Understanding the Tribunalization

In India
(A complete study of the evolution of tribunals in India with reference
to the British Tribunal System)

(Assignment in Lieu of Third Continuous Assessment in the subject of

Administrative Law)

Submitted To:
Prof. (Dr.) I.P. Massey
(Faculty of Law)

Submitted By:
Mukul Krishna Vyas
BBA LL.B (Hons.)
Roll no.- 959
SECTION A

6th Semester
National Law University, Jodhpur
Winter Session
(January-May 2015)
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 3

UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING AND NATURE OF A TRIBUNAL ..................... 3

EVOLUTION OF TRIBUNAL SYSTEM IN INDIA .................................................. 5

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ACT, 1985 .................................................... 7

TRIBUNALIZATION AND REGULATORY BODIES IN INDIA ................................ 7

THE COMPARISION UK AND USA ............................................................... 10

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 11

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 14

BOOKS REFERRED .................................................................................... 14

ARTICLES REFERRED ............................................................................... 14

WEB RESOURCES ...................................................................................... 14

 INTRODUCTION

Welfare nature of government is the evolutionary goal of probably every kind

of government these days in this contemporary world. There has been a
phenomenal increase in the functions of the government, which has lent
enormous powers to the executive and also led
toincrease in the legislative output. This has led to more litigation, restrictio
ns on thefreedom of the individuals and constant frictions between them an
d the authority. The development of welfares led to an increase in
governmental functions and the executive saw in this a need to perform a
number of quasi- legislative and quasi- judicial functions, thus blurring the
traditional positions of the various wings of the government under the
doctrine of separation of powers, under which the powers of the government
were divided between the legislature, executive and the judiciary which were
to be entrusted with the power of making law, executing it and interpreting
it respectively.
With Sudden development in law as well as a increase in number of cases, it
became important to shred off some burden from the courts. The complexity
of issues also involved expert opinion and understandings. This led to the
introduction of specialized Tribunals. Informal tribunals that reviewed
administrative decisions and adjudicate on disputes between individuals
have been a part of the British system of civil justice for some time.
Similarly In India, there has been a gradual shift of justice delivery system
from courts to tribunals. A fundamental problem facing the judicial system
in India is speedy disposal of cases. The problem is even more pronounced
where environmental issues are concerned. A study done by the Delhi-based
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) on the status of cases filed by the
state pollution control boards showed that as many as 96 per cent, 76 per
cent and 55 per cent of cases filed by Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Karnataka
boards respectively, were pending in the lower courts. Therefore the
government has set up various tribunals to facilitate speedy and expert
justice. Till date, there have been around 20 tribunals in India on various
expert fields.1

UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING AND NATURE OF A TRIBUNAL

There is no statutory or constitutional provision which defines, exhaustively,

what a “tribunal is. The recent Tribunals Bill introduced by the Union
Government in the Rajya Sabha, does not provide a comprehensive legal
definition of ‘tribunal’ but seeks to define the term by enumeration in sub

1 http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/judlib/Rellks.pdf
clause (i) of clause 2, by referring to the Tribunals in the First Schedule to
the Tribunals Bill. However, the First Schedule does not contain an
exhaustive list of all tribunals set up by the Central Government.2 The First
Schedule to the Bill lists only twenty six such bodies, including the Coastal
Aquaculture Authority, Press Council of India and the National Industrial
Tribunal, all three of which, strictly speaking, are not ‘tribunals’. At the
same time, the list also excludes certain key tribunals. In order to get a grip
on the term ‘tribunals’, the law laid down by the Supreme Court and other
judicial bodies will have to be evaluated. While the term has received
extensive interpretation over a long period of time,3 relevant here would be
an instrumental definition of the term “tribunal” that was adopted by the
Supreme Court of India in NCLT case where it was distinguished from a
Court as follows:
“Though both courts and tribunals exercise judicial power and
discharge similar functions, there are certain well-recognised
differences between courts and tribunals. They are:
(i) Courts are established by the State and are entrusted with the
State's inherent judicial power for administration of justice in
general. Tribunals are established under a statute to adjudicate
upon disputes arising under the said statute, or disputes of a
specified nature. Therefore, all courts are tribunals. But all
tribunals are not courts.
(ii) Courts are exclusively manned by Judges. Tribunals can have
a Judge as the sole Member, or can have a combination of a
judicial Member and a technical Member who is an “expert” in
the field to which the Tribunal relates. Some highly specialised
fact-finding tribunals may have only technical Members, but
they are rare and are exceptions.
(iii) While courts are governed by detailed statutory procedural
rules, in particular the Code of Civil Procedure and the
Evidence Act, requiring an elaborate procedure in decision
making, tribunals generally regulate their own procedure
applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only
where it is required, and without being restricted by the strict
rules of the Evidence Act.”4

2
The Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals and Other Authorities (Conditions of Service) Bill, 2014 (the “Tribunals
Bill”), First Schedule as on March 16 2015
3
Alok Prasanna Kumar and Rukmini Das, “State of the Nation’s Tribunals: Introduction and Part 1: Telecom
Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal”, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, 2014 available at
http://www.vidhilegalpolicy.in/140618_State%20of%20the%20Nation's%20Tribunals%20-%20TDSAT.pdf
4
Madras Bar Association v Union of India, Writ Petition 150 of 2006
It also follows the distinction between ‘tribunals’ and ‘quasi-judicial
authorities’ as recently explained by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v
Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association, where it held that:
“18. …Where there is a lis between two contesting parties and a
statutory authority is required to decide such dispute between them,
such an authority may be called as a quasi-judicial authority i.e. a
situation where, (a) a statutory authority is empowered under a statute
to do any act; (b) the order of such authority would adversely affect the
subject; and (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties, and
the contest is between the authority and the subject; and (d) the
statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the
decision of the said authority is a quasi-judicial decision. An authority
may be described as a quasijudicial authority when it possesses
certain attributes or trappings of a “court”, but not all. In case certain
powers under CPC or CrPC have been conferred upon an authority, but
it has not been entrusted with the judicial powers of State, it cannot be
held to be a court.”5
Therefore the definition of a tribunal can be split up into six criteria, which
collectively are necessary and sufficient to designate a body as a tribunal.
These are:
(1) Permanency;
(2) Independence from the Executive;
(3) Set up by or under law made by Parliament;
(4) To solely decide a lis between parties;
(5) Specific jurisdiction vested by statute;
(6) Not part of the regular judiciary.

EVOLUTION OF TRIBUNAL SYSTEM IN INDIA

In India, administrative adjudication increased after independence and

several welfare laws were promulgated which vested the power on deciding
various issues in the hands of the administration. The modern Indian
Republic was born a Welfare State and thus the burden on the government
to provide a host of welfare services to the people was immense. These
quasi-judicial powers acquired by the administration led to a huge number
of cases with respect to the manner in which these administrative bodies
arrived at their decisions. The Courts held that these bodies must maintain
procedural safeguards while arriving at their decisions and observe
principles of natural justice-their opinions were substantiated by the14th

5
State of Gujarat v Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Assn, (2012) 10 SCC 353, p. 365 para 18
Law Commission Report.6 In order to avoid clogging the judicial machinery
with cases which would have arisen by the operation of these new socio-
economic legislations, a number of tribunals were established by the
government. The tribunals were established with the object of providing a
speedy, cheap and decentralised determination of disputes arising out of the
various welfare legislations7. Another important reason for the new
development is that law courts, on account of their elaborate procedures,
legalistic fronts and attitudes can hardly render justice to the parties
concerned, in technical cases. Ordinary judges, brought up in the traditions
of law and jurisprudence, are not capable enough to understand
technical problems, which crop up in the wake of modem complex economic
and social processes.Only administrators having expert knowledge can
tackle such problems judiciously. To meet this requirement, a number of
administrative tribunals have come into existence.
In India such tribunals were set up immediately after independence. In fact,
the most important adjudicatory function is carried out by statutory
tribunals created by the legislature to adjudicate upon certain disputes
arising from administrative decisions or to determine issues judicially. The
Railway Rates Tribunal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Labour
Tribunals, the Companies Tribunal, various Compensation Tribunals,
Revenue Courts of various States, etc., can be cited as examples of such
tribunals.8 Regarding the problem of backlog and delayed disposal of case
the Government set up the Administrative Reforms Commission in 1967. It
was to examine the problem, suggests solutions and also to recommend the
suitable areas in which tribunals could be set up, according to this
commission The reasons for the growth of administrative tribunals are as
follows:
1) Inadequacy of the traditional judiciary to effectively decide
administration-related matters especially when it came to
technicalities.
2) The traditional judiciary was seen to be slow, costly and excessively
procedural.
The Commission also recommended the establishment of independent
tribunals in the following areas:
a) Service matters and dispute of employees under the state
b) Orders of assessment on adjudication under Customs, Central
Excise, Sales Tax and orders under the Motor vehicles Act.

6 Nayak,R., Administrative justice In India, Butterwoths : New Delhi, 1989, p.38

7 Jain,M.P., Principles of Administrative Law, Wadhwa & Company : Nagpur, 1996, pp.246-
248
8 Thakker, C.K., Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company : Lucknow, 1996, p.66
Period of emergency played a crucial role in the evolution of tribunals in
India. There were clear signals that the executive did not want the judiciary
to interfere with their developmental plans and other such decisions. Such
as removing disputes regarding elections to the office of President, Prime
Minister and Speaker of the Lok Sabha beyond judicial scrutiny.9 Hence in
1976 the issue was discussed at the Conference of Chief Secretaries and
from amongst all these discussions and the reports of the various bodies
stated above, Parliament enacted the 42ndConstitution (Amendment) Act,
1976 inserting Articles 323A and 323B which provided for the establishment
of administrative and other tribunals to deal with the matters specifically
provided for.
The main distinction that can be made out between article 323A and 323B
is that while 323A allows for the Parliament to by law provide for
administrative tribunals to adjudicate disputes, 323B allows for the any
“appropriate legislature”, to by law create an administrative tribunal for the
adjudication of disputes.
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
In pursuance of Art 323-A Parliament has passed the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 covering all matters falling within the clause (1) of
Article 323- A. This Act authorises central government to establish
administrative tribunals for central services and on the application of States
even for States services as well as for local bodies and other authorities
including public corporation. From the date of establishment of tribunals all
courts except the Supreme Court under Art 136 lose their jurisdiction with
respect to the matter falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunals.
A tribunal shall consist of Chairman and such number of Vice-Chairmen
and other members as appropriate Government may deem fit. They are
appointed by the President in the case of Central tribunals and by the
President in consultation with the Governors or Governors in case of State
or joint Tribunals. The qualifications regarding that are laid down in the
Act.10 Other aspects regarding administrative Tribunals are being discussed
below different headings and sub-headings.

TRIBUNALIZATION AND REGULATORY BODIES IN INDIA

Since the enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, parliament

has systematically taken away important judicial functions of the High

9 “Tribunalisation in India” http://legalsutra.org/1446/tribunalisation-in-india/ as on 16th

March 2015.
10 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 http://cgat.gov.in/act.htm as on 16th March 2015
Courts and civil courts and transferred them to quasi-judicial bodies under
its supervision. The wide and necessary powers guaranteed reasonably to
the High Courts have therefore been curbed to a huge extent by transferring
adjudicatory powers to such tribunals under the executive.
In S. P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India11 the Supreme Court directed the
carrying out of certain measures with a view to ensuring the functioning of
the Administrative Tribunals along constitutionally sound principles. The
changes were brought about in the Act by an amending Act (Act 19 of 1986).
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 32 was restored.
Constitutional validity of the Act was finally upheld in S. P. Sampath
Kumar’s subject, of course, to certain amendments relating to the form and
content of the Administrative Tribunals. The suggested amendments were
carried out by another amending Act (Act 51 of 1987).
In 1997, a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India12 held that clause 2 (d) of article 323A and clause 3(d) of
article 323B, to the extent they empower Parliament to exclude the
jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under articles
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the
Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations
enacted under the aegis of articles 323A and 323B were, to the same extent,
held to be unconstitutional. The Court held that the jurisdiction conferred
upon the High Courts under articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court
under article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure
of our Constitution. The court also effectively overruled alternate
institutional mechanism theory of Sampath Kumar. All decisions of the
Administrative Tribunals were also held to be subject to scrutiny before a
Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal
concerned falls. Law Commission in its 215th report sought reference of this
judgment to a larger bench for fresh look.
However, tribunals in India (then British India) had begun with the setting
up of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) in 1941 which was followed
by creation of sales tax tribunals in several states. These tax tribunals were
deliberately kept outside the judiciary. The company law board (CLB) began
functioning in 1991 on the same pattern. When the CLB was formed, its
rules were made in a way that only civil servants could man the board. InV
Balachandran v UOI13 these rules were challenged and partly struck down
but creation of a quasi-judicial tribunal was upheld. Subsequently, Debt
Recovery Tribunals (DRT) were set up reasoning that there were too many
cases pending before civil courts and banks had to wait for a long time to

11 (1985) 4 SCC 458

12 AIR 1997 SC 1125
13 (1993) 76 Comp Cas 67 (Mad)
recover their money. The constitutional validity of these tribunals was
upheld in UOI v Delhi High Court Bar Association14. These DRT’s have been
admittedly a miserable failure and SARFESI Act was required to be
introduced to enable banks to attach assets of defaulters without adopting a
purely judicial process. In State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharati Housing
Building Coop. Society15, competence of the parliament to establish
consumer forums with hierarchy in the form of district forum, state forum
and national commission was challenged. It was contended that Parliament
cannot establish a hierarchy of courts parallel to district courts, high courts
and the Supreme Court in absence of a suitable amendment under Article
368 of the Constitution of India and that parliament by recourse to Art 323A
& 323B cannot establish forums which are substitute to civil courts
including the High Courts. The court referred to Art 246(2) and held that
there is no doubt about legislative competence of the Parliament to provide
for creation of special courts and tribunals. The Competition Act, 2002
before the amendment provided adjudication by the Competition
Commission of India without any provision for an appellate body. It was
challenged in BrahmoDutt v. Union of India16 as violative of the principle of
separation of powers and the Government undertook to amend it. Further,
the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), National Company Appellate
Law Tribunal (NCLAT), National Tax Tribunal (NTT) and Intellectual Property
Appellate Board (IPAB) were brought into the legal parlance. The
constitutional validity of NCLT was challenged in the Madras High Court by
the Madras Bas Association. The High Court struck down several provisions
of the Act but did not strike down the NCLT itself. The matter then knocked
the doors of the Supreme Court which fortunately did not stay the operation
of the decision of the High Court and halted recruitment of members of
NCLT & NCALT till final disposal. In the meanwhile, National Tax Tribunal
(NTT) was introduced which also sought immediate transfer of all
substantial questions of law cases to be transferred to it from all High
Courts. The constitutional validity of NTT was challenged before Madras,
Bombay, Orissa and other high courts and all cases were collectively
transferred to the Supreme Court. The challenge to both these tribunals was
taken up together by the Supreme Court and the matter was referred to a 5
judge bench. The 5 judge bench in Madras Bar Association v UOI17 delinked
the matters. A constitution bench of the court has heard the challenge to
validity of NTT and reserved the judgment, while the challenge to NCLT is
still pending.

14 CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4679 of 1995 Supreme Court of India

15 Appeal (civil) 9927 of 1996 Supreme Court of India
16 Writ Petition (civil) 490 of 2003 Supreme Court of India
17 Writ Petition 150 of 2006 Supreme Court of India
The rationale given for creating tribunals is often given to foresee judiciary
overburdened with huge backlog of cases and the need for speacialization.
The hidden and untraced reason however is that such tribunals act as an
excellent source of post retirement employment for chosen bureaucrats and
judges with special attachment with the ruling establishment. When the
NTT was mooted, it was stringly opposed by the parliamentary committee. In
the past Wanchoo Committee and the Chokshi Committee had strongly
recommended that tax tribunals should be carved out in form of dedicated
benches of High Courts already existing. Above all not a single suggestion
made by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in UOI v R. Gandhi18
has been implemented till date.
The Comparision UK and USA
Reference should at this juncture be also made to cases arising from the
United States and other commonwealth countries in lieu that attempts to
take away inherent jurisdiction of the civil courts has been struck down at
various intervals. In Canada a green tribunal was constituted to decide rent
control cases which was struck down by the Canadian Supreme Court as
unconstitutional holding that where the dispute was primarily civil in
nature, the case has to be heard only by the established judiciary and not
by quasi judicial tribunals [Residential Tenancies case19]. In US, the
Supreme Court struck down the bankruptcy tribunal pointing out the
dangers of creating tribunals that encroached into the established functions
of the judiciary in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathan Pipeline
Co.20 Similarly in Privy Council21 and Australian High Court22 held that any
attempt to take away judicial power to vest it into quasi judicial tribunals
was not permissible.
In UK annually a million cases are decided by over 70 tribunals. The Franks
Committee examined the functioning of tribunals which led to the Tribunals
Act, 1948. It emphasized that tribunals should be independent, accessible,
prompt, expert, informal and cheap. Sir Andrew Leggatt submitted a report
to the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain in March 2001. A cursory
reading of this report shows the urgent need for repairing our tribunal
system. Sir Leggatt’sreport emphasizes that tribunals must not only be
independent but also seem to be independent. They should not be seen as
departments of ministries or as part of the executive branch of government.
Our tribunals suffer from this syndrome heavily. There is no uniform

18 [2010] INSC 393

19 (1981) 123 DLR (3d) 554
20 73 Led 2d 675
21 In Hinds v Queen (1976) 1 All ER 533
22 In Harry Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245
recruitment conditions for service, retirement age etc, throwing them at the
mercy of the parent ministries for existence completely.

CONCLUSION

It has been noted since the mid of the twentieth century particularly after
the second world war that in the modem state vast expansion of social
legislation and unprecedented growth of the administrative process has
taken place. The problems arising out of this development have become the
most important issue of law and its administration in the present age. They
have affected many aspects of the legal system. Whatever be the causes and
sources of the growth, every student of law observes that the problem of
control of administrative process has assumed gigantic proportions.
Administrative tribunals resolve disputes between, for example, the citizen
and an officer of a government agency or between individuals in an area of
law in which the government has legislated the conduct of their relations.
According to Seervai, “the development of administrative law in a welfare
state has made administrative tribunals a necessity”23. Administrative
tribunals are authorities outside the ordinary court system, which interpret
and apply the laws when acts of public administration are questioned in
formal suits by the courts or by other established methods. They are not a
court nor are they an executive body. Rather they are a mixture of both.
They are judicial in the sense that the tribunals have to decide facts and
apply them impartially, without considering executive policy. They are
administrative because the reasons for preferring them to the ordinary
courts of law are administrative reasons. The Supreme Court in Jaswant
Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand24 aid down the following characteristics or
tests to determine whether an authority is a tribunal or not:
1. Power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or statutory
rule.
2. It must possess the trappings of a court and thereby be vested with
the power to summon witnesses, administer oath, and compel
production of evidence, etc.
3. Tribunals are not bound by strict rules of evidence.
4. They are to exercise their functions objectively and judicially and to
apply the law and resolve disputes independently of executive
policy.

23 H. M. Serwai, Constitutionsl law of India (1968 ed.) page 1128

24 AIR 1963 SC 677 at 687
 5. Tribunals are supposed to be independent and immune from any
administrative interference in the discharge of their judicial
functions.
India is a vast country. The Supreme Court sits only in Delhi and High
Courts in Capital cities of the states. For every infringement of right an
ordinary citizen as well as government servant cannot afford to move to the
proper court. In case administrative tribunals are introduced then justice
would be easier and also cheaper to obtain, particularly in the present rising
inflation. The Administrative Tribunals were conceived as and constitute an
effective and real substitute for the High Courts as regards service matters.
Moreover, the power of judicial review of the High Courts cannot be called as
inviolable as that of the Supreme Court. The very objective behind the
establishment of the Administrative Tribunals is defeated if all the cases
adjudicated by them have to go before the concerned High Courts. Another
advantage of the administrative tribunal would be that they would have not
only the legal but also other type of experts as might be needed. Hence
justice would be speedily given by those who know. Moreover tribunals
would also have the advantage of being able to translate the state policies
into action thus helping the growth of the country.
A tribunal or Chamber President is responsible for the day-to-day judicial
administration of their tribunal or (within the new simplified two-tier
structure) their chamber. They act as a vital link between the Senior
President of Tribunals; the judicial officers of their tribunal, and the senior
judiciary outside the Tribunals Service. Many cases involve individuals
putting their own case, without legal assistance, so the system needs to be
accessible to all. Tribunal judges often help to ensure this, by guiding non-
legally qualified parties through the necessary procedures, if necessary.
A radical amendment was caused within the constitutional law through
section forty-six of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976,
that inserted new half XIVA on ‘Tribunals’ within the Constitution. Article
323A empowers Parliament to produce, by law, for the assessment or trial
by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with regard to
recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services
and posts in reference to the affairs of the Union or of any State. The law
might give for the institution of an administrative tribunal for the Union and
a separate administrative judicature for every State or for 2 or more States.
The law might eliminate adjudication of disputes concerning service matters
from the hands of the civil courts and also the High Courts.
Pursuant to the provisions of article 323A, Parliament enacted the
administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act) to determine an administrative
tribunal for the Union, viz., the Central administrative tribunal and a
separate administrative tribunal for a State or a Joint administrative
tribunal for 2 or more States. The establishment of administrative Tribunals
became necessary since an oversized range of cases concerning service
matters were unfinished before various courts. It was expected that the
setting up of the administrative Tribunals wouldn't solely cut back the
burden of courts, but would additionally give speedy relief to the aggrieved
public servants.
In S. P. Sampath Kumar case , the Supreme Court directed the carrying out
of certain measures with a view to making sure the functioning of the
administrative Tribunals on constitutionally sound principles. The changes
were caused within the Act by an amending Act (Act 19 of 1986).
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 32 was improved.
Constitutional validity of the Act was finally upheld in S. P. Sampath Kumar
subject, of course, to certain amendments concerning the form and content
of the administrative Tribunals. The advised amendments were applied by
another amending Act (Act 51 of 1987).
Thus became the administrative Tribunals an efficient and real substitute
for the High Courts. In 1997, a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in
L. Chandra Kumar case, held that clause 2 (d) of article 323A and clause 3(d)
of article 323B, to the extent they empower Parliament to exclude the
jurisdiction of the High Courts and also the Supreme Court under articles
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the
Act and also the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses altogether different
legislations enacted under the aegis of articles 323A and 323B would, to a
similar extent, be unconstitutional. The Court held that the jurisdiction
bestowed upon the High Courts under articles 226/227 and upon the
Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution is an element of the
inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. All decisions of the
administrative judicatures are subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of
the high court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal involved falls. By
bringing back the tribunals within the jurisdiction of the High Courts, the
court served 2 functions. Whereas saving the power of judicial review of
legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution, it'll make sure that flippant claims are filtered out through
the method of adjudication by the tribunal. The high court also will have the
advantage of a reasoned decision on merits, which is able to be of use
thereto in finally deciding the matter. In sight of this decision the prevailing
provision of direct appeals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution conjointly stands changed. Currently the aggrieved party are
going to be entitled to move the high court and from the decision of the
Division Bench of the high court, he will move the Supreme Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution. The court saved the constitutionality of
Section 5(b) by providing that whenever an issue involving the
constitutionality of any provision arises, it shall be referred to a two-member
Bench, one among whom must be a judicial member.
Through this classical case, the court has, in one sense, tried to avoid
wasting the jurisdiction of constitutional courts from encroachment by the
assembly by invoking the doctrine of "basic structure of the Constitution".

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Referred
1. C.K. Thakker, Administrative Law 226 (1996).
2. H. M. Serwai, Constitutionsl law of India (1968 ed.).
3. H. P. Chattopadhyay, InduBaghel, Theory of Public
Administration 211 (1st ed. 2009).
4. History of Law of England, Vol. I, 57-63 (4thEdn.).
5. I. P. Massey, Administrative Law 605-606 (8th ed. 2012).
6. M. P. Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, 246-248 (1996).
7. R. Nayak, Administrative justice In India 38 (1989).
8. Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law 771(10th ed. 2009).
9. Webster’s New World Dictionary 1517 (1972); Concise Oxford
Dictionary, 1530-1531 (2002).
Articles Referred
1. Administrative Reform Commission, Report on Personnel
Administration (1969).
2. Law Commission of India, Fourteenth Report, Reform of Judicial
Administration(1958).
3. Perspective, SLJ (Journal Section) 1-5 (1986).
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OF_INDIA_A_Study_in_the_light_of_decided_cases.
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5. Rajib Hassan, Judicial Review of the Decisions of Administrative
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http://www.articlesbase.com/national-state-local-articles/judicial-
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