G.R. No.

L-32328 September 30, 1977

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO,
PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-
appellants
vs.
FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees

FACTS:

 One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence. Aldina
Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews,
respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on
November 4, 1963 in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 1736. In the course of said intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto
Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial
Partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said
estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each. The Court of First
Instance of iloilo, then prescribed by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, approved the extrajudicial
partition on March 21, 1964.

 On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and
testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Art of the Art of First Instant of
Iloilo. It appears that Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino
Maloto are named as heirs but Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares
in said with which are bigger, different and more valuable than what they obtained in the
extrajudicial partition. The said will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees
and/or legatees.

 On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding
No. 1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the
allowance of the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. The devisees and/or legatees in
the said will also filed for allowance of the will. Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the
motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.

 The Court of First Instance of iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated
November 16, 1968 denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the
said motion had been filed out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied.
Petitioners appealed from the order of denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and Felino
Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed late. A motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A supplemental order dated April 1,
1969 stating as additional ground that the appeal is improper was issued.

 The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed
as G.R. No. L-30479. This Court dismissed the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969
which reads:
“THE COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for certiorari and mandamus, without passing on the
issue of whether or not the petitioners appeal from the order of November 16, 1968 of respondent
Judge was made on time, it appearing that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the
premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of
the alleged will in question.”

 Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and citation, fl Art issued a resolution
dated July 15, 1969 which reads:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-30479,
Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969, the Court
resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the clarification that the matter of whether or
not the pertinent findings of facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject order of November 16,
1968 constitute res adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for probate of the alleged will in
question indicated in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein such matter will be more
appropriately determined.

 Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto.

 In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of
the with on the basis of the finding of said court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the
alleged win sought to be Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The
probate court sustained the oppositors' contention that the petition for probate is now barred
by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No.
1736.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOR THE WILL CAN STILL BE PROBATED?

HELD:

Yes. The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with
of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the case was denied
because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate
estate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in
Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have
filed a separate action for the probate of the Will." And this court stated in its resolution of May 14,
1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is
for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question."

In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar
to the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will
of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of
the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the respondent.
Guevara v Guevara Digest

Facts:

Victorino Guevara executed a will on August 26, 1931 wherein he made various bequests to his wife,
stepchildren(Candida G. and Piou G.), wife in the 2nd marriage(Angustia Posadas). He has a legitimate
son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario Guevara. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural
daughter.

In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement
proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernesto possessed the land which he adjudicated to
himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as
well as the devise given to her.

Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a
large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption
that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in
favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with.

Held :

No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the
last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is
mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Suppression of the wil is
contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory.

Section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the
heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that
will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard
the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with
the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary
to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because
unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant
case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be
cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition
of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23372 June 14, 1967

IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN. CIPRIANO DURAN and MIGUEL
DURAN, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor and appellee.

A. C. Aguilar, N. J. Quisumbing and E. Quisumbing-Fernando for petitioners-appellants.

Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for movant-oppositor-appellee.

BENGZON J.P, J.:

Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in Guinobatan Albay. Among his alleged heirs
are Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces.

Subsequent to his death, on June 2, 1962, Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a
public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of
Josefina Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00.

A year later, on June 8, 1963, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition for
intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator.
An ex parte motion to be appointed special administrator was also filed by him.

Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed on August 9, 1963 an opposition, praying for its dismissal
upon the ground that the petitioner is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of
transfer and renunciation the estate, in view of afore-stated, attaching a copy of the same; in the
alternative, she asked to be appointed administratrix.

Replying to this, Cipriano alleged, on September 11, 1963, alleged in his opposition to the motion to
dismiss, that Josefina Duran was not the decedent's wife. Anent the deed of assignment, he
contended that the same was procured thru fraud, with gross inadequacy of price and vitiated by
lesion.

Still later, another brother of the decedent, Miguel Duran, filed on September 14, 1963, a petition to
be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina Duran moved to strike out said petition as an improper
attempt to intervene in the case. She also filed a reply to Cipriano's opposition to her motion to
dismiss. In turn, Miguel filed an opposition to Josefina's motion to strike out.1äwphï1.ñët
Acting on said motions, on June 3, 1964, the Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the
petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate. Said lack of interest was premised on the
deed of transfer executed by Cipriano, regarding which the court declared itself without power to
examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would
render it rescissible or voidable. And with the petition's dismissal, Miguel's petition to be joined as co-
petitioner was deemed without leg to stand on.

Appeal to Us directly, on questions of law, was taken by Cipriano and Miguel Duran.

The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an estate must be
filed by an "interested person" (See. 2, Rule 79). Appellants contend that the deed of assignment
executed by Cipriano did not operate to render him a person without interest in the estate. Relying
on In re Irene Santos, L-11848, May 31, 1962, they argue that an assignment by one heir of his share in
the estate to a co-heir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement court to be
effective; and that the assigning heir does not lose his status as a person interested in the estate, even
after said assignment is approved by the court.

The situation in the Santos case involves an assignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the
course of settlement proceedings, properly and validly commenced. At the time of said assignment,
therefore, the settlement court had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate. As a
result, any assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. And since the approval
the court is not deemed final until the estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person
in proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated is given.

In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was
pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a
settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the assignor
and assignee, the same does not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An
extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for
extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and
non-participating heirs only (Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it be contended that said
partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul
the same in an action for that purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a
settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid
and effective against him, so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for
settlement proceedings.

Anent appellant Miguel Duran, he sought in his petition below to "join petitioner Cipriano Duran as
co-petitioner in the latter's petition . . . and incorporates herein by adoption all the allegations made
in said petition." (Record on Appeal, pp. 45-46). The same, therefore, amounted to a petition to
intervene in the settlement proceedings. As aptly ruled by the court a quo, since there was really no
settlement proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be denied.

Finally, although Josefina Duran prayed to be appointed administratrix, her doing so did not amount
to ratification of the petition for settlement under the ruling in Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, since
she did so merely by way of an alternative prayer, should her motion to dismiss fail. And said motion
to dismiss was properly sustained.
Wherefore, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.

FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,

FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.

Facts: The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel
Mamuyac, who died on the 2d day of January, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the Province of La
Union. On or about the 27th day of July, 1918, the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and
testament.

January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of La Union for the probation of that will. The probation of the same was opposed by
Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac

After hearing all of the parties the petition for the probation of said will was denied upon the ground
that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament (Exhibit A).

On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to secure the
probation of the said will of the 16th day of April, 1919

To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac
presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament
executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the
lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the
deceased Miguel Mamuyac.

Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Anastacio R. Teodoro, judge, after hearing the
respective parties, denied the probation of said will of April 16, 1919, upon the ground that the same
had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. Judge Teodoro, after examining the evidence
adduced, found that the following facts had been satisfactorily proved:

That Exhibit A is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of the deceased
testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per testimony of witness Jose Fenoy,
who typed the will of the testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920,
the original Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured
Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a house and the land where the house was built, he had
to cancel it (the will of 1919), executing thereby a new testament. Narcisa Gago in a way corroborates
the testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the deceased (Miguel Mamuyac) in
1919 was found in the possession of father Miguel Mamuyac. The opponents have successfully
established the fact that father Miguel Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. The same Narcisa
Gago, the sister of the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when cross-examined by
attorney for the opponents, testified that the original Exhibit A could not be found. For the foregoing
consideration and for the reason that the original of Exhibit A has been cancelled by the deceased
father Miguel Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of Exhibit A for the applicant." From that
order the petitioner appealed.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

Held: With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied,
which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920.

In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator
Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to
the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the
evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to
establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the
burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which
wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or
destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be
admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a
will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements
of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the
original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.

After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for
probate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920. Therefore the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA
RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

Facts:

This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court .As found by the Court of Appeals:

On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.

Appellees arguments are as follows:

(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after
death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will

(3) The alleged hollographic will itself ,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise
it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and

(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required
by law.

After the Court’s consolidation of the Cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the
probate of the will. They argued that:

(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and

(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of
February 23, 1979.

The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to
law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court

On July 23, 1979, the Trial Court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for
the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:

“ It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy
thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.This Court notes that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of
more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact
that the original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had
discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.”

Appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does not involve
question of fact.

Issue:

Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to
approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs.
Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
"Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of
the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976

ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE
BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.

FACTS:

 January 6, 1975 -

o Sotero Baluyut died in Manila at the age of eighty-six, leaving an estate allegedly valued
at not less than two million pesos.

 February 20 –

o His nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a
verified petition for letters of administration

o Alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was
mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate.

o Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will.

o He prayed that he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special

administrator.

 February 24, 1975 -

o Lower court appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator with a bond of

P100,000.

 March 8, 1975 –

o Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition alleged that she was unaware that her deceased
husband executed a will

o She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G.
Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.

 March 24, 1975-

 o Lower court cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special administrator.

o Lower court noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while on the
witness stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally qualified".

 March 31, 1975 –

o Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order.

o Lower court in its order of March 31, 1975 appointed Baluyut and Jose Espino as special
administrators.

 September 2, 1975 –

o Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition of asked that Espino, former governor
of Nueva Vizcaya and an alleged acknowledged natural child of Sotero Baluyut, be
appointed administrator should she not be named administratrix.

 November 12, 1975 - Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be appointed
administratrix.

o She reasoned out that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no more interest in the decedent's estate
because as a collateral relative he was excluded by Espino and other supposed
descendants of the deceased who had intervened in the proceeding, and, therefore, it
was not necessary to continue with the reception of his evidence.

o Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a natural
child of Sotero Baluyut because Espino's parents were the spouses Elino Espino and
Josefa de Guzman. Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared an
incompetent by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in its order of
September 25, 1975 in Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the guardianship of Mrs.
Baluyut. That procee proceeding was instituted by her sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de
Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez-Viray.

 November 17, 1975 –

o At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion no oral and documentary evidence was
presented.

o The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut

 November 27, 1975 –

o Probate court terminated the appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix with a bond of
P20,000.

o Based on the fact that as surviving spouse she has a preferential right to be appointed as
administratrix.
 o Lower court was convinced of the widow's capacity and that her "sufficient
understanding" justified her appointment.

 November 29, 1975 –

o Letters of administration were issued to Mrs. Baluyut after she posted her bond. She
took her oath of office.

 December 13, 1975 –

o Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent Judge, Mrs. Baluyut and the Espino spouses
this special civil action of certiorari in order to set aside the order of November 27
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.

 This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order of
November 27 and from disposing of the funds or assets of the estate in their possession or
deposited in certain banks.

 The Espino's in their comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut is aware that Jose Espino was
acknowledged in a notarial instrument by Sotero Baluyut as his natural child.

 Mrs. Baluyut in her comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut instituted the administration
proceeding after he had failed to get from her a cheek for P500,000 belonging to the decedent's
estate and that he grossly misrepresented that she was mentally incompetent. She further
alleged that the order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declaring her an incompetent
was issued in a blitzkrieg manner because it was based on the report of Doctor Lourdes V. Lapuz
which was filed in court just one day before the order was issued.

 February 2, 1976 –

o Alfredo G. Baluyut in his manifestation disclosed that Sotero Baluyut executed a notarial
will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in
certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The remaining three-
fourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives named Irene, Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo
and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin, all surnamed
Miranda. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not mentioned in
that will.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as
administratrix.

RULING:

We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys
preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not
follow that she should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her
competency to discharge that trust.

Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as executor is
not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters
testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have
been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have
rendered him unfit for that position.

Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be
appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording
oppositors a chance to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, L-26106, January 31, 1969,
26 SCRA 768, 791).

In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in order to satisfy itself
on her mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications.
He had squarely raised the issue as to her competency. The probate court assumed that Alfredo G.
Baluyut had no interest in the decedent's estate. As it now turned out, he is one of the legatees named in
the decedent's alleged will.

The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That
irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the decedent had
executed a will. He anticipated that development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero
Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix
is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is directed to
conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in this decision. Costs
against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.
Parreño v. Aranzanso

L-27657, 30 August 1992

This case is about the all-too-familiar problem as to who shall administer the estate of the deceased. It
exposes human nature in its most naked form — acquisitive.

Juliana Reyes died intestate. Her substantial estate is still being settled in Special Proceedings with the
CFI of Manila. The settlement has spawned a number of litigations.

The estate had only special administrators until Gregoria Aranzanso, who claims to be a first cousin of
the decedent, asked that she be appointed regular administrator.

The Court issued an order appointing Gregoria Aranzanso as regular administrator and relieving Araceli
Pilapil as special administrator.

Motions for reconsideration of the order were filed but the presiding judge held firm "considering that
most of the movants have adverse interests against this intestate estate."

But the opposition was persistent; it refused to give in. And so, the court which incidentally was
presided by a different judge issued an order declaring the oppositors, Gregoria Aranzanso, among
others, are without any right to intervene in this intestate proceeding hence, they should not be allowed
to take part therein. The appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as regular administratrix is revoked.
Paulina Santos de Parreno is appointed special administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Juliana
Reyes.

On appeal, the issue is whether or not the lower court was justified in revoking the appointment of
Gregoria Aranzanso as the administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.

It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed regular administrator of the intestate
estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed from her office but only for a cause or causes provided by law.
It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation, or removal. — If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided
by these rules, or absconds or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or
administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor
or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.

It is obvious that the decision of this Court that Gregoria Aranzanso, among other persons, is without
right to intervene as heir in the settlement of the estate in question is not one of the grounds provided
by the Rules of Court.

The decision denied to Gregoria Aranzanso the right to intervene in the settlement proceedings as an
heir of Juliana Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the
deceased. In fact, in one of her motions Paulina Santos de Parreno proposed the appointment of the
Philippine National Bank as special administrator. We hold that the intervention of Gregoria Aranzanso
in the settlement proceedings is not in the capacity of heir…

WHEREFORE, the order of June 20, 1966, removing Gregoria Aranzanso as administrator is hereby set
aside and she is reinstated as administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. Cost against the
appellee.