International Nuclear Waste Disposal Concepts

(Updated May 2016)

 There have been several proposal for regional and international repositories for disposal of
high-level nuclear wastes, and in 2003 the concept received strong endorsement from the
head of IAEA.
 The European Commission is funding studies to to assess the feasibility of European regional
waste repositories.
 Arising from these studies, 14 EU countries resolved to set up a European Repository
Development Organisation (ERDO) to collaborate on nuclear waste disposal.
 Following this a similar initiative is under way for the Middle East and North Africa, and
South East Asia is likely to follow.
 Pangea Resources earlier identified a large area of outback Australia as having appropriate
characteristics for deep geological disposal, and hence for an international repository.
 In May 2016 a high-level commission in South Australia recommended establishment of an
international repository there.

Responsibility for wastes

At present there is clear and unequivocal understanding that each country is ethically and legally
responsible for its own wastes, therefore the default position is that all nuclear wastes will be
disposed of in each of the 50 or so countries concerned.

The main ingredients of high-level nuclear wastes are created in the nuclear reactors which make
the electricity in 31 countries. They are essentially not left-overs from imported uranium.There is
thus no moral obligation on uranium suppliers in respect to the wastes, other than that involved in
safeguards procedures.

For instance, Australian uranium is supplied under safeguards, which are essentially accounting and
inspection procedures to ensure that neither the uranium nor any product of it (eg plutonium)
contribute to fulfilling the aspirations of anyone wanting to build weapons. With the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Australian Safeguards & Non-Proliferation Office tracks
"Australian Obligated Nuclear Materials" all the way through to used fuel, reprocessing (if
undertaken), and recycling of plutonium (if separated) in mixed oxide fuels. The same kind of
arrangements apply to Canadian uranium.

Thus any international waste repository has implications under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). The trustworthiness and standing of the host country is fundamental to the project's
acceptability to NPT states, which comprise virtually every country but India, Pakistan, Israel and
North Korea. Also, the international treaty produced by IAEA and signed by most nations of the
world in 1997 covering the management and disposal of used fuel and high-level wastes requires
that the host facility or system meets the highest national and international standards.

Even countries such as Australia with no nuclear power have need for secure disposal of long-lived
radioactive wastes from their research reactors.

International repositories
In November 2003, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the UN's International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), said to the UN General Assembly: "We should ... consider multinational
approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Over 50 countries
currently have spent fuel stored in temporary locations, awaiting reprocessing or disposal. Not all
countries have the appropriate geological conditions for such disposal - and, for many countries
with small nuclear programs, the financial and human resources required for the construction and
operation of a geological disposal facility are daunting."

In an October article he included research reactors in the scope of this suggestion and concluded
that "considerable advantages - in cost, safety, security and non-proliferation - would be gained
from international co-operation in these stages of the nuclear fuel cycle."

Nearly 25 years earlier, in 1980, the IAEA-sponsored International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
(INFCE) waste management and disposal report had firmly recommended that proposals "for
establishing multinational and international repositories should be elaborated" due to their non-
proliferation advantages. "Centralised facilities for disposal of spent fuel and/or vitrified high-level
wastes .... would reduce the diversion risk" and be more economical.

Individual waste repositories for spent nuclear fuel and other high-level wastes need to be reliably
secure. Achieving high security means:

 They can make a vital contribution to global environmental safety by ensuring that
radioactive substances are permanently removed from the human environment,
 They can greatly enhance global security in the broader sense by preventing malicious use
of fissile and radiological materials.

Insofar as these functions are less than fully assured in any of the 50 countries concerned with
radioactive wastes, there is a justification for some kind of international collaboration and facilities,
possibly on a regional basis. In particular, the second point is arguably best achieved by
international collaboration under IAEA auspices.

While most countries should be able to find suitably safe sites in stable geological formations,
demonstrating this safety so as to create public confidence is best achieved where there is simple
geology.

Certainly, geological disposal is the only foreseeable way of ensuring adequate safety and security in
the long-term management of used fuel which is treated as waste, and also of separated high-level
radioactive wastes which, if recycling of actinides becomes established, eventually will be mainly
fission products.

While acknowledging each county's responsibility for its own wastes, the limits to the logic on
indigenous disposal can be seen from the changing national borders within Europe over the last
century. For Slovenia for instance (which has one nuclear power reactor), its capital city Ljubljana
has politically lain within seven different states in the last 100 years.

The South Australian Royal Commission into the Nuclear Fuel Cycle report in May 2016 notes:
There are international models that address the transfer 
of waste between countries. The Basel
Convention, which applies to hazardous wastes other than radioactive waste, imposes requirements
upon the transfer of hazardous wastes between countries; namely the transfer shall only take place
where prior informed consent has been received and only if the transfer represents an
environmentally sound solution. Hazardous wastes are commercially transferred under
 this regime.
While the Joint Convention applies equivalent requirements to transfers of radioactive waste
between countries, there are no operating models for the commercial transfer of used fuel for
disposal.
Various organisations have looked into potential concepts. There are, however, commercial models
for the transfer of used fuel between countries for reprocessing, as well as the take-back of fuel from
reactors built by Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear corporation... The United Kingdom has
reprocessed used fuel for many countries but does not accept the waste products for disposal. In all
cases, transfers can only take place if the recipient country has the capacity to manage the waste
safely and where such transfer has been agreed between the countries concerned.

South Australian proposal

In May 2016 the South Australian Royal Commission into the Nuclear Fuel Cycle reported. A major
recommendation was that a facility for the disposal of international used nuclear fuel and
intermediate-level waste should be established. It found that the state "has the necessary attributes
and capabilities to develop a world-class waste disposal facility, and to do so safely." Based on a
"cautious and conservative approach", from assessments of used fuel inventories and potential
global interest the commission determined that such a facility could generate more than AUD 100
billion in income in excess of expenditure (including a reserve fund of AUD 32 billion for facility
closure and ongoing monitoring) over the 120-year life of the project.

The World Nuclear Association said that the report had "fundamentally changed the nature of the
global nuclear waste discourse," and a multinational waste facility based in South Australia would
provide a welcome option for countries operating nuclear facilities today. It would be a “viable
alternative" to national projects. Such a large multinational waste storage facility would be a world
first and should offer advantages in terms of siting and economics when compared to smaller
national approaches.

Under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety
 of Radioactive
Waste Management, any proposal to store and dispose of used fuel in South Australia would
require agreement between the countries concerned. In Australia, treaty level agreements would
need to be developed between the federal government and the relevant overseas government. An
agreement would also need to specify arrangements between the Australian Government and the
Government of South Australia, to ensure these commitments were fulfilled. Further agreements
may be required with third party countries: for example, if they have supplied uranium to the
country wishing to store and dispose of used fuel in South Australia.

As Australia is a net exporter of energy, it has a significant role to play in assisting other countries to
lower their carbon emissions. This includes countries with less opportunity for large-scale
renewable energy deployment than Australia, for whom nuclear power makes a substantial
contribution
 to their production of low carbon energy. For new nuclear entrants or countries with
little prospect of siting their own used fuel disposal facilities, an international solution would
remove a significant impediment to the new or ongoing use of nuclear power as a low-carbon
technology. As a result, Australia would derive a reputational and financial benefit by hosting a
facility for the disposal of international used fuel.

Excluding countries which are committed to developing national solutions or already have
structured programs leading to a domestic facility, and those with laws prohibiting export of wastes,
the report identifies 90,000 tonnes of used fuel and almost 270,000 cubic metres of intermediate-
levels wastes as a potentially accessible market and available for an Australian repository today.
These amounts, comprising about one-quarter of actual world used fuel and ILW, are increasing
annually. By 2090 the amounts are 276,500 tonnes and 782,000 m3 respectively. The viability
analysis is based on half these amounts.

Based on detailed analysis, the commission considered that a reasonable baseline price for the
purpose of assessing viability would be A$ 1.75 million/tHM for used fuel. This is based on a
reasonable baseline ‘willingness to pay’ estimate of A$ 1.95 million/tHM, less A$ 0.2 million/tHM to
account for costs incurred by customers in preparing and delivering the waste to South Australia.

The management and disposal of intermediate-level waste commands a far lower willingness to pay
than for used fuel since it is more readily managed and stored. However, a 2011 report from the UK
Department of Energy and Climate Change has suggested that £25,900 per m3
 (in current terms,
A$ 66,000 per m3) represents a levy that ought be imposed on nuclear power plant operators to
reflect current costs and the potential for future increases. In the interests of conservatism, and to
address the costs of packaging and transport (which are not as well defined as for used fuel) a price
to charge of A$ 40,000 per m3 is considered appropriate for the purposes of a viability analysis.

Interim above-ground storage for used fuel inside heavily engineered, purpose-built casks would be
followed by deep geological disposal, the repository design based on that under construction at
Olkiluoto in Finland at 400-450 metre depth. In the analysis, the geological disposal facility for used
fuel is notionally co-located with an intermediate-level waste facility, where those packages are
placed in medium-depth vaults of 50-250 metres. The report said that integrated facilities with
capacity to store and dispose of used fuel would be viable.

On a number of realistic scenarios, such a facility would be highly profitable. The timeline for
establishing an interim storage facility and associated transport infrastructure, including harbour,
port and railway would be 11 years after project commencement. 
Transferring used fuel and ILW
from surface storage to underground repository would begin at 28 years. Revenue would thus
commence at year 11, based on 3000 t/yr used fuel, so A$ 5.25 billion/yr over 30 years from then,
simply for the fuel. Total capital cost would be A$ 41 billion over some years including 25%
contingency, and operating expenses from year 11 about A$ 0.878 million (in 2015 $). Overall total
revenue (in undiscounted terms) would be more than A$ 257 billion, with total costs of A$ 145
billion. 
The project would add 4.7% to gross state product and 1.9% to employment by 2030.

Legislative changes would be necessary at state and federal levels.

ARIUS and Europe – ERDO

Early in 2002 a new, non-commercial body to promote the concept of regional and international
facilities for storage and disposal of all types of long-lived nuclear wastes was set up. This is ARIUS –
the Association for Regional and International Underground Storage. A key objective is to explore
ways of providing shared radioactive waste management approaches and facilities, in particular
storage and disposal facilities for smaller users. Membership is open and comprises countries with
small nuclear programs as well as industrial organisations with relevant interests. Arius is a
successor to the Pangea proposal (see below).

Arius is focusing initially on Europe, and the feasibility of regional repositories there. In 2002 a
European Commission Directive said that geological disposal of radioactive wastes was preferred
and that "A regional approach, involving two or more countries, could also offer advantages
especially to countries that have no or limited nuclear programs, insofar as it would provide a safe
and less costly solution for all parties."

In mid-2003 Arius initiated the SAPIERR Pilot Project for European Regional Repositories, which
obtained European Commission approval. This was undertaken over two years to 2005 to help the
EC grapple with the regional repository issue as flagged earlier in the EC Radioactive Waste
Directive. It allowed potential options for regional collaboration and for regional repositories to be
identified, though it did not extend to site identification. Slovakia provided the project coordination.

Following this pilot study, in September 2006 a new EC-funded SAPIERR (Strategic Action Plan for
Implementation of European Regional Repositories) project to assess the feasibility of European
regional waste repositories was commenced, indicating a recognition in the EU that implementing
25 national repositories is not optimal economically or for safety and security. The project was in
line with proposals from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Russia and the USA (with
GNEP, now IFNEC) for multilateral cooperation in the fuel cycle in order to enhance global
security. Shared repositories for high-level nuclear wastes are an important element of this.

The SAPIERR project held its final symposium January 2009 in Brussels. The results of studies on the
viability of shared, regional European geological repositories were presented to 50 participants from
21 countries. The aspects considered included organisational and legal issues, economic impacts,
safety and security considerations, and public and political attitudes to multinational repositories.

The main outcome of this was that 14 countries* resolved to move towards setting up a European
Repository Development Organisation (ERDO). The first step in the strategy was the establishment
of a self-financing Working Group (ERDO-WG) of interested countries in 2009 to prepare a
consensus model to be agreed for ERDO, using the SAPIERR findings as a starting point. It proposes a
sister organisation to waste agencies from European countries that have opted for a purely national
repository program. This model was presented to potentially interested countries, and internal
discussions are still in progress in several of these on adopting the multinational solution as one
option when responding to the requirements placed on EU member states by the EC Waste
Directive of 2011.** Some member states have already decided to follow this course. The ERDO-WG
secretariat is provided by ARIUS, Switzerland and the administration by the Netherlands waste
agency, COVRA.

* Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, though Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, and Latvia
subsequently did not continue in the ongoing ERDO-WG.
** At the end of 2011, the ERDO Working Group, led by representatives of the Dutch and Slovakian
national programs, prepared a set of documents outlining the possible structure, operating methods
and financing options for a formal, multinational, European waste management agency (the ERDO).
These documents were submitted to all EU governments that might be interested in actively
participating in the preparation of this next step, and also provided as information to those
European countries, such as Sweden, Finland and France, that have decided on purely national
approaches to managing their radioactive wastes. Discussions with potential participants have been
underway since 2012, and a number of positive responses received. In December 2013 the EC, the
European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) Waste Group and the ERDO-WG organised a meeting in
Luxembourg to consider how to help all EU member states meet the requirements set by the EC
Waste Directive of 2011. The meeting addressed the fact that some EU member states are not well
equipped to meet Waste Directive targets, but could develop a common program for addressing
many of its requirements. This led in June 2014 to a presentation to the European Parliament
Working Party on Atomic Questions on the COMS-WD (Cooperation between Member States
Responding to the Waste Directive) proposal.

In September 2014 Arius together with European partners submitted the COMS-WD proposal to the
€80 billion Horizon 2020 EU research and innovation program. Nine EU countries (Austria, Croatia,
Denmark, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia) and the Joint Research Centre
Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU) were involved with Arius in this. JRC-ITU involvement
is to ensure continued cooperation with other EU projects. However, the proposal was rejected as
being ‘out of scope’ for Horizon 2020. Nevertheless, the multinational or dual-track option is being
included by some countries in their strategies responding to the Waste Directive – Netherlands and
Slovenia so far.

ARIUS and the Gulf

Alongside ERDO, Arius is evaluating whether similar, regional shared solutions would be appropriate
for and of interest to emerging nuclear power programs in the Gulf, Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region and also SE Asia. The overall aim is to assess the interest within each region of
working towards Regional Repository Development Organizations (RDOs) similar to the Europe's
ERDO. A scoping study was completed in 2011 and funding for a further two-year project was
awarded in mid-2011 by two US Foundations. In 2011 the UAE's permanent representative to the
IAEA raised the possibility of a regional repository and said that "Among GCC countries there is
potential for a lot of co-operation in this area, including waste management and waste disposal."

In April 2012, an initial meeting took place in Abu Dhabi, hosted by the Federal Authority for Nuclear
Regulation (FANR) of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and supported by the IAEA. Around 35
participants attended, primarily from UAE waste management and planning organisations. UAE was
an obvious host for a first meeting since it has the most advanced nuclear power programme in the
region and has also formally committed to a “dual track” radioactive waste management strategy
that involves developing a national storage and disposal program in parallel with exploring regional
cooperation options. A follow up to the Abu Dhabi meeting was in November 2012 in Tunisia,
hosted by the Arab Atomic Energy Agency (AAEA), with a widened group of participating MENA
countries. In the six countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council region, which includes two
nations with expanding nuclear power programs (the UAE and Saudi Arabia), consideration is also
being given to launching a joint project on the feasibility of shared storage and/or disposal facilities.
Further discussion has followed, including at a January 2015 workshop in Abu Dhabi.
Arius estimated that the cost of such a shared regional repository in the Middle East might be $4
billion, but would offer a large payback in the form of regional security. It would not be needed
before about 2080.

The European and MENA initiatives will act as role models for a possible SE Asian initiative, where
interest has been shown by representatives of potential nuclear power newcomer nations such as
Malaysia and Vietnam and where involvement with the mature nuclear power programmes of the
region (e.g. in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan) will add an extra dimension to the issue. Following
a January 2014 meeting in Indonesia, further meetings are envisaged.

An EU group, the Implementing of Geological Disposal of radwaste Technology Platform (IGD-TP)

was established in 2009 by several EU organisations to support research related to its vision and
assist the various EU programs. It does not have government-level representation but is partly
funded by the EU.

Fuel Leasing

There have been a number of proposals for fuel leasing. At present the normal process is that a
utility buys uranium from a mining company, then gets it converted, enriched and fabricated, before
using it and discharging the used fuel. That used fuel becomes the responsibility of the country in
which it has been used, as outlined in the first three paragraphs of this paper.

Fuel leasing is an alternative concept whereby the utility leases its fabricated fuel from a supplier,
probably in another country, and after it has been used that supplier takes it back. This concept is
not yet in use except for some very limited applications, mainly for Russian-built nuclear power
plants in NPT non-weapons states (e.g. India, Iran). The supplier would then add the leased used
fuel to its own larger stocks to be stored for later disposal or reprocessing and recycling, in which
case the valuable components would belong to the fuel supplier/leaser.

The concept was part of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (now IFNEC) launched in 2006, in
order to restrict the spread of sensitive technologies such as enrichment, but it did not come to
fruition under that program. Of all the nuclear suppliers, Russia has expressed the most support for
fuel leasing and take-back. Russia’s fuel supply contract with Iran involves leasing, and Iran is
required to send the used fuel back to Russia. Russian law allows import of foreign used fuel for
reprocessing and the return of wastes (as with reprocessing other countries' used fuel in France and
Britain), and Russia's default position in supplying reactors to non nuclear weapons states is to take
back Russian-origin fuel without requiring return of the wastes, as with Iran.

The Pangea proposal

A major research program in the 1990s by Pangea Resources, a UK-based company, identified
Australia, southern Africa, Argentina and western China as having the most appropriate geological
credentials for a deep geologic repository, with Australia being favoured on economic and political
grounds. It would be located where the geology has been stable for several hundred million years,
so that there need not be total reliance on a robust engineered barrier system to keep the waste
securely isolated for thousands of years.
It would be a commercial undertaking and would have dedicated port and rail infrastructure. It
would take spent fuel and other wastes from commercial reactors, and possibly also material from
weapons disposal programs.

Pangea summed up the situation thus:

"By taking a fresh look at the reasons for the difficulties which have faced most national repository
programs, and discarding the preconception that each country must develop its own disposal
facilities, it is possible to define a class of simple, superior high-isolation sites which may provide a
multinational basis for solving the nuclear waste disposal problem.

"The relatively small volumes of high-level wastes or spent fuel which arise from nuclear power
production make shared repositories a feasible proposition. For small countries, the economies of
scale which can be achieved make the concept attractive. For all countries, objective consideration
of the relative merits of national and multi-national solutions is a prudent part of planning the
management of long-lived radioactive wastes."

Early in 1999 Pangea Resources released its project proposal to the Australian public, expecting this
"to initiate discussions which will enable us to more fully assess the feasibility and strategy of our
proposal ... on (its) merits." The initial response from the federal government however was to
reiterate Australia's long-standing and bipartisan policy of not importing nuclear wastes and saying
that there was no immediate intention of considering such a proposal.

Then, after only cursory consideration, the Western Australian parliament passed a Bill to make it
illegal to dispose of foreign high-level waste in the state without specific parliamentary approval.
Pangea continued its geological investigations in that state while extending its feasibility study to
other potential host regions.

Pangea objectives

The following were Pangea's objectives, but they are relevant to future proposals:

 To site a deep geologic disposal facility in a region where the geology and biosphere
conditions meet the test of simplicity coupled with robustness.

This is required to demonstrate that the performance of the facility from a safety standpoint will
meet the highest international standards and international safeguard requirements.

In addition to its ideal geological characteristics, the host country should preferably be a first-world,
stable democracy, familiar with high-technology enterprises. The basic technology envisaged is a
multibarrier system similar to that envisaged in most countries with advanced plans for such high-
level waste disposal, and as implemented for intermediate-level wastes.

 To create a facility for deep geological disposal capable of accepting spent fuel, vitrified
high-level waste, long-lived intermediate-level waste, and appropriately conditioned long-
lived nuclear materials, such as immobilised plutonium.
To the degree necessary, the disposal facility would also have short-term storage capability to allow
imported nuclear materials to reach a cool and safe condition for disposal.

 To provide an economic and environmentally responsible disposal option.

 To provide a safe and secure transportation service to the repository location.
 To provide the host country with the opportunity to gain substantial economic benefits and
to play an important role in enhancing security and non-proliferation efforts for the benefit
of all nations.

Pangea's strategy implied that the geological barrier can be the primary safety barrier, in contrast to
some other potential repository concepts where the waste form and the engineered barriers are
required to be more dominant. There is a side benefit in that less complex and less expensive
engineered barriers may be sufficient. Pangea also saw a potential public acceptance benefit, in that
reliance on a simple geological barrier might be more readily understood and accepted.

The decision to concentrate effort on Australia was the result of adding in to the fundamental safety
arguments considerations of a societal and political nature and to a lesser extent economics. The
end result is that Pangea focused on extensive contiguous sedimentary basins extending from
central Western Australia into northern South Australia.

Outline of proposed Pangea project

The Pangea concept envisaged a dedicated port and rail link to an inland repository site covering
perhaps 5 sq km on the surface and 20 sq km underground (500 metres down). There would be a
fleet of 35 dedicated and purpose-built ships at any one time.

Pangea's business plan was based on taking 75,000 tonnes of spent fuel and high-level waste from
reprocessing spent fuel, plus some intermediate-level wastes from decommissioning nuclear
facilities, over some 40 years. Spent fuel would be shipped to the facility at a rate of about 2,000 to
3,000 tonnes per year once it was fully operational. This rate is about 20% of the spent fuel
generated annually by commercial reactors around the world, or to put it another way, the
repository is designed to take 25% of the world's civil waste inventory at the time it opens. The
projected size of the repository is thus similar to that proposed at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.

The capital cost was estimated at US$ 6 billion, with some US$ 400 million per year operating cost.
An Access Economics study projected total export revenues over 40 years of about US$ 100 billion,
with payments to governments of about $50 billion (1998 dollars) before considering multiplier
effects. This would have added about one percent to the Australian GNP. The project envisaged
establishment of a shipyard and foundry for the manufacture of 70 specialised ships and some 3000
large stainless steel transport casks as well as port and fleet maintenance facilities. Direct
employment would be about 2000, indirect about 6000 people.

While the concept is aimed at nuclear waste generated by countries other than the USA, though
that country would need to be closely involved because through Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions
it controls some 60% of the nuclear fuel worldwide and would have to authorise any international
movement of it.
The commercial scheme would also provide the repository which can be used to dispose of
unwanted nuclear materials from disarmament, which was seen as a major spin-off. These would
include excess plutonium from nuclear weapons either in spent mixed oxide fuel or in the Synroc-
based ceramic developed by ANSTO and chosen in 1998 by the US Department of Energy as the
wasteform to immobilise some of its excess weapons plutonium.

Australian antecedents

The Pangea proposal had Australian antecedents. For instance, in 1983 the Labor government
commissioned a report from the Australian Science and Technology Council on Australia's role in the
nuclear fuel cycle. The 1984 ASTEC report recommended not only proceeding with uranium mining,
but also becoming involved with other stages of the fuel cycle such as enrichment. It also flagged
the "particular need for international collaboration in developing (high-level) waste management
programs" and the desirability of enabling access to the highest quality geological sites for disposal
of those wastes (para 2.3.51).

The Pangea concept can be traced to the Synroc Study Group, which began its activities in late
December 1988. The Synroc Study Group was a vehicle set up by the Australian government to
study the commercial potential for Synroc in a global context. It was conducted by four leading
Australian resource companies, assisted by ANSTO and the Research School of Earth Sciences at at
the Australian National University.

It is not current government policy to import nuclear waste into Australia, and this has been
reiterated several times by government sources. In order for any repository proposal to be
successful in any country, it would have to receive various government permits and meet full-scale
licensing and environmental impact requirements in its host country.

In the event, the proposal proved to be ahead of its time for Australia, and apparently elsewhere.

Relationship to national programs

There has been some disquiet regarding both the Pangea and other international repository
development proposals. There are two sources of this. One is from countries which are developing
high-level waste facilities, where concern is expressed that foreign wastes may be imported to help
fund those facilities without the endorsement of the citizens. Such fears are easily incited.

The second is that international proposals will erode the will of national governments to grapple
responsibly with their own wastes, and provide a 'cop-out'. Prospects of a politically easier or
economically better external solution might reduce commitment to implementing a national
solution.

There are in fact a number of national programs for waste disposal now emerging, but there also
remains much scope for international projects, particularly on a regional basis, as with other aspects
of the fuel cycle. This is underlined by developments since 2003 - see above.

Russian plans 2001-06

In 2001 the Russian parliament (Duma) passed legislation to allow the import of spent nuclear fuel.
The President signed this into law and set up a special commission to approve and oversee such
imports. The commission would have 20 members, five each from the Duma, the Council (upper
house), the government and presidential nominees. It would be chaired by Dr Zhores Alferoy, a
parliamentarian who is also Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a Nobel Prize
physicist.

In 2003 Krasnokamensk was suggested as the site for a major spent fuel repository - it is a city 7000
km east of Moscow in the Chita region and is a centre for uranium mining and milling, the mines
being run by the Priargunsky Combine.

This scheme was progressed in 2005 when the Duma ratified the Vienna Convention on civil liability
for nuclear damage. However in July 2006 Rosatom announced it would not proceed with taking any
foreign-origin used fuel.

See also Appendix 2.

Sources:

Pangea papers presented in Tucson 1 & 3/3/99 and Darwin 30/3/99:

ARIUS Newsletters
McCombie, C. & Stoll, R. 2002, International and Regional Repositories - The Key Questions,
Radwaste Solutions, March-April 2002.
McCombie, C & Chapman, N. 2002, Regional & International Repositories: not if, but how and when,
WNA Symposium.

MCombie, C. 2009, Responsible expansion of nuclear power requires global cooperation on spent-
fuel management, Innovations 4,4, 2009, pp 209-212.

Appendix 1:

Final Report of the MNA Expert Group of the IAEA, 2005

The Multinational Approaches Expert Group (MNA) was set up by IAEA Director General ElBaradei in
order to advise the Agency on how multinational initiatives could help enhance global nuclear
security. The Group included senior representatives from 26 countries. It held 4 meetings, each a
week long, within its year of operation and presented its final recommendations on 22 February
2005.

The topics covered included all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, with most emphasis on the
especially sensitive technologies such as uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing. The topics of
greatest relevance for Arius - storage and disposal of sent fuel and radioactive wastes - were also
prominent, however.
In the following, Arius have selected those passages that are of most direct relevance to its work.
These sections are directly related to earlier statement from the Director-General in which he has
emphasised the need to consider the merits of multinational approaches to the management and
disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. He has pointed out that not all countries have
the appropriate conditions for geologic disposal ?and that , for many countries with small nuclear
programs for electricity generation or for research, the financial and human resource investments
required for research, construction and operation of a geologic disposal facility are not available.
Accordingly, the Director-General had already concluded that considerable economic, safety,
security and non-proliferation advantages may therefore accrue from international cooperation on
the construction and operation of international nuclear spent fuel and waste repositories.

The following is composed of extracts quoted directly from the Executive Summary of the published
report.

The background to the study

The decades long nuclear non-proliferation effort is under threat: from regional arms races; from
actions by non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) that have been found to be in fundamental breach
of, or in non-compliance with their safeguards agreement, and which have not taken full corrective
measures; from the incomplete manner in which export controls required by the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have been applied; from burgeoning and alarmingly well
organised nuclear supply networks; and from the increasing risk of acquisition of nuclear or other
radioactive materials by terrorist and other non-State entities.

A different significant factor is that the civilian nuclear industry appears to be poised for worldwide
expansion. Rapidly growing global demand for electricity, the uncertainty of supply and price of
natural gas, soaring prices for oil, concerns about air pollution and the immense challenge of
lowering greenhouse gas emissions, are all forcing a fresh look at nuclear power. As the technical
and organisational foundations of nuclear safety improve, there is increasing confidence in the
safety of nuclear power plants. In light of existing, new and reawakened interest in many regions of
the world, the prospect of new nuclear power stations on a large scale is therefore real. A greater
number of States will consider developing their own fuel cycle facilities and nuclear know-how, and
will seek assurances of supply in materials, services and technologies.

The task and the approach chosen by the MNA Group

The mandate of the Expert Group was three-fold:

 To identify and provide an analysis of issues and options relevant to multilateral approaches
to the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle.
 To provide an overview of the policy, legal, security, economic, institutional and
technological incentives and disincentives for cooperation in multilateral arrangements for
the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle.
 To provide a brief review of the historical and current experiences and analyses relating to
multilateral fuel cycle arrangements relevant to the work of the expert group.

Two primary deciding factors dominate all assessments of multilateral nuclear approaches, namely
"Assurance of non-proliferation" and "Assurance of supply and services". Both are recognised
overall objectives for governments and for the NPT community. In practice, each of these two
objectives can seldom be achieved fully on its own. History has shown that it is even more difficult
to find an optimum arrangement that will satisfy both objectives at the same time. As a matter of
fact, multilateral approaches could be a way to satisfy both objectives.

The "Assurance of supply" value of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the associated

incentives, such as the guarantees provided by suppliers, governments and international
organisations; the economic benefits that would be gained by countries participating in multilateral
arrangements, and the better political and public acceptance for such nuclear projects. One of the
most critical steps is to devise effective mechanisms for assurances of supply of material and
services, which are commercially competitive, free of monopolies and free of political constraints.
Effective assurances of supply would have to include back-up sources of supply in the event that an
MNA supplier is unable to provide the required material or services.

Whether for uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, or spent fuel disposal and storage,
multilateral options span the entire field between existing market mechanisms and a complete co-
ownership of fuel cycle facilities. The following pattern reflects this diversity:
Type I: Assurances of services not involving ownership of facilities.
Type II: Conversion of existing national facilities to multinational facilities.
Type III: Construction of new joint facilities.

On the basis of this pattern, the Group reviewed the pros and cons associated with each type and
option. Pros and cons were defined relative to a "non-MNA choice", namely that of a national
facility under current safeguards.

Spent fuel disposal

At present there is no international market for spent fuel disposal services, as all undertakings are
strictly national. The final disposal of spent fuel is thus a candidate for multilateral approaches. It
offers major economic benefits and substantial non-proliferation benefits, although it presents
legal, political and public acceptance challenges in many countries. The Agency should continue its
efforts in that direction by working on all the underlying factors, and by assuming political
leadership to encourage such undertakings.

The final disposal of spent fuel (and radioactive waste as well) in shared repositories must be looked
at as only one element of a broader strategy of parallel options. National solutions will remain a first
priority in many countries. This is the only approach for States with many nuclear power plants in
operation or in past operation. For others with smaller civilian nuclear programmes, a dual-track
approach is needed in which both national and international solutions are pursued. Small countries
should keep options open (national, regional or international), be it only to maintain a minimum
national technical competence necessary to act in an international context.

Spent fuel storage

Storage facilities for spent fuel are in operation and are being built in several countries. There is no
international market for services in this area, except for the readiness of the Russian Federation to
receive Russian-supplied fuel, and with a possible offer to do so for other spent fuel. The storage of
spent fuel is also a candidate for multilateral approaches, primarily at the regional level. Storage of
special nuclear materials in a few safe and secure facilities would enhance safeguards and physical
protection. The IAEA should continue investigations in that field and encourage such undertakings.
Various countries with state-of-the-art storage facilities in operation should step forward and accept
spent fuel from others for interim storage.

Combined option: fuel-leasing/fuel take-back

In this model, the leasing State provides the fuel through an arrangement with its own nuclear fuel
"vendors". At the time the government of the leasing State issues an export license to its fuel
"vendor" corporation to send fresh fuel to a client reactor, that government would also announce
its plan for the management of that fuel once discharged. Without a specific spent fuel
management scheme by the leasing State, the lease deal will of course not take place. The leased
fuel once removed from the reactor and cooled down, could either be returned to its country of
origin which owns title to it, or, through an IAEA-brokered deal could be sent to a third party State
or to a multinational or a regional fuel cycle centre located elsewhere for storage and ultimate
disposal.

The weak part in the arrangement outlined above is the willingness, indeed the political capability,
of the leasing State to take-back the spent fuel it has provided under the lease contract. It could well
be politically difficult for any State to accept spent fuel not coming from its own reactors (that is,
reactors producing electricity for the direct benefit of its own citizens). Yet, to make any lease-take-
back deal credible, an ironclad guarantee of spent fuel removal from the country where it was used
must be provided, otherwise the entire arrangement is moot. In this respect, States with suitable
disposal sites, and with grave concerns about proliferation risks, ought to be proactive in putting
forward solutions. Of course, commitment of client States to forego enrichment and reprocessing
would make such undertakings politically more tolerable.

As an alternative, the IAEA could broker the creation of multinational or regional spent fuel storage
facilities, where spent fuel owned by leasing States and burned elsewhere could be sent. The IAEA
could thus become an active participant in regional spent fuel storage facilities, or third party spent
fuel disposal schemes, thereby making lease-take-back fuel supply arrangements more credible
propositions.

Conclusions of the Expert Group

The potential benefits of MNAs for the non-proliferation regime are both symbolic and practical. As
a confidence-building measure, multilateral approaches can provide enhanced assurance to the
partners and to the international community that the most sensitive parts of the civilian nuclear fuel
cycle are less vulnerable to misuse for weapon purposes. Joint facilities with multinational staff put
all MNA participants under a greater degree of scrutiny from peers and partners and may also
constitute an obstacle against a breakout by the host partner. They also reduce the number of sites
where sensitive facilities are operated, thereby curbing proliferation risks, and diminishing the
number of locations subject to potential thefts of sensitive material.

Moreover, these approaches can even help in creating a better acceptance for the continued use of
nuclear power and for nuclear applications, and enhance the prospects for the safe and
environmentally sound storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
As far as assurances of supply are concerned, multilateral approaches could also provide the
benefits of cost-effectiveness and economies of scale for whole regions, for smaller countries or for
those with limited resources. Similar benefits have been derived in the context of other technology
sectors, such as aviation and aerospace. However, the case to be made in favour of MNAs is not
entirely straightforward. States with differing levels of technology, different degrees of
institutionalisation, economic development and resources and competing political considerations
may not all reach the same conclusions as to the benefits, convenience and desirability of MNAs.
Some might argue that multilateral approaches point to the loss or limitation of State sovereignty
and independent ownership and control of a key technology sector, leaving unfairly the commercial
benefits of these technologies to just a few countries. Others might argue that multilateral
approaches could lead to further dissemination of, or loss of control over, sensitive nuclear
technologies, and result in higher proliferation risks.

In order to maintain momentum, the Group recommends that attention be given - by the IAEA
Member States, by the IAEA itself, by the nuclear industry and by other nuclear organisations - to
multilateral nuclear approaches in general and to the five approaches suggested below.

Five suggested approaches

The objective of increasing non-proliferation assurances associated with the civilian nuclear fuel
cycle, while preserving assurances of supply and services around the world could be achieved
through a set of gradually introduced multilateral nuclear approaches (MNA):

1. Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms on a case-by-case basis through long-term

contracts and transparent suppliers' arrangements with government backing. Examples would be:
fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel, as well
as commercial fuel banks.

2. Developing and implementing international supply guarantees with IAEA participation. Different
models should be investigated, notably with the IAEA as guarantor of service supplies, e.g. as
administrator of a fuel bank.

3. Promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities to MNAs, and pursuing them as confidence-
building measures, with the participation of NPT non-nuclearweapon States and nuclear-weapon
States, and non-NPT States.

4. Creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional,
MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management for front-end
and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment; fuel reprocessing; disposal and storage
of spent fuel (and combinations thereof). Integrated nuclear power parks would also serve this
objective.

5. The scenario of a further expansion of nuclear energy around the world might call for the
development of a nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral arrangements – by region or by
continent – and for broader cooperation, involving the IAEA and the international community.
Appendix 2:
From Arius Newsletter #11, October 2005.

Nine requirements to develop an international repository in Russia

Neil Chapman and Charles McCombie

Arius is simultaneously promoting both of the multinational disposal models that were defined in
last year's seminal IAEA report (IAEA, 2004) - regional repositories, shared by cooperating partners
(e.g. the SAPIERR initiative), and international disposal facilities, provided as a service by a large
nuclear country. As is well known, the only option of the second type that is currently being
discussed is the possibility of spent fuel storage in the Russian Federation. The storage proposal is
currently rather general and was re-stated most recently in July by Aleksandr Rumyantsev, head of
Rosatom, at the Moscow Rosatom-IAEA Conference, described earlier in this Newsletter. It would
involve using surplus capacity at the state-owned Mining and Chemical Processing Plant, an
underground facility for spent nuclear fuel storage, disposal, reprocessing and transportation, near
Krasnoyarsk in eastern Siberia.

The concept of a Russian storage and/or disposal facility is regarded with suspicion by the majority
of people - owing to the unenviable record of environmental pollution in the former Soviet Union,
its poor nuclear industry safety performance, and the continuing lack of transparency and variable
integrity of Russia's industrial and financial systems. What would it take to alleviate these suspicions
and make a sceptical international community 100% confident? This Topical Article presents our
views as nine key requirements that we believe would have to be met to make the 'Russian Option'
an attractive and achievable solution. It is based upon a longer, invited article to be published in the
Safety Barriers magazine (Radon Press) in Russia, later this year.

Background

Multinational initiatives to facilitate safeguards, provide increased nuclear security and guarantee
the supply of fuel cycle services to countries with nuclear power programmes are very much at the
forefront of international discussion (IAEA, 2005; McCombie and Chapman, 2004). Non-proliferation
is a key issue in current deliberations on global security within the United Nations. Although the
most urgent security and non-proliferation issues are concerned with the front end of the fuel cycle,
it is equally important to ensure that spent fuel is properly managed. A major international
workshop held in Moscow this July (see Newsletter item in this issue) explored many of the issues
involved and focussed in particular on the role that the Russian Federation could play in providing
facilities that would improve global control of spent fuel and high-level radioactive wastes.

Suggestions have been made from time to time by Russia concerning the possibility of long-term or
permanent spent fuel storage services. The current focus is on using the Krasnoyarsk facility as an
international store and, possibly, as a final repository for spent fuel. Under existing national
legislation, Russia could import spent fuel for:

 long-term storage, with eventual return to the sender;

 storage, with regeneration of light water reactor fuel for re-use in new generation reactors,
perhaps in Russia (thus possibly entailing no return requirement to the sender);
 storage, with reprocessing and return of some of the ensuing wastes to the sender.

Each option is economically attractive for Russia since they all provide either income from provision
of services or fuel for the future, or both. However, at present, the law does not allow import for
eventual disposal.

Arius is supportive of developing a Russian option that would be attractive to potential users and
which would satisfy international requirements for safety and security. Success for such an initiative
will require a range of important international stakeholders to be highly comfortable with what is
offered and with the conditions attached. In addition to the technical aspects, complex political,
societal and security issues are at stake. As stated in a paper by Alex Burkart (US State Department)
at the July symposium in Moscow:
"The overriding principle for State-to-State transfers of nuclear waste are established both in an
IAEA Code of Practice and the Provisions of the Joint Convention. A sending State should ship waste
or spent fuel only with the consent of the receiving State and only after satisfying itself that the
receiving State has the administrative and technical capacity, as well as the regulatory structure,
needed to manage the waste or spent fuel safely. Similarly, the receiving State should only consent
to receiving the waste or spent fuel if it can satisfy itself that it can meet those requirements. This
means that shipments of spent fuel and nuclear waste fall clearly under State jurisdiction and reflect
a State's policy. While technical factors are important in evaluating a proposal, political factors
always count in State decisions as well."

Nine requirements

We believe that nine key requirements will need to be met for the Russian proposals to have any
realistic chance of success and international acceptance:

1. Import of spent fuel for disposal, as well as storage, should be permissible. A new law will be
required in the Russian Federation to allow disposal of fuel that is not to be, or cannot be, recycled
(reprocessed or regenerated). Potential users of a Russian service are unlikely to wish to receive fuel
back after interim storage. A major attraction of an international facility is that provisions for long-
term storage and disposal do not have to be made in one's own country, thus avoiding the high
costs of a national repository and also reducing many of the political and societal problems entailed
in siting such facilities. In addition, this would allow accommodation with the United States over the
fate of US-flagged fuel. In the words of Burkart's paper:
"Before approving new arrangements for the retransfer of any spent fuel containing U.S.-origin
nuclear material, the United States would almost certainly need to be assured that the spent fuel
was destined for eventual disposal and not for reprocessing. A permanent repository need not be
available at the time of the export, and long-term interim storage could be part of any scheme. But
the scheme should also involve specific plans for, and the commitment of sufficient resources to,
development of a geologic repository."
2. A geological disposal option (not only for spent fuel, but also for vitrified high-level wastes and
other long-lived wastes) should be part of the package. As noted above, any country that does not
want to build a repository for spent fuel will not want to have to build one for returned reprocessing
wastes or for its other long-lived wastes. Russia needs to be prepared to retain HLW from
reprocessing of foreign spent fuel, to accept high level wastes that customer countries may already
have received from other reprocessing countries and to accept other long-lived wastes from
customer countries. The service should thus be complete, so that countries can use it for all their
wastes that will require deep disposal.

3. International acceptability is essential, in particular to the European Union and the United States.
Disposal outside the EU is not current EU policy and the USA has strict requirements (mentioned
above) with US-flagged materials. Any country (or group of countries) would have to present the
scheme's credentials to their own public and institutions with great commitment. Acceptability will
depend upon the scheme being openly executed to the highest technical standards being developed
internationally, using appropriate best available technology and being subject to international
monitoring. At present, politicians and the public tend to prefer national options, arguing that this
enables closer control of possible environmental and safety impacts. It will only be possible to gain
support for export if Russia can demonstrate clearly that there will be no relaxation of standards.

4. Economic advantages for user and supplier. Any scheme must benefit both implementer and user
economically. If the previous requirements are met, Russia stands to benefit substantially by
charging appropriate rates for a service not currently available anywhere else. The approach to
compensating host communities willing to accept an international responsibility needs to be set out
clearly, so that users are convinced of the equity of the scheme. Offering a service that enhances
global security and helps small countries to meet their waste management responsibilities can also
bring significant political advantages. Users should be prepared to pay for avoiding the problems
and unpredictable costs of running their own national disposal programmes, which can take
decades and might never even reach a successful conclusion. Disposal prices will thus be significant
but, owing to the huge economies of scale in repository implementation (e.g. see figure on page 2
of this Newsletter), they may still be less than small nuclear countries would have to pay for a
national repository.

5. Long-term availability of facilities should be guaranteed for user countries. The facilities offered
by Russia may be unique. If so, they need to be available over the period that wastes will be
generated by user countries, so that all wastes for geological disposal can be exported - otherwise
their national problems are not solved. This point is very important for some Central and Eastern
European countries that began a nuclear power programme under the assumption that spent fuel
would be returned to the USSR ?an option that was later withdrawn.

6. International support and recognition. If the scheme proves internationally acceptable (point 3,
above) then the major nuclear nations and international agencies and associations (IAEA, OECD-
NEA, WNA) should throw their weight behind it, acknowledging that Russia would be providing a
service that will enhance global security and safety. These organisations can promote groups to help
establish and guard the rights of the various parties to any waste transfer agreements.

7. Transparent project management. Information on the way that the scheme is managed, along
with all its significant technical, societal and economic aspects, should be available to interested
parties. Public and political communication should have high priority in Russia and internationally.
The acceptability of the project to national and local stakeholders in Russia needs to be clear. An
analogue for major international services being provided by one or a few countries is reprocessing,
where customers countries have formally joined together to require extensive access to information
from the reprocessors. A similar arrangement may be appropriate for disposal and Arius could be a
pre-cursor for such a group.

8. Use of best knowledge and expertise. Transparency and international standards will be achieved
by ensuring direct participation of the best international technical expertise. The Russian scheme
should be a truly international project, generating wide enthusiasm in the global scientific and
technical community. Russia could take the initiative by establishing credible advisory groups at the
outset, including internationally recognized experts in the disposal area.

9. Active involvement of the IAEA in establishing the project and, later, in an oversight monitoring
role, will underwrite its overall credibility. The IAEA has already expressed its interest in the
monitoring function.

Satisfying each of these nine requirements presents its own challenges, especially since some of the
main players have very different views on them. But each of the key players needs to be confident
and convinced, which requires their involvement in setting up such a scheme. Purely unilateral
initiatives (in Russia or elsewhere) will probably not succeed - a proper multinational approach is
absolutely essential.

We believe that, given the encouraging developments within Russia, the key players should now
join in a free and open discussion to develop plans for how a specific project can be established - a
project that addresses each requirement head-on.

The immediate objective should be to produce:

 an agreed set of requirements that an international repository must fulfil;

 a project plan, which, over several years, would lead to implementation of such a
repository;
 recommendations for specific actions by national and international organisations so that
the first steps can be taken towards this implementation.

We hope that 2006 will see such an initiative take shape, with Arius taking a role in promoting it,
alongside our activities in shared regional solutions.

References:
IAEA (2004). Developing and Implementing Multinational Repositories: infrastructural framework
and scenarios of co-operation. TECDOC 1413
IAEA (2005) Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report to the Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
McCombie, C. and Chapman, N. (2004). Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres - an Old and New Idea. Annual
Symposium of the World Nuclear Association, London, 8-10 September 2004. Radioactive Waste
Management

(Updated September 2016)

  Nuclear power is the only large-scale energy-producing technology which takes full
responsibility for all its wastes and fully costs this into the product.
 The amount of radioactive wastes is very small relative to wastes produced by fossil fuel
electricity generation.
 Used nuclear fuel may be treated as a resource or simply as a waste.
 Nuclear wastes are neither particularly hazardous nor hard to manage relative to other toxic
industrial wastes.
 Safe methods for the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste are technically proven;
the international consensus is that this should be geological disposal.

All parts of the nuclear fuel cycle produce some radioactive waste (radwaste) and the relatively
modest cost of managing and disposing of this is part of the electricity cost, i.e. it is internalised and
paid for by the electricity consumers.

At each stage of the fuel cycle there are proven technologies to dispose of the radioactive wastes
safely. For low- and intermediate-level wastes these are mostly being implemented. For high-level
wastes some countries await the accumulation of enough of it to warrant building geological
repositories; others, such as the USA, have encountered political delays.

Unlike other industrial wastes, the level of hazard of all nuclear waste – its radioactivity – diminishes
with time. Each radionuclidea contained in the waste has a half-life – the time taken for half of its
atoms to decay and thus for it to lose half of its radioactivity. Radionuclides with long half-lives tend
to be alpha and beta emitters – making their handling easier – while those with short half-lives tend
to emit the more penetrating gamma rays. Eventually all radioactive wastes decay into non-
radioactive elements. The more radioactive an isotope is, the faster it decays.

The main objective in managing and disposing of radioactive (or other) waste is to protect people
and the environment. This means isolating or diluting the waste so that the rate or concentration of
any radionuclides returned to the biosphere is harmless. To achieve this, practically all wastes are
contained and managed – some clearly need deep and permanent burial. From nuclear power
generation, none is allowed to cause harmful pollution.

All toxic wastes need to be dealt with safely, not just radioactive wastes. In countries with nuclear
power, radioactive wastes comprise less than 1% of total industrial toxic wastes (the balance of
which remains hazardous indefinitely).

Types of radioactive waste

Exempt waste & very low level waste

Exempt waste and very low level waste (VLLW) contains radioactive materials at a level which is not
considered harmful to people or the surrounding environment. It consists mainly of demolished
material (such as concrete, plaster, bricks, metal, valves, piping etc) produced during rehabilitation
or dismantling operations on nuclear industrial sites. Other industries, such as food processing,
chemical, steel etc also produce VLLW as a result of the concentration of natural radioactivity
present in certain minerals used in their manufacturing processes (see also information page on
Naturally-Occurring Radioactive Materials). The waste is therefore disposed of with domestic
refuse, although countries such as France are currently developing facilities to store VLLW in
specifically designed VLLW disposal facilities.

Low-level waste

Low-level waste (LLW) is generated from hospitals and industry, as well as the nuclear fuel cycle. It
comprises paper, rags, tools, clothing, filters etc, which contain small amounts of mostly short-lived
radioactivity. It does not require shielding during handling and transport and is suitable for shallow
land burial. To reduce its volume, it is often compacted or incinerated before disposal. It comprises
some 90% of the volume but only 1% of the radioactivity of all radioactive waste.

Intermediate-level waste

Intermediate-level waste (ILW) contains higher amounts of radioactivity and some requires
shielding. It typically comprises resins, chemical sludges and metal fuel cladding, as well as
contaminated materials from reactor decommissioning. Smaller items and any non-solids may be
solidified in concrete or bitumen for disposal. It makes up some 7% of the volume and has 4% of the
radioactivity of all radwaste. By definition, its radioactive decay generates heat of less than about 2
kW/m3 so does not require heating to be taken into account in design of storage or disposal
facilities.

High-level waste

High-level waste (HLW) arises from the 'burning' of uranium fuel in a nuclear reactor. HLW contains
the fission products and transuranic elements generated in the reactor core. It is highly radioactive
and hot due to decay heat, so requires cooling and shielding. It has thermal power above about 2
kW/m3 and can be considered as the 'ash' from 'burning' uranium. HLW accounts for over 95% of
the total radioactivity produced in the process of electricity generation. There are two distinct kinds
of HLW:

 Used fuel itself.

 Separated waste from reprocessing the used fuel (as described in section on Managing HLW
from used fuel below).

HLW has both long-lived and short-lived components, depending on the length of time it will take
for the radioactivity of particular radionuclides to decrease to levels that are considered no longer
hazardous for people and the surrounding environment. If generally short-lived fission products can
be separated from long-lived actinides, this distinction becomes important in management and
disposal of HLW.

HLW is a major focus of attention regarding nuclear power, and is managed accordingly.

Mining and milling

Traditional uranium mining generates fine sandy tailings, which contain virtually all the naturally
occurring radioactive elements naturally found in uranium ore. These are collected in engineered
tailings dams and finally covered with a layer of clay and rock to inhibit the leakage of radon gas and
ensure long-term stability. In the short term, the tailings material is often covered with water. After
a few months, the tailings material contains about 75% of the radioactivity of the original ore.
Strictly speaking these are not classified as radioactive wastes.

Conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication

Uranium oxide concentrate from mining, essentially 'yellowcake' (U3O8), is not significantly
radioactive – barely more so than the granite used in buildings. It is refined then converted to
uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6). As a gas, it undergoes enrichment to increase the U-235 content
from 0.7% to about 3.5%. It is then turned into a hard ceramic oxide (UO2) for assembly as reactor
fuel elements.

The main byproduct of enrichment is depleted uranium (DU), principally the U-238 isotope, which is
stored either as UF6 or U3O8. About 1.2 million tonnes of DU is now stored. Some is used in
applications where its extremely high density makes it valuable, such as the keels of yachts and
military projectiles. It is also used (with reprocessed plutonium) for making mixed oxide fuel and to
dilute highly-enriched uranium from dismantled weapons which is now being used for reactor fuel
(see pages on Uranium and Depleted Uranium and Military Warheads as a Source of Nuclear Fuel).

Electricity generation

In terms of radioactivity, high-level waste (HLW) is the major issue arising from the use of nuclear
reactors to generate electricity. Highly radioactive fission products and also transuranic elements
are produced from uranium and plutonium during reactor operations and are contained within the
used fuel. Where countries have adopted a closed cycle and utilised reprocessing to recycle material
from used fuel, the fission products and minor actinidesb are separated from uranium and
plutonium and treated as HLW (uranium and plutonium is then re-used as fuel in reactors). In
countries where used fuel is not reprocessed, the used fuel itself is considered a waste and
therefore classified as HLW.

Low- and intermediate-level waste is produced as a result of operations, such as the cleaning of
reactor cooling systems and fuel storage ponds, the decontamination of equipment, filters and
metal components that have become radioactive as a result of their use in or near the reactor.

How much waste is produced?

As already noted, the volume of nuclear waste produced by the nuclear industry is very small
compared with other wastes generated. Each year, nuclear power generation facilities worldwide
produce about 200,000 m3 of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, and about
10,000 m3 / 12,000 tonnes of high-level waste including used fuel designated as waste1.

In the OECD countries, some 300 million tonnes of toxic wastes are produced each year, but
conditioned radioactive wastes amount to only 81,000 m3 per year.

In the UK, for example, the total amount of radioactive waste (including radioactive waste expected
to arise from existing nuclear facilities) is about 4.7 million m3, or around 5 million tonnes. A further
1 million m3 has already been disposed. Of the UK's total radioactive waste, about 94% (i.e. about
4.4 million m3) falls into the low-level radioactive waste (LLW) category. About 6% (290,000 m3) is in
the intermediate-level radioactive waste (ILW) category, and less than 0.1% (1000 m 3) is classed as
high-level waste (HLW). Although the volume of HLW is relatively small, it contains about 95% of the
total inventory of radioactivity12.

A typical 1000 MWe light water reactor will generate (directly and indirectly) 200-350 m3 low- and
intermediate-level waste per year. It will also discharge about 20 m3 (27 tonnes) of used fuel per
year, which corresponds to a 75 m3 disposal volume following encapsulation if it is treated as waste.
Where that used fuel is reprocessed, only 3 m3 of vitrified waste (glass) is produced, which is
equivalent to a 28 m3 disposal volume following placement in a disposal canister.

This compares with an average 400,000 tonnes of ash produced from a coal-fired plant of the same
power capacity. Today, volume reduction techniques and abatement technologies as well as
continuing good practice within the work force all contribute to continuing minimisation of waste
produced, a key principle of waste management policy in the nuclear industry. Whilst the volumes
of nuclear wastes produced are very small, the most important issue for the nuclear industry is
managing their toxic nature in a way that is environmentally sound and presents no hazard to both
workers and the general public.

Managing high-level waste

Used fuel gives rise to high-level waste (HLW) which may be either the used fuel itself in fuel rods,
or the separated waste arising from reprocessing this (see next section on Recycling used fuel). In
either case, the amount is modest – as noted above, a typical reactor generates about 27 tonnes of
used fuel which may be reduced to 3 m3 per year of vitrified waste. Both can be effectively and
economically isolated, and have been handled and stored safely since nuclear power began.

Storage of used fuel is mostly in ponds associated with individual reactors, or in a common pool at
multi-reactor sites, or occasionally at a central site. See later section below.

If the used fuel is reprocessed, as is that from UK, French, German, Japanese and Russian reactors,
HLW comprises highly-radioactive fission products and some transuranic elements with long-lived
radioactivity. These are separated from the used fuel, enabling the uranium and plutonium to be
recycled. Liquid HLW from reprocessing must be solidified. The HLW also generates a considerable
amount of heat and requires cooling. It is vitrified into borosilicate (Pyrex) glass, encapsulated into
heavy stainless steel cylinders about 1.3 metres high and stored for eventual disposal deep
underground. This material has no conceivable future use and is unequivocally waste. The hulls and
end-fittings of the reprocessed fuel assemblies are compacted, to reduce volume, and usually
incorporated into cement prior to disposal as ILW. France has two commercial plants to vitrify HLW
left over from reprocessing oxide fuel, and there are also plants in the UK and Belgium. The capacity
of these Western European plants is 2,500 canisters (1000 t) a year, and some have been operating
for three decades.

If used reactor fuel is not reprocessed, it will still contain all the highly radioactive isotopes, and
then the entire fuel assembly is treated as HLW for direct disposal. It too generates a lot of heat and
requires cooling. However, since it largely consists of uranium (with a little plutonium), it represents
a potentially valuable resource and there is an increasing reluctance to dispose of it irretrievably.
Either way, after 40-50 years the heat and radioactivity have fallen to one thousandth of the level at
removal. This provides a technical incentive to delay further action with HLW until the radioactivity
has reduced to about 0.1% of its original level.

After storage for about 40 years the used fuel assemblies are ready for encapsulation or loading into
casks ready for indefinite storage or permanent disposal underground.

Direct disposal of used fuel has been chosen by the USA and Sweden among others, although
evolving concepts lean towards making it recoverable if future generations see it as a resource. This
means allowing for a period of management and oversight before a repository is closed.

Used fuel is subject to international safeguards due to its uranium and plutonium content.
Separated (and vitrified) HLW is not subject to safeguards, which is another factor in easier
handling.

Both direct disposal and reprocessing are in accordance with the definition of sustainable used fuel
management set out by the World Nuclear Association.*

* The World Nuclear Association considers used fuel management to be sustainable if it meets the
following key criteria:

 It covers all the steps of used fuel management from the generation of used fuel up to and
including final disposal in accordance with a well defined practical plan.
 It proves to be feasible with a sustainable impact level.
 It includes a realistic financing plan.
 It is able to demonstrate to a practicable extent that it is technically and economically
viable.
 It protects human health and the environment and has no greater impact on the health of
future generations than is allowed today.
 It answers to a present need but does not impose burdens on future generations.

Due to the long-term nature of these management plans, sustainable options must have one or
more pre-defined milestones where a decision could be taken on which option to proceed with.

Recycling used fuel

Any used fuel will still contain some of the original U-235 as well as various plutonium isotopes
which have been formed inside the reactor core, and the U-238c. In total these account for some
96% of the original uranium and over half of the original energy content (ignoring U-238).
Reprocessing, undertaken in Europe and Russia, separates this uranium and plutonium from the
wastes so that they can be recycled for re-use in a nuclear reactor (see page on Processing of Used
Nuclear Fuel). Plutonium arising from reprocessing is recycled through a MOX fuel fabrication plant
where it is mixed with depleted uranium oxide to make fresh fuel (see page on Mixed Oxide Fuel).
European reactors currently use over 5 tonnes of plutonium a year in fresh MOX fuel.
Major commercial reprocessing plants operate in France, UK, and Russia with a capacity of some
5000 tonnes per year and cumulative civilian experience of 80,000 tonnes over 50 years. A new
reprocessing plant with an 800 t/yr capacity at Rokkasho in Japan is undergoing commissioning.
France and UK also undertake reprocessing for utilities in other countries, notably Japan, which has
made over 140 shipments of used fuel to Europe since 1979. Until now most Japanese used fuel has
been reprocessed in Europe, with the vitrified waste and the recovered uranium and plutonium (as
MOX fuel) being returned to Japan to be used in fresh fuel (see page on Japanese Waste and MOX
Shipments From Europe). Russia also reprocesses some used fuel from Soviet-designed reactors in
other countries.

There are several proposed developments of reprocessing technologies (described in the page on
Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel). One technology under development would separate plutonium
along with the minor actinides as one product. This however cannot be simply put into MOX fuel
and recycled in conventional reactors; it requires fast neutron reactors which are as yet few and far
between. On the other hand, it will make disposal of high-level wastes easier.

So the options for used fuel are:

 Direct disposal (after storage) to a geological repository. The material has very long-lived
radioactivity, and will take about 300,000 years to reach the same level as the original ore.
 Aqueous reprocessing to remove only uranium and plutonium. The material then only takes
about 9000 years to reach the same level of radioactivity as the original ore.
 Advanced electrometallurgical reprocessing which removes uranium, plutonium and minor
actinides together for recycling in a fast reactor. The wastes then only need 300 years to
reach the same level of radioactivity as the original ore. This is not yet operational on any
commercial scale.

Storage pond for used fuel at the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant at the UK's Sellafield site
(Sellafield Ltd)

Storage and disposal of used fuel and separated HLW

There is about 240,000 tonnes of used fuel in storage, much of it at reactor sites. About 90% of this
is in storage ponds (smaller versions of that illustrated above), the balance in dry storage. Much of
the world's used fuel is stored thus, and some of it has been there for decades. Annual arisings of
used fuel are about 7,000 tonnes (6,000 t from LWRs), and up to 3,000 tonnes of this are intended
for reprocessing. Final disposal is not urgent in any logistical sense.

According to GE Hitachi, in 2015 funds set aside for managing and disposal of used fuel totaled
about $100 billion, about $51 billion of this in Europe, $40 billion in the USA and $6.5 billion in
Canada.

Storage ponds at reactors, and those at centralized facilities such as CLAB in Sweden, are 7-12
metres deep, to allow several metres of water over the used fuel comprising racked fuel assemblies
typically about 4 m long and standing on end. The multiple racks are made of metal with neutron
absorbers incorporated in it. The circulating water both shields and cools the fuel. These pools are
robust constructions made of thick reinforced concrete with steel liners. Ponds at reactors are often
designed to hold all the used fuel for the life of the reactor.

Some storage of fuel assemblies which have been cooling in ponds for at least five years is in dry
casks, or vaults with air circulation inside concrete shielding. One common system is for sealed steel
casks or multi-purpose canisters (MPCs) each holding about 80 fuel assemblies with inert gas. Casks/
MPCs may be used also for transporting and eventual disposal of the used fuel. For storage, each is
enclosed in a ventilated storage module made of concrete and steel. These are commonly standing
on the surface, about 6m high, cooled by air convection, or they may be below grade, with just the
tops showing. The modules are robust and provide full shielding. Each cask has up to 45 kW heat
load.

A collection of casks or modules comprises an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI),
which in the USA is licensed separately from any associated power plant, and is for interim storage
only. About one quarter of US used fuel is stored thus.

For disposal, to ensure that no significant environmental releases occur over tens of thousands of
years, 'multiple barrier' geological disposal is planned. This immobilises the radioactive elements in
HLW and some ILW and isolates them from the biosphere. The main barriers are:

 Immobilise waste in an insoluble matrix such as borosilicate glass or synthetic rock (fuel
pellets are already a very stable ceramic: UO2).
 Seal it inside a corrosion-resistant container, such as stainless steel.
 Locate it deep underground in a stable rock structure.
 Surround containers with an impermeable backfill such as bentonite clay if the repository is
wet.

Loading silos with canisters containing vitrified HLW in the UK. Each disc on the floor covers a silo
holding ten canisters

HLW from reprocessing must be solidified. France has two commercial plants to vitrify HLW left over
from reprocessing oxide fuel, and there are also significant plants in the UK and Belgium. The
capacity of these western European plants is 2,500 canisters (1000 t) a year, and some have been
operating for three decades. By mid-2009, the UK Sellafield vitrification plant had produced it
5000th canister of vitrified HLW, representing 3000 m3 of liquor reduced to 750 m3 of glass. The
plant fills about 400 canisters per year.

The Australian Synroc (synthetic rock) system is a more sophisticated way to immobilise such waste,
and this process may eventually come into commercial use for civil wastes. (see page on Synroc).

To date there has been no practical need for final HLW repositories, as surface storage for 40-50
years is first required so that heat and radioactivity can decay to levels which make handling and
storage easier.
The process of selecting appropriate deep geological repositories is now underway in several
countries. Finland and Sweden are well advanced with plans for direct disposal of used fuel in mined
repositories, since their parliaments decided to proceed on the basis that it was safe, using existing
technology. Both countries have selected sites, in Sweden, after competition between two
municipalities. The USA has opted for a final repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, though this is
now stalled due to political decision. There have also been proposals for international HLW
repositories in optimum geology2. (See also information page on International Nuclear Waste
Disposal Concepts.)

Relative activity of used fuel with 38 GWd/t burn-up

Source: IAEA (referenced in Radioactive Waste in Perspective NEA 2010, p74)

A current question is whether wastes should be emplaced so that they are readily retrievable from
repositories. There are sound reasons for keeping such options open – in particular, it is possible
that future generations might consider the buried waste to be a valuable resource. On the other
hand, permanent closure might increase long-term security of the facility. After being buried for
about 1,000 years most of the radioactivity will have decayed. The amount of radioactivity then
remaining would be similar to that of the naturally-occurring uranium ore from which it originated,
though it would be more concentrated. In mined repositories, which represent the main concept
being pursued, retrievability can be straightforward, but any deep borehole disposal is permanent.

Deep boreholes are more appropriate for smaller amounts of wastes than national programs
involving direct disposal of used fuel, and hence are more likely to be used for smaller volumes of
shorter-lived wastes arising from Generation IV fuel cycles.

France's 2006 waste law says that HLW disposal must be "reversible", which was clarified in a 2015
amendment to mean guaranteeing long-term flexibility in disposal policy, while “retrievable”
referred to short-term practicality. France, Switzerland, Canada, Japan and the USA require
retrievability, and that is policy also in most other countries, though this presupposes that in
the long-term, the repository would be sealed to satisfy safety requirements.

The measures or plans that various countries have in place to store, reprocess and dispose of used
fuel and wastes are described in Appendix 3: National Policies and summarised in the following
Table. Storage and disposal options are described more fully in Appendix 2.

Waste management for used fuel and HLW from nuclear power reactors

Country Policy Facilities and progress towards final repositories

 Central waste storage at Dessel
 Underground laboratory established 1984 at Mol
Belgium Reprocessing
 Construction of repository to begin about 2035

 Nuclear Waste Management Organisation set up 2002

Canada Direct disposal
 Deep geological repository confirmed as policy,
Country Policy Facilities and progress towards final repositories
retrievable
 Repository site search from 2009, planned for use 2025

 Central used fuel storage at LanZhou

 Repository site selection to be completed by 2020
China Reprocessing  Underground research laboratory from 2020, disposal
from 2050

 Program start 1983, two used fuel storages in operation

 Posiva Oy set up 1995 to implement deep geological
disposal
 Underground research laboratory Onkalo under
Finland Direct disposal
construction
 Repository planned from this, near Olkiluoto, open in
2023

 Underground rock laboratories in clay and granite

 Parliamentary confirmation in 2006 of deep geological
disposal, containers to be retrievable and policy
France Reprocessing "reversible"
 Bure clay deposit is likely repository site to be licensed
2015, operating 2025

 Repository planning started 1973

Reprocessing  Used fuel storage at Ahaus and Gorleben salt dome
Germany but moving to direct  Geological repository may be operational at Gorleben
disposal after 2025

 Research on deep geological disposal for HLW

India Reprocessing

 Underground laboratory at Mizunami in granite since

1996
 • Used fuel and HLW storage facility at Rokkasho since
1995
• Used fuel storage under construction at Mutsu, start
Japan Reprocessing
up 2013
 NUMO set up 2000, site selection for deep geological
repository under way to 2025, operation from 2035,
retrievable

 Underground laboratory in granite or gneiss in

Krasnoyarsk region from 2015, may evolve into
Russia Reprocessing repository
 Sites for final repository under investigation on Kola
peninsula
Country Policy Facilities and progress towards final repositories
 Pool storage for used VVER-1000 fuel at Zheleznogorsk
since 1985
 Dry storage for used RBMK and other fuel at
Zheleznogorsk from 2012
 Various interim storage facilities in operation

 Waste program confirmed 1998, KRWM seet up 2009

Direct disposal,
South Korea  Central interim storage planned from 2016
wants to change

 ENRESA established 1984, its plan accepted 1999

 Central interim storage at Villar de Canas from 2016
(volunteered location)
Spain Direct disposal
 Research on deep geological disposal, decision after
2010

 Central used fuel storage facility – CLAB – in operation

since 1985
 Underground research laboratory at Aspo for HLW
Sweden Direct disposal repository
 Osthammar site selected for repository (volunteered
location), likely to open in 2028

 Central interim storage for HLW and used fuel at ZZL

Switzerland Reprocessing
Wurenlingen since 2001
 Smaller used fuel storage at Beznau
 Underground research laboratory for high-level waste
repository at Grimsel since 1983
 Deep repository by 2020, containers to be retrievable

 Low-level waste repository in operation since 1959

 HLW from reprocessing is vitrified and stored at
Sellafield
United
Reprocessing  Repository location to be on basis of community
Kingdom
agreement
 New NDA subsidiary to progress geological disposal

 DoE responsible for used fuel from 1998, accumulated

$32 billion waste fund
 Considerable research and development on repository in
Direct disposal welded tuffs at Yucca Mountain, Nevada
USA
but reconsidering  The 2002 Congress decision that geological repository be
at Yucca Mountain was countered politically in 2009
 Central interim storage for used fuel now likely
Note: in most countries repositories or at least storage facilities for low-level wastes and
intermediate-level wastes are operating. See also individual country papers.

Wastes from decommissioning nuclear plants

In the case of nuclear reactors, about 99% of the radioactivity is associated with the fuel. Apart from
any surface contamination of plant, the remaining radioactivity comes from 'activation products'
such as steel components which have long been exposed to neutron irradiation. Their atoms are
changed into different isotopes such as iron-55, cobalt-60, nickel-63 and carbon-14. The first two
are highly radioactive, emitting gamma rays, but with correspondingly short half-lives so that after
50 years from final shutdown their hazard is much diminished. Some caesium-137 may also be in
decommissioning wastes.

Some scrap material from decommissioning may be recycled, but for uses outside the industry very
low clearance levels are applied, so most is buried and some is recycled within the industry.

Generally, short-lived intermediate-level wastes (mainly from decommissioning reactors) are

buried, while long-lived intermediate-level wastes (from fuel reprocessing) will be disposed of deep
underground. Low-level wastes are disposed of in shallow burial sites.

Disposal of other radioactive wastes

Some low-level liquid wastes from reprocessing plants are discharged to the sea. These include
radionuclides which are distinctive, notably technetium-99 (sometimes used as a tracer in
environmental studies), and this can be discerned many hundred kilometres away. However, such
discharges are regulated and controlled, and the maximum radiation dose anyone receives from
them is a small fraction of natural background radiation.

Nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants release small quantities of radioactive gases (e.g.
krypton-85 and xenon-133) and trace amounts of iodine-131 to the atmosphere. However, they
have short half-lives, and the radioactivity in the emissions is diminished by delaying their release.
Also the first two are chemically inert. The net effect is too small to warrant consideration in any
life-cycle analysis. A little tritium is also produced but regulators do not consider its release to be
significant.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission classifies low-level wastes into four categories based on
radioactivity corresponding to management and disposal requirments: Class A waste has the lowest
radioactivity level and decays to background level after about 100 years. It accounts for about 99%
of the volume of LLW generated in the USA and includes slightly contaminated paper products,
clothing, rags, mops, equipment and tools, as well as depleted uranium. Class B and C wastes
include filters, resins, irradiated hardware with activation products, and longer-lived radioisotopes
that decay after 300 and 500 years, respectively. Greater-than-Class C LLW has radionuclide
concentration limits greater than those specified for Class C waste.

Following the Fukushima accident, large areas were contaminated mainly with caesium fallout. In
2016 the government announced that material with less than 8 kBq/kg caesium would no longer be
subject to restriction regarding disposal or use for embankments. This is about six times the average
radioactivity of the Earth’s crust and about three times the average radioactivity of Australian coal
ash.

It is noteworthy that coal burning produces some 280 million tonnes of ash per year, most of it
containing low levels of natural radionuclides3. Some of this could be classified as LLW. It is simply
buried. (See also page on Naturally-Occurring Radioactive Materials.)

Costs of radioactive waste management

Financial provisions are made for managing all kinds of civilian radioactive waste. The cost of
managing and disposing of nuclear power plant wastes represents about 5% of the total cost of the
electricity generated.

Most nuclear utilities are required by governments to put aside a levy (e.g. 0.1 cents per kilowatt
hour in the USA to 2014, 0.14 ¢/kWh in France) to provide for management and disposal of their
wastes (see Appendix 4: National Funding). So far some US$ 35 billion has been accumulated in the
US waste fund from electricity consumers, including some interest.

The actual arrangements for paying for waste management and decommissioning also vary. The key
objective is however always the same: to ensure that sufficient funds are available when they are
needed. There are three main approaches4:

Provisions on the balance sheet

Sums to cover the anticipated costs of waste management and decommissioning are included on
the generating company's balance sheet as a liability. As waste management and decommissioning
work proceeds, the company has to ensure that it has sufficient investments and cashflow to meet
the required payments.

Internal fund

Payments are made over the life of the nuclear facility into a special fund that is held and
administered within the company. The rules for the management of the fund vary, but many
countries allow the fund to be re-invested in the assets of the company, subject to adequate
securities and investment returns.

External fund

Payments are made into a fund that is held outside the company, often within government or
administered by a group of independent trustees. Again, rules for the management of the fund vary.
Some countries only allow the fund to be used for waste management and decommissioning
purposes, others allow companies to borrow a percentage of the fund to reinvest in their business.

Natural precedents for geological disposal

Nature has already proven that geological isolation is possible through several natural examples (or
'analogues'). The most significant case occurred almost 2 billion years ago at Oklo in what is now
Gabon in West Africa, where several spontaneous nuclear reactors operated within a rich vein of
uranium ore5. (At that time the concentration of U-235 in all natural uranium was about 3%.) These
natural nuclear reactors continued for about 500,000 years before dying away. They produced all
the radionuclides found in HLW, including over 5 tonnes of fission products and 1.5 tonnes of
plutonium, all of which remained at the site and eventually decayed into non-radioactive elements.

The study of such natural phenomena is important for any assessment of geologic repositories, and
is the subject of several international research projects. However, it must be noted that the Oklo
reactions proceeded because groundwater was present as a moderator in the 'enriched' and
permeable uranium ore.

Legacy wastes

In addition to the routine wastes from current nuclear power generation there are other radioactive
wastes referred to as 'legacy wastes'. These wastes exist in several countries which pioneered
nuclear power and especially where power programmes were developed out of military
programmes. These are sometimes voluminous and difficult, and arose in the course of those
countries getting to a position where nuclear technology is a commercial proposition for power
generation. They represent a liability which is not covered by current funding arrangements. In the
UK, some £73 billion (undiscounted) is estimated to be involved in addressing these6 – principally
from Magnox and some early AGR developments – and about 30% of the total is attributable to
military programmes. In the USA, Russia and France the liabilities are also considerable.

Regulation

The nuclear and radioactive waste management industries work to well-established safety
standards for the management of radioactive waste. International and regional organisations such
as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Commission (EC)
and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) develop standards, guidelines
and recommendations under a framework of co-operation to assist countries in establishing and
maintaining national standards. National policies, legislation and regulations are all developed from
these internationally agreed standards, guidelines and recommendations. Amongst others, these
standards aim to ensure the protection of the public and the environment, both now and into the
future.

International agreements in the form of conventions have also been established such as the Joint
Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The latter was adopted in 1997 by a diplomatic
conference convened by the IAEA and came into force in June 2001 following the required number
of ratifications.

Other international conventions and directives seek to provide for inter alia, the safe transportation
of radioactive material, protection of the environment (including the marine environment) from
radioactive waste, and the control of imports and exports of radioactive waste and transboundary
movements.

International Atomic Energy Agencyd

The IAEA is the international organisation that advises on the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear
technology. It is an agency of the United Nations, based in Vienna, Austria founded in 1957 and it
currently has 134 member states from countries with and without nuclear energy programmes. The
IAEA develops safety standards, guidelines and recommendations and inter alia provides technical
guidance to member states on radioactive waste principles. Member states use the standards and
guidelines in developing their own legislation, regulatory documents and guidelines. It also verifies
through a safeguards inspection programme compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT).

The IAEA's Waste and Environmental Safety Section works to develop internationally agreed
standards on the safety of radioactive waste. The Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme
(RADWASS) provides guidance to member states to produce their own policies and regulations for
the safe management of radioactive waste, including disposal7.

In addition, the IAEA helps member states by providing technical assistance with services,
equipment and training and by conducting radiological assessments.

Nuclear Energy Agencye

The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD is based in Paris, France. It has a variety of waste
management programmes involving its 28 member states. The organisation aims to assist these
states in developing safe waste disposal strategies and policies for spent nuclear fuel, HLW and
waste from decommissioning nuclear facilities. It also works closely with the IAEA on nuclear safety
standards and other technical activities.

The NEA has a project aimed at preserving records, knowledge and management (RK&M) of long-
lived nuclear waste disposal for future generations.

European Commission

For several years, the European Commission (EC) has attempted to pass Directives aimed at
ensuring a common approach to nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. The so-called
'Nuclear Package' of Directives on nuclear safety and waste management was a top-down approach
which met with considerable opposition from several Member States and was revised on several
occasions leading to the 2011 adoption of a scaled-back version.8

In July 2011 the European Union adopted a directive for the disposal of used nuclear fuel and
radioactive wastes which required member countries to develop national waste management plans
for European Commission review by 2015. The plans must include firm timetables for the
construction of disposal facilities, descriptions of needed implementation activities, cost
assessments, and financing schemes. Safety standards promulgated by the IAEA would become
legally binding within the EU-wide policy framework. International peer reviews should be invited at
least every ten years.

The agreement allows two or more member nations to develop joint disposal facilities and allows
transport of used fuel and radioactive wastes within the EU. Exports outside the EU will only be
possible to countries that already have a repository in operation that meets IAEA standards. For
overseas reprocessing, ultimate wastes must be returned to the originating EU country. The
directive acknowledges that no country currently operates such a repository and projects that a
minimum of 40 years would be required to develop one. The shipment of used fuel and radioactive
wastes to African, Pacific and Caribbean countries and to Antarctica is explicitly banned. Plans are
expected to use a step-by-step approach to geologic disposal based on the voluntary involvement of
potential host communities. Two routes are acknowledged: one to dispose of used nuclear fuel as
waste; the other to reprocess the fuel and recycle the uranium and plutonium while disposing of the
remainder as waste.

The directive became effective in August 2011, and national governments, which retain ultimate
responsibility for wastes, had two years to bring their nuclear waste legislation into line with it.
There are 143 nuclear energy facilities generating used fuel in 14 of the EU’s 27 member nations.
The remaining nations possess radioactive waste requiring disposal that has been produced by
research, medicine and industry.

International Commission on Radiological Protectionf

The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) is an independent registered charity

that issues recommendations for protection against all sources of radiation. The IAEA interprets
these recommendations into international safety standards and guidelines for radiological
protection. National regulators may also adopt the recommendations by the ICRP for their own
radiation protection standards.

In March 2007, the ICRP approved its new fundamental Recommendations on radiological
protection (ICRP Publication 103)11, replacing the Commission’s previous Recommendations from
1990. Amongst others, the new recommendations include for the first time an approach for
developing a framework to demonstrate radiological protection of the environment.

Perspective

Nuclear wastes are a significant part of the nuclear power picture, and need to be managed and
disposed of properly. However in more than 50 decades of civil nuclear power experience they have
not caused any serious health or environmental problems, nor posed any real risks to people.

Alternatives for power generation are not without challenges, and for a variety of reasons they –
particularly those from coal combustion – have not always been well controlled. Both flyash and
bottom ash are often loaded with heavy metals (including uranium and thorium – see NORM
paper). Flyash is mostly retained for land disposal today, and bottom ash is normally buried also, but
not always securely and without effects on groundwater. Groundwater pollution with arsenic,
boron, cobalt and mercury is not unusual, and the US EPA in 2011 listed 181 US coal ash ponds
which posed a significant hazard, 47 of these a high hazard and threat to life. Burning any fossil fuels
gives rise to carbon dioxide emissions, and gaseous pollutants such as nitrogen oxides and often
sulfur oxides.

Further Information

Notes
a. A radionuclide is a radioactive isotope of a particular element. Different isotopes of a given
element have different numbers of neutrons, but the same number of protons; hence, isotopes of
the same element share atomic numbers but not mass numbers. [Back]

b. Uranium and plutonium are members of the actinide group, which comprises the 15 successive
chemical elements from actinium on the periodic table. The so-called 'minor actinides' are the
actinides present in used nuclear fuel other than uranium and plutonium. [Back]

c. Used fuel from light water reactors contains approximately:

95.6% uranium (less than 1% of which is U-235)

2.9% stable fission products
0.9% plutonium
0.3% caesium & strontium (fission products)
0.1% iodine and technetium (fission products)
0.1% other long-lived fission products
0.1% minor actinides (americium, curium, neptunium)

Increasingly, reactors are using fuel enriched to over 4% U-235 and burning it longer, to end up with
less than 0.5% U-235 in the used fuel. This provides less incentive to reprocess. [Back]

d. See the home page of the IAEA's Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety (www-
ns.iaea.org/home/rtws.asp) for further information. [Back]

e. See the radioactive waste management section of the NEA's website (www.nea.fr/html/rwm) for
further information. [Back]

f. See the International Commssion on Radiological Protection's website (www.icrp.org) for further
information. [Back]

References

1. Figures taken from International Atomic Energy Agency Managing Radioactive Waste Factsheet.
[Back]

2. Europe steps towards shared repository concept, World Nuclear News (11 February 2009). [Back]

3. The U.S. Geological Survey has published a fact sheet on Radioactive Elements in Coal and Fly
Ash: Abundance, Forms, and Environmental Significance, FS-163-97 (October 1997). [Back]

4. The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Nuclear Energy Agency (1994). [Back]

5. Information on the Oklo natural reactors is on the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management
Company (Svensk Kärnbränslehantering, SKB) website (www.skb.se). See also I. Gurban and M.
Laaksoharju, Uranium transport around the reactor zone at Okelobondo (Oklo), Data evaluation
with M3 and HYTEC, SKB Technical Report TR-99-36 (December 1999). [Back]
6. NDA gives revised UK clean-up cost estimates, World Nuclear News (18 July 2008); The Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority – Taking Forward Decommissioning, Report by the Comptroller and
Auditor General, National Audit Office (30 January 2008). [Back]

7. Dominique Delattre, RADWASS Update, IAEA Bulletin, Volume 42, Number 3 (2000). [Back]

8. EC pushes common standards again, Nuclear Engineering International (February 2007); De

Palacio's nuclear legacy, Nuclear Engineering International (September 2004). [Back]

11. International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication 103: Recommendations

of the ICRP, Annals of the ICRP Volume 37/2-4, Elsevier (2008). (ISBN: 9780702030482). [Back]

12. Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
(NDA), Radioactive Wastes in the UK: A Summary of the 2010 Inventory, (February 2011) [Back]

General sources

The International Nuclear Society Council (INSC, www.ne.jp/asahi/mh/u) has published information
relating to particular countries' waste policies and actions. See the Radioactive Waste paper from
the report of its 1997-98 Action Plan and its Current Issues in Nuclear Energy – Radioactive Waste
report (August 2002)

The management of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, Nuclear Energy Agency, NEA
Issue Brief: An analysis of principal nuclear issues, No. 6 (August 1989)

Storage and Disposal of Spent Fuel and High Level Radioactive Waste, International Atomic Energy
Agency

Association for Regional and International Underground Storage website (www.arius-world.org)

UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) website
(www.unscear.org)

Assessment of Disposal Options for DOE-Managed High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear
Fuel, October 2014, US DOE
Radioactive Waste in Perspective, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, NEA No. 6350 (2010)

Share

Appendices

Radioactive Waste Management Appendix 1: Synroc

Radioactive Waste Management Appendix 2: National Policies

Radioactive Waste Management Appendix 5: Environmental and Ethical Aspects of Radioactive

Waste Management

Storage and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes

Related information

International Nuclear Waste Disposal Concepts

Japanese Waste and MOX Shipments From Europe

Military Warheads as a Source of Nuclear Fuel

Mixed Oxide Fuel MOX

Naturally-Occurring Radioactive Materials NORM

Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel

Radioactive Wastes - Myths and Realities

Treatment and Conditioning of Nuclear Wastes

Uranium and Depleted Uranium

Related news

US DOE awards depleted uranium contract

Rectangular cask passes tests

Ignalina gets operating licence for storage facility