Malabar naval exercise: Powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region

ABHIJIT SINGH

Maritime power projection, and not sea denial, is the answer to China’s creeping
assertiveness in South Asia.

PTI

MALABAR NAVAL EXERCISE

The “Malabar” naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal came to an end earlier this week with
a close formation drill involving Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, the US flat-
top Nimitz, and Japan’s new helicopter carrier, the JS Izumo. The expansive scope and
complexity of the engagement led many to portray Malabar 2017 as a maritime response
to China’s aggression in Dokalam where the Indian Army and People’s Liberation Army
troops remain locked in a tense stalemate.

Indeed, with over 20 ships, including two submarines and over 100 aircraft and
helicopters involved in complex manoeuvres, the strategic messaging to China seemed
more than clear. Notably, Indian commentators cast Malabar as a strategic precursor to a
more proactive sea-denial strategy aimed at challenging People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean.

In the run-up to Malabar, the media had reported a “surge” in Chinese naval presence in
the subcontinental littorals. PLAN units prowling India’s near-seas reportedly included
the Luyang III class destroyers, hydrographic research vessels, and an intelligence-
gathering ship, Haiwingxing, presumably to keep track of naval ships taking part in the
trilateral exercises. But Indian analysts seemed more distressed by the reported presence
of a Chinese conventional submarine in the Indian seas, confirmed by the docking of
the Chongmingdao, a submarine support vessel, in Karachi last month.
 For many Indian observers, the
emphasis on anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) exercises in Malabar is a sign
of India’s growing willingness to
leverage its maritime partnerships in
Asia to counter PLAN operations in
the Indian Ocean.

Not surprisingly, much of the commentary in the Indian media highlighted exercises
involving P-8I and P-8A reconnaissance aircraft, MiG-29K fighters and Japanese ASW
helicopters, lending credence to accounts that an Indian “sea-denial” strategy was at work
in the Bay of Bengal.

Yet, there is something essentially flawed about the idea that Indian naval power can
prevent Chinese warships and submarines from accessing India’s near-seas. Modern-day
trading nations regard the oceans as a shared global common, with equal opportunity
rights for all user states. Consequently, unless a sea-space is a site of overlapping claims
(as in the case of the South China Sea) or a contested enclave in a geopolitically troubled
spot (as the Persian Gulf), no coastal state ever actively denies another the use of the high
seas.

This balance only changes during war, when navies seek to block adversaries from
entering critical sea spaces in the contested littorals. During peace-time operations,
however, maritime forces enjoy assured access to the seas that lie beyond national
territorial waters (even if a coastal state insists on prior notification).

Given Beijing’s key role in the politics and geoeconomics of the Indian Ocean region, a
peacetime plan to deny its warships entry into India’s surrounding seas is unlikely to
succeed. With the PLAN expanding its diplomatic engagements along the Indian Ocean
rim, many regional states have been welcoming of Beijing’s maritime initiatives and
investments in the Indian Ocean. India’s plans to constrain Chinese naval power in South
Asia are bound to meet with regional opposition.

New Delhi, in fact, might do well to

take a leaf out of Beijing’s maritime
playbook by leveraging naval
operations for geopolitical purposes.
In recent years, the PLAN has sought to project power in the Indian Ocean region through
a constant naval presence in India’s near-seas. By refusing to accept the Indian Ocean as
an Indian backwater, it has made successful inroads into India’s geopolitical sphere of
influence. India too must now resort to a strategy of counter-power projection by
expanding the scope of its naval deployments in the South China Sea, long considered a
Chinese preserve.

Raising the tempo of Indian naval operations in Southeast Asia does not mean
challenging China’s naval might in the Western Pacific. By gradually expanding security
presence along the critical sea lanes of the Western Pacific, the Indian Navy must plan to
use the South China Sea’s geopolitically sensitive spaces for the strategic power
projection.

Such a strategy is bound to have a deterrent effect on China’s naval posture in the Indian
Ocean region. Beijing’s constraints in opposing Indian maritime presence in the Western
Pacific are similar to New Delhi’s limitations in the Indian Ocean, where the Indian Navy
has struggled to offer push-back to China.

What’s different is that Beijing’s political and territorial ambitions in the South China Sea
make it far more sensitive to naval forays by unfriendly states. After an arbitral tribunal’s
ruling in July last year invalidated many of China’s historical rights within the nine-dash
line, Beijing has been extremely cagey about perceived challenges to its authority in the
waters of the South China Sea.

China’s vulnerability in its near-seas must be taken advantage of by India. To challenge

PLAN incursions into the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy must plan for counter-presence
in China’s near-seas, where Beijing cannot prove a territorial infringement, and yet feel
the pinch of a perceived violation of its political sphere of influence.

India’s maritime planners know well that a nuanced high-seas presence in the Western
Pacific is unlikely to ever cross the threshold of provocation which could lead to full-
fledged conflict with China. Nagging Indian naval presence in the South China Sea is
better suited to signal Indian resolve than any attempt to deny PLAN assets access into
maritime South Asia.

This commentary originally appeared in Live Mint.

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