G.R. No.

98395 Commented [a1]: services rendered on per diem is not a basis in

determining creditable government service for retirement
purposes.

EN BANC Commented [a2]: Petition (2) granted. CSC is ordered to

reverse and set aside its resolution and to allow GSIS to determine

G.R. No. 98395, October 28, 1994 the creditable government service for retirement purposes.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND DR. MANUEL BARADERO,
RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 102449. OCTOBER 28, 1994]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND MATILDE S. BELO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

QUIASON, J.:

Before us are two petitions docketed as G.R. No. 98395 and G.R. No. 102449.
The petitions were consolidated since they principally involved the same issue
and parties.

We grant both petitions.

G. R. No. 98395

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to
reverse and set aside four orders of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
namely: (1) the Resolution No. 90-642 dated July 16, 1990, which resolved as
creditable for retirement purposes the service of private respondent Manuel
Baradero, who served as Sangguniang Bayan member on a per diem basis from
January 1, 1976 to October 20, 1978; (2) the Order dated September 20, 1990
directing the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 90-642; (3) the Order
dated December 7, 1990 directing the President and General Manager of
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to show cause why
they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the implementation of
Resolution No. 90-642; and (4) the Resolution No. 91-526 dated April 23, 1991,
which dismissed petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
September 20, 1990.

Dr. Manuel Baradero was a government employee, who occupied the position
of Medical Officer IV in the Philippine Medical Care Commission, until he
reached the mandatory age of retirement of 65 years old.

He served the Philippine Army as an enlisted man from November 17, 1942
until June 30, 1945. He resumed his government career on January 1, 1976,
when he was elected a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
La Castellana, Negros Occidental. As such, he received per diem for every
session attended. He resigned from the Sangguniang Bayan on October 10,
1976. On October 20, 1978, he was appointed Medical Officer I at the
Philippine Medical Care Commission, where he served until he reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years old (Rollo, p. 28).

Prior to turning 65 years old, Dr. Baradero applied for compulsory retirement
with petitioner, which credited in his favor 13 years of government service,
excluding his term as a Sangguniang Bayan member. He requested an extension
of service from the CSC to enable him to complete 15 years of government
service. This was necessary so that he may avail of retirement benefits.

The request was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 90-642 dated July 16,
1990. Instead, it ruled that Dr. Baradero's two-year stint as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan be considered as creditable service, hence completing the
mandatory 15-year service and making him eligible for retirement benefits
(Rollo, p. 28).

The GSIS contested the resolution, alleging that:

"(1) Per diem was expressly excluded in the definition of Compensation in RA

1573 on June 16, 1956. Prior to this, services paid on per diem basis were
considered creditable.
(2) Per diems were excluded from the definition of compensation because "per
diems, by themselves are usually of minimal amounts which cannot actually
support an insurance coverage" (Office of the General Counsel Opinion 08-85,
June 3, 1985). It had been maintained that "salary is essential to insurance in the
System, as it serves as the basis for the determination of the monthly premiums
or contributions" (Government Corporate Counsel Opinion No. 198, s. 1957).
(3) In the case of the late Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social
Security System, Commissioner Ferrer received per diems not only for attending
meetings of the Commission but also for hearing cases as hearing officer. With
the almost daily hearings of Commissioner Ferrer, he was said to have been
performing full-time service and received substantial amount of per diems such
that "the so-called per diems that he received were not really per diems but
compensation" (OGC Opinion 08-85). Hence, his services as hearing
Commissioner were considered creditable, but his per diem for attending the
board meetings were excluded in the computation of his retirement benefits"
(Rollo, p. 32).

The GSIS advised that the CSC extend the services of Dr. Baradero until he
completes the required 15 years so that he may avail of retirement benefits.

On September 20, 1990, the CSC issued an order directing the GSIS to
implement Resolution No. 90-642 (Rollo, p. 35).

The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the order (Rollo, p. 37), which
was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 91-526 dated April 23, 1991. The
resolution further directed the GSIS to comply with the CSC resolution and
order under pain of contempt (Rollo, p. 49).

Hence, this petition where the GSIS charges the CSC with grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that: (1) services rendered on a per diem basis is creditable
for purposes of retirement; and (2) it has exclusive jurisdiction in the
determination of services which are creditable.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of
Comment," which submitted its position that the law expressly excludes services
rendered on per diem basis in determining creditable government service for
retirement purposes.

The Solicitor General is of the opinion that the CSC's resolutions and order
crediting such services were in violation of the law, and encroached on the
power of the GSIS to administer and implement retirement laws. He therefore
recommended that the instant petition be given due course (Rollo, p. 100).

G. R. No. 102449
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to
reverse and set aside three orders of the CSC, namely: (1) the Resolution dated
June 7, 1989, which resolved as creditable for retirement purposes the services
rendered by respondent Matilde S. Belo, who served as Vice-Governor of Capiz
in a hold-over capacity from December 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979; (2) the
Order dated July 18, 1991 directing the President and General Manager of
petitioner to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay
in the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368; and (3) the Order dated
October 3, 1991, finding the President and General Manager of petitioner guilty
of indirect contempt with penalty of a fine of P1,000.00 per day of defiance
until the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368.

Matilde Belo retired from the government service on February 2, 1988. At the
time of her retirement, Belo was the Vice-Governor of Capiz in a hold-over
capacity. She served as Governor of Capiz from January 25, 1972 until February
1, 1988.

As an elected government official, Belo received a fixed salary of P13,000.00 per

annum from January 25, 1976 until December 31, 1976. Thereafter, she held the
same position in a hold-over capacity and was remunerated as follows: (1) from
December 31, 1976 until January 1, 1979, she received per diem for every
session attended of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and (2) from December 31,
1979 until February 1, 1988, she received a fixed salary ranging from P23,000.00
to P45,000.00 per annum (Rollo, p. 25).

Belo sought an opinion from the CSC to determine if the services she rendered
from December 31, 1976 until January 1, 1979, in which period she was paid on
a per diem basis, is creditable for retirement purposes.

In response to the query, the CSC issued Resolution No. 89-368 dated June 7,
1987, which affirmed that her services for said period was creditable (Rollo, pp.
25-26).

Belo's application for retirement was referred to the GSIS Committee on

Claims, which adopted a position contrary to that of the CSC.

On August 6, 1991, the GSIS received the Order dated July 18, 1991, which
directed its President and General Manager to show cause why they should not
be held in contempt for the delay in the implementation of CSC Resolution No.
89-368 (Rollo, pp. 28).

The GSIS filed its "Manifestation/Explanation," alleging that it cannot

implement the resolution considering that it has a pending petition for certiorari
before this Court in the case of Dr. Baradero (G.R. No. 98395), where the same
issue was raised (Rollo, p. 30).

On October 3, 1991, the CSC issued an order finding the President and General
Manager of GSIS guilty of indirect contempt. Both were meted a penalty of
P1,000.00 fine for each day of defiance until the implementation of Resolution
No. 89-368. The CSC noted that the mere pendency of the case of Dr. Baradero
cannot prevent the implementation of its resolution unless this Court issues a
temporary restraining order, and that said case had nothing to do with the case
of Belo (Rollo, p. 34).

The GSIS filed the instant petition, charging the CSC with committing the same
errors in G.R. No. 98395.

The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was adopting its
"Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment" filed in G.R. No. 98395,
holding the view that the law excluded services rendered on a per diem basis, in
crediting the length of service for retirement purposes (Rollo, p. 62).

In her comment, Belo insisted that CSC was correct in finding that her services
rendered on a per diem basis are creditable for retirement purposes. She claimed
that the case of Commissioner Ferrer of the Social Security Commission applied
to her case by analogy.

She likewise contended that Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) vests in the CSC jurisdiction over matters regarding the accreditation of
government services. She particularly cites Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V
thereof which enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC, among which
is to:

xxx xxx xxx

17. Administer the retirement program for government employees and accredit
government services and evaluate qualifications for retirement (Underscoring
supplied);
xxx xxx xxx

II

The issues to be resolved are: (1) Is government service rendered on a per diem
basis creditable for computing the length of service for retirement purposes; and
(2) Is petitioner the proper government agency in determining what service is
creditable for retirement purposes?

Section 35 of P.D. No. 1146 (Government Service Insurance Act of 1987) vests
in petitioner the power to implement the provisions of said law, which includes
the guaranty of retirement benefits.

Under the epigraph "Benefits," Section 10 thereof provides for the computation
of service, and reads:

xxx xxx xxx

Computation of Service. -
For the purpose of this section, the term service shall include full time service
with compensation: Provided, That part-time and other services with
compensation may be included under such rules and regulations prescribed by
the System (Underscoring supplied).

It is therefore material in the claim of retirement benefits that the employee

should have rendered service with compensation.

"Compensation" is defined by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 1573, which amended

Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act), thus:

(c) ‘Salary, pay, or compensation' shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses,

per diems, allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given in
addition to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by law or regulations
(Underscoring supplied).

A similar definition is provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. No. 1146:

(i) Compensation - the basic pay or salary received by an employee, pursuant

to his employment/appointments, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay,
and allowances (Underscoring supplied).
The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of
"compensation." Originally, per diem was not among those excluded in the
definition of compensation (See Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186), not until the
passage of the amending laws which redefined it to exclude per diem.

The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also distinguishes it
from other forms of remunerations. Such distinction is significant not only for
purposes of computing the contribution of the employers and employees to the
GSIS but also for computing the employees' service record and benefits.

The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 196, s. 1976, opined:

xxx That such receipt of salary is an indispensable requirement for membership,

especially in the Retirement Insurance Fund, is logically inferred from these
provisions of the GSIS Act: Section 5 which requires that to receive the benefits
provided for and described in the GSIS Act, each official or employee who is a
member of the System and his employer shall pay the prescribed monthly rates
of contributions or premiums based on a percentage of the "monthly salary" of
the employee or official; Sections 11 and 12, providing that the amount of
retirement annuity or gratuity, or death or disability benefits granted thereunder,
shall be based on the monthly "salary"; and Section 13, providing that the term
"service," for purposes of computing the aggregate period of service which
forms the basis for retirement, shall include only service with "compensation"
(Underscoring supplied; G.R. No. 98395, Rollo, p. 67).

In essence, the grant of retirement benefits necessitates an obligation on the part

of the employee to contribute to the insurance fund of petitioner. Such
obligation only arises where the employee is receiving "salary, pay or
compensation" and not per diem, which is not capable of paying off the
premium contributions to petitioner.

Also enlightening is the "Joint Civil Service Commission, Department of Budget

and Management and Government Service Insurance System Circular No. 1-89"
dated July 13, 1989. It prescribes the guidelines on the filing and processing of
retirement applications, and we quote:

IV. Certification of Services Rendered

xxx xxx xxx
C. In certifying to services rendered, Heads and Personnel
Officers/Administrative Officers of agencies shall be guided by the existing
laws, rules and regulations followed by GSIS in determining creditable services
for retirement purposes which are as follows:
1. All previous services rendered by an official/employee pursuant to a duly
approved appointment, including those of Presidential appointees, to a position
in the Civil Service with compensation or salary or pay whether on permanent,
provisional, temporary, emergency, substitute, or casual status, and whether paid
monthly, daily, or hourly, subject to these conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Services of government employees paid on per diem basis up to June 15,
1956 only.
D. All cases not covered by the procedures/guidelines above shall be referred
to GSIS for final determination (G.R. No. 98395, Rollo, pp. 75 and 77;
Underscoring supplied).

The circular is clear that services rendered on a per diem bases are not creditable
for retirement purposes. It likewise confirms that it is the GSIS, and not the
CSC which is the proper agency in determining services which are creditable for
retirement purposes.

In Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 (1992), we ruled that the GSIS has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or
not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. No. 1146, based on its
computation of a member's years of government service. By analogy, we
reiterate our ruling in the cases at bench.

The case of Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social Security System is

unapplicable. While it is true that Commissioner Ferrer was granted retirement
benefits notwithstanding being paid on a per diem basis, we find merit in the
GSIS explanation that the grant was consistent with its policy, since the service
which was creditable in Commissioner Ferrer's favor was his full time service as
Hearing Officer, and not his attendance at board meetings, which was not
credited.

Anent the CSC's power to "administer the retirement program xxx and accredit
government services xxx for retirement" (Administrative Code of 1987, Book V,
Chapter 3, Section 12), we rule that CSC role is ministerial. "Accredit" merely
means acknowledge. It must not be confused with the power to determine what
service is creditable for retirement purposes. It has been established that such
power belongs to the GSIS (cf. Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]).

The aforementioned provision relied upon by public respondent is derived from

the Administrative Code of 1987, which is a general law. It cannot prevail over
the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, which is a special law (cf. Cena
v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179 [1992]).

With the passage of the Administrative Code of 1987, members of the

Sangguniang Bayan are no longer paid per diem, but are now receiving
compensation. Thus, services rendered after the effectivity of the law may
therefore be considered creditable for retirement purposes.

Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be liberally interpreted
in favor of the retirees. However, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be
applied in the instant petitions, where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and
leaves no room for interpretation or construction. Moreover, to accommodate
private respondents' plea will contravene the purpose for which the law was
enacted, and will defeat the ends which it sought to attain (cf. Re: Judge Alex Z.
Reyes, 216 SCRA 720 [1992]).

WHEREFORE, the petitions are both GRANTED. The CSC resolutions and
orders in question are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on official leave.
Bellosillo, J., no part.
146 Phil. 646 Commented [a3]: General manager decision is overpowered by
the Board.

G.R. No. L-21723, November 26, 1970

HILARION BERONILLA, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BARREDO, J.:

A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of
the Board of Trustees of the respondent Government Service Insurance System
of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be
considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of the Philippine
National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and void for having been
issued, in the words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by
law, a want on abuse of discretion, violation of contracts, removal or forced
retirement without due process of law and to declare all acts heretofore taken in
implementation thereof also void, and to prohibit said respondent and its
representatives from carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution."
Acting on petitioner's prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, this
Court issued the writ prayed for upon petitioner's filing an injunction bond in
the amount of P1,000.00.

At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner
was acting as and performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National
Bank. Before that, he had occupied many other positions in the government
and had been a member of the GSIS during all times required by law.

In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement
insurance as well as his application to be allowed to take civil service
examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that
his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date of birth in
his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the GSIS on October 29,
1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru
the Auditor General, that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed
to January 14, 1900. According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the
demise of his mother that petitioner discovered that his true date of birth is
January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro
Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already
18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being
able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-
one years of age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality;
that since then he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date
of birth and it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons
of their town, Felix Alberne and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former
had been a member of the provincial board and the latter is a retired justice of
the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner was supported
by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the
Commission to the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil
Service Commission."

In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who,
on October 22, 1959, denied the same since "all official records point to January
14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial,
petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his request. This evidence
consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14,
1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal
Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner
appealed to the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr.
Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General
Manager, Mr. F. G. Araña, in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2,
1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his initials, thus
indicating approval of the requested change.

Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the
date of birth of petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General
and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy
was re-computed. The Legal Counsel whose title and rank had been meanwhile
changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs later communicated the
aforesaid decision of the General Manager to the Philippine National Bank on
November 2, 1962 and the Deputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by
letter and indorsement, respectively. As emphasized by petitioner, in the letter
to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has been
adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand,
in the 2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that
relative to petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on
November 30, 1957, corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the
maturity value had been effected on the basis of his changed date of birth. In
the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was issued
a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as January 14,
1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of
P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner
promptly complied with.

Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of
birth, more specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the
Central Bank detailed to the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS about the service of petitioner and stated that "in the
course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine National Bank, it was
found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15,
1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank
notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th)
birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory
retirement from the government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096
approved June 16, 1961." Acting on this letter, the Board referred the same to
Assistant General Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel Hizon, then in charge of
the Claims Department. The latter submitted a memorandum on August 6,
1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the
determination of the date of birth of petitioner, including the actions
aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and the Legal Counsel. On August
9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without even notifying
petitioner of Mr. Mathay's letter and without giving him any opportunity to be
heard regarding the same.

Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General
manager Andal of his request for the change of the date of his birth in the
official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898 to January 14, 1900, after the
same had been previously denied by the Legal Counsel, could not be legally
altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only because the power to
decide such matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in
the Legal Counsel, nor in the Board, but also because even if the Board were
assumed to have authority to review the acts of the General Manager, it was
either guilty of laches or estopped from revising the same; and, furthermore, in
approving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due
process to petitioner and impaired the obligations of the contract between
petitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In other words, the main issue
before Us in this case is one of power and does not call for Our determination
of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or January 14,
1900. Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of
Trustees acted within its power when it reversed the approval by General
Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking
all circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata,
laches, estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of
contractual obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and
considering all pertinent legal principles and statutory provisions, particularly
Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended, together with
the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have decided to uphold
the superior authority of the Board over the General Manager and to dismiss
this petition.

We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition,

pressed vigorously, to be sure, to the effect that as between the previous denial
by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent approval by General Manager Andal
of his request for the change of his date of birth in the records, the latter, which
was precisely the action on his appeal from the Legal Counsel's denial, should
prevail. Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the
practice and the rule, applications for retirement annuities in the GSIS are sub-
ject to final approval by the General Manager after its being approved by one of
the Assistant General Manager’s and/or one or two Department Managers, it is [1]

clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not
beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in
mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by the
Board of Trustees ……” and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the
following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for
the administration of the System and the transaction of its business." On the
other hand, the extent of the functions and powers of the General Manager are
defined in Section 18 as follows:

"SEC. 18. Personnel. - The Board shall have the power to appoint a general
manager, who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the
subject of life and social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer
of the System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a
medical director, and an actuary, and fix their compensation. The general
manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint additional
personnel whenever and wherever they may be necessary to the effective
execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their compensation, remove,
suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall have the power to
prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications to the end that
only competent persons may be employed, and appoint committees: Provided,
however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations.
x x x x"

It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees

directly manages the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive
officer of the Board. In the exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations
for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business, the
Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to act on any matter the
Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be
considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much
less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and
responsibility to manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide
with finality any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words,
even if the Board may entrust to the General Manager the power to give final
approval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality of such approval
cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases and upon its
attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General Manager's
action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which
flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper
management of the System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may
be added that the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is
concerned, for the fiduciary character of the management of the System is
rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its administration are partly
contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and workers in all
the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to
remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong
to the government, much less to any administration which may happen to be
temporarily on the saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can
only be duly safeguarded if the administrators of the System act with utmost
fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its controlling and managing board called
the Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of
petitioner cannot be sustained and We hold that any authority conferred upon
the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board
may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review
the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the re-
solution granting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to the
General Manager's acts does not constitute such a representation to third
persons dealing with the System that such finality is definite even vis-a-vis the
Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is not legally
possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the
System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since
the law clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the General
Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must
be deemed to be on guard regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to
modify or reverse any action of the General Manager and they cannot complain
should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.

Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the
power to reverse or modify any action of the General Manager in the exercise of
his authority, because of the failure of the Board to act from June 2, 1960, when
General Manager Andal acted favorably on his request to August 9, 1963, when
the Board approved the herein impugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more
than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his
GSIS records, payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served
by the GSIS itself on all parties concerned on the basis of his changed date of
birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of laches or held in estoppel to
change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not
entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for the successful
invocation of the pleas of laches and estoppel. We have carefully considered the
lengthy and rather impressive discussion by petitioner of these points in his
petition, memorandum and reply to respondent's memorandum as well as the
equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and
memorandum of the respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that
petitioner's position cannot be sustained.

It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel
actually boil down in this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by
silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence
will not work estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or
negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury"
(Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the
doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based on
moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a
very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v.
Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614) Important also it is not to overlook
that as regards the actuations of government officials, the general rule is that
their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel. (Republic vs. Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27, 1969, citing Pineda vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March 30, 1970, and the cases therein cited.)

Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board,

what is relevant is not the actual or, what petitioner calls, imputable knowledge
of said Board of the favorable action of Mr. Andal. Even if such knowledge had
come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter, what is decisive is
that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the Board got notice of the error in
Mr. Andal's action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as
petitioner himself alleges, to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the
action of the General Manager, any knowledge thereof by the Board, whether
actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have placed the Board
on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps
taken by the Board to have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are
inconsistent with the charge of unreasonable delay, much more of laches.

The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their

reaching the age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to
maintain efficiency in the government service and at the same time give to the
retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their
lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their long service and devotion to
the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors
of civil service discipline and the exacting demands that the nature of their work
and their relations with their superiors as well as the public would impose upon
them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty of
implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the
correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all
that the Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision
of the General Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth,
because from the evidence before it, the Board was convinced that the originally
recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the
charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.

Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked

that for such invocation to succeed, it must appear that if the plea is not heeded,
the party making the plea will suffer, in truth and in fact, inequity and injury,
whether pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical sense. Such is not the case
with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of this case, We see nothing
inequitous to petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of
Trustees. For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear
in all material government and public records and in all his representations to
respondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated
request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which would
unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and correspondingly
adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was duly
investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action
by the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such
request. True this negative action was reversed by the General Manager, albeit
by virtue of a procedure not strictly in accordance with the established one as
outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable
action of the General Manager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees,
the final legal authority in the System, upon its being informed of the error
thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made
representations to the respondent System as to his date of birth, and not the
other way around. All that the System did was to take his representations for
what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but the
General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the General
Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these
circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel, where the conflicting
representations are of the petitioner rather than of the System?

Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of
Trustees acted on the letter of Mr. Mathay without notifying him thereof or
hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that since there is no showing that under
the procedure established in the GSIS, such notice and hearing are required,
considering that the System operates as a business corporation and generally
notice and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in
any event, inasmuch as what was considered by the Board was nothing more
than petitioner's own conflicting representations, and if petitioner really believed
he should have been heard, he could have filed a motion for reconsideration or
reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunity to pre-
sent his side.

Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question

constitutes an impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is
obvious that the constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such
argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions even of government
corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having
any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains
specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the
date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government
employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against

petitioner, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby
dissolved.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Fernando, J., concur in the result.
Ruiz Castro, J., reserves his vote.
Villamor, J., inhibits himself.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., on official leave of absence.
 With respect to the procedure for approval of applications for retirement, the
[1]

Board of Trustees has from time to time approved the following resolutions:

1. On January 15, 1952, Resolution No. 15 providing:

"In order to expedite action on applications for retirement

annuities, the Board resolved to authorize the Manager of the
Administrative Department of the System to process and
approve such applications, subject to final approval of the
General Manager and Actuary." (Emphasis supplied)

2. On March 24, 1954, Resolution No. 145 as follows:

"2. Retirement Applications

"Retirement applications shall be approved by the General

Manager, Administrative Department, the Assistant General
Manager, and the Associate Actuary and Acting Manager,
Production Department.

"In the following cases, approval of the following officials

shall also be required in addition to those named hereinabove:

a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved - By the Legal

Officer.

b. No premium payments - By the Manager, Accounting Department."

3. On November 3, 1954, Resolution No. 627 reading:

"Retirement applications shall be approved by the 3 officials

as follows: Manager, Claims Department, either one of the
Assistant General Managers, and either the Actuary or Associate
Actuary.

"In the following cases, approval of the following officials

shall also be required in addition to those named hereinabove:

a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved - By the Legal

Officer.
 b. No premium payments - By the Manager, Accounting Department."

4. On July 3, 1957, Resolution No. 1591 thus:

"Where the records show conflicting dates of birth of an

applicant for retirement and no birth or baptismal certificate can
be submitted due to its loss or destruction, the matter is referred
to the Corporate Counsel of the System, together with all
secondary evidence in relation to the date of birth of the
applicant. The Corporate Counsel in turn determines the correct
date of birth, for purposes of retirement and life insurance, after
evaluating the relative evidentiary value of the documents
submitted, in accordance with the Rules of Court."
(Underscoring Supplied)

It is the theory of petitioner that Resolutions Nos. 627 and

1591 must be understood as subject to the condition in
Resolution No. 15 that the approval of the other subordinate
managers or officials referred to therein must be approved by
the General Manager whose action shall be final. Respondents
deny this, specially as regards Resolution No. 1591 which they
claim makes the Corporate Counsel of the System the final
authority on the matters therein mentioned, which include
controversies or discrepancies as to the date of birth of any
applicant for retirement. The Court sees no necessity, as stated
in the above opinion, of passing on this secondary issue, the
same being subordinate, after all, to the main proposition that
the General Manager's decision is subject to the review and final
action of the Board of Trustees.
G.R. No. 97419 Commented [a4]: Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 - The
completion of the 15-year service requirement…Herein petitioner is
entitled to Sec. 11. (i.e., where the petitioner appealed to the LRA and
the LRA sought the opinion of the CSC. CSC denied. SC set aside CSC
EN BANC resolution and granted instant petition.

G.R. No. 97419, July 03, 1992

GAUDENCIO T. CENA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION AND THE HON PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, IN HER
CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:

May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government
service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service
requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an old-age pension
under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977? This is the issue raised before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T.
Cena, a Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.

The facts are not disputed.

Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November 16,

1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City where he
stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office
of the Congressman of the First District of Caloocan City where he worked for
only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.

On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of

Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time he reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would
have rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days.
Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service
requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under
Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.

The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service
Commission whether or not to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena
as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd
Indorsement dated August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator observed that if
petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days
(should be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would be extended to 15 years, he
would have to retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.

On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena's request
for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681, declaring therein, that
Mr. Cena shall be considered retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the
date when he shall reach the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years,
unless his retention for another year is sought by the head of office under Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.

Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990, the
Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681 and allowed
Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his service from January 22, 1991 to
January 22, 1992, citing CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1990, the
pertinent of which reads:

"1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete
the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to
permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period
not exceeding one (12) year."

On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was denied
in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil Service
Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
extension of petitioner's service as Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro
Manila, for a period of only one (1) year pursuant to CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months
to complete the 15-year service requirement for his retirement with full benefits
as provided under Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1146,
otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.

Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of

Memorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of a compulsory
retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is both erroneous and contrary to
the "benevolent and munificent intentions" of Section 11 of P.D. 1146.
Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit
nor specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete
the 15 years of service.

The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the

questioned provision being generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146 has
general application, thus respondent CSC has no authority to limit through CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27 the privilege under said section to government
employees who lack just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.

The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public respondent
CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, it is vested with the
power and authority, among others, to grant or allow extension of service
beyond retirement age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). In
interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public respondent CSC contends
that the phrase "Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he
shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years", is
qualified by the clause: "Unless the service is extended by appropriate
authorities," which means that the extension of service must be first authorized
by the Commission, as the appropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par.
(b), P.D. 1146, before the service of a compulsory retiree (one who has already
reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years of service) can be extended.

We grant the petition.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to
authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the
extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 without having completed 15 years of services, when said limitation
has no relation to or connection with the provision of the law supposed to be
carried into effect.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the

Administrative Code of 1987 provides thus:

"SEC. 12. Powers and Functions.- The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
"(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters
in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;"

As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot

authorize the modification of an express provision of a special law (Revised
Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose of
the provisions on retirement and pension of the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and
meaningless.

Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of

1977 expressly provides, thus:

"SEC. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. - (a) Old-age pension shall be paid
to a member who:
xxx xxx xxx
"(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years
of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years." (Emphasis
supplied)

Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing

retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve
the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and
well?being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor
General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957,
June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).
The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a
pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a double
purpose: (1) to entice competent men and women to enter the government
service, and (2) permit them to retire from the service with relative security, not
only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have
been incapacitated by illness or accident.

We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or

establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of the Judiciary who
lacked the age and service requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason
to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch, as
in the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but opted to avail of the
statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the
service to complete the 15-year service requirement in order to avail of old-age
pension.

In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana,

Adm. Matter No. 5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, the Court,
applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana, who at the time of his
courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986 lacked a few months to meet the age
requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits
under R.A. 910 because his accrued leave credits would have entitled him to go
on leave until beyond the age requirement for retirement.

The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for Retirement
under Rep. Act No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No. 6484-Ret., May 15, 1989. By
liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended, in favor of the persons
intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed the conversion of the
application for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto Martin under said Section
3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year lump sum without the lifetime annuity) into
an application for voluntary retirement under Section 1 (5-year lump sum with
lifetime annuity) eleven years after his disability retirement was approved on
January 10, 1978 (In Re: Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910.
Ruperto G. Martin, applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he
had received was considered by the Court as payment under Section 1 of the
five-year lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his monthly pensions for
the next five years.
However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No.
2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and its six (6) companion cases, 187 SCRA 469, that
when the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired
Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception.
The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or
length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on a case to case basis.

There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the

Executive Branch, on a case to case basis, to continue in the service to complete
the 15-year service requirement to avail of the old-age pension under Section 11
of P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only one (1) year would
defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.

In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to

continue in the service to complete the 15-year service, there must be present an
essential factor before an application under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may
be granted by the employer or government office concerned. In the case of
officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for lack
of required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was
marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re:
Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must be so in the instant case.

It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the fifteen years" found in Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a
reproduction of the phrase in the original text found in Section 12 (e) of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise known as the “Government
Service Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing in
the original text as well as in the revised version which would serve as the basis
for providing the allowable extension period to only one (1) year. There is
likewise no indication that Section 11 par.(b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a
borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has
completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of government service., i.e. only
a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to
collect an old-age pension.

While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service
Commission the authority "to take appropriate action on all appointments and
other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service
beyond retirement age", the said provision cannot be extended to embrace
matters not covered by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977
(Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46).
The authority referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect what the
special law, Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other
retirement law being invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law.

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the

nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that
administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People vs.
Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42
SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusto Toledo vs. Civil
Service Commission, et al., G.R. No-92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely
applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of Toledo that the rule
prohibiting 57-year old persons from employment, reinstatement, or re-
employment in the government service provided under Section 22, Rule III of
the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be
accorded validity, because it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service
Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement
and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law
which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thru Justice Edgardo
L. Paras, stated, thus:

"The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law
or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution,
not to supply perceived omissions in it. ‘By its administrative regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act
of Congress.’ (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine
Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo,
109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174
SCRA 214, 223?224 [1989] in turn citing Teoxon).
"The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of
the invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said
section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the
part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relation to or
connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The
section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of
carrying it into effect." (Emphasis supplied)

The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known
as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977”. The rule on
limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of
service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot
likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to or connection with
any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an
addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.
The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in
P.D. 1146.

As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 in
two (2) recent cases where We allowed two employees in the Judiciary who have
reached the age of 65 to continue in the government service to complete the 15-
year service requirement to be entitled to the benefits under P.D. 1146.

In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, We allowed

Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Dagami,
Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of 65 years on October 16, 1987 had
only 10 years of government service, to continue her services until October 10,
1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5 years, to complete the 15-year service
requirement to be entitled to the retirement benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of
P.D. 1146. The Court observed that Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties
without any adverse complaints from her superior and that she is physically fit
for work per report of the Medical Clinic.

The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re:
Request for the extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, allowed Mrs.
Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V, Budget Division, Fiscal Management
and Budget Office of the Supreme Court to continue her services until February
10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years, 10 months and 13 days because
she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17 days of government service
at the time she reached the age of 65 years on March 29, 1991 in order that she
be entitled to the retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146.

It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9 months

and 6 days of government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which
provides that “a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than
15 years of service at the time of separation shall, x x x upon separation after age
sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation
for every year of service."

The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him
to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year of service
consistent with the beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is
subject to the discretion of the government office concerned.

Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein petitioner
Cena, because he opted to continue in the service to complete the 15-year
service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The
completion of the 15-year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b) partakes
the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee
opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to the benefits of the old-age
pension. On the other hand, if the said employee opted to retire upon reaching
the compulsory retirement age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of
service, he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D.
1146, i.e. a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for
every year of service.

The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly situated,
so it does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law.
There is nothing absurd or inequitable in rewarding an employee for completion
of the 15-year service beyond the retirement age. If he would be better off than
the one who has served for 14 years but who is separated from the service at the
age of 64, it would be only just and proper as he would have worked for the
whole period of 15 years as required by law for entitlement of the old-age
pension. Indeed, a longer service should merit a greater reward. Besides, his
entitlement to the old-age pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus,
if the service is not completed due to death or incapacity, he would be entitled
to the benefit under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. a cash equivalent to 100% of his
average monthly compensation for every year of service.

Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D.
1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by Memorandum Circular No. 65
issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988.
Memorandum Circular No. 65 allowing retention of service for only six (6)
months for "extremely meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees or
officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who,
at the same time, have completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement
purposes. It should not apply to employees or officials who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age
pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case, they are allowed,
at the discretion of the agency concerned, to complete the 15-year service
requirement.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority

(LRA) of the Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner
Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government
service to complete the 15-year service so that he may retire with full benefits
under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon,
and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Padilla, see concurring opinion.
Grino-Aquino, Romero, JJ., see separate dissenting opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
 The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution No. 90-935 dated
October 17, 1990 of the Civil Service Commission, is whether the government service of
petitioner Gaudencio Cena as Registrar of Deeds for Malabon, Metro Manila, may be
extended for a period of one (1) year only (from January 22, 1991 up to January 22,
1992) and not for as long as necessary to enable him to complete 15 years service so
that he may retire with full benefits.
After a careful consideration of related provisions of the retirement laws, I Submit
that inasmuch as P.D. No. 1146 is silent on the matter, the Civil Service Commission,
pursuant to the authority granted to it in the Administrative Code of 1987, "to take
appropriate action on x x x all personnel matters in the Civil Service, including extension
of service beyond retirement age" (paragraph 14, Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V), appropriately promulgated Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990,
limiting the extension of service to "not exceeding one year." The pertinent provisions of
the circular are quoted below:
"1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete
the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to
permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period
not exceeding one (1) year.
“2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete
the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement who entered the
government service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to
appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.
“3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years
service requirement for retirement shall be filed not later than three (3) years
prior to the date of compulsory retirement.
“4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets
the minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes may be
granted for six (6) months only with no further extension." (pp., 64-65, Rollo;
emphasis supplied.)
The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one year" fixed in paragraph 1
of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 is reasonable, just, and consistent with the
general rule that "retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at the age of 65 years"
(Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).
I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline
situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14,
but less than 15, years of government service, or a few months short of the 15-year
requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the
beneficent objectives of our retirement laws, said retiree may be granted an extension
of not more than one year to enable him to complete 15 years of government service
and receive full retirement benefits including old-age pension which, otherwise, he
would not be entitled to receive. Such extension will enable him to retire after his 65th
birthday, but before he attains 66 years of age, hence, still within the mandatory
retirement age of 65 years fixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon
reaching his 65th birthday until the eve of his 66th.
Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the government for a total
of only 11 years, 9 months and 6 days, he is not entitled to an extension of his service
to complete 15 years for it would illegally and unreasonably stretch his retirement age
beyond his 68th birthday, or long after he shall have ceased to be 65 years old.
As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of government service even if he
were given a one-year extension of service, paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 27 may not be availed of by him. The applicable legal provision to him would be
paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has
rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service, at the time of
separation shall, x x x upon separation after age sixty,* receive a cash payment
equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service." He
is not entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being the determinant of whether
or not a retired employee would be entitled to such pension.
The petitioner’s theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is 65 years old) should
be allowed an extension of his service for any number of years to complete the 15-year-
service requirement under Section 11(b), P.D. 1146, can produce absurd and
inequitable results. An employee who has rendered only 3 years of government service
at the age of 65 can have his service extended for 12 years and finally retire at the age
of 77 and receive a life pension, while one who has served for 14 years, but whose
service is terminated by death or incapacity at the age of 64, will only receive a cash
gratuity equivalent to one month pay for every year of service in the government,
without a life pension, under Section 12, paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that
extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give
a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against
those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and
of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified
young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government
examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long
passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government
service to complete 15 years, so they may qualify for old-age pension.
While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission that an extension of
service may not exceed one year, I do not agree with the grant to Cena of a service
extension of one (1) year from January 23, 1991, or until January 22, 1992 under
paragraph 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 27 for that paragraph should apply to a
compulsory retiree who needs an extension of "not exceeding one year" (Cena needs
more than 3 years) to complete the 15-year-service requirement for old-age pension
benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65-year-old retiree a one-year extension of
service, if, anyway, as in Cena’s case, the extension will not enable him to complete 15
years of government service. Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D.
1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered x x x less than 15 years of
service upon separation after age sixty, (shall) receive a cash payment equivalent to
100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service."
I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.

*
Separation at age sixty-five is separation “after age sixty."

CONCURRING OPINION

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D. Medialdea, with a slight
modification. The majority opinion would vest upon the Land Registration Authority "the
discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his eleven (11) years, nine (9)
months and six (6) days of government service to complete the fifteen (15) years
service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146"
(decision, p. 16). A reading of the cited provision of law which reads as follows:
"SEC. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
xxx xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years
of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years."
would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee who has reached sixty-five
(65) years of age but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, has THE
RIGHT to continue in the service to complete fifteen (15) years, and that the
government office or agency where he is employed cannot but allow the exercise of
such right of the subject employee. In short, the employing government office or agency
must allow the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but
has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, the opportunity to complete the
fifteen (15) years of service in order to enjoy the benefits of old-age pension. It follows
from this that if such government employee is no longer fit to complete the remainder of
the fifteen (15) year service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated for cause,
after appropriate proceedings, otherwise, he has the right to continue in the service for
purposes of completing his fifteen (15) years of service.

DISSENTING OPINION

ROMERO, J.:

I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague, J.

Carolina Griño-Aquino, which are at once logical and reasonable even as it takes into
account the sociological implications of a contrary ruling. At the same time, I add my
own.
J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of practically all existing
retirement laws fixing the compulsory retirement age of government employees at sixty-
five. The precursor of Presidential Decree No. 1146, Commonwealth Act No. 186,
explicitly provided that retirement should be "automatic and compulsory at the age of
sixty-five years." The phrase "automatic and compulsory” with reference to the
retirement age of sixty-five years had been retained in subsequent amendatory laws,
specifically Republic Act Nos. 660, 728 and 3096.
The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal signification: involuntary or
forced in in contradistinction to voluntary.[1] Considering the use of the word
"compulsory" in connection with age sixty-five, the same word in Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146 should refer only to the specified retirement age and not to the fifteen-year service
mentioned therein. This paragraph merely cites one class of prospective retirees which
would be eligible to receive old-age pension and that is, those who have reached the
age of sixty-five years while at the same time having to their credit "at least fifteen years
of service." That this is the intendment of the law is borne out by the succeeding proviso
that contemplates the possiblity that the same sixty-five year old may have served "less
than fifteen years of service."
Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and the fifteen-year
length of service should concur before a government employee is allowed the old-age
pension may well give rise to a situation wherein a person who enters government serv-
ice a year before reaching age sixty-five would have to wait until he is seventy-nine
years old to be entitled to the old-age pension provided for in P.D. No. 1146, which is an
absurdity. Hence, to give substance to the real signification of the law, the proviso in
Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government employee who has "less than fifteen years
of service, x x x shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen
years," should contemplate a situation wherein the employee has only a minimal period
of time left to complete the fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is the Civil
Service Commission has correctly declared to be "not exceeding one year." Otherwise,
the government may well be saddled with a corps of civil servants that may be regarded
graphically as liabilities instead of assets.
Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the age of sixty-five
years would, in effect, swell the numbers of the qualified but unemployed many who
even now, face the bleak prospect of being edged out of the labor market by those who
can but offer to the government and the people their diminishing physical and mental
vitality.
Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is in consonance
with the present policy on retirement as well as trends being laid down by the other
branches of the government on the matter.
For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lower the
compulsory retirement age of the bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769 sponsored by
Congressman Roco and other Congressmen would lower it from sixty-five to sixty.[2]
Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is Senator Tamano,
likewise would amend the present law by lowering the compulsory age of retirement to
sixty.[3]
House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort and Estrella would
further reduce the compulsory retirement age to fifty-six in order to give the young
retirees the opportunity to engage in gainful employment or otherwise utilize their skills
and experiences while they are still relatively strong.
Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code would set the
compulsory age of retirement at sixty.
On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not served fifteen
years should be allowed an extension for as long as necessary to enable him to
complete the fifteen years of service required for entitlement to a life pension (which is
the position of the petitioner) or just a maximum period of "not exceeding one year" as
fixed in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported by the dissenting
opinion, it is worthwhile calling attention to Memorandum Circular No. 65[4] issued by
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig. Amending Memorandum Circular No. 163
dated March 5, 1968, it categorically states:
"Officials or employees who have reached, the compulsory retirement age of 65
years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious
reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months."
According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employees or officials
who have reached the compulsory, retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same
time, have completed the 15-year service requirement for requirement purposes." A
close reading of the title of Memorandum Circular No. 65, as well as the relevant
provision quoted above, leaves no room for ambiguity or interpretation inasmuch as
there is no phrase that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years " but who, at the same time, have
completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." To read into the
Memorandum Circular this qualifying phrase is to unduly expand the coverage of the
law to cases not intended by the Office of the Executive Secretary.
The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed the officials
and employees of the Judiciary who have reached the compulsory age of retirement but
lacked the fifteen-year service requirement to continue working until they complete said
period, there is "no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of
the Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner Cena". But there is cogent reason.
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of the Land Registration Authority
under the Department of Justice, falls under the Executive Department. Accordingly,
Memorandum Circular No. 65 quoted in the above preceding paragraph which allows a
retention or extension of only six months and this only for "extremely meritorious
reasons" should be applicable to his case.
Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in the
government if this rule could be rationalized and applied uniformly to all government
employees with the exceptions provided by law.

[1]
8 Words and Phrases 465 and 15A C.J.S. 312 both citing State v. Bradley, 230 P. 2d 216, 220.
[2]
The pertinent provision is reproduced below:

(INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMEN ROCO, BAUTISTA, SR., PONCE DE LEON,

BELTRAN, JR., MONFORT, CONGRESSWOMAN PLAZA (C), CONGRESSWOMEN JAVIER
 (R), BANDON, JR., ANIAG, JR., CONGRESSWOMEN COSETENG, LOBREGAT,
CONGRESSMEN DANS, MITRA, DRAGON, BACALTOS, MONTEJO, MIRAN, VALDEZ,
MASKARINO, TY, PUZON, CALINGASAN, PALACOL, DOMINGUEZ, ROMERO, YULO,
MENDIOLA, DIMAPORO (M.A.B.), NAVARRO, SR., ROXAS, JR., CONGRESSWOMAN
RAYMUNDO, CONGRESSMEN GILLEGO, MARTINEZ, JR., TIROL, BORJAL, LACSON,
DUREZA, DEL MAR, BAGATSING (A), ESTRELLA (E), CONGRESSWOMEN ALMARIO,
LABARIA, CONGRESSMEN WEBB, NOGRALES, SINGSON (L.) AND VILLAREAL, SR. PER
COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 1318)

"SEC. 11. Conditions for [Old-Age Pension] OPTIONAL AND COMPULSORY

RETIREMENT. - (a) [Old-age pension] OPTIONAL RETIREMENT shall be [paid] AVAILABLE
to a member who:
“(1) Has at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service;
“(2) Is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and
“(3) Is [separated from] LEAVING the service.
"(b) [Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,] Retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age with at least [fifteen] TWELVE
years of service: Provided, That, if he has less than [fifteen] TWELVE years of service, he
shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the [fifteen] TWELVE years:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL SERVICES RENDERED IN THE GOVERNMENT
IRRESPECTIVE OF STATUS OF APPOINTMENT DULY ACCREDITED SHALL BE
COUNTED AS GOVERNMENT SERVICE FOR RETIREMENT UNDER THIS ACT;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT ALL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WHO, AT THE TIME OF
THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT, ARE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE SHALL
RETIRE UNDER THE FOLLOWING PHASES:
“(1) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-FOUR TO SIXTY-FIVE YEARS OLD SHALL
BE RETIRED ON THE FIRST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACT;
“(2) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-TWO TO SIXTY-THREE YEARS OLD
SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE SECOND YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION; AND
“(3) THOSE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE THIRD YEAR
OF IMPLEMENTATION, "PROVIDED, FINALLY, THAT PAYMENT OF ALL RETIREMENT
BENEFITS TO A RETIREE SHALL BE MADE IN LUMP-SUM AND PAID NOT LATER THAN
THE EFFECTIVITY DATE OF HIS RETIREMENT."
[3]
The pertinent provision runs thus:

"Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.?

(a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who:

(1) has at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service;
(2) is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; And
is separate from the service.

(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be

compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age with at least [fifteen]
 TWENTY years of service; Provided, That if he has less than [fifteen] TWENTY years of
service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the [fifteen] TWENTY
years."
[4]
This Circular states:

"MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 65

FURTHER AMENDING CIRCULAR NO. 163, DATED MARCH 5, 1968, AS AMENDED,

PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE RETENTION IN THE SERVICE OF PERSONS WHO
HAVE REACHED THE COMPULSORY RETIREMENT AGE OF 65 YEARS.

WHEREAS, this Office has been receiving requests for reinstatement and/or retention in
the service of employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years,
despite the strict conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5,
1968, as amended.

WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more Strictly to the
law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely meritorious
cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months only.

WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 on the

retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows:

‘Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65

years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in
which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.’

All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government

including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to require
their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular.

This Circular shall take effect immediately.

By authority of the President

(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.

Executive Secretary

Manila, June 14, 1988"

314 Phil. 577 Commented [a5]: Inapplicability of the Cena doctrine. (Davao
Utility Worker denied of extension of government service)

EN BANC
G.R. No. 111812, May 31, 1995
DIONISIO M. RABOR, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor,

Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April
1978 at the age of 55 years.

Sometime in May 1991,[1] Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the

Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement,
considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and
seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government
service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of
Membership"[2] issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS")
and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a
typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15
years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the
following date "2/28/91."

Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the
Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City
("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to
what action [should] be taken on this matter."

In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised

Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:

"Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to

M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is
hereunder quoted:
'Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious
reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.'

IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr.

Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-
extend[i]ble."[3]

Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July

1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for
work effective August 16, 1991."[4]

Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14
August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Government until
he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the
Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws
given to employees of the Government." The extension he was asking for was
about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to
perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor
sought "extension of [his] service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No.
65 of the Office of the President."[5] This request was denied by Director Cawad
on 15 August 1991.

Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992
seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The
Office of the President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission on 5 March 1992.

In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission
dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad
embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:

"In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering

services as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year service
requirement under P.D. 1146.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part:

'1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the
fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to
permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not
exceeding one (1) year.'

Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for
retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given due
course."[6] (Underscoring in the original)

On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-

594 of the Civil Service Commission this time invoking the Decision of this
Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission. [7] Petitioner also asked for reinstate-
ment with back salaries and benefits, having been separated from the
government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Commission.

Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the
Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he be allowed to continue rendering
service to the Davao City Government as Utility Worker in order to complete
the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request
was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated 19 May
1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that, under Cena, grant of the
extension of service was discretionary on the part of the City Mayor, but that he
could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's letter, in relevant part,
read:

"The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, in the advent of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legal
opinion. Both the City Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission are one in these opinion that extending you an appointment in order that
you may be able to complete the fifteen-year service requirement is discretionary [on the part of]
the City Mayor.

Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are that we

can no longer do so. As you are already nearing your 70th birthday may no longer be able
to perform the duties attached to your position. Moreover, the position you had vacated was
already filled up.

We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your

request."[8] (Italics supplied)

At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a

Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993 appealing from Civil Service Resolution No.
92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993.

The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements
for instituting a special civil action of certiorari to review the assailed Resolution
of the Civil Service Commission. In turn, the Commission was required to
comment on petitioner's Letter/Petition. [9] The Court subsequently noted
petitioner's Letter of 13 September 1993 relating to compliance with the
mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk of Court to advise
petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask for legal assistance from
the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). [10]

The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
its comment on 16 November 1993. The Court then resolved to give due
course to the Petition and required the parties to file memoranda. Both the
Commission and Mr. Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did so.

In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within
the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission.[11]

Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from
Cena. The Commission, through the Solicitor General, stressed that in Cena, this
Court had ruled that the employer agency, the Land Registration Authority of
the Department of Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the
extension requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen not
to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the
instant case, the Davao City Government did exercise its discretion on the
matter and decided to deny the extension sought by petitioner Rabor for
legitimate reasons.

While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it
must reexamine the doctrine of Cena and the theoretical and policy
underpinnings thereof.[12]

We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.

Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon,

Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his
government service would have reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9)
months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the
Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the
fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the full benefit of
an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request
were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15
April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68) years.

The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on
whether or not Cena's request could be granted considering that Cena was
covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October
1990, the Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from
22 January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular No. 27.
Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without success. He then came to
this Court, claiming that he was entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three
(3) months and twenty-four (24) days to complete the fifteen-year service
requirement for retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146.

This Court granted Cena's petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking
through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the
same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service
required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age
Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for
such period of time as may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen
(15)-year service requirement. The Court also held that the authority to grant
the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the agency
concerned. Thus the Court concluded:
"Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority
(LRA) and Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner
Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government
service to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may retire with full
benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146." [13] (Italics supplied)

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and
ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be
quoted in its entirety:

"Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. -- (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a
member who

(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;

(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and

(3) is separated from the service.

(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be

compulsory for an employee at sixty-five (65) years of age with at least fifteen
(15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of
service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen
(15) years." (Italics supplied)

The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has
often been invoked in respect of retirement statutes:

"Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a]

retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of
persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve
the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-
being of government employees may be enhanced."[14] (Citations omitted)

While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and
still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the
extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-
five (65) years of age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990, which should be quoted in its entirety:
"TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND
AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL/LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS
SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the
Fifteen Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes

Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil Service
Commission hereby adopts and promulgates the following policies and
guidelines in the extension of services of compulsory retirees to complete the
fifteen years service requirement for retirement purposes:

1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete

the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to
permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period
not exceeding one (1) year.

2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete

the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement who entered the
government service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to
appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.

3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years
service requirement of retirement shall be filed not later than three (3) years
prior to the date of compulsory retirement.

4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets
the minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes may be
granted for six (6) months only with no further extension.

This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately." (Italics supplied)

The second administrative issuance — Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the
Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988 — provides:

"x x x xxx xx
x

WHEREAS, this Office has been receiving requests for reinstatement and/or
retention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in
Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.

WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly
to the law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely
meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6)
months only.

WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 on

the retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows

'Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65

years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious
reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.'

All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the

government including government-owned or controlled corporations, are
hereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply with this
circular.

This Circular shall take effect immediately.

By authority of the President

(Sgd.)
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary
Manila, June 14, 1988."[15] (Italics supplied)

Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative
regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27
and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular
No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.

We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No.

27. Medialdea, J. wrote:

"The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the

nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that
administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v.
Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42
SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). x x x.
The rule on limiting to one year the extension of service of an employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less
than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.
1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection with
any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or
extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service
Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146." [16]
(Italics supplied)

It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission

Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of what
subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and
valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling in
People v. Exconde,[17] where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the
latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes."[18] (Italics supplied)

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,[19] the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order

which established passing a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for admission into
medical schools in the Philippines, said:

"The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making
authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are
necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice
Fernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]) -?

'The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to
be attained in Calalang v. William is "safe transit upon the roads." '

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the
1959 Medical Act: 'the standardization and regulation of medical education' and in Section
5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together
are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle."[20] (Citations
omitted; underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied)

In Edu v. Ericta,[21] then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very
general nature of the standards which our Court has in prior caselaw upheld as
sufficient for purposes of compliance with the requirements for validity of
subordinate or administrative rule-making:

"This Court has considered as sufficient standards, 'public welfare,' (Municipality

of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]); 'necessary in the
interest of law and order,' (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]); 'public
interest,' (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]); and 'justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case,' (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of
Labor, 17 Phil. 602 [1940])."[22] (Italics supplied)

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail

in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems
clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to
begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing
administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative
bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any
relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule?making
by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be
reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in
respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to
this test we now turn.

We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is

the present Civil Service law — found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of
Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 — and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known
as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of
extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is
an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D.
No. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the
present civil service law.

Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative
Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:

"Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. — The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans
and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the
government;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and
retention of a qualified and competent work force in the public service;

xxx xxx xxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in
the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;

xxx xxx xxx

(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees, and
accredit government services and evaluate qualifications for retirement;

xxx xxx xxx

(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other
functions as may be provided by law." (Italics supplied)

It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative
Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular
No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel
agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and
guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the
government."[23] It was also discharging its function of "administering the
retirement program for government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing]
qualifications for retirement."

In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative

Code with providing leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of
qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the
"enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the
regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and
employees" (Section 16 [14]).

We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions

of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no
reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the
present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes
associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and
quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy
considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the
maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were
summarized by Griño-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena:

"Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission
that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year
would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect
discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the
latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified
young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government
examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees' who have long
passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their
government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age
pension."[24] (Italics supplied)

Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something
that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to
note that there should be countervailing stress on the interests of the employer
agency and of other government employees as a whole. The results flowing
from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as
suggested by Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino in her dissenting opinion. An
employee who has rendered only three (3) years of government service at age
sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and finally
retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the
general principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the
vanishing point.

The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel
administration and management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena
is considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission.[25] Toledo
involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of
persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service without prior
approval of the Civil Service Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be
appointed to the Civil Service provided that the exigencies of the government
service so required and provided that the appointee possesses special
qualifications not possessed by other officers or employees in the Civil Service
and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or
employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the
Education and Information Division of the Commission on Elections when he
was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointment had
been obtained either from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil
Service Commission and the Commission found that the other conditions laid
down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless
struck down Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view of
permissible administrative legislation that Cena relied on. [26]

When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange
results follow. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of
age may be appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may
demand extension of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at
age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general statutory policy of
compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively
becomes unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody
the notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government
service and that opportunities for government service should be distributed as
broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our
population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same general policy also
reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower than
the life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe, North
America and Japan.

Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to
this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990,
more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and
effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together
with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena
that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary
authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee
who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15)
years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised
conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990.

We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular

No. 65 of the Office of the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from
the text quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular
No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum Circular No. 163, also of the
Office of the President, dated 5 March 1968) [27] does not purport to apply only to
officers or employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who
have at least fifteen (15) years of government service. We noted earlier that Cena
interpreted Memorandum Circular No. 65 as referring only to officers and
employees who have both reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five
(65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so
interpreted this Memorandum Circular precisely because Cena had reached the
conclusion that employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but
who have less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed
such extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years of
service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way
as to comport with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that
Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that we today reached in the
instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely obiter.

We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service

Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of the President's
Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question must be reserved for detailed
analysis in some future justiciable case.

Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we
believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April
1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of
CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., vote to grant the petition for the same reasons stated in my
concurring opinion in Cena vs. CSC reported in 211 SCRA 192.
Quiason, J., on leave.

[1] Annex "A," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 4.

[2] Annex "A-1," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 5.

[3] Annex "B," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 6.

[4] Annex "B-1," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 7.

[5] Annex "C," Letter/Petitioner, Rollo, p. 8.

[6] CSC Resolution No. 92-594, Rollo, pp. 11-12.

[7] 211 SCRA 179 (1992).

[8] Rollo, p. 3.

[9] Supreme Court Resolution dated 24 August 1993, Rollo, p. 17.

[10] Rollo, p. 40-A.

[11] 211 SCRA 179 (1992).

Two (2) Justices dissented — Griño-Aquino and Romero, JJ. -- from the
[12]

Cena decision.

[13] 211 SCRA at 192.

[14] 211 SCRA at 186.

[15] 211 SCRA at 200-201.

[16] 211 SCRA at 190.

[17] 101 Phil. 1125 (1957).

[18] 101 Phil. at 1129.

[19] 152 SCRA 730 (1987).

[20] 152 SCRA at 740-741.

[21] 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

[22] 35 SCRA at 497 (note 43).

See Addendum to Comment filed by Civil Service Commission dated 5

[23]

August 1991; Cena Rollo, p. 91.

[24] 211 SCRA at 196.

202 SCRA 507 (1991). We are not here, of course, reexamining Toledo for this
[25]

case is not, strictly speaking, involved at present. At the same time, we cannot
disregard the intellectual relevance of the doctrine in Toledo to the issues that we
are presently addressing.

[26] Toledo held:

"[Section 22, Rule III] is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission,
having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be
related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into
effect, such as a requirement, for instance, that age should be reckoned as a factor in the
employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a direction that there be a
determination of some point in a person's life at which he becomes
unemployable or employable [only] under specific conditions. x x x [S]ince there
is no prohibition or restriction on the employment of fifty-seven (57) year old persons x x x
there was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter."
(202 SCRA at 513-514, per Paras, J.; underscoring supplied)

[27] 64 Official Gazette 3295 (1 April 1968).

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC Commented [a6]: Petition granted. The decision of the Office of

the President declaring petitioner as compulsory retire as of Oct.
15, 1991 is set aside. Petitioner is actually retired as of April 30,
G.R. No. 104139 December 22, 1992 1992, and the latters decision was the reason petitioner was not
able to come to office and comply the necessary work hours. On
LYDIA M. PROFETA, petitioner, the other hand, SC held Lydia M. Profeta to have rendered the 25 yr
requirement to avail of the complete emoluments and benefits of
vs. pension under GSIS. No need for an extension.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President of
the Philippines, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a portion of the decision of the Office of the
President, dated 23 October 1991, declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October
1991 and the resolution dated 31 January 1992 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
said decision.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal Technological Colleges from
24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30 April 1979, petitioner was the
appointed Acting President of said College until her promotion to President of the same college on 1
May 1979.

After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner filed her courtesy resignation as
President of the Rizal Technological Colleges and the same was accepted on 21 March 1986. A day
before the acceptance of her courtesy resignation, petitioner applied for sick leave.

On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez
Institute of Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and was thereafter
appointed its President on 29 March 1989.

After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as to whether she may be allowed to extend her
services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years, to
enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146 (Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her query, petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return
to the service until she shall have fulfilled the fifteen (15) years service requirement pursuant of
Section 11 of PD 1146, to qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan. The GSIS declared that
petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she had not rendered the sufficient number
of years of service on the date of her supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable
service was only twelve (12) years and two (2) months. As things stood, she could only claim one
hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year of creditable service or
to a refund of her premium contributions with the GSIS. 1
On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
Secretary and the Board of Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino, through Deputy Executive
Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner as President of EARIST until she
shall have completed the required fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five
(65) years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an additional period of two (2)
years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days. 2

In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an administrative complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and
corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990, the Office of the President furnished
petitioner a copy of the complaint with a directive to file an answer thereto with the DECS Secretary,
who was duly authorized to conduct a formal investigation of the charges against petitioner. Pending
investigation of the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a period of
ninety (90) days. 3 After serving the period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her duties and functions
as President of EARIST.

In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Cariño recommended the compulsory retirement of
petitioner. 4

For the purpose of investigating the administrative charges against petitioner, 5 an Ad-Hoc Committee
was created by President Aquino on 12 February 1991. The parties filed their respective pleadings and
hearings in the case were conducted by the committee.

Pending resolution of the administrative charges against her, petitioner was detailed with the DECS
Central Office pursuant to a memorandum dated 13 February 1991 signed by Deputy Executive
Secretary Sarmiento III. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, seeking her reinstatement as EARIST President. After
trial, said petition was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
for certiorari on 2 April 1991. 6

Petitioner likewise assailed her reassignment with the DECS Central Office, before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). On 30 July 1991, the CSC denied petitioner's complaint. She moved for
reconsideration of said resolution but the same was denied on 3 December 1991, which prompted
petitioner to file a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 103271. On 3 March
1992, this Court dismissed said petition.

After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a decision 7 dated 23
October 1991, the Office of the President dismissed the administrative complaint against petitioner for
lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the Office of the President also declared petitioner as
compulsory retired from government service as of 15 October 1991, holding that:

... (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working days (approximately 3 months) were to
be added to the respondent's creditable service, together with the period of two (2)
weeks which the respondent's counsel admits in his Memorandum the respondent
had served as Professorial Lecturer, the respondent should be considered as
compulsorily retired as of Oct. 15, 1991, having completed the required 15 years in
the service on or about the said date after reaching the age of 65.

Accordingly, the administrative charges against Dr. Lydia M. Profeta for her alleged
"irregular appointment and graft and corrupt practices" are hereby dismissed.
However, Dr. Profeta is hereby considered as now compulsorily retired from the
service as of October 15, 1991, in accordance with the provisions of Section 11 (b) of
 Presidential Decree No. 1146, having completed fifteen (15) years in the government
service on or about he said date after reaching the age of sixty-five (65) on June 16,
1989. 8

In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner requested the GSIS to determine the exact date of her
retirement. On 5 November 1991, petitioner was advised by the GSIS that the exact date of her
retirement falls on 14 August 1992. 9

A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the Office of the President, assailing
the portion of its decision declaring her as compulsorily retired from the service as of 15 October
1991, alleging that the said office has no jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory retirement
from the government service.

In a resolution 10 dated 31 January 1992, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Office
of the President. In the same resolution, the Office of the President clarified that there was an over
extension of petitioner's period of service with the government by failure to reckon with the sixty-two (62)
working days during which petitioner went on sick leave (from 20 March to 17 June 1986) and the period
of two (2) weeks during which petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. In considering petitioner as
compulsory retired as of 15 October 1991, the Office of the President held that it merely resolvedmotu
proprio to shorten by three-and-a-half (3-1/2) months the extension granted to petitioner to complete the
required fifteen (15) years of service for purposes of retirement. It further declared that it is for the
President to determine whether or not petitioner could still continue as EARIST President despite her
exoneration from the administrative charges filed against her.

Under Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977), one of the
benefits provided for qualified members of the GSIS is the old-age pension benefit. A member who
has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service and is at least sixty (60) years old when separated
from the service, is entitled to a basic monthly pension for life but for not less than five (5) years. On
the other hand, a member who has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service but with at least
three (3) years of service and is sixty (60) years of age when separated from the service is entitled to
a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the average monthly compensation for
every year of service.

However, retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years
with at least fifteen (15) years of service. If he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen (15) years, 11 to avail of the old-age pension
benefit.

To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred compensation for
services performed and his right to it commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement system
and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to
be paid. Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or employment. They serve a public
purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and
remain in public employment and render faithful and efficient service while so
employed. 12 Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to
provide for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue
earning his livelihood. 13 The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in
order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees maybe enhanced. 14

In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
years, she had rendered less than the required fifteen (15) years of service under Section 11 of P.D.
1146. Thus, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension benefit, she was allowed to continue in the
service and her term as President of EARIST was extended until she shall have completed the
fifteen (15) years service requirement, or for an additional two (2) years, seven (7) months, and
twelve (12) days, as determined by the Office of the President.

This period of extended service granted to petitioner was amended by the Office of the President. In
resolving the administrative complaint against petitioner, the Office of the President, ruled not only
on the issues of alleged irregular appointment of petitioner and of graft and corrupt practices, but
went further by, in effect, reducing the period of extension of service granted to petitioner on the
ground that the latter had already completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D.
1146, and declared petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991.

In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until January 1992. However, the Office of
the President made a new computation of petitioner's period of service with the government, the
Office of the President included as part of her service the sixty-two (62) days sick leave applied for
by petitioner covering the period between 20 March to 17 June 1988 and her service as a lecturer of
approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months. As a result of this new
computation, petitioner's extension of service which was supposed to end in January 1992 was
reduced by the Office of the President by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months or until 15 October 1991.

On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the exact date of retirement of
petitioner fell on 14 August 1992. 15 Thus, the extension of service granted to petitioner by the Office of
the President for two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days which brought her services only
up to January 1992, would not enable herein petitioner to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement for purposes of retirement. To allow the Office of the President to shorten the extension of
service of petitioner by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months which consist of petitioner's sick leave and service
as lecturer, would further reduce petitioner's service with the government. Such reduction from petitioner's
service would deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the old-age pension plan, based on the
computation of the GSIS.

We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a
member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its
computation of a member's years of service with the government. 16 The computation of a member's
service includes not only full time but also part time and other services with compensation as may be
included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System. 17

The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17 June 1986 and her
part-time service as a lecturer f approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2)
months is not reflected in her service record. Said period should be considered as part of her service
with the government and it is only but proper that her service record be amended to reflect said
period of service.

We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of retirement failed to
take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which was not reflected in
her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner
from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30 April 1992.

The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October
1991 defeats the purpose for allowing petitioner to remain in the service until she has completed the
fifteen (15) years service requirement. Between the period of 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992,
petitioner should have been allowed to continue in the service to be able to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement; she was prepared to render services for said period but was not allowed
to do so; she should, therefore, the entitled to all her salaries, benefits and other emoluments during
said period (16 October 1991 - 30 April 1992). However, petitioner's claim for reinstatement to her
former position to enable her to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement for retirement
purposes is no longer possible, considering that she is deemed to have completed the said service
requirement as of 30 April 1992.

WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the President dated 23 October 1991
declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
declared to have been in the service as President of EARIST from 16 October 1991 until 30 April
1992 and therefore entitled to all salaries, benefits and other emoluments of said office from 16
October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In addition, she is declared as entitled to her old-age pension
benefits for having reached age 65 years while in the service with 15 years of service to her credit,
subject to her compliance with all applicable regulations and requirements of the GSIS.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 41-42

2 Ibid., p. 49

3 Rollo, p. 50

4 Ibid., pp. 82-83

5 Ibid., pp. 53-54

6 Comment, Rollo, pp. 118-120

7 Rollo, pp. 25-33

8 Ibid., p. 33

9 Rollo, p. 71

10 Rollo, pp. 35-38

11 Sections 11 & 12, PD 1146

12 Ortiz v. Comelec, G.R. No. 78957, 28 June 1998, 162 SCRA 812

13 Santiago v. COA, G.R. No. 92284, 12 July 1991, 199 SCRA 125

14 Ortiz v. Comelec, supra.

15 Rollo, p. 56

16 Section 24, PD 1146

17 Section 10, PD 1146

276 Phil. 127

EN BANC
G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991 Commented [a7]: Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner. The
position was then vacant and could be filled either by permanent
appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the
second position was only an extension of the petitioner's office as State
TEODORO J. SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have
been no need for his designation thereto. The second office was
AUDIT, AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, distinct and separate from his position in the Commission on Audit.
RESPONDENTS. For the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled
to additional compensation which, following the letter and spirit of
Section 9, should be included in his highest basic salary rate.
DECISION The law should be liberally construed in favour of the employees.

The GSIS is directed to compute his retirement benefits as the 13k++

CRUZ, J.: basis of his highest basic salary rate.

The basic issue presented in this case is the correct interpretation of Executive
Order No. 966, Section 9, providing as follows:

Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. - The compensation of salary or pay which
may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be limited to the highest
salary rate actually received by an official/employee as fixed by law and/or
indicated in his duly approved appointment. This shall include salary
adjustments duly authorized and implemented by the presidential issuance(s)
and budget circular(s), additional basic compensation or salary indicated in an
appointment duly approved as an exception to the prohibition on additional or
double compensation, merit increases, and compensation for substitutionary
services or in an acting capacity. For this purpose, all other compensation
and/or fringe benefits such as per diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay,
honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees, consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in
correcting and/or releasing examination papers shall not be considered in the
computation of the retirement benefits of an official/employee.

The question was raised by the petitioner in connection with the computation of
his retirement benefits which he claims was not made in conformity to the
above-quoted requirement.

The petitioner was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV

with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to the COA
Auditing Unit at the Department of Transportation and Communications and
detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority. On July 1, 1988, the
board of directors of the MIAA passed the following resolution: [1]

RESOLUTION NO. 88-70

RESOLVED, that, as recommended by Management, the designation of Mr.
Teodoro J. Santiago, Jr., as Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration, effective 15 August 1988, be approved, as it is hereby approved,
subject to the following conditions:
1. He will retain his plantilla position in COA;
2. His compensation from MIAA, shall be the difference between the salary
of AGM for Finance and Administration (MIAA) and that of State Auditor IV
(COA); and
3. His retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA.

This resolution was duly communicated to the COA on July 11, 1988, with a
request for the petitioner's indefinite detail to the MIAA. In reply, Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo wrote MIAA on July 14, 1988, as follows: [2]

x x x please be informed that we are authorizing such detail through appropriate

office order up to February 15, 1989. The order includes authority to collect
representation and transportation allowances (RATA) of P1,200.00 each month
and other allowances attendant to the position chargeable against the funds of
the NAIAA.
As regards your proposal that Mr. Santiago be allowed to collect the difference
in salary of his position in the COA as State Auditor IV and his designated
position as Assistant General Manager thereat, likewise chargeable against the
funds of that office, this Commission interposes no objection to the proposal to
pay him the difference between his present monthly salary of P7,219.00 and that
of Assistant General Manager which reportedly amounts to P13,068.00 a month
or a monthly difference of P5,849.00, provided that he is formally designated
(not appointed) Assistant General Manager by the Board of Directors, NAIAA,
and that payment of his salary differential is approved by the same office. xxx
xxx xxx.

On August 10, 1988, Secretary Reinerio O. Reyes, concurrently chairman of the

MIAA board of directors, issued an office order formally designating the
petitioner as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration,
effective August 16, 1988.
[3]

The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the differential salary of
P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total compensation of P13,068.00.
He received this compensation until December 5, 1988, when he was
transferred to the Presidential Management Staff under COA Office Order No.
88-11448 dated December 6, 1988.

On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government for 44
years.

In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service Insurance

System used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering this the highest
basic salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his employment.
[4]

The COA disagreed, however, and paid his retirement benefits on the basis of
only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV.
[5]

The petitioner requested recomputation based on what he claimed as his highest

basic salary rate of P13,068.00. This was denied on December 8, 1989, and he
was so notified on February 5, 1990. On March 7, 1990, he came to this Court
to seek reversal of the decision of the COA on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
We note at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the legality of the
petitioner's occupying the second position in the MIAA and receiving additional
compensation for his services therein. As the Solicitor General observed, "What
the petitioner was receiving from the MIAA was the additional compensation
allowed under Section 17 of Act No. 4187 which, in turn, is allowed under
Section 8, Paragraph B, Article IX of the Constitution." [6]

In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, this Court held that double appointments are not
[7]

prohibited as long as the positions involved are not incompatible, except that
the officer or employee appointed cannot receive additional or double
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. The additional
compensation received by the petitioners is not an issue in the case at bar
because of its express approval by the COA and the admission of the Solicitor
General that it is allowed under the cited provision.

More specifically, Section 17 of Act No. 4187 provides:

Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary notwithstanding, no full time
officer or employee of the government shall hereafter receive directly or
indirectly any kind of additional or extra compensation or salary including per
diems and bonuses from any fund of the government, its dependencies, and
semi-government entities or boards created by law except:
(1) Officers serving as chairman or members of entities and enterprise
organized, operated, owned or controlled by the government, who may be paid
per diem for each meeting actually attended or when an official travel;
(2) Auditors and accountants;
(3) Provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees;
(4) Employees serving as observers of the Weather Bureau; and
(5) Those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation by virtue of
the provision of this Act. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the additional
compensation received by the petitioner was merely an honorarium and not a
salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under the provision of Section 9
and so should not be added to his salary in computing his retirement benefits.

We cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is defined as something given

not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a
voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no
compensation in money. The additional compensation given to the petitioner
[8]

was in the nature of a salary because it was received by him as a matter of right
in recompense for services rendered by him as Acting Assistant General
Manager for Finance and Administration. In fact, even Chairman Domingo
referred to it in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary
differential."

The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner cannot invoke
Section 9 because he was not appointed to the second position in the MIAA but
only designated thereto. It is stressed that under the said provision, "the
compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement
benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed by law and/or
indicated in his duly approved appointment." The petitioner's additional salary
was fixed not in a duly approved appointment but only in a designation.

Belittling this argument, the petitioner maintains that there is no substantial

distinction between appointment and designation. He cites Mechem, who
defines appointment as "the act of designation by the executive officer, board or
body, to whom that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office." He also invokes Borromeo v.
[9]

Mariano, where this Court said that "the term 'appoint,' whether regarded in its
[10]
legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation
of an individual."

Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between appointment and

designation. While appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office, designation, on the
other hand, connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, usually by law,
upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment
(or election). Thus, the appointed Secretary of Trade and Industry is, by
[11]

statutory designation, a member of the National Economic and Development

Authority. A person may also be designated in an acting capacity, as when he is
[12]

called upon to fill a vacancy pending the selection of a permanent appointee

thereto or, more usually, the return of the regular incumbent. In the absence of
the permanent Secretary, for example, an undersecretary is designated acting
head of the department. [13]

As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho: [14]

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the
case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief
Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature.

Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in question, the term
"appointment" was used in a general sense to include the term "designation." In
other words, no distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of
Executive Order No. 966. We think this to be the more reasonable
interpretation, especially considering that the provision includes in the highest
salary rate "compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity."
This need not always be conferred by a permanent appointment. A contrary
reading would, in our view, militate against the letter of the law, not to mention
its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit seeks to extend the maximum benefits to
the retiree as an additional if belated recognition of his many years of loyal and
efficient service in the government.

As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated
Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration in the office
order issued by Secretary Reyes on August 10, 1988. The position was then
vacant and could be filled either by permanent appointment or by temporary
designation. It cannot be said that the second position was only an extension of
the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as
otherwise there would have been no need for his designation thereto. The
second office was distinct and separate from his position in the Commission on
Audit. For the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to
additional compensation which, following the letter and spirit of Section 9,
should be included in his highest basic salary rate.

It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied the second office not only for a
few days or weeks but for more than three months. His designation as Acting
Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration was not a mere
accommodation by the MIAA. On the contrary, in his letter to Chairman
Domingo requesting the petitioner's services, MIAA General Manager Evergisto
C. Macatulad said, "Considering his qualifications and work experience, we
believe that a finance man of his stature and caliber can be of great help in the
efficient and effective performance of the Airport's functions."
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because
their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort,
when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After
devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the
appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous
retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That
generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth
is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach
of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that
he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution is SET

ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING the computation of the
petitioner's retirement benefits on the basis of his Highest Basic Salary Rate of
P13,068.00. It is so ordered.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., on leave.

[1] Rollo, p. 20.

[2] Ibid., p. 22.
[3] Id., p. 24.
[4] Id., p. 26.
[5] id., pp. 27-28.
[6] Id., p. 65.
[7] 98 Phil. 705.
[8] McDonald v. Napier, 14 Ga 89.
[9] Public Office and Officers, Sec. 102.
[10] 41 Phil. 322.

Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 188; Gonzales, Political Law Review (1969),
[11]

pp. 184-185.
 Sec. 5, Chapter 2(C), Title II of Book V, Revised Administrative Code of
[12]

1987.
[13] Sec. 10(5), Chapter 2 of Book IV, Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
[14] 188 SCRA 158-159.
254 Phil. 846

EN BANC
G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989
ZAIDA G. RARO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(BUREAU OF MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES), RESPONDENTS.
Commented [a8]: 2 approaches:
…where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not
listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant's
working conditions….
- one, if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection
because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be
presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting
the ailment.

- two, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required

DECISION work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law
says so.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a
source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies
enforcing the employees' compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of
the principles of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in
the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the
present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in
employees’ compensation decisions.
**petitioner’s Tumor was not proved to be caused by her work in the
MGB. Her petition for disability benefits was denied by GSIS, affirmed
the same by SC.
SC: if the law is not enough, the remedy is in legislation. The court
cannot make a judicial legislation on the matter no matter how
imperative….
**read dissenting opinions of J. Paras, J. Sarmiento

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new

principle of "proof of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in
cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed
as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.
The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the
necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown,
it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting
the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof
of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the
law says so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by
the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional
office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from
severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take
sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She
was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from
brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning
power had been lost.

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission
resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.

The following issues are raised in this petition:

“1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during
employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.
“2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable
under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as
occupational disease." (p. 17, Rollo)

The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science
cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a
disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment
appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly
paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the
earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a
white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller
or a resident of a rural area.

It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable.

The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some

cancers as compensable, namely --

"Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

xxx xxx
16. Cancer of stomach and other
lymphatic and blood forming
vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses
17. Cancer of the lungs, liver and
brain.
xxx xxx
Woodworkers, wood products
industry carpenters, loggers and
employees in pulp and paper
mills and plywood mills.
Vinyl chloride workers, plastic
workers."
(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation)

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the

Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be
compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably
considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as
Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain
chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally
accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law re-
quires for others is proof.

The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.

Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines
defines "sickness" as follows:

ART. 167. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Title, unless the context
indicates otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof
by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and
approve occupational disease and work-related illnesses that may be considered
compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May 1,
1978)."

Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation

clearly defines who are entitled. It provides:

"SECTION 1.
xxx xxx .xxx
"(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex
"A" of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions." (Emphasis supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing - that
the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not
available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the
legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-
existent proof cannot be presumed.

In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G. R. No. 46684, April 27,
1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown
origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless
it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working
conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we
cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of
contracting the disease.

To understand why the "presumption of compensability" together with the host

of decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment."
provision the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go
into the distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the
present scheme.

On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel

scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted
a system based on social security principles. The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencies -- the Government Service Insurance
System and Social Security System -- under the Employees' Compensation
Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right
to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. (Sulit v.
Employees’ Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., G. R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988).

Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the

employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are
paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to
those who can prove entitlement.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed

the validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:

“We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against he

constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted
that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was
only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of
this law on appeal by certiorari.
"The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and
rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the
worker's constitutional rights."
xxx xxx xxx
"The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of
employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does
not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim.
There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker
simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission
which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and
medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of
benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of
death benefits has also been doubled.
"On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly
premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet
sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet
these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously
documented or long past claims.
"The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund
under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the
compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of
benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of
causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits.
"Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the
rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have
importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which
called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the
claimant, is now absent. x x x.”
"The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There
is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.
"The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen' s compensation is a matter
that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court.
Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its
presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is
preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments.
The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the
mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of
working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve
or amend the law, our duty is to apply it." (at pp. 4, 5, and 6).

The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial

to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread
misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and
power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of
favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the
employer which suffers if benefits are paid claimants who are not entitled under
the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims
approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative
proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government
institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund
against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee; this time
assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the important feature which
distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered

employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and
regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits
are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was
being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined
number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is
important in insuring the stability of the trust fund and making certain that the
system can pay benefits when due to all who are and in amounts fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the Iaw
to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the
State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not
covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund
which the tens of million of workers and their Families look for compensation
whenever covered accidents, diseases, and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if
increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to
those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after
proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such
a complex subject with such far reaching implications.

We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are
continually evaluating the acturial soundness of the trust funds they administer.
In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included
in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be
recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers,
increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret
that these are beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers

concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)] Nemaria v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases
with conclusions different from those stated above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision

of the public respondents is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,

Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., dissents in a separate opinion.
 DISSENTING OPINION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 27, 1981 of
respondent - Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 1692
entitled “Zaida G. Raro vs. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)”, which
dismissed the claim of petitioner Zaida G. Raro for compensation benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended for her ailment diagnosed as “brain tumor."
Petitioner assigns the following alleged, errors:
First
THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
BRAIN TUMOR IS ALLEGEDLY NOT A LISTED OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE, HENCE, PETITIONER IS REQUIRED TO PROVE BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY HER
EMPLOYMENT.
Second
THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
BRAIN TUMOR WHICH CAUSE IS UNKNOWN CANNOT BE CAUSED
BY THE NATURE OF PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT.
Third
THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING BRAIN TUMOR AS A BORDERLINE CASE, HENCE
COMPENSABLE.
Fourth
THE SYSTEM AND THE COMMISSION DISOBEYED THE
STATUTORY MANDATE THAT ALL DOUBTS SHALL BE RESOLVED
IN FAVOR OF LABOR AND IGNORED THE NATURE OF LABOR
LAWS AS SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS.
 The undisputed facts, summarized by the Office of the Solicitor-General, are as
follows:
Petitioner was hired as clerk on March 17, 1975 by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences at its office in Daet, Camarines Norte.
In the course of her employment, petitioner contracted an ailment which was
diagnosed as brain tumor. Petitioner stopped working because of said ailment.
On January 7, 1980, petitioner filed with respondent GSIS a claim for disability
benefits under P.D. 626, as amended.
On November 24, 1980, respondent GSIS denied petitioner's claim on the ground
that brain tumor was not an occupational disease. Respondent GSIS also denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, respondent ECC sustained the GSIS decision.
We find this petition impressed with merit.
While "brain tumor” is not expressly or specifically referred to as an occupational
disease, and while admittedly its precise causes are still unknown, We may say that the
disease is akin to “cancer of the brain" and should therefore be regarded as either
compensable or a borderline case. At any rate, the precise work of the petitioner at the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences consisted of the following:
“As Mining Recorder II, to record and file mining instruments and documents
in the Mining Recorder's Section and to type correspondence and other
documents pertaining to the same action. (See Petitioner's Brief, Rollo, p. 13).
It will readily be seen that her work required at times mental concentration.
Whether this is specifically causative of brain tumor is of course still unknown but
doubts must generally be resolved in favor whenever compensation for disease is
concerned. It would certainly be absurd to throw upon petitioner the burden of showing
that her work either caused or aggravated the disease, particularly when both the GSIS
and ECC profess ignorance themselves of the causes of the disease.
Nowhere is this truism more glaring than in cancer, the most dreaded of all diseases
mankind has ever known. Held the Supreme Court in the case of Acosta v. Employees'
Compensation Commission (L-55464, Nov. 12, 1981): "It is generally accepted that the
exact origin of practically all types of cancer is not yet determined. Scientists and
medical experts are still in the process of discovering the most effective cure for the
malady. With this backdrop, one should not expect ordinary persons to prove the real
cause of the ailment of the deceased when the experts themselves are still in the dark."
In a case like the present one, even medical experts have not determined its cause,
and therefore the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to require an
impossibility. Thus in the case of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation
Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, We ruled as
follows:
'While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation
espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned
under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be
challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists.
"x x x As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and
secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more
liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is
some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection, 103 SCRA 329, 336).
"x x x Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or
undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual
link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so
that those who have less in life will have more in law x x x.
"x x x The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an
award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment - the
cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical
science - was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his
working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially
considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the
intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material
resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the
cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment
compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not
having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275?276).
“x x x As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34
years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its
duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as
guaranteed by law,” (Ibid., p. 277).
In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria,[1] Petitioner versus Employees'.
Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of
Education and Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the
rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated:
"Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the
employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be
determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no
duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an
impossibility."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is my humble opinion that this petition should be
GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission
should be SET ASIDE and another should be rendered ordering the respondents to pay
the herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626
as amended.

[1] G.R. No. 57889

DISSENTING OPINION

SARMIENTO, J.:

I do not think that the Labor Code intended to do away with the "presumption of
compensability" prevailing under the old Workmen's Compensation Act. It must be
noted that as a social legislation, the Code is fundamentally a measure intended to
afford protection unto the working class. If any protection should be given to labor, it is
in workmen's compensation cases that protection is a felt need.
The primacy that the majority would give to the integrity of the trust fund "to which
the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever
covered accidents, diseases, and deaths occur"[1] is correct but, in my view, hardly the
point. In granting the petitioner compensation, I do not believe we would have
dissipated substantially the State Insurance Fund, and considering the fact that the
petitioner is a victim herself.
It must likewise be noted that the petitioner is suffering from cancer (brain tumor),
whose cause medical science is yet to unravel. It would then be asking too much to
make her prove that her illness was caused by work or aggravated by it, when experts
themselves are ignorant as to what brings it about.
I do not believe, finally, that the question is a matter for legislation. Compassion, it
is my view, is reason enough.
 Supreme Court of the Philippines

135 Phil. 95

G.R. No. L-26341, November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND IRENEA M. PABLO, FOR
HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN EDWIN AND
EDNA, ALL SURNAMED PABLO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter

referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City,
and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G.
Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed
Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial
expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount
of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as
amended.

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was
employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was
shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO
gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin
Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive
for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he
could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion
was, Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished
overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate
to the spot where Pablo was killed, there-were four "carinderias" the left side of
the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The
entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.

According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's
death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out
of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that
Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and
intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific" phrase "arising
[1]

out of and in the course of employment." The two component of the coverage
[2]

formula - "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" - are said to be
separate tests which must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be
[3]

forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual,
and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application or each of the two
portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected
injuries. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident,
[4]

and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to
the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. [5]

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the

course of employment" when it takes place within the period of them
employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he
ism fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. [6]

The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going &
coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an
employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded
from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts." This rule„ however,
[7]

admits of four well recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is
proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the
employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by
way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the
employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at
his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand
connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of
the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of
employment. [8]

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the

second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but
while using a customary means of ingress and egress.

This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber
Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil. There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while
[9]

proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell
into a ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which
he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which
caused the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his
employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant, thus:

"The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the
petitioner intimated that we do not of course mean to imply that an employee
can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That
depends on the nature of his, employment.' Considering the facts found by the
Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel was not under any shift routine;
that his assignment covered the entire working hours of the factory; that the
first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least
thirty minutes before the machine operates at full Speed or load; that the spot
where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is
immediately proximate this place of work, the accident in question must be
deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore
arose out of and in the course thereof. In Sailing vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R.
No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the
Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition,
compensation was allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in
going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer aril
commonly used by the latter's laborers."

In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz, which

[10]

concerned injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for

work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following
morning. Soon "after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing
about 2 1/2 meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad
that came from inside the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a
ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained"
injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced by an accident
'arising out of and in the course of employment,'" this Court reasoned thus:

"The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or

coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is 'work connected.' As
Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, 'the fact that the employee
is travelling to or from work on a public highway does not necessarily exclude
coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is
not enough to say, that the employee would not have been on the public
highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the
general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The
law, in effect, insures the employee against losses: arising from the perils of his
work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational
injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with something, not
merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to
warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has
been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have
caused or allowed to exist. Hence,

'It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have

involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the
premises and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the
employer should have removed the ice.' (Underscoring ours.)

"It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130
(June 30, 1956), We held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an
employee who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped
and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate and near the same. The
ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to
the gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his
inaction, he had, contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident.
"In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no
particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee
and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision
appealed from, the record does not show that the company 'had taken measures
to make the waiting place safe for the employees, neither does the record show
either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or
that said place was particularly unsafe."

Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and

text, it is not amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In
the precise area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence
of Federal and State precedents.

From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation

Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations:

"Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way
home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial
upheavals.
"The question here is limited to whether the injuries are 'in the course of’ and
not 'out of’ the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street
risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other similar
questions deal with the risk of injury or 'out of’ the employment. 'In the course
of’ deals mainly with the element of time and space, or 'time, place and
circumstances.’
"Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within
one hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the
question of 'in the course of’ the employment is flatly raised.
"Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of 'in the course of to
include these 'injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the,
moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives
early or late. These states find 'something sacred about the employment
premises and define 'premises' very broadly, not only to include premises owned
by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even
private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are
protected many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public
sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island,
all its streets are protected premises.
"There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable
distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme
Court of the United States has declared that if will not overturn any state
decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing
on rail-road 'tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but shown
by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a
train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an on-corning
train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as a causal
relation to the employment is discernible, no federal question arises.
"The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he
crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-
premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle
owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer’s
street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all
house or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is traveling for the
employer, i.e. traveling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time
from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is
on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where
the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use
there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their
own peculiar circumstances."

Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:

"The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an
employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while
coming to or going from his work, when, through off the actual premises of his
employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an
appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary,
convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress, either on land under the
control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied
consent of the employer."

On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR we find the following disquisition:

"The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award
in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to
which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C.L. 804. And they do not as a
general rule cover injuries received while going to or from so work on public
streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the employer's
premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the
employment, however, is one depending upon the facts of each case, and in
some cases, where an injury occurred while the employee was going to or from
work, but was in the street-in front of the employer's premises, it has been held
compensable.
"Thus, in the reported case (BARNETT V BRTILING CAFETERIA CO.,
ante, 85) the injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the
employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in
front of the employer's place of business, while on her way to report for duty,
and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of employment. The
court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee is injured while going
to or from his work to his house, or to or froth some point not visited for the
discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a
public highway, he does not come within the protection of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to this rule and that the
employment is not limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the
scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable
time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of
employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee
had not entered the employer’s place of business, and the sidewalk was a public
highway so much therefore as was in front of the employer’s place of business
was a necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business, and that the
sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the employer’s premises.
"In Industrial Commission v Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the
injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an
employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was
struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within a short
distance from the employer's plant, which was located at the dead end of a street
maintained by the employer from its plant the intersection with another street,
and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere except player's plant,
and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their
work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of an
industrial plant are such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given
course with reference to such conditions and environments, the pursuance of
such course is an implied obligation of the employer in his contract with such
employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering his employment, has
entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is pursuing a
course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within the
conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the
course of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to
such conditions and environments, there is a direct causal connection between
his employment and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial
injuries for which compensation has been provided by the Workmen's
Compensation Law."
99 C. J. S. at pp. 807-814, has this to say:
"It is laid down as a general rule, known as the 'going and coming rule, that, in
the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual
circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an
employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or
accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not arising out
of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof.
"However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is
subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature,
circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances
of the particular case, and the cause of the injury."

Jaynes vs. Potlatch Forests expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for
[11]

extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises"

injuries:

"We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-
premises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on
public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-
premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a
distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not
sound to say that while an employee is on a public highway he is always there as
a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right conferred by
his contract of employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is
on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he
would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered
employee should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights
to enter upon lands, or by the law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.
"A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of
employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the
necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or
may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason there is no
justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways and
private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference. Under
the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is obviously of
no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive."

Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule

exceptions:

"We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it
is not nearness, or even reasonable distance, or even the identifying or
surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied
itself that there is a distinct 'arising out of' or causal connection between the
conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the
occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of employment extends as
far as those conditions extend." (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965
ed, vol. 1, pp. 210-211)

We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.

An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered

an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, since the word "accident", is intended to indicate that "the act causing the
injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not
legally responsible."
[12]

In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected,
compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was
engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in coiling it on the deck of the boat
preparatory to passing it down a hatchway. He found the space necessary for
coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This
passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava
expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do
so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then,
with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the
passenger's 'brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was
adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit, the truck which
[13]

Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite

direction. The latter fumed around and immediately pursued the bus. He
overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The
driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore
nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed
the grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in
the course of employment.

In Galicia vs. Dy Pac, the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of
[14]

another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his
labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to
intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter
the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held com-
pensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an
accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that the fight
which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact
that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant."

In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the
assailant.

In A.P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol, the death of an employee-driver who, while
[15]

driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by

the Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the
employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.

In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera, that question was

[16]

raised. While the employee-driver was driving the bus, a passenger boarded it
and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the
passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger
shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the
cause of the assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose
from a personal grudge. The majority decision ruled the death
[17]

compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the
course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the
compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the
workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved
in favor of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's
declaration on the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There
are employments which increase the risk of assault on the person of the
employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm, sustained by the assaulted
worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to assault
supplies the link or connection between the injury and the
employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are
(a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs
having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject the employee to
the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which
expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members
of the community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi
driver or street car conductor.

It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because
of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The
first kind of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1)
jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's
property, that of carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed
to lawless or irresponsible members of the public, or that which subjects him to
increased or indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street
car conductor or taxi-driver;" (2) jobs where the employee is placed in a
[18]

dangerous environment; and (3) jobs of employees whose work takes them on
[19]

the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-
matter of a dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by a
workmen he has fired, or where the argument was over the performance of
work or possession of tools or the like, or where the violence was due to labor
disputes.[20]

In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to

have arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of
employment. This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any
proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come
within the provisions of the Act. According to this Court, "this statutory
[21]

presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the corresponding New
York provision of law, Larson has this to say:
"In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory
presumption in coverage has figured in unexplained accident cases. The
Massachusetts statute provides:

'In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is
physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions
of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the
injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to
injure or kill himself or another.'

"This provision was largely copied from the New York section on
presumptions, except that the New York act creates the presumption in all
cases, not merely those involving an employee's death or inability to testify.
"The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean
that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long
as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts
courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary
to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before the
presumption can attach. Otherwise the claimant widow would have merely to
say, 'My husband, who was one of your employee, has died, and I therefore
claim death benefits,' whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon
the employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the
environment.
"It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection
will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in
which claimant can show neither, that the injury occurred in the course of
employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has
no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury
occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will usually supply the
arising out-of-employment factor." Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law
(1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124

We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus
vs. Gunderman & Sons: [22]

"The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden
of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually, were sustained in
the course of his employment. 'It is not the law that mere proof of an accident,
without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the
Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol Laws, c. 67) that the accident arose out
of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently
held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the
conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of
the employment. Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory
presumption only where some connection appears between the accident and the
employment.'"

Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:

"The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of
employment,' was opened with the suggestion that, while 'course' and 'arising'
were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the
two factors should be observed in the various categories discussed.
"A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice,
have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged
into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a
sort of quantum theory of work-connection must be shown, and if the 'course'
quantity is very small, but the 'arising' quantity is large, the quantum will add up
to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the 'arising' quantity is very small
but the, 'course' quantity is relatively large.
"But if both the 'course' and 'arising' quantities are small, the minimum quantum
will not be met.
“As an example of the first, a strong 'arising' factor but weak 'course' factor, one
may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment
premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from
work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a
traffic jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through
the air from a blast on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment
standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on the
'premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal
relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the
weakness of the 'course' factor. Another example of the same kind of
balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to traveling men or
loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunk-houses. It was shown in the analysis of
these cases that, although the 'course' factor is on the borderline when the
employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the
injury to the conditions of employment - as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or
a straw falls into the bunk- house-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or
the employee is trapped in a burning hotel - will boost the case over the line to
success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a
hotel bath, coupled with a weak 'course' factor due to the absence of any direct
service performed for the employer at the time, will under present decisions add
up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an award. It was also
shown that when the 'course' element is strengthened by the fact that the
employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is
broader than when the employee, although living on the premises is not on call.
"A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a
borderline course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going
to and from work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is
unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the
direct performance of the work.
"As an example of the reverse situation, a strong 'course' element and a weak
'arising' element, one may recall the 'positional' cases discussed in section 10, as
well as the unexplained-fall and other 'neutral-cause' cases. Here the course of
employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the
midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is
very weak, since the source of the injury - whether a stray bullet, a wandering
lunatic, an unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken assault by a stranger is not
distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and is tied to the
employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to
this employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the
position to be hurt. Yet, since the 'course' element is so strong, awards are
becoming increasingly common on these facts.
"Incidentally, it may be observed that this 'quantum' idea forms a useful
yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding
compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above
standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal connection,
one can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a broad
construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v. General Electric, where the
course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was weak (setting
fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in
O'Leary v, Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment
consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the
arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited
from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak
(a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an
unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York.
"But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course
and arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not
found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an
employee who while combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently
struck her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts: as to course
of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to the course of
employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as to the
causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing
alone -- lunch period, care of appearance, negligence -- would not be fatal; there
are many awards in which one or another of these is present. But when all are
present, while an award is not impossible and could be defended on a point by
point basis, it can not be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent
lawyer." Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to
452.100.

In resume:

1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident

which arise out of and in the course of employment.

2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one
factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where
both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-
connected.

3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to

come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a
preliminary link must first be shown to exist between the injury and the
employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is
presumed to have arisen out of the employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is
present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place
where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.

5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes
from his place of work, is not of the employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises,
but while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of
ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of
employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection
between the work and the hazard.

7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the

Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of
assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the
assault.

From these milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar,
having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with
specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be
inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the
line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue
has been held to be usually one of fact.

We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where
Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road
where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO
road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable
assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out
that "even if the ownership of the road were open to question, there was no
doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the respondent for
the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make it to all intents and
purposes an extension of its premises," so that "the shooting a the deceased may
be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the
employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in
connection, with the private road for the ingress and egress a the employees it
did not apparently take the necessary precaution to make it safe for its
employees by employing security guard."

But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with
the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from
his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of
ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that
the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely
two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking along the
IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion for
reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where
the incident happened was a public road, not less than (20) meters away from
the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the
immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was
implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/ or appeal to the
Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the
incident took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to
IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns
the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no
question that the assault arose "in the course of employment." But if it did
[23]

indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and placed its
main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.

But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it
was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private
road leads directly to its main gate. Its right to use the road must then perforce
[24]

proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore,
is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should
logically and properly be charged with security control of the road. The
IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with
such duty, the IDECO should have seen it not only that the road was properly
paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted
measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo
was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly
nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to
the IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo
had just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes
after dismissal from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may
say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured being
"immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be
deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore
arose out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the
injury was sustained in the course of employment. We find that it was and so
conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said
assault is unexplained.

American jurisprudence supports this view.

In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
[25]

"Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with
the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way
over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and
relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employers premises, the injury is
one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it
had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time
before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where
the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may
be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer’s
premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule
extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress
and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.”

The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and
twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and
space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The
IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or
implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to
the IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of
employment.

In Carter vs. Lanzetta, it was held that "such statutes envision extension a
[26]

coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until,
they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this
might be accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that “under
exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be
extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave
the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."

The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it
would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine
Sales, it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end
[27]

of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the
employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used
the street only in connection with those premises, and the employer actually
stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of
employment. In that case there were even two business establishments on the
dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to be
at the end of the private road.

We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation a meaningful statement of the

[28]

obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to

speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach
the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without question."

We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company. [29]

"The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an
employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning
from the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule
being that in most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk
and hazards to which all members of the travelling public are subject rather than
risk and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of
the employer. x x x
"Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called
'access' cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured a place intended
by the employer for use as a means of ingress and egress to and from the actual
place of the employee's work has been held to be in the course of his
employment. The courts have said that these access areas are so closely related
to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's
premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with this exception
to the general rule.
"The leading cases in Texas dealing with the 'access' exception, and one which
we think controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v.
Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 23 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee
was employed by Hartburg Lumber Company, which company operated and
owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely
of the employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the town and a part of
the lumber company's facilities was situated on either side of the right-of-
way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various
buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing was used by
any member of the public desiring to go to any part of the lumber company
facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work at noon, went home
for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the purpose of
resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the crossing in
question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the
decedent's death did not originate in the work or business of his employer and
that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the
affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive
opinion, reviewed the authorities from other states and especially Latter's Case
238 Mass. 326, 130 N.E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury
and death under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas
Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the
lumber company's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a
part of the premises. The court pointed out that the lumber company had rights
in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the lumber company's
business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In announcing
the 'access' doctrine Justice Greenwood said:

‘Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of

his employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the
crossing provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an
employee. He encountered, the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order
that he might perform the duties imposed by his, contract of service. Without
subjecting himself to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in
the conduct of the lumber company's business. He had reached a place
provided and used only as an adjunct to that business, and was injured from a
risk created by the conditions under which the business was carried on, To hold
that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber
company would be to give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which
should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to
promote justice.'

x x x
"In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderon, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S.W. 2d 674,
wr. ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case
the employee was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of
employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney
said:

'Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only
conduced to his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promises and
efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his
employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon the railroad
track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of way) when
injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out of the work
of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place, and under the
circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or business of the
employer.'

"Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App., 53 S.W. 2d
327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the 'access' doctrine. In that case
Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Bountiful Brick Company et al v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221, 72
L.Ed. 507, 66 A.L.R. 1402, as follows:

'An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and
from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while
passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his
work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's
premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as
much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at
the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in
point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the
place where the work is to be done is reached.'"
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the
road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's
premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employees premises as
to be fairly treated as a part of the employer' s premises.” That portion of the
road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief
means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the public or for its
employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has
rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or
contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access
to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO
was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is,
against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these
dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security
measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the
injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.

As heretofore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was

himself killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for
the statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be
shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the hazard
which resulted in the injury. The following more modern view was expressed
[30]

in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones: [31]

"While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be
peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to
arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121], Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. V.
Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more
liberal, saying that, 'to be compensable, injuries do not have to arise from
something peculiar to the employment.’ Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v.
Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. 'Where the duties of an
employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there
occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others
x x x unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such
conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit.' New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S. E. 786, cited in
Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47.
McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d
471, 473."

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be
held liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo
was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's
premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there
automatically arises the presumption - invoked in Rivera - that the injury by
assault arose out of the employment, i.e., there is a causal relation between the
assault and the employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from
overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring
Pablo's death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be
asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five
minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In
answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler
Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an ingenious
hypothetical situation put forth by the defendant therein:

"We could, of course, say 'this is not the case before us' and utilize the old saw,
'that which is not before us we do not decide.' Instead, we prefer to utilize the
considerably older law: 'Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof' (Matthew
1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain
constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case
should not be suppressed because of a conjectural posture which may never
arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then-existing law."

Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed

to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose
for which it was enacted. Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends
[32]

Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., reserves his vote.
 Description used by Justice Frank Murphy in Cardillo vs. Liberty Mutual
[1]

Insurance Co., 330 US 469 (1947), 91 Led 1028.

[2] Sec. 2, Workmen's Compensation Act.

Arthur Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law (1952 ed. with 1959

[3]

supplement), vol. 1, p. 41; see also 1965 ed., vol. 1, p. 42.

[4] See note 3, at pp. 42-& 43.

Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 58 Phil. 42, citing Fitzgerald vs. Clarke
[5]

& Sons, 1 LWCC 197, Dretzen Co. vs. Industrial Board, 279 III, 11, 116 NE
684.

PHHC vs. WCC & Alba Titong, L-18246, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Murillo vs.
[6]

Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689, & Larson's Workmen's, Compensation Law, 1952 ed., p.
153.

Vol. 8, William R. Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text, Permanent

[7]

Edition (1951), p. 3.
[8] See note 7, at pp. 7 and 8.
[9] L-8130, June 30, 1956, 99 Phil. 1050.
[10] L-22117, April 29, 1966.
[11] 50 ALR 2d. 356, Idaho Supreme Court, June 15, 1954.
[12] Taller vda. de Nava vs. Ynchausti Steamship Co., 57 Phil. 751.
[13] 70 Phil. 685.

G.R. No. 7402, March 25, 1941, 40 OG No. 1, p. 83 (Court of Appeals case,
[14]

decision of a special division of five Justices, Justice Alex Reyes, ponente).

[15] L-19051, Nov. 23, 1966.
[16] L-7658, May 8, 1956.
[17] Five Justices dissented.

The jobs of the employees in the Nava, Rivera, Madanguit and Dabacol cases
[18]

are within this class.

The injuries resulting from assault on the manager of a building used as a

[19]

rooming house by unsavory characters, was adjudged compensable in Israel vs.

Ramble Properties, Inc., 58 NYS 2d 388.

The Galicia case probably comes under this category. For a discussion of
[20]

assaults as a work hazard, see Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law (1965

ed.), vol. 1, pp. 132-144.
[21] Sec. 43(1), Workmen's Compensation Act.
[22] 28 NE 2d 914.

The presumption that the injury arises out of and in the course of
[23]

employment prevails where the injury occurs on the employer's premises. The
injuries were sustained by the employee when she was struck by an automobile
while walking from the processing plant where she worked to her automobile
which was parked in the adjoining parking area maintained for
employees. Forest v. Birds Eye Division of General Foods Corporation, 422
P2d 616, Supreme Court of Idaho, Jan. 17, 1967.

Where a state vehicle being driven with consent of the state and under its
direction and upon its business struck a state hospital employee on the premises
of the state hospital after she had completed her shift, the injuries sustained
were declared covered by workmen's compensation law in Nichols v. Godfrey,
411 P2d 763, March 4, 1966.

“Main" means principal, chief, first in size, rank, importance. 26 Words &
[24]

Phrases 60, citing Evers v. Flanagan, 61 NYS 2d 496, 499, 186 Misc. 101. It may
be reasonably assumed to then that the main gate, although the natural tendency
of employees and customers is to pass through the main gate.
[25] 72 L. ed. 507, Feb. 20, 1928.

193 SO 2d 259, Supreme Court of Louisiana, December 12, 1966. Here, the
[26]

Court held that the accident when the employee, fell on the step adjoining the
employer's front door, as the employee was leaving, occurred during the course
of employment although the employee had been engaged for one day and had
already been paid, and although the employee had lingered for from 20 to 30
minutes talking to the employer.

271 NYS 2d 514, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third
[27]

Department, April 29, 1966.

[28] 140 NW 2d 756, Court of Appeals of Michigan, March 22, 1966.
[29] 391 SW 2d 558, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, May 21, 1965.
[30] Jaynes vs. Potlatch Forests, supra.
[31] 140 SE 2d 113, Court of Appeals of Georgia, Nov. 24, 1964.

Abana vs. Quisumbing, L-23439, March 27, 1963, 22 SCRA 1278, 1968A
[32]

PHILD 997; Manila Railroad Co. vs. WCC, L-21504, Sept. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA
98, 1967 PHILD 676; ITEMCOP vs. Reyes-Florzo, L-21969, August 31,1966 17
SCRA 1104.