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On Aristotle
Physics 1.5-9
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SIMPLICIUS
On Aristotle
Physics 1.5-9
Translated by
Han Baltussen, Michael Share,
Michael Atkinson and Ian Mueller
with an Introduction by
Richard Sorabji
www.bloomsbury.com
Translation © 2012 by Han Bultussen, Michael Share, Michael Atkinson and Ian Mueller
Introduction © 2012 by Richard Sorabji
Han Bultussen, Michael Snare, Michael Atkinson, Ian Mueller and Richard Sorabji have asserted their
rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identiÀed as Authors of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
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retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.
No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action
as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.
Acknowledgements
The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative
funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities,
Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA;
the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the
Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e
del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation;
the Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham College; the
Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N.
Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for ScientiÀc Research (NWO/GW); the
Ashdown Trust; Dr Victoria Solomonides, the Cultural Attaché of the Greek
Embassy in London. The editor is grateful for comments on early drafts to Myrto
Hatzimichali, Robert Wardy, Eleni Kechagia, Giannis Stammatellos and Fiona
Leigh, and for especially full comments to Pamela Huby, Stephen Menn, Rachel
Barney, Harold Tarrant and Carlos Steel. The translation of 1.6 beneÀted from
the comments of Carlos Steel, Dirk Baltzly, and Robbert van den Berg. Ian
Mueller died before he was able to revise 1.7-9 in the light of valuable comments
from Donald Russell and James Wilberding. The editor implemented revisions
on 1.7-9 with the aid of those comments. He thanks Michael Atkinson for Ànal
comments on 1.5 and 1.7-9, as well as for preparing the Greek-English indexes
and subject indexes for 1.5 and 1.7-9, and collaborating with Michael Share on
the indexes for 1.6. He would also like to thank Sebastian Gertz for compiling
the English-Greek indexes and preparing the volume for press, and Deborah
Blake, the publisher responsible for every volume in the series. The editor also
wishes to thank Janel Mueller and Lucas Siorvanes for their help with proofreading.
Translation: 1.5-6 15
1.5 Han Baltussen 17
1.6 Michael Share and Michael Atkinson 30
Departures from Diels’ Text and Bibliography 50
Notes 53
English-Greek Glossary 65
Greek-English Index 71
Subject Index 79
Memorial notice 85
Translation: 1.7-9 Ian Mueller 87
Notes 145
English-Greek Glossary 157
Greek-English Index 161
Subject Index 166
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Introduction
Richard Sorabji
Notes
1. Pantelis Golitsis, Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la
Physique d’Aristote, Berlin, 2008, pp. 128-39.
2. Philoponus On Aristotle’s Physics 156,10-17, Against Proclus, 405,11;
413,6-7; 414,22; 415,2 and 4; 426,21; 442,17. Philoponus’ view is discussed in
Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, London, 1988, chs 2 and 3; Frans de
Haas, John Philoponus’ New Definition of Prime Matter, Leiden, 1997.
3. Philoponus in Phys. 577,13; 687,30-3; 688,30.
4. Philoponus Against Proclus 424,10 and 16; 428,8; 434,4.
5. I. Hadot, ‘La vie et l’oeuvre de Simplicius’ in her (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie,
son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin, 1987, pp. 3-39, at p. 21, translated into English in
Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London, 1990, pp. 275-303, at p.
290
6. Against Proclus 443,6-13 and 22-3.
7. Against Proclus 414,10-17; 418,25-6; 419,3.
12 Introduction
8. e.g. in Cat. 83,14-17.
9. Philoponus Against Proclus 405,26; 424,10, 16 and 24.
10. Matter, Space and Motion, ch. 1, p. 20 on Simplicius’ concept of matter,
ch. 2, p. 27 on Philoponus’.
11. I thank Carlos Steel for the references.
12. On the second ambiguity see notes on the lemma 191b15 at 236,13-14,
on 238,8; on 242,4-10, on the lemma 191b36 at 242,15-16, on 243,12, and 32,
and on 254,9.
13. Aristotle Metaphysics 1.6-7, 987b20; 26; 988a31; 26; Physics 1.4, 187a17;
3.4, 203a15; 4.2, 209b35, and W.D. Ross’ commentary on Aristotle Metaphysics
14.1, 1087b16.
14. Starting from Lemma 35 on Epictetus’ Handbook ch. 27. The most recent
edition by Ilsetraut Hadot discusses it in her ch. 5, and it is translated by Tad
Brennan and Charles Brittain in Simplicius: On Epictetus Handbook 27-53, in
the present series, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. I thank Sebastian Gertz
for drawing my attention to two further contributions on the subject by I. Hadot,
‘Die Widerlegung des Manichäismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios’,
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51, 1969, and ‘Dans quel lieu le néopla-
tonicien Simplicius a-t-il fondé son école de mathématiques, et où a pu avoir lieu
son entretien avec un manichéen?’, International Journal of the Platonic Tradi-
tion 1, 2007, 42-107.
15. On this see the studies by Philippe Hoffmann, ‘Aspects de la polémique
de Simplicius contre Philopon’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre,
sa survie, Berlin, 1987; ‘Simplicius’ polemics’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and
the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, London, 1987, pp. 57-83, enlarged 2nd edn,
Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, suppl. vol. 103, 2010, pp. 97-123;
‘La triade Chaldaïque, erôs, alêtheia, pistis: de Proclus à Simplicius’, in A.Ph.
Segonds, C. Steel (eds), Proclus et la théologie Platonicienne, Leuven, Paris
2000, pp. 459-89.
16. See Richard Sorabji, ‘Waiting for Philoponus’, in Charles Burnett, Ro-
traud Hansberger, Afifi al-Akiti (eds), Medieval and Arabic Thought, Warburg
Studies and Texts, London, 2012, revised in his Introduction to the translation
of Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus and Zacharias of Mytilene, Ammonius, in the
present series.
Conventions
[}] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to
the translation or the lemmata for purposes of clarity, as well as those
portions of the lemmata which are not quoted by Simplicius.
<}> Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e.
additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and
editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompany-
ing notes provide further details.
(}) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, con-
tain transliterated Greek words and Bekker page references to the
Aristotelian text.
Translation
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Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.5
Translated by Han Baltussen
Chapter 5
188a19-27 All make the contraries principles [those alleging that 179,20
all is one and does not move (for even Parmenides treats hot and
cold as principles and addresses such things as fire and earth and
there are those too [who use] the rare and the dense, as Democritus
[does with] the full and the empty, [both] of which he says exists,
one as being and the other as non-being.) Moreover [this is] in
position, shape and order. These things are genera of opposites: of
position above and below, before and behind, of shape angular and
smooth, straight and round. It is thus clear] that all in some way
make the contraries the principles.
Having shown that the principle is neither one [in number] nor infinite,
and concluding that those who posit many and limited [principles]
speak better, such as Empedocles, he owed us an immediate indication
of how many of these multiple [principles] there are. But he, passing
over that [issue], shows first which [principles] there are, and does not 25
have an unreasonable approach, but shows concurrently with which
ones there are, also how many [there are]. For if they are contraries, two
are in any case (pantôs) at the top of the hierarchy (anôtatô). He shows
that the principles are contraries, that is, the elementary foundations
of physical things, firstly from the agreement (sumphônia)1 among
almost all the natural philosophers, even if they disagree in other
respects. For even those who say being is one and unmoved, as for 30
example Parmenides, even these [people] make the principles contrar-
ies of physical things. For even he [=Parmenides] in his [account] with
regard to opinion makes ‘hot and cold’ principles. Those things he calls
‘fire’ and ‘earth’ and ‘light’ and ‘night’ or ‘darkness’. For he says after the
[comments] regarding truth:2
for they have decided to name two forms one of which is not 180,1
appropriate [to name], wherein lies their error; they have distin-
guished things opposed in shape and allocated them signs as
separate from each other, here the heavenly flame of fire smooth
and very soft, in every respect identical to itself, but not identical 5
to the other; in contrast, they have also determined this by itself
as opposite, the unknowing night, dense and heavy in bodily form.
18 Translation
And a little later (28B9 DK):
But when all things had been named light and night and things
10 [allocated] in accordance with their powers for each everything is
full alike of light and invisible night, both equal, because in neither
is anything which does not have a share.
If ‘nothing has no share in either’, it is made clear that (1) both things
are principles and (2) that [they are] contraries.3 And those who sup-
posed that the principle is one and in motion, such as Thales (see
15 23.22-3) and Anaximenes (see 24.26) making creation happen by rare-
faction and compression, those too posited as contrary principles rare-
faction and compression. Democritus too makes contraries principles,4
choosing the full (to plêres) and the empty (to kenon), of which he said
the former exists, but the latter does not (Phys. 188a22-3). But even in
the atoms5 themselves he saw contrariety. For he said that they differed
20 by three upper level distinctions, rhusmos, diathigê, tropê – rhusmos
meaning the shape, diathigê the arrangement, and tropê the position. For
the [capital] A (if it were an element) differs from [capital] N by shape, the
Z from the N by position, and AN from NA in arrangement.6 These are the
three genera of contraries, position in terms of high and low, left and right,
front and back, shape of having an angle or not and being straight or
25 curved, and in arrangement the first and last [are] contraries.
Empedocles and Anaxagoras he (i.e. Aristotle) left for the moment,
the former because clearly by his own admission there is contrariety
among the elements – both in respect of Strife and Love, and even with
regard to combination and dissolution; for he says that coming-to-be is
30 nothing other [than] ‘just mixing and separation of things mixed’ (B8.3
DK). As for Anaxagoras he made mention of him even earlier (Phys.
187a22-7) as positing contraries among the principles, when he pre-
sented his disagreement with Empedocles with the words ‘they differ
from each other in that the latter creates a cycle of these things, the
former [lets them happen] once, and he (i.e. Anaxagoras7) [makes] both
181,1 the homoiomerous things and the contraries infinite, while he (i.e.
Empedocles) [posits] the so-called elements’. Anaxagoras in his actual
words clearly also transmits [to us] the contrarieties in [his account of]
the process of coming to be, in which he says (B12 DK): ‘this rotation
(perikhôrêsis) brought on separation, and from the rare separated off
5 the dense and from the cold the hot and from the gloomy8 the bright and
from the wet the dry’.
Also the Pythagoreans9 posited the contraries as secondary and
elementary principles not only for the physical things, but simply for all
that comes after the One, which they said to be the principle of all
things, and they subordinated [to the contraries] the two coordinated
10 series (sustoikhias), which are no longer properly principles. About
these Eudorus writes the following [things]:10
Translation 19
It must be stated that the Pythagoreans said the One was the
principle of all things according to their highest account, but,
according to their second account, that there were two principles
of the things which are brought to completion, the One and the
nature contrary to that; [that] of all the things that are conceived
of as contraries they list the preferable under the One, but the
inferior under its contrary nature. That is why these things are not 15
regarded as absolute principles according to these men [i.e.
Pythagoreans]. For if the one is principle of the former, and the
other of the latter, the principles are not universal to all as is the
One.
That is why they also said that the One is in another way principle
of all things, presuming that both matter and all realities have
come about from it. And that is also the God high above (ton
huperanô theon).
Next Eudorus, describing it in more accurate terms, says that they posit 20
the One as principle and say that the elements arise from the One, but
he states that they refer by many names to the elements. For he says:11
It is worth pointing out that Aristotle does not say [simply] that the
contraries make up all the principles, but the things that are contrary
in some way (pôs). For they do not speak of contraries in the primary
sense (kuriôs), but of those things that they regard as contraries. For
the void and full are not contraries, but rather they are opposed as a
state and [its] privation, nor are the angular and non-angular or the
straight and curved. And if one13 were to say the straight is some kind 182,1
of shape, he proved himself that there is no contrariety among shapes.
But perhaps they did not posit them as contraries (enantia) in an
absolute sense, but as opposites (antikeimena). And he himself, as we
shall learn, saying that the contraries are principles, will posit the form
and [its] privation as the principal opposition, which are contrasted not
20 Translation
5 as contraries, but in some other way. So the [phrase] ‘contrary in some
way’ involves differing ways of antithesis.
188b30-189a9 But they differ from each other [by the fact that
some take [contraries] that are prior, others take ones posterior,
and some take ones better known according to reason, others
better known according to sense perception; for some postulate as
the cause of generation hot and cold, others fluid and dry, others
odd and even, or strife and love; these differ from each other in the
way just stated, so that they say that they are in a way the same
and different: different, as is the view of most, yet the same (189a1)
by analogy; they take them from the same list of coordinated
opposites. Some are of general scope, others are subordinate. From
this perspective they say they are the same and different, and
some better and others worse, and some say they are better known
according to reason, as has been said before, others according to
sense perception. For the universal is known according to reason,
the particular according to sense perception; for reason is directed
to the universal, sense perception to the particular. For instance,
the great and the small is known according to reason, the rare and
dense according to sense perception.
Having shown that regarding the principles there is agreement (sum-
phônia) among the ancient natural philosophers in making them con-
traries, because to many they seem to disagree with each other as each 15
one posits something else as the principle, he also passes on their
difference. And how this too leads to agreement, he shows nicely and
clearly.
So he makes the difference clear by saying ‘some take [contraries]
that are prior in nature, others posterior in nature’ and ‘some take ones
better known according to reason, others better known according to
sense perception’. Or [he clarifies] by meaning the same thing with 20
‘prior in nature’ and ‘better known according to reason’, and again
‘posterior in nature’ and ‘better known according to sense perception’.
And of the examples he added ‘the odd and even and Strife and Love’ as
they are [contraries] by nature prior, and more known according to
reasoning, but not via sense, as befitting the prior ones (for these are 25
intelligible; that is why Empedocles, when speaking about Love, says
‘but look with your mind and don’t sit with your eyes astounded’), but
he ascribed to the posterior things ‘the hot and cold and wet and dry’ as
things posterior by nature and more known via sense.
Parmenides mentions hot and cold, but regarding wet and dry Alex-
ander says that either he said that (the very one who called them hot 30
28 Translation
and cold), or Empedocles [did so] placing the four elements as principles
next to Love and Strife. Yet Porphyry39 ascribed the view more appro-
189,1 priately to †Anaximenes who said ‘earth and water are all that comes
to be and grows’.40 The Pythagoreans posit the even and odd as princi-
ples, in the way that Empedocles [posited] Strife and Love with the four
elements. Perhaps he added the [opposites] mentioned as examples of
those [things] more known by nature and by sense, but not anymore of
5 those prior and posterior. For the more general and comprehensive
must be prior, while those particular and contained more posterior.41
The things mentioned do not stand in such a relation to each other, with
the result that they would not differ in that respect. Or perhaps it is
because he spoke earlier about the contraries differing with regard to
the prior and the posterior, when he said (187a15) ‘they generate the
10 other things from condensation and rarefaction and create many things
– these are contraries, and at a general level excess and defect, as is the
great and the small according to Plato,42 unless perhaps of these [con-
traries] those that are intelligible and considered by reason, such as
Love and Strife and odd and even, should be said to ‘contain’, because
they reach all other things, whereas perceptible and material things,
because they are ranked below the former and share in them, are
15 ‘contained’. For hot and cold and dry and wet partake in Strife and Love
and odd and even in respect of unification and dissolution and the
combinatory and separative. For in his On Generation43 he characterises
the hot as what compounds (sunkritikon) similar things by its combina-
tory [property] (sunkritikon). But it is not participated in by these.44
Alexander says that the more formal of these are containing, while the
20 more material ones are contained [within them], saying that the more
formal ones among these aforementioned contrarieties are hot, dry,
uneven, and Love,45 but the more material ones the opposites to these.
Still, he says that one group assumes the prior and containing [oppo-
sites], while the others [assume] the posterior and the contained, while
no one speaks of hot and dry, nor again anyone else of cold and wet, but
25 of opposite things together. For in this way, but not in the other, they
could say that the opposites were principles, all in common having an
opposed nature but differing by some being prior and others posterior.
Therefore those who have put forward these opinions say ‘the same
and different things’, different, as shown before, because the one says
30 Strife and Love, the other hot and cold and others again another of the
oppositions, yet also while seeming to state a differing view they say the
same things, in so far as they assume things which are analogous (ta
analogon). For given that there are two opposed columns, the one being
stronger, in which Love and odd and excess and great and rare and hot
[reside], and the other being weaker, in which the contraries of these
35 are, they all take from the same column, from the stronger one the
190,1 stronger [elements] of their own opposition, and from the weaker one
the weaker elements, even if some assume the more general and con-
Translation 29
taining oppositions, while others [assume] more particular and con-
tained ones. For excess and defect contain great and small and the latter
contain rare and dense and these last hot and cold. They are analogous:
as excess stands to defect, so great to small and rare to dense and hot to 5
cold. And it is clear that those who posit the prior and more comprehen-
sive as principles speak better, while those who [posit] the contained
and more immediate worse; for even though these are principles of
others, they also are from principles. Those who posit the intelligible 10
and more general and comprehensive speak of what is better known
according to reason (188b32), while those who posit the perceptible and
more particular and the contained speak of what is better known to
sense (188b32-3), because the universal is to be grasped by reason, but
the particular by sense perception.
How is it that he says (189a8-9) that the great and small are general
principles and according to reason, but the rare and dense of the things
that are particular and according to sense? For each of these is also both 15
general and particular. Perhaps because the rare and dense are more
physical and material, just as the hot and the cold are more perceptible
and because of that also particulars, but the great and small more
immaterial because they are also observed in incorporeal things and
therefore more universal and more known by reason. 20
Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.6
Translated by Michael Share (lines 190,21-202,19)
and Michael Atkinson (lines 202,20-208,32
Chapter 6
190,21 189a11-14 The next thing should be to say whether they [sc. the
principles] are two or three or more. [For they cannot be one, because
contraries are not one [thing], nor infinite [in number], because being
will not be knowable, and [because] there is a single contrariety46 in
any one genus and substance is one particular47 genus }48]
Having set himself the task of discovering the number and identity of
the principles of physical49 things50 and having set out opinions on the
25 subject,51 which are various, he detected a single common feature of
those [opinions], the inclusion of the contraries among the principles.52
Therefore, taking this general agreement as evidence (eis pistin), [and]
in addition establishing it by demonstrative arguments of his own,53 he
first shows what the principles are: that they are [in fact] the contraries.54
And concurrently with this it is also shown how many principles there are:
that those that are contrary [to one another] are two,55 and that which
30 underlies the contraries one (which he will add later).56 This, then, is why
he has first shown what the principles are and then added their number.57
To begin with (teôs), from its having been demonstrated that the
contraries are principles, he concludes once more58 that it is not possible
for there to be either [just] one principle or an infinite number.
191,1 That there is not [just] one he argues (sullogizesthai)59 as follows: If
there is [just] one, it is not contraries. The principles are contrary [to
one another].60 Therefore if there is [just] one, it is not a principle.
That the principles are [indeed] contrary [to one another] has [al-
ready] been shown;61 that what is one (to hen) is not contraries he now
shows by conversion: If the contraries are not one [thing], what is one
[thing] is not contraries; for if a contrary is contrary to a contrary, the
contraries62 would not be in one [thing].
He shows that the principles are also not infinite in number using the
5 same argument as previously:63 If the principles are infinite in number,
they themselves will be unknowable on account of being infinite in
number and the things [that derive] from them will be unknowable
because ‘we think that we know a thing when we have discovered its
first causes and first principles and [have traced it] back to its elements’.
He also employs a second argument for the principles not being
Translation 31
infinite in number as follows: Substance is a single genus. In every
single genus there is a single contrariety. Therefore there is a single 10
contrariety in substance. A contrariety is between two things, the
contraries. Therefore substance has two principles in its sphere (peri
autên), [namely,] the contraries. Therefore the principles, since they are
contrary [to one another], are not infinite in number.
In relation to this last [argument] one should first ask what ‘one
substance’ is and what the word ‘genus’ means here and what the single
contrariety that is observed in the sphere of (peri) the genus of sub-
stance is and why it is that, having set himself the task of discovering 15
the principles of all physical things in common, he has focussed on
(paralambanein) just substance and the contrariety associated with it.
For how will the contrariety associated with substance be applicable to
the genera in (kata) the other categories?64
Alexander takes substance to be the enmattered form, or, rather, the
composite of matter and form, which is one genus65 of substance, there 20
being three [such genera]: matter, form and the composite. And indeed
it is only in it that contrariety is observed in association with substance.
For it is not the case [that it is found] in substance as a whole (pas) while
in all the other categories that have contrariety there are many contra-
rieties. In fact in each of the genera that come under quality there is also
a single contrariety, as for instance, in colour, which is a single genus, 25
[that of] black and white, in disposition, [that of] virtue and vice, in
flavour, [that of] sweet and sour, and similarly with the other [genera].
And in the same way, in the one genus of substance, the one involving
(kata) enmattered and generated form, there is a single contrariety, that
of form and privation.66, 67
He [sc. Alexander] says that the ‘one genus’ in question (ekeinos) is
one whose division is into species and no longer into genera.68 And
enmattered form too is divided into the differentiae of the species, all of 30
them as species. And qua generated it has a single contrariety, that of
form and privation. And if there is a single contrariety in ‘any one genus’
and [if] physical substance in [the realm of] generation and perishing is
a single genus, there would also be a single natural contrariety in it, 191,1
which would be the principle of generated substances. And when a thing
has a single contrariety, and that [contrariety] is itself a principle, the
principles of natural and generated (en genesei) things that belong to it
would not be infinite in number.69
But if by ‘one genus’ he means enmattered substance, first, he himself
said70 that there is no contrariety in substance and, second, if we were 5
seeking the principles of substantial change alone, we should make only
the contrariety in substance a principle, while if [we were seeking those]
of [change] in quality and the other categories as well, it would be
necessary to assume another, common, contrariety.
Well, on the question of there being nothing contrary to substance,
one must say that he was denying one [kind of] contrariety there, one
32 Translation
10 where both [contraries] would be species,71 and proposing another [kind]
here, one involving form and privation. And we know that privation is
not thought to be anything that has being, since it is a kind of absence
of being. So it is correct to say both that nothing is contrary to substance
and that there is a single opposition (antithesis) in substance.
With regard to the second [point] our master Ammonius said that ‘we
15 are seeking the principles of the existence (hupostasis) of the substances
in which the other categories also have their being, as Alexander also
noted when commenting on [the words] “moreover, it is impossible for
there to be more than one primary contrariety, for substance is a single
genus of being”.’72 For, just as being is primarily in substance and
comes to the other genera secondarily from it in the manner of [other]
20 things that are [derived] from one [thing] and [relative] to one
[thing],73 so too will the contrarieties in the other genera have their
being from that in substance. Therefore it will be fitting to speak of
form and privation firstly with reference to the contrariety in sub-
stance but in the second instance also with reference to the changes
in the other categories. After all, in them too there is on the one hand
form and on the other privation.
25 ‘The [words] “in any one genus” will not refer to the genus which is
proximately divided into species. For the contrariety in this genus will
not be primary, since it [sc. the genus] is not primary either, and the
principal74 contrariety should be prior to the other contrarieties.’75
The great Syrianus, however, says: ‘Perhaps by genus he means the
30 category and [says] that it has a single contrariety because, although
there are many [contrarieties], they are all reduced to one, excess and
defect,76 which is understood in the appropriate way (oikeiôs) in each
category. “Excess” is always the superior contrary, “defect” the inferior.
So excess is one thing in quantity, another in quality, another in place
35 or posture, “for”, says Porphyry, “there are as many [kinds of] excess and
defect as there are kinds of being”.’ ‘But’, he [sc. Syrianus] says, ‘one
193,1 might perhaps add “if every category admits of such an opposition”.’
Ammonius said that it is not a genus in the strict sense, whether the
proximate or the highest, that is in question here (for contrariety on the
part of (kata) the differentiae of neither77 of these produces generation
5 and perishing), but as, he says, Alexander also noted towards the end of
his explanation of the present passage, he is here calling the single
substratum78 a single genus. (It was in fact his habit to also call the
nature underlying anything a genus.) So, just as a single contrariety,
that of even and odd, is observed in79 number, and the [contrariety] of
sweet and sour in flavour, and that of smooth and rough in surface, so
10 too is a single contrariety, that of form and formless (which [Aristotle]
calls privation), observed in substance. So, just as number is different
from odd and even in definition (for neither one of them80 is included in
the definition of number), but in actuality it is always one or the other
of them,81 and [just as] surface stands in relation to even and uneven,
Translation 33
so does the nature which underlies substance stand in relation to form 15
and formless.82
On these issues, in response to the [comments] of the most philo-
sophic Syrianus one must say that if he understands excess and defect
in the strict sense, the contrariety would belong to quantity alone; it is
[only] present in the other categories because of quantity. And if, on the
other hand, he is taking it in the sense of superior and inferior, how does 20
he explain83 ‘if every category admits of it’?84 After all, there are cer-
tainly also differentiae in each [category] and in differentiae one is
superior, the other inferior.
And in response to our master, who also cites Alexander in his
support, first, how will the contrariety of substance85 also be present in
the other categories when each should have its own contrariety just as
it has its own genus? If the others [derive] their being and their genus 25
and their contrariety from substance, there would be [just] one primary
genus, substance, and the primary [genera] would no longer be ten. In
fact, not even being [comes to be] present in the other categories from
substance, but is present in substance first and after it in the others,
just as order [does] not [travel] from the first to the second but to all
[members of a series] from the shared order. And how by ‘one genus’ 30
could he mean the substratum, or matter, in this passage when he has
not yet shown (as he will soon86) that there must be some third principle
which underlies the contraries?
Well, it is clear from what follows87 that the contrariety he intends to
assume is that of form and privation. And that exists not only in
substance but in every category that allows of change. Whiteness, for 35
example, is sometimes present in a substratum, sometimes absent, and
when it is present, the form of whiteness is said to be present in it, and
when it is absent, privation is. And likewise for the other categories. So 194,1
perhaps when he says ‘substance is one particular genus’ he is not on
this occasion talking about the substance that is opposed to the other
categories but about the whole being (huparxis) of that physical reality
(hupostasis) which is subject to change, [and] which is our current topic
and the principles of which we are seeking.88 The contrariety of form and 5
privation is observed to be present throughout this on account of [the
presence of] change. [First], having assumed that such physical, gener-
ated and enmattered being (huparxis) is, as it were, one particular
genus (just as he would also say that there is one particular genus of
intelligible, ungenerated, completely matterless existence (hupostasis)), 10
he shows that the highest contrariety in such substance must be single;
then, further assuming that ‘in any one genus’ the highest contrariety
is single, he concluded that in this genus, the one we are currently
discussing, or that of physical substance, the principal contrariety of the
genus is89 also single, and on that account the principles will not be
infinite in number.
It should not surprise us that the word ‘substance’ is being used with
34 Translation
general application (koinôs). Similarly, here [in the Physics], when he is
15 talking precisely, he will describe90 generation and perishing as a
change with respect to substance, but he often also uses them in relation
to quality, saying [for example] that white comes to be out of black and
that black perishes into white;91 and yet in the process of black becoming
white no change with respect to substance takes place but [only one]
with respect to quality.
That ‘in any one genus’ the first contrariety is single is clear from the
20 following. The genus indicates a commonality of nature. The common-
ality is either from above, and so is the cause of the differentiae, as [in
the case of] substance and the other92 categories, or from below so as to
receive them.93 And if it is [their] cause, it is clear that, within the range
of the generation of the differentiae, it will produce two extremes that
are furthest removed from one another, in other words [a pair of]
contraries; and if it is a substratum, it is certainly the case that, among
25 the things that are changing in it, it will have no more than two that
are, while connected,94 furthest removed from one another. This is also
evident among the things themselves: in quality there is a single
highest95 contrariety, like and unlike, and in quantity [there is] equal
and unequal, and in the same way in substance in the general sense
(koinos) there is form and privation.
‘Substance’, then, should be understood either in this way or else with
reference to the substantial96 [element] (to ousiôdes) everywhere. (We
30 do, after all, say that colour and compressiveness (to sunkritikon)97
belong substantially98 (ousiôdôs) to black.)99 In this way there is in every
category its own substantial element with respect to which ‘black’ or
‘three cubits long’ or ‘on the right’100 are said to come to be or perish; and
yet the substance which underlies these is not said to come to be or
perish when they come to be or perish but [only] to alter. So the
35 substance now in question is that in which generation and perishing
[take place], [and] in which [are included] both substance in the strict
195,1 sense,101 [the kind] that is said to exist in its own right, and the existence
of the accidents of such substance.102 For this103 too partakes of genera-
tion and perishing.
Which kind of substance, then, is it that Alexander takes104 to be the
kind involving (kata)105 enmattered form in this passage (entautha)? If
it is substance in the strict sense, the kind that is opposed to the other
5 categories, the argument is defective, but if it is the kind that is said of
all generated forms in common, all would be well.
It seems to me that what Eudemus106 of Rhodes says also tends
towards this view, albeit that too107 is obscurely expressed. It goes like
this: ‘If there is a contrariety, there will be at least two things. And once
it is established that the primary contraries are two [in number],
10 neither of them can be a substance, since substance is not a contrary, if
indeed the physicist does not investigate everything108 – which is why
he does not enumerate all the things that exist or assume common
Translation 35
principles of all things but [only] of substances, and of those [only] of the
corporeal ones as though [they were]109 “one particular genus”. Not just
anything comes to be from just anything, but from something of the
same genus, such as colour from colour, flavour from flavour, and
likewise in other cases; and nor would substance come to be except from 15
substances or body except from bodies.’
In the above the [words] ‘as though [they were] one particular genus’
and ‘not just anything comes to be from just anything, but something of
the same genus, such as colour from colour’, indicate that ‘substance’ is
not being understood in the sense of the primary substance of the ten
genera [sc. categories]. For that is not ‘as though’ a genus but really a
genus. So [the substance] in question would be that which also embraces
the accidents.110
20 189a34 And so if the previous argument and this one are thought
to be valid, it is necessary, if both of them are to be preserved, to
posit some third thing.
He has shown previously that the contraries are principles of natural
things (ta phusika): this is because what comes to be does not come to
be from anything random but from a contrary, and it passes away not
25 into anything random but into a contrary. Next, he introduces further
arguments which leave this matter problematic and seem to show the
contrary, that the contraries are not principles; his arguments show this
moreover through deductive accuracy rather than by being just clever.
Now he finds a way in which both the previous arguments and the
subsequent ones, though they seem to contradict each other, will come
30 to the same thing. This he does by maintaining that the contraries are
principles (this has been validly proved previously), but not however
when taken on their own (since the arguments which deny it are also
Translation 43
valid), but when accompanied by some other third thing underlying the
contraries. Again he finds that the natural philosophers agree with his
argument, those [philosophers] that is who posit for the contraries a 203,1
single nature, and because of it maintained that the universe was a
single thing, and generate everything from this – water for Thales, fire
for Heraclitus, air for Anaximenes, and that which is intermediate for
Diogenes. For all of these posited this single nature for the contraries,
saying that other things came to be from it through combination and 5
separation or rarefaction and condensation. He is more complimentary
to those who speak of what is intermediate and adds his reason. The four
elements are already involved with contrarieties: fire is hot and dry, air
is warm and wet, water cold and wet, earth cold and dry. All of them are
involved with contrariety, for all derive from matter and form. But that
which is going to receive the contraries, and along with them is going to 10
produce the genesis and the passing away of the things which are, must,
in its own nature, be without a share in the contraries. For should it
possess one of the contraries in its substance, either it will not change
in itself and nothing will be from it or pass away (if its being is in one or
the other of the contraries), or it will possess all the contraries together.
In short, if it is involved with a contrary, it will no longer be simple but 15
compound, for the contraries are in a substratum, so it will not even be
a principle. Principles are the things from which a particular thing
(touto) stems; they are not the thing itself. But if someone really wants
to make one of the elements the principle, it is better to speak of air,
because compared to the others air seems to have differences which are
imperceptible: it will seem to be posited as something without qualities
and as something having no contrariety within it per se. Of the other
elements, water is more naturally able to turn into the contraries, as it 20
easily gets warm or cold – and in particular turns into solid ice so that
it seems not even to have wetness in its substance. Fire, however, has
obvious contrarieties – I mean heat and dryness, and particularly heat
– and fire when it stays constant (menon)165 does not naturally receive
the contraries. The reason for this is its particularly active nature (to
drastikon mallon) and because it is analogous to form rather than to 25
matter.
189b8 But all of them give shape to this one thing by means of the
contraries.
Introducing the one thing both through the necessary thrust of his
argument and on the evidence of the other natural philosophers, he
shows that not even this is self-sufficient per se, saying that not even 30
they posited the one thing on its own, but the contraries along with it,
since he wants to establish the three principles as principles among
them too. And he says that even they give shape to the one thing by
means of the contraries; they explain the differences in the things that
44 Translation
come to be in terms of the differences of the contraries, some [sc. of the
philosophers] by means of rarefaction and condensation, and others by
means of more and less. And those who generate other things by means
35 of rarefaction and condensation create them by intensifying or relaxing
204,1 the quality which they have. For rarefaction is relaxation, and conden-
sation is intensification; of these, intensification comes under ‘more’ and
relaxation under ‘less’, and everything is reduced to excess and defect.
‘And it seems,’ he says, that there being three principles is not an
innovation of my own ‘but that this doctrine, that oneness and excess
5 and defect are the principles of things which are, is an ancient one’
(189b11-13). Even though everyone did not use the same words, excess
and defect, but some spoke of combination and separation, others of
rarefaction and condensation, or the more and the less, or the great and
the small, nevertheless all of these are reducible to excess and defect.
And in this way at least all those who say that the principles are three
10 are in harmony with each other. They differ in this way. The more
ancient thinkers say that the two things, which are in fact the contrar-
ies, are active, whereas the one thing is passive and material, whereas
some of the later thinkers say that the one is active and the two, the
contraries, are passive and material. Plato seems to mean this when he
makes that which acts one and calls that which is acted upon, or matter,
15 excess and defect, and great and small, thereby too speaking of it as two
things. It is clear that if he was speaking of the active cause in a strict
sense as one, then this was not an element. If the form is one and matter
is two, signifying things by numbers, in the Pythagorean way, then he
reasonably spoke of form as one thing, since it defines and limits
whatever it takes hold of, and matter as two, since it is indefinite and
the cause of mass (onkos) and division and is naturally disposed towards
20 the opposites (ta antikeimena). It must soon be noticed that even
Aristotle himself reduces privation and matter to the same thing, when
he says ‘the substratum is numerically one, but two in terms of form’
(190b23-4). Obviously, he too will say that the substratum is two,
whereas form is one.
208,1 189b27 That the number of elements is neither one, nor more than
two or three is clear. [But which of these is the case, as we said, is
very perplexing. Let me discuss first coming to be in general, for it
is natural to consider first what is common to everything, and]
subsequently to consider the distinctive features of individual
cases.
Having shown that there must be a single contrariety in the principles
and some substratum for contraries, he concludes that ‘the number of
5 elements is neither one’, since there are contraries and a substratum for
the contraries, nor however are they ‘more than two or three’. For the
substratum is a single thing and the contraries are not more than two.
Whether the principles are two or three (this is the reference of ‘as we
said’) deserves investigation. If the contraries are taken as a single
principle, there would be two principles, matter and the contraries. If
10 the contraries are taken as two, then the principles are three. It is
preferable, because of privation, for the ambiguity to be left, rather than
that privation should be apparently the same as matter, or if it is not
the same, a principle only accidentally. The question is whether there
are two principles, form and matter, or three, if privation is also added,
or whether in one sense there are two and in one sense three, which in
fact will appear to be the truth. These after all are the subsequent
15 subjects of his discussions. And in this matter there is much difficulty,
whether the contraries are principles in a similar way, or whether one
is a principle per se and the other is only accidentally a principle.
Furthermore, concluding these arguments, he [Aristotle] goes on
(190b29): ‘Thus in one sense we have to say that there are two princi-
ples, and in another that there are three; and in one sense that they are
the contraries and in another sense not.’ Since he proposed to discover
the principles of things which come to be starting particularly from
change and the process of coming to be; and since, among the things
20 which come to be, those which come to be in respect of an accidental
attribute (kata ti tôn sumbebêkotôn) have substance as an obvious
substratum, while those which come to be in a substantial sense
(kat’ousian) less obviously have the substratum: it was for this reason
Translation 49
that he initially made the account about genesis in a quite general
manner, and, having introduced examples of change in respect of an
accidental attribute, he subsequently distinguishes this from coming to
be in a substantial sense, and shows the need for the substratum in that
case, and how privation relates to it. He made his point rather generally, 25
also because he applied it not only to natural coming to be, but also to
that induced by skill; such is the coming to be of the educated man. At
the beginning of his work (cf. 184a23ff.), he said that, for us, the
consideration of general and unspecific points was prior to the consid-
eration of distinctive points. From what has been said here, it is clear 30
that what were in that passage referred to as universal points (after
which he said ‘one should proceed to the particular details’) were the
general and unspecific points, which are more knowable to us.
Departures from Diels’ Text
This second half of the book is the last of the ten and a half volumes
translated for the series by Ian Mueller. As the third of the volumes
published posthumously, it is the only one that he did not live to revise.
But with the help of outstanding comments by Donald Russell, James
Wilberding and Michael Atkinson, the general editor was able to supply
a revision. For an extensive appreciation of Ian Mueller’s work, see
Stephen Menn ‘In memoriam Ian Mueller’, Aestimatio 7, 2010, pp.
193-228.
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Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.7-9
Translated by Ian Mueller
189b27-31 So that there is neither one element nor are the ele-
ments more than two or three [is evident. But as we have said,
[deciding] which of these alternatives holds involves great diffi-
culty.
Chapter 7
So let us state our view in this way, first discussing coming to be 208,1
in general. For the natural way to proceed is first to discuss
common features] and then to investigate the specific features of
each thing.
Having shown that there must be one contrariety among the principles
and a substratum underlying the contrarieties, he concludes that there
is neither one element – since there are contraries and a substratum 5
underlying them – nor, however, are the elements more than two or
three; for the substratum is one and the contraries are not more than
two. But it is worth investigating whether there are in fact two or three
principles, (this is what the words ‘as we have said’ refer to). For if the
contraries are taken as a single principle, there would be two principles,
matter and the contraries, but if the contraries are taken as two, there
are three principles. It is better [to say there are two] because1 ‘priva- 10
tion’ is ambiguous and is either thought to be the same as matter or,
even if they are different, privation is a principle in an accidental sense.
So the difficulty is whether there are two principles, form and matter,
or whether there are three, privation being added, or whether they are
two in a way and three in a way – and the last will be seen to be true.
These are the difficulties which he articulates next. And the great 15
perplexity is about whether contraries are principles in the same way
or whether one is a principle per se, the other in an accidental sense. And
in concluding this discussion he says, ‘Therefore there is a way in which
one should say there are two principles and a way in which one should
say there are three. And there is a way in which one should say the
principles are contraries } and a way in which one should not say this’.2
Since he had proposed to find the principles of what comes to be by
considering change and coming to be, but of the things which come to be 20
those which come to be with respect to some attribute have substance
as an obvious substratum, but those which come to be with respect to
88 Translation
substance have a substratum which is less obvious; therefore, having
first discussed coming to be generally and setting out examples of
change with respect to some attribute, he then distinguishes coming to
25 be with respect to substance from this and shows that in this case a
substratum is also necessary, and also how privation is related to it. He
says this discussion is more general, because he invokes not just natural
coming to be but also the coming to be due to art – the coming to be of
the musical is an example. He has said3 at the very beginning of this
treatise that the study of what is common and general is prior for us to
30 the study of specifics. And it is also clear from what is said here that
what he there called universals, from which he said one should proceed
to the particulars, were the common and general things which are better
known to us.
Another kind of privation is the one which is opposite to a form and does
5 revert to it so that coming to be and perishing comes about in terms of
the change of these two into one another. And this privation exists after
the form[‘s arrival] since it is a ‘disabling’ (pêrôsis) of the form, and it is
to be found both prior to and after the form as an absence of the form,
though with a suitability for it. Consequently [with this kind of priva-
tion] there will not be a privation of a privation, but only form and
privation, the latter being a certain absence of form. And when the form
is present the privation is not present. Nor is the absence of the
10 privation present as another privation. For privation is absence of form
but not of privation. And the form can be said to be present or absent,
but the presence [of form] cannot be said to be present or absent, as if
there could be a further presence of presence. And similarly with
15 absence; for when some things are connected and then separated from
each other, we do not say that there is a separation of a separation.
But if this is correct why does Alexander say25 that coming to be in the
strict sense is also classed under alteration? For change with respect to
affective qualities should not be coming to be in the strict sense.
217,1 190b23-9 The substratum is one in number, [but two in form. For
human and gold and, in general, matter can be counted, because
it is more a particular thing, and what comes to be does not come
to be from it in an accidental sense. But privation and contrariety
are accidental. But form is one, for example, ordering or musical
or any of the other things] which are predicated in this way.
Here again he is describing the common features of matter and priva-
tion and their difference. For, insofar as privation exists together with
matter before the form supervenes and is considered together with
5 matter as a substratum, the substratum composed of form and matter
is one in number. But insofar as matter, such as human or gold in the
reshaping of gold objects,36 endures and can be pointed to and called
some particular thing (for the necklace is a gold necklace and the ring
10 is a gold ring) and since matter always inheres per se in the composite,
it can also be counted; for what exists per se and can be pointed to can
be counted in the strict sense. And human and gold, individual things
which are also substrata, can be counted directly, and each of them is a
particular thing. But since he adds to ‘human and gold’ the phrase ‘and,
in general, matter’, but prime matter is no longer countable in the way
15 human is and is not a this (since separated from form, it cannot be
pointed to), for this reason he adds ‘rather’ to ‘a particular thing’.37
For matter is not a this without qualification, but it is a this insofar
as it works together with the composite toward making it a particular
thing, for example, one having come to be or being perceptible while
itself enduring and being preserved in the [composite]. Aristotle
indicates this with the words ‘and what comes to be does not come to
20 be from it in an accidental sense’. And in general matter is countable
and a particular thing because it exists in the compound, since, even
if it is less countable than form is, it is still more countable than
privation is. Indeed privation does not inhere in what comes to be in
the way that form and matter do, so that what comes to be would not
be said to have come to be from privation primarily and per se. But
the composite is not a particular thing because of privation either,
25 since privation does not endure and since it is only an absence, so that
it is neither countable nor a particular thing. For privation is like a
Translation 99
kind of negation, although it differs in some respects from negation. A
negation cannot be counted and it is not a particular thing because it is
indefinite. However, a privation differs from a negation because it also
indicates the thing in which it is. Unmusical does not exist in everything
but only in human. And if privation is not an independent cause, it is a 30
cause accidentally because it attaches to matter, which is a cause per se.
For privation is not a being per se; rather it is a being in an accidental
sense because it is an absence of form in what is naturally constituted
to have the form. Accordingly the substratum is one in number, even if
it is two in logos. And form is one of the elements which fill out the
composite. And so it has become clear on the basis of what has been said,
in what sense the principles can be said to be two and in what sense 35
three.
In this connection it is worth pointing out how Aristotle has here
written consistently with what Plato said about matter in the Timaeus. 218,1
For Plato has written,38
One should only refer to that in which these things are always
appearing to come to be and from which in turn they vanish by
using the words ‘this’ and ‘that’,
Aristotle says ‘in a way’ and ‘so to speak, two’, because matter and
form are not two in number because it is not possible for either of
10 them to exist as individual things, whereas things which are
Translation 101
different in number are separated in their own individual sub-
stances. Or perhaps, having said that they are two ‘in a way’, he
adds the ‘way’ by saying ‘but they are, so to speak, two in number’;
for matter together with privation is one in number, and form is
one, but they are three because privation is different in logos from
matter.
Since ‘cause’49 has several senses, when one50 seeks the cause, one 30
should state all the possible causes. For example, what is the
material cause of human? The menstrual fluid? What is the mov-
ing cause? The seed? What is the formal cause? The essence. What
is the51 final cause? The end. (But perhaps these two are the same.) 220,1
And one should state the most proximate causes. What is the
matter? [We must not say]52 fire or earth, but the specific matter.
It is necessary to search in this way in the case of natural sub-
stance which comes to be if one is going to search correctly, since
the causes53 are these and this many, and it is necessary to know 5
the causes. There is a different story in the case of natural but
102 Translation
everlasting substances. For perhaps some do not have matter or
not this kind of matter, but only matter which can change place.
And there is no matter for things which are natural but are not
substance, but rather the substratum is the substance.
Nor do all things have matter, but only those things which come to
be and change into one another do. But things which are or are not
10 without changing do not have matter.
But even if the principles given are elemental in character, and princi-
ples of this kind are principles of composites, while the heavenly body
is demonstrated to be simple, being made of a different, fifth substance
which is alien to coming to be, it cannot have elemental principles.55
15 However, if these things are true, why did we say56 that the concern
of the treatise is the properties which are common to all natural things
if, although heavenly things are natural, their principles are not the
ones which have just been demonstrated? And why did he entitle the
treatise simply Physics unless these principles are also the principles of
heavenly things insofar as they change? (The moon changes in its
phases, and all heavenly things change by changing place, and in this
20 respect they share in privation and in a substratum, the changing body.)
Aristotle agrees with this. And in general if we say that all things are
natural insofar as they have a nature, and nature is a principle of
change and rest (as we will learn),57 and all change is a kind of alteration
(as we will also learn),58 it is clear that what is completely unalterable,
insofar as it is unalterable, cannot be said to be natural without quali-
25 fication. Consequently, even if he calls heavenly things natural, he does
so with respect to change of place, not substantial change. And so,
heavenly things are not included here in terms of their substance, but
they will be included in the discussion of change with respect to their
change of place, on the basis of which they are proved to be natural; and
they will be included both with respect to the common form of change of
30 place and with respect to their circular form of motion, which is the
crowning point of all discussions of change.
Consequently these are the common principles of all natural things,
but they apply to things which come to be and perish, both with respect
to substance and with respect to the other attributes relative to which
changes occur, whereas they apply to eternal things with respect to
change of place; and they apply to natural things without qualification
insofar as they are natural, which is to say insofar as they contain a
35 principle of change and alteration – not all change, since the change
involved in choice is irrelevant, but natural change, that is, bodily
221,1 change; for nature is a certain corporeal principle of change and rest,
both change of place and the other changes.
Translation 103
However, since both privation and substratum are clearer in cases of
coming to be and perishing because of the variety of kinds of change, he
directs most of his discussion at these things and gives his examples in 5
terms of them, as if he also thought that the aim of the treatise was
these things. For it is not just here that he says that he has found the
principles of ‘natural things which come to be’, he also does so in the
second book:59
Since60 our study is for the sake of knowledge and we do not think
we know a thing before we have grasped why it is – that is, grasped
its first cause, it is clear that we must do the same thing in the case 10
of coming to be and perishing and every natural change in order
that, knowing their principles, we can try to reduce each thing that
comes to be61 [to them].62
And one should notice that, when he has said ‘in the case of coming to
be and perishing’, he adds ‘and every natural change’ – and this includes
change of place. And he makes clear in the second book of this work that 15
he thinks heavenly things are in a way intermediate and in need of their
own treatise, when he divides the subjects to be treated in three:63
One is64 concerned with what does not change, one with what
changes but is imperishable, one with perishable things.
For the moment one should conceive three kinds of thing: what
comes to be; that in which it comes to be; and that by resembling
which what comes to be develops. And it is appropriate to compare
the recipient to the mother, that from which to the father, and the 25
nature which is between these to the offspring.
And Aristotle introduced matter on the basis of the fact that what comes
to be comes to be from contraries, but contraries cannot act on each
other nor be acted on by each other on their own (for he believes it is
necessary that what is acted on be acted on while enduring but contrar- 30
ies do not endure the presence of each other); and furthermore he
introduced it on the basis of the fact that contraries do not satisfy the
definition of principle, since they are accidents and not substances; for
there is no contrariety in [the category of ] substance,72 and accidents
need some substratum in order to exist. I think these are the most
important points in what Aristotle has said.
Plato himself also introduced matter on the basis of the change of 35
what comes to be, the change always requiring that it occur with a 224,1
common substratum since nothing which changes endures; and he also
called the changing things contraries. For, having said that each thing
which comes to be, such as fire or water, can no more be called fire or
water than anything else which comes to be from it because these things
flee and do not submit to ‘the words “that” and “this” } and any other 5
expression which indicates that they are stable beings’,73 he adds:74
One should only refer to that in which these things are }75
appearing to come to be and from which in turn they vanish by
106 Translation
using the words ‘this’ and ‘that’, but anything which is hot or white
or any other contrary and all that is composed from these things
should in no case be referred to with these terms.
10 You see then that Plato himself also says that coming to be is from
contraries, that the contraries do not endure, and that because of this
there is need of an enduring substratum. He has added the words ‘or
anything which is composed from these things’ because it is not just hot
and dry which come to be, so do fire itself and in general the substances
which are composed of contraries on the basis of the change of contra-
15 rieties. For air comes to be from water, which is cold and moist, when
cold changes into warm, and again when moist changes into dry, fire
comes to be. And human comes to be from seed. And in these cases it is
not easy to specify the contrary qualities the change of which from one
to another makes substance come to be from substance. And that is why
20 Aristotle invoked the general antithesis of form and privation; for hot
comes to be from cold, but it is also true to say that it comes to be from
not hot.
Plato adds another, most authoritative reason why there must al-
ways be some substratum underlying forms which come to be. Having
demonstrated first that the intelligible form, which is archetypal, para-
digmatic, and independent, is one thing, while the perceptible form,
25 which has the nature of an image and is therefore a likeness of some-
thing else, is another, he reasonably infers that this will always be in a
substratum which is different from it and is made like [the form]. For a
likeness and image does not exist on its own; rather it exists in the thing
which has been made into a likeness and image, that is, the substratum.
But perhaps it would be better to hear Plato’s beautiful words them-
selves:76
This being the way things are, it ought to be agreed that there is
30 one thing which has an unchanging form; it does not come to be,
and it is not destroyed; it77 does not receive anything else from
elsewhere, nor does it go into anything else somewhere; it is
invisible and imperceptible in any other way, and it is assigned to
understanding (noêsis) to apprehend it. A second thing has the
same name as the first and is similar to it; it is perceptible, it comes
to be, it is always tossed about, and it comes to be in some place
225,1 and again disappears from there; it is grasped by opinion together
with perception. And a third kind is that of space which always is
and does not admit perishing; it provides a seat for everything
which comes to be,78 and it is barely an object of belief but is
grasped independently of perception by a certain bastard reason-
ing; in regarding it we are as in a dream and we say that it is
5 necessary that what is79 be somewhere in some place and occupy
some space and what is neither on earth nor anywhere in heaven
Translation 107
is nothing. Because we dream in this way we are unable to wake
up and distinguish all these things and others akin to them – even
in the case of the reality (phusis) which does not sleep and genu-
inely exists – and to speak the truth: because this very thing in
which an image has come to be does not belong to the image itself,
but rather the image is a picture of something else and always in 10
motion, it is fitting that it come to be in something else and either
cling to existence (ousia) in some manner or be nothing whatso-
ever; but what really is is supported by the precisely true account
according to which, as long as they are two different things, neither
will ever come to be in the other in such a way that they are
simultaneously one and the same and two.
By using the words ‘this’ and ‘that’ one should refer only to that in
20 which these things are }91 appearing to come to be and from which
in turn they vanish }.
But Aristotle, who views the particular thing in terms of form (morphê)
gives [the term] to forms. After the words ‘the particular thing’ Aristotle
adds ‘and what is’, that is, he is saying ‘as matter is to all that is’, of
which some things are substances and some are attributes, some are
particular things in a primary way, others have particularity through
25 that.92 Plato calls this apprehension by analogy ‘bastard reasoning’93
because it does not come from the impact of forms but from the stripping
away94 and negating of forms; and reasoning sees matter with its eyes
shut as it were. And understanding of matter is not understanding
(noêsis) but rather non-understanding (anoia95); therefore our picture
30 (phantasma) of it is bastard and not genuine. For just as we apprehend
what is above the first Form not by any impact of forms, but – having
learned that the Forms are not first from the very nature of Forms,
which is distinct and requires the unified and the One to be before it –
apprehend what is above Form by the negation of Forms (and this
negation does not cast us altogether into the undefined but into the
35 cause of the Form and what dwells above the bounds of Form), so also,
having seen that the last forms are image-like and change into each
other and therefore need a substratum naturally capable of receiving
227,1 each of the opposites in turn, we proceed to the notion of matter by a
negation of the forms which leads us to the receptacle. And if in seeking
for matter we suppose it to be a particular thing distinctively different
from other things, we have stumbled on something else, but not matter,
Translation 109
since matter has no difference relative to anything since every differ- 5
ence is a formal quality. Consequently apprehension (gnôsis) of matter
is rather non-apprehension (agnôsia) since the things which change
with matter as subject, being the last forms, receive the last kind of
apprehension, perceptual apprehension. Therefore, Plato, pointing out
that matter does not strike us with impact, says matter is grasped
independent of perception, so that he is indicating that just as matter is
grasped by a ‘bastard reasoning’ so too it is grasped by a bastard 10
perception. But matter’s being apprehended96 by a bastard reasoning
and the insight (epibolê) into it by negation and the [insight] from
whatever cause may arise are drawn from things in first philosophy.
But Aristotle’s words ‘by analogy’ preserve the measures of the appre-
hension of the elements of natural things which are appropriate for the
natural philosopher. For just as it belongs to grammar to know the
generalities about the twenty-four elements [i.e. letters of the alphabet] 15
and literature (mousikê) teaches the precise apprehension of them, so
too the first philosopher will teach about the natural elements. There-
fore in a little while he refers the study of form to him.97
However, it should be understood that Aristotle borrowed the term
‘by analogy’ from the Pythagorean Timaeus, just as Plato borrowed
‘graspable by a bastard reason’ from him. For in his own work the
Pythagorean Timaeus says,98 ‘Matter [is apprehended] by a bastard 20
reasoning because99 it has never been understood by direct observation,
but [it is apprehended] by analogy’.
100
But since some people (and not just indifferent philosophers) say
that both according to Aristotle and according to Plato the very first
matter is qualityless body – and these include the Stoics among the 25
ancients and Pericles of Lydia101 among moderns, it would be well to
investigate this opinion. For102 both Aristotle and Plato, who introduce
the matter of changing things as prior to103 the change think that
hot/cold/dry/moist are the qualities of the elements. These qualities
have body as common substratum, and they change with it as subject.
And so body would be first matter. 30
Furthermore, if there were some other substratum underlying body,
then, since coming to be is from contraries, there would have to be some
opposite to body so that the opposites could change with the common
substratum as subject. [But there is no such opposite.]
Furthermore, we say that what endures in any change is matter. But
qualityless body endures, since there is nothing into which body might 228,1
perish.
That Plato also says that the direct substratum of the qualities of the
four elements, that is qualityless body, is matter is clear from the
following passages:104
The nurse of coming to be, being made watery and fiery and
receiving the shapes of earth and air }, 5
110 Translation
and105
Now if the demiurge first put the forms of the elements into matter, and
10 qualityless body is the common substratum of these, qualityless body
will be matter.
But according to Aristotle also, qualityless body should be thought to
be the first substratum and matter. For if body enters into matter and
departs from it like any other form, it is clear that, before body entered
into matter and after it departed, the privation of body, that is, incor-
15 poreality, would have matter as subject. And there would be a natural
incorporeal substance. But Aristotle does not think this, since he fre-
quently says clearly that natural things are bodies and have bodies as
their subject.106
107
However, that Plato does not think that body is the first substra-
tum (which we call matter) should be clear from the fact that he also
assumed his planes to be, as it were, the elements of body, presumably
20 as being more fundamental. And so he writes in the Timaeus:108
It is, I think clear to everyone that fire and earth and water and
and air are bodies, but every form of a body also has depth, and
depth necessarily is bounded by plane surface.
In itself matter has neither magnitude nor shape nor number; but
body in itself does have magnitude and shape and number; there-
fore matter is not body.
But I think that it is among the most obvious things that what belongs
in common to all natural and perceptible things as natural and percep-
tible must be matter. But what is common to all of them is being
20 extended in bulk (onkos) and dimension (diastasis). And so, as Aristotle
says,118 ‘the science of nature } deals with bodies and magnitudes
(megethê) and their119 properties’.
So perhaps one should posit that there are two kinds of body:120 one
exists in terms of form and logos and is determined by121 three dimen-
sions, the other exists as a slackening (paresis) and extending (ektasis)
and indefiniteness of the incorporeal, partless, and intelligible nature;
25 this second is not determined formally by three dimensions, but it is
slackened everywhere and loosened (ekluesthai), and it flows from every
direction from being into not being. And perhaps it should be posited
that matter is this sort of extension (diastasis),122 but not the corporeal
form, which already is a measure and delimitation123 of the infinity and
Translation 113
indefiniteness of this kind of extension and which puts a stop to its flight
from being. For it is worth pointing out that it is appropriate that matter 30
be that by which material things are distinguished from immaterial
ones,124 and they are distinguished by bulk and extension and divisibil-
ity and such things, not the extension, divisibility, etc. which are
determined with respect to measures, but those which are without
measure and indefinite and capable of being determined by formal
measures.
As Moderatus125 also recounts, among the Greeks the Pythagoreans 35
and after them Plato seem to be the first to have had this conception of
matter. For [Plato] following (kata) the Pythagoreans proclaims the first
One above Being and all substance, and he says that the second One,
which is what really is and is intelligible, is the Forms, and he says that 231,1
the third, the domain of Soul, participates in the One and the Forms,
and that the final nature after this, which is that of perceptibles, does
not even participate [in them], but it is ordered in terms of reflection
(emphasis) of these things, the matter in perceptibles being a shadow- 5
reflection of the not being which is first in quantity (poson) and being
even further below and derivative of this [not being]. Porphyry, who sets
out these views of Moderatus in the second book of On Soul, has written
that ‘As Plato says somewhere,126 the unified logos, wanting to bring
about the coming to be of things from itself, found room for127 the
quantity (posotês) of all things by privation of itself, depriving quantity
of its own128 logoi and forms. He129 called this thing formless, indivisible, 10
and shapeless quantity, but [said it is] receptive of form, shape, division,
quality, everything of this kind. He130 says that Plato seems to have
predicated many words of this quantity, “omnirecipient”131 and “form-
less”132 and “invisible”,133 and said it shares in a most perplexing way in
the intelligible134 and is barely graspable by a bastard reasoning135 and
all sorts of things like this. He136 says that this quantity and this form, 15
which is understood by privation of the unified logos which embraces all
the logoi of existing things in itself, are paradigms of the matter of
bodies, which itself, he said, was also called quantity (poson) by the
Pythagoreans and Plato, not quantity as form but quantity which is
derived from (kata) privation and loosening (paralusis) and extending
(ektasis) and spreading out (diaspasmos) [and exists] because of devia- 20
tion (parallaxis)137 from being, for which reason matter is also thought
to be evil since it flees away from the good. And it is apprehended by it
[the good] and is not allowed to escape determination, its extension
receiving the logos of eidetic magnitude and being determined by it, its
spreading-out being given form by numerical discrimination.’
So, according to this account, matter is nothing other than the 25
deviation (parallaxis) of perceptible forms in relation to intelligible
things, which have turned away from there138 and move down toward
not being. For it is clear that the bulk which is proper to perceptible
things is one thing and eidetic magnitude another, and that the disper-
114 Translation
sion of perceptible forms is one thing, numerical discrimination another,
because eidetic magnitude and numerical discrimination are logoi and
30 forms without extension or parts (for the logos of the three-foot magni-
tude and the logos of three are without extension and partless and
incorporeal), but these [the bulk and dispersion which are proper to
perceptible] are without logos, and they are corporeal and divisible and
descend into bulk and dispersion because of their procession into coming
to be and what comes last, that is to say, into matter. For what is last
35 is always a residual sediment (hupostathmê) and really matter. And so
the Egyptians also said that the residual sediment of primal life, which
they referred to symbolically as water, is matter, since it is a kind of
slime (ilus). And matter is a kind of space (khôra) for perceptible things
232,1 which come to be, not existing as any determinate form but as a
condition (katastêma) of their existence, just as what is partless and
without extension and immaterial and genuinely existent and so on is
a condition of the intelligible nature, all the forms existing both here and
there, but there immaterially, here materially – which is the same as to
5 say that there they exist indivisibly and truly, here divisibly and like
shadows, and so too each form here is extended with material extension.
But how can these things be harmonised with Aristotle and Plato,
who think that matter is a substratum for contrariety? Or does what
other people say about matter really reduce [it] to the last body? (For
10 there is nothing opposite to body.) And in this way it will not only be the
heavenly body which neither comes to be nor perishes, but also sublu-
nary body, whereas the conception just expressed also preserves the
corporeal extension of sublunary things, an extension which comes to be
and perishes with the form which has extension (e.g., with human or
horse.) Or is it the case that when what comes to be is substance, the
15 change also occurs with the material deviation as subject, a deviation
which endures forever? For attributes change with substances as sub-
ject, but substances change with what the Pythagoreans call quantity
(poson) as subject, and they change either with respect to privation or
with the deviation from being as subject, which is to say, with extension
and material mass as subject. For air comes to be from water not just
because there is a change of qualities but also because there is a change
20 in eidetic magnitude, since the magnitude is different before and after
the change. And the smaller [magnitude] is not a part of the greater but
each is a determinate form, even though material extension endures139
before and after the change. For [the air and water] are both material
in the same way and divisible in the same way and perceptible and have
the same matter. For the differences [between the two] are seen in their
forms. That Aristotle himself has the same sort of conception of matter
25 as the Pythagoreans do, namely the conception of it in terms of exten-
sion and indefinite quantity, can be learned from what is said in the
fourth book of this treatise, where he says,140
Translation 115
Insofar as place is thought to be the extension (diastêma) of a
magnitude (megethos) it will be thought to be matter.141 For this is
different from the magnitude; it is what is contained by and
determined by the form as by a surface and limit. Matter and what 30
is indeterminate are this sort of thing.
I do not know how all those people who claim to understand matter
either in terms of Being as the worst of the forms142 or in terms of the
One as the echo of the first One143 can be correct. For when the One or
Being is considered as nothing but One or Being they are in the strict
sense and primarily what they are said [to be]. But matter is what is
last and it departs from Being and much more from the One, and it 35
exists in deviation and turning away in relation to Being, because, on
account of the generative powers of Being, it was necessary that there 233,1
should also be a reflection of them. But I have prolonged this discussion
too much because of the dominant conception of matter, which is not
pleasing to me.144
As far as the text is concerned,145 the words ‘another is hê ho logos’
mean that one146 other principle is that related to logos and form, but it 5
produces unclarity because of the hê added to the ho logos, a feminine
article combined with the masculine ho logos. However hê is not coordi-
nated with the phrase ho logos, but with arkhê and so the words are
equivalent to saying ‘another is the [principle] related to logos’ or better
‘another principle is the logos and form’. As Alexander says, the words
are also written in some texts without the hê, perhaps because some
people took it away because of the unclarity, even though with hê the 10
expression is more old-fashioned.
And perhaps form does not perish. For what comes to be perishes,
but neither matter nor form come to be; rather the composite of 25
them does. And so this is also what perishes. Consequently the
principles do not perish. But even if they do not perish that does
not mean that form, taken numerically, is everlasting. For the
composite does perish, but its perishing occurs because the form is
cast off.
It seems that Alexander has spoken from the point of view of the study
of nature, but what he says gives rise to the following difficulty. Why 30
should something which formerly did not exist, but later does, not be
said to come to be? And why should something which formerly existed
but later does not, not be said to perish? And why, when we say that the
composite perishes because it casts off the form which is not preserved
and does not exist after it is cast off but rather departs into not being,
should not [the form]154 be said to perish (since the form because of 235,1
which the composite was destroyed is not separate)? And why, if form
does not perish, is it not everlasting? But I think it would be better not
to get too sophisticated.155 We also say that the particular form involved
in coming to be is perishable and that the composite perishes with
respect to the form. For there is no necessity to hypothesise that the
elemental principles of perishable things are imperishable, nor need we, 5
for fear of the proposition that there are some things which perish into
not being, therefore say that things which exist now, but then again do
not exist, are imperishable. For these things do not simply perish into
not being, but there is always some other form which succeeds the
destruction of the perishing form.
Chapter 8
191a23-31 We will next say156 that the difficulties of earlier think- 10
ers are dissolved only in this way. [For the first philosophers were
seeking the truth and the nature of things, but, driven by inexpe-
rience, they turned aside into another path, as it were, and they
said that nothing either comes to be or perishes because it is
necessary that what comes to be come to be either from what is or
from what is not, but it is impossible that it come to be from either
of these, since it is impossible that what is come to be (since it
118 Translation
already is) or that anything come to be from what is not,] since it
is necessary157 that something underlie as a substratum.
He proves that it is right to have posited privation among the principles
in addition to matter on the basis of the fact that some of the earlier
15 philosophers who did not understand privation, being defeated by a
certain difficulty, did away with coming to be and perishing and fell into
other absurdities. He calls first philosophers not only those who were
first chronologically, but also those who first sought the truth [on
philosophical principles]. But he is not now speaking about all of them,
but about those who did away with coming to be. These are divided into
two – or rather three. Some158 of them said that being is one thing, and
20 that this does not come to be; others, such as Anaximander and
Anaxagoras, said that there are many things, but they are separated
out [from one thing], being inherent [in it] and thus did away with
coming to be; and others, such as Democritus and Empedocles, produced
coming to be by the combining and separation of the first elements. He
says that there is no coming to be ‘but only mixture and dissolution of
what has been mixed’.159
Aristotle says that these people did away with coming to be because
25 they were constrained by a difficulty which they were not able to
resolve, but it is resolved when the principles of natural things are
hypothesised to be such as we have hypothesised them to be. Having
first set down the difficulty by which these people were driven from the
path which leads to truth and did away with coming to be, and having
set down the absurd consequence of the difficulty, he then adds the
solution. The difficulty is this:
15 And it is clear that even if privation is said to not-be per se, nevertheless
it has a kind of reality (hupostasis). For if it were not in any sense
whatsoever, nothing would come to be from it even in an accidental
sense. Consequently the words, ‘we ourselves say that nothing comes to
be from what is not without qualification’ should be understood in two
senses: as meaning either that nothing comes to be from what is not
without qualification or that nothing comes to be in the strict sense and
20 without qualification from what is not. For something comes to be from
something in the strict sense and without qualification when it comes
to be from something which endures, and it is in this way that those
people thought that what comes to be must come to be from something
which is not and inheres in what comes to be. But this is impossible.
It is clear from what is demonstrated in the Sophist170 that Plato
knew before Aristotle that ‘is not’ has two senses. He added to this:
And the distinction made by Plato is also between being in one way and
not being in another and between not being per se and being in an
5 accidental sense (because of being an accident of what is). However, not
being as otherness is distinct (diapherei) from not being as privation
insofar as the former concerns forms in relation to one another, but the
latter also coexists with matter.
(191b17) Aristotle says, ‘Likewise we say that what is cannot come to
Translation 123
be from what is’ insofar as it is (since then being would already be before
it had come to be), but nothing prevents a being even of a particular sort 10
from coming to be from what is in an accidental sense. For the person
who says that animal comes to be from animal does not say that it comes
to be from it as animal, since the animal, changing as animal, would not
change into animal. But neither would the animal which comes to be, if
it came to be insofar as it is an animal, come to be from animal, but
rather173 from seed. But if something came to be insofar as it is an
animal of a particular sort, and it came to be from an animal to which
being an animal was attached, and when the animal changed something
came to be to which being an animal also belonged,174 this would be a 15
case of animal coming to be from animal in an accidental sense. For it
is not the case that insofar as an animal changes into an animal it
changes as animal; rather insofar as it is an animal of a particular sort
it makes the change into an animal of another sort. For example, if dog
were to come to be from horse – or rather wasps from horse or bees from
bull (‘since horses are the source of wasps and bulls of bees’),175 animal
would be said to come to be from animal, but not insofar as it is animal 20
but in an accidental sense. For from one animal of a particular sort
which changes in this case [there comes to be] an animal of another
particular sort which is not but comes to be. Being animals belongs to
both that which changes and that which comes to be, so that in an
accidental sense animal comes to be from animal. For the discussion
does not concern the efficient cause, but rather the material cause, and
in this case176 it is not possible for horse to be the matter for horse. 25
However, when animal comes to be from seed it no longer comes to be
from animal in an accidental sense, but only from not animal. In this
way, then, even if a being of a particular sort were to come into being
not accidentally but per se, it would come into being from not being.
The text is also written ‘for example, if a dog or a horse [comes to be]’,
[the text meaning] ‘even if an animal of a particular sort were to come
to be from an animal of a particular sort, for example a dog from a dog
or a horse from a horse, it does not come to be as dog or horse, but as a 30
particular dog or horse’. But if something were going to come to be 240,1
insofar as it is animal and not in an accidental sense, it would not come
to be from animal but from not animal, e.g., from seed, and if it came to
be as body it would not come to be from body but from not body. And so
if a being of a particular sort is going to come to be per se and not in an
accidental sense, it would not come to be from what is, but it would not
come to be from what is not either – insofar as it is not (this has already 5
been proved). So if what is as what is does not come to be from what is or
from what is not, what is as what is does not come to be at all, nor of things
that come to be is their coming to be as things which come to be, but as fire
or as air. So perhaps the earlier people also spoke in this way and mean
that no being as being comes to be or perishes; for beings are forms, such
as human and white, but none of these come to be, only individuals do. 10
124 Translation
191b33-4 For seeing this nature (phusis) would have dissolved all
their ignorance.
126 Translation
5 He says that seeing privation contains the solution of all the difficulty
in the discussion. For if that which is by accident also is not because of
privation, he has solved the difficulty by these two concepts. For priva-
tion is by accident, because it is an accident of what is, and again matter
is not by accident, because privation (which per se is not), is an accident
of it and at the same time [matter] is potentially because of privation.180
10 This is the interpretation of Alexander. But perhaps by ‘this very
nature’ Aristotle does not just mean the nature of privation, but also the
nature of matter (and, in proceeding, Alexander himself also points this
out) and indeed also the nature of the per se and accidental and the
nature of the potential and actual about which he was speaking next.
Chapter 9
15 191b35-192a1 Some other people have touched on this nature but
not in a sufficient way. [For first they accept that something can come
to be, without qualification, from what is not,181] and that that [part]
was correct in Parmenides’ formulation [of his dilemma].182
Whether it is seeing the nature of privation and matter which would
have removed all the difficulties, or that of per se and accident, and
potentiality and actuality, or indeed both of these (because one depends
20 on the other), it is this which, he tells, some failed to touch on at all –
those who make being one and those who say that everything exists in
actuality before coming to be and in general those who do away with
coming to be183 – but others did touch on it but not in a sufficient way.
And with these last words he seems to be referring to Plato. For Plato
seems in a way to touch on both matter and privation in the Timaeus
because he means that matter is not among actually existing things,
25 when he says that the substratum of the forms would not be ‘well
prepared unless it were without the form of all those things which it is
going to receive from somewhere’.184 For what is of a nature to receive
something and not to receive it, but does not have it, would rightly be
said to be deprived of it. And Plato is clearly the first person to distin-
30 guish potential and actual and per se and accidental and being in one
way and not being in another, as was said earlier.185 For in the other
243,1 cases too Plato made distinctions among things said with several
senses, as Eudemus also bears witness in his Physics when he says, ‘By
bringing in the notion of ambiguity Plato solved many difficulties con-
cerning things’.186
In these ways then Plato too would be touching on this sort of nature.
5 However, he is thought not to have grasped it sufficiently in two
respects,187 one insofar as he accepts Parmenides’ statement that being
is one. For on this principle [Plato] makes coming to be be from what
without qualification is not and is not as not being. For, if being is one,
it is not possible for there to be anything further (allo) which is per se
Translation 127
and in an accidental sense is not, or is potentially but actually is not,
and from which can come things that come to be. For everything which
is not that188 is not without qualification. For what is other than being 10
is a non-being, and what is a non-being is nothing. Only that is a being,
and so, in praising Parmenides as saying that being is one, Plato himself
is obviously making coming to be be from what without qualification is
not.189
This is the way in which practically all commentators have inter-
preted our text as saying that Plato accepts Parmenides’ statement that
being is one. And this amazes me. For it is clear that in the Sophist Plato 15
gives many arguments objecting to Parmenides’ doctrine which asserts
that being is one. And the arguments were introduced earlier in the
discussion of Parmenides.190 But let me set out the conclusion of the
arguments now to aid in their recall. It goes as follows:191
Nor does Aristotle say that the people [mentioned] accept that [some-
thing] comes to be without qualification from what is not inasmuch as
they accept that Parmenides speaks correctly.192 So perhaps Aristotle is
instead challenging their acceptance of Parmenides’ minor premiss
which says that what is anything else besides (para) being is not, and
thereby their agreement that what is not is. For [Plato] says that what 25
is other than (heteron) beautiful, since it is something else besides
beautiful, is not beautiful, and he says that what is other than large,
since it is something else besides large, is not large. And, having added
further (alla) things of this sort, he says,193
For this will never prevail: that things which are not are. 244,1
But you must keep your thought away from this path of enquiry.
192a1 And then they think that if [this nature] is one in number
it is also only one196 in potentiality. But these are two very different
things.
Having stated one way in which even those who have touched on the
25 nature being discussed have not grasped it sufficiently, he now adds the
other. In this connection Alexander says,
On the basis of what he has now said it has become clear that when
Aristotle said197 ‘some other people have touched on this nature’ he
was referring to matter and not privation. For when he says that
they think that just as it is one in number so it is one in potential-
ity, he is speaking about matter, since privation is not one in
30 number. Or perhaps the first words ‘some other people have
touched on this nature’ refer to privation, but what he is saying
now refers to matter, which they assume has privation in its own
nature. And so they thought that just as the pair [of matter and
privation] is one in number so they are also one in logos and
245,1 potentiality and not divided in logos in the way that we say matter
and privation are different in logos.
Translation 129
It should be said against Alexander that it is better to interpret ‘this
nature’ in both the previous and the present passage as referring to the
underlying nature from which there is coming to be, and this is matter
together with privation. That Aristotle is speaking about the same thing
in both passages is made clear by the continuity of the text. But matter 5
by itself is not one in number and two in logos, matter together with
privation is.
If Aristotle is thinking of Plato when he says that they do not
distinguish in logos between matter and privation, he means by this
that Plato teaches that there are two elements, matter and form, but he
adds the cause that transcends these two, being at once both a paradig- 10
matic and an efficient cause. For he says this in the Timaeus:198
This being the way things are, it ought to be agreed that there is
one thing which has in an unchanging way form that does not come
to be, and is not destroyed; that199 does not receive anything else
from elsewhere and does not go into anything else anywhere; it is
invisible and more generally imperceptible, and it is assigned to
noêsis to apprehend it. A second thing has the same name as the 15
first and is similar to it; it is perceptible,200 it is always tossed
about, and it comes to be in some place and again disappears from
there; it is grasped by opinion together with perception. And a
third kind is that of space which always is and does not admit
perishing; it provides a seat for everything which comes to be,201
and it is barely an object of belief but is grasped independently of
perception by a certain bastard reasoning.
But Plato makes clear that he knows that privation is connected with 20
matter, privation being the absence of the forms which are naturally
constituted to come to be in the matter, by calling matter omnirecipi-
ent,202 a term which is appropriate for what is of a nature to receive all
things, and by saying that it is without any of the forms which it is going
to receive,203 a description which indicates the absence of forms. But
Plato did not think it right to posit privation and what is not in the sense
of being a privation among the elements, because it is present only by 25
the absence of what is constituted by nature to be present and does not
introduce anything else along with itself. So Plato himself is satisfied
with form alone since it is capable of providing for coming to be and
perishing by its presence and absence. And Aristotle agrees with this
since he said a little earlier,204 ‘One of the contraries is sufficient to
produce change by its absence and presence.
However, [Plato does allow as an element] non-being in the sense of 30
what is other, as directly introducing some being. After all, since motion
is not what sameness is, it is not the same, but it is a being. Plato in the
Sophist counted this kind of being/non-being among the forms when he
said,205 ‘So even non-being unchangingly was and is non-being, being 246,1
130 Translation
counted as one form among the many which are’. Plato did not count
privation among the elements not only for the reasons given but also
because elements must inhere in what they are elements of; but priva-
5 tion produces coming to be by its absence, not its presence, and also
because elements must be causes per se; but if privation is a cause it is
so in an accidental sense. Conversely, one might criticise the one who
seeks the elemental principles of natural things while including priva-
tion among them. And [Aristotle] himself agrees that privation is a
cause not by inhering but by not inhering, and it is not a cause per se
10 but in an accidental sense, if it is a cause at all.206 Because Plato was
seeking the per se causes, the causes in the strict sense which are
elemental and inhere, it was reasonable for him not to include privation.
But because Aristotle was seeking the causes of change it was also
reasonable for him to include privation as something else differing from
matter itself in logos. For nothing prevents one from speaking about a
15 cause in an accidental sense, but it is not easy to form a picture of an
element in an accidental sense since an element must inhere and fill out
per se what it is an element of.
[Plato] says that of things which are, some, such as human and
horse, are in themselves, some are in relation to other things, and
of these, some are in relation to contraries, as good is to bad, others
are in relation to something [or other], and of these some are
definite, others indefinite.
5 Then he adds,
However, we will need [to address] a little later222 the fact that matter
is not a principle according to Plato, but it has, I think, become clear
20 from these words in what way Plato called matter great and small and
a not-being.
Having proved that matter does not come to be, he next proves that it
does not perish either. For everything which perishes is not said to
perish by being dissolved into not-being but by being dissolved into that
20 inherent thing from which it first came to be not in an accidental sense,
Translation 139
that is, into matter. So if matter perishes it is dissolved into the sort of
thing which it itself is, and what will result from this perishing will be
matter. But matter is what was there before the perishing. Therefore 25
matter will have perished before it has perished. Consequently, if
matter comes to be, the sort of nature which it itself is must underlie for
the coming to be of matter, and so matter will be before it comes to be.
And if matter perishes, it must perish into the sort of thing which it
itself is, and it will have perished before it has perished.
Aristotle has also taken over the idea that matter does not perish
from Plato and the Pythagoreans. At least Plato’s Timaeus says,241
And a third kind242 is that of space which always is and does not
admit perishing; it provides a seat for everything which comes to
be,243 and it is barely an object of belief but is grasped inde- 30
pendently of perception by a certain bastard reasoning.
For the present one should conceive three kinds: that which comes
to be, what it comes to be in, and that from which what comes to
be emerges.
The first cause would also be an efficient cause. For Aristotle says
in the Metaphysics that what is moved by it is the fifth body, and
Translation 143
it moves the other things which come to be and perish. And so the 20
first cause is an efficient cause. But insofar as everything achieves
its own perfection by aiming at this (as will also be said a little
later) and insofar as ‘it causes motion by being loved’266 (as he has
again said in the Metaphysics) the first cause would also be the
goal and the cause ‘for the sake of which’; for what is wished for is
this sort of thing.
You see clearly how Alexander presents in what respect Aristotle hy-
pothesises mind as an efficient cause and in what respect he hypothe-
sises it as a final cause! 25
Alexander Aristotle
on privation and substratum Cael. 268a1-2 (science of nature
211,13-15 deals with bodies) 230,20-1
on matter, refuted by Simplicius, Cat. 1a1-6 (homonymous
211,20ff. expressions) 216,23-6
on the coming to be of substance Cat. 2a11-19 (on substance)
213,15ff. 233,31-234,1
on the being of alteration 214,18ff. Cat. 13a31ff. (privation) 211,31ff.
on matter, form and privation Phys. 193b19-20 (privation as
according to Aristotle form), quoted on 191a18-19,
(189b29-191a3) 219,7ff.; 222,22ff. 233,27
on the text of Phys. 191a13 233,8-10 Phys. (book 2) 194b17-23; 198a30-1
on how form is a principle 234,11ff. (principles of natural things)
on whether form perishes 234,23ff. 221,7-18
on coming to be from what is not Phys. (book 4) 209b2-4 (matter of
238,6ff. magnitude) 229,5-10
failed to comment on 191b30-3 Phys. (book 4) 209b6-9 (matter as
241,21 extension and indefinite
on privation 242,5ff. quantity) 232,25-30
commentary on 191b35 (on matter Phys. (book 4) 217a26-7 (the first
and privation) 244,26-245,2; substratum is not body)
247,25-9 228,28-229,1
Alexander’s views on 191b35 Metaph. 1029a1-3 (substance
criticised 245,2-7 divided into three) 234,2ff.
on matter as the cause of evil Metaph. 1044a32-b9, b27-9 (on
249,12-14 causes and matter) 219,29-220,10
commentary on 192a32 ‘not in an Metaph. 1076a4 ‘the rule of many is
accidental sense’ 254,13-17 not good’ 250,26; 256,21-2
on efficient and final causes Metaph. Book 9 (see n.178) (on
258,17-24 potentiality and actuality)
Anaxagoras 241,17-18
did away with coming to be 235,20 body
Anaximander two kinds of body 230,21ff.
did away with coming to be 235,20 Boethus
Archytas on matter and substratum
divides substance into matter, form 211,15-18
and composite 234,1-2 coming to be (change)
with respect to substance 208,24ff.
simple and composite 209,9-14
Subject Index to Simplicius 1.7-9 167
types of coming to be 212,23ff. Eudemus
all cases of coming to be require a on Plato and ambiguity 243,2-3
substratum 213,13 form
substantial coming to be 213,15ff. defined as that which comes to be
all cases of coming to be are 215,9
composite 215,8ff. on whether form is perishable
coming to be from what is and 234,33ff.
what is not 236,14ff. the first form (nous) 250,13-14;
coming to be from what is not in 257,13-15
two senses 237,22ff. two sorts of form distinguished
the ancients failed to distinguish 257,19-20; 258,13ff.
these two senses 237,29ff. Hermodorus
coming to be from what is in an quoted to explain Plato’s views on
accidental sense 239,8ff. matter 248,2-18; 256,35-257,4
the coming to be of particular matter
beings 239,28ff. and privation – see under privation
theory of coming to be preserves not a ‘this’ without qualification
the ‘axiom of contradiction’ 217,16ff.
240,13ff. apprehension of matter is
coming to be from what is actually non-apprehension 227,5ff.
and potentially 241,1ff. as qualityless body, arguments for
composite (to suntheton) 227,23ff.; arguments against
in relation to form and privation 228,17ff.
252,32ff. arguments that matter is not body
dissolved into matter and form 229,17ff.
257,31-3 matter does not have magnitude
contraries 229,27ff.
as principles 218,21ff. matter the potentiality for all
Democritus forms 230,3ff.
on coming to be 235,20-2 matter a sort of (non-corporeal)
Dercyllides extension (diastasis) 230,26ff.
quotes Hermodorus on matter matter distinguishes material
247,31ff.; 256,34-257,4 things from immaterial ones
divine and heavenly things 230,29-33
the principles of divine things matter as deviation from being
219,24ff. 231,20; 255,13 (see n. 137)
the heavenly body does not have matter as evil 231,21; 249,14ff.
elemental principles 220,11-13 matter as residual sediment
as ‘natural’ things (phusika) (hupostathmê) 231,34-7
220,13ff. incorrect views about matter
division (diairesis) 232,30ff.
of substantial coming to be 214,5ff. matter as substance 234,5-6; as
that everything which comes to be ‘almost substance’ 246,23ff.
comes to be from either from matter as potentially but not
what is or what is not 240,22-3 actually what it comes to be
Egyptians 241,11ff.; matter and potentiality
on matter 231,35ff. 252,29-31; 253,11ff.
elements matter as ‘maternal’ cause 248,26-7
paired with principles 215,26-7 matter and privation as necessary
must inhere in what they are for the completion (teleiotês) of
elements of 246,15-16 the universe 249,26ff.
Empedocles matter strives for form 250,23;
on coming to be 235,22-3 251,14ff.
168 Subject Index to Simplicius 1.7-9
imperishable in itself, unlike Tim. 49E7-50A2 on matter 218,2-4
privation, 252,19ff.; 254,17-26 Tim. 50A5-B3 on matter 218,4ff.
matter does not come to be 254,1ff.; Tim. 50C6-D2 what comes to be is
255,17ff. a likeness of its source 255,10-12
common and individual matter Tim. 50D3 matter called ‘mother’
255,21ff. 249,1ff.
matter not a first principle in the Tim. 50D7-E1 on matter and
way god is 256,14ff. privation 242,22ff.
matter, according to Plato, a Tim. 50E1-4 as an illustration of
concomitant cause of the cosmos the formlessness of the
256,28-31 substratum 226,2-5
Melissus Tim. 51A7 matter omnirecipient
the one and being are identical 245,21
236,6-7 Tim. 52A1-D1 on the apprehension
Moderatus of matter 226,25ff.
quotes Pythagoreans and Plato on Tim. 52A8-B3 that matter does not
matter 230,36ff. perish 254,28-31
One, the Tim. 52B1 matter called ‘space’
apprehension of by negation 249,2
226,29ff. Tim. 52D4-6 and 53A9-B5 cited as
Parmenides evidence for qualityless body as
the one and being are identical matter 228,1ff.
236,6-7; 243,5-6.14 Tim. 53C5-8 body is not the first
his minor premiss (that what is substratum (matter) 228,17ff.
anything else besides being is Tim. 51A7; ibid. 52A3; cf. ibid.
not) 243,23-4 51A8-B1; ibid. 52B2 referred to
does away with not being by Porphyry 231,12ff.
243,31-244,2 on matter, substratum, and the
Pericles of Lydia elements in Tim. 49E2-4; ibid.
on first matter as qualityless body 49E7-50A2; ibid. 50C6-D2; ibid.
227,25 51A8-B2; ibid. 52A1-D1
Plato 223,3-225,20; cf. 245,11-19
Phdr. 245C9 on the elemental agrees with Aristotle on the
principle 234,20-3 substratum 222,29ff.
Phdr. 245D4-6 quoted by Plato the first to distinguish
Alexander 234,12-13 between potential and actual, per
Soph. 245D12-E2 on difficulties se and accidental, and the
with the theory that being is just different senses of being
one or two 243,15-20 242,28-30
Soph. 258A11-B8 on otherness apparent criticisms of Plato for
243,24-31 accepting that being is one
Soph. 258C2-4 non-being among 243,3ff.
the forms 245,31-246,2 accepts Parmenides’ minor premiss
Soph. 258D71ff. on the different (see under Parmenides), but
senses of ‘is not’ 238,22ff. rejects the major premiss (what
Tim. 28A-30A Moderatus on is not is nothing) 244,3-5
matter, quoted by Porphyry, Plato, Parmenides and the dialogue
230,35ff. Parmenides 244,3-21
Tim. 41B8-9 on the completeness of knows about privation but does not
the cosmos, paraphrased in include it among the elements
249,32ff. 245,19ff.; 246,2-6
Tim. 49A7 and 52D5 matter called meaning of ‘great and small’ in
‘nurse’ 249,5 Plato 247,10ff.
Subject Index to Simplicius 1.7-9 169
Plotinus Pythagoreans
matter is not qualityless body cf. on matter 230,34ff.; 231,18ff.
Enn. 2,4,8-12 229,11-12 have the same conception of matter
Porphyry as Aristotle 232,24ff.
quotes Moderatus and Plato on like Plato, believe that matter does
matter 231,5ff. not perish 254,27-8
says Plato and Pythagoreans called Stoics
matter quantity 231,18ff. on first matter as qualityless body
refers to Dercyllides who quotes 227,23ff.
Hermodorus (on matter) 247,31ff. substance
principle substratum and privation required
principles are what comes to be for the coming to be and
and what it comes to be 215,26ff. perishing of substance 212,21-3
in one sense two and in another matter is almost substance 246,23ff.
three 215,34ff.; 218,15ff. substratum
relation between principles of defined 209,28ff.
natural things and the principles similarities with privation and
of change 216,30ff. differences from it 209,14ff.33ff.;
form as a principle 257,10ff. 210,4ff.; 211,9ff.
privation (see also substratum and not contrary to the form 210,2-3
matter) the substratum of substance is not
opposite to and incompatible with clear 213,1-3
the form 210,3-4 one in number 217,6; but two in
does not endure 210,12 logos 217,32-3; 218,35
an accident of matter 211,3-5 as principle 218,27ff.
privation and form 211,29ff.; must be completely qualityless and
221,22ff.; privation the contrary formless 226,2
of form 251,6 knowledge of the substratum by
as accidental cause 216,32ff.; analogy 225,22ff.
217,29ff.; 222,3ff.; 246,4-10 the great and the small, according
privation and matter 217,3ff.; to Plato 247,17
233,16-17; 246,19ff. strives for form 252,4-6
privation and negation 217,25ff. Syrianus
privation falls under the same accepts Alexander’s exegesis of
category as form 233,21ff. substantial coming to be 213,24-5
privation has a kind of reality comments on the ancient theory
(hupostasis) 238,14-16 that there is no coming to be
privation as producer of evil 249,7 241,22ff.
privation and matter in relation to Timaeus the Pythagorean
form 250,9ff. Plato and Aristotle both borrowed
privation, unlike matter, perishes phrases from him 227,18-22
per se 252,29-23