9.

4
VOLUME

THE
PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION
ARMY OF CHINA:
Its raison d’être,
current
and
state
trajectory

OCCASIONAL
PAPER APRIL 2016
 OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

02
THE
PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION
ARMY OF CHINA:
Its raison d’être,
current state
and
trajectory
THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
The guard of honor of the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Three Services
participates in a rehearsal for the military parade in commemoration of the
70th anniversary of end of World War II in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.

With the growing presence and influence of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an economic
heavyweight and political leader in the regional and
global arenas, Filipino academics and policymakers
are beginning to cultivate a keen interest in the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as China’s hard
instrument of national power. Since its inception in
1927, the PLA has arguably become a stabilizing
force for China after its so-called Century of
Humiliation; the PLA has played the pivotal roles of
liberating the country from Western and Japanese
imperialism and of perpetuating the one-party rule
of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However,
the growing tension over the territorial and maritime
disputes in the South China Sea and East China
Sea in recent years lead one to question whether or
not the PLA, with its rapidly expanding regional and
global footprint, is going to be a destabilizing force to
the international liberal order. This strategic research
paper sheds light on the PLA—its raison d’être,
current state and trajectory—to gain a balanced
perspective on the said military organization and
help Filipino academics and policymakers critically
assess whether continuously tilting towards the
US (and allies) and balancing against China is
the best way forward for the Philippines.

Image Credit: xinhua

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

03 A Close Examination of the

People’s Liberation Army
The PLA is the armed forces of China which is under the
direct control of the ruling CPC.1 The PLA is tasked to
help advance the so-called six (6) core national interests,
namely: (a) state sovereignty; (b) national security; (c)
territorial integrity; (d) national reunification; (e) China’s
political system established by the Constitution and
overall social stability; and (f) basic safeguards for
ensuring sustainable economic and social development.2
Given these core interests, one may conclude that China
through the PLA hopes to achieve the following strategic
objectives: (a) maintaining a stable political and security
environment conducive to continued economic growth;
(b) securing trade routes transiting the region; (c) gaining
access to regional energy resources (i.e. oil and natural
gas) and raw materials; and (d) gaining influence
to defeat perceived attempts at strategic
encirclement or containment.
A. Armed Forces Division
In Chinese military parlance, the so-called PLA “force providers” are the
PLA Army (PLAA), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF),
and the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLA SAF). The Paramilitary and
reserve forces are also included as force providers.5 Based on the
2006 National Defense White Paper, PLA forces have undergone
drastic downsizing since mid-1980s.6 The PLAA’s share in the total
force structure went down from 77% in 1985 to 69% in 2014.7
Conversely, PLAN grew from 8.6% in 1985 to 10% in 2014, the
PLAAF from 12% to 17%, and the PLA SAF from 2% to 4%.8
FIGURE 1. ACTIVE AND RESERVE PERSONNEL BY SERVICE
IN THE PLA IN 2014

Founded in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province on 1 August

1927, the PLA is currently the largest military in the world,
with a total troop membership of around 2.3 million as of
June 2015.3 In contrast to the militaries of other countries
in the world such as the US whose allegiance lies in the
State and the Constitution, the PLA is beholden to the
Party which, under the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political
ideological framework, is the sole representative of
the people. Hence, the PLA within the Chinese
party-state system is the military wing of the CPC
Source: CHINESE STRATEGY AND MILITARY POWER IN 2014, P.163
and the guarantor of its one-party rule.4

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

04
The PLA is composed of 2,285,000 active troops and 510,000 reserve forces, which far surpasses US military B. Organizational Structure
troop numbers.9 According to the 2013 Defense White Paper, PLAN accounts for 235,000 troops and the and Command Chain
PLAAF for 398,000 troops.10 The PLAA’s mobile operational units comprise 850,000 troops of an estimated
total of 1.6 million PLAA troops. The PLA SAF accounts for about 100,000 personnel.11 Interestingly, China’s Distributed into seven (7) military regions, the PLAA serves
paramilitary forces, such as the People’s Armed Police (PAP), has a total strength of 660,000 staff as well as the as “force employers”, namely: Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou,
militia.12 Since its activation in 1983, the PAP was primarily tasked to address internal security challenges, such Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu.14 Every region is
as natural disasters and ethnic and social unrest, especially in the restive regions of Xinjiang and Tibet.13 overseen by four (4) general departments, namely: the PLA’s
General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department,
the General Logistics Department, and the General Armaments
Distribution of the armed forces throughout the Chinese mainland Department.15 The PLAN, PLAAF and PLA SAF
have separate headquarters.16

FIGURE 2. THE PLA’S STRUCTURE AND COMMAND CHAIN

Source: UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S POLITICLA SYSTEM, MARCH 2013, P.27

Source: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

05
Under the Chinese command chain, the CMC plays a crucial role—it
exerts direct organizational control over the PLA. The CMC oversees PLA’s Seven Old Military Regions
military and defense affairs and is a high-profile party body, through
which the CCP exerts control over the PLA since the 1930s.17 The
Ministry of National Defence is subordinated to the State Council and
is outside the PLA’s direct command structure. It serves as a liaison
office with foreign militaries. Meanwhile, the PAP being an auxiliary
force to the PLA and law enforcement body is subject to a different,
dual command structure18 —it is both under the supervision of the
CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security.

On 26 November 2015, Chinese President Xi Xinping announced

the comprehensive reorganization and overhaul of the current
military administration structure and command system of the PLA.19
According to Beijing-based military expert Song Zhongping, the new
military structure will unburden the theater commands of personnel
management and administrative responsibilities and allow them to
focus mainly on war-fighting.20 Said overhaul comes as a
response to growing geopolitical tensions vis-à-vis the
globalization of its security and developmental interests.21

Under the new structure, the CMC will now administer both the PLA
and the PAP, while the battle zone commands will focus on combat
operations.22 Said reform will institutionalize a three-tier “CMC-battle
zone commands-troops” command system and an administration
system that runs from CMC through different services down to the
troops.23 Furthermore, the armed forces will be more professionally
and effectively managed by introducing modern management
techniques, reducing its troops by 300,000, and downsizing its
administrative and non-combatant personnel.24 Lastly, to ensure
party loyalty and curb corruption, a new discipline inspection
commission will be established within the CMC to conduct regular
Source: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
disciplinary inspections to CMC departments and zone commands.25

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

06

The new theater commands are generally

patterned after former area commands, PLA’s Five New Theater Commands
with a more enhanced command and
logistics support functions.26 The five
(5) new theater commands will be the
following: Eastern Theater Command (to
be headed by commander Liu Yuejun
and political commissar Zheng Weiping);
Southern Theater Command (commander
Wang Jiaocheng and political commissar
Wei Liang); Western Theater Command
(Zhao Zongqi and political commissar
Zhu Fuxi); Northern Theater Command
(commander Song Puxuan and political
commissar Chu Yimin); and Central
Theater Command (commander Han
Weiguo and political commissar Yin
Fanglong).27 Said theater commands
will be run by the joint battle command
system and be responsible for addressing
the security threats within their respective
strategic scopes, maintaining peace,
containing or winning wars, and
safeguarding the country’s overall national
security and military strategies.28
Source: The STRAITS TIMES

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

07 C. Defense Budget
Summary of Military Budget of the People’s Liberation Army 38
The Chinese defense budget has been on a
constant, upward trajectory.29 Between 1998 and
2007, military expenditure went up by almost 16%
on average, year on year.30 This is comparable to
the surge in the annual state expenditure by about
18%, and the PRC’s average annual GDP growth of
roughly 12%.31 In 2014, PLA defense budget was
registered at US$132 billion, which was a 12.2%
increase over the preceding year. On March 4,
2015, China announced that it would further raise
its defense budget by approximately 10%.32 While
this raise is lower than the previous year’s 12.2%
increase, the budget nonetheless reflects the fifth
consecutive year with a double digit increase in
official military spending.33 This would then
translate to roughly $US145 billion.34

The PLA’s defense budget composition is as follows:

personnel expenses, mainly including pay, food
and clothing of military and non-military personnel;
costs for maintenance of activities, mainly including
military training, construction and maintenance
of facilities and running expenses; and costs for
equipment, including research and experimentation,
procurement, maintenance, transportation and
storage.35 These expenditures include militia and
reserve requirements.36 A large amount of spending
is devoted to fund activities associated with social
welfare, mainly pensions for some of the retired
officers, schools and kindergartens for children of
military personnel, training personnel competent
for both military and civilian services, supporting
national economic construction, and participation in
emergency rescues and disaster relief efforts.37

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

08
D. Doctrine and Strategy
China’s Two-Island Chain or Leap East Strategy
China’s national objectives and strategic interests
serve as the bases for its military doctrine and
strategy. Dubbed as “Active Defense/Active Offshore
Defense,”39 the objective of the PLA is to fight “local
wars under high-tech conditions.”40 Said objective
requires smaller, more specialized rapid-reaction
forces, possession of a limited offensive and
force projection capability, and the option
of preemptive military action.41

For the PLAN, in particular, the “Active Defense/

Active Offshore Defense” strategy entails an
evolutionary shift from its “Static Coastal Defense”
role to “Active Offshore Defense.” Through this
shift, Chinese naval assets are employed for both
tactical and strategic purposes in asserting control
of coastal economic regions and maritime interests,
and for optimizing the Navy’s operations for national
Source: BBC.CO.UK
defense. Said Chinese maritime strategy is credited
directly or indirectly to General Liu Huaqing, PLAN
extending deep into Southeast Asia. It addresses since it encompasses maritime areas out to
head from 1982 to 1987 and CMC vice chairman
many of China’s maritime national interests: the approximately 1,800 nm from China’s coast,
from 1988 to 1997.42 He advocated for the
concentration of economic investment along including most of the East China Sea and East
expansion of PLAN navy’s operations from coastal
the coast, offshore territorial claims, oceanic Asian SLOCs. The third stage of Liu’s putative
defense to offshore active defense.43
resources, and coastal defense. It is ambitious maritime strategy poses the PLAN as a global
in scope, extending from approximately 200 to force built around aircraft carriers, deployed by
At the heart of the “Active Offshore Defense”
700 nm from the mainland, to include Taiwan and the middle of the 21st century. This goal would
doctrine is the so-called “Two-Island Chain” or
the South China Sea land features claimed by imply a PLAN many times larger and more air-
“Leap East” strategy which defines the geostrategic
Beijing as sovereign territory. The second island capable than China’s current force. Alternately,
theaters in East Asia that the PLA aspires to control:
chain bounds Liu’s second strategic maritime however, global naval force might be deployed
area: a north-south line from the Kuriles through in a fleet of ballistic missile submarines (FBMs)
This first island chain area encompasses the
Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, capable of launching intercontinental ballistic
Yellow Sea, facing Korea and Japan; the western
and Indonesia. This is a much more ambitious missiles (ICBMs) and long-range land-attack
East China Sea; and the South China Sea,
goal than that implied by the first island chain, cruise missiles.44

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016
09
E. Force Modernization Goals and Trends
The modernization of the PLA was kick-started in
the late 1970s and had three major goals: First,
under the political leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the
military sought to clarify its relationship with the civilian
branch of government.45 The PLA gradually returned
to its pre-Cultural Revolution relationship with the
CPC and became disengaged from civilian politics.46
Deng reasserted civilian control over the military by
undertaking the following measures: (a) appointment
of his supporters to key military leadership positions;
(b) reduction of the scope of the PLA’s domestic
nonmilitary role; and (c) revitalization of the
party political structure and ideological
control system within the PLA.47
Second, modernization required the reform of military
organization, doctrine, education and training, and
personnel policies to improve combat effectiveness in
combined-arms warfare.48 To achieve organizational
reforms, the Chinese government created the CMC,
reduced and streamlined the PLA forces, civilianized
many of the PLA units, reorganized military regions,
formed group armies, and enacted the new Military
Service Law in 1984.49 Doctrine, strategy, and tactics
were revised under the rubric of “people’s war based
on the contemporary security environment,” which
envisaged a forward defense at selected locations
near China’s borders, to prevent attack on Chinese
cities and industrial sites, and emphasized operations
using combined-arms tactics.50 Furthermore, reforms
in education and training gave strong emphasis on
improving the military skills and raising the education
levels of officers and troops and conducting combined
arms operations.51 New personnel policies fostered the
C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
upgrading in the quality of PLA recruits and
officer candidates, thereby improving their conditions
Comparison of PLA’s old and new force structure and troop strength
of service, changing promotion practices to
stress professional competence, and
providing new uniforms and insignia.52
The third goal of military modernization was the radical
transformation of the whole defense establishment
into a system capable of independently maintaining
a modern military force.53 As military expenditures
remained relatively constant, reforms focused on
the reorganization of the defense research-and-
development and industrial base to better integrate
civilian and military science and industry more closely.54
Foreign technology was used selectively in the
upgrading of weapons.55 Defense industry reforms also
transformed the Chinese defense economy from being
import-driven to export-driven, thereby allowing its full
entry into the international arms market and paving
the way for the increased production of civilian goods
by local defense industries.56 The scope of PLA local
economic engagements was reduced, but the military
continued to participate in infrastructure development
projects and initiated a reintegration program to provide
demobilized soldiers with technical skills deemed
beneficial in the civilian economy.57
The latest “China’s Military Strategy” dated May
2015 is a pertinent document that sheds light on the
PLA’s modernization trends based on the country’s
framing of the national security situation. From
the Chinese perspective, the US rebalancing and
Japan’s normalization, both fostered by the shift in
the economic and strategic center of gravity towards
the Asia-Pacific, are some of the latest security
Source: South China Morning Post
developments to pose a direct threat to Beijing’s
www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

10
sovereignty and territorial integrity.58 These developments transpire against the
backdrop of China’s growing economic and strategic interests abroad
in accordance with its New Silk Road Strategy.59 As a response to
the changing security situation, the PLA seeks to implement the
military strategic guideline of active defense.60
PLA.68 According to You Ji, overseer of the Department of Government and Public Administration at the
University of Macau, the new title symbolizes that Xi will exert a more direct role in the command and
control of the joint battle command systems with the aim of strengthening inter-service
coordination and raising the prospects of military victory.69

The South China Morning Post recently published an infographic that

encapsulates the present as well as possible future force structure and troop
strength of the PLA based on the latest military strategy. The PLA will then
undergo professionalization through internal rebalancing of its major service
branches, with the navy and air force assuming equal status as that of the
army.61 Meanwhile, a national guard will replace the People’s Armed Police.62

President Xi affirms the envisioned force restructuring: During the 02 September

2015 PLA military parade in commemoration of 70 years of end of World War II,
he announced that he would reduce the country’s military personnel by 300,000
until 2017, thereby shrinking the military forces to roughly 2,000,000 personnel.63
This is an integral part of the accelerated modernization of the PLA which
would shift spending from the traditional land forces to more advanced
sea and air forces.64 Said shift would require fewer but higher-skilled
military personnel and pave way for the development of more
technologically sophisticated offensive/defensive capabilities.65

Similarly, Yang Yujun, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense,

explained that “through the cut of troops’ number, China’s military will further
adjust and optimize its scale and structure, make its troops more capable and
its structure more scientific, and construct a modern military force system with
Chinese characteristics.”66 He further remarked that “cutting the number of
troops is conducive to pooling resources, speeding up the pace
and improving the quality of informatization construction.”67 Image Credit: xinhua

Dressed in combat fatigues, Chinese President Xi Xinping visited

As of writing, the latest development within the PLA is President Xi’s assumption
military officers in the Central Military Commission (CMC) as he assumed
of the new title, Commander in Chief of the joint battle command center of the the newest and highest military title, Commander in Chief

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

11
2015 PLA Capabilities and Trajectories

Source: US Department of Defense 2015 Annual Report to Congress70

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016
12
Critical Analysis
Overall, the PLA under Xi is undergoing radical
force restructuring, transforming from an army-
centric to a navy/air force-centric military with
a greater qualitative edge at an unprecedented
pace. This restructuring can be explained by
recent developments in China’s domestic, regional
and global strategic and economic landscapes.
Domestically, the relatively stable internal security
situation, the civilianization of law enforcement
agencies and the looming cost of maintaining huge
personnel disincentivize the PLA’s sustainment of
massive ground forces. Regionally, the perception of
containment by the US and its network of security
allies in the Asia-Pacific region—the Philippines
included—necessitates the PLA to strengthen its
naval and aerial capabilities for better deterrence
and force projection. Globally, the internationalization
of its developmental interests as shown in One Belt-
One Road Initiative (OBOR) creates the imperative
for the PLA to develop more advanced capabilities
to protect China’s sea lanes of communications
(SLOCs) and transcontinental roads and railways.
It is highly unlikely, however, that the PLA will be
able to proceed smoothly with its radical force
restructuring in the coming years. Internally, the
ongoing anti-corruption campaign of Xi in the military
is opening up a Pandora’s box that could create
more instability within China’s defense and security
establishment. The arrest last year of Xu Caihou,
former general of the PLA and vice-chairman of
C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
the CMC, amid allegations of accepting bribes for
promotion as well as the punishment of more than
200 officers of lieutenant-colonel rank and above
since 201371 has not only sent a strong message
against other military personnel who are embroiled
in various corruption activities. Over and above, the
arrest has raised the question on what constitutes
the threshold for labeling certain activities as corrupt
and how loyalty to Xi could factor in into
the determination of that threshold. Nevertheless,
once Xi overplays his scare tactics, the PLA may
soon find itself deeply polarized as the beneficiaries
of the old military command structure may
opt to band together to protect their
vested interests and reputations.
Externally, the convergence of territorial and
maritime disputes between China and its
neighboring ASEAN countries, on the one hand,
and the growing concern of extra-regional powers,
namely the US, Japan, South Korea, and Australia
to preserve freedom of navigation, on the other
hand, is further raising the risk calculus for the
PLA—along with China maritime coast guard—to
achieve uncontested supremacy over China’s near
seas. In the foreseeable future, the PLA will
then have to contend with three (3) major
challenges in line with China’s bid for regional
supremacyand global presence:
(a) On the legal front, the much-anticipated United
Nations (UN) arbitral tribunal ruling expected
for May 201672 is highly likely to undermine the
principle of 9-dashed line as China’s legal basis
of ownership over the entire South China Sea as
well as raise China’s reputational costs for non-
compliance.
(b) On the political front, the reelection of Shinzo
Abe (Japan),73 reappointment of Nguyen Phu
Trong (Vietnam),74 and election of Tsai Ing-wen
(Taiwan)75 raises the possibility of strategic
convergence of the said countries’ foreign
policies which, in turn, will lead to greater bilateral
security pacts with the US.
(c) On the military front, the US together with
its allies, Japan and Australia, is very much
likely to up the ante on its freedom of navigation
operations (FONOPS)76 to protect the global
commons.
Tightening Grip within the US-led Security
Alliance: Is this the Best Way Forward?
The massive withdrawal of US forward-deployment
forces from Subic Bay naval base and Clark air base
in 1992 brought the Philippines into a precarious
position within the US-led security alliance. Having
been sheltered by the US forces from without
and dragged into low-level, counterinsurgency
operations from within throughout the Cold War,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) then
lagged behind vis-à-vis its counterparts in the
region in fully developing its territorial and maritime
www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

13
defense capabilities. This has rendered Manila highly
vulnerable against gradual Chinese assertion of
sovereignty over West Philippine Sea which began
with the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995
and intensified with the seizure of Scarborough
Shoal in 2012 as well as island construction
in Spratlys from 2014 up to present.

With the growing militarization of the West

Philippine Sea, the AFP is currently fast-tracking
its modernization program to achieve minimum
credible defense posture vis-à-vis the PLA which is
tantamount to “an effective force present inside the
Philippines and its exclusive economic zone with
exhibited competence to defend the country and
protect its national interests if the need arises.”77
As a US treaty ally, however, such modernization
program may be viewed as a bid to better augment
the Allied Forces in preserving the current US-
dominated regional security architecture.

Amidst the brewing great power rivalry, what then

are the advantages and disadvantages for the
Philippines’ next administration in adopting Benigno
Aquino III administration’s balance-of-power
logic by tilting towards the US (and allies)
and balancing against China?

In continuing the Aquino administration’s policy, the

Philippines will become better integrated with the
US as well as Japan, South Korea and Australia
within the American security umbrella. In this regard,
the Philippines will be able to increase its overall Image Credit: asiancorrespondent.com

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016
14
deterrence capability as it simultaneously pursues
internal and external balancing: Internally, as the
AFP is undertaking force restructuring and strategic
reorientation from internal security towards territorial
defense, closer military ties with the US (and
allies) will allow Manila greater preferential access
to Western armaments, capital, technology and
interoperability training to accelerate its capability
upgrade programs and possibly pump prime its
defense manufacturing industry. Externally, the
enhancement of formal alliance with Washington
and informal military alliances with Tokyo, Canberra
and Seoul will significantly raise the risk calculus
for the PLA to assert full sovereignty over the West
Philippine Sea and disrupt freedom of navigation
and overflight which is the shared interest
among all members of the alliance.
Over time, the Philippine national interest to
defend its territories in the disputed waters and US
national interest to defend freedom of navigation
and overflight would see greater convergence. The
ongoing militarization of China’s artificial islands in
the Kalayaan Island Group—construction of network
of airstrips, deep-water ports and other military-
capable infrastructure—is necessitating the US
Seventh Fleet to raise the quantity of its naval and
aerial assets as well as increase the frequency of
its patrol activities of in West Philippine Sea. This is
providing a stronger impetus for Japan and Australia
C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
to take a more proactive stance in jointly supporting
the US in protecting the sea lanes of communication
(SLOCS). In the short- and medium-term, the
formation of a triangulated defense of SLOCS
(de facto US-Japan-Australia alliance) will provide
a firm layer of external deterrence for the
Philippines while the latter is boosting its
coast guard and naval capabilities.
On the other hand, putting all eggs in Washington’s
basket risks diminishing Manila’s foreign policy
flexibility in exploring alternative avenues for long-
term political resolution of the territorial and maritime
disputes in West Philippine Sea. By invoking greater
US as well as Japanese and Australian military
presence in the contested seas, the Philippines
could contribute to China hardening its antagonistic
stance toward the Philippines at a time when
China’s foreign policy thrust is otherwise that of
improving relations with its neighbors. By further
drawing the US (and allies) into the equation, Manila
may narrow the space for China to be able to
exercise pragmatism—which it showed when it
agreed to pull out the Haiyang Shiyou-981
oil rig last year after fierce standoff
and mass protests in Vietnam.
In the long-term, however, the prevalence of such
defense posturing by the US, Japanese and
Australian armed forces vis-à-vis the PLA could
render the resolution or shelving of territorial and
maritime disputes between the Philippines and
China much more difficult to attain. Given that
China rejects external interference in resolving
what it perceives as bilateral territorial and maritime
disputes, the Philippines could then find it tough to
re-explore critical areas of political, economic and
socio-cultural cooperation with China and restore
mutual trust and confidence akin to the time of the
Gloria Arroyo and Hu Jintao administrations. This
could also narrow the window of opportunity for
greater military-to-military cooperation between
the AFP and PLA, especially in humanitarian
assistance and disaster response operations
(HADRO), peacekeeping operations (PKO),
and internal security operations (ISO).
Continued deterioration of Philippines-China
bilateral relations could well spill over into multilateral
institutions and frameworks, such as ASEAN plus
China and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
The Philippine government should be careful, lest
this further contribute to a down spiraling of any
prospect for the formation of a collective security
arrangement that includes both the US and China or
new regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific.
www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

15
Conclusion
The People’s Liberation Army has gone a long way from being a
small ragtag guerrilla force in Nanchang into the Communist Party
of China’s colossal modern armed forces, promoting the security
and developmental interests of the world’s nascent economic
and political power, the People’s Republic of China. The PLA’s
growing regional and global footprint is, in effect, altering threat
perceptions, the regional balance of military power, and risk
calculi in the greater geopolitical game. For this reason, it is
imperative for the Philippines to transcend the amorphous “China
threat” metanarrative that has dominated the political-security
discourse in the Philippines and objectively re-examine
what the PLA is, why it exists and where it is headed.

By comprehensively reviewing the multifaceted aspects of the PLA

as a military organization (i.e. organization, chain of command,
budget, doctrine and strategy, and modernization goals and
trends), one may conclude that the PLA is the new indispensable
factor in the Philippines’ security equation. The PLA deserves
serious attention in national security policy formulation and
military strategy-making. Finally, an unadulterated picture of the
PLA as China’s hard power instrument in pursuing its objectives
should lead key stakeholders in the Philippine government and
academia to the naked realization that adherence to the Aquino
administration’s balancing strategy will have positive and negative
consequences well within and beyond the military realm.

Image Credit: reddit.com & en.wikipedia.org

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

16
Endnotes:
1
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Re- focus is on winning wars”, The Straits Times, 03 February 43
Ibid. 64
Ibid.
public of India, White Paper: China’s Peaceful Development, 2016, accessed 09 February 2016, http://www.straitstimes.
2011, Chinese Government. com/asia/east-asia/military-rezoning-shows-chinas-focus- 44
Ibid. 65
Ibid.
is-on-winning-wars.
2
Ibid. 45
“China Military Organization”, The Library of Congress 66
Shannon Tiezzi, “The Real Reason China is Cutting
21
Ibid. Country Studies and CIA World Factbook in Photius.com, 300, 000 Troops”, The Diplomat, 08 September 2015, ac-
3
Grieger, Gisela, “The Role of the Army in China’s Poli- accessed 27 October 2015, http://www.photius.com/ cessed 27 October 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/
tics”, European Parliamentary Research Service, 29 June 22
“Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural reform”, countries/china/economy/china_economy_military_organi- the-real-reason-china-is-cutting-300000-troops/.
2015, accessed 26 October 2015, http://www.europarl. Xinhuanet. zatio~7400.html.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/564375/EPRS_ 67
Ibid.
BRI(2015)564375_EN.pdf. 23
Ibid. 46
Ibid.
68
Austin Ramzy, “China’s President, Xi Xinping, Gains
4
Ibid. 24
Ibid. 47
Ibid. a New Title: Commander in Chief”, The New York Times,
21 April 2016, accessed 18 May 2016, http://www.nytimes.
5
Ibid. 25
Ibid. 48
Ibid. com/2016/04/22/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-military-com-
mander.html?_r=0,
6
Ibid. 26
“China’s military regrouped into five PLA theater 49
Ibid. 69
Ibid.
commands”, Xinhuanet, 01 February 2016, accessed 09
7
Ibid. February 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016- 50
Ibid. 70
US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Con-
02/01/c_135065429.htm. gress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
8
Chinese Strategy and Military Power in 2014, op. cit., 51
Ibid. People’s Republic of China, 2015, US Government.
p. 162. 27
Ibid.
52
Ibid. 71
Charles Clover, “Xi warns China military amid anti-
9
“The Military Balance,” International Institute of Stra- 28
Ibid. corruption purge”, Financial Times, 20 July 2015, accessed
tegic Studies, 2013, p. 287, cited in Chinese Strategy and 53
Ibid. 28 October 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5e531480-
Military Power in 2014, op. cit, p. 159. 29
Gisela Grieger, “The Role of the Army in China’s Poli- 2eb8-11e5-91ac-a5e17d9b4cff.html#axzz3ppAkoeMJ.
tics”, European Parliamentary Research Service. 54
Ibid.
10
Gisela Grieger, “The Role of the Army in China’s Poli- 72
Patricia Lourdes Viray, “UN tribunal to issue Philip-
tics”, European Parliamentary Research Service. 30
Ibid. 55
Ibid. pines vs China decision by 2016”, Philippine Star Global, 01
December 2015, accessed 10 February 2016, http://www.
11
D.J. Blasko, “The 2013 Defense White Paper in Per- 31
Ibid. 56
Ibid. philstar.com/headlines/2015/12/01/1527874/un-tribunal-
spective”, China Brief, Vol. XIII, issue 9, 25 April 2013, pp. issue-philippines-vs-china-decision-2016.
6-10. 32
“China’s Defense Budget”, GlobalSecurity,org, ac- 57
Ibid.
cessed 27 October 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 73
Shinzo Abe re-elected as Japan’s prime minister, BBC
12
Gisela Grieger, “The Role of the Army in China’s Poli- military/world/china/budget.htm. 58
“China’s Military Strategy”, Ministry of National De- News, 24 December 2014, accessed 10 February 2016,
tics”, European Parliamentary Research Service. fense: The People’s Republic of China, May 2015, accessed http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30595376.
33
Ibid. 27 October 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/White-
13
Ibid. Papers/. 74
Mike Ives, “Vietnam’s Communist Party Gives Old-
34
Ibid. Guard Leader a New 5-Year Term”, The New York Times,
14
Ibid. 59
Ibid. 27 January 2016, accessed 10 February 2016, http://www.
35
Ibid. nytimes.com/2016/01/28/world/asia/vietnam-communist-
15
Ibid. 60
Ibid. party-nguyen-phu-trong.html?_r=0.
36
Ibid.
16
Ibid. 61
“How China will rebuild its People’s Liberation Army”, 75
“Tsai Ing-wen elected Taiwan’s first female president”,
37
Ibid. South China Morning Post, 02 September 2015, accessed BBC News, 17 January 2016, accessed 10 February 2016,
17
J.C Mulvenon and N.D. Yang, “The People’s Liber- 27 October 2015, http://www.scmp.com/infographics/ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35333647.
alization Army as Organization”, RAND National Security 38
Ibid. article/1854629/infographic-how-china-will-rebuild-its-peo-
Research Division, 2002, pp. 45-121. ples-liberation-army?comment-sort=recommended. 76
Dan de Luce and Keith Johnson, “US dispatches
39
Bernard Cole, “The PLA Navy and Active Defense,” warship to challenge China’s artificial islands”, Foreign Pol-
18
Gisela Grieger, “The Role of the Army in China’s Poli- Global Security.org, accessed 06 May 2015, http://www. 62
Ibid. icy, 26 October 2015, accessed 28 October 2015, https://
tics”, European Parliamentary Research Service. globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/pla-china_ foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/26/u-s-dispatches-warship-to-
transition_11_ch07.htm. 63
Edward Wong, Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, “Chi- challenge-chinas-fake-islands/.
19
“Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural re- na Announces Cuts of 300,000 Troops at Military Parade
form”, Xinhuanet, 26 November 2015, accessed 09 Feb- 40
Ibid. Showing Its Might”, The New York Times, 02 September 77
Bong Lozada, “AFP nears ‘minimum defense pos-
ruary 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015- 2015, accessed 27 October 2015, http://www.nytimes. ture’, Inquirer.net, 21 July 2014, accessed 22 April 2015,
11/26/c_134859089.htm. 41
Ibid. com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town- http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/622005/afp-nears-minimum-
as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html?_r=0. defense-posture.
20
Teo Cheng Wee, “Military rezoning shows China’s 42
Ibid.

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. www.stratbase.com.ph
9.4
VOLUME

ABOUT
Mark Davis M. Pablo
is a Research Analyst at the ADR Institute. He graduated Cum
Laude from the Ateneo de Manila University in 2012 with a
bachelor’s degree in Political Science and Philosophy. Prior to
joining the ADR Institute, Mr. Pablo specialized in Strategic Studies.
He began his career as a Defence Researcher/Analyst in the
Office for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management (OSSSM),
the think tank of the General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from 2013 to 2015. During his two-and-a-half
year stint, he engaged in strategic research, analysis and
assessment, policy formulation, event organizing, academic
lecturing, and public relations for the armed forces. His fields of
interest include: China’s defence and foreign policy; South China
Sea conflict; maritime security; ASEAN multilateral security
and defence cooperation; and terrorism and political
violence in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Stratbase’s Albert Del Rosario Institute

is an independent international and strategic research
organization with the principal goal of addressing the
issues affecting the Philippines and East Asia
9F 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
Philippines 1200
V 8921751
F 8921754
www.stratbase.com.ph

C 2016 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Image Credit:wired.com