Lawyers Against Monopoly and constitutional sanction,” and, therefore,

Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and impermissible and must be considered

Management, G.R. No. 164987, April nothing less than malfeasance.
24, 2012, 670 SCRA 201
On the other hand, the respondents said
Mendoza, J: that he perceptions of LAMP on the
implementation of PDAF must not be
Facts:
based on mere speculations circulated in
LAMP sought the issuance of writ of the news media preaching the evils of
preliminary injunction or TRO to enjoin pork barrel
the Secretary of the Department of
Issue: W/N the implementation of PDAF
Budget and Management (DBM) from
by members of the Congress is
making, and thereafter, releasing
unconstitutional and illegal.
budgetary allocations to individual
members of Congress as pork barrel Held:
funds out of Priority Development
No.
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for
in RA 9206 or the General Appropriations To justify the nullification of the
Act of 2004 (GAA). law or its implementation, there must be
a clear and unequivocal, not doubtful,
LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National
breach of the Constitution.
Treasurer and the Commission on Audit
(COA) from enforcing the questioned In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
provision. establishing unconstitutionality, the
Court must sustain legislation because
According to LAMP, the above provision
to invalidate based on baseless
is silent and, therefore, prohibits an
supposition is an affront to the wisdom
automatic or direct allocation of lump
not only of the legislature that passed it
sums to individual senators and
but also of the executive which approved
congressmen for the funding of projects.
it.
It does not empower individual Members
of Congress to propose, select and No convincing proof was presented
identify programs and projects to be showing that, indeed, there were direct
funded out of PDAF. releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them
This situation runs afoul against the
according to their sole discretion. Devoid
principle of separation of powers because
of any pertinent evidentiary support that
in receiving and, thereafter, spending
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
funds for their chosen projects, the
kickbacks has become a common
Members of Congress in effect intrude
exercise of unscrupulous Members of
into an executive function. Further, the
Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
authority to propose and select projects
petitioner’s request for rejection of a law
does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in
which is outwardly legal and capable of
fact, a non-legislative function devoid of
lawful enforcement.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777,
April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1
Carpio Morales, J:
Facts:
This case is regarding the railway
project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well
as the Wiretapping activity of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (ISAFP), and the
Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations
to various officials of the Executive
Department and AFP officials for them to
appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005.
Before said date arrived, Executive
Secretary Ermita sent a letter to Senate
President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29
in order to “afford said officials ample
time and opportunity to study and
prepare for the various issues so that
they may better enlighten the Senate
Committee on its investigation.” Senate
refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued
EO 464, effective immediately, which,
among others, mandated that “all heads
of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of
Congress.” Pursuant to this Order,
Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to
the Senate that the executive and AFP
officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet
given her consent. Despite the lack of
consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani, among all the AFP officials
invited, attended the investigation. Both
faced court martial for such attendance.
Issue: W/N E.O. 464 contravenes the
power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Held:
To determine the constitutionality
of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court
discussed the two different functions of
the Legislature: The power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation and the
power to conduct inquiry during question
hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry
during question hours is recognized in
Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
“The heads of departments may, upon
their own initiative, with the consent of
the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House
shall provide, appear before and be heard
by such House on any matter pertaining
to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to
written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question
hour is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress’ oversight function. When
Congress merely seeks to be informed on
how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it had issued, the
department heads’ appearance is merely
requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1
of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the
appearance of department heads during
question hour as it explicitly referred to
Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislature’s power to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is
expressly recognized in Article 6,
section 21 of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
“The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in, or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation
is inherent in the power to legislate. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change.
And where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information,
recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of
legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric
of -
“executive privilege”
This is the power of the
government to withhold information from
the public, the courts, and the Congress.
This is recognized only to certain types of
information of a sensitive character.
When Congress exercise its power of
inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one
official may be exempted from this power
-- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that
all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) should secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. In view thereof,
whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to
justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a
declaration to Congress that the
President, or a head of office authorized
by the President, has determined that the
requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary
to Senator Drilon does not explicitly
invoke executive privilege or that the
matter on which these officials are being
requested to be resource persons falls
under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does
it expressly state that in view of the lack
of consent from the President under E.O.
464, they cannot attend the hearing.
The letter assumes that the invited
official possesses information that is
covered by the executive privilege.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know
why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office,
has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of
E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is
thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It
is merely implied. Instead of providing
precise and certain reasons for the claim,
it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with
an announcement that the President has
not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by
Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable
time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need
for invoking the privilege.
This is necessary to provide the President
or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the
matter indeed calls for a claim of
executive privilege.
If, after the lapse of that reasonable time,
neither the President nor the Executive
Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress
is no longer bound to respect the failure
of the official to appear before Congress
and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his
appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly
granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464
are declared void. Section 1(a) are
however valid.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.,
petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in
her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management,
respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.
G.R. 132988, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA
201
Panganiban, J:
Facts:
On December, 1997, the President
issued AO 372 (Adoption of Economy
Measures in Government for FY 1998).
The AO provided that (a) 10% of the
Internal Revenue allotment to LGUs is
withheld. Further it (b) "directs" LGUs to
reduce their expenditures by 25 percent.
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998,
President Estrada issued AO 43,
amending Section 4of AO 372, by
reducing to five percent (5%) the amount
of internal revenue allotment (IRA)to be
withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that by
issuing AO 372, the President exercised
the power of control over LGUs in
contravention of law. Moreover,
withholding 10% of the IRA is in
contravention of Sec 286 LGC and of Sec
6 Article X of the Constitution, providing
for the automatic release to each of these
units its share in the national internal
revenue.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand,
argues that the aforesaid AO was
purportedly in order to cope with the
nation’s economic difficulties brought
about by the peso depreciation on that
said period. Further, he claims that AO
372 was issued merely as an exercise of
the President’s power of supervision over
LGUs.
It allegedly does not violate local fiscal
autonomy, because it merely directs local
governments to identify measures that
will reduce their total expenditures for
non-personal services by at least 25
percent.
Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of
the LGUs’ IRA does not violate the
statutory prohibition on the imposition of
any lien or holdback on their revenue
shares, because such withholding is
"temporary in nature pending the
assessment and evaluation by the
Development Coordination Committee of
the emerging fiscal situation."
Issue:
W/N Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it
"directs" LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent is a valid
exercise of the President's power of
general supervision over local
governments.
W/N Section 4 of AO 372, which
withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of
the President's power of general
supervision over local governments.
Held:
Section 1 of the AO does not
violate local fiscal autonomy.
Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out
any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in
order to ensure that local programs,
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with
national goals.
AO 372 is merely directory and has been
issued by the President consistent with
his powers of supervision over local
governments.
A directory order cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power
of control. The AO is intended only to
advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-
reduction measures that will help
maintain economic stability in the
country. It does not contain any sanction
in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also
allows the President to interfere in
local fiscal matters, provided that
certain requisites are met:
(1) an unmanaged public-sector deficit of
the national government;
(2) consultations with the presiding
officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the
various local leagues;
(3) the corresponding recommendation of
the secretaries of the Department of
Finance, Interior and Local Government,
and Budget and Management; and
(4) any adjustment in the allotment shall
in no case be less than 30% of the
collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A
basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the national internal revenue.
This is mandated by the Constitution and
the Local Government Code. Section 4
which orders the withholding of 10% of
the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law.
The Province of North Cotabato v. The
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain, G.R. 183591, October 14,
2008, 568 SCRA 402.
Carpio Morales, J:
Facts:
The Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) is a
result of various agreements entered into
by and between the government and the
MILF starting in 1996;
In 1997, they signed the Agreement on
General Cessation of Hostilities; and the
following year, they signed the General
Framework of Agreement of Intent on
August 27, 1998.
However, in 1999 and in the early of
2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao.
In March 2000, they took the hall of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then
Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-
which tolled the peace negotiation.
It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed
office, when the negotiation regarding
peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was
hesitant; however, this negotiation
proceeded when the government of
Malaysia interceded.
Formal peace talks resumed and MILF
suspended all its military actions. The
Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the
ceasefire between the parties. After the
death of MILF Chairman Hashim and
Iqbal took over his position, the crafting
of MOA-AD in its final form was born.
MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed
by the GRP and the MILF. Used as
reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are
the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of
ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws
such as ILO Convention 169, the UN
Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e
compact right entrenchment (law of
compact, treaty and order). The body is
divided into concepts and principles,
territory, resources, and governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is
the definition of Bangsamoro as all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands. These people have the
right to self- governance of their
Bangsamoro homeland to which they
have exclusive ownership by virtue of
their prior rights of occupation in the
land.
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the
Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation'
with defined territory and with a system
of government having entered into
treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations." It then mentions for the
first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of
the Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD,
the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region,
involving the present ARMM, parts of
which are those which voted in the
inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The
territory is divided into two categories,
“A” which will be subject to plebiscite not
later than 12 mos. after the signing and
“B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25
years from the signing of another
separate agreement.
Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE
shall have jurisdiction over the internal
waters-15kms from the coastline of the
BJE territory; they shall also have
"territorial waters," which shall stretch
beyond the BJE internal waters up to the
baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south
west of mainland Mindanao; and that
within these territorial waters, the BJE
and the government shall exercise joint
jurisdiction, authority and management
over all natural resources.
There will also be sharing of minerals in
the territorial waters; but no provision on
the internal waters.
Included in the resources is the
stipulation that the BJE is free to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade
relations with foreign countries and shall
have the option to establish trade
missions in those countries, as well as
environmental cooperation agreements,
but not to include aggression in the GRP.
The external defense of the BJE is to
remain the duty and obligation of the
government. The BJE shall have
participation in international meetings
and events" like those of the ASEAN and
the specialized agencies of the UN.
They are to be entitled to participate in
Philippine official missions and
delegations for the negotiation of border
agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues
involving the bodies of water adjacent to
or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain. The BJE shall also
have the right to explore its resources
and that the sharing between the Central
Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. And they shall have the right to
cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-
AD claims that the relationship between
the GRP and MILF is associative i.e.
characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. This structure of
governance shall be further discussed in
the Comprehensive Compact, a
stipulation which was highly contested
before the court.
The BJE shall also be given the right to law or act in question as not yet effective
build, develop and maintain its own does not negate ripeness.
institutions, the details of which shall be
With regards to the locus standi, the
discussed in the comprehensive compact
court upheld the personalities of the
as well.
Province of Cotabato, Province of
Held: Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City
of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention
The power of judicial review is
Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
limited to actual cases or controversy,
Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to
that is the court will decline on issues
have locus standi since it is their LGUs
that are hypothetical, feigned problems
which will be affected in whole or in part
or mere academic questions. Related to
if include within the BJE.
the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
ripeness. Tamano, in alleging their standing as
taxpayers, assert that government funds
The contention of the Solicitor General is
would be expended for the conduct of an
that there is no issue ripe for
illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to
adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a
delineate the BJE territory.
proposal and does not automatically
create legally demandable rights and On that score alone, they can be given
obligations. Such was denied. legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also
given a standing as an intervenor. And
The SC emphasized that the petitions are
lastly, the Intervening respondents
alleging acts made in violation of their
Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for
duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-
Peace and Development, an advocacy
settled jurisprudence states that acts
group for justice and the attainment of
made by authority which exceed their
peace and prosperity in Muslim
authority, by violating their duties under
Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance
E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the
Foundation Inc., a non-government
Constitution and statutes, the petitions
organization of Muslim lawyers since
make a prima facie case for Certiorari,
they stand to be benefited or prejudiced
Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an
in the resolution of the petitions
actual case or controversy ripe for
regarding the MOA-AD.
adjudication exists.
On the contention of mootness of the
When an act of a branch of government
issue considering the signing of the MOA-
is seriously alleged to have infringed the
AD has already been suspended and that
Constitution, it becomes not only the
the President has already disbanded the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
GRP, the SC disagrees. The court
to settle the dispute. This is aside from
reiterates that the moot and academic
the fact that concrete acts made under
principle is a general rule only, the
the MOA-AD are not necessary to render
exceptions, provided in David v.
the present controversy ripe and that the
Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it become moot and academic considering
finds that - that parties have already complied
thereat.
(a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;
(b) the situation is of exceptional
character and paramount public interest
is involved;
(c) the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and
(d) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review; and that where there is a
voluntary cessation of the activity
complained of by the defendant or doer,
it does not divest the court the power to
hear and try the case especially when the
plaintiff is seeking for damages or
injunctive relief.
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of
the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the
GRP did not render the petitions moot
and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to
further legal enactments including
possible Constitutional amendments
more than ever provides impetus for the
Court to formulate controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, the public
and, in this case, the government and its
negotiating entity.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction
over most if not the rest of the petitions.
There is a reasonable expectation that
petitioners will again be subjected to the
same problem in the future as
respondents' actions are capable of
repetition, in another or any form. But
with respect to the prayer of Mandamus