducted from whatever
benefits he may be entitled to under existing
laws.
 Green Notes 2014
CRISELDA C. GACAD vs. JUDGE HELARION P.
CLAPIS, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257/July 17, 2012
PER CURIAM
FACTS: According to Gacad, on 3 November
2009, she went, together with her father
Jovenciano Cardenas and sister-in-law Agriculita
Vda. De Cardenas, to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Nabunturan, Compostela Valley,
to file criminal charges against the suspect who
gunned down her brother Gregorio Cardenas.
They met provincial prosecutor Graciano Arafol,
Jr. (Arafol), who advised them not to hire a
private counsel. The following day, Arafol
informed Gacad that he filed a complaint for
murder against the suspect but H§ Provincial
Governor kept on pressuring him about her
brother’s case. Arafol suggested that they see
Judge Clapis so he would deny the Motion for
Reinvestigation to be filed by the accused
Rodolfo Comania (accused). Arafol, further, told
Gacad to prepare an amount of P50.000 for
Judge Clapis.
On 23 November 2009, Arafol told
Gacad that they would meet Judge Clapis at the
Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City. Thus,
Gacad, together with her husband Rene Gacad
and their family driver Jojo Baylosis (Baylosis),
proceeded to the Golden Palace Hotel. Inside
the hotel, Gacad joined Arafol and his wife at
their table. After a while, Judge Clapis joined
them. Arafol told Judge Clapis, "Judge sya yong
sinasabi kong kapitbahay ko may problema."
Judge Clapis replied, "So, what do you want me
to do?" Afarol answered, "Kailangang madeny
ang reinvestigation ni Atty. Gonzaga and we
proceed to trial kasi palaging tumatawag si
Governor." Arafol paused, and continued, "Wag
kang mag-alala judge, mayron syang inihapda
para sa iyo." Gacad felt terrified because she
had not yet agreed to Arafol’s demands. Hence,
when Arafol asked her, "Day, kanus a nirno
mahatag ang kwarta?" (When can you give the
money?), Gacad could only mumble,
"Paningkamutan na ko makakita ko ug kwarta...
basin makakita ko sir." (I will try to look for
money, maybe I can find, sir.) Judge Clapis
excitedly nodded and said, "Sige, kay ako na
bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it all
to me, we shall crush them.)
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To bolster her case of corruption
against Judge Clapis, Gacad recounted her
previous encounter with Judge Clapis and Arafol
in Criminal Case No. 6251 against her brother.
According to Gacad, Arafol suggested that they
give Judge Clapis the P80,000 cash bond posted
in the case so that her brother’s case could be
dismissed. After conceding to Arafol’s proposal,
Judge Clapis indeed dismissed the case despite
the strong evidence against her brother.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. is
guilty of Gross Misconduct and Gross
Ignorance of the Law.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in
administrative proceedings, the complainant
has the burden to prove his accusations against
respondent with substantial evidence or such
amount of evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The Court has consistently ruled
that charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.
In the present case, there is indeed no
substantial evidence that Judge Clapis received
the P50,000 given by Gacad to Arafol, and that
Judge Clapis tried to borrow another P50,000
from Gacad secured by a check allegedly signed
by Judge Clapis himself. The testimony of
Gacad, stating that Judge Clapis received
P50,000 and tried to borrow another P50,000
from her, both through Arafol, cannot be given
due weight for being hearsay evidence. On the
other hand, although Baylosis testified based on
his personal knowledge, he did not categorically
state that he saw Arafol give the money to
Judge Clapis. In addition, the check allegedly
issued by Judge Clapis was in the account name
of Arafol as attested by the BPI Business
Manager’s Certification. Hence, Gacad fell short
of the required degree of proof needed in an
administrative charge of corruption.
However, Supreme Court finds Judge
Clapis liable for gross misconduct. In the
present case, the Investigating Justice found
Gacad’s narration, that she met and talked with
Judge Clapis in the Golden Palace Hotel, as
credible. Gacad categorically and unwaveringly
narrated her conversation with Judge Clapis and
Arafol. On the other hand, Judge Clapis merely
denied Gacad’s allegation during the hearing
 Green Notes 2014
conducted by the Investigating Justice, but not
ip his Comment, and without presenting any
evidence to support his denial. It is a settled
rule that the findings of investigating
magistrates are generally given great weight by
the Court by reason of their unmatched
opportunity to see the deportment of the
witnesses as they testified. The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the
assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial
judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases. Thus, the acts of
Judge Clapis in meeting Gacad, a litigant in a
case pending before his sala, and telling her,
"Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila"
(Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.),
both favoring Gacad, constitute gross
misconduct.
The Supreme Court also find Judge
Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for
conducting bail hearings without a petition for
bail being filed by the accused and without
affording the prosecution an opportunity to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong.
Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment
but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the
judge liable for gross ignorance of the law., If
judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the
powers vested in them by the law, there will
riot only be confusion in the administration of
justice but also oppressive disregard of the
basic requirements of due process.
Judge Clapis had already been
administratively sanctioned in Humol v. Clapis
Jr., where he was fined P30,000 for gross
ignorance of the law. His order relied solely on
the arguments of counsel for the accused. In
Humol, the Court reminded Judge Clapis of the
duties of a trial judge when an application for
bail is filed, but in the present case, he ignored
the same. Therefore, we now impose upon him
the extreme administrative penalty of dismissal
from the service.
Page 32 of 43
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MURPHY CHULATGAS TRADERS and
MARINELLE P. CHU vs. HON. MARIO
B.CAPELLAN, Assisting Judge, Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 40, QuezonCity
A.M. No. MTJ-1111779/ July 16, 2012 BRJON
FACTS: On March 22, 2007, spouses Ofelia and
Rafael Angangco filed before the MeTC, Branch
40, Quezon City, an unlawful detainer
complaint, with application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (PMI)
against the complainants. The complainants
filed their answer with compulsory
counterclaim on March 30, 2007. In an order
dated October 7, 2008, the respondent denied
the application for a writ of PMI and set the
case for preliminary conference on November
25, 2008. On this date, the respondent referred
the case for mediation, so the preliminary
conference was again reset to December 9,
2008. On November 21, 2008, the spouses
Angangco filed their pre-trial brief. The
complainants, on the other hand, did not file
their pre-trial brief.
During the December 9, 2008
preliminary conference, the complainants
moved for the consignation of several checks as
payment for the amounts they owed to the
spouses Angangco, for which the respondent
set clarificatory hearings on January 23 and 30,
2009. The preliminary conference finally took
place on February 3, 2009. During the February
3, 2009 preliminary conference, the
complainants moved to dismiss the unlawful
detainer complaint on the grounds that: (1) the
spouses Angangco failed to comply with the
required barangay conciliation and to implead
the other co-owners of the property subject of
the unlawful detainer case; and (2) the MeTC
had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of PMI. On the
other hand, the spouses Angangco orally moved
to declare the complainants in default for their
failure to file a pre-trial brief.
On February 26, 2009, the respondent
issued the assailed joint order which submitted
the unlawful detainer case for decision based
on the facts alleged in the unlawful detainer
complaint. The complainants moved for
reconsideration, but the respondent denied
their motion. The complainants thereupon filed
the present administrative complaint against
 Green Notes 2014
the respondent. They also filed a motion asking
for the respondent’s inhibition from the
unlawful detainer case. The respondent
eventually inhibited himself from the case in an
order dated September 8, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Mario B. Capellan, is
guilty of delay in rendering a decision or order.
HELD: In numerous occasions, the Supreme
Court admonished judges to be prompt in the
performance of their solemn duty as dispensers
of justice because undue delay in the
administration of justice erodes the people’s
faith in the judicial system. Delay not only
reinforces the belief of the people that the
wheels of justice in this country grind slowly; it
also invites suspicion, however unfair, of
ulterior motives on the part of the judge. Judges
should always be mindful of their duty to
render justice within the periods prescribed by
law.
The Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure was promulgated to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of
the cases that it covers. In the present case, the
respondent failed to abide by this purpose in
the way that he handled and acted on the
subject unlawful detainer case.
A review of the relevant background
facts shows that the unlawful detainer case
against the complainants was filed on March
22, 2007 and the complainants filed their
answer thereto on March 30, 2007. Under
Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure of preliminary conference
should be held not later than thirty (30) days
after the last answer is filed.
The respondent set the case for
preliminary conference only on June 24, 2008,
i.e., at a time way beyond the required thirty
(30)-day period. Another of the respondent’s
procedural lapses relates to the frequent
resetting of the date of the preliminary
conference. The preliminary conference
scheduled for June 24, 2008 was reset, for
various reasons, to August 26, 2008, November
25, 2008 and December 9, 2008, and was finally
conducted on February 3, 2009, or almost two
(2) years after the complainants filed their
answer. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert
Page 33 of 43
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his authority in expediting the proceedings of
the unlawful detainer case. Sound practice
requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full
control of the proceedings in his court and to
adopt a firm policy against unnecessary
postponements.
Sections 9 and II, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10- SC,
classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or
order as a less serious charge sanctioned by
either (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one'(I) or
more than three (3) months, or (b) a fine of
more than Ten Thousand Pesos (PI0,000.00) but
not to exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
Considering that the respondent had
been previously adjudged guilty of the same
offense, we impose upon him a maximum fine
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Again,
we remind him that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant the imposition of a
more severe penalty.
RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST THE HON. CHIEF
JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA DATED
SEPTEMBER 14, 2011 FILED BY INTER-PETAL
RECREATIONAL CORPORATION
A.M. No. 12-6- 10-SC/ June 13, 2012 PER
CURIAM
HELD: Considering the Judgment dated May 29,
2012 of the Senate sitting as an Impeachment
Court, which found Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona guilty of the charge under Article II of
the Articles of Impeachment, with the penalty
of removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines as provided in Section 3(7), Article XI
of (he Constitution, the complaint against the
Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona dated
September 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal
Recreational Corporation is hereby DISMISSED
for having become MOOT AND
 Green Notes 2014
ACADEMIC."FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA
BENGCO vs. ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO
A.C. No. 6368/June 13, 2012 REYES
FACTS: That sometime on or about the period
from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty.;
Pablo Bernardo with the help and in connivance
and collusion with a certain Andres Magat
[willfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act
with intent to defraud herein complainants!
Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by
using false pretenses, deceitful words to the
effect that he would expedite the titling of the
land belonging to the Miranda family of.
Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of
complainants herein and they convinced herein
complainant[s] that if they will finance and
deliver to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as
advance money he would expedite the titling of
the subject land and further by means of other
similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as
lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective
buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of
Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and he is the one handling
William Gatchalian’s business transaction and
that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO
and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation
he well knew were false, fraudulent and were
only made to induce the complainants] to give
and deliver the said amount ([P]495,000.00)
and once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite and
cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully],
unlawfully and illegally misappropriated,
misapplied and convened the said amount to
his personal use and benefit and despite
demand upon him to return the said amount,
he failed and refused to do so, which acts
constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation
of Duties and Oath as a lawyer.
The case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Pablo A.
Bernardo be suspended for a period of two
years from receipt hereof from the practice of
his profession as a lawyer and as a member of
the Bar.
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ISSUE: Whether Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is guilty
of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD: It is first worth mentioning that the
respondent’s defense of prescription is
untenable. The Court has held that
administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. The lapse bf considerable time from
the commission of the offending act to the
institution of the administrative complaint will
not erase the administrative culpability of a
lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would
only be emboldened to disregard the very oath
they took as lawyers, rescinding from the fact
that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance
of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for.
There is no question that the
respondent committed the acts complained of.
He himself admitted in his answer that his legal
services were hired by the complainants
through Magat regarding the purported titling
of land supposedly purchased. While he begs
for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition is
shallow considering the fact that he used his
position as a lawyer in order to deceive the
complainants into believing that he can
expedite the titling of the subject properties. He
never denied that he did not benefit from the
money given by the complainants in the
amount of P495,000.00.
It is likewise settled that a disbarment
proceeding is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer despite
having involved the same set of facts.
Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in
the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively.
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme
Court has no option but to accord him the
punishment commensurate to all his acts and to
accord the complainants, especially the 88- year
old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.
Thus, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is
found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
suspended from the practice of law for ONE (1)
 Green Notes 2014
YEAR effective upon notice hereof. Further, the
Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to
RETTJRN the amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela
Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10)
DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to
SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant
within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN
WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him
the additional penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
Tomas Tan, Jr. vs. Atty. Haide Gumba
A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011
FACTS: Sometime in August 2000, respondent
asked complainant to be lent 0350,000.00. She
offered by way of security a parcel of land
located in Naga City registered in her father’s
name. Respondent showed complainant a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
respondent’s parents, and verbally assured
complainant that she was authorized to: sell or
encumber the entire property. Complainant
then agreed to lend money to respondent. With
the help of Atty. Payte, respondent executed in
complainant’s favor an “open” Deed of
Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land,
attaching thereto the SPA. Complainant was
made to believe that if respondent fails to pay
the full amount of the loan with interest on due
date, the deed of sale may be registered.
Respondent, however, defaulted on her
loan obligation and failed to pay the same
despite complainant’s repeated demands. Left
with no recourse, complainant went to the
Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to
find out that respondent deceived him since the
SPA did not give respondent the power to sell
the property but only empowered respondent
to1 mortgage the property solely to banks.
Complainant filed this disbarment case
against respondent where no answer or
comment was ever filed by the latter.
Consequently, the IBP Commissioner then in-
charge found respondent guilty of violating
Canon Rule 101and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending
that she be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.
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ISSUE: Whether the respondent committed
gross unethical conduct.
HELD: Yes, the Court agreed with the findings
and conclusions of the IBP but the modified the
recommended penalty. The Court held that a
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court. Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers
to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity
of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly
required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same
Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Here, respondent’s actions clearly show
that she deceived complainant into lending
money to her through the use of documents
and false representations and taking advantage
of her education and complainant’s ignorance
in legal matters. As manifested by complainant,
he would have never granted the loan to
respondent were it not for respondent’s
misrepresentation that she was authorized to
sell the property and if respondent had not led
him to believe that he could register the “open”
deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan. By her
misdeed, respondent has eroded not only
complainant’s perception of the legal
profession but the public’s perception as well.
Her actions constitute gross misconduct for
which she may be disciplined, following Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Rey Panes and Eduardo Panes, Jr. vs.
Atty. Michael Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann,
Rodolfo Viajar, Jr., John Nadua
A.C. No. 8096, July 5, 2010.
FACTS: Koronadal Water District (KWD), a
government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC), hired respondent Atty. Michael A. Ignes
as private legal counsel for one year effective
April 17, 2006. The Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Commission
on Audit (COA) gave their consent to the
employment of Atty. Ignes. However,
 Green Notes 2014
controversy subject of this case later arouse
when two different groups, herein referred to
as the Dela Pena board and Yaphockun board,
laid claim as the legitimate Board of Directors of
KWD. Cases against each other’s group and
their respective corporate acts were then filed.
On January 18, 2007, the Dela Pena
board also adopted a resolution appointing
respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and
Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private
collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and
its Board of Directors, under the direct
supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.
Meanwhile, the OGCC had approved
the retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin B.
Cuanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated
that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had
expired on January 14, 2007. In spite of a
resolution issued to terminate respondents’
authority to represent KWD, the latter still
continued to represent KWD in cases it is
involved.
Alleging that respondents acted as
counsel for KWD without legal authority,
complainants filed a disbarment complaint
against the respondents before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
Complainants alleged that respondents filed
cases as counsels of KWD without legal
authority.
In his defense, Atty. Mann stated that
he and his fellow respondents can validly
represent KWD until April 17, 2007 since Atty.
Ignes was not notified of his contract’s pre-
termination. Atty. Mann also stated that he
stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2QQ7
in deference to the OGCC’s stand.
The Investigating Commissioner
recommended a dismissal of the charge against
Atty. Ignes for lack of merit. It held that Atty.
Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for
one year, and he was unaware of the pre-
termination of his contract when he filed
pleadings in the cases KWD was involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of
misconduct?
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HELD: Yes, the Court found respondents
administratively liable. Section 3 of
Memorandum Circular No. 9 enjoins GOCCs to
refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms
to handle their cases and legal matters. But the
same Section 3 provides that in exceptional
cases, the written conformity and acquiescence
of the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the
written concurrence of the COA shall first be
secured before the hiring or employment of a
private lawyer or law firm. In Phividec Industrial
Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, three (3)
indispensable conditions were laid down before
a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private
counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases;
(2) the GOCC must first secure the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor
General or the Government Corporate Counsel,
as the case may be; and (3) the written
concurrence of the COA must also be secured.
Hence, respondents herein, had no
valid authority to represent KWD as the legal
requisites thereto were not complied with. Even
the fact that Atty. Ignes was not notified of the
pre-termination of his own retainership
contract cannot validate an inexistent authority
of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann as
collaborating counsels.
Moreover, respondents in this case,
have admitted the existence of Memorandum
Circular No. 9 and professed that they are
aware of our ruling in Phividec but still,
respondents acted as counsels of KWD without
complying with what the rule requires.
Consequently, for respondents’ willful
appearance as counsels of KWD without
authority to do so, there is a valid ground to
impose disciplinary action against them. Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.
 Green Notes 2014
Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla v.
Victoriano Pascua
A. C. No. 6655, October 11, 2011.
FACTS: Complainant Caalim-Verzonilla
Verzonilla seeks the disbarment of respondent
Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying
a public document and evading the payment of
correct taxes through the use of falsified
documents.
Complainant alleges that on September
15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized
two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with Sale.
Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious
because all the heirs’ signatures were falsified.
She contends that her sister, Marivinia, does
not know how to sign her name and was
confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center
at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by
her, as shown by a certification from said
hospital.
Complainant further alleges that the
two deeds were not presented to any of them
and they came to know of their existence only
recently.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two
deeds we’re used by respondent to annul a
previously simulated deed of sale.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits
having prepared and notarized the two
disputed Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies
any irregularity in their execution. He claims
that it was the parties themselves who pleaded
with him to prepare the second deed with the
reduced selling price. Moved by his humane
and compassionate disposition, respondent
gave in to the parties’ plea.
Respondent denies complainant’s
assertions that the two deeds are simulated and
falsified averring that all the parties
acknowledged the same before him.
As to the allegation that Marivinia did
not appear before him as she was allegedly
under confinement, he points out that
Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in another civil
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case pending before the RTC in Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan, for the annulment of the subject
deeds, and nothing in the complaint states that
she is mentally or physically incapacitated.
Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked
the appointment of a guardian for her.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent committed acts
meriting suspension or disbarment for
misconduct?
HELD: The Court suspended respondent for
misconduct showing deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Respondent did not deny preparing and
notarizing the subject deeds. He then claimed
to have been “moved by his humane and
compassionate disposition” when he acceded to
the parties’ plea that he prepare and notarize
the second deed with a lower consideration to
reduce the corresponding tax liability. However,
the two deeds were used by respondent and his
client as evidence in a judicial proceeding which
only meant that both documents still subsist
and hence contrary to respondent’s contention
that the second deed reflecting a lower
consideration was intended to supersede the
first deed.
As to the charge of falsification, the
Court finds that the documents annexed to the
present complaint are insufficient for us to
conclude that the subject deeds were indeed
falsified and absolutely simulated. We have
previously ruled that a deed of sale that
allegedly states a price lower than the true
consideration is nonetheless binding between
the parties and their successors in interest.
Complainant, however, firmly maintains that
she and her co-heirs had no participation
whatsoever in the execution of the subject
deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery,
simulation and fraud raised by the complainant
in this proceeding apparently are still to be
resolved in the pending suit filed by the
complainant and her co-heirs for annulment of
the said documents (Civil Case No. 2836-S).
With his admission that he drafted and
notarized another instrument that did not state
the true consideration of the sale so as to
reduce taxes due on the transaction,
respondent cannot escape liability for making
an untruthful statement in a public document
 Green Notes 2014
for an unlawful purpose. Respondent abetted in
depriving the Government of the right to collect
the correct taxes due. His act clearly violated
Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that, A LAWYER
SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION^ OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Not only did respondent assist the
contracting parties in: an activity aimed at
defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack
of respect for and made a mockery of the
solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment By
notarizing such illegal and fraudulent
document, he is entitling it full faith and credit
upon its face, which it obviously does not
deserve considering its nature and purpose.
In this case, respondent proceeded to
notarize the second deed despite knowledge of
its1 illegal purpose. His purported desire to
accommodate the request of his client will not
absolve respondent who, as a member of the
legal profession, should have stood his ground
and not; yielded to the importuning of his
clients. Respondent should have been more
prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn
oath not to commit falsehood nor consent to
the doing of any. As a lawyer, respondent is
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and, confidence reposed by the public in the
integrity of the legal profession.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Gregorio
Saddi
A. M. No. P-10-2818, November 15, 2010
FACTS: This administrative matter stemmed
from a financial audit conducted by the Court
Management Office on the cash and accounts
of the Clerk of Court and OlC/Clerks of Court of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Sasmuan,
Pampanga.
The cash count conducted revealed
shortages for the periods of accountability of
Clerk of Court Gregorio B. Saddi. Saddi received
a copy of the Memorandum which required him
to explain in writing why no administrative
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Prepared by: Atty. Erickson H. Balmes
charge should be filed against him for the delay
in remitting the collections, but he did not
comply. A previous audit of MTC-Sasmuan,
Pampanga also revealed that Saddi had
previously incurred a shortage although he later
restituted the amount in full.
The audit team further reported that
Saddi did not prepare and submit monthly
financial reports of his collections to the Court
in violation of OCA Circular No. 113-2004. Thus,
the audit team recommended that Saddi be
held liable for gross neglect of duties,
dishonesty as an accountable officer in charge
of collecting money belonging to the court, and
for violations of various administrative circulars
relative to custody of Court funds.
The audit team also disclosed that Saddi
had issued: a handwritten receipt for ain
amount of £500.00 which he received as
execution fee from the plaintiff in a civil case.
He failed to issue the necessary writ of
execution pending appeal and was ordered by
Judge Yulo- Antero to explain in writing why he
only issued a handwritten receipt. Saddi,
however, submitted no explanation.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be
considered remiss in' his various duties as clerk
of court?
HELD: The court sustained the findings of the
OCA. Clerks of court, as the chief administrative
officers of their respective courts, must act with
competence, honesty and probity in accordance
with their duty of safeguarding the integrity of
the court and its proceedings. They are judicial
officers entrusted to perform delicate functions
with regard to the collection of legal fees, and
as such, are expected to implement regulations
correctly and effectively. As custodians of court
funds, they are constantly reminded to deposit
immediately the funds, which they receive in
their official capacity to the authorized
government depositories for they are not
supposed to keep such funds in their custody.
The Court enjoins clerks of court to
strictly observe the rules and regulations
relative to the management of court funds
received by them. Saddi’s failure to turn over
the full amount of his and to adequately explain
and present evidence thereon constitute gross
 Green Notes 2014
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even
malversation of public funds. On the other
hand, the delayed remittance of his previous
cash collections and failure to submit monthly
reports of court funds he received constitute
gross neglect of duty.
By these deplorable acts of gross
dishonesty, grave misconduct and gross neglect
of duty, Saddi has, no doubt, undermined the
people’s faith in the courts and, ultimately, in
the administration of justice. Dishonesty alone,
being in the nature of a grave offense, carries
the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the
government service. Dishonesty has no place in
the Judiciary. Gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct, likewise, carry the same penalty.
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled
“Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, October 19, 2010.
FACTS: This case deals with Allegations of an
intellectual offense that were hurled by Atty.
Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares
against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for
hisponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28,2010.
On August 9, 2010, a number of lawyers
published a statement on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the
Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP
College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of
allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was
meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del
Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as
an established fact, but a truth. In particular,
they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del;
Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the
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primary sources of the quoted portions and yet
arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the
authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
The statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of a
statement by the faculty of the UP College of
Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was a
reasonable exercise of the right to criticize the
judiciary?
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. It held
that the publication of a statement by the
faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the
allegations of plagiarism and I
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was
totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act
of misplaced vigilance.
The first paragraph of the letter subject
of this case concludes with a reference to the1
decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a
reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. The authors also not only assumed that
Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they
went further by directly accusing the Court of
perpetrating extraordinary injustice by
dismissing the petition of the comfort women in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further
attempt to educate this Court on how to go
about the review of the case.
The insult to the members of the Court
was aggravated by imputations of deliberately
delaying the resolution of the said case, its
dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the
Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming
lack of concern of the members of the Court for
even the most basic values of decency and
respect.
The Court could hardly perceive any
reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the
April 28, 2010 Decision in the case and
undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
 Green Notes 2014
authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Their actions likewise
constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Emelita Garayblas and Atty. Renato Dela
Cruz v.Hon. Gregory Ong, Hon. Jose Hernandez,
and Hon. Rodolfo Ponferrada
G. R. No. 174507-30, August 3, 2011
FACTS:Petitioner Atty. Emeiita H. Garayblas
(Atty. Garayblas) is the principal legal counsel,
with petitioner Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz (Atty.
De la Cruz) as collaborating counsel, for Gen.
Jose S. Ramiscal who is facing charges for
falsification of public documents and violation
of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before
several divisions of the Sandiganbayan.
Accused Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal was
arraigned on February 20, 2006, and the SB 4th
Division set the pre-trial for April 6, 2006 in
Davao City On February 28, 2006, the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the SB 4th Division sent a
Notice of Hearing to all the parties, informing
them of the cancellation of the April 6, 2006
pre-trial hearing and the resetting to April 27,
2006 in Davao City. Petitioner Atty. Garayblas,
opposing the resetting to April 27, 2006, filed a
Motion to Reset. On March 23, 2006, the SB 4th
Division issued an Order denying said motion to
reset, stating that “Atty. Garayblas and
Associates must adjust their schedule to suit all
the other accused and their counsels, Who are
available for the pre-trial hearing in Davao City
on April 27,2006.”
Petitioners failed to appear for pre-trial
on April 27, 2006 in Davao City; hence, public
respondents ordered petitioners to explain why
they should not be held in contempt; Atty.
Garayblas, for her part, explained her absence
as due to an illness; as she suffered from 'a high
blood sugar level and a high blood pressure,
thereby preventing her to attend the subject
pre-trial. Atty. Dela Cruz, on the other hand,
explained that his absence was due to the fact
that he was also required to attend before the
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Second Division of the SB in another criminal
case involving the same accused.
After due course, the Court held Attys.
De la Cruz and Habacon-Garayblas liable for
their absence or non-appearance which caused
the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial
conference and thus wasted the time of the
Court. Then, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 118 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Court ordered them to pay the amount of ten
thousand pesos (PI 0,000) each as sanction or
penalty and to partially answer the traveling
and other expenses of the Court in holding the
subject pre-trial conference in Davao City,
within ten (10) days from receipt of this order.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the;
same was denied stating that even if the Court
is inclined to believe Atty. Garayblas' illness, the
Court still expected her to make the necessary
arrangement for co-counsel or any other
colleague to attend the pre-trial. It was also
reiterated in said Resolution that Atty. De la
Cruz should have given priority to the pre-trial
hearing in Davao City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed order is
warranted?
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.
The Court held that the SB 4lh Division
already said it believed Atty. Garayblas' claim
that a day before the scheduled pre-trial
conference in Davao City, she started suffering
from hyperglycemia (high blood sugar) and
hypertension, and she felt the symptoms
thereof until the day of the pre-trial itself. This
incapacitated her from traveling to Davao City
to appear at the proceedings. Note that
symptoms of hypertension include confusion,
ear noise or buzzing, fatigue, headache,
irregular heartbeat, and vision changes. As for
hyperglycemia, a person suffering therefrom
experiences headaches, increased thirst,
difficulty concentrating, blurred vision, frequent
urinating, and fatigue, among others. It is
understandable then that a person suffering
from confusion, difficulty in concentrating,
blurred vision, fatigue/and others, would be
hard put to attend a hearing, much less have
the clarity of mind to think or worry about
finding another lawyer to substitute for her.
Indeed, it would not be reasonable to expect
 Green Notes 2014
her to have been able to make the necessary
arrangements for another lawyer to attend in
her stead.
It is considered further that the
importance of having counsel who is the most
well- versed on the facts of the case, to be the
one attending a pre-trial conference. This being
so, it is not quite prudent to send in a new
lawyer, who has not had ample time to fully
familiarize himself or herself with the facts and
issues involved in the case, to attend a pre-trial
conference. Sending to the pre-trial conference
a new lawyer who is not very knowledgeable
about the case would most probably lead to
such careless preparation which the Court
abhors.
With regard to Atty. De la Cruz, his non-
appearance at the pre-trial conference was also
excusable. There were hearings for their client's
case in two separate divisions of the
Sandiganbayan on the very same date in two
distant locations. To ensure representation for
their client at the hearings in both divisions of
the Sandiganbayan, petitioners agreed that
Atty. De la Cruz would attend the one before
the Second division, while Atty. Garayblas
would attend the one before the SB 4thDivision
in Davao City. It appears that Atty. De la Cruz
was not fully apprised of the fact that his co-
counsel would not be able to attend the pre-
trial conference. It is understandable why Atty.
De la Cruz could not have abandoned the
hearing before the Second Division so he could
attend the pre-trial in Davao City. It was already
too late in the day for Atty. De la Cruz to change
plans and to notify the Second Division that he
would be absent so he could attend the pre-trial
in Davao City instead of the hearing at the
Second Division.
Dennis Habawel and Alexis Medina v.
The Court of Tax Appeals
G. R. No. 174759, September 7, 2011
FACTS: The petitioners were the counsel of
Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield),
which sought from the Office of the City
Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of
excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2000.
After the City Government of Mandaluyong City
denied its claim for refund, Surfield initiated a
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special civil action for mandamus in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City.
The RTC dismissed the petition oh the ground
that the period to file the claim had already
prescribed and that Surfield had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Surfield, represented by the petitioners,
elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition
for review. The CTA First Division denied the
petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to
exhaust the remedies.
Undeterred, the petitioners sought
reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, insisting
that the CTA had jurisdiction, and arguing that
the CTA First Division manifested its “gross
ignorance of the law” and “lack of
understanding or respect” for the doctrine of
stare decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v.
Trampe. The CTA First Division denied Surfield’s
motion for reconsideration.In addition, the CTA
First Division, taking notice of the language the
petitioners employed in the motion for
reconsideration, the CTA First Division adjudged
both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt
of court for failing to uphold their duty of
preserving the integrity and respect due to the
courts.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners’ language in the
subject motion was contumacious?
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain
the respect due to the court and to judicial
officers and to insist on similar conduct by
others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys
thus:
Rule 11.03. - A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
It is conceded that an attorney or any
other person may be critical of the courts and
their judges provided the criticism is made in
respectful terms and through legitimate
channels.
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision
is, therefore,; whether or not the criticism; is
 Green Notes 2014
bona fide or done in good faith, and does not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Here, the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration contained the following
statements, to wit: (a) “it is gross ignorance of
the law for the Honorable" Court to have held
that it has no jurisdiction over the instant
petition;”(6) “the grossness of the Honorable
Court’s ignorance of the law is matched only by
the unequivocal expression of this Honorable
Court’s jurisdiction;” and (c) the “Honorable
Court’s lack of understanding or respect for the
doctrine of stare decisis."
By such statements, the petitioners
clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds
of] propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their
sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation
in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court
or its judge, especially in the absence of any1
evidence, is a serious allegation and constitutes
direct contempt of court. It is settled that
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
contained in pleadings or written submissions
presented to the same court or judge in which
the proceedings are pending are treated as
direct contempt because they are equivalent to
a misbehavior committed in the presence of or
so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. This is true, even if the
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
are not read in open court. Indeed, in Dantes v.
Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, where the petitioner’s
motion for clarification stated that the
respondent judge’s decision constituted gross
negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was
pure chicanery and sophistry, the Court held
that “a pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements when
submitted before a court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending is direct contempt
because it is equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court
or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice.”
The statements manifested disrespect
towards the CTA and the members of its First
Division approaching disdain. Nor was the
offensiveness of their “strong, tactless and
hurtful” language minimized on the basis that
“snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by
counsels are not considered contemptuous
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considering that unfavorable decision usually
incite bitter feelings.” By branding the CTA and
the members of its First Division as “totally
unaware or ignorant” of Section 7(a)(3) of
Republic Act No. 9282, and making the other
equally harsh statements, the petitioners
plainly assailed the legal learning of the
members of the CTA First Division. To hold such
language as reflective of a very deliberate move
on the part of the petitioners to denigrate the
CTA and the members of its First Division is not
altogether unwarranted.
The power to punish contempt of court
is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally
should a court invoke its inherent power to
punish contempt of court in order to retain that
respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail. The sanction the CTA
First Division has visited upon the petitioners
was preservative, for the sanction maintained
and promoted the proper respect that
attorneys and their clients should bear towards
the courts of justice.
HEAVENLY FATHER,
PLEASE FILL IN THE GAPS, PLEASE FILL IN THE
BLANKS!
THY WILL, THY TIME, THY PLAN ALWAYS BE
DONE!
To LANI AND EULO For Providing the Inspiration
to see this compilation to its fruition!
GOOD LUCK! GOD BLESS©
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Batangas City and
Manila,
Basta Ikaw Lord!
 Green Notes 2014
Legal Ethics
Prepared by: Atty. Erickson H. Balmes

THE BARRISTERS’ CLUB OFFICERS

Chancellor: LESLIE D. RAGUINDIN

Vice Chancellor: MILDRED P. AMBROS

Secretary: SHEENA MARIE S. YSIT

Treasurer: ANNE LUCILLE B. RUIZ

PRO: SHEENA LIZ A. BALITTE

PRO: JUAN MA. AMBROSIO M. DAGUIO

Business Manager: MARK T. MANGLIWAN

Business Manager: MARJO MARIE B. SISON

SSG Representative: ROLEX JURISTER G. DAWATON

Ex-Officio: ABBYGAILE T. GONZALES

Adviser: ATTY. ISAGANI G. CALDERON

Dean, College of Law: ATTY. REYNALDO U. AGRANZAMENDEZ

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