Problem of Evil (Responses)

Responses to the problem of evil have occasionally been classified as defences

or theodicies; however, authors disagree on the exact definitions. Generally, a
defense against the problem of evil may refer to attempts to defuse the logical
problem of evil by showing that there is no logical incompatibility between the
existence of evil and the existence of God. This task does not require the
identification of a plausible explanation of evil, and is successful if the
explanation provided shows that the existence of God and the existence of evil
are logically compatible. It need not even be true, since a false though coherent
explanation would be sufficient to show logical compatibility.

A theodicy, on the other hand, is more ambitious, since it attempts to provide a

plausible justification—a morally or philosophically sufficient reason—for the
existence of evil and thereby rebut the “evidential” argument from evil. Richard
Swinburne maintains that it does not make sense to assume there are greater
goods that justify the evil’s presence in the world unless we know what they are
—without knowledge of what the greater goods could be, one cannot have a
successful theodicy. Thus, some authors see arguments appealing to demons or
the fall of man as indeed logically possible, but not very plausible given our
knowledge about the world, and so see those arguments as providing defences
but not good theodicies.

The above argument is set against numerous versions of the problem of evil that
have been formulated. These versions have included philosophical and
theological formulations.

Skeptical theism

Skeptical theism defends the problem of evil by asserting that God allows an evil
to happen in order to prevent a greater evil or to encourage a response that will
lead to a greater good. Thus a rape or a murder of an innocent child is defended
as having a God’s purpose that a human being may not comprehend, but which
may lead to lesser evil or greater good. This is called skeptical theism because
the argument aims to encourage self-skepticism, either by trying to rationalize
God’s possible hidden motives, or by trying to explain it as a limitation of human
ability to know. The greater good defense is more often argued in religious
studies in response to the evidential version of the problem of evil, while the free
will defense is usually discussed in the context of the logical version. Most
scholars criticize the skeptical theism defense as “devaluing the suffering” and
not addressing the premise that God is all-benevolent and should be able to
stop all suffering and evil, rather than play a balancing act.

“Greater good” responses

The omnipotence paradoxes, where evil persists in the presence of an all

powerful God, raise questions as to the nature of God’s omnipotence. Although
that is from excluding the idea of how an interference would negate and
subjugate the concept of free will, or in other words result in a totalitarian system
that creates a lack of freedom. Some solutions propose that omnipotence does
not require the ability to actualize the logically impossible. “Greater good”
responses to the problem make use of this insight by arguing for the existence
of goods of great value which God cannot actualize without also permitting evil,
and thus that there are evils he cannot be expected to prevent despite being
omnipotent. Among the most popular versions of the “greater good” response
are appeals to the apologetics of free will. Theologians will argue that since no
one can fully understand God’s ultimate plan, no one can assume that evil
actions do not have some sort of greater purpose. Therefore, the nature of evil
has a necessary role to play in God’s plan for a better world.

Free will

The problem of evil is sometimes explained as a consequence of free will, an

ability granted by God. Free will is both a source of good and of evil, and with
free will also comes the potential for abuse, as when individuals act immorally.
People with free will “decide to cause suffering and act in other evil ways”,
states Boyd, and it is they who make that choice, not God. Further, the free will
argument asserts that it would be logically inconsistent for God to prevent evil
by coercion and curtailing free will, because that would no longer be free will.
This explanation does not completely address the problem of evil, because
some suffering and evil is not a result of consciousness choice, but is the result
of ignorance or natural causes (a child suffering from a disease), and an all-
powerful and all-benevolent God would create a world with free beings and stop
this suffering and evil.

Alvin Plantinga has suggested an expanded version of the free will defense. The
first part of his defense accounts for moral evil as the result of human action
with free will. The second part of his defense suggests the logical possibility of
“a mighty non-human spirit” (non-God supernatural beings and fallen angels)
whose free will is responsible for “natural evils“, including earthquakes, floods,
and virulent diseases. Most scholars agree that Plantinga’s free will of human
and non-human spirits (demons) argument successfully solves the logical
problem of evil, proving that God and evil are logically compatible but other
scholars explicitly dissent. The dissenters state that while explaining infectious
diseases, cancer, hurricanes and other nature caused suffering as something
that is caused by the free will of supernatural beings, solves the logical version
of the problem of evil, but it is highly unlikely that these natural evils do not have
natural causes that an omnipotent God could prevent, but instead are caused by
the immoral actions of supernatural beings with free will who God created.[1]
According to Michael Tooley, this defense is also highly implausible because
suffering from natural evil is localized, rational causes and cures for major
diseases have been found, and it is unclear why anyone, including a
supernatural being who God created would choose then inflict localized evil and
suffering to innocent children for example, and why God fails to stop such
suffering if he is omnipotent.[44]

Critics of the free will response have questioned whether it accounts for the
degree of evil seen in this world. One point in this regard is that while the value
of free will may be thought sufficient to counterbalance minor evils, it is less
obvious that it outweighs the negative attributes of evils such as rape and
murder. Particularly egregious cases known as horrendous evils, which
“[constitute] prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could
(given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole,” have been
the focus of recent work in the problem of evil.[45] Another point is that those
actions of free beings which bring about evil very often diminish the freedom of
those who suffer the evil; for example the murder of a young child may prevent
the child from ever exercising their free will. In such a case the freedom of an
innocent child is pitted against the freedom of the evil-doer, it is not clear why
God would remain unresponsive and passive.[46]

Another criticism is that the potential for evil inherent in free will may be limited
by means which do not impinge on that free will. God could accomplish this by
making moral actions especially pleasurable, or evil action and suffering
impossible by allowing free will but not allowing the ability to enact evil or
impose suffering.[47] Supporters of the free will explanation state that that would
no longer be free will.[39][40] Critics respond that this view seems to imply it
would be similarly wrong to try to reduce suffering and evil in these ways, a
position which few would advocate.[48]

A third challenge to the free will defence is natural evil. By definition, moral evil
results from human action, but natural evil results from natural processes that
cause natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions or earthquakes.[49]
Advocates of the free will response to evil propose various explanations of
natural evils. Alvin Plantinga, following Augustine of Hippo,[50] and others have
argued that natural evils are caused by the free choices of supernatural beings
such as demons.[51] Others have argued

• that natural evils are the result of the fall of man, which corrupted the perfect
world created by God[52] or

• that natural evils are the result of natural laws[53] or

• that natural evils provide us with a knowledge of evil which makes our free
choices more significant than they would otherwise be, and so our free will more
valuable[54] or

• that natural evils are a mechanism of divine punishment for moral evils that
humans have committed, and so the natural evil is justified.[55]

There is also debate regarding the compatibility of moral free will (to select good
or evil action) with the absence of evil from heaven,[56][57] with God’s
omniscience and with his omnibenevolence.[3]

Free will and animal suffering

One of the weaknesses of the free will defense is its inapplicability or

contradictory applicability with respect to evils faced by animals and the
consequent animal suffering. Some scholars, such as David Griffin, state that
the free will, or the assumption of greater good through free will, does not apply
to animals.[58][59] In contrast, a few scholars while accepting that “free will”
applies in a human context, have posited an alternative “free creatures” defense,
stating that animals too benefit from their physical freedom though that comes
with the cost of dangers they continuously face.[60]

The “free creatures” defense has also been criticized, in the case of caged,
domesticated and farmed animals who are not free and many of whom have
historically experienced evil and suffering from abuse by their owners. Further,
even animals and living creatures in the wild face horrendous evils and suffering
– such as burn and slow death after natural fires or other natural disasters or
from predatory injuries – and it is unclear, state Bishop and Perszyk, why an all-
loving God would create such free creatures prone to intense suffering.[60]
Another line of extended criticism of free will defense has been that if God is
perfectly powerful, knowing and loving, then he could have actualized a world
with free creatures without moral evil where everyone chooses good, is always
full of loving-kindness, is compassionate, always non-violent and full of joy,
where earth were just like the monotheistic concept of heaven. If God did create
a heaven with his love, an all-loving and always-loving God could have created
an earth without evil and suffering for animals and human beings just like
heaven.[61]

Soul-making or Irenaean theodicy

The soul-making or Irenaean theodicy is named after the 2nd century French
theologian Irenaeus, whose ideas were adopted in Eastern Christianity.[62] It has
been discussed by John Hick, and the Irenaean theodicy asserts that evil and
suffering are necessary for spiritual growth, for man to discover his soul, and
God allows evil for spiritual growth of human beings.[62]

The Irenaean theodicy has been challenged with the assertion that many evils
do not seem to promote spiritual growth, and can be positively destructive of
the human spirit. Hick acknowledges that this process often fails in our world.
[63] A second issue concerns the distribution of evils suffered: were it true that
God permitted evil in order to facilitate spiritual growth, then we would expect
evil to disproportionately befall those in poor spiritual health. This does not seem
to be the case, as the decadent enjoy lives of luxury which insulate them from
evil, whereas many of the pious are poor, and are well acquainted with worldly
evils.[64]Thirdly, states Kane, human character can be developed directly or in
constructive and nurturing loving ways, and it is unclear why God would
consider or allow evil and suffering to be necessary or the preferred way to
spiritual growth.[65] Further, horrendous suffering often leads to dehumanization,
its victims in truth do not grow spiritually but become vindictive and spiritually
worse.[66]

This reconciliation of the problem of evil and God, states Creegan, also fails to
explain the need or rationale for evil inflicted on animals and resultant animal
suffering, because “there is no evidence at all that suffering improves the
character of animals, or is evidence of soul-making in them”.[66]

Afterlife

Thomas Acquinas suggested the afterlife theodicy to address the problem of evil
and to justifying the existence of evil.[67] The premise behind this theodicy has
been that afterlife is unending, human life short, and God allows evil and
suffering in order to judge and grant everlasting heaven or hell based on human
moral actions and human suffering.[67][68][69] Acquinas went further and
suggested that the afterlife is the “greater good” that justifies the evil and
suffering in current life.[67] Christian author Randy Alcorn argues that the joys of
heaven will compensate for the sufferings on earth.[70]

Stephen Maitzen has called this the “Heaven Swamps Everything” theodicy, and
argues that it is false because it conflates compensation and justification.[68][71]

The second failure of the afterlife theodicy is in its inability to reconcile the
suffering faced by small babies and innocent children from diseases, abuse and
injury in war or terror attacks, since “human moral actions” are not to be
expected from babies and children.[72] Similarly, moral actions and the concept
of choice does not apply to the problem of evil applied to animal suffering from
natural evil and the actions of human beings.[72][73]

Deny evil exists

In the second century, Christian theologists attempted to reconcile the problem

of evil with an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God, by denying that
evil exists. Among these theologians, Clement of Alexandria offered several
theodicies, of which one was called “privation theory of evil” which was adopted
thereafter.[74] The other is a more modern version of “deny evil”, suggested by
Christian Science, wherein the perception of evil is described as a form of
illusion.[75]

Evil as the absence of good (Privation Theory)

The early version of “deny evil” is called the “privation theory of evil”, so named
because it described evil as a form of “lack, loss or privation”. One of the
earliest proponents of this theory was the 2nd-century Clement of Alexandria,
who according to Joseph Kelly,[74] stated that “since God is completely good,
he could not have created evil; but if God did not create evil, then it cannot
exist”. Evil, according to Clement, does not exist as a positive, but exists as a
negative or as a “lack of good”.[74] Clement’s idea was criticised for its inability
to explain suffering in the world, if evil did not exist. He was also pressed by
Gnostics scholars with the question as to why God did not create creatures that
“did not lack the good”. Clement attempted to answer these questions
ontologically through dualism, an idea found in the Platonic school,[76] that is by
presenting two realities, one of God and Truth, another of human and perceived
experience.[77]

The fifth-century theologian Augustine of Hippo adopted the privation theory,

and in his Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, maintained that evil exists only
as “absence of the good”, that vices are nothing but the privations of natural
good.[76] Evil is not a substance, states Augustine, it is nothing more than “loss
of good”.[78] God does not participate in evil, God is perfection, His creation is
perfection, stated Augustine.[78] According to the privation theory, it is the
absence of the good, that explains sin and moral evil.[78]

This view has been criticized as merely substituting definition, of evil with “loss
of good”, of “problem of evil and suffering” with the “problem of loss of good
and suffering”, but it neither addresses the issue from the theoretical point of
view nor from the experiential point of view.[79] Scholars who criticize the
privation theory state that murder, rape, terror, pain and suffering are real life
events for the victim, and cannot be denied as mere “lack of good”.[80]
Augustine, states Pereira, accepted suffering exists and was aware that the
privation theory was not a solution to the problem of evil.[79]

Evil as illusory

An alternative modern version of the privation theory is by Christian Science,

which asserts that evils such as suffering and disease only appear to be real, but
in truth are illusions, and in reality evil does not exist.[75] The theologists of
Christian Science, states Stephen Gottschalk, posit that the Spirit is of infinite
might, mortal human beings fail to grasp this and focus instead on evil and
suffering that have no real existence as “a power, person or principle opposed to
God”.[81]

The illusion version of privation theory theodicy has been critiqued for denying
the reality of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain to
the victim.[81] Further, adds Millard Erickson, the illusion argument merely shifts
the problem to a new problem, as to why God would create this “illusion” of
crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain; and why doesn’t
God stop this “illusion”.[82]

Turning the tables

A different approach to the problem of evil is to turn the tables by suggesting

that any argument from evil is self-refuting, in that its conclusion would
necessitate the falsity of one of its premises. One response – called the
defensive response[83] – has been to assert the opposite, and to point out that
the assertion “evil exists” implies an ethical standard against which moral value
is determined, and then to argue that this standard implies the existence of God.
[84]

The standard criticism of this view is that an argument from evil is not
necessarily a presentation of the views of its proponent, but is instead intended
to show how premises which the theist is inclined to believe lead him or her to
the conclusion that God does not exist. A second criticism is that “evil” is
inferred from the “suffering” of the victims, not from “ethical standard” for the
evil actor.[85][86] This argument was expounded upon by David Hume.[83]

Hidden reasons

A variant of above defenses is that the problem of evil is derived from probability
judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, one can
see no good reason for co-existence of God and of evil. The inference from this
claim to the general statement that there exists unnecessary evil is inductive in
nature and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from
the logical argument.[2]

The hidden reasons defense asserts that there exists the logical possibility of
hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil along with the existence of
an almighty, all-knowing, all-benevolent, all-powerful God. Not knowing the
reason does not necessarily mean that the reason does not exist.[1][2] This
argument has been challenged with the assertion that the hidden reasons
premise is as plausible as the premise that God does not exist or is not “an
almighty, all-knowing, all-benevolent, all-powerful”. Similarly, for every hidden
argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely
that there is a hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse
than they appear without hidden arguments, or that the hidden reasons may
result in additional contradictions.[1][87] As such, from an inductive viewpoint
hidden arguments will neutralize one another.[1]

A sub-variant of the “hidden reasons” defense is called the “PHOG” –

profoundly hidden outweighing goods – defense.[87] The PHOG defense, states
Bryan Frances, not only leaves the co-existence of God and human suffering
unanswered, but raises questions about why animals and other life forms have
to suffer from natural evil, or from abuse (animal slaughter, animal cruelty) by
some human beings, where hidden moral lessons, hidden social good and such
hidden reasons to reconcile God with the problem of evil do not apply.[87]

Previous lives and karma

The theory of karma refers to the spiritual principle of cause and effect where
intent and actions of an individual (cause) influence the future of that individual
(effect).[88] The problem of evil, in the context of karma, has been long
discussed in Indian religions including Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism, both in
its theistic and non-theistic schools; for example, in Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sutras
Book 2 Chapter 1;[89][90] the 8th century arguments by Adi Sankara in
Brahmasutrabhasya where he posits that God cannot reasonably be the cause
of the world because there exists moral evil, inequality, cruelty and suffering in
the world;[91][92] and the 11th century theodicy discussion by Ramanuja in
Sribhasya.[93]

Many Indian religions place greater emphasis on developing the karma principle
for first cause and innate justice with Man as focus, rather than developing
religious principles with the nature and powers of God and divine judgment as
focus.[94] Karma theory of Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism is not static, but
dynamic wherein livings beings with intent or without intent, but with words and
actions continuously create new karma, and it is this that they believe to be in
part the source of good or evil in the world.[95] These religions also believe that
past lives or past actions in current life create current circumstances, which also
contributes to either. Other scholars[96] suggest that nontheistic Indian religious
traditions do not assume an omnibenevolent creator, and some[97] theistic
schools do not define or characterize their god(s) as monotheistic Western
religions do and the deities have colorful, complex personalities; the Indian
deities are personal and cosmic facilitators, and in some schools conceptualized
like Plato’s Demiurge.[93] Therefore, the problem of theodicy in many schools of
major Indian religions is not significant, or at least is of a different nature than in
Western religions.[98]

According to Arthur Herman, karma-transmigration theory solves all three

historical formulations to the problem of evil while acknowledging the theodicy
insights of Sankara and Ramanuja.[13]

Pandeism

Pandeism is a modern theory that unites deism and pantheism, and asserts that
God created the universe but during creation became the universe.[99] In
pandeism, God is no superintending, heavenly power, capable of hourly
intervention into earthly affairs. No longer existing “above,” God cannot
intervene from above and cannot be blamed for failing to do so. God, in
pandeism, was omnipotent and omnibenevolent, but in the form of universe is
no longer omnipotent, omnibenevolent.[100]:76–77