THE BURALI-FORTI PARADOX*'
IRVING M. COPI
University of Michigan
The year 1897 saw the publication2 of the first
of the modern logical paradoxes. It was published
by Cesare Burali-Forti, the Italian mathemati-
cian whose name it has come to bear. Burali-
Forti's own formulation of the paradox was not
altogether satisfactory, as he had confused well-
ordered sets as defined by Cantor with what he
himself called "perfectly ordered sets" ("Classe
parfettamente ordinata").3 However, he soon
realized his mistake, and published a note admit-
ting the error and making the correction.4 He
concluded the note with the observation that his
result could be established on the basis of the
correct definition of well-ordered set as easily as
for the "perfectly ordered sets" for which it had
first been obtained.5 We shall reproduce his re-
sults in their corrected form.
* Received January 1958.
1 From a dissertation submitted in partial ful-
fillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Michi-
gan.
2 In (4).
3 These were defined by Burali-Forti as follows
((4), pp. 156-7):
Any set u is perfectly ordered if it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. u has a first element.
2. Every element of u (provided it is not the last)
has an immediate successor.
3. Where x is any element of u, either
a) x has no immediate predecessor, or
b) there is an element y of u such that y precedes
x, y has no immediate predecessor, and only
a finite number of elements of u lie between
y and x.
As has been pointed out by K. G. Hagstr6m (15)
and also by W. H. Young and G. C. Young (39),
perfectly ordered sets are not the same as well-
ordered sets. Examples are easily constructed of
sets that are perfectly ordered but not well-or-
dered, as, e.g., w (1 + *cw).On the other hand, it
is easily proved that every well-ordered set is
perfectly ordered.
4See (5).
5 Ibid. "II lettore puo verificare quali prop.
della mia Nota ora citata sono verificate anche
per le classi ben ordinate." For an insight into
the extent of the confusion attendant on correct-
ing the original mistake, see L. Couturat (9), pp.
228-229, and H. Poincare (28), p. 304, where dis-
tortions are alleged, a mysterious repudiating
letter is imputed to Burali-Forti, errors are said
to be typographical and blamed on the printer,
and the whole controversy takes on more the
atmosphere of the burlesque stage than the scien-
tific arena.
281
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If a set u is ordered by the relation h, the or-
dered set is represented by '(u, h)'. The order-
type or ordinal number of a well-ordered set
(u, h) is represented by 'T '(u, h)'. The set of all
ordinal numbers is designated by "No". Ordinal
numbers are ordered by the relation of "being
ordinally greater than," which is symbolized by
'Z >'. It is shown that the ordered set (No, e>)
is well-ordered, and therefore has an order-type
or ordinal numberQ = T'(No, e>). Hence Q
is an ordinal number, so Q e No. But for any
ordinal number a, a < Q. However, any ordinal
number a may be increased by adding 1 to it,
and we have, for any ordinal numnber a,
a + 1 > a. If we now substitute 2 + 1 for a in
the former statement, and Q for a in the latter, we
obtain:
Q+ 1< Q; Q+ I >Q
which is an obvious contradiction.
At the time of its appearance, this contradic-
tion did not have the effect one might have ex-
pected. A contradiction within the very heart of
mathematics, one would have thought, could
scarcely have failed to create a sensation. Yet no
sensation was created, and it is interesting to see
why this astonishing result failed to create a
furore.
One reason, of course, was that the mistaken
definition of well-ordered set in the initial presen-
tation served to render the whole matter suspect.
Contradictions are easy to obtain if one allows
mistakes in the derivations; and Burali-Forti's
later correction seems to have passed unnoticed
by many investigators.6 Another reason for the
6 For example, K. G. Hagstr6m, seventeen
years later, devoted the whole of (15) to proving
that Burali-Forti's perfectly ordered sets are
different from Cantor's well-ordered sets!
Hagstrom made explicit reference to Burali-
Forti's correcting note; but it did not seem to
have occurred to him that the contradiction re-
mains after the mistake has been eliminated. And
thirty-one years later, W. H. and G. C. Young
(38) referred to ". . . the serious misunderstanding
made in the early days of Burali-Forti . . ." and
asserted that: ". . . the errors in them have been
entirely ignored and the statements made have
been accepted as proven." The Youngs quote from
a letter of Georg Cantor himself: "What Burali-
282 IRVING M. COPI

lack of response was that Burali-Forti's deriva- camp. Theirs was no friendly disagreement over
tion of the contradiction, even after the required admissible methods, but a cruel conflict, the
corrections are made, is not in the most convinc- strain of which had seriously affected Cantor's
ing form possible. A third reason why Burali- health.8 A mild understatement of the virulence
Forti's result was not taken more seriously was with which the sustained polemic between these
that it was not presented as a contradiction, two groups was carried on is Bell's remark that
demanding resolution, but as part of an at- ". . . Kronecker spelled Satan to Cantor, Cantor
tempted proof that ordinal numbers are not neces- signified the personification of all mathematical
sarily comparable. But Cantor had already evil to Kronecker."9
demonstrated the contrary, and Cantor's proof In this larger controversy, then, the Burali-
was certainly the more convincing. This circum- Forti antinomy was welcomed by the second
stance, coupled with the mistake already noted, camp as the final step in a reductio ad absurdum
and the inelegance of his formulation, led a great disproof of what they called "Cantorism." As
many to underestimate the importance of Burali- such, it would occasion no surprise, for the anti-
Forti's discovery.7 Cantorists had always known that Cantorism was
But another reason why Burali-Forti's contra- contradictory. In 1908, when he had definitely
diction was not accorded more attention was that joined this second camp, Poincar6 wrote: "There
when it first appeared it was regarded by many as is no actual (given complete) infinity. The Can
a minor skirmish in a larger war. Those mathe- torians have forgotten this, and they have fallen
maticians who were at all concerned with matters into contradiction."10
that may be said to pertain to the "foundations On the other hand, the "Cantorians" could
of mathematics" were divided at that time into scarcely welcome the contradiction, for it was a
two camps. In one camp were Cantor and his contradiction within the part of mathematics
followers, who accepted and worked with the they were striving to defend. For the most part,
therefore, they contented themselves with point-
multiple infinities involved in the theory of sets of
points and transfinite cardinal and ordinal arith- ing out the mistakes in the (first) publication of
metics. In the other camp were mathematicians the paradox."
who rejected the infinities of Cantor, and the A further reason for the Burali-Forti paradox
"non-constructive" methods seemingly required having received as little attention as it did was
by those theories. Unitil his death in 1891, L. the tendency towards narrow specialization
Kronecker had been the leader of this second among mathematicians which resulted from the
tremendous proliferation of mathematics during
Forti has produced is thoroughly foolish. If you the nineteenth century. So much material had
go back to his articles in the Circolo Matematico developed within each branch of mathematics
you will remark that he has not even understood that one could scarcely hope to master all of
properly the concept of a well-ordered set."
7Thus as late as 1903, even after the discovery them. The explosion of Burali-Forti in the theory
and publication of his own paradox, Bertrand of sets was scarcely noticed by the vast majority
Russell, in discussing the Burali-Forti result,
seemed to see no connection between it and his of mathematicians, each engaged in cultivating
own. He observed that he could not accept Burali- his own little patch of the mathematical garden.
Forti's conclusion that ordinal numbers are not More significant, perhaps, in explaining the
necessarily comparable, preferring to accept
Cantor's results in this connection as established. indifference that greeted the contradiction, was
He urged that Burali-Forti's contradiction could that Burali-Forti had written his article in the
be simply resolved by denying the premise that
the series of all ordinal numbers is well-ordered, logical symbolism of Peano. This new mathe-
"... since, so far as I know, it is incapable of matical logic of Peano, which had far-reaching
proof." ((32), p. 323). Here Russell was repeating implications and tremendous importance, achiev-
the argument he had first presented in (31).
Russell concluded his brief discussion of the ing its culmination in the Principia Mathematica
Burali-Forti paradox with the remark: "In this of Whitehead and Russell, was then but little
way, it would seem, the contradiction in question known. Burali-Forti's language was new and
can be avoided." ((32), p. 323.) Thus an additional
reason for the slightness of the impact of the strange, and intelligible to but few mathemati-
Burali-Forti paradox is that the aura of error and
confusion that surrounded its first publication 8 See (11), especially p. 466.
led its readers to cast about for "accidental" " See (1), p. 279.
sources of the contradiction, which could then be 0See (29), p. 484.
eliminated "easily". "Cf. (15), p. 4, and (39), passim.

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 BURALI-FORTI
cians. This circumstance undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the relative neglect of his paradoxical
result.
The appearance of an outright contradiction
within mathematics posed an acute philosophical
problem. Unfortunately, few mathematicians at
that time were concerned with philosophy, and
few philosophers knew any mathematics beyond
Euclid's Elements.
The mathematical incompetence of the phi-
losophers of that time is well-known. But perhaps
less well-known is the philosophical incompetence
of the mathematicians. Thus Louis Olivier, editor
of the Revue generale des sciences, in commenting
editorially on the Burali-Forti and other para-
doxes, expressed himself as follows: "The study
of the transfinite seems now to lead to a certain
number of contradictory consequences. Why not?
Hasn't one also stated a paradoxical conclusion
when he began to introduce incommensurable
numbers, negative numbers, imaginary numbers?
Perhaps we are at one of those turning points of
science, and we must leave to the future the task
of explaining those obscurities etc., etc."12
In view of the circumstances described, had
Burali-Forti's been the only contradiction to ap-
pear, in all probability it would have attracted
little serious attention, and not much would have
conmeof it. But it was followed, after a brief
pause, by a veritable flood of similar contradic-
tions which poured over the dike of indifference
and hostility that Burali-Forti's contradiction
had failed to breach. Yet to Burali-Forti must go
the distinction of having been the first to publish
a m-odern instance of the logical paradoxes.13
12 See (27), p. 242. For an appropriately humor-
ous report of the mathematician Schoenflies's
philosophical efforts, see (35), Chapter XXVII,
pp. 75-78.
13 The question of priority is interesting in
connection with the Burali-Forti paradox. Bell
asserted in (1), p. 552, that ". . . Cantor himself
found this paradox in 1895, and communicated
it to Hilbert in 1896." Church referred briefly to
this anticipation in (8), and wrote in his index to
(7): "Concerning Cantor's unpublished discovery
of the paradox see Georg Cantor Gesammelte
Abhandlungen and Fraenkel's life of Cantor in
the same volume." Fraenkel's life of Cantor is
also referred to by Kleene in (24), p. 519, "Con-
cerning Cantor's discoveries of the Burali-Forti
and Cantor paradoxes, see Fraenkel . ."
Fraenkel definitely attributed priority to Cantor
most recently in (12), most extensively in (11),
and earlier in (10). Only in (10) did Fraenkel cite
his own source for that information: he referred
to Felix Bernstein's (2). But there Bernstein cited,
as his source for the report that Cantor antici-
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PARADOX 283
There are three chief methods of formulating
the Burali-Forti paradox. Within each metlhod
there are various nuances of expression, but-
apaIrt from confusious or mistakes-Uthere are only
pated Burali-Forti by two years, P. E. B.
Jourdain's (21). This article by Jourdain is also
cited, in connection with the Cantor anticipation,
by A. Riistow in (36), p. 126; by J. Ko. ig in (25),
p. 254; and by E. W. Hobson, botLhin (19), p. 245,
and in (18), p. 171. In this connection Hobson also
cites D. Hilbert's (17), p. 184. But in this article,
dated 1899 by Hilbert, no reference is made to
any anticipation, nor even to ordinal numbers,
but only to the fact that Cantor had used the term
"inconsistent set" ("nichtconsistente (nichtfer-
tige) Menge") in connection with the collection
of all cardinal numbers ("der Inrlbegriff aller
Maichtigkeiten"). This can scarcely be taken as
evidence for Cantor's priority over Burali-Forti
in the matter of the present paradox; no dates
were mentioned by Hilbert.
The Jourdain article cited (21) would seem to
be the ultimate source for the claim that Cantor
anticipated Burali-Forti by two years. In his
article Jourdain presented a putative demonstra-
tion of the well-ordering theorem (". . . every
well-defined aggregate can be put, by re-arrange-
ment if necessary, in the form of a well-ordered
aggregate . . ."). hTis proof was by the method of
reductio ad absurdum. He managed to arrive at
a contradiction-but it was that of Burali-Forti!
Jourdain recounts in a footnote on page 70 of (21)
that he had communicated this result to Cantor,
who replied in a letter dated November 4th, 1903,
that he also had arrived at the same result in
1895, and had communicated it to Hilbert in 1896
and to Dedekind in 1899.
As an appendix to (6) there are reprinted several
letters from the correspondence between Cantor
and Dedekind (pp. 443-450). In the first of these
is Cantor's derivation of the Burali-Forti contra-
diction. Cantor's conclusion here is that the set
of all ordinals is an "inconsistent multiplicity",
and not a well-defined "Menge". No reference is
made to Burali-Forti's result, although the letter
is dated July 28, 1899. It is a pity that the alleged
letter to Hilbert of 1896 was not available for
reproduction.
I am inclined to think we must accept
Jourdain's account of Cantor's letter, and
Cantor's claim to have arrived at the contradic-
tion as early as 1895.
But one further question then naturally arises.
How are we to square Cantor's anticipation of
the Burali-Forti contradiction with his bitter
attack on Burali-Forti's article? (cf. (39)).
The only way I can find to reconcile the
two is the following. Burali-Forti evidently be-
lieved the contradiction to invalidate some of
Cantor's system-for he was willing to jettison
Cantor's theorem on the comparability of or-
dinals. Cantor, on the other hand, did not regard
the paradox as invalidating any part of his system,
but rather as showing the need for further and
more refined analysis of the notion of set
("Menge"). Cantor, although knowing the diffi-
culty, could neither resolve it nor accept Burali-
Forti's "resolution." Consequently, it would
seem, he contented himself with abusing Burali-
284 IRVING
three methods. All of these methods are adequate
to bring out the force of the contradiction; but
the method used by Burali-Forti (and some
others) is least convincing, and most open to
objection. That these objections are not conclu-
sive is shown by alternative formulations which
are not open to the objections in question. But
against this particular formulation they have
some effect.
The inerve of Burali-Forti's derivation lies in
the fact that to any ordinal number y, the ordinal
number I can be added, and the result is greater
than y, i.e. y + 1 > y. This formulationhas been
used by a number of writers.14It is not refutable,
but doubt can be cast upon it by arguments such
as those used by the Youngs, who wrote: "When
you have taken in your mind a set of type Q, you
have taken everything, nothing remains to give a
new element, and the whole of the reasoning is
mere confusion." They anticipated one possible
reply by adding, in a footnote: "It might be
contended that we do not need to take a new
element; it would suffice to take the first of our
numbers and place it after the last, viz. after
U2.But the fallacy is really the same as the
above, thereis no place after U. Indeed the term
"after Q" has not been and cannot be defined, it
is equivalent to "greater than the greatest."'5
These "objections" are arresting, but not con-
vincing. They involve the sort of "pictorial"
reasoning that might be directed against the
possibility of the ordinal w, or of w + 1, by a
strict finitist. Yet the Youngs were not finitists,"6
and it is not easy to square their general posi-
tion with these particular arguments.
Despite the weakness of these objections, they
suggest that a formulation which did not allow
them would be, for that very reason, superior.
Forti for certain undeniable inaccuracies in his
published results.
One is tempted to condemn Cantor's attitude
here; but it should be kept in mind that scurrilous
attacks had destroyed Cantor's health and had
driven him, for a period, into a sanatorium. Our
purpose in such matters is not to judge, but to
understand.
14 Among them we may list, in addition to
Burali-Forti himself in (4): Felix Bernstein in
(2), p. 187; K. G. Hagstrom in (15), p. 2; E. W.
Hobson in (18), p. 170, and in (19), p. 244; Bertrand
Russell in (32), p. 323; W. H. and G. C. Young in
(39), p. 103. A. Fraenkel in (10), p. 212, gives al-
ternative formu-ilations, of which this one is the
second.
15 See (39), p. 103.
16For a clear expression of his complete faith
in the Cantorian "Mengenlehre," see W. H.
Young's Presidential Address (38).
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M. COPI
Such a superior formulation is achieved by the
second method.
The second mode of formulation of the contra-
diction is the following. If the series of all or-
dinals has an ordinal number Q, then the series of
all ordinals up to and including Q must have the or-
dinal number Q + 1. But Q + I > Q, so Q can
not be the ordinal number of the series of all or-
dinals. This formnulationof the paradox has also
been used by a number of writers.'7
The advantage of the second mode of formula-
tion over the first is that in the second we no
longer claim to "construct" Q + 1 by adding 1
to Q. Instead, we observe that by defining Q
there has already been exhibited a series of type
Q + 1. This procedure has the advantage of
sidestepping objections such as those raised by
the Youngs. Yet even here, referring to both
Q?and Q?+ I lends an air of artificiality to the
derivation. It would seem that the second mode
of formulation could be improved upon; and
the third mode of formulation effects just such
an improvement.
The third mode of formulating the Burali-
Forti is to assign the ordinal number Q to the
series of all ordinals, and then note that since
Q must be an element of that series, it must be
the order type of the section of all ordinals <Q.
Here we have the result that the series of all
ordinal numbers is similar to one of its own sec-
tions, which is impossible. This formulation is
superior to either of the first two, for it does not
require us to be able to add 1 to Q, like the first,
nor even to consider Q + 1, like the second.
This formulation has been used with but minor
variations by a number of writers.1'
One of Russell's early serious considerations
of the Burali-Forti led him to doubt whether
"all" of the transfinite ordinals 'existed." Thus
he wrote in 1905 ". . . at present it is not easy to
see where this series beoins to be non-existent,
if such a bull may be permitted."" But, as D.
17 Among them we may list P. E. B. Jourdain
in (21), p. 64, in (22), p. 466, and in (23), p. 267;
Bertrand Russell in (34), pp. 223-224, and in (37),
pp. 60-61 of vol. I; J. Jorgensen in (20), p. 166 of
vol. III; Max Black in (3), p. 99. See also (37),
vol. III, *256, pp. 73-80, for a discussion of al-
ternative formulations of the Burali-Forti.
18 Among them we list Cantor himself in (6),
p. 445; Bertrand Russell in (33), p. 34; G.
Hessenberg in (16), p. 631; K. Grelling and L.
Nelson in (41), p. 304; K. Grelling again in (13),
pp. 42-43; J. Konig in (25), p. 245; A. Fraenkel in
(10), p. 212; D. Mirimanoff in (26), p. 44; and J.
Barkley Rosser in (30), pp. 2 and 17.
19See (33), p. 36.
 BURALI-FORTI PARADOX 285

Mirimanoff pointed out somewhat later, drawing BIBLIOGRAPHY

a distinction between "existent" ordinal numbers
and others leads only to a reformulation of the
paradox in terms of the ordinal number Q of the
series of all "existent" ordinal numbers. The
contradiction emerges just as well in either case.20
Improper or inadequate formulations may be
blamed for much of the misunderstandirngthat
has attended the paradoxes, and for the under-
estimation of their importance that is attendant
upon such misunderstanding. Thus P. E. B.
Jourdain rendered a disservice by arguing that
Burali-Forti's contradiction
". . . is analogous to the contradiction arising
from the statement that there is a greatest finite
ordinal number, in that both contradictions arise
from supposing a next greater to all the numbers of
a certain class to exist which is itself a member of
that class. 21
He proceeded to give a hopelessly inadequate
proof that there is no greatest finite ordinal
number, and followed it with what he claimed
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His presentation was:
"Suppose that there is a greatest ordinal number 13. KURT GRELLING, MIengenlehre, Leipzig and
A3.Then ... we get, if w is the class of ordinal
numbers and ,Bis a member of w, f <K3. 122
If this were the Burali-Forti contradiction, we
should be justified in ignoring it! But the Burali- 15. K. G. HAGSTROM,
Forti does not involve any assumption that there
is a greatest ordinal number, but only what can 16. GERHARD HESSENBERG, "Grundbegriffe der
be demonstrated, namely, that the set of all
ordinal numbers, in order of magnitude, is well-
ordered and thus has an ordinal number. To
call Burali-Forti the "paradox of the greatest
ordinal" is a misnomer, based on a mistake.23
20 See (26), P. 44.
21 See (23), p. 270.
22 Ibid., p. 271. Jourdain's "proof" that there
is no greatest finite ordinal is this. "Suppose that
there is a greatest finite ordinal nu mber n.
Let w be the class of finite integer ordinal num-
bers; then the proposition 'm is a member of w'
implies that n > m. But n is a member of w; con-
sequently n > n, a palpable contradiction."
But this "palpable contradiction" is arrived at
only on the basis of a non sequitur: n > m only
if w is the class of finite ordinials less than n, not
if w is defined to be the class of all finite ordinals! 22. P. E. B. JOURDAIN, "On a Proof that Every
23 J6rgensen, in (20), seems to make the same
mistake. Thus he suggests that we ". . . call the
greatest ordinal in this (well-ordered) series
2 . . ." But a well-ordered series need not contain
any "greatest ordinal", (e.g., the series 1, 2,
3, . . . , does not) and there is nothing contra-
dictory about this.
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"Note sur l'antinomie
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Vereinigung,
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24. STEPHEN COLE KLEENE, Introduction to

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286 IRVING
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